1 Friday, 22 April 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

5 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Mr. Court Deputy.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number

7 IT-01-48-T, the Prosecutor versus Sefer Halilovic.

8 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

9 Before we hear the witness, I see Mr. Morrissey standing.

10 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

12 MR. MORRISSEY: My apologies. Your Honours, good morning. I just

13 wanted to raise a couple of matters now to pre-empt raising them later and

14 entangling the witness in discussions about this. Your Honours, we don't

15 have time today to deal with the matters that I have to raise but I have

16 to put them on the record now because if I cross-examine upon a couple of

17 things it might make it look as if we are accepting that they are part of

18 the Prosecution case. Your Honours, as to the existence of an operations

19 group and as to the relevance or existence of or otherwise of this Sandzak

20 lobby that has now emerged, the Defence is concerned that these have got

21 nothing no do with the indictment and nothing to do with the pleadings as

22 they currently exist.

23 Now, question arises as to how to deal with that now because there

24 is really -- probably a matter of characterisation at the end of the case,

25 but there is no evidence really at all, not really, there is no evidence

1 at all of any -- of an operations group currently before the Court. Nor

2 is there any evidence of any substance concerning the existence of a

3 Sandzak lobby. Nevertheless, the Prosecution is -- has led evidence about

4 them or attempted to do so from this witness.

5 Now I'm in the position where I don't want to lend any validity to

6 these ideas by cross-examining about them, but it's not appropriate to ask

7 you the Tribunal to deliver an off-the-cuff ruling, an extemporary ruling

8 on these matters and on the pleadings now. And it seemed to me what I

9 wanted to do was to put on the record now that we don't accept that these

10 have got anything to do with the indictment but that I will ask some

11 questions about it now and thereby not waste the witness's time and still

12 try to finish today. But when we come to argue the question of the

13 operations group and the Sandzak lobby and what relevance these have, if

14 any, to the case, I just want it on record now that I'm proceeding now on

15 the basis that it's still going to be open to me later say it's

16 irrelevant, even if I cross-examine on them. In other words the mere fact

17 of cross-examining doesn't somehow build it into the pleadings. That's

18 the reason I raise it now. I don't ask you to determine the matter or to

19 make a ruling at all at this stage, and that can be dealt with later. If

20 we have got a good argument, we'll win it; if we haven't we'll lose,

21 frankly.

22 I -- so I put those on the map anyway, at this stage, because I do

23 propose to ask some questions about those topics, unless I've got clear

24 coverage that then -- that they are irrelevant and not to be taken any

25 notice of.

1 Very well, that's the first thing. The next thing is that,

2 Your Honour, because there is a number of important procedural things that

3 have to be dealt with as well and they were supposed to be dealt with

4 today or by today at all events, we might need to ask the Court to

5 consider having a short Status Conference of some sort during the week

6 next week. Now it's a matter for the Tribunal whether you have any time

7 whatsoever or whether you have any interest in doing this, given the heavy

8 schedule that you have. I understand that it's at short notice. But we

9 have got a lot of outstanding correspondence with the Prosecutors we don't

10 seem to be able to resolve this out of court, so there are some matters we

11 are going to have to resolve in court. I won't say what the discussions

12 have been; it doesn't matter what happens out of court. But we are going

13 to have to ask to you help with some of those things.

14 And there is also the two important issues I've already raised,

15 the experts, so that's not one of them, but the future of the Karic

16 deposition and what's to happen there. Whether the Prosecutor has any

17 scheduling news to give us as to when they propose to have that deposition

18 played, seeing that both sides agree it should be played, and the question

19 is only in what form and when and how, that's the first one.

20 And well, I note my learned friend, Ms. Chana, is not here and I

21 won't raise things in her absence concerning the witness Delalic but there

22 are a couple of issues we want to raise about Mr. Delalic as well, but I

23 just put that on the map. Those are the reasons why we ask the Tribunal

24 to consider whether it would be able to accommodate us for the purpose of

25 some sort of Status Conference next, bearing in mind we are nearly at the

1 end of the Prosecution case now and it will be too late to raise these

2 things once we finish. When we come back from the break it appears there

3 are four substantial witnesses left and then we're finished.

4 So I raise those things now. I'm not asking Your Honours to do

5 anything about it right now, I just think I have to put them on the record

6 and maybe -- now, rather than complain later. So I do raise those things

7 now and, perhaps later in the day, I could raise again the issue of

8 whether we can be accommodated by the Tribunal or whether you have time or

9 whether you will be prepared to do that to assist in -- during the time.

10 I understand there is another proceeding going on, but the Defence would

11 like that if it could be done.

12 JUDGE LIU: Well, could I ask you a question? I believe that you

13 indicated that you will be not available next week. So could you please

14 tell me whether we will be back and what's the proper time for us to have

15 that Status Conference?

16 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, the Tribunal doesn't have to dance

17 at my convenience. I'm grateful for the inquiry. I shall be back in The

18 Hague on Tuesday, late on Tuesday, so Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday would

19 all be acceptable from the Defence. Wednesday and Thursday would be

20 acceptable, I think, from the Defence point of view.

21 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. At this moment, not everything

22 is in our hands because we have six cases going on simultaneously and some

23 courtroom needs to be maintained. So I have to consult with the Registrar

24 to see if logically it's possible or not for the Status Conference.

25 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, could I just indicate this? In

1 terms of the matters that would be raised at the Status Conference, my

2 learned friend Mr. Mettraux would be well and truly able to represent the

3 Defence at that, so that if an opportunity arose on a day when I was not

4 around, that would be acceptable from the Defence point of view and the

5 Prosecution also may have its timing issues to be taken into account so if

6 you can accommodate us then, any time will suit and if I can't be there,

7 Mr. Mettraux will be able to handle those matters.

8 JUDGE LIU: I see. As for the other two issues, popped up in the

9 direct examination, one's the operation group, the other is the Sandzak

10 group, and my preliminary response is that I did not see any relevance for

11 that Sandzak group. Because it's not appeared in the indictment, I fail

12 to see the relevance to our case, I mean direct relevance, at this stage.

13 Maybe later on there will be some lights shed by the parties on that

14 issue. As for the operational group, I believe that, as I said yesterday,

15 the operational group is not a kind of special force -- I mean the

16 operational group was not capitalised. It's just a way to describe the

17 inspection team, to my understanding. Of course, you have the full right

18 to cross-examine on that issue, but this is my understanding at this

19 stage. Maybe Mr. Re could shed more light on that issue.

20 MR. RE: That's quite correct, Your Honour. It is -- an

21 operational group under JNA doctrine was a group formed for a specific

22 tags being such as the 2nd operational group in the Strugar case, which

23 was used to blockade Dubrovnik. It's formed for a specific task. It

24 could be combat, it can be a specific other purpose, and some evidence is

25 available that the inspection team had the same function as an operational

1 group. So in one respect it really is only a matter of terminology, but

2 it also goes to the issue of command and control.

3 On the issue of the Sandzak lobby it only goes this far: There

4 may be evidence that there was something called a Sandzak lobby and Celo

5 from Sandzak and Mr. Halilovic being from Sandzak, that is -- could be the

6 reason why he chose Celo to go to -- on our case, to go to Grabovica. So,

7 it's not a -- it's not a -- it's not a huge part of the Prosecution case

8 but there could be some evidence on it.

9 It's not a matter of pleading. It's an evidentiary matter. It's

10 not a material fact. But it could form part of the -- the whole tapestry.

11 There is just -- the others things my learned colleague, Mr. Morrissey,

12 pointed to, the Karic depositions, it's not correct that the Prosecution

13 agree that they should be played. The Prosecution said quite clearly

14 we -- we resist them being played and Court time being used for them being

15 played. We are of course in the Trial Chamber's hands. The Trial Chamber

16 should of course view them, but we say preferably not in invaluable court

17 time. But it's a matter for the Trial Chamber.

18 The other thing was the necessity for a Status Conference. The --

19 the Prosecution doesn't see at the moment -- of course we are in the Trial

20 Chamber's hands, the necessity for a Status Conference to discuss any of

21 the matters my learned colleague raised, when we come back, he says this

22 is for four witnesses. We anticipate there will be at least two weeks

23 of -- of evidence in that, probably with some days spare, in which any of

24 the outstanding evidentiary issues can be resolved.

25 And finally on the matter of outstanding correspondence, I'll give

1 an undertaking here, we'll have -- we'll have any outstanding

2 correspondence resolved by mid next week, which is when the Status

3 Conference would probably occur. So, if that doesn't happen, my learned

4 friends are of course entitled to come back and lay complaint to the Trial

5 Chamber about our tardiness in that matter.

6 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. Could I ask you who will be the

7 next witness after we resume the proceedings? Is that the pathologist

8 planned?

9 MR. RE: Yes, it will be as planned, it will be the pathologist,

10 whose name I can't quite recall, "Andalejovic" or something like --

11 followed by Ramiz Delalic.

12 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Thank you very much. Well, for the

13 information of the parties, I believe that we made decisions yesterday

14 concerning the provisional release filed by the Defence. As for the Karic

15 decisions, it will be delivered today or next Monday. It depends on how

16 we proceed, because as you understand that, we have a very, very busy

17 week, and yesterday I have five sittings in this courtroom. So it's hard

18 to find any time to go into the details of anything. But anyway, we will

19 consider the requests from the Defence for a Status Conference sometime

20 next week. At the same time, we will bear in mind the objections from the

21 Prosecution.

22 Well, could we have the witness, please?

23 MR. RE: Your Honour, while the witness is being brought in, just

24 on the last matter you raise the which was the provisional release

25 decision, the -- we note that the application was filed confidentially.

1 The Prosecution's view of this is it's not a matter which should be dealt

2 with confidentially, an application for provisional release mid-trial. If

3 there are matters that -- medical matters or private matters which

4 shouldn't be in the public domain, they should really be in a confidential

5 schedule, because a matter of provisional release mid-trial is a matter of

6 public interest as, of course, would be -- in our submission the -- the

7 Trial Chamber's decision. We would ask if there is a decision that has to

8 be filed, that, if it could be made, we would request that it be made

9 public.

10 JUDGE LIU: Well, I do remember about confidentiality of these

11 filings but we discuss it in the open court the other day.

12 MR. METTRAUX: Yes, Your Honour, we did. We agree with the

13 Prosecution to the extent that as far as possible all filings should be

14 done in a non-confidential basis. The only reason why this was done in

15 this case was that within the filing itself there were references to

16 threats being made to a person which Your Honour will remember, and we

17 thought better and safer to make reference to those matters in

18 confidential -- in a confidential fashion. For the rest we agree with our

19 colleagues that in general those applications should be made on a

20 non-confidential basis. But that was the reason why it was done,

21 Your Honour.

22 JUDGE LIU: Well, thank you very much. We will look into the --

23 all the filings in this matter and see whether there is a necessity to

24 lift the confidentiality on that. Of course, we will take your

25 submissions into consideration.

1 [The witness entered court]

2 JUDGE LIU: Well, good morning, witness.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

4 JUDGE LIU: I believe today is the last day for your stay in The

5 Hague. We will try our best to send you home today.

6 Yes, Mr. Morrissey.

7 WITNESS: VAHID KARAVELIC [Resumed]

8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Cross-examined by Mr. Morrissey [Continued]

10 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

11 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Karavelic. Yesterday, before we

12 finished, you gave evidence concerning some attempts to bring the 9th

13 Brigade and the 10th brigade into the line of command and control and now

14 I want to move to another step. Having considered the steps taken by

15 Hajrulahovic and Sefer Halilovic early in June and having considered the

16 report given by the commission involving Maslak and Bilajac, I now want to

17 turn to another body. Do you recall an institution called the Council for

18 the Protection of the Constitutional Order?

19 A. I seem to vaguely recall something like that but I can't really

20 say much about it.

21 Q. Okay. This was not a purely military body, was it, the Council

22 for the Protection of the Constitutional Order?

23 A. Yes, that's true.

24 Q. And that was a body that was attended, I understand that you

25 weren't -- were not normally present at it, but to your knowledge that was

1 a body that involved the highest levels of government and in particular

2 ministers from that government. Is that -- was that your understanding at

3 the time?

4 A. I think that's so but I really can not be certain about all the

5 particulars.

6 Q. No, I understand that. The questions I have for you about that

7 are, I have to say, very general ones. But did you on one occasion

8 provide information to that council, broadly in the terms that you've

9 provided to this Tribunal, namely that the 9th and the 10th Brigades were

10 not in the line of command and control?

11 A. I don't remember that. I'm not sure, but I'm not ruling out the

12 possibility.

13 Q. I understand. Just -- I take it you were pretty busy at that

14 time; is that correct?

15 A. Yes, precisely.

16 Q. We have heard evidence from other witnesses concerning that

17 particular council. Can you just tell us, in the normal course of events,

18 if that council wanted to hear from a military person such as yourself, in

19 what form would they seek that information? Would they ask you to go

20 there and speak to them or would they seek a report from you in written

21 form?

22 A. I think that most often it would be the second case, that you

23 would send a written report and then subsequent steps would be taken.

24 Q. Well, in terms of your own contribution, I appreciate you can't

25 remember any -- any particular contacts that you had, but from the time

1 you were appointed as 1st Corps commander in August, you made it quite

2 clear, both to Rasim Delic, your commander, and also to the president of

3 the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, that you wanted a political decision

4 made to allow you to deal with command and control issues in the 1st

5 Corps; is that accurate?

6 A. Absolutely.

7 Q. And really, at that time, you understood that if you were to deal

8 with the -- the 9th and 10th Brigades' command and control problems in a

9 military way, that would require very significant resources and very

10 significant planning; is that correct?

11 A. Absolutely.

12 Q. And it's the fact that you were not able to deal with those units

13 without support at the highest political level, namely the level of the

14 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; is that correct?

15 A. Absolutely.

16 Q. Just to establish this point a little bit further, when you did

17 finally come to deal with that problem, you had to mount a massive

18 operation involving something in the order of 5.000 combat troops and

19 police; is that correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And I just want to ask you about some of the other preparations

22 that were -- that had to be done at a military level by you and your

23 subordinates. There had to be -- the troops who you were going to use in

24 that operation to bring the 9th and 10th into the line of command and

25 control had to be given some morale type of preparation and some morale

1 support for the job they were going to do; is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You also had to be sure that counterintelligence manoeuvres were

4 in place to stop the Serbs from finding out -- the Republika Srpska army

5 from finding out that there might be trouble in the town; is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And there was another problem that you faced and that was the

8 danger that other units might seek to intervene, might potentially,

9 possibly seek to intervene to help the 9th and 10th Brigades if you didn't

10 take proper steps to protect against that; is that correct?

11 A. Absolutely.

12 Q. I Just briefly want to ask you a question about the 2nd

13 Independent Battalion in that regard. The 2nd Independent Battalion, to

14 your knowledge, were a very patriotic, multi-ethnic unit who were very

15 good fighters; is that correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And you were very hopeful that they wouldn't get themselves caught

18 up in the trouble of Operation Trebevic when the 9th and 10th had to be

19 dealt with; is that correct?

20 A. Yes. That's why I had to take particular steps in relation to

21 that unit.

22 Q. Yes. And one of the concerns -- you tell -- I want to put a

23 proposition. You tell me if this is accurate, and you might be able to

24 make a comment on it. One of the concerns that the 2nd Independent

25 Battalion appeared to have was that any cleanup of the 9th and 10th

1 Brigade might be a move in favour of the police and against the army. Was

2 that a concern that the 2nd Independent Battalion leadership expressed to

3 you at various times or at any time?

4 A. Not so directly, but it's possible that it was done implicitly.

5 Q. It -- it was a constant problem that you had to deal with that the

6 soldiers on the line were suspicious of the police authorities and in

7 Trebevic, too, you knew you had to use police authorities; is that

8 correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And so as a result of that, you invested considerable time to

11 persuade the 2nd Independent Battalion that they had nothing to fear from

12 this operation and that they should not become involved in a civil strife

13 in Sarajevo; is that correct?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. And apart from the 2nd Independent Battalion there was other units

16 that you took precautionary measures against to block certain roads and so

17 on, just in case they decided to intervene in the Operation Trebevic; is

18 that correct too?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, I appreciate I've jumped forward to the Trebevic operation in

21 taking you to those details, but back in August of 1993, when you first

22 raised this matter, the political will to undertake such a major task

23 appeared to you to be lacking; is that correct?

24 A. That's what I think, yes.

25 Q. And in the end, you had to bring significant pressure to bear,

1 including a threat of resignation, before you were able to secure that

2 written authority that you wanted to take military steps to bring the 9th

3 and 10th back into control; is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And one of the documents that you needed to have produced was a

6 document from the Presidency, from Alija Izetbegovic, terminating the

7 commission of Musan Topalovic as the brigade commander of the 10th

8 Brigade; is that correct?

9 A. Yes. And some others as well.

10 Q. Yes. And -- was also -- just to be clear, was one of those others

11 Ramiz Delalic?

12 A. I think so, yes.

13 Q. Just as an extra question on that, Fikret Prevljak, once again,

14 managed to retain his position at the 4th Hrasnica Brigade, didn't he?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. All right. I understand that. Are you able now to

17 remember when it was that you got the -- the -- the document from Alija

18 Izetbegovic indicating that he hereby removes from their positions of

19 command Ramiz Delalic, Musan Topalovic and other individuals? Do you

20 recall when you saw that?

21 A. I think that was just before the action at Trebevic. I don't know

22 whether a day or two before, or on the very day. I can't be sure.

23 Q. Yes. Okay. Thanks very much. So moving back to August, I asked

24 you the question about the political will to get rid or to deal with these

25 units, and you've given the answer about that. At that time, you had a

1 real concern about the 9th and 10th Brigades, I suggest to you, and you

2 comment on this. It wasn't just that they were out of the line of command

3 and control themselves, but you saw a real danger that if they stayed out

4 of the line of command and control, that sort of behaviour would have a

5 very negative effect on neighbouring units that were holding crucial parts

6 of the front line; is that correct?

7 A. Precisely.

8 Q. And in particular, you were concerned about the effect that

9 these -- that the 9th and 10th and their behaviour -- perhaps I should

10 make this clear, the leadership of the 9th and the 10th and their

11 behaviour would have on the 1st and 2nd Brigades which held the adjoining

12 parts of the front line; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And just to put this -- we have been dealing in a sense at a level

15 of abstraction but, in practical terms, did it pose problems for you as a

16 commander in trying to maintain command and control of the other units

17 that these other units would say, "How come we have to obey the rules and

18 you don't do anything about the 9th and the 10th brigades whether they

19 break the rules?" Did you have to deal with that sort of problem and that

20 sort of inquiry from other soldiers?

21 A. I had an enormous number of problems in that respect. There were

22 even requests from some, so to say, good brigade commanders who tended to

23 say even if you don't give your approval we are going to go ahead and

24 attack them. For example, I had one example, and in that case it would

25 have been actually a disaster had it happened in that way.

1 Q. Is one example of that sort of behaviour the incident you

2 described where Senad Hasic, the loyal friend of or loyal subordinate of

3 Musan Topalovic had that cannon trained in your direction?

4 A. That's just one example.

5 Q. And if the Tribunal needs to know about this, I'm not going to ask

6 you for the details about this now, but if the Tribunal needs to know

7 about other examples you've got plenty of other examples you could tell,

8 haven't you?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. And I suppose in short, to -- this is just to capture your

11 position, whether as a deputy under the command of Mustafa Hajrulahovic,

12 Talijan, and also under the command of Sefer Halilovic, when he was in

13 charge of the army, or as corps commander, yourself, under the command of

14 Commander Delic, you yourself wanted action to be taken to bring these

15 units in, and you yourself supported any action taken by your superiors to

16 attempt to bring those units under the line of command and control. Was

17 that your position?

18 A. Precisely.

19 Q. Okay. Now, the next series of questions concern the realities of

20 how to deal with the 9th and 10th Brigade in the real situation that you

21 found yourself in.

22 As a general proposition, you as commander simply had to live with

23 and to work with Ramiz Delalic and, to the extent possible, Musan

24 Topalovic, because they were defending your front line in the 1st Corps;

25 is that correct?

1 A. It is.

2 Q. And in the situation that you were in, when you wanted them to do

3 something, you had to rely on persuasion to get them to cooperate; is that

4 correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. For example, when Ramiz Delalic was on one side of the street with

7 his guns and soldiers and Boris Krstanovic was on the other side and you

8 went out and intervened and stopped a blood bath from happening, you used

9 persuasion and an appeal to their better nature to stop the disaster from

10 happening; is that correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And when Caco -- I'm sorry, when Musan Topalovic had that -- had

13 the showdown with Mujo Zulic of the 1st Brigade that you described, again

14 you had to use persuasion to stop a disaster from happening; is that

15 correct?

16 A. It is.

17 Q. In a normal army, where the system of command and control was

18 maturely developed and in place, the way to deal with those sort of

19 incidents is that you would send in the military police, arrest the

20 wrongdoers and have them dealt with by the relevant legal process; is that

21 correct?

22 A. It is.

23 Q. That wasn't an option available to you because the system of

24 command and control in the Bosnian army at that time was immature and

25 because Ramiz Delalic and his units, and Musan Topalovic and his units,

1 were not integrated into the system of command and control; is that

2 correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Incidentally, I just mentioned the name Mujo Zulic before and I

5 just wanted to ask you a question about him. We've spoken in this Court

6 about a number of rumours, pieces of gossip and bits of information

7 concerning other people. There was plenty of rumours, gossip and nonsense

8 being talked about Mujo Zulic as well, wasn't there, at that time, if you

9 wanted to listen to rumours, gossip and nonsense?

10 A. I have not quite understood the question.

11 Q. I'm really asking, because it's been said that there was rumours

12 about Ramiz Delalic and rumours about Caco, and Musan Topalovic, so I'm

13 just asking you whether there was rumours about other people too, and

14 including -- and I'm using Mujo Zulic as an example. Can you comment on

15 that?

16 A. Yes. Yes, there were quite a few rumours about Mujo Zulic as

17 well. If you need some more information about him, I can go ahead.

18 Q. Yes. Well, really what I'm concerned to establish here is just

19 the simple point. You can tell us if it's right. There was a lot of

20 rumours about a lot of people in Sarajevo at that time, it wasn't limited

21 to Ramiz Delalic and Musan Topalovic among the commanders; is that

22 correct?

23 A. Precisely. The entire time, amongst other things, I had also been

24 referring to that in the course of my testimony.

25 Q. Yes. I understand that. All right. Thank you. Now, however,

1 there was a war to fight and Sarajevo had to be defended against daily

2 attacks from the Army of the Republika Srpska, and so you continued to try

3 to work with these units even though they were outside the line of control

4 and command; is that correct?

5 A. Even if they were not in the line of command and control 100 per

6 cent, and, yes, and the second part of the question, yes, I do agree with

7 you.

8 Q. And turning now to the brigade of Ramiz Delalic briefly, to your

9 knowledge, in that brigade, there were a number of Croatian persons,

10 including the chief of security, Tomo Juric; is that correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, both the 9th and the 10th Brigade were units from which it

13 was and had already proved over time from which it was possible to detach

14 small numbers of soldiers at short notice to be used in emergency

15 situations elsewhere. Now I'm going to give you some examples but, in

16 general, is that accurate?

17 A. Not just from those units and those brigades. It was possible

18 from other brigades as well, that's correct.

19 Q. Certainly.

20 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please.

21 Q. I'm just going to show you an example of an order dealing with

22 those particular troops, and others, too.

23 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown -- sorry, just

24 excuse me a moment, please. Pardon me, I just have to bring this up on

25 the -- thanks. Your Honours, this is Defence document 65 ter number 216

1 and it's DD001099. There is a paper copy for the Prosecutors.

2 THE REGISTRAR: MFI 400.

3 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, can I just indicate that as to the

4 provision of paper copies, we are going to provide -- attempt to provide

5 an a paper copy of each document we show to the witness to the

6 Prosecution. It's a matter -- one of the matters we want to raise at the

7 Status Conference later on because it's -- we are using the E-court and we

8 have to use the E-court, but because the Prosecutor has indicated in his

9 motion some difficulties in using the screen simultaneously we are

10 prepared to provide those paper copies here today. But we don't want to

11 say -- we don't want to pre-empt the ruling that Your Honour might give on

12 this topic, on this motion later on. So in saying what I'm saying I just

13 want to protect our position in terms of that motion, but -- so as not to

14 delay things with argument now, we are going to do that.

15 JUDGE LIU: At this stage, maybe you could remind me whether you

16 filed something in response to the Prosecution's motion.

17 MR. MORRISSEY: I thought we had, Your Honour. I thought we had

18 some days ago, as a matter of fact.

19 JUDGE LIU: I see. I think I have to check it.

20 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, we -- certainly one was produced

21 because I looked at it. If it hasn't -- if it's miscarried we will give

22 you a copy of it straight away.

23 MR. RE: It has been filed. We do have a copy of it. It opposes

24 the motion, but I'd like to express my gratitude for -- our gratitude for

25 my learned friend providing us with paper copies, at least with this

1 witness.

2 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. You may proceed.

3 MR. MORRISSEY: Thanks, okay.

4 Q. Sorry, Mr. Karavelic, it's an E-court dispute that you don't have

5 to be worried by.

6 Now, just -- do you have that order in front of you now, that

7 order of the 18th of the August?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And among other obviously the units from the 9th and 10th are not

10 the only units that you detached, but it is the fact that you ordered the

11 detachment of some of their troops to go out on Igman to assist in

12 operations -- defensive operations out there; is that correct? First I

13 should ask you, is that an order that you issued? I should get the

14 formalities straight first. Is that an order issued by you on the 18th

15 of August moving certain units out to Igman to assist the position out

16 there?

17 A. I think it's my name and my signature, and I had referred to this

18 order in the course of my testimony before. I had mentioned it --

19 Q. Yes?

20 A. -- is what I meant to say.

21 Q. You did -- you mentioned an order dated the 18th of August, and I

22 just wanted to know if this was the order you were talking about.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Very well. Thanks. Your Honours, I offer that document for

25 tender.

1 MR. RE: There is no objection.

2 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. It's admitted into the evidence.

3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D400.

4 MR. MORRISSEY:

5 Q. I'm not sure whether you can remember this but please tell us if

6 you can remember. On that particular occasion, can you remember whether

7 you spoke to Mr. Imsirevic or Mr. Delalic prior to issuing that order

8 concerning the 9th Brigade? If you can remember, tell us; if not, well, we

9 understand that too.

10 A. I really don't remember. More likely I did not. Perhaps I did.

11 I can't remember.

12 Q. Well, I won't pursue it in that event. Very well. Could the

13 witness now be shown another document please, this one is Defence 65 ter

14 number D218. Sorry, it's admitted we think as D257. Yes, it's Exhibit

15 D257. This is a later order - I'm showing it to you as an example of such

16 orders - concerning the movement of one unit from the 10th Brigade on the

17 6th of September. It may or may not have any connection at all to the

18 units that you sense down to Herzegovina and I'm going to ask you that

19 question. Do you have that document in front of you?

20 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Morrissey this document has yet to be admitted.

21 A. Yes.

22 MR. MORRISSEY: I'm The Court deputy just indicated -- yet to be

23 admitted.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Document MNA is not admitted.

25 MR. MORRISSEY: No, it's not admitted. Very well. Sorry.

1 Q. Okay, well, anyway, in regard to this particular document here, is

2 this an order of yours returning a part of the 10th Brigade back to its --

3 back to Sarajevo at least, because of favourable military developments on

4 Igman?

5 A. Precisely.

6 Q. And do you recall now -- you may or may not recall -- do you

7 recall now whether any soldiers from that unit were taken down to

8 Herzegovina when those troops -- when the 10th Brigade troops that went to

9 Herzegovina actually left or not?

10 A. I can't remember. I can't really confirm anything there.

11 Q. In fact, just to clinch that closed, do you have any memory of the

12 particular reasons why that unit was brought back to -- to Sarajevo at

13 that time or not?

14 A. I don't know what you mean, what it says in the document, and

15 although what I know, is that in the course of the war, considering the

16 situation and considering the reasons for writing a document or an order,

17 you would always refer to the actual reasons in the said document. So

18 there is nothing but the truth with regard to the actual situation, which

19 is the reason why I'm withdrawing this unit, but perhaps prior to that, I

20 don't know whether there had been any problems or any complaints about

21 individual soldiers of that 10th Mountain Brigade -- at Igman. I don't

22 know, but had it happened, presumably it would have been in this order. I

23 never intended to write orders in one way, trying to imply something else,

24 and something else is the real reason why I'm doing it. I never used that

25 before.

1 Q. To be clear we are not suggesting to you that you did. And in

2 addition to what you've just said there, it's the fact that you would

3 never in an order have concealed anything wrong done by the 10th Brigade

4 because it was your desire to bring them into line; is that correct?

5 A. Precisely. And there are quite a few documents referring to all

6 that.

7 Q. Okay. But let me just put this question to you as a general

8 proposition. When you used -- when you yourself used units from the 9th

9 Brigade, units from the 10th Brigade, outside of Sarajevo, you did not

10 expect them to slaughter innocent civilians of any nationality whatsoever;

11 is that correct?

12 A. At least, and without wanting to insult anyone at all, but I think

13 it's not serious and it's ridiculous, in fact.

14 Q. You're not insulting any one. Sometimes we have to ask very basic

15 questions here and I'm grateful for your patience in answering them. As

16 far as you knew, as you've indicated, most of the soldiers, most of the

17 individual soldiers from these units were just good boys, patriotic, and

18 not criminals; is that correct?

19 A. Absolutely.

20 Q. Of course, you knew that the leadership had involved itself in

21 some trench-digging activities, you'd heard rumours about rackets, and you

22 knew about problems with the line of control and command. But what I

23 suggest to you is this: There was nothing that suggested that a nightmare

24 set of killings like those at Grabovica would occur; is that correct?

25 A. I think that -- and I do apologise. In my previous answer to your

1 previous question, when you said, if I may repeat what you said, that most

2 of them were not criminals, I would like to reformulate that. I mean, I

3 agreed with you, but it would follow that some of them were indeed

4 criminals, but not a single member of these units was ever described as a

5 criminal in any way. This is a fact. I mean, not just the majority. I

6 kind of glossed over it, but I just like to put it right now.

7 Q. Yes. Thank you. And I just want to jump forward to the

8 individual selection of the troops that went down to Herzegovina. The

9 fact is that you yourself absolutely did not hand pick the individuals who

10 took the journey down to Herzegovina; is that correct?

11 A. No.

12 Q. And furthermore --

13 A. I do apologise. That wasn't my job either.

14 Q. That was my next question. As corps commander, it just wasn't

15 your role to select those individuals. That was a job for someone much

16 lower down the hierarchy; is that correct?

17 A. Precisely.

18 Q. Okay. And in fact, although you might have met one or two of the

19 soldiers for one reason or another in the course of your duties, it wasn't

20 necessary for you to know those individuals personally at all; is that

21 correct?

22 A. Precisely. I did not know them. Perhaps two, three, five people,

23 tops; soldiers, I mean.

24 Q. At the time when they were lined up -- I shouldn't say "they"

25 because they are separate units. I'll deal with the 9th Brigade troops

1 that went down there first of all. To the extent that you can remember

2 them lining up at the Trampina street barracks and then setting off on

3 their journey, and so far as you can remember that, did it appear to you

4 that the people who went down there to Herzegovina in that unit were in

5 fact volunteers?

6 A. I suppose that it was so to a large extent but it does not have to

7 be true totally.

8 Q. Just to be clear about that, do you have a very clear memory about

9 that lineup or is it a bit long ago?

10 A. I do. I do remember that lineup. It was brief, it was not at the

11 barracks, it was in the street. Close to Titova street, next to the

12 command of the 9th Motorised Brigade. I think -- I don't know whether it

13 was that morning that day or the day before. I think it was that morning

14 on the day that the unit was supposed to set off, and in the course of

15 those preparations, as to whether I came on purpose in order to address

16 the units and to take a look at the unit, because they were the closest to

17 the command of the corps. The command of the 9th Motorised Brigade was

18 the closest alongside the reconnaissance and sabotage brigades. Those two

19 commands were closest to the corps command at 50- and 150-metre distance

20 respectively. So I addressed them for five, six minutes, very briefly.

21 And nothing -- there was absolutely nothing to indicate that anything bad

22 or anything out of the ordinary was likely to happen. Everything was

23 absolutely ordinary, as I would say.

24 Q. And when -- when you spoke to these troops, I understand you may

25 not recall the exact words that you used to them, but I suppose you said

1 in words that they -- well, I ask you this: In general terms, did you say

2 in words that they could understand, "Boys, fight well, don't hurt the

3 civilians, and behave properly while you're down there"?

4 A. I suppose that every single word that you've just uttered must

5 certainly be a part of that five-minute address on my part.

6 Q. Because that's the sort of thing you always said when you were

7 talking to troops, to give them some motivation?

8 A. Absolutely.

9 Q. You didn't have a written-out text of that speech, I suppose.

10 A. Of course not. I never had that in writing. I mean, it was

11 always off the cuff.

12 Q. I understand that. Now -- very well. Now, I jumped forward.

13 Perhaps I should ask you this question: Do you recall whether or not you

14 spoke to the units from the 10th Brigade which went down there before they

15 left?

16 A. As far as I can remember, no. I don't think so. Certainly not.

17 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I offer the order that's on the

18 screen here --

19 JUDGE LIU: Any objections?

20 MR. RE: There is no objection, no.

21 JUDGE LIU: But I have some doubts about this document. What's

22 the relevance of our case here? I fail to see the direct relevance to the

23 troops moved to Herzegovina.

24 MR. MORRISSEY: It's just to show that these troops could be moved

25 around without fear. Even though they were out of the line of command and

1 control, that in terms of detaching them from one place and taking them to

2 another, when I come -- when I come to the discussions that took place,

3 I'm going to be putting that it was perfectly sensible to choose to take

4 these units down to Herzegovina, and I want to establish why that is by

5 pointing out that they been used in the past, in military operations, that

6 they had been detached sensibly in the past. So it's part of the

7 Prosecution's case I take it, Your Honours, well, I'll go on if you need

8 me to, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE LIU: Well, in this sense and since there is no objections

10 from the Prosecution, this document is admitted into the evidence.

11 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours I'd have to concede it's on the B

12 list.

13 Now, could I just ask --

14 JUDGE LIU: Well, I was informed that this document was earlier

15 marked as under seal document. Are there any particular reasons for that?

16 MR. MORRISSEY: It may have been put a witness at a particular

17 time. There is nothing about the document itself, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE LIU: I see. So you don't ask for the confidential?

19 MR. MORRISSEY: No.

20 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

21 MR. MORRISSEY: Can I just consult to make sure I'm not making a

22 mistake?

23 [Defence counsel confer]

24 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours we don't think there is any problem

25 about it.

1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. The Court deputy will announce

2 the number of that document.

3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D257.

4 MR. MORRISSEY: Very well.

5 Q. Okay. Now, before we come to the events in Herzegovina, I

6 understand we've jumped forward into those events a couple of times, but I

7 just want to ask you about two more things that happened in the months of

8 July and August, which may have relevance to this case. The first of

9 those is what happened to -- what happened to Sefer Halilovic and there

10 are just a couple of documents I want to show you about that. Just excuse

11 me. Sorry, Mr. Karavelic. I've got into trouble with my papers here. I

12 think I can proceed without the papers. I'll just ask you the questions.

13 You've indicated -- I've asked you questions in the past about -- about

14 Mr. Halilovic being -- I've asked you some questions in the past about

15 Mr. Halilovic being replaced by Rasim Delic as the number one man in the

16 army and I won't repeat those, but I want to come now to an order that was

17 passed on the 18th of July -- there is an order of the 18th of July which

18 clarified the structure of the senior leadership of the Bosnian army.

19 MR. MORRISSEY: Now, Your Honours, I'm sorry could I just indicate

20 why there is fluffing at the bar table? This was all on a sheet of paper

21 and the relevant documents to go to which has now vanished. I know the

22 questions to ask and just as soon as we can identify, or re-identify that

23 document, I can proceed. So, if I could just ask -- I apologise to those

24 helping me for that slip. Just excuse me while we find that, please, Mr.

25 Karavelic.

1 Yes, could the witness please be shown Exhibit 143? And in

2 particular page 5 of that exhibit. Perhaps show the first page and

3 then -- then once the witness has had a chance to look at that --

4 Q. Okay. Do you have on the screen in front of you now a document

5 headed decision on the organisational structure of the Ministry of Defence

6 and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

7 A. Yes.

8 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours in this situation, what I might do is

9 ask that the witness be provided with a paper copy of this document

10 because it's lengthy and has annexes to it. What I'm doing is providing

11 the Bosnian copy to the witness. Okay.

12 Q. This is-- this a lengthy document. You have the full right to

13 read it if you feel the need to, but I might try to ask you a couple of

14 questions before you read the whole thing because I'm only going to take

15 you to a very narrow part of it. First of all, are you familiar with this

16 document under the hand of the president of the Bosnian presidency, Alija

17 Izetbegovic, and dated the 18th of July 1993?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Okay. Well, in that event, could I ask you to look at the fifth

20 page which is a diagram or a chart of the organisation -- organisational

21 chart of the Main Staff of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

22 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, it's on page 5 of the English. It's

23 a chart. And could I just ask that the Court staff assist to the best

24 extent that they can in having the document rotated in the relevant way so

25 that it can be read?

1 Q. Very well, thanks. I just want to get some explanations from you

2 here about the line of -- at a very basic level for those of us who are

3 not military people, as to what this document says about certain aspects

4 of the line of command and control. Now, that document reveals that the

5 commander of the -- has a position of the commander of the General Staff

6 of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the time, that commander was Rasim

7 Delic; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. Now, under commander Delic, there are three deputy

10 commanders, two of whom are just simply deputy commanders, and one of whom

11 is a deputy commander by virtue of being the Chief of the Main Staff.

12 That person at this time being Sefer Halilovic; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. The other two deputy commanders were Jovo Divjak and Stjepan

15 Siber, a Serbian person and Croatian person by ethnicity, respectively?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And that arrangement of army matters answered to a higher

18 political requirement that the -- that is revealed in the platform that

19 you've showed us at the start of your evidence; is that correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, in the line of command, the 1st Corps of which you were

22 the -- the head, perhaps just so that -- so that the transcript clearly

23 reflects realities here, the 1st Corps commander was you, Mr. Karavelic;

24 is that correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Who was the 2nd corps commander?

2 A. At the time, Sead Delic.

3 Q. Who was the 3rd Corps commander?

4 A. August 1993, it was Enver Hadzihasanovic.

5 Q. The 4th Corps was Arif Pasalic; is that correct?

6 A. Arif Pasalic.

7 Q. Now the 5th Corps was somewhat isolated far to the north in Bihac;

8 is that correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Who was the commander of that corps?

11 A. I think at the time it was still Ramiz Drekovic.

12 Q. Commander of the 6th Corps was Salko Gusic; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And the 7th Corps and the 8th Corps had yet to come into being in

15 any real sense; is that correct?

16 A. Yes, at the time they didn't exist yet.

17 Q. All right. Now, the line of reporting of command and control from

18 the corps level at which you were to the next level up, there was a line

19 directly between Commander Delic and the corps; is that correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Do you see in the bottom right-hand corner a section entitled

22 "legend," and it describes the function of the solid line and of the

23 dotted line, do you see that section?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. The English translator was unable to work out what those words

1 were. What's the word next to the solid line and what's the word next to

2 the dotted line?

3 A. It's very small. I assume it says "commanding," and the second

4 word could be "saradnja," "cooperation." That could be next to the dotted

5 line. I assume that's it. It's very small. I can't read it.

6 Q. You assume that because, although on this particular chart it may

7 be difficult to read, nevertheless, given your knowledge of the situation

8 at the time, that is in fact what those lines must mean; is that correct?

9 A. Yes, exactly.

10 Q. Now I have to ask you some questions about the powers of the Chief

11 of Staff, and to come to the crunch, in this -- matters that are relevant

12 to this case, the Chief of Staff was a person who could issue a combat

13 order if the commander authorised him to do so; is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Simply by virtue of his office as Chief of Staff, he did not have

16 the right, without such an authorisation to issue commands to you as the

17 commander of a corps; is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. But of course, if he was supported, if he was authorised by the

20 Supreme Commander, in this case Rasim Delic, then he could do whatever he

21 was authorised to do by that Supreme Commander, is that accurate?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And therefore at a general level of abstraction like this, the

24 question whether or not a Chief of Staff has got power to command combat

25 operations or combat activities is always to be resolved by reference to

1 one thing, and that is: What power did the commander give him; is that

2 correct?

3 A. Should I -- the function of the Chief of Staff at any level of any

4 unit or at the level of the staff as a whole, is one of the key posts as

5 far as planning, monitoring, and control is concerned. And then when I

6 say "control," it's hard to translate. It means that they have constant

7 oversight of the combat operations, and anything that has to do with

8 combat operations, that would be the staff to prepare any kind of

9 decisions, guidelines, directives, in terms of what to do at that point in

10 time, tomorrow, in the future, how to conduct the conduct -- the combat

11 operations. This is prepared by the staff of that command, together with

12 the Chief of Staff, and it's prepared for the commander of that unit or

13 the commander of the Main Staff of the Army of the Republic of

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This would be it, roughly, generally.

15 Q. And in the course of combat operations, does a Chief of Staff,

16 even though not having any direct power to issue commands, have the

17 competence and the right to explain and clarify to the subordinate junior

18 units what is the meaning of the order of the commander to whom that Chief

19 of Staff is attached?

20 A. I think that he does have that right, and it's a kind of

21 obligation and duty for him, because the orders which are issued by the

22 main commander, for example, are something that the Chief of Staff would

23 understand the best, because it was the Chief of Staff who prepared that

24 for the commander and not the commander who did that.

25 Q. And when the Chief of Staff issues -- when the Chief of Staff

1 issues an explanation, let's say during a combat operation the Chief of

2 Staff is -- finds himself in a position where he needs to explain the

3 commander's order to someone down the line, how does he do that? Does he

4 issue an order to the people down the line or does he issue an instruction

5 to those people down the line, or an advice? What's the mechanism by

6 which he should do that?

7 A. All of those options are possible. It depends on the

8 circumstances.

9 Q. In the situation where a Chief of Staff issues an order to one of

10 the units down the line, is he entitled to do that in order to clarify and

11 give expression to the original order of the commander?

12 A. You're talking about an order as well as providing an explanation.

13 This is a little bit counter to one another. In the military jargon, if

14 it's an order, it's an order; if it's an explanation, then it's an

15 explanation. However, I'm not ruling out the possibility of something

16 like that happening, but it's not customary.

17 Q. And I should ask you this, in terms of the --

18 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, could I ask, please, that the -- I'm

19 just being distracted a little bit -- I'm sorry I didn't raise this, but

20 it's been going on for 20 minutes. I'm being distracted by talking and I

21 ask that it stop now, please.

22 Q. Now, just to press on about that, in terms of the rights of the

23 Chief of Staff at the -- at the level of this chart here, the Chief of

24 Staff has got a command power over certain of his branches that are under

25 his direct power, according to that chart; is that correct? In other

1 words, can the Chief of the Main Staff command his staff within the staff?

2 A. Yes. And he had the full command only over the staff within his

3 headquarters, and this is the part that is marked in black, the squares

4 that are in this part that is highlighted in black, but it's not clear to

5 me why the operations centre is not also in that black square. It's maybe

6 clear why they did it on this particular diagram but according to what I

7 think it should be within this highlighted area, it's probably not

8 included in the staff, in terms of full command, probably because the

9 operation centre also includes officers and staff from these other parts

10 of the Main Staff Command. However, I think that the operation centre

11 should also be under the control of the Chief of Staff. This is just a

12 little point or a note when we are talking about the organisational

13 scheme.

14 Q. I'm grateful to you for raising it because I was going to ask you

15 that question. According to that chart, does it appear that the Chief of

16 Staff here has been given the power over the operations centre?

17 A. I think so, yes.

18 Q. Okay. And what other -- well, perhaps -- the question I'm really

19 coming to is this: When you're considering the usual powers of a Chief of

20 Staff, does the Chief of Staff normally have under his competence the

21 administration for organisation and mobilisation affairs and also the

22 intelligence administration? Now I understand he doesn't on this scheme

23 but usually speaking, in military organisation, does the Chief of Staff

24 normally have those under his power?

25 A. I have to clarify something. I don't know the exact dates when

1 certain changes were made. For a time, the intelligence and the security

2 sections, especially the intelligence section, were in the staff. Then

3 they were taken out of the staff and then returned again. But I think

4 that, generally, the intelligence section remained part of the staff under

5 the command of the Chief of Staff, but the security section was never

6 under the command of the Chief of Staff. This first part that you

7 mentioned, I don't know. What did you say before the intelligence, if you

8 can say that again, please.

9 Q. I can probably clarify it by pointing to the chart. If you look

10 at the left-hand side of the chart you'll see that there is a series of

11 branches that are set out in boxes there, and the two I was asking you

12 about was Roman numeral V, administration for administration and

13 mobilisation affairs, and Roman numeral II, intelligence administration.

14 And my question really is this: You'll see that the black line indicating

15 the line of command goes from those two branches back to the commander,

16 but only a dotted line appears to go from those back to the Chief of

17 Staff. And what I wanted to know is does this appear to you to be -- to

18 be somewhat of a reduction of the usual powers of a Chief of Staff,

19 according to this diagram?

20 A. Absolutely. If we look at the left side of the administrations,

21 you have the administration of the services, of the air force, the

22 administration for organisational and mobilisation affairs, intelligence

23 administration, section for the navy and also the administration for -- I

24 can't read it and I can't remember what it is. These administrations are

25 directly under the commander of the Main Staff of the Army of

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The staff with each of these administrations had the

2 line of cooperation between them.

3 Q. Yes. Thank you for that. Now, the next issue I want to move to

4 is the --

5 JUDGE LIU: Well, just out of curiosity, Mr. Morrissey, could I

6 ask you a question?

7 MR. MORRISSEY: Of course.

8 JUDGE LIU: Do you have a similar chart outlining the military

9 structure in the 1st Corps?

10 MR. MORRISSEY: What we would do -- because the witness has given

11 evidence about this we can simply provide photocopies of that document

12 because it was a contemporaneous document. If Your Honour would like us

13 to draft one that's -- sorry, pardon me. 1st Corps? I misunderstood the

14 question, my apologies. Perhaps I could pursue that with the witness for

15 a moment and see. I don't have one but --

16 JUDGE LIU: I understand, since we have this witness here, he's

17 the commander of the 1st Corps, and it might be good for us to get some

18 information about the military structure under the 1st Corps.

19 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes. Well with respect I agree entirely. I can

20 ask some questions about that.

21 MR. RE: I actually have one the witness drew. It's a handwritten

22 one. He drew it outside of court. We didn't get it typed up. That may

23 be of some assistance.

24 JUDGE LIU: Maybe during the break the parties could meet together

25 to see whether it's useful or not. Do you agree with that, Mr.

1 Morrissey?

2 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, I'm happy to. I'll just ask a couple

3 of questions about that.

4 JUDGE LIU: Yes, please.

5 MR. MORRISSEY:

6 Q. In fact, did the Prosecutors ask you to draw up a similar sort of

7 diagram concerning the structure of the 1st Corps before we came into

8 court last week? And did you in fact draw one up?

9 A. At the end of last week, I just did it by hand on a piece of

10 paper.

11 Q. Yes. Well, perhaps it would assist the Court if you were able to

12 draft a document that is as similar in form as possible to the one that

13 you've just been looking at so it could be compared to, if needs be, in

14 the future. If that's already been done, fine, if you'd like to do

15 another one, that's also fine. Would you be prepared to draw such a

16 document in the break that we are about to have now?

17 A. I can do that, but I cannot be sure about exactly the time period

18 that you are looking for. If you give me a time period, then I cannot be

19 sure whether the situation was the way it was during that particular

20 period, because the transformations were on going from throughout that

21 whole period. I told the Prosecution regarding the organisation that it

22 was like that, but I'm not 100 per cent sure. If we are talking about the

23 intelligence organ I think that later, and I can't tell you exactly when,

24 that the intelligence organ only was returned or -- to be a part of the

25 staff.

1 Q. Okay. Well, perhaps if you -- if you were able to draft it to the

2 best of your memory now and then when -- when you're -- if you're asked

3 questions about it, you can indicate what areas you were 100 per cent sure

4 about and which once ones you possibly had some doubts about. Just before

5 we break, there was one other diagram I was going to ask you -- ask you

6 to -- to draw, and that was a rough diagram of Sarajevo and where the

7 units were placed around Sarajevo. In other words, I understand you

8 haven't have a topographical map but just a schematic map with 1st Corps,

9 10th -- 1st Brigade, 10th Brigade, and the way it was around Sarajevo just

10 to give us a function ago idea where these units were in relation to each

11 other. And in doing so it might assist if you marked down where those

12 units were and also where a couple of crucial headquarters were,

13 headquarters of the 9th, headquarters of your corps, headquarters of the

14 Chief of Staff, headquarters of the army, and if you wouldn't mind drawing

15 that in just rough form that would assist, or could assist.

16 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, could I indicate that the -- that

17 the next topic is going to be the Zenica conference? And before we break,

18 perhaps I can just indicate what's proposed to be done. The Zenica

19 conference is -- is a tape. I'm going to ask the witness to look at a

20 tape and just verify that -- that that's him, and indeed all of the people

21 there, he can name the people that he can recognise there, and listen to a

22 short part of what he says himself, also a short part of what

23 Mr. Halilovic said at that Zenica meeting. And then I'm going to seek to

24 tender that tape.

25 Now the whole tape, not everything said on that tape it is

1 relevant to this case and the reason the Defence wants to tender is

2 because of what's not said on that tape. Because there is -- what we will

3 say is there is no reference to some of the things that are said in the

4 indictment. The indictment says certain things about Zenica and we have

5 this tape. There is a tape and there is a transcript of the tape. I

6 don't propose to play the whole thing to the witness. I just propose to

7 tender it. I understand the Prosecution must have -- have some version of

8 this because there is already evidence that the witness Salko Gusic was

9 shown that document on a previous occasion.

10 Nevertheless it's important that it be in evidence in case anyone

11 was to say anything about what was said at Zenica. I'm going to ask this

12 witness from his memory, of course, but that's what's proposed, so we will

13 cue up the tape to the parts we want. But I make it clear I'm not

14 proposing to play the whole thing, and I am proposing to tender the whole

15 thing so it will be available to everyone to look at if they need to.

16 That's what's proposed, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE LIU: I hope there will be some logistic preparations

18 concerning playing of that tape.

19 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, Your Honour, there will be.

20 JUDGE LIU: It's time for the break. We'll resume at 11.00 sharp.

21 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

22 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

23 JUDGE LIU: Well, before we start, I have to say that this

24 afternoon -- I'm sorry, this afternoon we'll sit from 3.30 instead of

25 2.15, because, you know, we should have enough time for lunch.

1 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, Your Honour. Your Honour, can I say I think

2 the progress is quite good and I'm -- I remain hopeful if we lose an hour

3 we might still be able to do it. So let's continue.

4 Q. Yes, sorry, pardon me. Mr. Karavelic, there was just a matter I

5 should have dealt with before the break which I forgot to. I asked you

6 before the break about whether you saw an order from President Izetbegovic

7 concerning the dismissal of Musan Topalovic and Ramiz Delalic, and I'd

8 just like to show you a document now and see whether this is the order we

9 are talking about.

10 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours we don't have this uploaded, I'm

11 sorry. This is a photocopied document.

12 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 401.

13 MR. MORRISSEY:

14 Q. Would you mind just taking the opportunity to look at that quickly

15 and just see whether that's the order that you were referring to earlier

16 on in the cross-examination. Decision, I should say.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I offer that document for tender.

20 JUDGE LIU: Any objections?

21 MR. RE: No.

22 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. It's admitted into the evidence.

23 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D401.

24 MR. MORRISSEY: Thanks very much.

25 Q. Now, before the break you indicate -- we had a discussion about

1 certain documents, and I understand you've been kind enough to draft a

2 couple of documents for us. Could I ask, please, did you have the

3 opportunity to draft a rough map of Sarajevo with the units broadly drawn

4 on them?

5 A. I managed to do some of it.

6 Q. Is it in a position where it mentions the main units surrounding

7 Sarajevo at this stage?

8 A. You mean defending Sarajevo, yes.

9 Q. I do. That's what I mean. Yes.

10 MR. MORRISSEY: Could that be please be shown how -- I understand

11 that the witness had a chance to draft that on court equipment, and I

12 wonder if that could be displaced, please. Excellent, thank you.

13 Q. There were two units called the 1st Glorious Brigade and the 2nd

14 Knightly Brigade. Would you mind just indicating where they were based?

15 Perhaps just by -- I'm not sure what the best way to designate those is,

16 but could you indicate where they were? Perhaps before you draw on the

17 map I'll just ask you to indicate verbally where they were. In that map,

18 the 1st Glorious Brigade, whereabouts is that to be found?

19 A. This is the 1st glorious, and this is the 2nd Vitez.

20 Q. Thank you. With respect to those two brigades, their engagement

21 on the combat line was sufficiently intense that you couldn't really take

22 units out of Sarajevo to help others from those two units; is that

23 correct?

24 A. Not 100 per cent but to a large extent, yes.

25 Q. Thank you. And although this is very obvious to you we just to

1 have to be very clear in this Court. The 1st glorious and 2nd Knightly

2 Brigades that are referred to there are quite different units to the 1st

3 and 2nd Brigades that are found at the far left-hand end of the map; is

4 that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And when we refer to the individual Mujo Zulic, he was the

7 commander of the brigade -- the 1st Brigade, that is at the far left-hand

8 end of the map; is that correct?

9 A. Yeah, that's the one that I'm underlining here.

10 Q. Yes, thank you. Now, just so that the Tribunal understand a

11 further matter, at the top right-hand of the -- of the map is drawn the

12 4th Motorised Brigade. Is that the unit that was under the command of

13 Fikret Prevljak?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. When persons travelled through the tunnel underneath the airport,

16 did they then, when they came out, find themselves in the zone of

17 responsibility of Fikret Prevljak and his corps -- and his brigade?

18 A. Yes.

19 JUDGE LIU: I believe that in the transcript it should be the 5th

20 Motorised Brigade instead of 4th.

21 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, I'm not sure about that.

22 The -- perhaps I could clarify that with the witness.

23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, please.

24 MR. MORRISSEY:

25 Q. Just because of a question asked by His Honour Judge Liu there,

1 could I just clarify this? The unit at the top right-hand corner of that

2 map, that is the 4th Mechanised Brigade -- the 4th Motorised Brigade

3 commanded by Fikret Prevljak; is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Thank you. Now, just on the -- since we discussed rumours,

6 operative information, and gossip that was going around Sarajevo

7 concerning commanders, there was plenty of such rumour, gossip and

8 story-telling about Fikret Prevljak and his supposed criminal activities

9 as well; is that correct?

10 A. Absolutely.

11 Q. Okay. And in fact, by virtue of Fikret Prevljak's position at the

12 end of the tunnel there, I'm not suggesting that you had concrete facts

13 about him in September 1993, but the rumours were that he had a very major

14 part to play in the smuggling activities of things coming in and out of

15 Sarajevo through the tunnel; is that correct, in terms of those rumours?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. But to get rid of Fikret Prevljak would have required an act of

18 political will which just never happened while you were commander of the

19 1st Corps; is that correct?

20 A. The first part of your question is correct. But by the end of

21 1994, when I was forming divisions, the operations group or rather the

22 division was formed in the city of Sarajevo, and I had other proposals,

23 but I believe, and I would have to consult some papers, but I believe that

24 he was appointed as commander of that division in the city of Sarajevo and

25 this was not in line with my proposal. So he was promoted basically, and

1 on the occasion of him taking over as the commander of the 4th Motorised

2 Brigade, I was put in a position in which I -- well, since I was not in a

3 position to influence the first part of the decision, then I asked a

4 question about who the new commander for the 4th Motorised Brigade was

5 going to be. Fikret Prevljak, appointed a man that he wanted and he

6 requested it from President Izetbegovic. And that's another occasion

7 where I had serious problems and, in the end, after a longer period of

8 time, perhaps a month, a month of correspondence and all that, I managed

9 to put my principles into practice and the man who was appointed was the

10 one I had suggested.

11 Q. Very well. Thank you. Okay. Now, the last question I have about

12 that map that's on the screen is that there is a unit there marked as

13 "HVO." Now, is it the fact that a unit which had been in the early days

14 of the war an HVO unit still maintained part of the front line against the

15 Republika Srpska forces within Sarajevo?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And what was the name of that particular brigade?

18 A. The brigade of the HVO, initially, at that time.

19 Q. Very well. Thanks.

20 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, I offer that for tender.

21 JUDGE LIU: Any objections Mr. Re?

22 MR. RE: There is no objection.

23 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. It's admitted into the evidence.

24 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D402.

25 MR. MORRISSEY: The next -- yes. Could that document, although

1 it's been tendered, is it possible for that to be returned to the screen

2 because there has been some data lost. We -- we are using a computer

3 system here, and sometimes things go o wrong. Would you mind just marking

4 again the same marks that you put before? There was an underlining of

5 the -- of Mujo Zulic brigade, there was a line underneath that. There

6 were squares around the 1st Glorious Brigade and 2nd Knightly Brigade and

7 I think you'd also placed a square around Fikret Prevljak's units. Would

8 you mind doing those please?

9 Q. And Could you ask you, having done that, were there any other

10 marks that you put on that map that we've forgotten about? Because they

11 should be the same as before, if possible.

12 A. I think not. I'm not sure whether previously I underlined the 4th

13 Motorised Brigade, and the rest is correct.

14 Q. Thank you. I'm just asking now for a brief comment about the

15 little try angles that you've put. Do those triangles angles indicate the

16 headquarters of those units marked next to them?

17 A. Precisely.

18 Q. Thank you. And where was the Main Staff office?

19 A. You mean the Supreme Command Staff?

20 Q. Yes. I do mean that.

21 A. I'm going to indicate it now.

22 Q. Thank you. Very well. Thank you very much for that.

23 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, could I tender that document? It

24 may be appropriate to tender the original as well, I'm not sure what the

25 mechanics of that are but this is the one we want most but --

1 JUDGE LIU: Yes. But where is the headquarters of the 1st Corps?

2 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours I think it's directly below but we

3 can ask the witness that.

4 Q. Is the 1st Corps headquarters designated below that with the

5 "1K"?

6 A. Command of the 1st Corps is what I'm indicating now.

7 Q. There is just one other matter now - sorry - before we tender

8 that. Are you able to indicate where the Presidency was? Perhaps with a

9 "P" for presidency.

10 A. If I may, but in a different colour so as not to confuse anything,

11 the Presidency building was here, right, and I'll mark it with a P.

12 Q. And if you coloured it in so it was fully black then we could see

13 that it was different to a military type of unit.

14 A. [Marks]

15 Q. Okay. Thank you very much.

16 MR. MORRISSEY: Now, Your Honours, finally I offer that document

17 for tender.

18 JUDGE LIU: Yes, any objections?

19 MR. RE: No.

20 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. It's admitted into the evidence.

21 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D403.

22 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re.

23 MR. RE: Before my learned friend goes on, before -- I raise this

24 matter in advance. Before the break he indicated that he with would be

25 tendering the transcript of the Zenica meeting and the tape. I've made

1 inquiries over the -- since then. The Prosecution does not have an

2 English translation of the entire Zenica meeting. We have one in B/C/S.

3 We actually requested a translation but because it wasn't on our exhibit

4 list, the request for translation was denied. So we do not have the

5 English translation. So I would very much request a copy of the English

6 translation my copy of the B/C/S is 190 pages long. We certainly couldn't

7 deal with that on the screen if it -- if it were tendered.

8 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, it's -- it's reasonable. I

9 thought -- Your Honours might recall in relation to this Zenica transcript

10 that the matter was raised with a witness previously, Salko Gusic, who was

11 also present -- present at this meeting, and we don't have a full

12 transcript either. We just have a partial transcript of relevant parts.

13 What my learned friend says is quite right. But I actually believed, and

14 in fact I still do believe now, that I think we gave Ms. Chana a copy of

15 this document at the time of our -- of our partial English transcript. So

16 my learned friend is substantially in the same position we are, although

17 slightly better because he's got the full Bosnian one. We've only got a

18 partial Bosnian one to work from. I don't know how to resolve this matter

19 really, because it -- we don't need to pollute these proceedings by masses

20 of tapes. The Prosecutor of course, is entitled to go to any part of it

21 they want to, and really we are tendering it to make absolutely clear what

22 our submission is about it, that -- namely, that there is no mention of

23 these things on it. That's why. So we have given a copy, but we'll give

24 another copy of what we have and if there is any -- if there is any other

25 common sense way to deal with it, we are very open to suggestions. Would

1 you just excuse me, Your Honour, for one second?

2 [Defence counsel confer]

3 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, sorry, I'm just instructed a long

4 time ago there was released in the E-court system. I don't think it's

5 been tendered. What's released in the E-court system has got -- what we

6 are going to hand up now has got blacked-out bits. Those blacked-out bits

7 are comments by Ms. Delalic, who is present in court, because she actually

8 provided the Bosnian transcript from which the English was made, and there

9 are a couple of comments by her in there, which we have noted. In the

10 transcript we are going to hand up now, we've blanked them out, but of

11 course we don't want to interfere with documents so -- anyway, it's --

12 this is a long-winded process. I'm sorry, Your Honour.

13 Could I just indicate the number when it was released was

14 DD002577. So I understand the Prosecution's position entirely, frankly,

15 and we are somewhat in the same position. But perhaps if we can proceed

16 in the best way we can now to see -- to see what develops in relation to

17 that, and we will provide another copy of this -- of what we have to the

18 Prosecutor.

19 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. Are we going to deal with

20 another chart?

21 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, we are going to deal with the -- with the 1st

22 Corps chart now before we get to Zenica.

23 Q. Mr. Karavelic, my apologies for that management delay. Now, could

24 we just now come to the next document. Do you have did you have the

25 opportunity in the break to draw a rough chart of the command structure of

1 the 1st Corps?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay.

4 MR. MORRISSEY: Could that now please be shown on the screen?

5 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 404.

6 MR. MORRISSEY: Okay, thank you.

7 Q. Now, can I just ask you a couple of questions about the realities

8 of the size of the staff of a corps? How many people did you have in your

9 corps staff? Approximately. I understand not person for person but --

10 was it 20 or a hundred or 50 or what sort of range?

11 A. 30 to 40.

12 Q. 30 to 40, okay. Thank you. And what was the staff of a -- I'll

13 withdraw that. I'll come to some staff sizes later on. What was the

14 normal size of a brigade staff? I mean, bearing in mind they all varied in

15 size, but an average brigade, what sort of size of, in terms of personnel,

16 was their staff?

17 A. At any rate, less than a corps. Roughly speaking, up to 15 men,

18 about 15.

19 Q. About 15 in a brigade, and what about at battalion level?

20 Approximately how many might you find in a battalion staff?

21 A. At the battalion level it's not called "staff." It has a

22 different name but it doesn't really matter but that's the same thing,

23 you're quite right and the number would be some 7, 8, 10, and so on.

24 Q. I understand. Very well, thanks. And finally, in terms of

25 operative groups or operations groups you've indicated that those groups

1 were temporary formations which, in terms of the hierarchy, stood at some

2 similar sort of position to the permanent type of institution of a

3 division. Is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. What was the normal size of a -- of a divisional staff?

6 Appreciating that at this time there weren't any divisions but once

7 divisions came into being, what sort of size di the -- was a divisional

8 staff, approximately?

9 A. Between the corps staff and the brigade staff, we spoke about that

10 a little bit earlier. So it would be an average of about 20 people.

11 Q. Okay. As to the operative group, which -- perhaps I should ask

12 you this just to make clear for the transcript. In 1993, there weren't

13 any divisions but there were some operative groups in the Bosnian army; is

14 that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And the staffs of the operative groups were to some degree smaller

17 than those of the division -- the permanent structure of that size; is

18 that accurate?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Even so, however, they -- you would still expect an operative

21 group staff to be larger than that of a brigade, given that an operative

22 group might have one or more brigades under its control; is that an

23 accurate statement?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Very well. And just on that topic of operative groups, if

1 possible, in order to set up an operative group, there needs to be the

2 appointment of a commander of such an operative group; is that correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And because it's at a higher level than a brigade level, that

5 commander has to be appointed with the ultimate authority of the

6 Presidency; is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And not only does the commander of the operative group have to be

9 appointed but so, too, do certain officers who go to make up the staff of

10 that operative group, with their functions designated in the order; is

11 that correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And is it also the case that when an operative group is set up,

14 the -- not only the commander of that operative group, but the units that

15 are to be part of that operative group have to be described in the order;

16 is that correct?

17 A. I didn't understand the question very well.

18 Q. Yes. I'll -- I'll -- I'll -- I'll phrase it another way. When an

19 operative group is established, the units which go to make up that

20 operative group have to be set out in an order effecting the

21 resubordination of those units to that new operative group; is that

22 correct?

23 A. Just one clarification. When any unit is formed, and this

24 includes the category of an operative group, two orders are written. One

25 is an organisational order, which includes all that you have put in your

1 question, and after that, there is a second personal order appointing

2 people to various duties, including the one of operative group commander.

3 Q. I understand. And it's only when both orders are made that it can

4 be said that the operative group exists; is that correct?

5 A. Yes, according to legal norms, yes.

6 Q. And in terms of an operative group in the -- in the -- in the

7 current case, you yourself never did hear that -- perhaps before I get to

8 that point about what you heard and what you didn't hear, the normal

9 person to be appointed as commander of a -- of an operative group would be

10 a person -- I'm thinking at the moment of the concrete case of Mr. --

11 Brigadier Cikotic but an appropriate person to appoint to an operations

12 group would be a person who was somewhat senior to a brigade commander but

13 somewhat junior to a corps commander; is that correct?

14 A. In principle, yes, but this doesn't have to be a rule, and it's

15 not always a rule. Two officers of the same rank -- you can have two

16 officers of the same rank. However, the person that holds the higher

17 establishment post is superior to the other one. So it's rank plus

18 function.

19 Q. Yes?

20 A. Function has more weight than rank.

21 Q. Yes. And perhaps that's raised another issue that rank and

22 seniority -- sorry, perhaps I'll take a step back. Normally it's the

23 function of -- of the officer which determines who is superior, but is it

24 the fact that sometimes you'll have officers whose function is the same?

25 For example, two brigade commanders? And then perhaps I understand this

1 is perhaps not an expert question but in that situation, seniority and

2 rank will determine who is the superior when the -- when two -- let me

3 just start that question entirely again. We got entirely lost there. I

4 apologise for that.

5 When you have two brigade commanders of equal functional weight,

6 the superiority between them will be determined by reference to their

7 seniority and their rank? Is that an accurate statement?

8 A. According to my understanding, there has been certain things that

9 have being mixed up here. You have two brigade commanders of the same

10 rank and of the same function. This does not happen very often. I think

11 in that case, the superior person would then decide to place one under the

12 other. This is not a usual military rule. If you have two brigade

13 commanders of the same function and the same rank, they would remain that

14 way in any kind of relationship, and in any kind of situation.

15 Q. May I say your answer was helpful even if the question itself was

16 a complete mess, so I thank you for that.

17 MR. MORRISSEY: Very well, now, I offer that chart that's been

18 drawn for tender.

19 JUDGE LIU: Any objections.

20 MR. RE: No, no objections.

21 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. It's admitted into the evidence

22 at this stage and I believe that we will instruct the translation section

23 to have it translated.

24 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you very much.

25 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D404.

1 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you.

2 Q. Now, Mr. Karavelic, I now want to turn to the Zenica meeting. I'm

3 going to have you shown a tape in a minute. I'll just ask you some

4 general questions first of all. But while I'm asking these questions

5 could just pledges to those in the audiovisual booth that we are going to

6 now ask that videotape number 1 be played, starting at 0.23.03 and go

7 through until 0.24.25. So a length of tape of about a bit over a minute.

8 And, Your Honours, could I just indicate as well that the audio -- that

9 the interpreters' booth is going to make an effort to give a live

10 translation of that. We understand the difficult situation they are in,

11 of course. But they have been provided with a transcript so they are

12 going to help us as best they can for which we are very grateful.

13 After that -- and that's a section which features Mr. Halilovic.

14 And after that comes a section which features the current witness,

15 Mr. Karavelic. Before that's played and I ask that it not be played just

16 yet. I've got a couple of preliminary matters -- questions to ask. Could

17 I just indicate firstly that the tape is -- sorry, that the transcript is

18 Defence document 1509(b), and could I now provide to the Court staff the

19 Bosnian copy and -- the tape itself will be tendered, and that is Defence

20 number 1509(c). Before -- I ask that that not be played straight away. I

21 just have a couple of questions.

22 Q. First of all, Mr. Karavelic, do you recall now the Zenica meeting

23 that took place on the 21st and possibly into the 22nd of -- or into the

24 22nd of August 1993?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, to the best of -- you can't recall whether you were there on

2 the second day of that proceeding or not; is that correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. But it is quite possible that you were, you just don't remember;

5 is that accurate?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, again, to my understanding, you don't have any recollection

8 whether or not you came home from Zenica to Sarajevo via the city of

9 Konjic in the company of Sefer Halilovic and Salko Gusic. Do you remember

10 whether that's the case or not? I'm not suggesting you should remember,

11 but I have to ask you the question.

12 A. I've already given a lot of answers to this question, and I'm a

13 little bit confused about the -- these time periods, immediately after

14 these consultations in Zenica on the 22nd and the days following that.

15 It's possible. However, I cannot claim that 100 per cent.

16 Q. Look, I'll be quite frank with you about the reason for asking.

17 There is a journalist who gave evidence here named Sefko Hodzic. He said

18 that he saw you and Sefer Halilovic in Konjic on a certain day, and I just

19 wanted to confirm that that's -- with you that that's accurate. If you

20 can't recall, you can't recall. But I think in fairness to all the

21 witnesses I just have to ask you whether you can remember that or not. I

22 take it your answer is, you don't remember it.

23 A. No, no. I never said that I cannot remember it. I remember that,

24 when I was together with Generals Halilovic and Salko Gusic in front of

25 his corps command in Konjic but there was in the context of being at the

1 at the same time as that famous photograph was made in Jablanica where I

2 am also seen.

3 Q. I understand, okay.

4 A. But I don't know exactly whether it was that day. I assume that

5 it was, but I don't claim it 100 per cent.

6 Q. I think you've provided an answer to my question. Thank you.

7 Okay. Well, in any event, while you were at -- at the Zenica meeting, no

8 one discussed Operation Neretva; is that correct?

9 A. As far as I know, they did not.

10 Q. And to the best of your recollection, Sefer Halilovic expressed an

11 interest in military operations in the direction of Vitez. Do you recall

12 that?

13 A. I vaguely seem to remember something about that but I cannot claim

14 to be 100 per cent sure.

15 Q. That's okay. Look, as I've indicated in court, there is a

16 different reason for tendering this transcript. But, look, what I'll ask

17 you to do now is just have a look at a passage to be played.

18 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request that a French

19 booth also receives the English copy of the transcript, thank you.

20 MR. MORRISSEY: Just one moment, please.

21 Sorry, Your Honours, we've just had a request from the

22 interpreter's booth that a copy be provided to the French booth as well

23 and we just --

24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the tape and the transcripts

25 accompanying that will be MFI 405.

1 MR. MORRISSEY: Grateful for that. The passage is about to

2 commence now.

3 Q. And Mr. Karavelic, it features Mr. Halilovic speaking and I just

4 ask to you listen to it and then I'll ask you a question about it at the

5 end.

6 MR. MORRISSEY: Could that now be played, please?

7 [Videotape played]

8 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "I would just like to share my

9 opinion with you. And there is room for each of us to reach our own

10 conclusion. Since we still do not have a final answer to this question,

11 according to information from the press, the Presidency in its full

12 composition, without Ganic, has made a decision in Geneva to embark on

13 such a division which is being done now. My opinion in this regard is

14 that we should not dwell on this issue for too long, for the simple reason

15 that the aggressor's goals are to destroy the state of Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina and to destroy the Bosniak Muslim people. Because of that,

17 even through these talks, negotiations, they will offer that part of the

18 territory as much as -- exactly as much territory as would constitute the

19 defeat of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and if this share of the

20 territory is accepted, that would mean a shameful defeat for the army and

21 primarily for the Bosniak Muslim people. In my view, there would be the

22 first step on the way towards our final destruction. Our task is as

23 follows: To reinforce the army, to step up combat readiness, to get

24 stronger, to organise ourselves at all levels, and continue the armed

25 fight. I'm deeply convinced that this will amount to nothing. My

1 proposal is to listen to the corps commanders briefly, to their brief

2 papers, only very brief, identity cards. Please put things into the

3 perspective of problems. This will enable us to come up with solutions

4 together to reach the best possible solutions for us."

5 MR. MORRISSEY: That's far as we want that part to be played at

6 this stage. Could that please be stopped now? Thank you.

7 Q. Well, I don't know if you recall what you said on the tape, but

8 does that accord with your memory of what Sefer Halilovic said at the

9 time?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now I just ask that the witness -- perhaps we just stop there for

12 a moment. Well, that was said. Did you see in that scrambly part of the

13 tape that the -- that the meeting was being chaired by the commander,

14 Commander Delic, on the right of the screen there?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. Very well.

17 MR. MORRISSEY: Now could we please move to the next point which

18 is 0.44.50? This is going to be a very short part. But -- and it's to go

19 up until 0.45.03, at which point it can stop. I'm really just showing you

20 this for the purpose of reminding you of what you already know, frankly.

21 But I ask that that please be played to the witness. And of course if

22 there is anything more that you wish played of there, you're entitled to

23 ask of that and ...

24 Q. While this is whizzing through, I take it that that speeded-up

25 person there on the screen is you?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Very well. Could the -- could we just play that short passage

3 now?

4 [Videotape played]

5 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] From Lukavica with the forces in

6 Nedjarica by finding Golo Brdo, that would be their objectives at the

7 Igman front or the Bjelasnica front, that part overlaps with the area of

8 responsibility of the 6th Corps. I don't know if we need to go into

9 details here, but when we are talking about the fourth offensive which

10 started in that area on the 1st of July and it started on the 3rd of July

11 in Golo Brdo the objective was at the same time to carry out two Chetnik

12 offensives on two different actions at the same time to bring Sarajevo to

13 a fait accompli. In the first half of July, with a whole bunch of

14 subjective weaknesses, when we are talking about the units of the 1st

15 Corps, I would like to be realistic and objective. It's quite realistic

16 and objective, but subjective weaknesses are first of all command,

17 control, lack of unity, different settling of accounts. To be quite

18 crude, the consequences are that in the first half of July, very quickly,

19 Grebak fell, Delijas fell, Prevoj, Rogoj. The Chetniks went in two axes.

20 One was from Dobro Polje to Prevoj and Rogoj, the second one was from

21 Jahorina via Vis, Grebak, and Delijas. These are these two actions where

22 they managed to break through the lines very quickly with powerful

23 artillery support, and grouping of their forces, specialised infantry

24 units. They broke through those sections with a large use of

25 psychological and propaganda war. These were different methods of work.

1 They did what they did, causing panic, chaos and an exodus of the civilian

2 population and --

3 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I might ask that it be stopped there

4 and I'm grateful for that. Although of course, once again, if it's sought

5 by anyone to play further we can do that.

6 Q. Thank you. Now, could I just confirm that that was you reporting

7 to the Zenica meeting on the situation that had developed in the area of

8 the 1st Corps as a result of the troubles on Igman?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Very well. And when you mentioned the command and control, the

11 command problems that you mentioned during the course of that, were you

12 referring to the same sort of problems about which you've spoken at length

13 in this Tribunal here?

14 A. This was just a part of the problems.

15 Q. Yes. Very well.

16 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours I offer that -- I know it's been

17 marked. I now offer the tape and the transcript that goes with it for

18 tender.

19 JUDGE LIU: Any objections?

20 MR. RE: I just have an inquiry. Our understanding is it's not

21 full tape, that there is a portion missing from it. There is a gap in the

22 tape. It doesn't record the entire proceedings. And the transcript seems

23 to be -- it seems to have piecemeal bits recorded from it. Can I -- can

24 I -- can we ascertain from the Defence whether that is in fact the

25 situation?

1 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, that is in fact the situation. The

2 first -- the tape itself has been -- the last part has been cut off by

3 somebody at some stage. Evidence was given by Salko Gusic about that. He

4 was a witness who had been given the opportunity by OTP investigators to

5 look at the whole tape and he could confirm here that he had looked at the

6 whole tape and that he confirmed that the tape had been cut and that a

7 part of the end was missing, and he described what that part was. And he

8 gave clear evidence about all that, upon which the Defence will obviously

9 rely.

10 Now, this witness has not been shown the tape frankly just simply

11 for time purposes here because we know we are rushing to finish. For that

12 purpose. But to answer the Prosecutor's question, yes, the tape was cut,

13 the tape itself is clearly incomplete and has been confirmed as such. And

14 furthermore, the transcript that we've offered to tender here is only

15 parts of the tape. It's only highlights of it, parts of it, as my friend

16 says it's many, many pages long, many hours long. The Tribunal doesn't

17 really need to sit here unless, of course, if it assist a party's case to

18 ask you to, then, of course, that's open. We don't ask you to do that

19 because we are simply tendering it to show that there is no evidence at

20 all of the discussions which are alleged in the indictment and may be

21 alleged by a witness, depending on what they say. That's why we are

22 tendering it to show it's -- it's really what is not said rather than what

23 is said that we are interested in this tape.

24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that the second part of the

25 tape was simultaneous translation, and there was no transcript of that.

1 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, the interpreters have just pointed

2 out, for which, I'm grateful that when that translation took place, they

3 didn't have a transcript from us. I must say, I thought that the part

4 that I thought I was getting was a little bit different to what came,

5 although the relevant information came, in any event, so it's -- from the

6 Defence point of view. However, the interpreters are entitled to be

7 covered by this. We thought we had given the transcript, but obviously

8 not. Now, that's what I can offer about the transcript. I'm not sure now

9 what the Prosecution's position is. Do they oppose us or not?

10 MR. RE: It's not a position of opposing it. The Defence is

11 proposing to tender portions of the transcript. Our concern is that there

12 is an entire B/C/S transcript of 190 pages. Hour concern is the selective

13 tendering of portions, and I understand it is to be linked at some later

14 point to a submission that Neretva isn't mentioned on the part of the tape

15 that we do have. This English transcript won't -- of course won't prove

16 that because it's only selective portions. If the Defence -- if my

17 learned colleague could just perhaps elaborate a little bit on that, it

18 may -- it may overcome our concerns about the selective tendering or the

19 highlighted portions. I don't quite understand at the moment the purpose

20 of tendering highlighted portions in an attempt to show that Neretva

21 wasn't discussed there.

22 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, I can -- I can indicate that, Your Honour.

23 In the first instance, the tape itself is being tendered, and this is

24 regardless of the transcript at all, to show that there is no mention of

25 the things that are said in the indictment, that are supposed to have

1 happened at Zenica. At least according to the Prosecutor's case. So we

2 tender the tape itself to prove that. We do that against a background

3 where the Prosecutors have this tape already, put it in full in their

4 investigations to a witness, Mr. Gusic, who was called here, through whom

5 they did not seek to tender that tape. And you can draw a clear inference

6 from that that they know very well there is no mention at all of these

7 matters on that tape. Otherwise, they would have tendered it in evidence.

8 But however to make crystal clear that the Defence wants to underline that

9 fact, so we are tendering the tape. If the Prosecution won't do it, we

10 can't force them to. But we are going to do it, because we want there to

11 be no doubt at all that no such thing happened.

12 As to the editing of the tape at the end, we don't know who did

13 it. And if an appropriate witness comes along we will grill them about

14 that question. If they come along. So that's -- that's that side.

15 However, as to the transcript, there are parts of the tape that may be of

16 interest. For example, words said by the late Arif Pasalic about the plot

17 of the 4th Corps down in Mostar. Now, some of these were put in general

18 terms to the witness Gusic, he agreed with some, couldn't remember others

19 and gave comments in general terms. The court might recall, I actually

20 put parts of the transcript to him. I'm sure you don't recall the actual

21 incident, but I did put it to him. So his subjective concerns play well

22 be matters of background relevance to this Tribunal because it's said that

23 the situation in Mostar was very bad and part of that is that Arif

24 Pasalic, the commander, was saying at the Zenica meeting that it was very

25 bad. Likewise, Commander Gusic made some complaints about the

1 difficulties he faced and you'll recall one thing you may recall because

2 it could have relevance was some of the smaller units were not complying

3 with the line of command and control and the 6th Corps. The "crni

4 Labudovi," that's the Black Swans Unit, was one. The "Akrepi" was another

5 unit, and other units like that were mentioned.

6 So that the subjective concerns of the individual commander at

7 that meeting can shed some light. It is only background, but it's -- it

8 can show some light. And finally, the Prosecutor tendered into evidence a

9 document which we have been calling the Zenica conclusions. That's a

10 document dated the 29th of August, and that document is relevant because

11 it shows if you like what Rasim Delic thought had emerged from that

12 meeting and what action he proposed to take at a very high level, it has

13 to be stressed, about that.

14 For those reasons, therefore, the Defence has produced the

15 transcript of those parts which we thought seemed to be of relevance, are

16 capable of being of relevance. We don't have the resources to have the

17 whole thing transcribed. We just don't have it. And what we submit is it

18 would not help this Tribunal in any way to have the whole thing

19 transcribed unless you wish to here about the Bosnian air force and other

20 topics or the situation in the Bihac area or in Gorazde and other places

21 like that.

22 Now I don't, frankly, know myself what's on some of the parts of

23 the tape. If it is to the Prosecutor's advantage to play those things,

24 one would have thought that they would have done it in their own case.

25 They've got this tape. For that reason, to assist the Tribunal, I do

1 still seek to tender that tape. The tape it really the evidence, not the

2 transcript. The transcript is just there to help with the tape. It's the

3 tape that is evidence. If the transcript's wrong, then it's not to be

4 relied upon. You've got a tape there. If the Prosecution wants to assist

5 you by pointing out parts of the tape which are wrong, well, we are happy

6 and they can, of course they can do that. But for that reason we submit

7 that it should be submitted and it should be received just as an aid to

8 the Tribunal like transcripts normally are.

9 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

10 MR. RE: We don't object to the tape now, but my query was

11 actually about the transcript. Can the Defence link the portions of the

12 transcript they seek to tender with the days? There is a date of the

13 221st and the 22nd of August 1995. This witness's evidence in chief was

14 he cannot remember whether he attended on both days. We are interested in

15 whether the transcript can be linked to the two separate days on which the

16 meeting was said to occur. That's all.

17 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

18 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, I can't -- I can't do it through this

19 witness. I can't do it through this witness because he doesn't remember.

20 There is another witness coming who was present at that -- well, when I

21 say "coming," there is another witness on the list, named -- who was

22 there. And he might know. We might ask him questions. At the moment,

23 all we have is -- is a tape that was cut at some stage, but Your Honours

24 what we can do, of course, is -- Ms. Delalic was the person who produced

25 there. I can easily ask her to say at what -- which of the tapes are used

1 and at what point. We can provide that information to the Prosecutors if

2 they haven't had a chance to look at that tape in the last ten months or

3 so, and, Your Honour, we will do that.

4 JUDGE LIU: Generally speaking, I believe that there is no problem

5 for the tape as well as for the transcript to be admitted into the

6 evidence. And the selective tendering and admission is possible, and we

7 have done that especially concerning of some very thick books in the past.

8 So the tape and the transcript are admitted into the evidence at this

9 stage. Of course, in the future, if we have other witnesses who

10 participated in this meeting, they could also give some evidence

11 concerning some details. It is so decided.

12 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honour. Thank you very much.

13 JUDGE LIU: The Court deputy will pronounce the number of the two.

14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit 405, D405.

15 MR. MORRISSEY: Thanks very much.

16 Q. Very well. We now turn to the -- the combat activities that took

17 place down in the Neretva valley early in September of 1993. And I just

18 want to ask you a couple of very general introductory questions. The

19 first of those questions is: That you yourself had absolutely nothing to

20 do with those -- those combat activities beyond complying with an order

21 from Sefer Halilovic to send down some units; is that correct?

22 A. Precisely.

23 Q. I just want to get some specifics about that. In some ways it's

24 repetitious but I just need to go through it. You, yourself, did not

25 attend any planning meetings concerning combat operations in that area; is

1 that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Nor did you meet with Suljevic, Bilajac, and Karic concerning any

4 specific combat operations in the Neretva valley; is that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You were familiar with the concerns that commander Arif Pasalic

7 had for his troops and civilians in Mostar but you didn't discuss

8 combat -- specific combat operations to relieve Mostar with him either; is

9 that correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You didn't discuss specific combat operations with Sefer Halilovic

12 or with Rasim Delic in the Neretva valley; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. At the time, whether all this was going on, you did not see that

15 inspection team order dated the 30th of the 8th about which we have had

16 some evidence; is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Nor did you see the map which has been shown to you in evidence;

19 is that correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Nor did you see any order appointing Sefer Halilovic as the

22 commander of any operations group; is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Nor did you see any order appointing Sefer Halilovic as the

25 commander of anything at that time; is that correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Nor did you hear the name "Operation Neretva" prior to the

3 departure of your troops -- I say "your troops," of the troops that were

4 taken out of your unit down to Herzegovina; is that true?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Nor did you see any order creating an IKM in Jablanica or indeed

7 in Donja Jablanica; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Nor did you see any order referring to an operation called

10 "Operation Neretva," or, to use the Prosecution's phrase, "Operation

11 Neretva 93"; is that correct?

12 A. Yes. I don't remember seeing it.

13 Q. And apart from the order shown to you by the Prosecution and dated

14 the 15th of September 1993, in which Sefer Halilovic appears to issue

15 certain instructions and under the heading of an order, you did not see

16 any other document that was a combat order by Sefer Halilovic relating to

17 that period; is that correct?

18 A. I only saw those documents upon my arrival to The Hague now, yes.

19 Q. Yes. And -- nor did you see any report from combat troops to

20 Sefer Halilovic; is that correct?

21 A. I haven't seen the reports from the 9th and the 10th Brigades and

22 as to the 2nd Motorised Battalion, it is possible I might have seen it,

23 but I can't remember.

24 Q. Yes. But as to the 2nd Independent Battalion, the report that you

25 saw -- the one that you think you might have seen, is that the document

1 that they showed you here that you've looked at here, dated the 25th of --

2 of September 1993?

3 A. That's that document. I don't really know if it's the date.

4 Q. That's okay but in relation to that document -- yes, I understand,

5 sorry, pardon me. I understand your answer. Okay. Now, okay. Just

6 pardon me a second. All right. And just further to those questions, that

7 I've asked you, the situation you were facing in Sarajevo -- I'll put a

8 proposition you tell me if I'm right or wrong. The situation was that on

9 every day there would be combat activities of some sort on the perimeter

10 of Sarajevo; is that correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And in particular, in the zone of engagement of the 1st Glorious

13 Brigade and the 2nd Knightly Brigade, there was very common and heavy

14 fighting most of the time, is that correct? In the area of [inaudible]?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. All right. And although it might be a short answer and a short

17 answer which doesn't capture the full situation, is the fact this: You

18 were very busy for every minute that you were awake trying to defend

19 Sarajevo and also your area of responsibility outside Sarajevo on the

20 other side of the tunnel, on Igman; is that correct?

21 A. Absolutely. And sometimes they were totally lost in all that

22 occasionally.

23 Q. And in that context, you had no competence and no reason to be

24 discussing with Rasim Delic, or with Sefer Halilovic, the combat details

25 of whatever was going to happen down in the Neretva valley; is that

1 correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And so you yourself cannot say what power, what nature of power

4 and what degree of power, commander Delic actually gave to Sefer Halilovic

5 with respect to the combat activities in the Neretva valley; is that

6 correct?

7 A. Roughly speaking.

8 Q. Okay. Now, I'll go to the details of these documents a little bit

9 later on but broadly speaking, the order of the 30th of the 8th, that's

10 the inspection team order, does not on its own face answer the question of

11 whether or not Sefer Halilovic had a command power over the units during

12 the combat activities in Operation Neretva, but that that document is

13 quite ambiguous on that point. Do you agree with that proposition?

14 A. I agree, quite a bit.

15 Q. And turning to the map that you were shown here, once again, as

16 you've pointed out, the map, you would say, is ambiguous on the question

17 of who had command power in relation to combat activities in the Neretva

18 valley and also the extent of any such command power. Is that an accurate

19 proposition?

20 A. The question is less than clear. What do you want me to do?

21 Q. Well, when the question is less than clear, you points it out to

22 me and then I'll ask you a proper question. That's the way we handle that

23 situation. What I'm putting to you is simply by looking at the map, you

24 can't determine who was in command of combat activities in the Neretva

25 valley in September of 1993, is that accurate?

1 A. I'm a professional soldier, and on the basis of a short yes or no

2 answer, I can't really deal with that question because it wouldn't be

3 sufficient. In replying to one of the previous questions I did already

4 point out that this topographic map that had been shown here and we have a

5 copy here, that that map in itself is not a complete document covering all

6 the combat activities in full. So you may perhaps derive the answer to

7 your question from this.

8 Q. Yes. Is another way of -- perhaps another way of asking the

9 question is the map is not sufficiently complete documentation on which to

10 answer that question? Is that a fair way to put the proposition?

11 A. The question is a bit better now, yes, that's it, more or less.

12 Q. Yes, thank you. Okay. Well -- and again I'm dealing at a very

13 high level of generality here but I'm putting perhaps the high level

14 propositions. The crucial question, I suggest to you, is one that you're

15 not in a position to answer from your own knowledge, and that is: What

16 powers did Rasim Delic actually give to Sefer Halilovic, and/or other

17 people, with respect to combat activities in the Neretva valley? Do you

18 agree that's the appropriate question to ask and do you agree that you're

19 not able to answer it from your own knowledge?

20 A. I've -- I commented yesterday on the order of the 30th of August,

21 which was submitted to General Halilovic by Rasim Delic and about the

22 contents of that order. And I commented the way I did. Those parts that

23 refer to the content. But what you're now referring to and the question

24 that you seem to be putting, yes, by all means, but what's put in writing

25 is one hand, is on one hand, but the right of any superior officer is

1 always to have the absolute right to issue orders in writing, but also to

2 issue oral orders. That's their absolute right as well. And I do totally

3 agree with you, it is a matter of relationship and the type of

4 communication between Rasim Delic and Sefer Halilovic. It is extremely

5 difficult for me to comment on that.

6 Q. Certainly. Very well, I'm now going to turn to the order of the

7 30th of the 8th itself?

8 JUDGE LIU: Well if you're going to details, maybe this is a

9 proper time for to us have a break.

10 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, Your Honours.

11 JUDGE LIU: Yes. I think we'll have 30 minutes' break and we'll

12 resume at 10 minutes to 1.

13 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.

14 --- On resuming at 12.51 p.m.

15 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey.

16 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honour. There are just two -- two

17 other matters that I neglected to deal with.

18 Q. Sorry, Mr. Karavelic, there are just two matters there that I

19 forgot about. One of them concerns the ending of the tape of Zenica. I

20 should ask you this: Before today, have you ever been shown that Zenica

21 tape?

22 A. One of those who -- well, perhaps the key, or rather if I'm not

23 mistaken, two years ago, following a request from somebody from the

24 Prosecution, at the Nedzarici department in Sarajevo, I tried to get these

25 cassettes with the help of some other people. We made a special effort

1 and we managed to get the cassettes that you are referring to. We were

2 told straight away, and this is precisely what you're referring to, we

3 were told about the missing third cassette, or about a missing end to the

4 film representing that meeting. But in my talks with all these people and

5 my conversation with the cameraman who actually made the tape, and I think

6 at the moment he works in Zenica, or I don't know whether he works for

7 radio or television, I'm not sure, but he did say something along the

8 lines that there may not be a tape at all, because there was an

9 interruption there. As to whether his memories were not too -- not all

10 that will clear, I don't know. This is just a minor contribution, for

11 what it's worth, in this entire situation.

12 Q. No, no. I'm grateful for the indication, but what I might do is

13 well -- perhaps --

14 A. And I've never seen the missing bit that you're referring to. I

15 do apologise for not answering your question properly.

16 Q. It's okay. But the question is now: Did you view the tapes that

17 they -- that you were provided with -- sorry, perhaps I should ask: Did

18 you get a chance to view the tapes that you sought?

19 A. Yes. In Sarajevo, I went through -- there are two tapes, I think,

20 if I remember correctly, and I viewed them in their entirety.

21 Q. Okay. I'm just going to show you the end of the tapes and I'll

22 ask you if that accords with your memory in just one second but before I

23 do that, apart from the cutoff at the end, there were no apparent breaks

24 or pieces of editing which you could see within the tape that you viewed;

25 is that correct?

1 A. I think not. As far as I'm concerned, these are very realistic,

2 truthful, objective pictures, the way I see it.

3 Q. Okay. Now I'm just going to show you the end of the tape and ask

4 you if the tape that you saw cut out and ended in the same way that the

5 tape you're about to look at now.

6 MR. MORRISSEY: So could that please be played?

7 [Videotape played]

8 MR. MORRISSEY: All right. Perhaps unless there is something we

9 don't know about, perhaps it could be stopped there. We are grateful for

10 that.

11 Q. Did the tape that you saw in Sarajevo cut out at the same point,

12 to the best of your memory, as the one here?

13 A. Yes. I think it did. Although if I may comment briefly, my

14 opinion is that this somewhat longer bit at the end of the second tape,

15 indicates that the meeting had basically already been completed but some

16 extra conversation is continuing at the tail end of that meeting whereby

17 people are asking questions and commenting on less essential matters. So

18 the way I see it, it is highly probable that this is the end of the tape

19 because it was not felt that any further tapes would be necessary. But I

20 can't say that I'm 100 per cent sure of this.

21 Q. Okay. Who was the person who was speaking at the end of that

22 particular tape, to the best of your recollection? When the tape cut off,

23 who was that man speaking?

24 A. The one to the right, the one that I've just seen, was Rasim

25 Delic, the Staff Commander of the Supreme Command.

1 Q. Yes, and the other person who was in the main part of the screen

2 was the accused man here, Sefer Halilovic; is that correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. All right. Very well. Thank you. Now just excuse me a moment.

5 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, that brings me to the second matter.

6 Your Honours, I call and the Prosecutors to provide, please, a copy of the

7 complete unadulterated tape that they have in their possession and any

8 translations of that which may chance to exist, to be provided to the

9 Defence as soon as possible, please, because the uninterrupted nature of

10 that tape is a matter of significance in our case. We think it's shown,

11 but we don't want there to be any doubt about it so I ask the Prosecutors

12 to provide that, please.

13 JUDGE LIU: Well, it's not in the materials of the disclosure

14 before?

15 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, we believe that it may be in the -- what's

16 called the "electronic discovery suite" which is a vast mine of

17 information, but I just want to be clear that what is in there is indeed

18 that document.

19 JUDGE LIU: Anybody in the Prosecution in the position to answer

20 this question?

21 MR. RE: No. Not when it's, to use Mr. Morrissey's words, sprung

22 on us like this in the middle of trial, no. But we'll look into it.

23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, yes, of course.

24 MR. MORRISSEY: It's really the video that's the -- the

25 significant part, what the Prosecution have there.

1 Q. Anyway, thank you again, Mr. Karavelic, for that.

2 Now, I just want to come now to the -- to some details about --

3 about how it was that Sefer Halilovic came to send you that order which

4 you complied with and obeyed, which is really your only involvement in

5 this case at all. Now, you were aware -- let me just -- I'll just go to

6 Zenica. Zenica was effectively a chance for all the corps commanders to

7 meet with commander Delic and the Main Staff in order to consider the

8 future direction of the war at a very high and general level, is that an

9 accurate way to put it?

10 A. Yes. That gathering was probably aimed at -- well, I don't know

11 whether prior to that meeting General Delic had any opportunity to bring

12 together all the corps commanders except for the 5th Corps commander in

13 order to have this sort of meeting, and, yes, basically we can say that

14 you're right.

15 Q. Okay. And after the Zenica conference, on the 29th of August, a

16 document was issued under the hand of commander Delic called "conclusions

17 and tasks."

18 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown Exhibit 109,

19 please?

20 Q. What's going to be shown to you now is a document that was

21 tendered here earlier on in the trial and I'll just ask you for some

22 comments on that document when it comes up. This is quite a lengthy

23 document that's here but just looking at the first page of it, are you

24 able to comment on whether you are familiar with the document? In other

25 words, whether a copy of this was provided to you at some stage by

1 commander Delic?

2 A. I think so. And I am familiar with the document.

3 Q. Yes. Oh, good. Okay. Well could we please go and on the

4 electronic version could we go to the part headed Roman numeral II, tasks,

5 I think it might be two or three pages into the document. I just like you

6 to -- you don't have to do it in any great detail but just to be fair to

7 you just to refresh your memory as to some of the tasks that were issued

8 by Commander Delic arising out of the -- the Zenica meeting. Do you

9 notice that under the heading of tasks, there are a number of individual

10 tasks, which are at a high level of generality, if you like? They are not

11 concerned with -- with specific battles but they are concerned with high

12 level sort of matters concerning education and so on, each one is

13 different of course, but do you agree with that generally speaking, that

14 those tasks that are issued are quite high-level ones?

15 A. Generally speaking, yes.

16 Q. Now, one -- could I ask you to direct your attention to number 9,

17 please? With respect to number 9, that seems to get a little more

18 specific than some of the others, but is it the fact that there was a

19 general problem throughout the army, and in particular with respect to the

20 6th Corps, concerning smaller units which had yet to find a secure place

21 within the line of command and control of the individual corps? Do you

22 agree with that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. I just want to ask you a specific question about the Zulfikar unit

25 now seeing that it's mentioned there. The Zulfikar unit was a unit which

1 took part in the very desperate struggles of the army throughout 1993,

2 including on Igman; is that correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Is it fair to say -- to describe the Zulfikar unit this way:

5 Sometimes it was in the line of command and control and sometimes it just

6 wasn't? And perhaps you might --

7 A. Maybe I can say yes, but this was not within my jurisdiction, so I

8 don't know what that unit -- what the relationship of that unit was to my

9 superiors, but it's probably the way you said in the question.

10 Q. I understand. I'll keep the questions just within what you know,

11 if I can. With respect to the Zulfikar unit, to your knowledge, was that

12 unit a unit which, at least on many occasions, was directly subordinated

13 to the Main Staff rather than being subordinated to a corps?

14 A. Yes. Precisely. It wasn't subordinated to the 1st Corps at

15 least. It's possible that it was subordinated to others. I don't know.

16 Q. Tell me if you remember this, the answer to this question. You

17 may or may not. What -- is it your recollection that the Zulfikar unit

18 was the subject of a number of attempts to place it within the line of

19 command and control of a particular corps, but that that unit did not

20 cooperate with being placed within the control and command of a particular

21 corps, whether that be the 6th Corps or some other corps? Do you remember

22 any such proposition as the one I've put to you?

23 A. I think that the answer is yes.

24 Q. And -- very well. Now, just returning to this document at

25 paragraph 9, the other units described there were similar, smaller units,

1 one might say, popular units with commanders popularly appointed, is that

2 accurate?

3 A. You could say that.

4 Q. And on the face of this, what Commander Delic was trying to

5 achieve was just one more step in the gradual process of bringing the

6 whole army under a single line of command and control. Is that accurate?

7 A. I think so, too.

8 Q. Okay. Just excuse me a second. In general terms, I won't take

9 you through every word of it just to prove a simple point but do you agree

10 that in that document there, there is no reference to the Operation

11 Neretva or to the appointment of Sefer Halilovic to any command position

12 or indeed to any specific operation in the Neretva valley whatsoever?

13 A. I agree.

14 Q. And that document is completely consistent with what you saw and

15 heard at the Zenica conference that you attended; is that correct?

16 A. It's difficult to say that it's so, 100 per cent, but for the most

17 part, yes, I think so.

18 Q. Yes. Very well. Thank you. Okay. Well, I've asked you about

19 Zenica. I've asked you about this particular note. Now I just want to

20 show you to another document.

21 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the -- I'm sorry, this is a document --

22 sorry, just pardon me, Your Honour. Just excuse me.

23 [Defence counsel confer]

24 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours we may have left this off the list of

25 documents that we uploaded. It's not on the list. Sorry, would you just

1 excuse us for a moment? We will provide you with the D numbers in any

2 event. Thank you.

3 Your Honours, could I just indicate and apologise, there has been

4 significant slashing of the -- of the list here, and extra lists have been

5 produced at short notice. The fault is mine not those of anyone else in

6 the team.

7 Okay. Could the witness please be shown document DD000099?

8 Your Honours, a copy of this will be provided to the Prosecutors,

9 but it's a pretty short document in any event. Okay.

10 Q. This is a letter that's going to be shown to you and I'll just ask

11 you to read it and then I'll ask you some questions about it.

12 Mr. Karavelic, could I just ask, while that's being done, do you have that

13 document yet on the screen or not? Because we don't. We are getting

14 there.

15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter doesn't know whether the witness

16 said yes or no.

17 MR. MORRISSEY: The answer was no.

18 Q. But while that's being done, let me just ask you another question,

19 perhaps not to waste all the time. You were familiar with -- with some

20 staff officers, Zicro Suljevic, Rifat Bilajac, and Vehbija Karic during

21 your time as commander of the 1st Corps; is that correct? ?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I just have a question about Vehbija Karic. So far as you were

24 aware, he was a married man who had married a person of Croatian

25 ethnicity; is that correct? His wife was Croatian by background?

1 A. I think so but I'm not 100 per cent sure.

2 Q. Okay. Yes. Okay. The document that I wanted is now on the

3 screen. And if you wouldn't mind just looking at that -- look at the date

4 of it, which is -- it's dated Jablanica the 1st of September, and look at

5 who it's directed to. And then look at the contents, and I'll ask you --

6 I'll ask you whether you've seen it before and then I'll ask you to

7 comment on some of the things that are contained in it.

8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 406.

9 THE WITNESS: I've read it.

10 MR. MORRISSEY:

11 Q. Okay. Now, among the thousands of documents that you may have

12 seen over time, I suppose I have to ask you this very clearly, do you

13 recall whether you've seen this document before or not?

14 A. I don't think I've seen it before. I'm seeing it for the first

15 time.

16 Q. Well, in that event, I'll just ask to you to note certain of the

17 characteristics of it. Does this appear to be a -- at least on the face

18 of it, a document sent from Jablanica by the three individuals at the

19 bottom, just excuse me a moment, sorry, Zicro, Rifat, and Vehbija, a

20 document sent from there to the commander of the Supreme Command Staff,

21 namely Rasim Delic?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay. It makes reference -- this document makes reference to a

24 proposal, and what I want to do is ask you whether you recall anything

25 about this proposal that was, at least on the face of this document,

1 current, at -- on the 1st of September 1993. It says here, "we did not

2 know" -- down at the bottom, it's at -- very low down on the page. "We do

3 not know if the proposal that we have sent to use units from Sarajevo and

4 the 3rd Corps met with approval." Now I just want to ask you, from your

5 own memory, did you know about or do you remember anything about a

6 proposal sent by these three individuals to Commander Delic concerning the

7 use of -- I'm just quoting in general terms -- units from Sarajevo and

8 also from the 3rd Corps? I just ask you: What's your recollection, if

9 any, about that topic?

10 A. I don't remember. It's very hard for me to say anything about

11 this.

12 Q. Let me but some questions about what you were doing at that time.

13 On -- at the end of August and at the start of September -- I began to ask

14 you about this before and then we changed streams. At the end of August

15 and at the start of September, although the Igman situation had stabilised

16 to some extent, you were still very concerned about the security of

17 Sarajevo; is that correct?

18 A. Absolutely, absolutely.

19 Q. And the very last thing you wanted, even if -- I'm sorry, I'll put

20 that in a more formal way I apologise. Although of course you would

21 comply with orders you received, you did not want to give up units from

22 your defence if you didn't positively have to give them up. Is that

23 accurate?

24 A. Yes. Precisely. And this links on to your previous question.

25 For example, if the situation in Igman deteriorated and the aggressor had

1 some successes would mean that Sarajevo would be under a second ring of

2 siege, which would ultimately lead to the death of Sarajevo, because it

3 would be short of food, water, ammunition for combat and so on. So in a

4 way, a good or a bad situation at Igman would reflect equally on Sarajevo.

5 Secondly, in the course of 1993, the aggressor was constantly

6 conducting combat operations vis-a-vis the town so it was a danger every

7 day that the aggressor could enter the town and that the town could fall

8 as a result. And this was always a reflection of the situation at Igman,

9 and that's the reason why I did what I did, and in a way, it's also the

10 answer to your question.

11 Q. Yes. And I appreciate the answer. Well, because of that pressure

12 that you were under, do you -- in terms of any discussions sorry I'll take

13 a step back. You indicated a memory that you had of a conversation with

14 Sefer Halilovic, possibly a telephone conversation, in which you discussed

15 some troops -- the possibility of troops being sent down to Herzegovina to

16 help in combat activities there. And what I want to ask you is this: Are

17 you able to comment on the possibility that these inspection team members,

18 Zulic, Bilajac, and Karic, did in fact have a conversation with commander

19 Delic on the topic of getting extra units from Sarajevo and also from the

20 3rd Corps? Can you comment on that or not?

21 MR. RE: I mean, that's really speculative. It goes a little bit

22 too far in my submission.

23 JUDGE LIU: Unless there is some basis for you to ask this

24 question, otherwise, this question is not allowed.

25 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour the basis would be: If he remembers

1 it, he remembers it; and if he doesn't, he doesn't. And that will be --

2 if he doesn't remember, it's the ends. If he remembers it, I'll ask him

3 what he remembers.

4 JUDGE LIU: The question is not whether he remembers or not. The

5 question is whether he knew or not.

6 MR. MORRISSEY: Ah, well to the extent of a difference Your Honour

7 I'll certainly ask it this way.

8 Q. Do you remember whether there was such discussions going on

9 between Commander Delic and the three inspection team members, Suljevic,

10 Bilajac, and Karic, exploring the possibility of getting some extra units

11 from Sarajevo and possibly the 3rd Corps?

12 A. I don't remember anything like that specifically but this document

13 indicates something like that, and we can see from it that these talks had

14 taken place, these discussions. I don't know what else to say.

15 Q. That's okay. You just say what you can remember and that's what

16 you're being asked. Going further from that, did Sefer Halilovic in the

17 conversation with you, do you recall whether he made any reference to this

18 matter, in other words, that Vehbija Karic, and Suljevic, and Bilajac had

19 already discussed this matter with Rasim Delic and canvassed the

20 possibility of taking some of your troops?

21 A. I did speak with him, and General Sefer Halilovic spoke to me

22 about the possibility of taking units from the 1st Corps, but I don't

23 remember us talking about whether Zicro, Rifat, and Vehbija talked with

24 General Delic or not. This was beyond my area. I could have heard or

25 found out about it quite by coincidence, but it was not a part of my

1 chain, so I really didn't know regardless of whether it did happen or not.

2 Q. Okay. And well let me just ask you then some other questions

3 about -- about what Sefer Halilovic said. Do you -- you indicated when we

4 asked you about -- when you were asked by my learned friend, Mr. Re, and

5 me about this conversation, you indicate add general memory rather than

6 word-for-word memory. Is that a fair way to put the situation in terms of

7 that telephone conversation?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. All right. Is it possible that Sefer Halilovic in that

10 conversation asked you whether you'd be prepared to provide units from the

11 1 Glorious Brigade and the 2nd Knightly Brigade for his purposes down in

12 Herzegovina? In other words, is it possible that he asked you for those

13 units?

14 MR. RE: Again it's the same objection. I mean, anything is

15 possible. The real question should be: Did he or do you recall him

16 asking you that?

17 JUDGE LIU: Yes, maybe the form of the question is not so proper,

18 but generally speaking this kind of question is allowed.

19 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes. Okay.

20 Q. I'll put the question more directly to your memory about it. Do

21 you remember whether or not Sefer Halilovic made that inquiry of you

22 during that conversation?

23 A. It's really hard to say. I would rather say that I really don't

24 remember. I don't remember that units were mentioned at all. Actually

25 units were discussed, but I don't remember that specific units were

1 mentioned. I don't think that they were.

2 Q. Well, just in terms of the concrete situation facing the 1st

3 Glorious Brigade and the 2nd Knightly Brigade, who had you been asked to

4 release them, what were the relevant factors that would have determined

5 your answer about those two in terms of their obligations on the front

6 line?

7 A. I decided about that as the commander of the 1st Corps. In making

8 my decision, I put the significance of a certain unit at a given point in

9 time as the most important thing while I was making my decision, and we

10 are talking about the glorious and the knightly units, because they had a

11 very important part, and they bore the heaviest burden in the defence of

12 Sarajevo. And I decided -- I would be reluctant to decide to send units

13 from those brigades anywhere, or I wouldn't do it at all.

14 Q. Well, now, in terms of fighting abilities, it was perfectly

15 sensible for Sefer Halilovic to ask for units of the 9th and the 10th to

16 be provided to him for combat operations down in Herzegovina, in the order

17 which he ultimately sent you; do you agree with that?

18 A. Yes. He could have done that, absolutely. He had the right to do

19 that. And in my opinion, this does not run counter to anything in terms

20 of my own professional military opinion. At the same time, this could

21 have been some other unit also.

22 Q. Yes. And the fact is that when those units were chosen to go down

23 and fight, and when you said goodbye to the 9th Brigade in particular,

24 never for one second did it occur to you these people might commit

25 atrocities against civilians; is that correct?

1 A. Absolutely.

2 Q. What you expected from those units was that they would behave with

3 honour and seek to bring about conclusions consistent with the platform of

4 the Presidency and the purposes of the army; is that correct?

5 A. Absolutely.

6 Q. And, of course, if you personally as a professional commander had

7 have had any thoughts that there was danger like that, and I'm not

8 suggesting for one second you should have had such thoughts, but if you

9 had have any such thoughts you would have made it clear, "Don't take these

10 units"; is that correct?

11 A. Without any doubt, and to the least possible degree.

12 Q. And I suppose just to follow that up, you knew of course when they

13 were being dispatched that they were going to be sent to fight in

14 Herzegovina against the HVO; is that correct?

15 A. I think so, yes.

16 Q. Now, Sarajevo was a town that had a very mixed population of

17 different people of different ethnic backgrounds at the time of the war;

18 is that correct?

19 A. Precisely. In the corps command, during 1992 and 1993, my morale

20 assistant was a Serb by the name of Rajko Mihajlovic. In my corps, the

21 legal affairs assistant, from day one to the last day of the war,

22 throughout the whole four years of the war, I had an assistant whose name

23 was Zlatko Petrovic, and he's a minister today in one of the ministries in

24 the Sarajevo canton. The number one man in the artillery of the corps was

25 a Croat named Miro Grbavac. The commander of a unit which reported to the

1 corps command, it was a light artillery and anti-aircraft defence unit,

2 was a Croat by the name of Darvin Lisica, and so on and so forth.

3 Q. And within the city of Sarajevo, Bosniak Muslims who lived there

4 often lived side by side with their Croatian neighbours who also stayed

5 and lived in Sarajevo and joined the struggle; is that correct?

6 A. Absolutely, absolutely.

7 Q. That's what you were actually fighting to protect, that sort of

8 neighbourly relations; is that correct?

9 A. It was something very basic, and it was the foundations of the

10 future Bosnia-Herzegovina that I was fighting for, and I believe 100 per

11 cent that General Halilovic also fought for that.

12 Q. Yes. And in concrete terms, in the city of Sarajevo, that meant

13 that -- okay, could I just ask you this: When soldiers finished on the

14 line, finished their line duty in Sarajevo and went off duty, did they go

15 and live in big, organised barracks rooms like a regular army or did they

16 go home to their own homes in Stari Grad or elsewhere? What was the

17 general practice for soldiers off duty there?

18 A. The 1st Corps, as I said, in 1993, numbered somewhere around

19 75.000 soldiers. Even at peacetime, you can't provide housing for such

20 large numbers of soldiers, not to mention a wartime in Sarajevo when

21 two-thirds of overall infrastructure was either torched, destroyed, and

22 totally useless. So the conclusion is that out of the entire number of

23 soldiers, about 40.000 in the city of Sarajevo where the 1st Corps is

24 concerned, perhaps -- I'm just going to give you one figure. Perhaps

25 5.000 or 6.000 soldiers had some sort of housing, but even that was

1 improvised housing in cellars and parts of some buildings. Everybody

2 else, and all that housing was provided for those units and those soldiers

3 who had to be in a certain state of preparedness, who had to be ready to

4 intervene within a quarter of an hour if there was a problem along the

5 defence lines of the city of Sarajevo. They had to rush out to the front

6 lines and start fighting straight away, in case there was a problem with

7 those defence lines. Everybody else was either on the defence lines or,

8 if not, they were at home.

9 Q. Yes, okay. Thank you for that. One of the things I wanted to

10 find out from you is -- is this: It was pretty common just for Bosniak

11 soldiers to live next door to their Croat neighbours in peace in the city

12 of Sarajevo, to your understanding; is that correct?

13 A. Absolutely.

14 Q. Now, in terms of the selection of billeting facilities for the

15 troops that were sent down to Herzegovina, first of all, the selection of

16 those billeting facilities had absolutely nothing to do with you

17 personally; is that correct?

18 A. I don't understand what facilities you mean.

19 Q. Pardon me. What I'm talking about is where the -- where the

20 soldiers from the 9th and 10th Brigade and 2nd Independent Battalion who

21 were sent out of Sarajevo by you and went down to Herzegovina, those

22 soldiers had to be billeted somewhere and the question is: You had

23 nothing to do with the selection of the place where they were billeted; is

24 that correct? You as corps commander just had nothing to do with any such

25 thing; is that correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. And in the concrete case of course these troops were not

3 under your control once they left Sarajevo, and I understand that, but in

4 any event, the billeting of 200 troops or so is not a matter that the

5 corps commander would normally concern himself with, even if they were in

6 your zone; is that correct? That would be a matter for somebody lower

7 down the chain; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. Now, in the event that -- I understand you don't -- you

10 weren't involved in what happened down there but I just have to ask you

11 this as a -- in the event that these units were -- were subordinated, or

12 at least ordered to be subordinated or suggested to be subordinated, to

13 the unit of Zulfikar Alispago, then, of course, it fell to local

14 commander -- I withdraw that because it's a hypothetical. You can't

15 comment on it. I'll deal with it in a different way. In the case of units

16 that are sent down it on a mission like that, units let's say 200 soldiers

17 strong, approximately, it would fall to the local commander at a company

18 or possibly battalion level to organise accommodation for those troops; is

19 that correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And in assessing where to place particular troops, the local

22 commander would have to take into account all of his local knowledge to

23 determine what was the appropriate place to put those troops; is that

24 correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So that that commander would have to consider, first of all, what

2 was the available range of choices of places to put such troops; is that

3 correct?

4 A. Absolutely.

5 Q. Then he'd have to consider whether the units that he was

6 accommodating had any special dislike for the local population. For

7 example, a history of anti-Croat behaviour; is that correct?

8 A. Definitely. That was one in a series of steps.

9 Q. Yes. Of course. And I'm just going through a number of these --

10 these steps now. Then he would have to consider whether or not there was

11 water nearby for the troops to drink and a suitable place for a

12 communications centre to be established?

13 A. Definitely. Those elements and many others.

14 Q. Yes. I mean, there are a whole host of matters that have to be

15 taken into account by the local commander in determining those matters.

16 But, in fact, let me just ask you: Are you aware of whether or not in

17 Jablanica and Grabovica, in early September 1993, whether there was a big

18 influx of refugees taking up a lot of space in those -- in that -- in

19 those two places?

20 A. As far as I can remember, and as far as I know, from many sources,

21 the media or sources of information coming from the political and military

22 leaders, with regard to those matters and the state of affairs down in the

23 valley of Neretva, there was a great deal of confusion. It was chaotic

24 and there was a huge number of refugees.

25 Q. So -- now if a commander was given -- where a commander is given

1 the opportunity to billet, where a commander was given an opportunity to

2 billet -- to billet a mixed force of Bosnian army soldiers, by which I

3 mean a mixed force, including Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, where a

4 commander was given the opportunity to billet such soldiers in a village

5 populated by old and relatively friendly Croatian villagers, then if the

6 other options were limited, then it's perfectly open to such a commander

7 to make that decision to put them there; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And of course, in that situation, if such a mixed unit is billeted

10 with those old Croat civilians, of course a staff unit should go and see

11 if the troops are settling in and if everything is under control and

12 conditions are friendly; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. All right. Now, I've drifted a bit forward into the world of the

15 things that actually happened there and I need to -- need to come and --

16 come back to where we were. Anyway you've indicated already that as to

17 this document with Vehbija, Zicro, and Rifat, you can't recall seeing it,

18 and you've indicated what you can remember about the conversation with

19 Sefer Halilovic. Soon after that, you got a -- you got a -- on the 2nd of

20 September, you got an order from Sefer Halilovic to please -- and then

21 could the witness please be shown Exhibit - I'm sorry, just excuse me - as

22 to that document of -- with Rifat, Zicro, and Vehbija, I offer that

23 document for tender.

24 JUDGE LIU: Any objections, Mr. Re?

25 MR. RE: No, Your Honour.

1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. It's admitted into the evidence.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D406.

3 JUDGE LIU: I understand it's time for the break. So could we

4 break now and continue your cross-examination in the afternoon?

5 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, certainly, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Thank you. And we'll resume at 3.30 in the same

7 courtroom.

8 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.45 p.m.

9 --- On resuming at 3.30 p.m.

10 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey. Are you ready to continue?

11 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, Your Honour.

12 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Karavelic. We are just going to spend --

13 I'm going to ask you some questions for the next 15 minutes or so

14 concerning some limited aspects of military theory. Some of this might be

15 very basic for you but it's -- it helps the Court to have some of it on

16 the record so I'm going to show you a couple of documents I'll ask you for

17 brief comments on it, and you feel free to comment, if you feel as if

18 you're being put in a funny position by being shown part of a document you

19 should tell us that because we may not know. So -- but in any event,

20 having said that -- just excuse me one moment.

21 [Defence counsel confer]

22 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours I'm going to now put to the witness

23 some parts of a book with a title in English, "The Theory of Military

24 Control." Can I indicate that some of this -- most of this was put to the

25 witness Selmo Cikotic who gave evidence a month or so ago, and because --

1 it's up loaded into the system in Bosnian language but not in English but,

2 however, we've photocopied the transcript of the hearing of Mr. Cikotic to

3 an English version can be before the Tribunal and the Prosecutors as well,

4 of course, so I just ask that this be distributed now and I would ask

5 meanwhile that MFI 195 be displayed on the screen. That's in Bosnian.

6 Okay.

7 Q. Now, on the screen, there is a document I'm going to show you,

8 it's computerised, but it's -- it's title is the "The Theory of Military

9 Control. " May I just ask you first of all, are you familiar with that

10 particular book?

11 A. I'm not sure.

12 Q. Do you have that on the screen in front of you there or not?

13 A. I do.

14 Q. Well, I'm not in any way attempting to set an exam, I can assure

15 you I'm not fitted to do that, but I just want to put certain parts of it

16 to you and could the witness please be shown page 2 of that document, as

17 it is uploaded and Mr. Karavelic you'll have in front of you a page that

18 has a heading, "Two, obnas rukovodjenje i komanovanje. [phoen]" Do you

19 see that heading?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Very well. Now, the second paragraph down concerns a definition

22 of the process of -- just excuse me one moment. Yes.

23 [Defence counsel confer]

24 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, on page 73 of the transcript at line

25 7, the passage that I'm going to put to the witness is to be found. It's

1 the same passage that I put to Mr. Cikotic long ago at line 7.

2 Q. Very well, if you just read that passage and I'll read at the same

3 time from the transcript here, "the military dictionary defines command as

4 the function of control in the armed forces with the interpretation of the

5 right of officers to make decisions. It is important to say that only

6 persons authorised by law, regulations and rules are authorised to command

7 and not other command staffs or some other control structures."

8 Now, is that an accurate -- or, sorry, does that quotation

9 accurately reflect military doctrine as it was or as it was supposed to be

10 in the Bosnian army in 1993?

11 A. As to the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they did not have

12 their own special military doctrine. They had taken over the military

13 doctrine of the JNA. In the case of the first part of this quote, the one

14 that you've just read out, yesterday or the day before, I did say word for

15 word, as it were, that command is a part of control, an integral part of

16 control. That's what I said. So, for example, the first sentence of this

17 quote confirms that, but it says at the same time that command and control

18 are things that go hand in hand, and they can be separated. It's not

19 impossible. But they normally go together.

20 And the second part of the quote, generally speaking, I would tend

21 to agree, but if we were to ask a whole series of questions, because there

22 is a rather general statement, you know, so at one point it says, "command

23 can be carried out only by people entitled to do so by law," and the

24 question arises: Who are these people entitled to do that? And then the

25 rules and regulations, what rules? What regulations? Command staff or

1 some other sort of control structure. With reference to this part of the

2 sentence, and this is my view, the command is not in command. It is

3 quite right. I mean, when it comes to the 1st Corps, the command of the

4 1st Corps commands the corps. But if we look at it on the basis of this

5 part of your quote, the commander of the 1st Corps is the person who has

6 the exclusive right to command the 1st Corps. And the entire command of

7 the corps depends on him, is accountable to him. In the same way the

8 entire staff of the Supreme Command is accountable to the Supreme Command

9 Staff Commander. And so what you are saying here is absolutely correct.

10 The command of the staff or any other structure are not entitled to

11 command.

12 Q. Yes. Now, I'm grateful for that and I just want to ask for a

13 little further explanation arising from this quote, perhaps stepping

14 outside it slightly, but I want to put the question to you. At the high

15 level, say, at the corps level or even higher, at the General Staff or

16 Main Staff level, do -- does a Chief of Staff exercise some -- some parts

17 of rukovodjenje, of the general function of control, without actually

18 exercising command powers? In other words, do chiefs of staff participate

19 with coordination, planning and the other four parts of the control

20 process but not in the command process unless they have specific authority

21 to do so? Would you comment on that, place?

22 A. By putting this question, you've actually explained it very

23 nicely. Your very question in itself provides us with an answer. So

24 roughly speaking that's the way it is.

25 Q. You have no idea how relieved I am, Mr. Karavelic. I'm sorry, I

1 do struggle with these concepts myself from time to time. But so, it's

2 accurate to say that a Chief of Staff can been exercising Rukovodjenje in

3 a very real sense but without exercising command. In a short way, is that

4 an accurate statement?

5 A. Depending on duties, tasks, that staff of any command is faced

6 with, or rather the Chief of Staff is faced with. It is precisely those

7 duties and tasks that the staff of the Chief of Staff carry out are for

8 the most part dependent on control activities, on the control function,

9 because whatever is done is done in terms of organisation, preparation the

10 drafting of final documents and so on and so forth, with regard to any

11 specific task. And then you move on to the actual implementation, that is

12 to say command. Implementing the work of the staff as personified by the

13 Chief of Staff.

14 Q. Yes. I understand. Thank you.

15 Now, there is -- now, just excuse me one moment, please.

16 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours I'm now going to ask the witness to

17 read into the transcript a short six-line, seven -- six-and-a-half-line

18 passage. This has not previously been translated but I have to say that

19 just today, we've made a decision to use it. So we've provided the

20 translation booth with a photocopy of the Bosnian and I'm just going to

21 ask -- we did this with -- with Mr. Cikotic. It's not ideal, I understand

22 that, but because of the hurry factor we just think we better do it and

23 accomplish what we can. That's what's about to be done.

24 Q. Now -- sorry, Mr. Karavelic, would you please look two paragraphs

25 further down at a section -- at a line beginning "calan," [phoen] I think,

1 "calan 1, 2, 3." Do you see that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Would you please read aloud slowly or just reasonably slowly to

4 help the interpreter that section for seven lines down, up to the section

5 that says "samo jedno lice" [phoen]? So six and a half lines' worth, and

6 if you -- thank you.

7 A. Article 123 of the constitution of the SFRY singles out the

8 control function. "The president of the Presidency of the SFRY on behalf

9 of the Presidency of SFRY carries out the command of the armed forces of

10 the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, in line with this

11 constitution and the federal law."

12 This means that the control function is placed -- the command

13 function, sorry, is placed within the area of competence of the president

14 of the Presidency of SFRY whilst the control function in its entirety, the

15 control of the armed forces, that is, has remained within the area of

16 competence of the Presidency of SFRY. The Presidency is a collegial body

17 for the control of the armed forces, whilst the command function requires

18 one person only.

19 Q. Thank you very much.

20 MR. RE: Can I just inquire what -- what -- I'm just a bit

21 confused what was being read out. Was that from the previous exhibit?

22 Perhaps that could be put on the record.

23 MR. MORRISSEY: I'm sorry, yes, that should be put on the record.

24 I apologise for that. Yes, it is. It's from the same page of the

25 previous exhibit and it's 3 paragraphs down from that.

1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

2 MR. MORRISSEY:

3 Q. Thank you. Would you mind just briefly commenting on what the

4 significance of that passage is that you've read to the Court?

5 A. The significance is that everything I've said so far is basically

6 the same as what I've just read out, which means I mentioned that the

7 command function is within the framework of the control function. This

8 has been confirmed by the previous quote, and this quote says, and this is

9 something else that I've mentioned before, that is to say that the staff

10 and the command in its entirety depend on control. And that is confirmed

11 by this quote, and that the entire staff or rather the entire command

12 depends on one person, the commander, that is. And that is stated in the

13 last bit of this quote. That is to say, the command function requires one

14 person only.

15 Q. Very well. I'm grateful for that. Now, would you please --

16 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown now the same

17 exhibit but two pages further on? I think it's page 4 of the exhibit, the

18 DD number is DD002758.

19 Q. Now, at the bottom of that page is to be found another passage.

20 MR. MORRISSEY: And, Your Honours, that passage begins with

21 "komandovanje vojnom dzididikom," [phoen] and some of there was read to

22 the witness Cikotic in the past and that was done at page 76 of the

23 transcript of 23rd of February, lines 9 to 11. But, however, on advice

24 now from -- from within our team, there is a slightly longer passage that

25 I want to ask the -- the witness read in and that's what I'm going to do.

1 This also has been provided to the booth so at the bottom of page 176 of

2 the document, page 4 of the uploaded one.

3 Q. Mr. Karavelic, do you see the passage that I mentioned there?

4 It's perhaps ten lines from the bottom commencing with the word

5 "komandovanje." [phoen] Do you see that passage?

6 A. I can see two paragraphs starting by the term "command."

7 Q. It will be the lower of the two, ten lines from the bottom of the

8 page. Yes, no, pardon me. I take that back because actually there is

9 three on that page. So that was the problem. Yes, not the very bottom

10 one. The one above that, say ten lines from the bottom. Do you have

11 that?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Thank you. Would you please read those ten lines relatively

14 slowly so that the interpreters can interpret it?

15 A. "The command of a military unit is carried out by appointed

16 individuals who are appointed as commanders of units, depending on the

17 size and the significance of the units in question, which is established

18 on the basis of the formation of the said unit. The appointment is

19 carried out on the basis of an order, an appointment order or decree.

20 That means that the right of command is in the hands of the appointed

21 individual at any establishment duty. We have to keep in mind that there

22 are certain differences, such as, A, command is related to specific

23 establishment duties; that is, only some positions within the organisation

24 chart or structure are characterised by the right of command. B, if an

25 individual is appointed to such a duty, that individual acquires the right

1 of command within limits established by the regulations of the

2 organisation, by law, with regard to the establishment position in

3 question. That is to say, if a person is appointed as a unit commander,

4 that person acquires the right to command that unit." The end.

5 Q. Thank you. I'm very grateful to you for reading that into the

6 transcript for us.

7 Does that accurately state JNA doctrine and also, as a result,

8 Bosnian army doctrine, at the time of 1993?

9 A. According to my understanding, my general understanding of this, I

10 believe that's it.

11 Q. Yes. Thank you very much for that. I now wish to have you shown

12 a couple of other documents.

13 MR. MORRISSEY: Now, could the witness please be shown on the

14 screen Exhibit 142? This was a book entitled, "Command and control."

15 Again, parts of this were shown to other witnesses. I believe Mr. Cikotic

16 as well, but this is uploaded and translated.

17 Q. Could I say while that's being done, frankly, I acknowledge as I

18 have acknowledged before, that proceeding in the way that we are does

19 create potential difficulties for the Prosecutor and if there is some way

20 they are caught out or it proves something has gone wrong then the Defence

21 won't, I would think, seek -- seek to oppose any remedy that seems

22 appropriate. I understand it's not -- it's not desirable but I also

23 understand that we don't want to be here on Monday or next week so that's

24 why we've done what we've done.

25 Now, if the witness can be shown, please ...

1 Q. Sorry, first of all, just looking at the front page there, do you

2 see the front page of a book and do you know that -- that military

3 textbook, "rukovodjenje i komandovenje" [phoen]?

4 A. I think so but I'm not sure. I'm not 100 per cent sure here

5 either. There are quite a few such books.

6 Q. Yes. Well, these books are brought courtesy of Mr. Dzambasovic.

7 MR. MORRISSEY: Now, could I ask that the witness please be shown,

8 in the Bosnian version, pages 18 to 19. In the English version this, I

9 believe, is page 13 of Exhibit 142. Mr. Karavelic, just excuse us,

10 please, we just want to be sure we put the right part to you. Oh, I'm

11 sorry, what we really need -- the Court staff have placed on screen -- we

12 mean page 18 in terms of this document itself, so that's page 21 on the

13 document. We need to go back to page 18 of the actual document.

14 Q. Do you see a heading entitled, "Number 2, command and

15 control"?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Very well. I won't get you to read this into the transcript

18 because we -- we -- we have it here. But there is a passage which in the

19 Bosnian commences -- commences -- it's the last paragraph there,

20 commencing with the words "ovda je nusdo." [phoen] Do you see that

21 passage? "At this point it is necessary to establish a distinction

22 between control and command." Do you see that section?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Very well. Would you mind just reading that as quickly or slowly

25 as you want to and then confirming whether or not that accurately reflects

1 JNA military doctrine, and therefore Bosnian military doctrine in 1993?

2 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, the passage which the witness is

3 reading is in English on page 14, starting at the words, "at this point,"

4 and down to the bottom of that page.

5 THE WITNESS: I've read it.

6 Q. Okay. Now, does that passage there accurately reflect JNA

7 military doctrine, and therefore, Bosnian military doctrine in, as you

8 understood it, in 1993?

9 A. For the most part.

10 Q. And --

11 A. It's nothing special, if we compare it to everything we've said

12 before. It simply confirms everything else, everything we've said before

13 with regard to command and control. There is just one bit bothering me

14 here. When it says, "Command carries out on the basis of orders,

15 directives, and instructions," almost as if only senior officers could

16 issue such orders, and not a command bodies, administration bodies, or

17 whatever. And other -- other bodies. It's not just individuals. So I'm

18 a bit puzzled by this particular bit, but everything else, as far as I can

19 understand, is correct.

20 Q. And perhaps just to clarify that, as a result of something that

21 was said in the past, was there a different word used for a commander at a

22 lower level than a commander at a higher level in the Bosnian language?

23 A. In English, all sorts of levels for leader of a military unit are

24 described as commander, but we have a company commander, and a -- the word

25 in Bosnian is "komandir," and everything higher up is commander,

1 "komandant."

2 Q. That's the distinction I was interested in. Thank you very much

3 for pointing that out. Good. Thank you.

4 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please now be shown the same

5 exhibit, it's pages 33 to 34 in the Bosnian, and it's page 27 and over to

6 page 28, in the English.

7 Q. Now, what's coming now is a section headed, "Number 5, principles

8 of command and control." Once again, this may not prove to be any

9 different to anything you've said before but I just ask for your comment

10 in any event. Do you have that passage there in front of you, "principles

11 of command and control"?

12 A. I can see the end of those principles.

13 Q. Perhaps -- well --

14 A. I can see it now, the beginning, at the beginning of the

15 principles.

16 Q. Excellent. Sorry, just excuse me a moment. We may be looking at

17 something else now, so -- I'm sorry, we have a small problem of

18 coordination and control of our own on our side here, so just forgive me.

19 I'm sorry, I remember this problem happened last time, yes, it's page 25

20 in Bosnian, in the Bosnian one. My apologies for that.

21 Okay. Do you have that now, number 5, "principles of command and

22 control," including a subheading of "single authority"?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Very well. Would you mind just reading to yourself at whatever

25 speed you like that section five, "principles of command and control," and

1 including the part on single authority. And just read that to yourself

2 and at the end I'll just ask you does that accurately reflect JNA doctrine

3 and Bosnian military doctrine as well.

4 A. I've read through it, if that's the end.

5 Q. Yes, thank you, that's farce I wish to go with it. Does that

6 accurately state JNA military doctrine and therefore Bosnian military

7 doctrine as well?

8 A. These principles of command and control, as far as I can see, have

9 been taken over from certain rules, but I would just like to add

10 something, to emphasise the fact that the principles of command and

11 control in the JNA are regulated in the book called "The Strategy of Armed

12 Combat," and this is a document of crucial significance, issued,

13 published, by the Federal Secretariat for National Defence in the former

14 Yugoslavia. It was published in Belgrade, and this was the most

15 significant document that concerns strategic matters, and it sets forth in

16 detail all these principles of armed combat or rather all these principles

17 of command and control. So this is probably been adopted from that book.

18 In my opinion, that is the case.

19 Q. Very well, thank you very much. Now there is one final passage

20 from this book that I would like you to be shown, and that is the Bosnian

21 page 29, the English is at pages 35, and over the page to 36. This is a

22 short passage. And where we start is at the heading number 6, functions

23 of command and control. And it's the introductory paragraph to a

24 description of the five functions, but I'm just really interested in a

25 comment on the introductory paragraph.

1 Sorry. It's page 29, I'm sorry, of the Bosnian version. I'm

2 sorry, I have caused the Court staff some difficulties with that, but it's

3 page 29 on the Bosnian page at the bottom left.

4 A. I'm reading this part on planning. I don't know if that is the

5 end of the relevant section.

6 Q. Yes, it is at the end of the relevant section. I wasn't going to

7 ask you specifically about the planning function. I was just going to ask

8 you about that introductory paragraph there. It may appear to be more of

9 the same, but could I just ask you could confirm whether or not this is --

10 this accurately states JNA military doctrine and therefore Bosnian

11 military doctrine at the time?

12 A. It's difficult for me to say. In 1992 and 1993, we worked in

13 accordance with all the rules, in accordance with all the established

14 doctrines that had been taken over in a -- from the JNA. We followed

15 these rules blindly. Afterwards, and especially after the war, the army

16 of Bosnia-Herzegovina gradually tried to transform the doctrine of the

17 eastern bloc into a NATO doctrine. This would be my general point of

18 view. As to whether this was fully carried out, it's hard to say. But on

19 the whole, it was. Although there were certain deviations.

20 Q. Yes. Very well. May I just say thank you very much for bearing

21 with those questions? And now I just seek to move to another topic, and

22 that is, when appointing a commander -- now we've been through some of

23 these doctrines in the abstract now, but now I want to come to the

24 concrete case of appointing a commander?

25 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown Exhibit 144?

1 Q. Now, here we have an order, this is an unrelated to this case but

2 I'm putting it to you as an example of how one can appoint a commander and

3 I just ask for your comments about it. There is a document that's already

4 been tendered. We will just wait for it to come up on the screen. Now,

5 this is a decision and then on the other page there is some more material.

6 Would you mind just having a look at this -- this decision firstly,

7 please, and when you're finished looking at that we'll just look at the

8 other page. You will notice first of all this is from a time that's got

9 little to do with our case. It's from the 20th of August 1992. So I'm

10 just using it to illustrate certain points about appointments and I'll ask

11 for your comments about them. Now, first of all, do you notice that there

12 is a temporary command called JUG [phoen] being set up in a particular or

13 general sector, actually of Igman?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And although you hadn't been appointed at that time, had you, to

16 the position of deputy commander of the 1st Corps, but are you familiar

17 in broad terms with the existence of that group called JUG?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Okay. So what you have in setting up the group JUG on Igman is a

20 specific order establishing that group. Now, do you have the second page

21 now in front of you, the page where the temporary command is

22 established?

23 A. I can see it.

24 Q. Okay, okay. I'll go -- I'll go through what -- what -- what there

25 is on that page in just a moment, but is this an example of something you

1 described earlier on where you have effectively two parts to an order

2 establishing a temporary command, that the part that establishes that

3 command and then the part that establishes its personnel? Is this what we

4 were talking about before, or an example of what we were talking about

5 before?

6 A. Well, I think so. Under A, there is a reference to the temporary

7 command of the group JUG south, and we have a list of 11 officers here,

8 and if you have a look at the list, each officer has a different profile,

9 a different professional profile. When I testified about the command of

10 operative groups, I said that depending on the tasks concerned, various

11 sort of individuals, various sort of officers who had various specialties

12 would become part of that group. The group would include officers who

13 specialised in certain fields which were of relevance for the task that

14 had been assigned to the unit.

15 Q. Yes, I understand. And here, the commander is specifically named,

16 and we are moving now to the specific case here, the commander is

17 specifically name that's Dzemal Nejetovic. His chief of staff is

18 specifically named Asim Dzambasovic, and so on. Could you explain to the

19 Tribunal why -- why it's necessary to name those people on an order, and

20 what the importance is of naming those people on an order, and their

21 functions in that way?

22 A. Well, this is a general principle, a general rule in the military.

23 The first and last name of each man must be put down on paper, as well as

24 his duties, his position, in light of which the individual concerned has

25 to carry out certain tasks. For example, under number 4, it says Saric

1 Edib [phoen] will be appointed as chief of security. And as a result of

2 being appointed to this post, this individual has a certain task he has to

3 carry out because there are other rules that state what a certain officer

4 has to do within that service. If the individual has that post on a

5 permanent bases or, for example, on a temporary basis. This is why one

6 proceeds in this manner.

7 Q. And just turning from this document to the case of Neretva, the

8 Operation Neretva, you have never been aware of any such document as this

9 in connection with Operation Neretva, in other words, one which sets out

10 who the commander is, who the Chief of Staff is, and who the various

11 branches, officers in charge of those various branches are; is that

12 correct?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Very well. Thank you. All right. Thank you, Your Honours.

15 Sorry, excuse me one moment. Sorry, pardon me, I've just been reminded to

16 ask you to note who it is that signed that -- that second page and why is

17 it that Alija Izetbegovic had to sign that second page? Well, in fact,

18 I'll ask you why. Why did Alija Izetbegovic have to sign on the bottom

19 right and what's the function of Sefer Halilovic's signature on the bottom

20 left on that document?

21 A. The president, Alija Izetbegovic, was the president of the

22 Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the same time the

23 Supreme Commander of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is the person

24 who would order that such formations at this level be established. I have

25 said this on a number of occasions in the course of my testimony. The

1 establishment of brigades and units at other levels, establishment of

2 commands and units at other levels were his responsibility as well as

3 the -- when it came to appointing commanders or officers at those levels.

4 Q. I acknowledge that -- sorry, you go on.

5 A. I don't believe that this document had to have the signature of

6 the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, but I assume that this document

7 is at the same time a proposal from the chief of the Supreme Command, and

8 there is the signature of the Supreme Commander, as this is a decision, an

9 order, but nothing of any significance has been changed by virtue of this

10 fact.

11 Q. Okay. Thank you. Well, yes, I understand that. And now I'm

12 grateful for that explanation. The next topic I want to move to is how

13 one -- perhaps I've just got another question arising from that. But I'll

14 ask it later.

15 Could we move to the issue of the creation of IKMs, now, please

16 I've just got a question about the creation of IKMs. I want to illustrate

17 it by one that seems to be a 1st Corps IKM. Could the witness please be

18 shown Defence document 65 ter number D219? Its court number is DD001107.

19 There is a short -- relatively short order but could a copy please be

20 given to the Prosecutors, as it is more than one page long?

21 Q. What's coming up on the screen here, we hope, is a -- an IKM

22 that -- I'll just ask you. Are you aware of this document and is it an

23 IKM created in your area of responsibility?

24 THE REGISTRAR: This will be MFI 407.

25 MR. MORRISSEY: Perhaps if the witness could be given a chance to

1 look at the back page.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document seems familiar to me.

3 It seems to be my document.

4 MR. MORRISSEY:

5 Q. Yes. Very well, well, I just want to ask you some questions,

6 perhaps could I offer it for tender? Then I'm going to ask some questions

7 about it to establish the structures of an IKM and so on.

8 JUDGE LIU: I have some questions concerning with the number of

9 this document. It's number 219?

10 MR. MORRISSEY: That's the 65 ter number.

11 JUDGE LIU: Or 279.

12 MR. MORRISSEY: The 65 ter number is 219. That's the handwritten

13 number at the top of the page that Your Honour can see. That's 219. It's

14 MFI 407.

15 JUDGE LIU: Any objections?

16 MR. RE: No, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE LIU: It's admitted into the evidence.

18 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you.

19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D407.

20 MR. MORRISSEY:

21 Q. Now, with respect to this document, is it the fact that this

22 document is an order of yours establishing that "particular officers shall

23 constitute the IKM of the 1st Corps at Mount Igman," those officers

24 including as their leader or as their commander I'm sorry, Nedzad Ajnadjic

25 and his deputy Salko Muminovic?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And did you establish, too, various other officers who had to

3 operate different organs of command at that IKM?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. And that IKM had under its -- or had to deal with and

6 coordinate and exercise control over the 4th Mechanised Brigade and other

7 units. Were the other units smaller units or were they other brigades as

8 well under that IKM?

9 A. There was the 4th Hrasnica Brigade a motorised brigade which was

10 within that IKM, and then there was a newly established or the newly

11 established 81st Bosniak Brigade on Igman, which consisted of two Foca

12 brigades that had fallen apart after the problems in July on Igman. And

13 then under the command of that IKM there was also the 9th Mountain Brigade

14 from Tarcin and all these units, all the companies, came from the Sarajevo

15 brigade to hold the defence line in the wider Igman area. And this was

16 under the command of the Igman IKM. There were about, well, almost over

17 10.000 troops there.

18 Q. That was my next question. It was three brigades and some other

19 units totalling about 10.000 troops and in that IKM you needed --

20 A. About 10.000 men.

21 Q. And at that point you needed a staff of something in the order of,

22 I think it's accurate to say, just under 20 -- I haven't counted them

23 actually there but I'm -- yes, well, it is 20, 20 staff to run that IKM.

24 Now, in creating that IKM it was very important to you, in order to

25 preserve clarity of command and control and in order to preserve the

1 effectiveness of the IKM to set out quite clearly who was in command, who

2 was the deputy and who had -- which other officers had the various other

3 functions; is that correct?

4 A. Absolutely.

5 Q. And it's important to have an order that sets those things out

6 clearly because you don't want temporary functions or -- sorry, temporary

7 units or units governed by an IKM to be subject to any confusion in the

8 chain of command. You want it to be quite clear who has what function and

9 who is able to issue orders to the units in the local area; is that

10 correct?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Once again, with respect to the alleged IKM down in Jablanica

13 early in September or in the middle of September, or indeed at any time in

14 September of 1993, did you ever see any order like this, creating an IKM

15 and -- and enumerating the functions of the staff who were to go there and

16 to perform particular tasks?

17 A. I don't remember having seen anything like this, no, I didn't.

18 Q. Thank you. Yes. I'm grateful for that. Now, before the break,

19 I'm grateful to you for -- before the break, I was asking you some

20 questions concerning the sending of the troops or -- sorry, the order by

21 Sefer Halilovic directed to you to send -- to provide some troops?

22 MR. MORRISSEY: And could the witness now be shown Exhibit P161,

23 which is that order.

24 Q. Here we are coming back to Sefer Halilovic's order to you which

25 you obeyed. Okay. You've made yourself very clear about this order and

1 its effect and there are just a couple of details about it -- about this

2 orders and about a couple of other orders which I'm going to show you

3 which I would seek some assistance from you on. Now do you have that

4 order in front of you on the screen?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Very well. May I just ask you here it's -- in point one, do

7 you -- it says there "prepare the Delta Brigades, parts of the 9th and

8 10th Mountain Brigades and Solakovic's units totalling some 300 soldiers,"

9 and it gives some other details. Now, in terms of the selection of the

10 individual troops, once again, that order did not force you to have any

11 role at all in choosing which particular young men went down to

12 Herzegovina. In other words, the choice of the individual troops. Is

13 that an accurate way of analysing that order? It doesn't place that

14 obligation upon you?

15 A. I don't know what relation you're establishing between the

16 document and the duty or lack of such an obligation for the corps

17 commander to select troops. The document is not about this.

18 Q. Well, yes. Even in my question was silly, you've answered it.

19 Because what I'm really seeking is that the question I've -- the selection

20 of the individual troops to go down to Herzegovina was to be determined at

21 a lower level, by the organs of the 9th and 10th Brigades themselves and

22 Solakovic's units itself; is that correct?

23 A. That's how it works, after the order I issued an order to these

24 units of mine. To be more precise to the brigade commands or brigade

25 commanders. And I did this in the same way, in a way similar to the way

1 in which I received the order from General Halilovic. A unit was to be

2 designated or formed, a new unit was to be formed, of a certain strength

3 and it was to be prepared to carry out its tasks. When the brigade

4 commanders received this, no one was preventing them from participating in

5 the selection of the troops, but this was not their obligation. They

6 would forward the case to the level of the battalion, and they would say,

7 I'm going to designate my 2nd Battalion for this task. They will single

8 out 50 or 100 men for me, if possible. If they can single out an

9 establishment company they will do so, if not and quite frequently this

10 was not possible. I have testified about this. Then the battalion

11 commander says, single out a platoon, from a company, and form another

12 company as a temporary unit, which will carry out the task. Once the task

13 has been carried out then all the troops are sent back to their original

14 units, the units that they left in order to form this temporary formation.

15 So it's the command battalion that is the highest level that decides about

16 such things.

17 Q. Yes. Thank you for that explanation. And once you issued those

18 orders, you didn't have any part in appointing some sort of a commander

19 over the collection of soldiers which was gathered from your brigade and

20 sent -- sent down to Herzegovina. For example, you didn't select somebody

21 from the 10th Brigade to be in charge of all of these people, did you?

22 A. Precisely so. That was within the competencies of the brigade

23 commander and lower levels, battalion level and so on, depending on the

24 size of the unit.

25 Q. Yes, and just to be very clear about that, you did not -- did you

1 know a man called Senad Pecar at that time, from the 10th Brigade?

2 A. At the time, I met him. I don't know whether at that very moment

3 I knew him very well or not. That's debatable. However, I do know who

4 Senad Pecar is. It is possible that I had only met him by that time. I

5 think that I had.

6 Q. But certainly you didn't take is Senad Pecar and set him in some

7 position of authority over these three units who went down to Herzegovina;

8 is that correct? In other words, you didn't -- you didn't personally

9 appoint Senad Pecar to do anything in relation to these men; is that

10 true?

11 A. Yes, precisely so.

12 Q. And in fact it may well be that you hadn't even met Senad Pecar at

13 that time; is that also true?

14 A. It is very likely that I hadn't met him at that time. However,

15 while he was on Igman, it is possible that we had some telephone contacts.

16 Q. I understand. The last question -- or there are two other

17 questions I've got about that document. One is the mention of the 6th

18 Corps Command taking over these troops which you can see at the end of the

19 paragraph number 1. Now, in relation to that, were you aware of what

20 role, if any, the 6th Corps Command was going to play with respect to

21 these troops? In other words, did you know whether or not these troops

22 were to be resubordinated to the 6th command or not?

23 A. Right now, I couldn't tell you. I can only tell you something

24 based on the documents which are pertinent to what you are asking me

25 about. Everything else would depend on how the communications transpired

1 in the field. I don't know. I wouldn't know whether somebody received

2 orders or not, whether the units were supposed to be resubordinated to one

3 command or to the other command. I couldn't tell you that because I don't

4 know. I truly can't be of assistance in this matter, and I don't think

5 that it would be appropriate for me to speculate.

6 Q. No, no. Well, I stand --

7 A. People from the field could tell you much more about that, those

8 who were involved.

9 Q. No, thank you for that, and it's really just the orders itself

10 that I'm concentrating on in your case. The second paragraph there,

11 that -- could I just ask that? Is that really something by way of a

12 personal comment passing between you and Mr. Halilovic as a result of

13 discussions you had and as a result of the genuine fears that you had at

14 the time, that taking away your mobile reserve might endanger Sarajevo?

15 A. Yes. I could agree with that.

16 Q. Because in military terms, would you agree with this? It's a

17 pretty meaningless thing for him to say that he would be prepared to bear

18 full responsibility for the fall of Sarajevo? Would you agree with that

19 comment of mine?

20 A. Absolutely.

21 Q. All right. I take it this it was a time when there was a lot of

22 pressure on all military commanders, you, Sefer Halilovic, Rasim Delic and

23 the whole lot of you, frankly.

24 A. Analysing that nowadays, and I could see it even during the war,

25 let alone nowadays, that if Herzegovina and Mostar had fallen, then

1 defending Sarajevo would be pointless. It would just be a matter of time

2 when Sarajevo would fall as well. And this is why it is very important to

3 look at it as a whole.

4 Q. Last question on that topic. The Delta Brigade didn't go. Do you

5 remember what -- what happened to the Delta Brigade? Did they just refuse

6 to talk to you or what occurred with them?

7 A. I think that I have partially answered that question already.

8 Namely, I said that the dates are not fully clear to me, the dates when

9 the Delta Brigade came under my command, or became a part of the 1st

10 Corps. I would have to take a look at the documents to refresh my memory.

11 This could be one of the reasons. However, my personal view is that even

12 if this was one of the reasons, it wasn't the only one. Regardless of

13 whether it became a part of the 1st Corps or not, I ought to have issued

14 an order, and I don't know whether the order was indeed issued, and even

15 if it did not become part of the 1st Corps, it should have had and it is

16 most likely that General Halilovic issued that order because he believed

17 that it was already part of the 1st Corps.

18 Now, as to whether it was under my command or not, that's

19 debatable. There were certain problems involved. Whether I was unable to

20 send the unit because the command and the commander of the brigade were

21 dissatisfied on a number of issues, that is possible. In a way, they

22 sometimes felt that they were a unit of the Supreme Command, and then they

23 were a unit of the Supreme Command Staff, and were supposed to be

24 relegated to the level of the corps which they thought was a kind of a

25 humiliation. I don't know if that's the right word. And there were many

1 other reasons. There was a lot of disobedience and lack of respect for

2 the chain of command. So it is possible that there are many reasons for

3 the fact that that unit was not sent out. However, I would need to get in

4 touch with certain people and take a look at some documents in order to

5 give you a full and accurate answer.

6 Q. I'm grateful to you for what you've given there.

7 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness now please be shown -- just

8 excuse me, I'm sorry. Thanks, yes, pardon me, finally, there is just one

9 other point about that. Well, no.

10 Q. On the face of that document there, I understand you don't know

11 the -- the realities of what happened down in the Neretva valley but on

12 the face of that document, does it appear to you that the -- I withdraw

13 that question. I'll withdraw the question.

14 MR. MORRISSEY: I'd now like the witness, please, to be shown

15 Exhibit P -- Exhibit 290, 290.

16 Q. Mr. Karavelic, what's now happening I'm now moving through those

17 days at the time when Sefer Halilovic sent the order and you then complied

18 with that order and gave some orders yourself. I'm not going to take you

19 to those orders that you gave. You've already talked about those with

20 the -- with the Prosecutors. But I now want to move to the -- the 5th of

21 September, when a note came from you down to Sefer Halilovic personally

22 and you sent it to him at Jablanica, Jablanica. Do you have that in front

23 of you now?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, it may be that you can't remember the details of sending a

1 handful -- not a handful, but a couple of hundred troops out of the

2 district. But I just want to see whether you can remember any details

3 about a particular part of this. If you can, you can. If you can't, you

4 can't. But would you just look at this section here where it says, four

5 lines or so down, it says "at 2230 hours, when the motor vehicles arrived,

6 Caco and Celo personally proposed to me that the departure be postponed

7 for 24 hours," and then the next sentence reads like this: "However,

8 after that in the course of the day today it was put off completely."

9 Now, I'm going to ask you what you remember about each of those

10 steps along the way. Do you recall, yourself, that discussion when Caco

11 and Celo personally proposed to you to put off the departure for 24 hours?

12 Can you remember that?

13 A. At one point in time, I touched upon this in one of my answers. I

14 don't remember exactly whether it was me personally who talked to Caco and

15 Celo, or whether that was done by my assistants, my deputy, my Chief of

16 Staff, because they had numerous contacts, they had to be in touch with

17 the units continuously. So they were continuously in telephone and other

18 contact with them. So it's possible that will they prepared this. It is

19 possible that they talked to Caco and Celo. However, it is also possible

20 that I talked to them. I couldn't tell you how it was. I remember that

21 there were some problems with the time schedule at the time, and

22 deadlines. Now, whether they tried to avoid that or not, I really

23 couldn't tell you.

24 Q. No.

25 A. Therefore, in my own terms, there was a lot of hesitation and

1 clashes there. There were constant -- there was constant pressure

2 applied, constant requests, and continuous problems of all kinds.

3 Q. Yes, and even though you can't remember all the details, which we

4 understand, this just looks like another example of these two units not

5 being in the proper line of control and command, because Halilovic had

6 ordered you to -- to provide troops, and you'd ordered them to provide

7 troops, but now we have that it was put off completely. Do you agree with

8 that, that this was just another one of those failures in the line of

9 command and control?

10 A. Judging by the circumstances, yes. This all fits in. Now, in

11 relation to your question whether it is 100 per cent consistent or less, I

12 couldn't tell you. However, there is some truth in it.

13 Q. Yes. And I understand, too. Yes, I understand that. But

14 clearly, Halilovic gave you an order, you gave these men an order, and

15 then these men did not carry out that order. And so much is apparent on

16 the face of this document, would you agree with that?

17 A. Well, not exactly. If you want me to say that they failed to

18 carry this out and that this is a result of the failure to abide by the

19 chain of command, I couldn't say whether it was that or some objective

20 circumstances, such as bad weather, as a result of which I consciously

21 agreed to postpone it because later on the units indeed departed. From

22 the distance nowadays it would be hard for me to say which of these two

23 prevailed. It is possible that both reasons existed. I'm trying to be as

24 frank as possible.

25 Q. I understand that. But just to assist you with that, could we

1 just look at the second page in the English version, please? I'm sorry,

2 Mr. Karavelic, I think it's all on one page for you but for us it's broken

3 up. Do you see the second -- do you see the paragraph, paragraph 2,

4 saying "the vehicles that you sent are located at Hrasnica and there are

5 no problems with them, let us know how you -- how to proceed with these

6 vehicles."

7 Let me just ask you this: It may sound speculative and if it is

8 you can tell us that you can't answer it, but it's -- it's not likely that

9 you would have countermanded the order for those units to go to

10 Herzegovina without telling Sefer Halilovic or the inspection team that

11 you'd countermanded that order. Do you agree with that?

12 A. You put several questions. I don't know whether I should answer

13 with a yes or a no. I'm not sure, just to be clear on this.

14 Q. I'll try again. If -- you raised a couple of possibilities as to

15 why it was that these troops didn't go down to Herzegovina a minute ago,

16 and I just wanted today's ask you this: If it was a decision by you that

17 they shouldn't have gone, then in accordance with the proper approach, you

18 would have let Sefer Halilovic know and you would have let -- I'll keep it

19 to Sefer Halilovic. You would have let Sefer know, "Look, I'm not sending

20 those troops for the following reason." Is that correct?

21 A. Roughly, yes, that's how it should be.

22 Q. Okay. So given the information on this document, whilst you can't

23 remember exactly what happened, would you agree it's likely that this was

24 some form of failure to comply with the chain of control and command which

25 led to the units not departing whether they should, even though they did

1 depart later on; do you agree with that proposition?

2 A. I've already said. I think I've fully answered the question you

3 put just now in my previous answer to your previous question. I do not

4 exclude the possibility, but I cannot confirm to what extent each of the

5 reason was responsible. If Ramiz Delalic, Celo, would come here to

6 testify he would be the best person to say that. Unlike Caco who is

7 unable to come.

8 Q. We'll ask him. Thank you, Mr. Karavelic.

9 Very well. I'm sorry, Your Honours, could I just inquire now what

10 time urns are proposing I'm going to move on to another topic now and --

11 JUDGE LIU: Could you please tell me first how long are you going

12 to need?

13 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, as history has shown, if I just have a

14 moment to gather my thoughts I think the witness and counsel and perhaps

15 the Judges as well get tired as time goes by. I'm still very hopeful to

16 finish today, and I'm going to press on to do that. I would rather

17 appreciate having a short break if that were possible now, just to collect

18 my thoughts. There are a very finite number of topics left to go.

19 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we could have the break right now, and we will

20 resume at 20 minutes past 5.

21 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 --- Recess taken at 4.52 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 5.21 p.m.

24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey? You have something to inform us?

25 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I have. I've been considering the

1 issue of finishing tonight and I believe that it can be done. But in

2 looking at the -- at the amount of time spent, I think the Prosecution

3 have had more than double the time that the Defence have with this

4 particular witness. Now, the way I think it can be done is this. I --

5 there was a number of transcripts I wanted to question him about. What I

6 proposed in the past was to talk to the Prosecutors about these

7 transcripts and see if we could find any middle ground about it and we

8 agreed to talk but we have been too busy to actually do that. Therefore I

9 propose to leave those out. With the witness Salko Gusic that -- you'll

10 recall there was a time limit like this imposed, and what we decided was

11 that if needs be the witness might be able to give some limited extra

12 evidence later by videolink to which, of course, the Defence would agree

13 if the Prosecution would. In the event that we couldn't resolve the

14 matters that we needed to resolve otherwise. In that way, I think I can

15 complete it tonight. That's what I propose to do. If I feel that we have

16 been shut out from dealing with a couple of relevant issues, I might ask

17 that the witness be recalled at a later time. However, I think it's

18 rational to expect that we can resolve those problems. That's my belief.

19 I think we -- there's a couple that the Prosecution might want and that we

20 might. So for those reasons and given that, if I'm able to -- to ignite

21 the recalling mechanism, if I need to, at a future stage by videolink,

22 then I would be comfortable to say we'll finish tonight.

23 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much for your information. As for the

24 videolink issues, I believe that you have to file something in written to

25 the attention of this Bench at a later stage because now it's very

1 difficult to predict how far we could go.

2 MR. MORRISSEY: Of course, Your Honours, and I won't take more

3 time talking about it. We are in a difficult position here. In reality,

4 I could go on for significantly more time but we are living in the real

5 world so I'll now continue to ask the questions.

6 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.

7 As for the -- yes, Mr. Re?

8 MR. RE: The transcripts, I'm not sure what my learned friend is

9 talking about, there being some agreement about some transcripts he wanted

10 to cross-examine on. Could he enlighten us.

11 JUDGE LIU: I believe just like we have we have at our hands for

12 this transcript, maybe Mr. Morrissey will ask some questions concerning

13 the testimonies of other witnesses.

14 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, that was part of it. But -- sorry. But

15 there is also some telephone intercept material which the Prosecution has

16 and there is obviously some that we have and we need to discuss on what

17 basis that can be admitted. It would take an argument to be had. Now, we

18 don't have time for it so, frankly, that's why I say I would rather put

19 that off. If the Prosecutors and we can agree on terms of admissibility

20 for such things then there won't be any need for any arguments about it.

21 That's what I was referring to.

22 JUDGE LIU: Yes, well, that may be a subject for the proposed

23 status conference if there is any -- as for that, I believe that the

24 Defence should draft the topics they would like to talk about and next

25 Monday, I hope the parties will sit together to go over those issues one

1 by one to see how far you could go.

2 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE LIU: If there is still any problems pending on next

4 Tuesday, the Defence should inform the Bench and we will see whether we

5 could hold a kind of Status Conference next week, sometime next week. I'm

6 not sure. Of course, saying this, we will bear in mind there is an

7 objection from the Prosecution on this issue.

8 Yes. Could we have the witness, please?

9 [The witness entered court]

10 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey.

11 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown D146.

12 Q. We are now returning to the order of the 30th of August, for

13 another five to ten minute period.

14 MR. MORRISSEY: Could that document please be shown to the

15 witness? Thank you.

16 Q. Do you have that document in front of you now?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. I just want to ask you some questions about certain components in

19 this order which may bear upon the question of the interpretation of the

20 word "rukovodjenje" in this order. I'm going to put them to you one by

21 one and I'll ask you to comment on them as you see fit. First of all,

22 could I just ask you to note that when you look at this order here, that

23 in point 3, a specific power to issue orders is given to the Chief of

24 Staff of the SVK. Do you see that specific power given there in point 3,

25 a power to solve problems in the field by issuing orders?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Very well. When considering the ambit of the word "rukovodjenje"

3 up in paragraph number 1, is it a relevant fact that the drafter of this

4 document felt the need to give a specific command power to the Chief of

5 Staff thus possibly implying a limit on the ambit of the term

6 "rukovodjenje" in paragraph 1? Do you have a comment on that?

7 A. Can we keep item 3 on the screen? Item 3 provides the answer to

8 your question, where it says "to solve problems through his orders, and

9 inform me regularly of it, and in case of radical proposals and solutions,

10 it is necessary to consult me," which indicates what the limits are.

11 Q. Yes. And in terms of interpreting that term "rukovodjenje" which

12 is up in paragraph number 1, if that word "rukovodjenje" was to be given

13 its full meaning as including a power to command, then paragraph 3 would

14 be entirely unnecessary. Is that accurate?

15 A. Well, it's hard for me to say, and be sure 100 per cent that this

16 is how it is because these are general issues, issues of principle, and

17 this is -- this is why the sentence where it says that Rasim Delic does

18 not allow Sefer Halilovic to do anything radical through his orders

19 without consulting him. Now, what does the term "radical" entail? We

20 don't know. Only Rasim Delic could reply to that, or, rather, Sefer

21 Halilovic as well. He can also provide his opinion as to why Rasim Delic

22 formulated this ban on him not being able to do something without

23 consulting Rasim Delic, which means that Rasim Delic is behind all of

24 this.

25 Q. Just in the bottom left, do you see the initials ADZ/IH? And

1 could I ask you when you look at them does that mean that this document

2 was drafted up for Rasim Delic by Asim Dzambasovic and another person?

3 A. In my opinion, that's quite likely, if not certain, unless there

4 is someone else who has the initials A.DZ., because at the time he had

5 already left me in the command of the 1st Corps while he was the Chief of

6 Staff.

7 Q. Yes. Okay. What I'm doing here, I understand, I'm just asking

8 you for comments as you go along. I've put that particular one to you.

9 There is another one I want to put to you and ask you what effect that has

10 on the interpretation of the term "rukovodjenje," and that is the preamble

11 of this document altogether. Do you see that the preamble hear reads and

12 could the witness be given the chance to look at the preamble on the

13 screen, the preamble provides that "in accordance with -- effectively with

14 the Zenica meeting, and with the aim of eliminating current shortcomings

15 and weaknesses in the zones of responsibility of the 4th and 6th Corps the

16 order is passed." In other words, the purpose being to follow through

17 with what happened at Zenica and to fix up the 4th and 6th Corps, is the

18 preamble there something that an officer would look at when trying to work

19 out what the extent of the meaning -- what the extent of the powers under

20 that order are? In other words, is the preamble something relevant to

21 interpreting the rest of the document? I think that's probably the best

22 way to put it.

23 A. Usually, there is always a preamble. I don't know how this is

24 translated in English but the part preceding the word, "I order" is the

25 part that we call a preamble, and in that preamble one usually briefly

1 states the purpose of the order, or, rather, the reason for which the

2 order is being drafted, or rather, the reason for which what follows below

3 is set forth. In this preamble, it mentions a meeting held in Zenica on

4 the 21st of August. So it's quite logical to expect that each and every

5 officer would have a look at the conclusions from the meeting and he would

6 draw the conclusion that one should bear in mind the conclusions from that

7 meeting and the zone of responsibility of the 4th and 6th Corps.

8 Q. Yes, thank you. There are two other matters I wanted to raise.

9 The first one is having regard to the reference to the zones of

10 responsibilities of the 4th and 6th Corps, is it accurate to say that

11 whatever powers there are in this order have got nothing to do with units

12 of the 3rd Corps, so far as you can see?

13 A. It's the case in my opinion, too, because it's quite explicitly

14 stated that it concerns the zone of responsibility of the 4th and 6th

15 Corps here.

16 Q. Finally could we look at the 4th point there, on that list, which

17 indicates that the monitoring should begin on the 31st of August and be

18 completed by an unspecified date, and then it's required that a written

19 report be written on return. Now let me just ask you about that. Is it

20 the fact that an inspection team's mission is completed when it reports,

21 unless of course it's extended by some other order?

22 A. I have to be clear as to how one usually proceeded. Item 4 says

23 "when one should commence," but it doesn't say when it should be ended.

24 Perhaps for other reasons, I don't want to guess what reasons. Perhaps

25 there was an agreement between the commander of the Supreme Command and

1 the Chief of Staff because it was impossible to know when this could be

2 ended. So in the second paragraph, under item 4, it says upon completion

3 when you're ready to submit a written report, then the inspection should

4 come to an end, in accordance with this order. There were such cases, but

5 everything depends on the contact that the commander of the Supreme

6 Command and the Chief of Staff had. Everything depends on what they had

7 agreed on orally.

8 Q. Yes. I understand that. Are you aware that the inspection team

9 in fact reported on the 20th of September upon return from Herzegovina up

10 to Sarajevo? Are you aware of that as a fact or not?

11 A. Perhaps I heard about that recently but I don't believe that I saw

12 that document. I don't think so.

13 Q. That's okay. At all events, am I right -- well, is this

14 proposition correct, that whenever -- whenever the inspection team did

15 report, then, unless there was another order in place, that report signals

16 the end of the inspection team? Is that correct or not?

17 A. Well, it's difficult for me to answer your question by saying yes

18 or no, because the written document could always be changed because of a

19 verbal agreement. This is how it should have been, but it does not

20 necessarily mean that this is how it was.

21 Q. Yes. We may be agreeing entirely over this. What I'm putting to

22 you is that if there was another order that could have changed things, but

23 if there was no other order, then this inspection team finished when the

24 inspection report was produced. Is that correct?

25 A. That's how things should have been, more or less. Because even

1 when there was drafted, one could say that's one of the reports continue

2 with your work. Or perhaps that wouldn't be said. This is something that

3 one could discuss at far greater length.

4 Q. Okay. Yes, thank you very much for those explanations. Now,

5 could we move please now -- just one second, please.

6 Sorry, I just want to show the witness -- I'm sorry, just excuse

7 me one moment, please.

8 MR. MORRISSEY: Sorry, the document I -- MFI 385, please. Thank

9 you. This is a document that in respect of which questions have been

10 asked about whether it's a genuine document or not, and those are the

11 questions I have to ask you. So could that document please be shown on

12 the screen? And in particular the Bosnian version, could that be shown to

13 everyone?

14 Q. Now, with respect to this document, this is a document concerning

15 the sending of the 2nd independent -- on its face it's a document sending

16 the 2nd Independent Battalion down to Herzegovina. Now, I wanted to ask

17 you a question about this. First of all, do you have that on your screen?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, there is no suggestion that -- there is no critical questions

20 of you about this but I just have to -- have to test it. Your signature

21 on that document there, is that a handwritten signature or a signature, a

22 pre-made, rubberised stamp?

23 A. Could you move the document so I can have a look at the bottom?

24 MR. MORRISSEY: I wonder if the witness could be shown a closeup

25 of that particular part? If it could be zoomed in on the stamp and on the

1 signature? I'm sorry, I believe there is a technical problem. I can

2 continue to ask some questions, anyway, so as not to waste time while

3 that's being fixed.

4 Q. You indicated in examining that document -- when you were asked

5 questions about that, you thought it was possible that there was a number

6 2 contained within that 1st Corps stamp. Do you see that now?

7 A. Are you referring to the stamp? I didn't understand your

8 question.

9 Q. Sorry I've jumped from the signature to the stamp, yes. Very

10 well. Well, first of all, is that stamp a -- a proforma rubber stamp or

11 is it a natural bit of handwriting by you?

12 A. Are you referring to my signature in the form of a stamp?

13 Q. I'm referring to the cursive script writing there. Was that -- is

14 that a handwritten signature. Sometimes people have a signature that's

15 pre-made and that's I'm asking you, if that's what it is or not.

16 A. This signature has nothing to do with a stamp, nor does the stamp

17 have anything to do with the signature. These two things are quite

18 separate from each other. They were never linked, if that's your

19 question.

20 Q. That's okay. And so the signature there was a signature done by

21 your hand, is that correct or not?

22 A. Well, one could ask oneself whether this is a signature, my own

23 signature, whether this is something that I signed, or whether it was a

24 facsimile of my signature, a facsimile of my signature or, rather, a stamp

25 because I signed in this way. But my facsimile was like this too. But I

1 very rarely gave my facsimile signature to others. That would happen very

2 rarely, almost never, so it is really of no great importance whether it is

3 an original signature or not is really not of much importance because I

4 always had it on me. I had it in my wallet. I had my facsimile signature

5 in my wallet. I never really gave it to anyone else.

6 Q. Okay. You indicated when being questioned by my learned friend

7 the Prosecutor that you thought you'd seen a number 2 or it was possible

8 that there was a number 2 within that stamp. Do you see any such number 2

9 there?

10 A. I certainly didn't say that I saw the number 2, if we are talking

11 about the stamp now.

12 Q. Yes, we are, and it must have been my mistake about that, I'm

13 sorry. Could you clarify whether or not you did say such a thing?

14 A. I can. We can see a stamp here. It says 1. Corps, the 1st Corps,

15 and there is the coat of arms of Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the time I said

16 the corps had two kinds of stamps. And because of the existence of an

17 IKM, because it was necessary for an IKM to operate, and we mentioned an

18 order of mine a while ago about forming an IKM. As far as I can remember,

19 on one of the stamps below the coat of arms, there was the number 2, and

20 such stamps do exist. I don't know whether that means that on the basic

21 stamp, the one that didn't come from the corps command, I don't know

22 whether that means that this basic stamp should contain the number 1 or

23 whether it was taken for granted that if stamp -- the stamp that contained

24 the number 2 meant that the other one should refer to number 1. I can't

25 be certain about that.

1 Q. Okay, now you've clarified that issue and thank you. Just one

2 other question about that order, sending the 2nd Independent Battalion

3 away. A number of troops indicated -- I can't give names, unfortunately,

4 but a number of people who have indicated that when they left they were

5 told that they were going to be resubordinated to Zuka, that they were

6 going to go to the -- Zuka's base at Donja Jablanica and they were going

7 to be resubordinated to Zuka. Now, that's the evidence we have to deal

8 with in this Court and I just want your comment on that. Do you recall

9 saying that to any of the troops when they set off, from your own memory

10 now?

11 A. You said that they said that they were going to be resubordinated

12 to Zuka. I don't know that is something that they were told. As far as I

13 can remember in the brief, addressed this unit from the company, from the

14 9th Motorised. I didn't address any other units. I didn't say anything

15 like that. I didn't know that they were subordinated to Zuka until I saw

16 that order. Quite by chance I saw a copy of that order, perhaps two years

17 ago when I signed the third statement in Sarajevo. I wasn't aware of it

18 up until that time, and I really couldn't have told them anything of this

19 sort in Sarajevo in 1993.

20 Q. Okay. Very well. Thank you for those answers. I wants to move

21 on now to the order of commander -- sorry, the instruction that purports

22 to come from Commander Delic on the 12th of September. It's Exhibit 157.

23 Now, this document is one that you've already looked at. The Prosecutor

24 showed you. This is a document which is under the name of Rasim Delic,

25 and I've got some questions for you about -- about it, to investigate

1 whether it's genuine or not, and first of all, I -- do you have that in

2 front of you now on the screen?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, the first thing is, in the preamble there, sorry, I won't

5 trouble you with the preamble now.

6 With respect to paragraph number 2, you'll notice there that there

7 is a reference to a genocide, an apparent -- that's what the document

8 says, "the genocide committed against the civilian population by members

9 of the 1st Corps, 9 Mountain Brigade." Now, at around this time, and I

10 mean, you know, around the 11th, 12th, and 13th of September, at

11 approximately the time when you got that coded report from the 2nd

12 Independent Battalion, Rasim Delic did not call you and ask you whether

13 you knew anything about this supposed genocide, did he? In fact, you

14 heard nothing about it through official channels; is that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So although there is some -- there is talk in this document that a

17 unit from the 1st Corps has committed things, has committed genocide, in

18 fact -- well, sorry, I'm making a comment, I won't make it. I'll withdraw

19 that.

20 Go now to the last sentence in that paragraph where it

21 says, "Order the 1st Corps, 9th Brigade deputy commander to return to

22 Sarajevo immediately in order to solve problems in the unit." Now, that

23 document appears to say nothing about returning any units to Sarajevo but

24 rather talks about returning the deputy commander to Sarajevo. What I

25 want to ask you is: Did you personally request Commander Delic to send

1 Ramiz Delalic, Celo, back to Sarajevo to solve, and I quote, "problems in

2 the unit"?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Did you ask Commander Delic -- I have to say we are not blaming

5 Commander Delic for this. We were asking whether this order is genuine at

6 all --

7 MR. RE: I object to that. I mean, how can the witness possibly

8 answer whether the document is genuine, if the order is genuine? He's

9 never seen it before.

10 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe that's the purpose of the

11 cross-examination, but actually, I don't think Mr. Morrissey will ask this

12 question to this witness.

13 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, Your Honour, I'll just ask him about what he

14 did in order to build up that one part of our picture.

15 Q. Any way, you've already answered one question about it and I'll

16 ask you another one. Did you ask Rasim Delic to send anyone back from --

17 from Herzegovina, whether it be Ramiz Delalic or any other person? At

18 that time, I should make clear.

19 A. I don't remember. I don't think so. I didn't.

20 Q. Thank you very much. Very well, those are the questions about

21 that particular order.

22 Now, thank you. I'm sorry, I'm just keeping an eye on the time

23 here, Mr. Karavelic. Very well. Now, on or about the 20th of September,

24 were you aware that Sefer Halilovic and Rifat Bilajac and the team, the

25 inspection team, all came back to Sarajevo at approximately the same time

1 that your units were returned to you and returned to your line of control

2 and command?

3 That question has become a monster and I'll start it again. Did

4 you become aware that Sefer and the inspection team had come back at

5 around the 20th of September?

6 A. It's really difficult for me to confirm such a date. I had

7 problems of my own. I had my daily duties to perform. And I did not have

8 the right to monitor what my superior was doing. I think that

9 General Halilovic did come to Sarajevo, I don't know why. I really don't

10 know and I wouldn't want to speculate and answer your question

11 erroneously.

12 Q. That's okay. I could ask you another question which might help.

13 Did Sefer Halilovic come back to Sarajevo at approximately the same time

14 that your units did? That the units you'd sent out came back to your command

15 and control?

16 A. I don't know exactly when the unit from the 9th and 10th returned,

17 let alone when Sefer Halilovic returned. I really couldn't answer your

18 question precisely, because I really don't remember.

19 Q. Okay. Now, you've indicated, you've given the evidence that you

20 want to give about the order that you received to find some more troops to

21 send back to -- back to Herzegovina. I just want to show you some later

22 documents that may be relevant to that. Oh, perhaps there is one other

23 thing. After Sefer Halilovic and the inspection team came back, were you

24 aware of whether the rest of the team, Karic, Zulic, Bilajac, ever went

25 back down to Herzegovina or not? Can you comment on that?

1 A. I really couldn't say anything about that either.

2 Q. All right. Okay.

3 MR. MORRISSEY: I'd like the witness now to be shown Exhibit 132

4 following which we'll show Exhibit 133.

5 Q. These -- you're about to be shown some letters now which may or

6 may not have been -- you may or may not have seen yourself but they have

7 been tendered into evidence here and I just want your comment here about

8 them. So Exhibit 132 is a letter from Sefer Halilovic to Rasim Delic, and

9 I don't need to be -- you don't need to be concerned about the -- the

10 references to Pasalic. It's really the issue about Salko Gusic that I

11 want to you comment on. Now, here, you'll see at the second prong, the

12 following passage: "Although with your permission I said to Salko Gusic

13 the commander the 6th Corps that we would see each other at Jablanica on

14 Saturday, he has not shown up yet or contacted me. This has become his

15 habit." And then Halilovic goes on to say a couple more things about

16 that. Then he goes on to observe this: "He seems to have taken it very

17 seriously that I cannot order him, which is basically what I do not want.

18 However, it would be only fitting if he or someone from the corps command

19 at least contacted me because there is fierce fighting going on here."

20 Now, I'll show you another document from -- from Commander Delic

21 in a minute but to your understanding, does that passage there suggest to

22 you that Sefer Halilovic was in a position to issue commands to Salko

23 Gusic at the time of that letter?

24 A. In legal terms, one may wonder whether he had the right to issue

25 orders to Salko Gusic. As to how it was in practise, I couldn't say

1 because I don't know what sort of terms Sefer Halilovic and General Delic

2 were on. I don't know what sort of contact they had. I don't know what

3 sort of relation they had, what sort of a relationship they had. From

4 this paragraph you can quite clearly see that the command of the 6th

5 Corps -- I wouldn't want to use an ugly term -- he was trying to extricate

6 himself from a situation perhaps. I don't know why. Perhaps he was

7 trying to avoid Sefer Halilovic. These are very delicate issues. It's

8 difficult for me to comment on them because I really wasn't involved.

9 Q. I understand. Very well. I just ask for your comment to the

10 extent you can, and I understand what you say.

11 MR. MORRISSEY: Could we move on to the next document, please,

12 that is Exhibit 133? Very well.

13 Q. Do you now see -- this is an order from Rasim Delic, both to Sefer

14 Halilovic personally and to the 6th Corps commander personally which gives

15 certain orders and instructions to them?

16 A. [No interpretation]

17 Q. Very well. Now, what I want you to comment on here is -- is this

18 issue. In this document, Sefer Halilovic is addressed as the chief of the

19 SVK, in other words in his capacity as Chief of Staff. Do you agree with

20 that?

21 A. Yes. That's what it says, in the first item of the order. And

22 also in the heading.

23 Q. And in paragraph number 2, it's apparent that at this point, the

24 chief of the -- Chief of Staff, Sefer Halilovic, has prepared, has planned

25 and prepared, or as formed an idea or plan concerning combat operations to

1 begin in that area. Is that correct?

2 A. It says here clearly, it is hereby ordered to the commander of the

3 6th Corps to locate the chief of the Supreme Command Staff, to report to

4 him, and to commence with planning and preparation of combat activities.

5 This probably refers to the commander of the 6th Corps, because naturally,

6 the Supreme Command Staff and its chief, who represents the staff, are the

7 one who is are most familiar with the general idea, which is completely

8 logical in military terms.

9 This is simply the idea, the general idea, nothing else.

10 Q. Bearing in mind the comment in the previous letter by Halilovic

11 that -- that Gusic regarded him as unable to command him and that

12 Halilovic did not purport to want to command him, do you agree that it

13 appears here that Halilovic is performing with respect to these proposed

14 combat operations, a staff sort of coordinating type of function whereas

15 the direct line of command goes from Delic, Commander Delic, down to Salko

16 Gusic? Is that how it appears to you based on the two documents you've

17 seen?

18 A. Your question is fully clear to me. And this is what I would say

19 to that question. What you're trying to get me to answer in response to

20 your question is not something that is completely unknown. There were,

21 indeed, elements of that within the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22 However, whether that was the case here and if so, to what extent, in this

23 particular case, that is something that is very difficult for me to say,

24 because all communications went above me and beyond me. Therefore, it is

25 very -- also difficult for me to say in response to that document where

1 Jovo Divjak wrote something as a deputy of the Chief of Staff about him

2 being isolated from certain activities and so on, so any response that I

3 might give to that would, to a certain extent, be improper because I

4 cannot tell you what was the relationship between Rasim Delic and Jovo

5 Divjak. It is very difficult to judge that. So I hope that you will be

6 satisfied with my answer.

7 Q. I understand and I will move on from that. I want to go now to

8 the issue of -- of the operation of Trebevic. Now, turning to Trebevic,

9 because you -- you took an important part in the, if I may say, direct

10 military side of Operation Trebevic in Sarajevo; is that correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. We've heard evidence from General Jasarevic in this court already

13 and it's fair to state that he also and his service played a significant

14 role in planning and carrying out that operation; is that correct?

15 A. Well, yes.

16 Q. Would --

17 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown Exhibit 261,

18 D261?

19 Q. What's about to be shown to you now is a document -- it's an

20 action plan I think for Operation Trebevic which has your name and a

21 number of other people upon it and I just want to show it to you and you

22 can confirm what it is, if you're prepared to.

23 While that's being brought up, could I just ask you this question?

24 Did you become aware, in the course of preparing Operation Trebevic, that

25 the SVB services would take this opportunity to investigate more fully a

1 number of crimes that were outstanding to be investigated, including the

2 crime at Grabovica?

3 A. I did not hear about that, nor did I know about that all the way

4 up until the Trebevic plan. I also didn't know about that in the course

5 of implementation of the Trebevic plan. That's how it was, as far as I am

6 concerned. However, soon after the Trebevic plan, such stories started

7 circulating.

8 Q. I can just ask you this: It wasn't necessary -- it wasn't

9 required of the SVB to inform you about their criminal investigations one

10 way or the other; is that accurate?

11 A. I believe that they did not have that duty, and even if they did

12 have it, they wouldn't have done it.

13 Q. After the operation, Trebevic, had succeeded in a military sense,

14 did you become aware, while you were carrying out your other military

15 duties that the SVB was in fact interviewing numerous arrested people from

16 the two brigades?

17 A. Yes. I know that because a large number of my staff participated

18 in taking 2 to 300 people to prison upon completion of the Trebevic plan,

19 and all of them were questioned and so on, and I have not learned anything

20 about the results of such investigations to this date. I was never

21 briefed by anyone on that.

22 Q. No, and I think you've explained to the Prosecutor what the

23 relationship was. But I just want to ask you this question, too. In

24 terms of the SVB's ability to take statements and to interview persons

25 from the 9th Brigade back in Sarajevo, I understand it's not your

1 responsibility but I just want to did you about the realities of doing

2 that. To your knowledge, the 9th Brigade, whilst it might cooperate in

3 combat activities was unlikely to cooperate in criminal investigations.

4 Is that an accurate statement?

5 A. Once again, it is very difficult for me to be clear and accurate.

6 I cannot really answer there question because I don't know how to answer.

7 I would need to have much more information in order to be able to answer.

8 Q. Well, perhaps given your answers about that, I'll just restrict

9 myself to one general, theoretical question about it. From where you --

10 from where you stood at the time, in a theoretical sense, did it make

11 sense for the SVB, if they had outstanding criminal investigations to do

12 into crimes at Grabovica, to delay interviewing persons, witnesses, or

13 others, until Trebevic was carried out so that the -- so that their

14 investigations could happen in a unit that was brought under the line of

15 command and control? In other words, did it make sense for them to wait?

16 A. Analysing it from a military point of view, I, as a military

17 professional, analysing it only in those terms, believe that there was no

18 reason to postpone anything, and to delay it. Now, as to whether that did

19 happen and if so, under whose influence, is something I couldn't tell you

20 because I lack the -- I don't have the necessary information. I know

21 that in that respect, I never obstructed the work of my security service,

22 which was working on this, and had my security service received orders

23 from Jasarevic to do that, it would have done so, or in other terms, had

24 I been ordered to do that I would have done it with my security service.

25 However, I was never instructed to do that, nor did my

1 security service ever seek any instructions or approvals from me, although

2 it is not duty-bound to do that because it needs to take the matters to

3 the end.

4 Q. I understand that, just the last point that you made there is

5 one that I just wanted to clarify. If it turns out that Sacir

6 Arnautovic did in fact endeavour to take statements from 9th Brigade

7 people, he wasn't duty bound to tell you about that investigative process,

8 was he?

9 A. I think that it wasn't, but I cannot now claim that I am 100 per

10 cent familiar with the rules and regulations of the security service. I

11 suppose that it wasn't. However, I don't know that he did it because he

12 never told me about that. Therefore, I don't know.

13 Q. Final question is that did you become aware, in 1995, or 1996,

14 that Sefer Halilovic called for the perpetrators of the crimes at

15 Grabovica to be investigated and dealt with according to law?

16 MR. RE: The relevance of that is what?

17 JUDGE LIU: Well, I think there is obvious relevance to this

18 case.

19 MR. RE: In 1995 and 1996?

20 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

21 MR. RE: Okay.

22 MR. MORRISSEY:

23 Q. The question is just in broad terms did you become aware of Sefer

24 Halilovic making such a call in 1995 and 1996?

25 A. I think that I heard about that. However, I cannot substantiate

1 it, and nobody told me anything officially, nor did I see any documents.

2 Q. That puts an end to any questions about that. Thank you for your

3 patience in answering the questions.

4 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, subject to what I said earlier on,

5 that is the end of the cross-examination.

6 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. Any redirect examination?

7 Mr. Re?

8 MR. RE: There is, only, not very much, but thank you.

9 Re-examined by Mr. Re:

10 MR. RE:

11 Q. Mr. Karavelic, yesterday my learned colleague, Mr. Morrissey,

12 asked you about the Geneva Conventions and training of members or soldiers

13 in your corps in relation to the Geneva Conventions. My question is: Was

14 there any formal training system for training the lower-ranking soldiers

15 in their obligations under the Geneva Conventions and in the laws of war?

16 A. Could you please clarify your question? What are you referring to

17 when you are mentioning formal training system?

18 Q. Was there a formal system within the corps of educating the

19 lower-ranking or unranked members, soldiers, in the laws of war, the

20 treatment of civilians, the treatment of prisoners of war?

21 A. You just put a very difficult question, very difficult because

22 this is a huge question, whether there was a training. Naturally, upon

23 hearing your question, I assume that what you mean is whether there were

24 any plans, first at the level of the corps command, going down until the

25 lowest level, the squad and platoon, plans to educate officers, which is

1 quite natural and mandatory in the peacetime army or in the army which is

2 at war but in the circumstances where the entire army is not engaged in a

3 war. For example, that could happen in a case where one of the NATO

4 countries would send their army to Iraq and a unit sent to Iraq would need

5 to have such a training before being deployed there. Or any other unit

6 going from a country elsewhere would need to be trained before being able

7 to accomplish its assignment. Now, in order to apply this system in the

8 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I think that the Defence, through

9 their questions, wanted to find out exactly how the brigades were

10 established and how the commanders became commanders, and so on, so I can

11 give you a general reply. But before I give you the reply, I want to say

12 the following.

13 The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of ordinary people,

14 young men and old men, all of them, every one of them, were patriots, and

15 there was no selection as to their abilities and intelligence levels. Now

16 to go back to your question, I had an assistant for legal matters within

17 the corps.

18 Q. Could I just --

19 A. In order to serve justice, I'm prepared to work until midnight.

20 Q. We can't --

21 A. I will be brief.

22 Q. We've got to stop at 7. I'm asking you whether there was a

23 system?

24 A. I will be brief. I had an assistant for legal issues. The

25 assistant for legal issues had to and must have produced such documents

1 and clarified such documents and ensured that these documents reached the

2 lowest-ranking soldiers and that all of them were aware of this. There

3 were plans to educate and to train. Now, here is my answer. Had this

4 training been implemented as it is done in an American unit before it is

5 sent to an assignment, no. It wasn't done. However, there was some

6 training. That is a fact.

7 Q. Who was the training of? Which level was the training carried

8 out? Senior officers? Junior ones?

9 A. There were -- that was done on all levels, both for senior and

10 junior officers. All of the officers had to be informed and made familiar

11 with basic principles and rules of the international law and Geneva

12 Conventions.

13 Q. What percentage of soldiers in the corps, to your understanding,

14 received this training?

15 A. During the four years of war, I believe that a large percentage of

16 officers were familiarised with that very well, but I cannot guarantee you

17 that 100 per cent of the officers were trained. As for the troops, it

18 would be very difficult for me to estimate.

19 Q. Today, this is at page 68 of the transcript, in response to a

20 question from my learned colleague, Defence counsel, you said that you

21 didn't see an order appointing Sefer Halilovic as the commander of

22 anything. My question to you is: What was your understanding of who was

23 to command the units that you sent to Herzegovina upon Sefer Halilovic's

24 request in early September 1993?

25 A. My reply is as follows: I sent the units to Jablanica upon the

1 order of the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff. By doing so, by sending

2 the units upon the order of the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff, the

3 units were duty bound to report at the place and the Chief of the Supreme

4 Command Staff was just one of the persons deciding what to do with the

5 corps units. And what I said is you don't really expect the Chief of the

6 Supreme Command Staff to command two or three units, companies. This is

7 why these units were resubordinated to somebody else. From a military

8 point of view, this was quite proper.

9 Q. My learned colleague, Mr. Morrissey, also asked you some questions

10 about the map, the Operation Neretva map, which is Exhibit D131. I just

11 want you to have another look at it. Rather than going to the trouble of

12 putting up the original, I'll just show you this one, which is the copy of

13 it.

14 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I didn't show him the map on any

15 occasion, did I? From recollection.

16 MR. RE: I didn't say that he did. I said he asked you questions

17 about the map.

18 JUDGE LIU: Yes, if the questions were asked. I believe that

19 any --

20 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I'm happy to see how far it goes,

21 but if -- the questions have to be very much in response to what I asked.

22 It's re-examination, but we'll see where it goes.

23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, yes, I believe so.

24 MR. RE: I do understand the purpose of re-examination. The

25 question that Mr. Morrissey put to you, just to satisfy him that this is

1 re-examination, at page 71, was, quote, "By looking at the map, you can't

2 determine who was in command of combat activities in the Neretva valley in

3 September 1993." Your response was, and I'm paraphrasing to an extent,

4 the map is not a complete document covering all combat activities in full,

5 unquote. My question to you is, following from that, to clarify it, if

6 the map were the only document relating to the combat activities, looking

7 at it, what would it tell you about who was in command of the operation

8 Neretva which is inscribed in the top of it?

9 A. Now this is what you are asking me, if the map were the only

10 document and nothing else existed, well, the map speaks for itself. I am

11 a soldier. I cannot tell you anything else other than what is stated on

12 the map, and that is the name of the person who produced the map.

13 Q. My question is, what would it tell you about who is in command of

14 the combat marked and the map, inscribed "Operation Neretva," in the

15 absence of any other documents?

16 A. Through my testimony and everything else, you were able to see

17 just how many times the Defence quoted certain portions of books,

18 regardless of whether these books can be considered formal sources, and

19 you could see how contradictory these quotes were. Now you are putting a

20 question to me invoking my abilities as a professional soldier, and I have

21 to tell you that this is a really hypothetical question, a question that

22 would require me to study this in great depth in order to give you an

23 answer. This is something that an expert should do, and not only upon

24 studying this very thoroughly, the expert still would not be able to

25 simply answer it and say Sefer Halilovic was a commander or was not a

1 commander. The expert would give you an answer that would have a very

2 large number of various elements.

3 I'm trying to clarify it in the following terms. It is clear that

4 this map was produced by Sefer Halilovic. It was approved by Rasim Delic.

5 But these two persons should be viewed as one. Rasim Delic was the

6 commander. Sefer Halilovic was the Chief of Staff. So if we look at the

7 map only, this is how it is. This map doesn't mean that the combat

8 activities were indeed implemented. Now, if you were to ask me something

9 else, if you were to say this map was implemented and combat activities

10 were carried out in accordance with this map, then a large number of other

11 questions would ensue from this as to exactly what happened out there in

12 the field.

13 Q. What do you mean Rasim Delic and Sefer Halilovic should be viewed

14 as one?

15 A. In a certain sense, that's quite correct, because the Chief of

16 Staff of the Supreme Command and the commander of the Supreme Command have

17 to think in an identical manner, have to draft documents as if they were

18 just one body when it comes to leading the army, when it comes to combat

19 activities. Because at the very beginning, when Defence counsel put

20 certain questions concerning principles, the first principle of armed

21 combat or rather of command and control is the singleness of command.

22 This refers to what the commander has to be, and the Chief of Staff --

23 there has to be, one body, one head, one soul, in order to ensure that

24 everything functions properly. In this case, as many questions obviously

25 have been raised, many issues are being raised, that did not function.

1 Well, this is where the problem lies. I, as a soldier, would not have

2 allowed myself to provide random assessments and to draw such serious

3 conclusions, and this is a very serious conclusion.

4 Q. At page 90 of the transcript today, Mr. Morrissey asked you about

5 the billeting of soldiers, specifically in relation to 200 soldiers from

6 Sarajevo, and suggested that the corps commander would not normally

7 concern himself with such details. My question to you arising from that

8 is: In what circumstances could a commander of seniority such as a Corps

9 level involve himself in details such as the billeting of soldiers?

10 A. Well, he would involve himself in such matters very rarely. The

11 corps commander would do this very rarely. His task was to designate the

12 sectors or zones of responsibility for certain units, and to say that such

13 and such a battalion or such and such a brigade will be assigned such and

14 such a sector or zone of responsibility, and that it is for the commander

15 to decide how to deploy the unit in that sector or rather in that zone of

16 responsibility. And this goes right down the chain of command.

17 Q. You said very rarely. In what circumstances, what rare

18 circumstances, could you envisage a commander - the seniority of a corps

19 commander - involving himself in that level of detail?

20 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours I object to this now. This is now

21 becoming a speculative exercise, frankly.

22 MR. RE: I withdraw the word "envision," then.

23 MR. MORRISSEY: I'm really asking the whole question be withdrawn

24 as speculative, Your Honour.

25 MR. RE: Well, it can't be speculative because the witness has

1 said "very rarely." Now, if he says "very rarely" -- he didn't say

2 "never." He said "very rarely."

3 JUDGE LIU: Even with that I wonder how relevant it is to our

4 case.

5 MR. RE: Highly relevant, because the Prosecution allegation is

6 that Mr. Halilovic involved himself in the details of billeting soldiers

7 in Grabovica, as did Mr. Karic, very senior officers. And with civilians,

8 too.

9 JUDGE LIU: Yes, you may try.

10 MR. RE:

11 Q. What are those rare circumstances?

12 A. For example, let's say that the corps commander, in accordance

13 with the norm of the command of the Supreme Command Staff is assigned a

14 unit, a police unit, a civilian police unit, and for certain reasons that

15 only the commander of the Supreme Command Staff is aware of, he may issue

16 a written or verbal order to the corps commander. He may say take charge

17 of this unit that will be deployed in your zone of responsibility and take

18 responsibility for its accomodation, for billeting them, and then he might

19 mention certain reasons. And then the corps commander might have to

20 become more involved and become more involved in billeting such a unit.

21 That is one possibility.

22 Q. All right. My learned colleague, Mr. Morrissey, also asked you

23 about the SVB investigation in relation to Grabovica and Trebevic and

24 suggested there was a reason -- Trebevic could have been a reason --

25 sorry, there could have been a reason to delay it until Trebevic. And

1 your response was, "there was no reason to delay it." My follow-up

2 question or clarificatory question is, there is no reason to delay it past

3 when?

4 A. No, no, no. That's not what I said. If you have a look at the

5 transcript, you'll see that for yourself. I said that there was no reason

6 in the sense of postponing the processing of Grabovica. I never mentioned

7 Trebevic.

8 Q. That's clarified the question I had, thank you.

9 A. We were speaking about the security service, and then the Defence

10 counsel asked me whether Arnautovic did anything or not, and whether there

11 were any reasons to halt the Prosecution of crimes committed in Grabovica.

12 I said that from a military point of view, there was no reason to put an

13 end to that and Trebevic was also discussed but Trebevic is something

14 else.

15 Q. You -- you also in cross-examination, in response to questions

16 from Mr. Morrissey, said that the 1st Corps I think had 70.000 troops and

17 40.000 were within Sarajevo. How many troops were there on the other

18 side, encircling Sarajevo?

19 A. Are you referring to the enemy's forces?

20 Q. Yeah, the VRS, the Serb forces which were encircling Sarajevo in

21 1993. Mr. Morrissey asked you questions about the threat to Sarajevo, the

22 number of troops you had. Specifically the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.

23 A. You just want to know about the number of troops or are you

24 interested in all the equipment that they had? I really have to be

25 careful when I mention numbers because I can't guarantee that they are

1 quite correct. I can only provide you with approximate numbers. I think

2 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps that had laid siege to Sarajevo had about, as

3 far as I know, according to my sources, which may be correct but not

4 necessarily so, I think it had between 25.000 or perhaps 30.000 troops.

5 It would sooner be 30.000. It had all sorts of weapons. This is very

6 important because you will now compare the number of mren my corps had and

7 the number of men that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had, but you aren't

8 bearing in mind weapons and ammunition. Men are of no importance. Men

9 are only cannon fodder if you don't have ammunition, and if you don't have

10 any weapons, if you don't have tanks, if you don't have howitzers, et

11 cetera, so they were far stronger, especially in terms of technical

12 equipment, and such supremacy has never been observed before in any other

13 wars, anywhere in the world.

14 Q. Thank you. Mr. Morrissey also asked you about I think the

15 composition of the brigades, the ethnic composition. In case it wasn't

16 clear, you referred to a mixed brigade. What was the percentage ethnicity

17 of this majority of the soldiers in the 9th Motorised Brigade? Are you

18 able to say how many -- percentage of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in that

19 particular brigade? And the 10th, if you can answer that, answer both.

20 A. I can tell you about the corps. I don't know what the case was

21 for lower units because I don't have the exact numbers. In the corps as a

22 whole at the time, there were 70.000 or 75.000 men, 5 to 7 per cent were

23 Serbs and 3 to 4 per cent were Croats, in the entire corps. However, it's

24 also true to say that there were units in which there were very few men

25 who were not Bosniaks when compared to units which were far more

1 multi-ethnic.

2 MR. RE: Thank you, Your Honours.

3 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Judge El Mahdi?

4 Questioned by the Court:

5 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Witness, there are two matters I would like to clarify, and I'd like to

7 deal with these matters in five minutes, at the most. Firstly, I'd like

8 to ask you about two orders that were submitted to you. You received an

9 order dated the 2nd of September from Mr. Halilovic, and there was another

10 order dated the 23rd of September. In the first one, reference was made

11 to certain units and soldiers requested brigades, though the 9th and 10th

12 Brigade and the 2nd Independent one. And in the order dated the 23rd, the

13 reference was only made to the formation of a unit of 300-odd soldiers,

14 and it was up to you to select them. So how do you reconcile this? Which

15 order was more in accordance with the military needs?

16 A. As a soldier, and this is something I have already mentioned in

17 the course of my testimony, believe, and I'm convinced that it is the

18 right of the most senior officer to draft and issue an order. In both

19 cases, it is his legal right. And both the order issued on the 2nd of

20 September and the one issued on the 23rd, the superior has the right to do

21 this. But if we are discussing purely military matters, the second part

22 of your question concerned the rule that was generally followed.

23 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] I apologise for interrupting you,

24 but which one was more in accordance with military regulations? Your

25 corps commander or superior commander, any superior commander?

1 A. As a soldier, I have to say that usually the second order would be

2 more in accordance with military regulations, the order dated the 23rd of

3 September 1993.

4 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Perhaps this is why you asked for

5 Mr. Delic's opinion before you carried out the order of the 2nd.

6 A. That really wasn't the reason. I received an order from my

7 superior and regardless of whether units had been named or not, all that

8 was important for me was whether I would carry out that order, or perhaps

9 there were some objections that the key man in the Army of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina had.

11 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] So in your opinion, Mr. Halilovic

12 did not have the authority to issue orders to you?

13 A. Yes. He did have the authority to issue orders to me. He did

14 have such authority. I could have chosen not to consult Rasim Delic.

15 However, when constantly justifying myself and, as I have said in my

16 subconscious, I wanted it avoid the necessity of sending units. But not

17 for any other reasons, just because of the danger that that would have

18 posed for the city of Sarajevo. This is what I explained to Rasim Delic.

19 I told him that I had problems. I couldn't sends the units there. I was

20 afraid that Sarajevo would fall. But he said, "Act in accordance with the

21 order from the Chief of Staff," and that was the end of the matter. I

22 complied with that order.

23 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Very well. So Mr. Delic was

24 informed of the details?

25 A. What else could I say except "absolutely"? That's precisely how

1 it was.

2 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] The second matter I would like to

3 clarify concerns you. You were defending the town. In military terms, in

4 your opinion, were there any other possibilities? Could one have used

5 other brigades that were also defending the town, brigades other than two

6 brigades? I'm referring to the 9th and the 10th Brigade.

7 A. To be quite frank, perhaps there was another possibility there,

8 but not a very realistic one. Perhaps there was a possibility to use

9 somebody from the 1st Mountain Brigade or the 2nd Mountain Brigade. Yes

10 that might have been possible, but as for the other brigades and you have

11 to remember that Sefer Halilovic was in Sarajevo from the first day of the

12 war, and he was very familiar with the situation in Sarajevo, just as I

13 was. He knew very well which brigade was deployed where, and what their

14 responsibility was for the defence of Sarajevo. Therefore, I believe that

15 it did not occur to him at all to ask that I send units from the 1st Vitez

16 Brigade because Sefer Halilovic knew very well what the elevation 850 Zuc

17 was, and what it meant for the Defence of Sarajevo. Also what the

18 elevation Stupa [phoen] meant nor the Defence of Sarajevo. And how

19 important the defence of Dobrinja was, where the 5th Motorised Brigade was

20 deployed, because this is where the tunnel was where which was used by

21 many citizens of Sarajevo, and which was a life line for the city. Now,

22 let me tell you something about Mojbilo [phoen]. I'm now referring to all

23 these geographical areas and this might be too much.

24 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Just to make sure I have

25 understood your answer correctly, did you think that there was the

1 possibility of using other brigades and use other elements to carry out

2 another operation outside of Sarajevo? Would your answer be yes or no?

3 Could you answer the question -- or could this have been done without

4 affecting the military need of protecting the town?

5 A. If I may say so, this is a very good question, whether we could

6 have used, perhaps, units from the 3rd Corps or from the 2nd Corps.

7 Knowing the entire situation in the battlefields of the Army of Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina --

9 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] But I'm speaking about the 1st

10 Corps and the brigades that is were defending Sarajevo because you have

11 shown us where the various brigades were deployed.

12 A. You will be very satisfied with my answer. When Sefer Halilovic

13 sent the first order on the 2nd of September, had he perhaps not named the

14 units at all, Delta, the 9th and the 10th Brigade, and the 2nd Independent

15 Battalion, had he only said and had he only written the order in the same

16 way as the order of the 23rd September was written, then I, if I were

17 deciding on that, would have sent at least 50 per cent of the same units

18 that I did send.

19 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] I apologise for interrupting you

20 but I'll quote roughly the order of the 2nd. [In English] "Part of the

21 9th and the 10th and Solakovic, totaling 300, to be sent to Bradina where

22 the 6th Corps command will take them over." [Interpretation] So the units

23 were specified. However, perhaps you've confused the order of the 23rd of

24 September. Perhaps you confused that with the order of the 23rd of

25 September but you were given the possibility of selecting the 300-odd

1 soldiers that were needed. So my question is as follows. I will repeat

2 it. As someone involved in the strategy and the defence of the town, was

3 it possible for you to select soldiers from other brigades without

4 affecting what was needed in military terms, without affecting the

5 military situation?

6 A. Partially, probably yes. However, not to the full extent. Not in

7 the sense of the full number of people that were needed. What I was

8 trying to say is the following: If Sefer Halilovic had not named the

9 units in the first order, even then I would have still sent the 2nd

10 Independent Battalion and the Delta Brigade. He didn't even have to list

11 them. I can guarantee you that I would have decided to send them.

12 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] And why not the 9th and 10th?

13 A. I will tell you why. I would have sent these units because they

14 were reserve units, they were mobile units, they did not have an area of

15 responsibility. Now, the question is whether I would have sent the 9th

16 and the 10th, and I have to view this realistically. Perhaps if I did not

17 send these two units, perhaps I would have still decided to use one of

18 these brigades and would have used some troops from another unit. This is

19 my reply.

20 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 JUDGE LIU: Yes, any questions out of the Judge's questions?

22 MR. RE: No, Your Honour.

23 MR. MORRISSEY: No, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, well, I think during the proceedings, the

25 Prosecution tendered a lot of documents, and the Defence made some

1 objections. I believe that I'm in a position to make a ruling concerning

2 the admission of those documents. The documents 378, 379, 391, 385, 392,

3 393, 389, 395, are admitted into the evidence. The document 380, 386,

4 387, P205, are not admitted into the evidence through this witness,

5 without prejudicing the future tendering. As for the document 390, that

6 is the intercept document, we will deal with it at a later stage. On the

7 part of Defence, do you think you still have any documents which were not

8 tendered?

9 MR. MORRISSEY: We don't, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.

11 Well, witness, thank you very much indeed for coming to The Hague

12 to give your evidence. We keep you here for more than a week. I

13 apologise to you, but I can say to you that you may go back home and if in

14 the future we need your assistance, I believe you'll be willing to come to

15 our help. Thank you very much. And I would like to thank all the

16 interpreters and the guards and the other people working for this case,

17 since we have been sitting here for five sessions today. It is very

18 tiring. Also taking into consideration we have a very extraordinary

19 sun-shining day today.

20 We will resume on the 11th of May and we'll continue our

21 proceedings in this case.

22 Witness, after we adjourn, Madam usher will show you out of this

23 courtroom. We wish you a very, very pleasant journey back home. Thank

24 you. The hearing for today is adjourned.

25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m., to

1 be reconvened on Wednesday, the 11th day of May,

2 2005, at 2.15 p.m.

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