110202IT

Page 11076

1 possession right now. I'm serving outside of Canada. The original copy

2 does not exist. There may be a photocopy somewhere, but I don't know --

3 a photocopy exists, but I don't have one where I'm serving now.

4 JUDGE KWON: If you have a chance to go back to Canada and find

5 that photocopy, are you minded to make a photocopy which would be

6 available to the parties, as requested by the Defence?

7 THE WITNESS: Yes, provided I can redact the necessary portions,

8 as Mr. Robinson mentioned.

9 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any observation to make, Mr. Robinson?

10 MR. ROBINSON: No. We appreciate that very much, and we'll ask

11 the Witness and Victim Unit to follow up on that as he returns. Thank

12 you.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

14 Yes, Mr. Tieger.

15 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

16 Examination by Mr. Tieger:

17 Q. Witness, although your name has already been mentioned, perhaps

18 we can begin by simply asking you to state your name for the record.

19 A. It's Patrick Anthony Rechner.

20 Q. And you are currently with the Canadian Armed Forces; is that

21 correct?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And your rank, sir?

24 A. Major.

25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.

Page 11077

1 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly pause between questions and answers.

2 Thank you.

3 MR. TIEGER: Can we first call up 65 ter 90213.

4 Q. Major, do you recognise this document as your amalgamated witness

5 statement, which incorporates portions of your testimony or evidence

6 given previously in connection with the matters before the Court?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. And can you confirm that this document accurately reflects your

9 declaration and that you would provide the same information to the Court

10 if asked the same or similar questions here in court?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.

13 Your Honour, I tender 90213.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.

15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2170.

16 MR. TIEGER:

17 Q. Major, I want to ask you a few questions about your background,

18 but particularly with respect to your previous work in former Yugoslavia.

19 But first let me ask you to confirm, as I believe you did in the

20 amalgamated witness statement, that you joined the

21 Canadian Armed Forces at the age of 18, attended military college, and

22 were commissioned as an infantry officer in 1985.

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. You served with the Canadian Battalion in Western Slavonia in

25 former Yugoslavia between February and May 1993 in what was then called

Page 11078

1 Sector West; is that right?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. And subsequently you applied to be a United Nations

4 Military Observer, an UNMO?

5 A. That is also correct.

6 Q. And thereafter served in Sector South, that is, from July of 1994

7 to December of 1994, and was subsequently posted to Pale from January to

8 June 1995; is that correct or at least approximately correct?

9 A. Approximately correct. I actually arrived on the 31st of

10 December in Pale.

11 Q. Okay, thank you. Now, first of all, Major, may I ask you to

12 explain to the Court, generally speaking, what the role of the

13 United Nations Military Observers was in former Yugoslavia?

14 A. In general, the role of the UNMO military observers was to work

15 with the different sides in the conflict, and we lived right in the local

16 communities. What distinguished us from the other peacekeeping forces

17 was that we worked in small international teams of commissioned officers

18 holding at least the rank of captain, and we were unarmed.

19 The main duties were to help supervise the following of

20 provisions in cease-fire agreements that the different parties agreed to,

21 and where we were stationed and where we were working, that was all with

22 the agreement of the parties in conflict.

23 That is, in general terms, what the UN Military Observers did.

24 As well, we got involved in doing assistance with delivery of

25 humanitarian assistance as we were able to, but that was not our primary

Page 11079

1 task.

2 Q. Major, in connection with your work as a

3 United Nations Military Observer or UNMO in Pale in 1995, first of all,

4 did you work with a particular team?

5 A. Yes. It was the United Nations Military Observer Liaison Office

6 to the Bosnian Serb Government and the Military High Command.

7 Q. And did that liaison office have a particular designation or name

8 by which it went?

9 A. Like all UN Military Observer teams, we normally referred to

10 ourselves by our radio call sign. So in the case of our liaison team or

11 liaison office, we were called "7 Lima."

12 Q. And specifically, Major, what was the role or duties of the

13 7 Lima liaison team in Pale? What did your team do?

14 A. We had a very unique function, different from the other military

15 observer teams, in that our work was primarily administrative and

16 political. So we did not go out patrolling or checking violations of

17 cease-fire agreements and that sort of thing. Our job was to facilitate

18 communications between the United Nations and the Bosnian Serb military

19 and political authorities, as well as then, by extension, facilitating

20 communications with other parties in the conflict and the UN. And in

21 that way, we could also act as intermediaries if the Bosnian Serb

22 authorities wished to get some information passed or received from some

23 of the other parties in conflict.

24 Our work normally involved communicating by telephone, both land

25 line, commercial, and satellite, as well as a special United Nations

Page 11080

1 satellite system known as VSAT. We also used a communication system

2 called CapSat, which is similar to e-mail, and also fax machines, and

3 those were means available to us to contact the UN headquarters, that is,

4 Mr. Akashi's office, and the commander of the UN peacekeeping forces in

5 Zagreb, as well as Bosnian-Herzegovina Command in Sarajevo, and on the

6 Bosnian Serb side, the government in Pale, and also the Military High

7 Command in Han Pijesak, which is located about 60 kilometres away.

8 That's the Bosnian Serb Military High Command.

9 Q. Major, you mentioned earlier that as a general matter,

10 United Nations Military Observers were also involved in assisting with or

11 delivery of humanitarian assistance. Did your team in Pale become

12 involved with this kind of work as well?

13 A. Yes. On behalf of the representative of UN Civil Affairs in

14 Sarajevo, which at the time was Mr. Aguilar, we were involved in some

15 meetings with the Bosnian Serb Government. That was primarily the

16 Vice-President's Office, Professor Koljevic, and also the health

17 minister, Mr. Kalinic, as well as the director of the Medical Services on

18 the Bosnian Serb side, which was Dr. Sosic. And that was in our official

19 capacity.

20 Unofficially, we tried to ease the suffering in the local

21 community. And primarily through Dr. Sosic, who also was the head of the

22 hospital in Pale, we would receive some requests if we could try to

23 obtain a small amount of some vital medicine to try and deal with a

24 critical situation with some of the patients in the hospital. So in

25 support of that, we would take it on ourselves to personally go into

Page 11081

1 Sarajevo to try to get this from the UN medical facilities there.

2 And, as well, some of the other military observers got involved

3 in a more personal capacity helping, actually, individuals in Pale and

4 the area.

5 Q. Major, how large was the 7 Lima team?

6 A. We were -- we were a total of four officers. There was myself,

7 there was Ole Zidlik from the Czech Republic, Thelmo Reis from Portugal,

8 and Pavel Teterevsky from Russia.

9 Q. And was there a team leader or chief liaison officer?

10 A. Yeah. At the time, it was myself. Since late April, I became

11 the team leader and the chief liaison officer of 7 Lima.

12 Q. Where did the team members live and work?

13 A. We lived and worked by renting a portion of a house from a local

14 family. It was a three-storey building in Pale. Our office was a

15 converted garage on the main floor, and our living quarters were on the

16 third floor. And it was a three-storey house, so our living area was on

17 the top floor. And the house was also inhabited by a local family with

18 which we had regular and very cordial contact.

19 Q. Where was that building located in reference, for example, to any

20 official Bosnian Serb government or military structures?

21 A. It was located about 300 metres from what we knew as the

22 Bosnian Serb Presidency. It was a complex of a hotel called the Panorama

23 Hotel and a building adjacent to it that was used as an office building.

24 So we were about 300 metres in a straight line from that complex.

25 Q. Now, a few moments ago you mentioned some of the officials -- the

Page 11082

1 Bosnian Serb officials with whom you had contact in the course of your

2 duties. Can you tell us, please, who your main contacts were on the

3 Bosnian Serb side, as a general matter, in order to fulfill your daily

4 functions?

5 A. On the military side, the primary contact were two

6 Bosnian Serb Army liaison officers who were based at the main

7 headquarters in Han Pijesak. There was, first of all,

8 Colonel Milos Djurdjic and Major Kralj. On the civilian side, it was

9 primarily Professor Nikola Koljevic, the vice-president of the

10 Republika Srpska, and also he was the chairman of their Committee for

11 Co-operation with UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid agencies.

12 Q. And did you deal, on a daily or weekly basis - you can tell us

13 the frequency - directly with Professor Koljevic or with a member of his

14 staff?

15 A. We did not deal directly with Professor Koljevic frequently. It

16 was normally with his secretary, Ceca. Her last name was Savic. And

17 that was very frequent, essentially on a daily basis. And the same with

18 the two Bosnian Serb Army liaison officers; we dealt with them on a daily

19 basis. And I should also add that we also dealt with Mr. Karadzic's

20 office, that is, the Presidency, through his secretary, Mira, also on

21 quite a frequent basis to transfer any correspondence or if we needed to

22 request permission at that level.

23 JUDGE KWON: Just for clarification: You were a captain in rank

24 at the time?

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was.

Page 11083

1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

3 Q. In addition to Mira, did you deal with anyone else in

4 Mr. Karadzic's office or anyone else associated with Mr. Karadzic?

5 A. Yes. I also had fairly frequent contact with Mr. Jovan Zametica,

6 who I understood to be Mr. Karadzic's senior political adviser and

7 spokesman.

8 Q. Major, I'd like to turn your attention and our attention to a

9 specific time-period during the course of your work in Pale, and that's

10 to late May 1995, and specifically to May 25th, 1995.

11 On that date, Major, did you become aware of an air-strike by

12 NATO, or explosions generally, occurring in the vicinity of Pale?

13 A. Yes. We had actually seen two large explosions occur at about

14 4.00 in the afternoon to the south of where we were located in Pale, that

15 is, south of our office, a distance of something like 5 to 10 kilometres.

16 Q. At that time, did you know what those explosions were or were you

17 able to go out and check to see what had happened?

18 A. No, we did not know exactly what they were, and we could not go

19 out to that area because we were under restrictions of movement at the

20 time and we were not permitted to leave the Pale area. However, we did

21 suspect that they could be air-strikes, because we had transmitted

22 earlier a letter to General Mladic - that's the commander of the

23 Bosnian Serb Army - from General Smith, who was the commander of the UN

24 peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, threatening that if certain conditions

25 were not met by the Bosnian Serb side and, actually, all parties to the

Page 11084

1 conflict, that they would be subject to air-strikes. And in the case of

2 the Bosnian Serbs, the first condition was that they had to return four

3 heavy weapons back to a weapons collection point from which they had been

4 removed earlier.

5 Q. Turning your attention next to the next morning, May 26th, did

6 you become aware at that time of further explosions?

7 A. Yes. At approximately 10.00 in the morning, a similar type of

8 explosions like the air-strikes the previous day occurred.

9 I should just, for the clarification of the Court, mention that

10 after the air-strikes had occurred, approximately 30 minutes later we

11 were informed by our headquarters on the 25th of May that those two

12 explosions had, in fact, been air-strikes carried out by NATO on behalf

13 of the United Nations.

14 So then on the 26th of May, there were similar explosions, but

15 much more over the course of about an hour and a half or so. We

16 estimated it was approximately 10.00 -- starting at 10.00 in the morning,

17 approximately, also.

18 Q. Now, at some point after the explosions began, did you become

19 aware of any activity at your accommodations or office?

20 A. Yes. A few minutes later, there was a couple of shots fired and

21 some yelling, some loud voices.

22 Q. And where were you when you first became aware of those shots and

23 the loud voices?

24 A. I was upstairs on the third floor, in my accommodation there.

25 Q. And, Major, what did you do after you became aware of this -- of

Page 11085

1 these shots and the voices?

2 A. We were aware from the news broadcast the previous day, and also

3 by the reactions of our neighbours, that people had been very angry about

4 the air-strikes there, so we were concerned who it actually was. We had

5 also requested the previous day, on the 25th of May, from Mira,

6 Mr. Karadzic's secretary, if she could ensure that our house and office

7 were being watched by their security people just to prevent any local

8 people trying to attack us for -- out of revenge or feeling badly about

9 the situation. So I wasn't sure what was going on, so I went slowly down

10 the stairs quietly to investigate the situation.

11 Q. What did you find out?

12 A. I -- our office had two entrances. There was a main entrance at

13 the front of the house which was the entrance to what previously had been

14 the garage, and then around the back there was a small door. So I went

15 around to the back. The door had already been opened, so I was able to

16 peer in and actually saw and heard what appeared to me to be three

17 Bosnian Serb people. I saw at least one who was armed.

18 So then I went to the kitchen, where we -- that's across the

19 corridor from our office, to where we had a telephone, and there I made

20 three telephone calls. The first one was to Mira, Mr. Karadzic's

21 secretary, who I'd spoken to the previous evening, inquiring -- or

22 mentioning to her that we had some armed people in our office who had

23 already been shooting outside. And I asked her if she could send someone

24 around to investigate the situation. She then asked me what time they

25 had arrived, so I said, Well, a few minutes ago, which would have been

Page 11086

1 approximately 10.30 that morning on the 26th of May. And then she told

2 me, Oh, they were sent -- she also asked me, Are they soldiers? And I

3 said I couldn't really tell. They weren't dressed properly as soldiers

4 in a full uniform. So then she asked me about the time, and I said,

5 10.30, and said, Okay, then they were sent officially. And I asked her

6 what that meant, and she didn't give me any further information.

7 So the second telephone call I made was then to

8 Mr. Jovan Zametica, whom I had mentioned earlier was Mr. Karadzic's

9 senior political adviser and whom I got to know personally, and I

10 asked -- and I explained the situation to him. And he said, yes, he had

11 also heard that something was being organised to send some people to our

12 office that morning. And I asked him to clarify and explain what that

13 was supposed to mean, and he said, just simply, I suggest that you be as

14 co-operative as possible.

15 And then I was able to -- had also our housekeeper there that

16 morning. So I was then going to call the chief of police in Pale to send

17 some policemen around just to verify that everything was under control.

18 And as I was about to call, our interpreter from the office who was on

19 duty that morning, Snezana Golijanin, came out of the office, started

20 waling up the stairs and calling for me in a loud voice, so I turned to

21 her and asked what was going on. And she said, You are required in the

22 office. So then I asked the housekeeper to call the chief of police and

23 went into the office.

24 Q. And when you arrived in the office, Major, who was there?

25 A. When I walked through the door, I saw one person armed with an

Page 11087

1 AK-47. That's a Russian assault rifle, or it could have been made in

2 Yugoslav -- the Yugoslav Army also used it, made by Zastava, their

3 weapons company, with hand-grenades, and he had a military camouflage

4 pants and T-shirt on. And the other individual was someone I had met

5 earlier in Pale on at least two occasions, who was a Canadian of Serbian

6 origin. His name was Nicholas Ribic, and he was wearing a full

7 Bosnian Serb uniform with helmet and also armed with an AK-47 rifle.

8 Q. Were any of the other members of your team either in the office

9 or in the vicinity?

10 A. Yes. Both Ole Zidlik and Pavel Teterevsky were in that office.

11 Q. And what was happening or what happened when you entered the

12 office?

13 A. Nicholas Ribic immediately turned to me and said, Sit down, Pat,

14 in an angry voice, so I complied. Also, I remember Ole Zidlik then was

15 on -- was operating our radio in communication with our

16 UN Military Observer or UNMO headquarters in Sarajevo, with Nick Ribic

17 being next to him.

18 Q. At some point, did you become involved with the contact or the

19 attempt to contact headquarters, that is, UNMO headquarters, via the

20 radio system?

21 A. Yes. As the team leader then, I took over control of at least

22 our team's involvement and told our headquarters that we had some armed

23 men in our office. And then Nicholas Ribic, who spoke, of course,

24 perfect English, as a Canadian, started making threats that he wanted the

25 air-strikes called off.

Page 11088

1 Q. And did he indicate what would or might happen if the air-strikes

2 weren't called off?

3 A. It started first with simply demands that the air-strikes needed

4 to be called off. Then he mentioned, If you value the lives of your

5 UNMOs, you will call off the air-strikes. And then I should also add we

6 then moved -- switched over to using our satellite phone because it would

7 make the communications easier, because on the radio net, a lot of people

8 were. And Mr. Ribic was not familiar with the UN protocols for how you

9 speak on a radio and procedure, was it was getting a bit confusing with

10 our headquarters. So then we switched to the satellite phone, and then

11 Mr. Ribic continued making his threats. And he got more and more angry

12 and his threats got more specific. So at this point, he was saying, If

13 the bombing continues, we will start executing your UNMOs, meaning myself

14 and the other two team members.

15 I should say the fourth one that I had mentioned earlier -- sorry

16 for the break in the flow -- Thelmo Reis from Portugal, he was not there.

17 He was away on leave during that period out of the country, so it was

18 just the three of us, myself, Ole and Pavel.

19 So back to the situation in the office. The threats got more and

20 more specific, and then to the point where for the next bomb that falls,

21 I will -- or one UNMO will be killed.

22 Q. Now, during the course of this contact with UNMO headquarters,

23 and following the issuance of -- or the demand that the bombings be

24 halted, and the threat about what would happen if not, were you able to

25 hear the response by headquarters to Ribic?

Page 11089

1 A. Only on the radio. And what they told him was that he needed to

2 understand that the United Nations Military Observers were not involved

3 in the air-strikes in any way and they had no means of communications to

4 get them called off, that this would have to go through other channels.

5 So perhaps -- I'm not sure because it probably was discussed over the

6 telephone, so I didn't -- we didn't have a speaker on the phone, so it

7 was only what -- I heard was what Mr. Ribic was saying, because then at

8 some point Mr. Ribic turned to me and said, Okay, get me in touch with

9 General Smith. So then I presume our headquarters told him that it was

10 General Smith's office, that is, the UN peacekeeping forces, that would

11 be able to get the air-strikes called off more expeditiously. So then

12 Mr. Ribic told me to get him in touch with General Smith's office, and I

13 called General Smith's office using our satellite phone, which we called

14 them frequently. And I spoke with General Smith's aide-de-camp and said

15 that we had some armed people in our office who were making threats

16 against our lives and they insisted on speaking to General Smith. And

17 then Mr. Ribic took the hand-set and started making the same threats over

18 the phone to General Smith's office, his aide-de-camp.

19 Q. After these calls were completed, did other people arrive to the

20 UNMO office?

21 A. Yes. After Ribic finished his telephone conversation with

22 General Smith's office, he told us that his commander would be arriving

23 shortly. So in about 10 or 15 minutes, another group of Bosnian Serb

24 soldiers arrived at our accommodation, and they were led by a fellow

25 named Srdjan.

Page 11090

1 Q. After Srdjan and the other VRS members arrived, what happened

2 next? Did you stay at the accommodations or leave?

3 A. No, we were told to get our vehicle. It was a white Toyota Land

4 Cruiser with UN letters and also "UN Military Observers" written in front

5 of it with the UN flag. That was our official vehicle. So we were told

6 to get it, and then we were told to radio our headquarters that we were

7 going to be taken down to the site of the targets of the air-strikes,

8 which at that time were still continuing to be bombed. And that location

9 I was told to transmit was Jahorinski Potok.

10 Q. En route to -- first of all, who was told to get into the

11 vehicle? So it was yourself and who else?

12 A. It was myself and the other two military observers in my team, so

13 Ole Zidlik and Pavel Teterevsky. So we were all sat in the back seat,

14 and the vehicle was driven away by the Bosnian Serb soldiers. And we had

15 additional seats in the back, that's the cargo compartment, and a couple

16 of them sat there as well. And then we drove away in the direction of

17 where the air-strikes were occurring.

18 Q. And en route to Jahorinski Potok, were you and the other UNMOs

19 secured in any way?

20 A. Yes. We were all handcuffed to each other with two handcuffs.

21 So my -- I was sitting on the -- on one side of the vehicle, so my right

22 hand was handcuffed to the left hand of Ole Zidlik, and his right hand

23 was handcuffed to the left hand of Pavel Teterevsky.

24 Q. Major, what happened when you and Captain Zidlik and

25 Captain Teterevsky and the soldiers arrived at Jahorinski Potok?

Page 11091

1 A. At Jahorinski Potok, it was a large complex, what we thought was

2 some sort of large logistics and ammunition storage depot. We had not

3 been there before. But there was a main gate there, and it was locked,

4 so we were stopped at the main gate as one or two of the Bosnian Serb

5 soldiers then went to look for someone to open it.

6 As we were standing or waiting there, still secured by the

7 handcuffs to each other and inside the car, a fairly large group of local

8 civilians had gathered near our vehicle. And one of them then broke away

9 from the crowd and went to our vehicle, opened the door, and started

10 punching and kicking me. I had, unfortunately, only one hand to defend

11 myself, so I got a few good punches and kicks in the process.

12 Fortunately, though, the guards - that's the other Serb soldiers - were

13 able to react in time before anything serious happened to me and pulled

14 him off. Then he went back, that's the individual that attacked me. He

15 appeared to calm down, and then suddenly he pulled out a pistol,

16 chambered a round and pointed it at the vehicle. Pavel Teterevsky, the

17 Russian observer, was very quick-witted, and he immediately opened the

18 door and pulled us out of the other side. So we had the vehicle between

19 us and this armed individual. And then the guards also reacted fairly

20 quickly and managed to take the pistol away from him and unloaded it.

21 But to our surprise, once the man calmed down, they gave it back to him.

22 But that was, from our point of view, a very close call.

23 Just one other thing regarding that incident.

24 Once this man had calmed down, he asked me to come forward, so --

25 or he came -- I believe the Serbs took off my handcuffs. So I went to

Page 11092

1 him with the Serb soldiers just to make sure, I guess, I was protected a

2 bit. And he grabbed me by the throat and said that he had lost 12 sheep

3 in the air-strike, and he said that was his livelihood, and he was very

4 upset. And he also said that one of his relatives that had gone out that

5 morning, they didn't know where he was and were afraid that he had also

6 been killed by the air-strike. And so then he ended saying that he --

7 for those reasons, he should be allowed to kill me and I shouldn't be

8 surprised at his reaction. And I told him also that we had nothing to do

9 with the air-strikes, but he was too emotional and angry at that point to

10 sort of discuss that issue.

11 Q. Thank you, Major. Were you eventually -- was the -- was access

12 or entry to the facility obtained, and were you taken inside

13 at Jahorinski Potok?

14 A. After about 15 minutes, the lock had been -- they couldn't find

15 the key, so they broke the lock with a hammer, and we were then driven

16 inside the compound a few hundred metres in front of a large warehouse.

17 There -- because the air-strikes, I should say, were still going on and

18 we were still waiting to get confirmation from our UNMO headquarters at

19 that -- or when they would be called off, so, anyway, we stopped in front

20 of the warehouse. They took us out of the car and just sort of changed

21 the handcuffs. So we were still handcuffed to each other, but we were

22 able to stand. And one of us had his arm through the window of the rear

23 seat, so we were actually secured, through his arm, to the actual vehicle

24 so we couldn't run away or do anything.

25 So we waited there for the air-strikes to be called off. It was

Page 11093

1 perhaps 20 or 30 minutes. And during that time, one of the Serb

2 soldiers, who was a lieutenant-colonel that we later learned was

3 apparently the head of the press information organisation within their

4 units in Pale and who had a video camera, he showed us his revolver that

5 he took from his holster and pointed to two notches that he had cut in

6 the handle. And he explained those two notches were for two people that

7 he had already killed with it, and that if the air-strikes would not kill

8 us by the end of the day, then he would come over and personally execute

9 us, and he would really enjoy getting three more notches onto his

10 revolver handle, indicating, you know, the three notches for the three of

11 us.

12 Q. Did he -- did the lieutenant-colonel indicate that he intended to

13 kill you, whatever happened, or that it was conditioned in some way on

14 air-strikes?

15 A. He was not clear on that point. It could have meant either way.

16 Q. Did you receive any word from UNMO headquarters, or any other

17 source, about whether the air-strikes would be called off?

18 A. Eventually -- that is, as I mentioned, we were waiting there

19 about 20 minutes, so after about those 20 minutes we did get a radio call

20 from our UNMO headquarters, and I can refer to them at Kilo X-ray. It

21 may be easier than just repeating "UNMO headquarters" all the time. So

22 our UN military headquarters in Sarajevo Bosnia-Herzegovina Command, also

23 known as Kilo X-ray, gave us a call and said that the air-strikes had now

24 been called off.

25 Q. And after receiving that information, what happened, Major?

Page 11094

1 First of all, were there -- was there any other indication or any further

2 indication of air-strikes?

3 A. Not -- they were not going in constantly. It was only every five

4 or ten minutes or so, there would be another -- or even maybe 15 or 20

5 minutes. There was not a regular interval, but they were at least five

6 minutes apart. I recall also either myself or Nick Ribic, the

7 Bosnian Serb soldier of Canadian origin, would also be on contact with

8 our radio and also telling them where we were being taken. So at that

9 point, I believe Ribic mentioned that we would be taken to the actual

10 site of the air-strikes, that is, to the site of the ammunition bunkers

11 further into the complex that were being bombed that morning.

12 So they put us into the vehicle, and just as we were about to get

13 going another air-strike went in, so that is after we had gotten the all

14 clear or the confirmation that the aircraft had been called off. The

15 Serbs continued to drive towards the bunkers, so it wasn't clear to any

16 of us what the real situation was, if the air-strikes had, indeed, been

17 called off or not. Fortunately, that was the last impact, so that was

18 the last air-strike, but it went in after we got the all clear.

19 Q. And, Major, please tell the Court what happened after you and

20 Captain Zidlik and Captain Teterevsky were taken to the bunkers.

21 A. So it was the same thing as before. We were handcuffed to each

22 other, driven down. It was perhaps 1 to 2 kilometres from the warehouses

23 where we had been waiting beforehand. We arrived in front of four

24 bunkers that were approximately 50 metres away from each other. Two of

25 them had been destroyed. I presume it was that morning, because the

Page 11095

1 smell of the explosive, the cordite, was very strong in the air. And

2 Nick Ribic then reported on the radio that we're now at the site of -- he

3 said "warehouse," but he meant the bunkers, and he said, Any more bombing

4 and they'll be the first to go.

5 So then they took us out of the vehicles and handcuffed me and

6 Pavel Teterevsky to two lightning rods in front of one of the bunkers

7 that had not been hit yet, and they handcuffed Ole Zidlik to the door of

8 the bunker that had not been hit, and that was -- we saw was full of

9 ammunition.

10 Q. Major, after you and the other two members of your team were

11 secured to these potential targets, did you see other members of other

12 UNMO teams brought to the same area?

13 A. Yes. About an hour and a half later or so, we saw our vehicle

14 then being driven back towards the bunkers from the same direction that

15 we had been taken there earlier, and we recognised members of another

16 UN Military Observer team that was also based in Pale, but this was the

17 standard patrolling-type UN observer team that was known as Sierra Echo 1

18 by their radio call-sign. So we saw them packed in their vehicle. The

19 vehicle was driven by Serb soldiers, and they passed our position where

20 we had been handcuffed, and then they went down the road. And then

21 sometime later, 15 to 30 minutes later, then we saw the vehicle drive

22 back past us and back to the -- in the direction from which it came.

23 Q. And do you know where the -- do you know what happened with these

24 other members of the UNMO team?

25 A. At that specific moment, no. We just saw the vehicle go past us

Page 11096

1 and then come back the other way. But I learned later on, after a few

2 hours, that one of the military observers, a Polish officer by the name

3 of Janusz Kalbarczyk, had been taken down to where the vehicle went past

4 us and handcuffed there in front of another bunker. And then the other

5 four members of the team remained in the vehicle, and then they were

6 taken to what I think were the warehouses where we had stopped initially

7 while waiting for the air-strikes to be called off. And then also two of

8 them had been taken to a bridge in Pale for a short period of time. And

9 then I understood they were also taken back to the warehouses inside the

10 complex.

11 And one other thing. Before the Sierra Echo 1 team was driven

12 passed us, about half an hour before that two of the Serb soldiers who

13 had taken us hostage, they took the Russian officer in my team,

14 Pavel Teterevsky, away. So after -- so for the first hour, there was the

15 three of us from my team, and then after about an hour there was just

16 myself and Ole Zidlik handcuffed in front of the bunker.

17 Q. After securing you and Captain Zidlik to those positions, and

18 initially securing Captain Teterevsky, did the -- did the Bosnian Serb

19 soldiers remain with you at all times?

20 A. No, they had only stayed with us when -- initially when they

21 handcuffed us to the -- in my case, the lightning rod, and Pavel's case

22 as well, and Ole Zidlik to the bunker, the lieutenant-colonel who I

23 mentioned showed us -- had a video camera and showed us the pistol. He

24 filmed us in that position for a few minutes, and then -- but I think

25 they were concerned, because the situation was not quite clear what was

Page 11097

1 actually going on with the air-strike, so they didn't want to spend any

2 time there, so they quickly left.

3 Then about an hour later, two of them came back. They gave me a

4 box then to sit on. They moved Ole Zidlik, who was handcuffed to the

5 door of the bunker, to handcuff him to a grate over a vent in the bunker

6 which was lower down, so that would allow Ole Zidlik to sit. And then at

7 that time, they also took Pavel Teterevsky away.

8 Q. And at some point later in the day, did any VRS soldiers come to

9 check either on you and Captain Zidlik or on the UNMOs who were further

10 up the road?

11 A. Yes. Then shortly before, about 2.30 in the afternoon, two

12 soldiers who we had not seen before went up the road to check on us. And

13 both Ole Zidlik and I, we understood Serbo-Croatian, so we could

14 understand what the soldiers were discussing among themselves, and they

15 were debating whether they had time to check on the other UNMO - they

16 didn't name him - who was further down the road, because at 2.30,

17 another -- or the air-strikes were supposed to resume. And one of them

18 mentioned that he was there the previous day and there was no way that he

19 wanted to be anywhere near the area if there were going to be more

20 air-strikes. So all they did was they just walked past us quickly, just

21 went to a little -- there was a little bit of a hill, and just looked

22 over the hill, and then went back very quickly away from the location

23 where we were handcuffed.

24 Q. Major, how long did you and Captain Zidlik remain handcuffed to

25 the lightning rod or to the bunker?

Page 11098

1 A. I was there between five and six hours, so roughly from 11.00 or

2 after 11.00 sometime, or 12.00, until about 5.00 in the afternoon. And

3 Ole Zidlik was there until about 9.00 in the evening, so about nine hours

4 in his case.

5 Q. Now, you mentioned the soldiers who came to check at about 2.30

6 and were concerned about being in the area because of the possible

7 resumption of air-strikes. After that, did you see others come to the

8 area?

9 A. Fortunately, no air-strikes occurred at least in our location at

10 2.30. So about an hour later, that is, 3.30 in the afternoon, there were

11 two groups of military officers, fairly senior from the ranks that we had

12 observed - they had some full colonels in the groups - came by to inspect

13 the area, but they appeared more interested in assessing the damage,

14 rather than our situation, but they clearly saw us. And then they were

15 followed, about 20 to 30 minutes later, by a group of civilians who I

16 supposed were government officials because most of them were wearing

17 suits, with jacket and tie. And in this group of civilians, one of the

18 members was Mr. Jovan Zametica, who I had known and who was

19 Mr. Karadzic's senior political adviser and spokesman.

20 Q. Do you know whether Mr. Zametica saw you and Mr. Zidlik there?

21 A. Yes. Not only did he see us; he came over and talked to me. And

22 I should mention we were all quite close together. When Pavel Teterevsky

23 was there, he was about 10 metres to my right, and Ole Zidlik was just

24 across the road, about 20 metres in front of me, so we were all fairly

25 close. So the delegation, both the military and the civilians, walked

Page 11099

1 right between us. And then Mr. Zametica came over to me, and I expressed

2 to him my shock and surprise how we were treated, saying, you know --

3 because up to that point I had thought maybe there was some sort of

4 mistake, that this was an out-of-control group that had taken us hostage.

5 When I had called Mr. Karadzic's secretary and Mr. Jovan Zametica, they

6 never clearly explained what was actually going to happen in our office.

7 So when I saw Mr. Zametica, I asked him what was going on and how he

8 could justify the treatment of us. I explained that I had been attacked

9 and so on. And he said, Well, times have changed, simply. And then in a

10 self-satisfied way, he added a comment to himself, I wonder what

11 General Smith will do now? And then he walked up the road.

12 One thing I should mention for the Court - I don't know if it was

13 mentioned before - another thing that distinguished UN Military Observers

14 from UN peacekeeping -- the normal blue-helmet soldiers, is that we are

15 protected under International Law as UN experts on mission, so we are

16 internationally-protected persons. We all were conscious of that, and so

17 was Mr. Karadzic's government and people like Zametica. So we were

18 really shocked with what was happening to us.

19 Q. Major, you mentioned a moment ago that you remained handcuffed to

20 the lightning rod at Jahorinski Potok until about 5.00. What happened

21 then?

22 A. Then we saw our vehicle again come from the same direction, that

23 is, as before, from roughly where those warehouses were, driven by some

24 Bosnian Serb soldiers. They went down the road and then came back,

25 stopped, and came to me, and told me that they would be taking me away.

Page 11100

1 I asked where, and they wouldn't say, and they put me in the back of the

2 vehicle where Janusz Kalbarczyk was already handcuffed, and I was

3 handcuffed there as well, and then we were driven away.

4 Q. And where did the vehicle go with you and Mr. Kalbarczyk?

5 A. We went through Pale, where they picked up some more soldiers,

6 and then we drove up a road to a ski complex called Jahorino [phoen],

7 which was also -- Jahorina is also a name of a mountain, a large mountain

8 in the area. It's a road that I knew well, because in the ski resorts

9 there was a hotel named the Hotel Bistrica where some of the Bosnian Serb

10 officials stayed, and including Mr. Zametica, where I had once visited

11 him, so I recognised the road. So we were going up the road, and then it

12 stopped and pulled off on the side where there was a track. And then we

13 were at that point followed by at least one other civilian vehicle with

14 Bosnian Serb soldiers. Also, a civilian journalist named Snezan Lalovic

15 and his cameraman, as well as the lieutenant-colonel -- that's the Serb

16 lieutenant-colonel, who was the press officer, who was the other

17 cameraman. The Bosnian Serb soldiers, without explaining anything, just

18 then blindfolded both myself and Janusz Kalbarczyk. Most of the other

19 people got into the vehicle, that is, packed into it, because we then

20 went up a dirt track with their civilian vehicles. It was a Volkswagen

21 Golf was one of them, I recall, was parked. So then blindfolded, we

22 started going up a bumpy, very steep track, going up-hill for perhaps 45

23 minutes or so. Because of the nature of the road, it was slow going.

24 Then we stopped and they took us out of the vehicle, took our blindfolds

25 off. And I found myself in front of a large radar dome, together with

Page 11101

1 the same people that I had mentioned before, so several Bosnian Serb

2 soldiers, the two military and civilian cameramen, the reporter. And as

3 we were taken out of the vehicle and the blindfolds were taken off, two

4 of the soldiers took their weapons - that's the same AK-47 assault

5 rifles - donned black masks or balaclavas, and then Snezan Lalovic turned

6 to us and asked if we were afraid. I'm not sure what the point of his

7 question was, so I said, No, trying to appear as calm as I could. And

8 then they took Janusz Kalbarczyk, leaving me where I was next to their

9 vehicle, and they took Janusz Kalbarczyk to the radar dome about a

10 hundred metres or so in front of me. And there they handcuffed him to

11 the radar dome, filmed him with the two armed soldiers there with the

12 black masks, and conducted some sort of an interview with Janusz.

13 Q. Major, you've just told us that in response to Lalovic's question

14 about whether you were afraid once you had arrived at the radar dome and

15 the blindfolds were removed, that you weren't, but let me ask you: When

16 the vehicle stopped and you were blindfolded immediately before being

17 taken to the radar dome, what did you understand or think would happen?

18 A. Well, understand, I can't say because there were a lot of

19 different scenarios in my head, but one of the things I couldn't forget

20 was the threats that had been made throughout the whole morning, starting

21 in our office, then at the warehouses and along the way, that if there

22 would be any bombing, that we would be executed. There was also the

23 incident at 2.30 with the two soldiers who came by, arguing among

24 themselves if they had time to check on the other guy because air-strikes

25 were supposed to resume. So I didn't know if there had actually -- any

Page 11102

1 more air-strikes had occurred or what the situation was, but throughout

2 the day, of course, there was a concern in all of us, and we discussed

3 this with the other UNMOs later on. We were really concerned that we

4 could be executed any time not only that day but throughout our

5 captivity. But at that particular moment on the afternoon of the 26th of

6 May when we were taken up there to the radar dome, my grave concern was

7 we were taken there to be executed.

8 The other thing that caused me to be particularly worried about

9 that scenario actually happening was because on the way, as we were

10 driving up this dirt track, one of the soldiers in the car turned to

11 another one and asked him why we were going there, and he said, That is

12 up to Jahorina, and the other soldier turned to him and said, Well,

13 that's because Mladic wanted us to film some UN people there. And that's

14 why I said he didn't say filmed in what way. So perhaps one of the

15 things -- or I shouldn't say "perhaps." I mean, it was very clear in my

16 mind. One of the possibilities was that we were going to be taken there

17 to be executed, and probably filmed in the process.

18 Q. Major, you told us that Captain Kalbarczyk was taken by the men

19 with the guns and the balaclavas to be interviewed. What happened after

20 that?

21 A. Well, after that interview, which was conducted by this reporter

22 also, Snezan Lalovic - he was with him and his civilian cameraman - then

23 we were again blindfolded, put into the back of the vehicle still

24 handcuffed as before, with all the soldiers piled into it, and then we

25 continued -- and then we went back the same way down the dirt track. And

Page 11103

1 then once we hit the main road where we had initially stopped and had

2 been first blindfolded, then the blindfolds were taken off again, and we

3 were driven to the Bistrica Hotel in the Jahorinski ski complex. And it

4 was -- the word I'm searching for is "awkward" or extremely bizarre

5 situation, because all of a sudden the mood changed to -- at least on the

6 part of the Serb soldiers, to rather festive. They offered us if we

7 wanted coffee or drinks, and they became very relaxed. I had been in the

8 hotel a couple of times before, so some of the women who had been working

9 there recognised me. So they came up to me, asked me how I was and

10 everything. So it was completely as if nothing had happened at all.

11 We then -- they took us for supper in the hotel restaurant, which

12 was actually quite a nice meal. And so it was a very strange, for me,

13 situation where sort of up to that point I had been constantly under a

14 threat, and then all of a sudden everybody relaxed and pretended nothing

15 had happened at all to us.

16 So after the supper, we then were told by the guards that we

17 would be taken to our accommodations to pick up some blankets and

18 sleeping bags and coats for ourselves and also the other team members,

19 because we would be spending the night at the bunkers or other strategic

20 targets overnight outside. So we went into our accommodations, picked up

21 those items.

22 And then as we were going back through Pale, we saw another UN

23 vehicle with Serb soldiers there, and it was another UN Military Observer

24 team that we knew as Sierra Sierra 1 from a location called Kasindol.

25 And I remember seeing a Czech, Pakistani and Dutch officer from that team

Page 11104

1 in the vehicle. They were dressed in civilian clothing, which surprised

2 us. But we didn't have an opportunity to talk to them because we were in

3 the back of the vehicle, and only the guards went out to chat with the

4 other Serb soldiers that were with the other vehicle to discuss

5 something. I don't know what it was.

6 And then from there, we were taken to a military garrison that

7 was known as the Koran Barracks. We were taken upstairs to the second or

8 third floor of a dormitory-type building. And there, for the first time

9 that day, I saw all the other UNMOs. So it was a very relieving

10 situation to see that everybody was okay.

11 And the other UNMOs -- so there was, from my team, just

12 Ole Zidlik, and from the other team, that's the Sierra Echo 1 team, there

13 was Griffiths Evans from Ghana, Pepe Romero from Spain, Janusz Kalbarczyk

14 from Poland, and Zlato Kukuznik [phoen] from the Czech Republic. They

15 also had a Russian officer Dmitri Batiouchenkov, who was not there, and

16 the Russian officer from my team, Pavel Teterevsky, he also wasn't there.

17 And then there was also two members from another team called Sierra Golf

18 1 from Grbavica, which is a neighbourhood in Sarajevo on the Serb side,

19 and there was two of them, Harley Alves from Brazil and Josh Gelasen

20 [phoen] from the Netherlands.

21 Q. Thank you, Major. Now, the next morning, did you remain at the

22 garrison or were you taken from there?

23 A. The next morning, the first thing that happened, and it was

24 around 9.00 in the morning, Mr. Ribic and one of the other soldiers told

25 me to go with them, and they took me outside of this dormitory building

Page 11105

1 to our UNMO vehicle which was parked outside. And they told me to send a

2 message to Kilo X-ray. That's our UNMO headquarters in Sarajevo. And

3 they gave me a list of locations where I was supposed to tell them how

4 many military observers were at each one, and it was basically the places

5 where we had been handcuffed the previous day, so it was places like the

6 bunkers at Jahorinski Potok, some warehouses. I remember a bridge and

7 perhaps some other locations. So I transmitted that information and also

8 took the opportunity to add that if Mr. -- next time -- or when

9 Mr. Akashi comes for a meeting with the Bosnian Serbs, to please insist

10 on having us -- UNMO chief liaison officer with him as a way of us to,

11 sort of, not to be forgotten, and for the UN to try to involve us as

12 quickly as possible in their dealings to resolve the crisis or whatever

13 had actually been going on at that point.

14 Q. Major, let me ask you to take a quick look at a document.

15 And if I could ask that 65 ter 10597 be called up, please.

16 This is a code cable dated 27 May 1995 from Janvier to Annan.

17 And if I could ask that we turn to paragraph 5 of that document.

18 That's on the second page of the English.

19 That indicates that:

20 "The UNMO team from Pale, taken hostage during the course of

21 yesterday, have been allowed to make radio contact with UNMO HQ in

22 Sarajevo this morning. They report that they are unharmed, and were able

23 to brief on the location of some of the other teams."

24 Major, does that appear to be a reference to the contact that you

25 had on the morning of May 27th, to which you just referred?

Page 11106

1 A. I can't be absolutely certain, but it would appear so. It just

2 mentions an UNMO team from Pale, so it could be us or Sierra Echo 1. But

3 I sort of fit the description of the messages being sort of from a team

4 in Pale that made radio contact and reported some locations of the other

5 teams.

6 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Major.

7 Mr. President, I tender that document.

8 JUDGE KWON: That is admitted.

9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2171, Your Honours.

10 MR. TIEGER:

11 Q. Major, after making the call, where were you taken and by whom?

12 A. Then all of us that had spent the night together, so I mentioned

13 the three teams, a total of eight UNMOs, we were then taken back to the

14 complex that had been bombed the previous day. I remember, in the

15 message that I relayed, that I passed on, that we would be taken back in

16 front of the bunkers. And to my great relief, they actually took us not

17 to the bunkers, themselves, but a few hundred metres before that, where

18 there was a small guard hut. So that's where we were kept for the

19 duration of that day.

20 Although things were fairly calm, we saw in the back room they

21 had about 10 sets of handcuffs laid out, so we knew that they were simply

22 waiting for an order and we would be taken and find ourselves in exactly

23 the same situation as the previous day. So we spent the day there.

24 Also, sometime later that morning or early afternoon, the two

25 Russians joined us, so Pavel Teterevsky from my team and

Page 11107

1 Dmitri Batiouchenkov from the Sierra Echo 1 team. We spent the day there

2 uneventfully.

3 Later in the afternoon, myself and a member of the Sierra Echo 1

4 team, we were told to go to our accommodations, that we could bring back

5 some toiletries and change of clothes for ourselves and the other team

6 members. So we were taken there by some of the guards. And in the

7 Sierra Echo 1 office, a couple of their interpreters were there, watching

8 television, and they had satellite TV so they were watching CNN. And the

9 interpreters told them that they saw the UNMOs used as human shields

10 broadcast around the world from the previous day, and that also on the

11 local Serb news in Pale, they had shown me, myself, and Ole Zidlik and

12 Pavel Teterevsky handcuffed to those lightning rods and the ammunition

13 bunker, and that the Serbs in the news broadcast accused us of actually

14 being the people on the ground guiding in the air-strikes, which was not

15 only false, but it infuriated us, because accusations like that put our

16 lives in danger, because the local people had very little access to

17 independent media, and we were concerned that now, especially given those

18 who were angry at the air-strikes, they would then believe these reports

19 and then seek to take their anger or frustrations out on us and retaliate

20 against us.

21 Q. Now, Major, as your statement indicates, you were eventually

22 released on the 18th of June, 1995; is that right?

23 A. That's when we left Pale, yes.

24 Q. I want to ask you about some of the events or some of what you

25 did during the period of time before that release.

Page 11108

1 First of all, you indicated that you had been back to your

2 accommodations. Did you go to your accommodations more than once between

3 the time you were -- that you began to be held at the garrison and the

4 time you were released?

5 A. Yes, several more times.

6 Q. At any -- at some point during one of those visits, did you

7 attempt to get someone to send a message to your HQ?

8 A. Yes. On the following day, that is now the 28th of May, so after

9 the day we spent at the guard huts near the bunkers, I was allowed again,

10 both myself and a member from the other team, to go to each of our

11 respective accommodations to pick up some more personal items for us,

12 because at that time it became clear that we would be held in captivity

13 for several more days. And one of our interpreters was on duty, and I

14 saw that since over the last three previous days, when we were no longer

15 in the office, the UN confidential situation reports kept being sent to

16 our office, so I instructed my interpreter to send a fax to our

17 headquarters, to Kilo X-ray, and tell them to stop sending the sitreps,

18 and also to report that myself and the other military observers that I

19 was with, so from my team, Sierra Echo 1 and Sierra Golf 1, were being

20 held at the Koran Barracks, and we were in good condition. And our

21 landlord was there in the office. He did not speak English, as I was

22 relaying the instructions in English to our interpreters, but he

23 understood facts and something, and he intervened very angrily and said,

24 No, no, no faxes, no telephone calls. Mr. Krajisnik had called, and he

25 said none of this is permitted. Just do as you're told and you'll be all

Page 11109

1 released in three or four days. And by Mr. Krajisnik -- our landlord,

2 they were close associates in business before the war and were close -- I

3 presume still close friends or colleagues, our landlord meant

4 Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, who was the -- we understood at the time, the head

5 of the Serb Parliamentary Assembly in Pale.

6 Q. Major, during the period of time you were held, did you attempt

7 to contact Professor Koljevic, with whom you'd had previous dealings, at

8 least through his office?

9 A. Yes. In fact, I had another opportunity the following day, on

10 the 29th of May, to go over to our accommodation, because we didn't have

11 any facilities where we were being held to do laundry and so on. So we

12 discussed that with our guards, and I suggested that we get our laundry

13 done, as required, from our housekeeper where we were living, because we

14 had already paid for the next month's rent, which included services like

15 doing laundry and so on. So I went there to drop off some laundry. But

16 before then, we stopped first at the Sierra Echo 1 team location, where

17 one of my interpreters was on duty -- sorry, not on duty, she was just

18 visiting there. And I told her that we would be leaving in a few minutes

19 for my office and that I needed to get a meeting done -- organised with

20 Professor Koljevic, because I still thought at this point perhaps he

21 could intervene in helping us in some way, because I had some personal

22 dealings with him previously in my capacity as the chief liaison officer.

23 So I asked our interpreter to call Professor Koljevic's secretary, Ceca,

24 and to tell her to call my office, that I had some urgent things to

25 discuss with her. And probably that's all I said. So my interpreter

Page 11110

1 complied, so it worked like clockwork.

2 Five minutes later, when I answered the door to my office, the

3 phone rang. My interpreter, who was on duty, picked up the phone, and

4 turned to me and said, It's Ceca, and she wants to talk to you. So the

5 Serb guard who was with us, that's was a fellow named Captain Vojvodic,

6 who would be the main guard for the rest of our captivity, he was a bit

7 surprised. But because the call came from someone from such a position

8 of authority, he had no objection. So I spoke with Ceca, and I told her

9 that I needed to get -- to meet with Professor Koljevic to try to find

10 out what's going on, and also to discuss our conditions, which were

11 unacceptable, and if there is -- and also I wanted to straighten out what

12 the circumstances were about the air-strikes and so on. And Ceca then

13 said, yes, no problem, she would arrange the meeting, and mentioned that

14 it should be no problem at all. And then she asked me to pass the

15 telephone to Captain Vojvodic, and I understood that she had instructed

16 him that, Tomorrow a meeting would be organised with Professor Koljevic,

17 and that this was all sanctioned -- you know, is all official.

18 So when we left, Captain Vojvodic and I discussed it briefly, and

19 from that discussion I understood that he had been told that, yes, the

20 meeting would occur.

21 Then later on, once we got back to our -- to the Koran Barracks,

22 where we were being held, he asked me if Colonel Djurdjic, the main

23 Bosnian Serb Army liaison officer that we had been dealing with, and the

24 most senior one, could attend the meeting. So I said it was up to

25 Professor Koljevic, but that I personally had no objections. So then he

Page 11111

1 asked me to draft a letter, what we would be discussing. So I drafted a

2 short letter that evening, saying basically what I've just said, that it

3 would be discussing the conditions of our service -- of our detention,

4 the circumstances of the hostage-taking, to explain everything to

5 Professor Koljevic, how we had actually been mistreated and what had

6 actually happened, and then to discuss the way ahead, how to get out of

7 this.

8 Q. And did the meeting the next day take place?

9 A. No, it didn't. And I asked Captain Vojvodic, you know, several

10 times during the day when it will be, and he said -- first he didn't

11 know, and then he said he went to try to find out, and that there was

12 nobody at all in Professor Koljevic's office and nobody else in the

13 Presidency area that he could get any information from about the meeting.

14 So he said nobody told him anything and he received no instructions about

15 any meeting.

16 Q. Did you eventually meet with Professor Koljevic during the course

17 of your captivity?

18 A. Yes, eventually, much later on, the 15th of June. So that's, I

19 believe, the 21st day of our captivity.

20 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, I'm in the Court's hands. I can

21 ask about that or we can take it up when we resume.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.

24 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

25 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

Page 11112

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.

3 May I introduce Kejia Guo from China and the Netherlands, who is

4 joining us for this session.

5 MS. GUO: Nice to meet you.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please continue.

7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

8 Q. Major, just before the recess I had asked you if you eventually

9 were able to meet with Professor Koljevic during your captivity. And you

10 indicated much later on -- that it did happen much later, on the 15th of

11 June. And then again -- or that was the 21st day of your captivity, as

12 you calculated it. Can you tell us about that meeting, please?

13 A. Yes. It came as a bit of a surprise, but a pleasant surprise.

14 It was on the morning of that day, Captain Vojvodic had come into our

15 accommodations and told us -- or told me to get ready, that I finally

16 have my meeting with Professor Koljevic, if I was happy, that he was able

17 to arrange this meeting. I told him, Well, it's about time.

18 So I was then taken with Captain Vojvodic. We drove to the

19 military police headquarters in Pale, and there, in a room, I had a

20 private one-on-one meeting with Professor Koljevic.

21 Q. And did you relate to Professor Koljevic your concerns about your

22 treatment and captivity and various specific issues you wanted to raise

23 with him prior to that?

24 A. Yes. In fact, in great detail, and I was grateful

25 Professor Koljevic had the time to discuss all of my concerns. The most

Page 11113

1 pressing concern I had, and all of us up to that point, was that we were

2 unable, except at just some very short and very limited periods of time,

3 to make contact with our next of kin. By that time, all of us had

4 managed to make a telephone call home, but for some of us, it was much

5 later, such as the 10th of June was when I actually got to make a phone

6 call home. And we wanted to not be limited to just one two-minute call

7 once during our captivity, because, of course, our families had seen all

8 the images that were broadcast of our use as human shields and were

9 extremely concerned about our well-being. And that, of course, made us

10 concerned about their well-being, how they were coping with the

11 situation, because there was no information being provided to them by the

12 Bosnian Serbs through the UN, what our conditions were. We were not able

13 to have contact with the outside world. So that was the first concern.

14 And Professor Koljevic responded positively, but he didn't commit to

15 anything. He would just say he would see what he can do.

16 Then we also discussed, in great detail, the actual

17 hostage-taking and what had actually happened to us. I wanted to make

18 sure Professor Koljevic understood everything. And he was a bit

19 surprised. He knew about some of the details, but not everything, how we

20 had actually been threatened and how the whole situation had impacted on

21 all of us; not just my team, but all the other people.

22 We then also moved on to discuss the working relationship between

23 the UN and the Bosnian Serb authorities, and my team's role as the

24 liaison office in that, specifically. And Professor Koljevic then

25 explained that the air-strikes, for the Bosnian Serbs, had been accepted

Page 11114

1 extremely badly. They were surprised at the intensity of them and that

2 they actually had done some real damage. Up to that point, he mentioned

3 air-strikes were really not much of a concern to the Bosnian Serbs. They

4 had normally received prior warning, and they were typically symbolic, it

5 was just one small, isolated target. But he said the air-strikes on the

6 26th, they were intensive, and they did not expect them to occur until

7 after a 12.00 noon dead-line that day, which was for something else. It

8 was a dead-line in General Smith's warning that all the shelling was to

9 stop. But, anyway, he mentioned, for the Serbs, this was a big crisis,

10 and they needed to react in a way that would send a shock to the UN. And

11 he then used the analogy of an electric shock, saying that sometimes if

12 you treat a patient -- a medical patient with an electric shock, you can

13 kill him, but sometimes you can cure him. So they said from their point

14 of view, this was all worth the risk.

15 Then I asked him about our future relationship, if we would be

16 released in Pale, but he said, no, the Serbs want to start a completely

17 new relationship with the UN, so that our office would be closed.

18 That's essentially what we discussed at the meeting.

19 Q. You mentioned your access to your family, communications with

20 your family, despite your requests. Were you able to -- did you request

21 to meet with and were you able to meet with, for example, the Red Cross,

22 the ICRC?

23 A. Earlier on in our captivity, on, I believe, it was the third day

24 or fourth day, I drafted a letter to Major Batinic, who was the superior

25 of Captain Vojvodic - and, again, just to recall, Captain Vojvodic was

Page 11115

1 the main guard during our captivity - because at that point we were

2 already starting to get frustrated by the fact that we were not receiving

3 telephone calls and other things. So we drafted a letter to

4 Major Batinic, requesting telephone calls, contact with the

5 International Committee of the Red Cross which had an office of delegates

6 right in Pale that we personally knew very well, and we knew that was our

7 right under International Law as well. We wanted access to medical care

8 because some of the people in the group were under extremely severe

9 stress. We wanted also regular access to our accommodations, and we

10 wanted regular access to news. And the final issue that we requested was

11 for me and my team to be able to work out of our office. If that was a

12 concern to the Bosnian Serbs, they could have some guards with us, but we

13 thought it would be important for us to maintain our role as the liaison

14 team between the UN and the Bosnian Serb authorities and to start that up

15 as soon as possible.

16 So regarding the Red Cross, we eventually were able to meet them.

17 I believe it was on the 8th of June, so well into our captivity. And I

18 also found out from them -- they had also been insisting from the very

19 first day, once it had been clear to them that we had been taken away,

20 that they have access to us. That is, the Red Cross wanted to have

21 immediate access as well to us.

22 Q. You mentioned a meeting with Professor Koljevic during the course

23 of your captivity. Did you also meet with someone you understood to be

24 the president of the Republika Srpska Exchange Commission?

25 A. Yes. When the delegates of the ICRC came to see us on what I

Page 11116

1 believe was -- I recall was the 8th of June, they were accompanied by

2 Mr. Bulajic, who was president of the Bosnia -- or the

3 Bosnian Serb Exchange Commission. This was the representative who would

4 be involved in exchanges of prisoners between the Bosnian Serbs and the

5 other parties to the conflict. And, in fact, I had met Mr. Bulajic once

6 before as I was driving from Kiseljak, which was an area near Sarajevo

7 held by the Croatian forces, and he had a problem at one of the

8 check-points, and I was travelling back from a meeting there with a

9 French team who was escorting him, and I managed -- because they didn't

10 speak Serbo-Croatian, I intervened and managed to get him access through

11 the Croatian check-point back into Republika Srpska.

12 So, anyway, Mr. Bulajic came in with the ICRC team and introduced

13 himself, and said that we were being treated properly as prisoners of

14 war, since we had been combatants. And I took issue with that. I asked

15 him was he aware that we were UN Military Observers, not other soldiers

16 or peacekeeping forces. And he said, Yes. And I asked him was he aware

17 that UN Military Observers are unarmed. He said, Yes. I said, Are you

18 aware that we were working on the Bosnian Serb held territory with the

19 permission of his president, Mr. Karadzic. And he said, Yes. So I

20 asked, Well, then how can you consider us to be combatants? And he

21 replied, Well, this is something we can discuss later on, and then just

22 turned us over to the ICRC. And I never had a chance to have further

23 discussions with him.

24 Q. You indicated earlier that you were released on the 18th of June,

25 finally. Did you meet with Professor Koljevic again after that meeting

Page 11117

1 of the 15th?

2 A. Yes. Also on the 18th, I had actually -- well, one was a short

3 meeting by telephone. There was an incident where, as we were packing up

4 our belongings prior to our release, we tried to take some of our office

5 equipment with us as well, and that was prevented by our landlord and the

6 Serb guards. And then Professor Koljevic found out about that and then

7 called to apologise about the incident and to reassure me that he would

8 take personal responsibility for the security of our office equipment.

9 And then later that day, as we were taken to the military police

10 headquarters, so again the same location where I had the meeting with him

11 on the 15th, this time it was the entire group of UNMOs that were being

12 held. We were taken there. And also I was met -- or I was -- I met

13 there also with a group of 11 Canadian soldiers from our peacekeeping

14 battalion that was stationed in Visoko, which is near Sarajevo. And

15 Professor Koljevic then talked to both the Canadians, as a group, and

16 then to the UNMOs, as a group, and he just mentioned that -- he

17 apologised for the treatment that we had received, and that he understood

18 a little bit because during his military service he had been imprisoned

19 in a Yugoslav military jail as part of that time. And then he repeated

20 the shock therapy analogy, asking us to understand that the Serbs were

21 required to take extreme measures.

22 Q. Earlier, when your landlord had intervened with something you

23 were trying to do in the accommodations, you mentioned that he cited

24 Mr. Krajisnik. In the instance you just described, for which

25 Mr. Koljevic apologised, was that something that you understood to be

Page 11118

1 done at the behest of the landlord or was there further mention of

2 Mr. Krajisnik?

3 A. What had actually happened is I had gone to the accommodations

4 first, and I'd taken my belongings and the hand-set to our satellite

5 telephone, and Ole Zidlik, the Czech UNMO on my team, he went then

6 afterwards, and he took the antenna for the satellite phone and the

7 CapSat transceiver, which is a small blue box that's essentially like a

8 hard drive on a computer that allows the system to be used over the

9 satellite's network as an e-mail-type system. Of course, we were

10 perfectly entitled to take this, this was our equipment, and I personally

11 had signed for responsibility of that equipment when I had taken over as

12 team leader.

13 However, for some reason, the wife of our landlord, Mira Savic,

14 had discussed that the antenna was missing, and she got extremely angry.

15 She called Ole Zidlik an enemy of the Serb people, that he was trying to

16 take this equipment, which was -- which surprised him very much because

17 he was particularly close to her and the children. He did a lot of good

18 every time he went on leave, he brought back lots and lots of sweets,

19 which was something we all did, but he went really out of the way to look

20 after the children of that family. So they searched his belongings but

21 only found those two items, but not the hand-sets. Our interpreter was

22 there, Svetlana Balovic [phoen]. And then when she saw the hand-set

23 wasn't there, she said, Ah, then Patrick must have it. So then I was

24 forced to come back to the accommodation to also return the hand-set, and

25 then I had an argument with our landlord. And subsequently to that -- in

Page 11119

1 fact, during that argument, he said he would report this to

2 Mr. Krajisnik. And then when I got the phone call later on from

3 Professor Koljevic apologising for the incident, Professor Koljevic

4 mentioned in that phone call that he had found out everything from

5 Mr. Krajisnik. So he was aware of -- so I imagine our landlord,

6 Dani Savic, called Krajisnik, who called Koljevic, who called me.

7 Q. Thank you, Major. I'd like to show you a couple of documents and

8 then some video footage as well.

9 If we could first call up 65 ter 18839. And if we could go to

10 the third page -- it should be the third page in e-court, I believe.

11 Thank you.

12 Looking at that first paragraph, Major, it reflects, among other

13 things, an entry by the VRS and into the 7 Lima house, and a threat to

14 UNMO HQ that for every bomb, one of the UNMOs will be killed. It

15 reflects that the threat was repeated to General Smith by phone, that

16 UNMOs of the 7 Lima Pale liaison team were taken to Jahorinski Potok, the

17 place where NATO conducted the air-strike. It further reflects requests

18 by VRS soldier and then 7 Lima to confirm that the bombing stop, the

19 gathering of a crowd, the team leader of 7 Lima beaten and threatened

20 with a pistol; that UNMOs handcuffed to the car; and an answer from

21 General Smith that the bombing stopped; a report by 7 Lima 9 that if

22 air-strike continues, the UNMOs will die for the sake of NATO.

23 Let me ask you, first of all, by way of clarification, 7 Lima 9,

24 do you know what that's a reference to?

25 A. Yes, that's my personal call sign. "9" means the head of the

Page 11120

1 team or the commander of the team, so 7 Lima 9. Or over the radio, we

2 say "niner." That was me.

3 If I may also clarify. You mentioned VRS. The abbreviation for

4 the Bosnian Serb Army that the UNMOs tended to use in their reporting

5 was, in English, BSA, but it's the same thing.

6 Q. And what does that acronym stand for?

7 A. "BSA," Bosnian Serb Army.

8 Q. So that's the acronym for VRS --

9 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... Srpski.

10 Q. -- in English?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So do these entries reflect some of what you experienced

13 first-hand and are they references to some of what you told the Court

14 during the course of your testimony today?

15 A. Yes, they are.

16 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I would ask that this document be

17 admitted.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2172, Your Honours.

20 MR. TIEGER: And if we could turn next to 65 ter 21963.

21 And if we could go to the next page, please. And the next page

22 after that. And just complete going through the two more pages. If we

23 could show those, please.

24 Q. Major, you've had a chance to look at this document previously,

25 and can you tell us, based on your own experience and what you learned

Page 11121

1 from others, what this document represents?

2 A. This document represents what the UN headquarters in Sarajevo,

3 that is, General Smith's headquarters, I believe, or it could be the

4 Sector Sarajevo headquarters of General Gobillard, what they believed

5 where the actual UN Military Observers who were taken hostage were

6 located.

7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'd ask this document be admitted.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2173, Your Honours.

10 MR. TIEGER: Major, I'd like to turn to some video footage, if we

11 could, please. And I'm going to invite you, during the course of

12 observing the footage, to assist us by indicating what is depicted there.

13 In some instances, the footage may be moving slowly enough that you'll be

14 able to speak over it. In other instances, we'll try to stop, identify

15 the particular frame at which we stop, and you can speak about what's

16 depicted at that point.

17 If we could first call up P02024, please.

18 And, Your Honour, in the 65 ter, the time code was 00:26:41

19 through 00:29:30. As the Court is aware, when these videos are placed in

20 Sanction, the time code begins to run from zero, so the calculation will

21 have to be made based on the Sanction designation, and then that will

22 have to be, of course, to identify the specific portion of the video,

23 added to the commencement time of the video in the longer footage, if

24 necessary. I'll also attempt to assist by describing, to the extent

25 possible, what's on screen at that moment.

Page 11122

1 So if we could commence with 02024, please.

2 [Video-clip played]

3 "Reporter: Again the Serbs' ammunition dump at Pale was attacked

4 by NATO jets, and this morning four bunkers were taken out. The Serbs

5 reacted furiously, this time not with shelling but with hostage-taking.

6 It was a time of humiliation for the United Nations --"

7 MR. TIEGER: Can we stop, please.

8 Q. And, Major, you are also invited to indicate when you feel the

9 footage should be stopped so you can make a comment that pertains to your

10 testimony?

11 Can you tell us who is depicted here and where that is?

12 A. Yes, this is my colleague from the Sierra Echo 1 team,

13 Janusz Kalbarczyk, and that's up at Mount Jahorina, the radar dome, where

14 we were taken late on the 26th of May. That's the incident where I

15 mentioned we had been blindfolded going up, and the soldiers, once we got

16 up there, took their weapons and donned black masks. And

17 Major Kalbarczyk was taken there and interviewed and filmed. And the

18 previous footage that you saw, that was also what I recollect seeing on

19 the morning of the 26th, the -- that is, the air-strikes. You saw the

20 big plume of smoke and dust, that's also what we saw from Pale, from our

21 accommodations which were on a piece of high ground.

22 MR. TIEGER: And for the record, this is shown at 00:26:58.4.

23 If we could continue, please.

24 [Video-clip played]

25 "UNMO's military observers were held chained and padlocked by the

Page 11123

1 Serbs to points of strategic importance, this Pole to an observatory and

2 a Ghanaian to a bridge, telling his captors what they wanted --"

3 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, if we can just go back. This is at

4 00:27:08.1.

5 Q. Do you recognise persons depicted here, and the location as well?

6 A. Yes. This is -- on the left is Griffiths Evans from Ghana, and

7 on his right -- or on my right, his left, is Pepe Romero from Spain, and

8 these are both UNMOs from the Sierra Echo 1 team in Pale. And this is a

9 bridge in Pale which I knew quite well. It was quite close to our

10 accommodations, just about 200 metres away.

11 MR. TIEGER: Continue, please.

12 [Video-clip played]

13 "Reporter: ... captors what they wanted to hear."

14 "Today, we, the UNMOs, saw that the NATO planes bombed a lot of

15 civilian targets and a lot of civilians were killed. This is very bad,

16 and it's a crime against humanity. We, the UNMOs, will appeal to NATO,

17 especially Rupert Smith, to be aware that our lives are in danger."

18 "Reporter: Three more UNMO officers were shown chained or --"

19 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please.

20 This is 27:35.7.

21 Q. Do you recognise who is depicted here?

22 A. Yes, this is Pavel Teterevsky, who was the Russian officer in my

23 7 Lima team.

24 MR. TIEGER: If we can continue, please.

25 [Video-clip played]

Page 11124

1 "Reporter: ... to steel posts in the arms depot that NATO had

2 attacked. One was a Russian, another was a Canadian --"

3 THE WITNESS: And that's myself, and both of us were handcuffed

4 to those lightning rods, the two of them that I had mentioned earlier in

5 my testimony.

6 MR. TIEGER: That's 27:42:7.

7 [Video-clip played]

8 "Reporter: ... used as human shields, and accused, quite

9 falsely, the UN said, of having called in the air-strikes. The third

10 officer from the Czech Republic --"

11 THE WITNESS: And that's Ole Zidlik --

12 MR. TIEGER: That's at 27:51:5.

13 THE WITNESS: -- who's the Czech officer in the 7 Lima team.

14 [Video-clip played]

15 "Reporter: ... the door of a bunker with ammunition still in it.

16 Six other military observers are being held in similar circumstances. On

17 the way to the arms depot and already in the captivity of the Bosnian

18 Serbs, the hostages called their headquarters."

19 "If the bombing stops, we will be set free. Otherwise, we will

20 be killed. Over."

21 "Just to confirm, what they are waiting from General Smith is

22 confirmation that the bombing will stop? Over."

23 "If the bombing starts again, I have been instructed to tell you

24 that we will die for the sake of NATO. Over."

25 "This is BSA soldier. Three UN observers are now at the site of

Page 11125

1 the warehouse. Any more bombings, they'll be the first to go.

2 Understood?"

3 "Reporter: The UN was --"

4 MR. TIEGER: Can we stop for a moment.

5 Q. Major, we just heard four excerpts, broadcasted excerpts. Can

6 you tell us who was speaking on those and approximately at what point

7 those broadcasts were made, or those radio transmissions were made, or --

8 A. The first three were made by me, at the request, or demand,

9 rather, of the Bosnian Serb soldiers that had taken us into captivity. I

10 believe the first two were taken as we were waiting at the warehouses for

11 the air-strikes to be called off, and the third one was as we were

12 starting to go forward towards the bunkers. And the fourth transmission,

13 where you see the text on the screen by the Bosnian Serb soldier, this is

14 from Nicholas Ribic, who was the Canadian of Serb origin, who was the

15 first person involved in our own hostage-taking.

16 And when -- this was relayed, I believe, by warehouse. He

17 actually meant the bunker, and this was when we had arrived at the site

18 of the bunkers, just prior to being handcuffed to the lightning rod and,

19 in the case of Mr. Ole Zidlik, the door of the bunker.

20 [Video-clip played]

21 "Right now, there's --"

22 MR. TIEGER: Okay. And if we could end.

23 Q. Major, I'd like to turn your attention next to 65 ter 40557A

24 [Realtime transcript read in error "44557A"] through C. This is ERN

25 V000-8393. The time codes are 0:38:16 through 0:43:02.

Page 11126

1 [Video-clip played]

2 MR. TIEGER: Let's stop first. This is at approximately nine or

3 ten seconds into this.

4 Q. Do you recognise this scene and who's depicted here, Major?

5 A. Yes. This is our vehicle. This is the Toyota Land Cruiser I had

6 mentioned earlier. And closest to the vehicle, looking left to right,

7 you see my -- actually, let's go from right to left. It will be easier.

8 Closest to the vehicle is Pavel Teterevsky, then Ole Zidlik, and then

9 myself. Then the man with the crutch is Srdjan, who is the commander, or

10 at least he was indicated to us by Ribic that he was the commander of the

11 group of soldiers that had taken us hostage. And the location is the

12 warehouse just inside the facility where we were waiting for the bombing

13 to be called off, so still a kilometre or two away from the bunkers,

14 itself, but inside that large logistics and ammunition storage facility.

15 JUDGE KWON: And the 65 ter number of this is 40557?

16 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. Did I misspeak on that? Yes,

17 that's correct.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

19 [Video-clip played]

20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "I didn't understand. Stay here

21 with them."

22 "Fuck it."

23 "They should all be all --"

24 "They should all be ..."

25 THE WITNESS: So that's the same location, just from a different

Page 11127

1 angle.

2 MR. TIEGER: And you're referring to the image at 59.1.

3 THE WITNESS: So left to right, that's myself, then Ole, then

4 Pavel.

5 [Video-clip played]

6 "He will die if they bomb, he will die for the good of NATO."

7 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please.

8 Q. Now, Major, you're obviously back in the vehicle now. Can you

9 orient the Trial Chamber about where this scene is taking place?

10 A. Yes. This is now we have left the warehouses where we had been

11 waiting, which is the image that you saw just before this, and now we're

12 back in the vehicle and being driven towards the actual bunkers and the

13 lightning rods, where we will then be handcuffed.

14 Q. And who was saying, "Tell them you will die if they bomb, you

15 will die for the good of NATO"?

16 A. That was Nicholas Ribic, who was the Canadian of Serbian origin,

17 who was one of the Bosnian Serb soldiers that day who took us hostage,

18 and he was sitting behind us on a bench seat in the cargo area of the

19 Land Cruiser.

20 [Video-clip played]

21 "Kilo X-ray, this is 7 Lima 9. Over."

22 "[Indiscernible]."

23 "7 Lima 9, we've been instruct to advise you that --"

24 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please.

25 Q. We're obviously moving on to a different scene. That portion of

Page 11128

1 the video ended with, apparently, you saying -- that was you; is that

2 right?

3 A. Yes, it was.

4 Q. Beginning a transmission that you'd been instructed to advise

5 them. And did that transmission continue with some of the information we

6 heard on the previous video excerpt with the radio broadcast?

7 A. Yes. I -- as you may recall, Ribic was telling me to say that we

8 will die for the good of NATO, and I changed that to that I've been

9 instructed to say that we will die for the sake of NATO, to make it a bit

10 more unintelligible and ambiguous.

11 [Video-clip played]

12 MR. TIEGER: If we could stop for just a moment.

13 Q. We've moved on to a different scene. Can you orient us now? And

14 we're at 1:36.5.

15 A. Yes. This is at the bunkers, so we've just arrived. You can see

16 where the handcuffs are being taken off. And there I am with

17 Nicholas Ribic, who is the fellow in the camouflage uniform and the green

18 helmet, and behind him is Ole Zidlik. So they are essentially taking us

19 out of the vehicle and to the lightning rods, in the case of Pavel and

20 myself, and to the door of the bunker, in the case of Ole.

21 [Video-clip played]

22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Wait here."

23 "Oh, my dear Russian. Are you Russian?"

24 MR. TIEGER:

25 Q. Who is dealing depicted here?

Page 11129

1 A. This is Pavel Teterevsky being handcuffed to the lightning rod by

2 one of the Serb soldiers.

3 MR. TIEGER: And this is at 1:47.3.

4 [Video-clip played]

5 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Call, what's his name, Kozirev. He

6 can save you. To hell with him."

7 "Not the hands."

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. At 2:04.2, what do we see here, Major?

10 A. You can see myself on the other side of the lightning rod and

11 Ole Zidlik being taken away by Ribic.

12 [Video-clip played]

13 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Find a wire, steel wire, something

14 more flexible."

15 THE WITNESS: Just what's being --

16 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please. We're stopping at 2:31.9 for the

17 major's comment.

18 THE WITNESS: What you seen on the transcript below and the

19 translation is there was three of us but they had only two sets of

20 handcuffs. So they used one on Pavel Teterevsky, the second one on

21 myself, and didn't have anything -- or didn't have a third set of

22 handcuffs for Ole Zidlik. So they were looking for something, and then

23 they made the decision to use Pavel's handcuffs on Ole, and then they

24 found a piece of rope and tied Pavel, with rope, to the lightning rod.

25 Q. And that's a reference to the portion of the transcript that

Page 11130

1 indicates:

2 "Find a wire, steel wire, something more flexible."

3 Is that correct?

4 A. Yes, and then they ended up finding a piece of rope.

5 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.

6 [Video-clip played]

7 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "There will be a lot of UNPROFOR

8 members in this circle this evening, just to let you know."

9 MR. TIEGER: And stop here at 2:53.9.

10 Q. Can you tell us what's happening in this portion of the video?

11 A. Yeah. In this clip, that appears to be our vehicle, and it's

12 moving further down into that narrow valley where the bunkers were. So

13 the person taking the photo is standing roughly where Pavel, Ole and I

14 are now handcuffed and tied. And it's going further away from us, so

15 further away from the original warehouses where we were held.

16 Q. And you mentioned the other UNMOs who were brought after you and

17 Captain Zidlik and Captain Teterevsky were secured there, and the

18 soldiers who came to check on the UNMOs around 2.30 or so. Can you

19 orient us, in relation to this portion of the video, where the other

20 UNMOs and Kalbarczyk appeared to be?

21 A. Yes. So the direction in which that vehicle is travelling,

22 that's towards where Janusz Kalbarczyk was held, in that direction.

23 Just to clarify, we never actually saw where Janusz was held,

24 because from our angle we couldn't see that far into the valley. So we

25 just knew he was somewhere down there.

Page 11131

1 [Video-clip played]

2 THE WITNESS: That's me again.

3 MR. TIEGER: At approximately 3:05.

4 [Video-clip played]

5 THE WITNESS: And this is the bridge back in Pale, very near to

6 our accommodations, where you earlier had seen Griffiths Evans from Ghana

7 and Pepe Romero sitting down next to the railing with a UN flag.

8 MR. TIEGER: And these comments were made at 3:15.8.

9 Q. And do you recognise anyone here at the bridge?

10 A. The pictures are a bit fuzzy, but I see a man with a cane. He

11 looks like Srdjan. Once, I think, you start rolling the video, it will

12 become clearer.

13 MR. TIEGER: And if you recognise anyone else during the course

14 of watching, let us know.

15 [Video-clip played]

16 THE WITNESS: So there's Ribic with the helmet. And on the right

17 side of the screen, it looks like someone is putting handcuffs on him or

18 doing something with him, is Pepe Romero from Spain. And in the blue

19 uniform next to him, that's Griffiths Evans from Ghana, both from the

20 Sierra Echo 1 team.

21 MR. TIEGER: And that's at 3:20.8.

22 [Video-clip played]

23 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Don't write this down. Memorise

24 it."

25 "Bomb civilian targets around Pale. Innocent civilians were

Page 11132

1 injured and killed. This is an act --"

2 THE WITNESS: So there you see Nicholas Ribic squatting - that's

3 the man with the helmet - giving instructions to the two UNMOs.

4 MR. TIEGER: And this is at 3:40.2.

5 Q. Do you recognise the man in the brown jacket, standing at the

6 left of the image?

7 A. Yes. That's Snezan Lalovic, who was the same reporter who then

8 accompanied myself and Janusz Kalbarczyk later in the day up to the

9 Jahorina radar site, and he's a Serb reporter from Pale.

10 [Video-clip played]

11 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please.

12 Q. We've moved to a different scene. Do you recognise what this

13 depicts?

14 A. Yes. This is on the road to Jahorina, where, as I had just

15 mentioned, Janusz and I had been taken. And we had stopped and were

16 going to turn on to a dirt track. And I'm in the back on the left-hand

17 side. Janusz, in the blue uniform, is on the right-hand side. And they

18 are just about to put the blindfolds on us.

19 [Video-clip played]

20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "This is for documentation. It's

21 not going anywhere."

22 "What documentation?"

23 "Let's see. Can he see through this?"

24 "No. He doesn't even know where he is, he's so scared and

25 traumatised. He doesn't know where he is."

Page 11133

1 THE WITNESS: And now we're driving -- that's the same road to

2 Jahorina. And the flagpoles that you see on the left-hand side, in front

3 of the vehicle, that's, I believe, the start of the ski resort portion of

4 that area.

5 MR. TIEGER: And we just stopped this at 4:28.9.

6 [Video-clip played]

7 MR. TIEGER:

8 Q. Major, I'd like to --

9 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour. I'd like to tender this

10 exhibit.

11 JUDGE KWON: In one exhibit?

12 MR. TIEGER: Yes.

13 JUDGE KWON: A, B, C all together or --

14 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, Mr. Reid asked me to mention, and we've

15 discussed it with the Registry, a portion of this exhibit is already in

16 evidence. We've begun discussing the best way of clarifying that overlap

17 or ensuring it doesn't result in any problems. No full determinations

18 have been made yet, but I raise it and indicate to the Court that the

19 resolution is underway. But I think for the moment, for identification

20 purposes, it's probably best to admit this as an exhibit in its entirety,

21 and then we can sort it out.

22 JUDGE KWON: Very well, we'll do that.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P2174.

24 MR. TIEGER: And I might add, Your Honour, the same will be the

25 situation for the fourth exhibit, the fourth video-clip we'll look at.

Page 11134

1 JUDGE KWON: Very well, yes.

2 MR. TIEGER: If we could turn next to 65 ter 40387A.

3 [Video-clip played]

4 THE WITNESS: So the man in the suit with the gray hair, that's

5 Professor Nikola Koljevic, the vice-president.

6 MR. TIEGER: And that's at 7.9 on the Sanction monitor and as

7 shown on the numbers depicted on the video, itself, 10:52:10:12.

8 [Video-clip played]

9 THE WITNESS: So there's Professor Koljevic again. And the

10 people in the military uniforms that he's talking to, they are from the

11 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia, not Bosnia-Herzegovina,

12 and I understood that they were a special unit from their Ministry of the

13 Interior. And this is just prior to our release on the 18th of June, and

14 these soldiers or special police were there to provide an escort for us

15 into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

16 MR. TIEGER: And at this moment, the video stopped at 16.3 in

17 Sanction and 10:52:18:21 on the time code shown on the video, itself.

18 [Video-clip played]

19 "I cannot make any official statement at this time. I'd like to

20 say, on behalf of myself and all of my friends and colleagues with us,

21 we're glad this crisis is now over. After 24 days, we are glad to be

22 going back to our different units, and it's been a difficult time, but we

23 are all okay and glad to be going."

24 "How were you treated, sir?"

25 "I'd rather not comment at this time."

Page 11135

1 "Where are you going to be going to? Are you going home? Would

2 you like to go home?"

3 "No, I still have some time left in the mission. It's up to my

4 headquarters to decide where they will send me."

5 "Would you like to continue to work here in the Serbian side of

6 Bosnia?"

7 "Yes, of course, as well as any other side."

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. And perhaps it's unnecessary, Major, but if you could for the

10 record identify the person who was just speaking.

11 A. Yes, that was myself. And the circumstances were we were all on

12 board the buses, ready to leave Pale for Serbia. And there was a lot of

13 newspaper reporters there, and they wanted an interview with us, and we

14 didn't want -- we just wanted to get going. And Professor Koljevic came

15 on the bus and asked or pleaded with us if someone would go, so the UNMOs

16 asked me to make the -- that short statement, which I did.

17 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, if we could tender and admit this

18 exhibit.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2175, Your Honours.

21 MR. TIEGER: And, finally, if we could turn to 65 ter 40202A.

22 [Video-clip played]

23 MR. TIEGER: Stop, please.

24 Q. And can you tell us, Major, if you recognise what's depicted

25 here?

Page 11136

1 A. Yes. On -- so you see one of the bunkers in the distance. That

2 one, as I recall, had the -- was hit in the back of the bunker, which you

3 can't actually see on the screen, on the left-hand side, and the back

4 of -- a bomb went -- from the air-strike went into the back of that

5 bunker and destroyed it. As you pan to the right, you see the lightning

6 rod, and that's Pavel Teterevsky. And the red dirt that you see in front

7 of him, that's the road from the warehouses in the back, which then

8 continued to where Janusz Kalbarczyk had been held. And on the screen,

9 it says the reporter is -- his name is Snezan Lalovic, and the cameraman

10 is Slobodan Stancevic.

11 [Video-clip played]

12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "... two NATO aircraft bomb Serb

13 civilian targets in the vicinity of Pale for the second time. The Serb

14 Army has been compelled to react like this as well. UNPROFOR members,

15 that is, the soldiers who called for the NATO aircraft, are now in our

16 hands, looking like this."

17 THE WITNESS: So that's Pavel Teterevsky and now myself. And

18 this, of course, is the first -- the 26th of May.

19 MR. TIEGER: And those comments were made at approximately 1:03.

20 [Video-clip played]

21 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Of course, nothing will happen to

22 these soldiers as long as NATO strikes are not repeated."

23 THE WITNESS: That's Ole Zidlik.

24 MR. TIEGER: At approximately 1:15.

25 [Video-clip played]

Page 11137

1 THE WITNESS: Actually, if I can say something.

2 You just heard a comment there about front-line. One concern we

3 had, we heard what appeared to be like shots in the distance to us,

4 further in the direction where Janusz Kalbarczyk had been later taken,

5 and we were concerned if we were very close proximity to a conflict area

6 between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims. But then the soldiers said --

7 told us, no, the front-line is far away, and that that was just

8 ammunition exploding from one of the air-strikes.

9 [Video-clip played]

10 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "There are also reasonable grounds

11 to suspect that these soldiers were guiding NATO aircraft towards Serb

12 civilian targets, but the investigation is still ongoing. This is just

13 one of a dozen sites hit by destructive NATO bombs."

14 THE WITNESS: And if I just reiterate for the record that those

15 accusations that we were involved in guiding those air-strikes or

16 providing any sort of assistance whatsoever are absolutely false.

17 [Video-clip played]

18 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "All the others hit civilian

19 targets, the places where refugees from Sarajevo were accommodated.

20 "Following the NATO air-strike on Pale, members of the

21 UNPROFOR --"

22 MR. TIEGER:

23 Q. And who is depicted here?

24 A. This is Snezan Lalovic, the reporter.

25 [Video-clip played]

Page 11138

1 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "... have been put under the

2 temporary control of the Serb forces, and now we're going to ask them

3 what they saw."

4 "We, the UNMOs, saw that the NATO planes bombed a lot of civilian

5 targets, and a lot of civilians were killed. This -- it's very bad, and

6 it's a crime against humanity. We want to appeal to NATO, especially

7 Rupert Smith, to [indiscernible] our lives are in danger. And we require

8 that NATO ceases bombing of BSA and Serb targets or Serb territories so

9 that our lives are spared."

10 "Reporter: Have you any problems with the Serb soldiers?"

11 "No at the moment. We don't have -- we didn't have any problem

12 at the moment."

13 "Reporter: You are from?"

14 "I'm from Spain."

15 THE WITNESS: And if I may just add some explanation there as

16 well.

17 Afterwards, Griffiths Evans and Pepe Romero, the two UNMOs you

18 had just seen making that statement on the bridge. They told us about

19 that, and that they'd been forced to make that statement with armed

20 people threatening them. From what we observed, no civilian targets were

21 hit, and there's no civilian houses near the areas that I observed; for

22 example, the bunk ers where I had been handcuffed. Also, from our

23 accommodations in Pale, we did not see any other targets hit, other than

24 the area of this bunker complex. So that's all I can offer, as far as

25 clarification, from what we observed about the targets that were actually

Page 11139

1 hit.

2 MR. TIEGER:

3 Q. And, Major, you indicated earlier in your testimony that you'd

4 been told that the broadcast, the SRT broadcast, had accused you and the

5 other UNMOs of being people involved in guiding the air-strike, and we

6 see it in this broadcast. Did you ever, during the course of your

7 captivity, have an opportunity to confront the journalist, Lalovic, about

8 the allegations made?

9 A. Yes, I was able to -- actually, very early on, on the late

10 afternoon of the 27th of May. So that was the second day of our

11 captivity. This is the day when we had been -- or we were told we would

12 be taken to the bunkers, but actually only held at a guard hut a little

13 ways away, where we had spent the day. During the course of that day,

14 Janusz Kalbarczyk and Harley Alves from Brazil, they were taken to

15 Mount Jahorina again to be filmed at the radar dome. So Snezan Lalovic

16 came there to go up there with them and then came back with them, and

17 stayed for a while. While they were gone, I went with one of the other

18 UNMOs to our accommodations, and that -- I mentioned previously in my

19 testimony that one of our interpreters at the Sierra Echo 1 location

20 mentioned that we had been shown on TV and accused of guiding in the

21 air-strikes. So when I got back to the guard hut near the bunkers, I

22 mentioned that to the other UNMOs. And Ole Zidlik and I, we confronted

23 Snezan Lalovic about these allegations, and he replied that -- well, we

24 explained to him that it was absolutely false, and he agreed, but he said

25 because the Muslim side and their propaganda, they lie, the Serbs also

Page 11140

1 have to lie. That was his simple explanation.

2 [Video-clip played]

3 THE WITNESS: And here you see Ole Zidlik. He was moved from

4 being handcuffed to the door to the grate in front of the vent to the

5 ammunition bunker, just in front of me. So it's the same bunker. He was

6 just moved so he could sit.

7 MR. TIEGER: And that's at 3:09.3.

8 [Video-clip played]

9 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "They have been positioned at all

10 crucial sites so that NATO could strike again, and we are going to visit

11 some of them."

12 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I would tender this exhibit.

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] An objection, if I may.

15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second before that.

16 This was merged with 40202B. That was my understanding.

17 MR. TIEGER: I have it as -- I have it as slightly overlapping

18 with P02153, and that was the nature of the problem.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was told that that was the bit already

20 admitted as Exhibit P2153.

21 MR. TIEGER: Correct.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 Mr. Karadzic, what is your objection? Is your objection already

24 moot, given that it is already admitted?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no, no, it's a remark.

Page 11141

1 I hope that the Trial Chamber are going -- is going to disregard

2 the way they have been called, these UN soldiers, hostages. I mean, the

3 way these dialogues have been lined up --

4 MR. TIEGER: This is utterly -- first of all, it's not an

5 objection, it's an inappropriate comment, and I don't think it should be

6 permitted.

7 JUDGE KWON: You have another opportunity to make your submission

8 or clarify with the witness, but it's not the time for you to intervene

9 in such a way.

10 Yes, Mr. Tieger, let's move on.

11 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, assuming that this exhibit -- yes, has

12 been admitted, that concludes my examination-in-chief.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

14 Shall we deal with the remaining associated exhibits. There are

15 a couple of exhibits that have been already admitted, which is 11723 and

16 40511B. And except those that have been admitted during your

17 examination-in-chief, the others will be admitted into evidence and given

18 a number in due course.

19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

21 Yes, it's not a major problem, but regarding the 65 ter 22011,

22 which is a questionnaire regarding Mr. Rechner, the witness, do you have

23 to tender it, given that it is a kind of statement of the witness?

24 MR. TIEGER: I have --

25 JUDGE KWON: With his amalgamated statement?

Page 11142

1 MR. TIEGER: Yes, no, I understand that, Your Honour. I

2 understood that that issue might be raised. It is one that might

3 arguably -- it isn't quite as obvious as maybe some others are, but

4 I'm -- given the nature of the amalgamated statement and its admission,

5 it's -- if the Court considers that it falls close enough to being a

6 prior statement that would have formed part -- that would have formed

7 part of the amalgamated statement, I have no problem with that. In fact,

8 Your Honour, I -- yeah, I accept the Court's guidance on that, which

9 I think is it's -- so I don't want to cause the Court any problem. So it

10 doesn't need to be admitted.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much. Yes.

12 There's no opposition from the Defence in regards to the

13 remaining documents, so thank you.

14 Mr. Karadzic, are you ready to start your cross-examination?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you.

16 Good afternoon to all.

17 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

18 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Major. I would like to ask you

19 whether you can confirm that while you were in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a UN

20 observer, you collected information, and that this information was shared

21 with UNPROFOR or, rather, made accessible to UNPROFOR.

22 A. "Information" is an extremely broad word. What we would do, in

23 accordance with our duties, is report the results of meetings. We would

24 report to our headquarters if anything unusual occurred in carrying out

25 our official duties. But if you think that we were going around trying

Page 11143

1 to collect information on what was going on in Pale or about the Serb

2 military, we were not doing any of that. As I mentioned earlier, our

3 function was strictly as a liaison team. And regarding the other UNMO

4 teams, as far as I'm aware, all the information that they would provide

5 to the UN was part of their official duties only, which they were

6 carrying out with the permission and knowledge of all authorities on all

7 sides of the conflict.

8 I should also add: The UNMOs, we worked very openly. When a lot

9 of them would patrol, as far as I know, they always had a representative

10 of the local faction for their won protection or security. In our

11 offices, we had no encrypted equipment. Our radio communications were

12 open. Almost anybody could listen in to them.

13 So, no, we did not go around collecting information

14 surreptitiously or trying to undermine the security, the legitimate

15 security of any of the parties in the conflict.

16 Q. Thank you. Are you trying to say that you just acted as liaison

17 officers, is that right, and that you only provided information on the

18 content of meetings?

19 A. Essentially, yes. If something unusual would happen during the

20 course of the day, for example, we had a couple of incidents where we had

21 our vehicles hijacked at gunpoint, once someone -- actually, a group of

22 armed people came into our office and actually robbed the other members

23 of my team when I wasn't there. These sorts of things we reported.

24 We also went into Sarajevo, and on a regular basis, to drop off

25 the original hard copies of correspondence that we had received for

Page 11144

1 transmission, and would also pick up correspondence there to send to the

2 Bosnian Serb military or civilian authorities; that is, your people.

3 Q. Thank you. Did you report about the feelings of the people,

4 about the situation among the people, about what the situation was in

5 Pale or, rather, places where you were deployed?

6 A. Not as a matter of routine. I think you're referring to a report

7 that I sent after the first day's bombing on the 25th of May, where I had

8 spoken with Mr. Akashi's office. There's a fellow there that I knew

9 quite well, John Almstrom, and I mentioned to him the concerns we had

10 about the local situation; that is, that the people were very concerned,

11 and in the media they had mentioned that civilian targets had been hit

12 and so on. And Mr. Almstrom asked me then to send that information to

13 him, but it's not something we did on a normal basis.

14 I think you'll agree these were rather unusual circumstances, and

15 I wanted to make sure that our senior leadership in the UN understood

16 that these air-strikes were regarded as basically directed against the

17 Bosnian Serb side, and because of the way that they were reported, as far

18 as we knew, falsely, that civilian targets had been hit, we were

19 concerned about our security.

20 Q. Thank you. Do you think that destroying defence capacities of

21 the Bosnian Serbs does not reflect on civilians? You saw that things

22 were destroyed that had nothing to do with collection points of weapons

23 and so on, reserves of ammunition, et cetera. Did you understand that

24 that had nothing to do with civilians and their feeling of safety and

25 security?

Page 11145

1 A. I can't comment on what the civilians thought of military targets

2 being bombed. And if you're also asking why those targets were bombed,

3 and not collection points, I'm not in a position to know why those sorts

4 of decisions were taken.

5 Q. Thank you. What was the position of Mr. Almstrom?

6 A. He was one of the senior advisers to Mr. Akashi, and I knew him

7 well because he is a former Canadian military officer and happened to be

8 my first commanding officer when I started serving as an infantry

9 officer.

10 Q. Thank you. Am I right if I say that Mr. Almstrom was not in the

11 UNMO chain; rather, he was in UNPROFOR, and it was from that position

12 that he asked you to report to him; right?

13 A. I should clarify. Our liaison office was not strictly only for

14 UNMO business. We were the only UN liaison office in Pale. There was a

15 small UN High Commissioner for Refugees, two UN people, but they had a

16 different function. So we actually acted as a liaison office also for

17 Mr. Akashi's office and other UN elements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it

18 was not unusual for us to get letters or other requests sent to us

19 directly from his office to transfer to your office, and vice versa. For

20 example, if we received something from your office for him, we would send

21 it directly to Mr. Akashi's office and just inform our headquarters in

22 Sarajevo.

23 Q. Thank you. That's the liaison function, as it were, but this is

24 what I'm interested in: First of all, the information that you had and

25 that you collected, was it accessible to UNPROFOR? And in addition to

Page 11146

1 that, what you told us today, could UNPROFOR put a task before you, could

2 they ask for something, and were you supposed to get it for them?

3 A. Your question is too general. I don't know what you mean by

4 "information" and so on.

5 Q. You described what "liaison" meant. There is no contest there.

6 I would be interested in the following: Your reports, your UNMO reports,

7 were they accessible to UNPROFOR? That is one question.

8 A. By "UNPROFOR" -- or "UNMO reports," you mean the reports from my

9 office only?

10 Q. Inter alia, your office, but all of this went through UNMO

11 channels. However, was it accessible to UNPROFOR, as such?

12 A. Okay. I think I understand where you're going.

13 We had -- there was a separate chain of reporting that the

14 UN Military Observers had through their own system. As I mentioned, we

15 were a distinct organisation from the UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces, so

16 that's where the reporting went. However, at each level within the

17 UNPROFOR, there was normally a co-located UNMO office. So, for example,

18 in General Smith's headquarters in Sarajevo, at UNPROFOR headquarters as

19 it was known then, there was the UNMO office, UNMO headquarters,

20 BH Command. At the Sarajevo UNPROFOR headquarters, there was located an

21 UNMO Sector Sarajevo headquarters, and so on. So they would maintain

22 contact and pass information back and forth as necessary.

23 Q. Thank you. With all due respect, you shouldn't really be

24 speculating as to what it is I'm getting at. I'm not speculating about

25 anything, and I'm not trying to blame anyone. I'm just trying to

Page 11147

1 establish the nature of your links.

2 The second question is whether UNPROFOR could send requests to

3 you, asking you to do something. Could they give you tasks, assignments,

4 as Mr. Almstrom did this time?

5 A. In this time, it wasn't a task; it was just a request. They

6 could ask us -- send us requests, but they could not send us tasks; for

7 example, order us to do things. It would have to be approved through the

8 UNMO chain of command. So if it was something straightforward, a

9 request, normally at each level the UNMOs acted upon it. If it was

10 something more serious, more complicated, more difficult, then we would

11 perhaps have to get it approved at a higher level in the UNMO

12 organisation.

13 Q. Thank you. That was your understanding; right? It was your

14 understanding that both warring parties in the zone of Sarajevo, the

15 Serbs and the Muslims, violated, in different ways, the cease-fire

16 agreements that had been reached, or the total exclusion zone, in respect

17 of heavy weaponry; isn't that right?

18 A. I recall there were violations. But our office was not involved

19 in investigating them and so forth, so I cannot provide more information

20 regarding your question.

21 Q. Thank you. Likewise, you know that the Muslim side was never

22 bombed; right?

23 A. Bombed by who?

24 Q. The United Nations, or, rather, NATO.

25 A. By "bombing," do you mean air-strikes?

Page 11148

1 Q. Yes, yes.

2 A. Not to my knowledge while I was there.

3 Q. Thank you. Today, on page 11 of the transcript, you confirmed

4 that NATO carried out air-strikes against Serb positions on behalf of the

5 United Nations; isn't that right?

6 A. That's the way it was reported in the press. I'm not sure how

7 the link between the UN and NATO is in conducting the air-strikes, but I

8 can confirm that the aircraft were NATO aircraft, not United Nations

9 aircraft.

10 Q. But on page 11, you characterised it as NATO air-strikes on

11 behalf of the United Nations. Do you agree that these NATO air-strikes

12 were asked for by the UN commander in Bosnia? I don't know which line it

13 is, but it is page 11. I think the line is 12 or 13.

14 A. Are you referring to my amalgamated witness statement?

15 JUDGE KWON: No, in the transcript of today's LiveNote.

16 THE WITNESS: Okay.

17 JUDGE KWON: Shall I read it for you. That part is:

18 "Yes. At approximately 10.00 in the morning, a similar type of

19 explosion like the air-strikes the previous day occurred. I should just,

20 for the clarification of the Court, mention that after the air-strikes

21 had occurred, approximately 30 minutes later we were informed by our

22 headquarters, on the 25th of May, that those two explosions had, in fact,

23 been air-strikes carried out by NATO, on behalf of the United Nations."

24 That's the transcript of what you said, and Mr. Karadzic referred

25 to that part.

Page 11149

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct. And I would have known that

2 based on the letter that I had received from General Smith to

3 General Mladic, warning him to return those weapons into the weapons

4 collection points unless there would be air-strikes. And it was just

5 common knowledge that if air-strikes were required, there was a system in

6 place where the UN would request NATO to carry them out.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 Q. Do you know or do you agree that these NATO air-strikes were

9 carried out two hours before the UNPROFOR dead-line expired, two hours

10 before the ultimatum expired?

11 A. Are you referring to the 26th or 25th of May? We were just

12 talking about the 25th of May.

13 Q. The 25th, the beginning of the bombing that was preceded by an

14 ultimatum. There were only two hours left. Do you know that?

15 A. I would have to look at the original letter. I don't have it in

16 front of me, and I haven't seen it in the many years.

17 Q. Thank you. Can you confirm that on the 25th of May, I was in

18 Banja Luka? Do you remember that?

19 A. Yes, I do, based on information from your secretary, because I

20 had a request from Mr. Akashi's office to try to find you, that they

21 had -- they needed to discuss something with you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 Could we now please have a look at 65 ter 32390. It's an

24 intercept. It's a conversation of mine with General Milovanovic about

25 this ultimatum.

Page 11150

1 I hope that we have a translation too. I'm not sure, but I'll

2 read it out.

3 It's the 25th of May, 1995, at 1530 hours. Ah, yes, here is the

4 translation as well. Milovanovic says -- well, he is greeting Karadzic,

5 and so on and so forth. That is not important. And then Karadzic says:

6 [In English] "Akashi's been after me all day. I didn't want to

7 talk to him. I just -- he managed to find me. He asked me if I could do

8 something in the next few minutes. Is it that difficult to give back

9 those four weapons, some four weapons? Nikola is here too, he is hearing

10 it," and so on and so on.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Can you please cast a glance at this. Do you see that I've been

13 given a few minutes to achieve that from Banja Luka, to have these four

14 weapons returned to the collection points?

15 A. Just bear with me. I will have a read through the whole thing.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could all the participants please

17 read all of this, because our position is contained there. There is also

18 a reference to Western Slavonia, that had fallen a month before that,

19 although it was a protected area.

20 THE WITNESS: Regarding the time, it says "1543" on top, so that

21 was if the air-strikes occurred at 1600. Again, in my recollection,

22 that's approximate. But let's use 1600 as a reference. Then that would

23 mean it's 17 minutes beforehand. However, when the actual dead-line was

24 for those weapons to be returned, I'm not sure if it was 1600. I believe

25 it was earlier. But as I mentioned before, I'd have to look at the

Page 11151

1 original letter to see what the actual dead-line was.

2 The letter, just for clarification, was sent to General Mladic

3 the previous day. So he had more than 17 minutes to return them. And

4 perhaps there were also discussions earlier on that subject, but

5 that's -- I don't want to speculate about that.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 [In English] "I told him I can't even get in touch in a few

8 minutes, let alone do something about this."

9 Q. [Interpretation] Is that right? In our circumstances, when

10 situations were difficult, it was difficult to achieve anything within a

11 few minutes from Banja Luka by phone. Do you agree?

12 A. I can't comment on that. I don't know about your circumstances,

13 and the communications means, and systems that you had available to you.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]

16 May this document be received?

17 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, following our practice, we'll mark

18 it for identification.

19 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D987, Your Honours.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 I should now like to display a document from the news

22 agency France-Presse, 65 ter 10726.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. You noticed, in the previous document, that our position was that

25 if Serbs were bombed, the United Nations could no longer be considered as

Page 11152

1 peacekeepers, but would be considered as enemies; right? We saw that in

2 the previous document, if you remember. You've read it.

3 A. These are your words, as far as I understand, yes.

4 Q. Thank you. May I ask you to look at this report from AFP

5 relating what I said in a public statement on Radio Banja Luka on the

6 25th of May. We say the same thing; namely, that if we should be

7 attacked, we would consider it as an attack, and in that case the

8 United Nations would be, to us, an enemy, a warring party?

9 A. That's what you stated, yes.

10 Q. Were you aware, Major, of the difference between close air

11 support and air-strikes as a punitive measure that changes the situation

12 on the ground, in other words, diminishes the combat capability of one of

13 the warring parties?

14 A. There are -- an air-strike is simply dropping a bomb, so -- and

15 "close air support" is also a fairly general term. So as I mentioned,

16 I'm -- well, neither at that time, nor since then, have I been trained as

17 a forward air controller, so I can't get into the subtleties of these

18 differences, in terms --

19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I note the time.

20 So we'll have a break for half an hour and resume at five past

21 1.00.

22 --- Recess taken at 12.36 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 1.06 p.m.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

25 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if I could introduce

Page 11153

1 Aiofe Nichearbhaill, from the National University of Galway, who is with

2 us this session. Thank you.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue your

4 cross-examination.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. If I may remind you, Major, would you agree that close air

7 support is meant for the self-defence of UNPROFOR units when they find

8 themselves in difficulty?

9 A. I don't know how it was defined specifically for UNPROFOR. That

10 is, I don't know how close air support was specifically defined for

11 UNPROFOR.

12 Q. Are you aware that General Mladic gave a free hand to UNPROFOR

13 generals, in case they are attacked by our forces, that they were free to

14 respond and that would have no consequence on our relationship?

15 A. No, I'm not aware of that.

16 Q. Do you agree that air-strikes are something entirely different,

17 that it's not just self-defence on the part of the UNPROFOR; it's a

18 strike against one of the parties?

19 A. As I mentioned before, I'm not aware of how you should

20 distinguish those two terms, air-strikes and close air support.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see that document again,

22 the one we had a moment ago on the screen, 65 ter 10726. It has been

23 admitted.

24 JUDGE KWON: Not yet.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11154

1 Q. Is the content of this document consistent with what was said --

2 what I said; namely, that in the case of an attack by the UNPROFOR, by

3 the UN, the UN would no longer be regarded as a peacekeeper, but as a

4 warring party? If it was published on the 25th, that means it had been

5 said on the 24th. Is it consistent with what you heard?

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.

8 Well, two different questions posed. With respect to the first,

9 in case it arises again, it cannot be an appropriate question to a

10 witness, to present him with two documents he hasn't seen before and ask

11 him if -- the extent to which they may be consistent.

12 The last document seems to be -- to have something to do with the

13 witness's knowledge and experience, and that's a different matter.

14 JUDGE KWON: Maybe the witness is able to answer whether it is

15 consistent with the knowledge he had at the time.

16 THE WITNESS: As far as the consistency question, I recall that

17 there was a press statement made by Mr. Karadzic around that time. I

18 can't say whether it was the 24th, or the 25th, or earlier. And I do

19 recall him saying something to the effect that -- as reported here, that

20 use of air-strikes or bombing, perhaps close air support - I don't know

21 the exact terms that were used - would lead Mr. Karadzic to consider the

22 UN peacekeeping force as something perhaps like an enemy, but I can't say

23 if those were the exact words or accurate. But it's something along

24 those lines, but how general or how specific it was, I can't comment

25 further, especially after so many years.

Page 11155

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that can be admitted.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D988, Your Honours.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 I'd like to refresh your memory, then, Major. I'll call 65 ter

6 12143 in e-court.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. While we're waiting: Do you agree that the strikes began on the

9 25th of May, and on that day you were asked to stay in your

10 accommodation?

11 A. My first awareness of those air-strikes occurring was those two

12 bombs that we observed on the 25th of May, and we were also -- I wouldn't

13 say "asked." We were ordered. It was made very clear. We were not

14 permitted to leave our accommodation. And that was -- that order was

15 sent to us by the Bosnian Serb Army Liaison Office, so either

16 Colonel Djurdjic or Major Kralj. And we understood it, from our

17 perspective, that we were being put under house arrest.

18 Q. Well, the problem is probably in the interpretation. The word I

19 used can be translated as both "asked" and "required."

20 Could you take a look at this document. Is this something you

21 sent to Mr. Almstrom? I don't see his rank, but is this the document?

22 A. It appears to be, yes. And Mr. Almstrom was a civilian at that

23 point. He was not a military officer.

24 Q. May I draw your attention:

25 [In English] "they repeated Karadzic's previous statements that

Page 11156

1 if the UN would use air-strikes against the Serbs, the Serbs would no

2 longer consider the UN troops as peacekeepers, but as enemies."

3 A. What is the question?

4 Q. [Interpretation] Well, I was waiting for the interpretation.

5 Was that, indeed, the position we took at the time, and as we see

6 from this report, that position was very well known to you?

7 A. In this report, I'm -- in paragraph 1 and those five bullets, I'm

8 just summarising what was reported on a news summary by the Serbian Radio

9 Broadcasting Service in Pale on the local television. But if you're

10 asking if this was, in fact, what I understood was being reported, that

11 is correct.

12 Q. Look at paragraph 3. It reflects your comments and conclusions;

13 correct?

14 I kindly ask all parties to read 3:

15 [In English] "The bombing caused and continues to cause

16 considerable alarm among Serb civilians both in Pale and among their

17 relatives and friends throughout the former Yugoslavia. Immediately

18 after the attack and before the news broadcasts began, friends and

19 relatives of the family we lived with, as well as of our neighbours,

20 began calling to determine what the --"

21 [Interpretation] Next page, please:

22 [In English] "... what the situation was ..."

23 [Interpretation] Well, let me not read all of it. The parties

24 can read for themselves, and then the next paragraph -- the whole text,

25 in fact.

Page 11157

1 In this paragraph, you note, quite correctly, that 60 to

2 70 per cent of the population of Pale were, in fact, refugees who had

3 already fled from other areas, and they were even worse hit by all of

4 this than the others:

5 [In English] "The state of fear continues among the civilians.

6 Just five minutes ago, the father of one of our interpreters called from

7 Ilidza to check ..."

8 And so on and so on:

9 "One should bear in mind that well over half (60 to 70 per cent

10 at least) of the population of Pale are refugees, themselves, and are

11 very sensitive to anything that could be perceived as putting their lives

12 in danger again."

13 [Interpretation] This is your observation and your conclusion at

14 the time; correct?

15 A. It was my observation, yes.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask to see the last

17 paragraph:

18 [In English] "As far as the locals see it, the UN is (once again)

19 singling out the Serbs for blame regarding the events of the last few

20 days in Sarajevo. While they are aware of the official reasons for the

21 air-strikes (the four guns), they cannot understand why the Muslims go

22 unpunished for the shelling and shooting that they inflict on Serb

23 civilians in and around Sarajevo. In the minds of the locals, the

24 Muslims started the recent surge in fighting, and the Serbs get punished

25 for defending themselves. Furthermore, the local press agency reports

Page 11158

1 create an overall impression that NATO has gone so far as to completely

2 disregard the safety of civilians in this latest attack."

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. That, again, was your observation and your conclusion; correct?

5 A. My observation was on the local perception, which is based on the

6 news reports and other information that they received from the

7 Bosnian Serb leaders.

8 Q. And in your view, was it really true that civilians were

9 panic-stricken and furious?

10 A. I can only comment on the ones that we had access to, which were

11 the family that we were living with, our interpreter who was on duty at

12 the time, and some of the neighbours around us, but I can't talk about

13 the general perceptions or -- further around Sarajevo. I was

14 unfortunately generalising a bit in this report.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it was part of an associated exhibit that had

18 been already admitted.

19 THE REGISTRAR: It will be assigned Exhibit P2177.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 Can we now see 65 ter 19300.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours, Exhibit P2178, also part of

23 the associated exhibits.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next page.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11159

1 Q. This is a debriefing memorandum from you, right, your report and

2 the report of Major Westlund?

3 Can we see the next page.

4 We need to look for the passage which contains your qualification

5 that civilians were panic-stricken and furious. It's the entry for the

6 25th and 26th of May. Perhaps it's on the previous page. Just a moment.

7 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think on e-court, page number 8.

8 If we could find that.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] 25 and 26 May.

10 Q. Can you remember this debriefing and this qualification,

11 civilians terrified and furious?

12 A. Yes. Those were not my words, though. That was drafted by

13 another individual who was debriefing me. But that was the -- it came

14 out of our conversation, so it's accurate, again, as I just mentioned

15 before, to the immediate surroundings in Pale where we were living.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now take a look at the

18 entry for the 15th of June, page 2, paragraph 81 and 82.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. You relate here your discussion with Professor Koljevic; correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. Very well. On the 26th of May -- I don't need to

23 tender this. It's an exhibit.

24 On the 26th of May, at the time when you were captured, were you

25 in the active service of the United Nations?

Page 11160

1 A. I don't know what you mean by "active service."

2 Q. Were you serving then, were you on duty, were you in the service?

3 A. I was employed as a UN military observer. That means I was sent

4 there by the Canadian Forces to work as a UN military observer.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see again P2172 for a

6 moment, speaking of your estimates. This document has been exhibited

7 today. Page 3. Rather, page 2, the next page. 8166, that's the page:

8 [In English] "... panic amongst civilian and military is assessed

9 as high."

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Is this consistent with what you observed, that it was a state of

12 panic? Do you agree with this conclusion?

13 A. I apologise, Your Honour. I'm still looking for the passage that

14 he's referring to.

15 JUDGE KWON: The first three lines.

16 THE WITNESS: Oh, the first three lines.

17 All I can say is panic among the civilians in the immediate

18 vicinity where I was living, that is correct. As far as others or the

19 military, I cannot assess. For example, the Bosnian Serb Army soldiers

20 who came to take us hostage on that morning, they did not appear panicked

21 at all, just angry.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Yes, but those who drew guns and who lost their sheep and their

24 families, did they look to you both terrified and furious,

25 panic-stricken?

Page 11161

1 MR. TIEGER: I think that question assumes facts not in evidence.

2 JUDGE KWON: No. You need to put that question. Please

3 reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 Q. Major, you testified today in-chief that you had suffered an

6 outburst of anger on the part of a man who later calmed down and

7 complained that he had lost a number of sheep, over 10, I think, and he

8 had lost a relative. Do you remember that?

9 A. I remember that's what he told me, yes.

10 Q. Would you qualify his state as fury, or panic, or both?

11 A. The word I would use -- it was translated as "fury" in English.

12 I would rather say just "anger."

13 Q. Thank you. May I now ask you to look at the second paragraph of

14 para 3:

15 [In English] "In such conditions when life of UN personnel cannot

16 be guaranteed, and when the possibility of directing involving the

17 UNPROFOR in military activity against one of the warring factions (BSA),

18 regular armed forces cannot be excluded, then it is strongly recommended

19 not to continue air-strikes in such conditions."

20 [Interpretation] Do you agree with this general assessment by the

21 UNMO command?

22 A. No, I cannot comment on it, because I don't know what information

23 he had at his disposal to make that assertion. I had very little

24 information. All I knew was the air-strikes that had occurred in Pale.

25 That, I could observe, and my own treatment.

Page 11162

1 Q. But you don't dispute that this is an official report, or,

2 rather, a general assessment made by the headquarters of the UNMOs at the

3 Sarajevo UNPROFOR headquarters? That's written at the top.

4 A. It's some sort of an assessment. But what its purpose is and

5 where it's being sent, I don't know, but it appears to be an official

6 report.

7 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to repeat the same question in relation

8 to others. Were all the others who were taken prisoner together with you

9 in the active service of the United Nations?

10 A. Sorry, could you please repeat the question?

11 Q. All the others who were captured together with you, from your

12 observation post and the neighbouring observation post, were all of them

13 in active service?

14 A. The people that I was held with, that's my teams here,

15 Sierra Echo 1 and Sierra Golf 1, they were not observation posts, they

16 were UNMO teams, and they were taken at their accommodations.

17 Q. Thank you. My question is: Were they in active service at the

18 time when they were taken prisoner, just like you?

19 A. Your Honour, I'm not sure if the translation is correct, "active

20 service." Do they mean on duty, as opposed to being on holidays, or --

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Were you serving, were you on duty?

24 A. The term we would use, you're on duty. I mean, people could be

25 away on leave or they could be at their post. Instead of going away,

Page 11163

1 they pass some of their leave days there. As far as I'm aware, everyone

2 from my team -- well, I can say not -- I know definitely for my team, and

3 I presume from the other two UNMO teams, they were all on duty, which

4 means not on holidays.

5 Q. Thank you. In the course of your captivity, were you ever told

6 that you were treated as prisoners of war?

7 A. Twice. Once on the evening of the 27th of May, by

8 Captain Vojvodic, when we were upstairs in that dormitory building, in

9 the room where we spent the night. When he introduced himself to us, he

10 told us that we were prisoners of war of the Bosnian Serb Army. And the

11 second -- actually, that was the only place it was actually used, the

12 term "prisoners of war." Mr. Bulajic, when he called us combatants,

13 I think, was going to say that we were prisoners of war, but he never

14 mentioned that. He just talked about us being taken captive as

15 combatants.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Well, here in this

17 65 ter 19300 that we looked at a moment ago, on page 5 - we don't have to

18 recall that document - you say that you have been informed that you were

19 POWs.

20 Can we now see 65 ter 22011. It's the questionnaire you filled

21 in immediately after release.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Do you remember, in fact, you confirmed that today, that Bulajic

24 was the president of the Committee for the Exchange of POWs on the Serb

25 side?

Page 11164

1 A. I don't know if it was specifically for POWs. I was told he was

2 the president of what was called the Serb Exchange Commission, and I know

3 they were involved in negotiating exchanges of prisoners. But as far as

4 prisoners of war or what that status meant to you, I don't know.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see your response to

6 question number 20. I think it's the third page from here. 1037307 is

7 the ERN number. That's right.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Could you please read the question for us, as well as your

10 answer, number 20? Could you read it out, please, just your answer.

11 A. Well, it says:

12 "During the ICRC visit on 8th of June, 1995, Mr. Bulajic

13 (president of the Bosnian Serb Exchange Commission) stated to us that we

14 were POWs officially because we were combatants. I had a short argument

15 with him."

16 So perhaps he did use the word POWs or prisoners of war, but what

17 got my attention was that he referred to us as combatants.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 Since this is part of the transcript now, we don't need to have

20 the questionnaire admitted.

21 Could we now have 1D3067.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. While we're waiting for that: Major, you -- or I don't know

24 whether you, personally, but you, as a group, asked for certain rights

25 and certain privileges; among other things, for a visit from the

Page 11165

1 Red Cross, from a doctor, and your right to receive information, or,

2 rather, watch television; right?

3 We have a translation of this document, too, so could we have

4 both on the screen?

5 Is that right, Major, that you put forth certain requests,

6 certain demands to the Serb Army, the things that I referred to; a visit

7 by the Red Cross, a visit by a doctor, and the right to watch television,

8 or, rather, to receive information through the media?

9 A. Yes, those things -- visit by the Red Cross, visit by a doctor,

10 and right to receive information through the media, that is, newspapers

11 or television, those were things that we were demanding, yes, and not

12 because anyone called us prisoners of war, because we considered that to

13 be completely unjust for us to have been taken captive.

14 Q. You asked for that in accordance with International Law,

15 international norms. I think that you referred to that today as well.

16 You asked for that in accordance with international norms. Have you

17 heard of hostages being referred to in any way in international norms?

18 A. Referred in any way? What international norms do you mean? The

19 Geneva Conventions?

20 Q. Any. For example, the International Law of War, is it envisaged

21 that hostages can make certain requests or demands, and are they

22 responded to or are they met? What do the hostages invoke when they say

23 that they want this or that or the other thing? You referred to

24 International Law.

25 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, the reality of the position is

Page 11166

1 that is a question that would test most professors of International Law

2 and give rise to an enormous debate and probably an enormous written

3 opinion. With great respect to this officer, I don't think he would

4 begin to claim to have that sort of expertise, so I think what you need

5 to do is to address that question in another forae, rather than put it to

6 this witness. I doubt very much -- I can't speak for him, and I don't,

7 but I doubt very much whether he has an exhaustive knowledge of this

8 topic that would be required to answer that question with the

9 particularly that you require.

10 THE WITNESS: If I may, I mean, all I'm aware of is that taking

11 of hostages is prohibited. But, I agree, I'm not the expert to be

12 discussing the details of Mr. Karadzic's question.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 I'm going to move away from questions of theory.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. But I just wanted to know, Major, when it was that you made these

17 requests that you wanted to have met. You refer to International Law.

18 Were you meaning international law that protected hostages or prisoners

19 of war?

20 A. What we were requesting was the minimum that we, as a group,

21 thought we were entitled to if the Bosnian Serbs had designated us as

22 prisoners of war, from our understanding of the rights of prisoners of

23 war under the Geneva Convention, because we weren't even getting any of

24 that. We thought that we would start that as a minimum.

25 Q. Well, you did ask for the Red Cross to visit you, as well as a

Page 11167

1 doctor, and to have the right to watch television, and you got all three,

2 didn't you?

3 A. Towards the end, yes. We made these requests early on, and I

4 would have to check the debriefing that you pulled up earlier, but it

5 was -- this letter was drafted, I think, on the fourth or fifth day,

6 something like that. The Red Cross visit I don't think happened until

7 the 11th day, something like that. The doctors -- sorry, the 11th of

8 June. The doctor's visit, I recall, was not until the 8th of June, and

9 it was only after constantly requesting it that this was finally given to

10 us, and only after the Serb side had started to release some of the UN

11 hostages, not beforehand.

12 Q. Thank you. With all due respect, and fully understanding how

13 much time has elapsed and the things that can happen to your memory, in

14 response to question 20, you say:

15 [In English] "During the ICRC visit on 8th of June, 1995 ..."

16 [Interpretation] So it was on the 8th of June that the Red Cross

17 visited you.

18 Let us now have a look at the 6th of June. A universities

19 professor visited you, Dr. Sosic, and this is what he says on the front

20 page, the interpreters can help us as well:

21 "Report of a doctor of the military hospital on the visit of

22 POWs, officers of the UN."

23 When it says "zarobljenik" [phoen] in our part of the world, it

24 would be superfluous to say the whole thing, "prisoners of war." It goes

25 without saying that it's a prisoner of war, a "zarobljenik." However, it

Page 11168

1 has been mistranslated here. It should not only say "prisoners," because

2 when you use the verb "zarobiti" [phoen], that means to take an enemy

3 prisoner or an opponent prisoner. So does it show that the professor

4 considered you to be a POW?

5 A. I don't know what report this is.

6 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the witness can help you on this

7 regard.

8 THE WITNESS: I'm not familiar with this report. I've not

9 seen --

10 JUDGE KWON: Move on, Mr. Karadzic.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. However, we do see that on the 6th, Dr. Sosic visited you. You

14 made your request on the 4th. On the 6th, you were visited by Dr. Sosic,

15 and on the 8th by the Red Cross.

16 Now, this is Professor Sosic describing the situation that you

17 were in, your physical and mental condition, of all the captives,

18 actually. So he visited you on the 5th of June, and on the 6th, he wrote

19 his report.

20 So can we have the next page, please. Professor M. Sosic,

21 Mirko Sosic, who is a senior consult -- who is a professor, and also

22 there is a senior consultant, Dr. Babic. These are top-notch experts who

23 visited you immediately after you had requested that, and they wrote up

24 their report on the 6th of June.

25 Is it true that this is the report on that visit, and you

Page 11169

1 actually said some of the things that are contained in this report; that

2 one was supposed to be released immediately, and that certain measures

3 were proposed, like more fruit and vegetables, and so on?

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

5 MR. TIEGER: I debated whether to get up, Your Honour, but

6 I think if I don't address these things as they happen, they will

7 continue to intrude.

8 There's more commentary by Dr. Karadzic that is identifying who

9 the experts are when it's not in the record. If it's important to him,

10 he can ask the question or elicit evidence about it. If it is not, in

11 and of itself, an important matter, I don't particularly question the

12 qualifications of these experts, but this is the kind of intrusion of

13 testimony and commentary that we need to discourage.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree with your observation, Mr. Tieger.

15 You have another lesson today, Mr. Karadzic. Please bear that in

16 mind. So what is your question?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My thanks to Mr. Tieger for

18 educating me, for lecturing me.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Major, do you agree that Dr. Sosic, a university professor, and

21 Dr. Babic, a senior consultant, visited you, and that this report is

22 based on that visit paid to you?

23 A. Two individuals who are doctors by that name visited us on the

24 5th of June, yes. And I'm not sure if that report is specific to us or

25 other UNMOs, but you can see that what he requests be provided us, that

Page 11170

1 matches fairly closely with what we had requested of Major Batinic,

2 formerly -- earlier into our detention.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Can this document be admitted?

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D989, Your Honours.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 Q. Major, I believe -- or, actually, I'm asking you to confirm or

9 deny that you saw POWs during your service in various situations, in

10 various theaters of war.

11 A. Actually, no, I have not, not as defined by the

12 Geneva Conventions.

13 Q. Well, I wanted to ask you something. I believe that you were at

14 different theaters of war on behalf of the UN. Did you ever see POWs who

15 were entitled to satellite telephones and other wireless communications?

16 Does any international law envisage that kind of thing, that they are

17 entitled to that?

18 JUDGE KWON: Move on to your next question, Mr. Karadzic.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this pertains to what the

20 distinguished Mr. Tieger asked about, taking away communications

21 equipment. When they were taken prisoner, they were forbidden

22 communication. I don't even have a mobile telephone over here right now,

23 so POWs are not entitled to --

24 JUDGE KWON: I think that that has been asked and answered.

25 I take it you are coming to an end.

Page 11171

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're working until 2.30, aren't

2 we?

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 Can we now have a look at pages 4 and 5 of 65 ter 19300, 19300.

6 JUDGE KWON: It's your debriefing.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, pages 4 and 5 of the

8 debriefing, the debriefing entry for June the 1st.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Actually, on the 1st of June, you wrote a letter, and you

11 referred to these rights that you had as POWs on the basis of the

12 Geneva Convention:

13 [In English] "... UNMOs discussed the implications of prisoners

14 all under the Geneva Convention. A six-point letter was formulated to

15 Major Batinic with various requests."

16 [Interpretation] Can you find that?

17 MR. ROBINSON: It should be e-court page 11, on the bottom, and

18 then continuing on to page 12.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, the 1st of June:

20 [In English] "The UNMO discussed how to deal with captain.

21 Consensus, was that they elected official team representative (other than

22 Rechner and Zidlik, the Serbs speaking UNMOs, so that always two UNMOs

23 could confront the captain, one acting as interpreter). They also felt

24 that they should not deal with captain, but with his superior. They

25 discussed implications of prisoners of war --"

Page 11172

1 [Interpretation] Could we have the next page, please:

2 [In English] "... prisoners of war and Geneva Convention."

3 [Interpretation] So here are your requests:

4 [In English] "The request was to Major Batinic, requesting:

5 Contact with next of kin; contact with ICRC; Rechner to be allowed to

6 speak with Professor Koljevic; for members of all three teams to visit

7 their accommodations to pick up clothes; access to news; medical

8 examination of UNMOs."

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Is it correct that Captain Vojvodic took some of you to get your

11 clothing from where you had been staying?

12 A. Yes, he did that for us.

13 Q. So all of these six points were met, more or less?

14 A. By were the 15th of June -- by the end of the 15th of June, yes,

15 which was the 21st day of our captivity.

16 Q. Now we have to go back to this. You wrote it up on the 1st, and

17 on the 4th you came in touch with - what's his name? - Batinic, and you

18 handed that over. I don't know when you handed it over. And then on the

19 5th, you visited by a doctor. On the 8th of June, you were visited by

20 the Red Cross; right? So it was considerably before your period of

21 captivity that these requests were met; right?

22 A. These requests were made, starting the first day, verbally. When

23 we saw we were not getting a reaction - especially what concerned us most

24 was the phone calls to our next of kin - we then decided to try to do a

25 more formal approach to Major Batinic.

Page 11173

1 Q. You wrote that on the 4th of June; right?

2 A. I'd have to go back. Can you scroll back to the previous page?

3 The 1st of June, as you see.

4 Q. Well, on the 1st of June, you discussed it, but earlier on you

5 said that you had handed it over in writing on the 4th of June. Did you

6 manage to speak to your families on the telephone?

7 A. Sorry, there was two questions there, one about handing over the

8 letter and something -- and speaking to our families by telephone. So

9 let me answer the first one.

10 We -- as soon as we drafted the letter, we gave it to

11 Captain Vojvodic. When Major Batinic actually had received it, I don't

12 know.

13 Q. Thank you. Did any of you or all of you speak to your families

14 by phone?

15 A. As far as I know, all of us had at least one opportunity to make

16 a supervised two-minute telephone call. So one single two-minute

17 telephone call by the 15th of June.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 Can I have the same document, the entry -- just a moment, please.

20 I'm sorry. Page 5. It has to do with the 1st of June yet again.

21 Can we have the next page. I have to find it now, where it says:

22 [In English] "The UNMOs agreed among themselves to give only ID

23 numbers, name, rank, and nationality because of the prisoner of war

24 status given them by the Serbs."

25 JUDGE KWON: It's in the middle, 1930.

Page 11174

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. So, Major, the Serbs gave you that status, and you decided to say

3 only what you had to in accordance with the provisions regulating POWs,

4 as stated here; name, rank, and nationality?

5 A. As I said, I didn't draft this. This was based on discussions

6 with someone, and they drafted it. By "status," that's probably not the

7 best way of phrasing it. What it should say is that the Serbs said, You

8 are POWs, period. That's all we ever got. We never got some sort of

9 document, or list of rights, or even how we were to be treated; nothing.

10 It was just simply that we were told that we are prisoners of war of the

11 Bosnian Serb Army, period. That's all that was ever told to us. And

12 then Major -- or Mr. Bulajic said that he considered us to be combatants.

13 That's all I can say.

14 JUDGE KWON: In one way or another, that is reflected in the

15 parenthesis, which says "given them by the Serbs"?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Then we can move on.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Is it correct that two out of the three pilots from that team

20 were questioned about the possibility of carrying out activities related

21 to forward air controllers?

22 A. I don't really know what was discussed. This is -- I mean,

23 afterwards they mentioned a little bit about the discussion and that the

24 Bosnian Serb officers were interested in NATO targeting capabilities and

25 that sort of stuff, but I don't know more than what's written here.

Page 11175

1 Q. I would like to ask you kindly to look at the same paragraph:

2 [In English] "The officers departed and then returned after the

3 superiors said they wanted to speak with Zidlik (Czech) and Evans

4 (Ghanaian) who were pilot background. Both the UNMOs were taken to a

5 separate area for questioning. These officers offered to allow Evans to

6 make a call home if he co-operated with them. He declined. They wanted

7 to know how the targets were selected. They also showed Zidlik a bomb

8 fragment which supposedly had grid co-ordinates marked on it and tried to

9 implicate UNMOs as providing these references to NATO."

10 [Interpretation] There is no need for me to read all of this out,

11 there is no need for me to read all of this out.

12 Do you see that the Army of Republika Srpska wondered how it was

13 possible for them to have this kind of information and to target with

14 such precision, and that it was the air force people among the UNMOs that

15 were actually doing that? Do you see that that is what is written here?

16 A. Again, I don't quite understand. Perhaps there's a problem with

17 the translation, but I'm not sure what your question is.

18 Q. Well, you did mention during the examination-in-chief that you

19 had been accused of acting as forward air controllers; not you,

20 personally, but UNMOs, in general, were accused of co-operating with

21 NATO, in terms of acting as forward air controllers; isn't that right?

22 A. Actually, my understanding was that I was accused, personally,

23 together with Ole Zidlik and Pavel Teterevsky, of acting as forward air

24 controllers on that news report on that first day.

25 Q. Thank you. But only these two air force men were questioned.

Page 11176

1 You weren't. And who else was there? Who else was there from the air

2 force?

3 A. Well, it's stated "Evans." That's Griffiths Evans.

4 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that the questioning was carried out by

5 a major from the Security Service and that Mladic, General Mladic, was

6 not present at the time, he was not in barracks?

7 A. I don't recall seeing General Mladic there during my captivity.

8 That's all I can say. Whether he was there or not, I can't say one way

9 or the other. I didn't see him.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Can we now have D306. It's an exhibit, D306.

12 I would like to show you the statement of one of the observers

13 who was held prisoner, Gunnar Westlund from Sweden, so could we please

14 have a look at this document. Just a moment to see what page.

15 Gunnar Westlund, I think that's the right one. Can we see the

16 next page.

17 MR. ROBINSON: I think if we had page 3 on e-court, that was what

18 we're looking for.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sorry. The pages in e-court and

20 the pages in the actual document do not always coincide.

21 Para 3.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. "In 1995 -- in April 1995, I looked out of our window and I saw a

24 UN vehicle with apparent UNMOs inside it ..."

25 Et cetera, et cetera.

Page 11177

1 "... about 200 metres from our building."

2 May I ask you and all the other parties to read this paragraph.

3 Were you aware of such incidents, Major?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Thank you. This was just to enhance our understanding. What was

6 the Serb side supposed to think of these ghost teams misusing your

7 uniforms and your vehicles and your insignia?

8 JUDGE KWON: The witness answered that he didn't know that.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Were you aware, Major, of any Canadian soldiers who served in

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina as forward air controllers or scouts in the

12 service of NATO?

13 A. I had heard that our battalion in Visoko had one -- perhaps two

14 such officers who were trained to be forward air controllers in case they

15 would require support from the air to protect them.

16 Q. Thank you. In the case against the said Nicholas Ribic in

17 Canada, you were a witness, weren't you?

18 A. Yes, I was.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 Can we now see 65 ter -- 1D2904.

21 Let's first see the first page to identify the document:

22 "In the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division."

23 Now, could we see in e-court page 138. In the document, it's

24 page 137.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11178

1 Q. Now, may I ask you to look at this passage referring to forward

2 air controllers and the statement of Witness B in this case. He

3 testified that one of forward air controllers was involved in guiding

4 bombs that were dropped on Pale in May 1995.

5 Yes, that's the right page, 138.

6 He was also a major; correct?

7 A. Sorry, I don't know who you're referring to.

8 MR. TIEGER: Right. At first, of course -- well, we better get

9 much more clarity, but this question lacks foundation, given the fact

10 that all we know is that this appears to be somebody who testified in the

11 same case that this witness testified in.

12 JUDGE KWON: Could you reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic,

13 so that the witness can understand.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. You testified in this same case, and you confirm today that

16 guiding did take place, that one of the soldiers in the UN troops was a

17 forward air controller and served in Visoko. Do you know that this

18 person, called Witness B in this case, also confirmed that a forward air

19 controller guided bombs in May 1995 in the area of Pale?

20 MR. TIEGER: Okay, and again I'm sorry, I really hate to rise

21 this much, but I think that assumes facts not in evidence. I believe the

22 witness, with respect to forward air controllers, spoke about capacity,

23 but not the act of guiding. And it shouldn't be built into questions in

24 this manner if it's not reflected in the witness's testimony.

25 JUDGE KWON: Having heard that, whether you can answer the

Page 11179

1 question whether you knew that this person, Witness B, confirmed that a

2 forward air controller guided bombs in May 1995 in the area of Pale.

3 THE WITNESS: First of all, I don't know anything more about this

4 person, other than there was someone named Witness B in the proceedings.

5 I was not there for the testimony or to know what he did.

6 The other thing is what I mentioned regarding our battalion in

7 Visoko. I heard that they were supposed to have, in their structure,

8 one -- somebody trained as a forward air controller, if required. If

9 they actually had one there with that battalion at that time, especially

10 at that particular time in May, I don't know. I don't have any of that

11 information.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 Can we see the next page.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Major, this is very important. A captain in your national army,

16 serving the United Nations, spends a whole week in Pale, from which you

17 report on anything of consequence. He planned the operation --

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, he says he knows nothing about it.

19 Call Witness B, then, if necessary, if it has any relevance at all. Just

20 put your case to the witness.

21 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. If I can just intervene

22 for a moment.

23 We do hope to call Witness B. We're engaged in discussions with

24 the Canadian Government about that. But I think that Dr. Karadzic,

25 although he is not quite doing it exactly the way a lawyer might do it,

Page 11180

1 is trying to put to this witness, to test this witness's credibility,

2 sufficient details about what Witness B has said so that later on you can

3 make an evaluation of this witness's credibility, considering these

4 events took place in the very town that he is located in. So that's the

5 object of what Dr. Karadzic is trying to do, and I think it's a

6 legitimate one.

7 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Robinson, the witness has already said that

8 he doesn't know anything more about this person, other than there was

9 someone named Witness B in the proceedings.

10 MR. ROBINSON: But I think the object of the questions is to ask

11 the witness whether he was aware of any individuals in the

12 Canadian Armed Forces who were, number 1, conducting surveillance of the

13 target in Pale that was bombed, that had spent a week in the area of Pale

14 prior to -- selecting targets for NATO, that was providing intelligence

15 information as to what was in the very ammunition dump that he was held

16 at, and that later on he goes on to say that there were four to five air

17 controllers in the Pale area. So it seems like all of these items, which

18 are part of our case, ought, in fairness to the witness, to be put to him

19 so that he can comment. And, if, in fact, he has no knowledge of any of

20 those things, then that's fine, but I think we have a right to put that

21 to him.

22 JUDGE MORRISON: I mean, specific discreet questions can, of

23 course, be put to the witness, but it's wrong, in principle, to put to

24 the witness the testimony of another witness when he wasn't --

25 particularly when he wasn't there at the time that the witness was giving

Page 11181

1 evidence. So you began your intervention quite rightly, Mr. Robinson, by

2 saying Dr. Karadzic wasn't doing it in the way that a lawyer would do it,

3 and that's right. He isn't. What he needs to do is to formulate

4 specific questions to which he can get discreet answers, without

5 reference to a third party.

6 JUDGE KWON: I would expect your role in formulating questions on

7 the part of the Defence, Mr. Robinson.

8 Mr. Karadzic, having heard these, put your case to the witness

9 and let's move on, or put your questions to the witness.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm waiting. I'm just waiting for

11 the interpretation.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Witness, the gist of my question is this: You are in Pale, and

14 you are reporting from Pale on everything and anything of consequence.

15 How is it possible you were unaware that a member of your army spent a

16 week in Pale and planned NATO attacks on our targets? That's my

17 question.

18 And Mr. Robinson feels what I'm trying to ask, perhaps a little

19 clumsily.

20 But how is it possible you were not aware your captain was in

21 Pale, planning an attack?

22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

23 Yes, Mr. Tieger.

24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. I have an elephant under my

25 robes. How is Dr. Karadzic not aware of that? The problem here is

Page 11182

1 obvious. He's assuming facts not in evidence, presenting it to the

2 witness, and we have to rely on the witness to untangle the problems with

3 such approaches.

4 If he wants to put his case to the witness, he can. But he can't

5 assume, in the course of that, that it's been established that there was

6 a member of "your army," as he put it, who spent a week in Pale and

7 planned NATO attacks, and so on.

8 JUDGE KWON: No. The question is whether -- how is it possible

9 that the witness was not aware, while his army spent a week in Pale.

10 Yes, that's a very compound question. The witness has answered the

11 second part, whether he knew or not -- or whether or not that a member of

12 the UNPROFOR or UNMO spent a week in Pale. Just put simpler questions,

13 if you would like to.

14 Let me put it on your behalf, Mr. Karadzic.

15 Mr. Rechner, did you know at the time that an air-strike

16 controller - I'm sorry about the terminology - spent a week in Pale?

17 THE WITNESS: No, I did not. I don't even recall seeing another

18 Canadian there.

19 JUDGE KWON: Move on, Mr. Karadzic.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. The same witness stated that UN observers provided intelligence

22 to NATO. What do you have to say to that?

23 I could show a page from this testimony, and the same witness

24 says that he received from you, from UNMOs, intelligence as to what was

25 contained in our ammunition depots. Were you aware of that, and do you

Page 11183

1 know who provided that intelligence?

2 A. I'm not aware of anyone in my team providing intelligence to

3 NATO, and nor anybody in the UN Military Observer organisations.

4 Q. On page 149 of this transcript, the same witness says that there

5 were four teams of forward air controllers in Pale, with four to five men

6 each. Did you observe that massive presence of forward air controllers,

7 and did you report on it?

8 A. Absolutely not did I observe any such presence in Pale.

9 Therefore, of course, there was no reporting. As I mentioned, I'm not --

10 I didn't see any of these either Canadian or other air controllers in

11 Pale.

12 Q. Thank you. You were among the last to be released; correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. How did you understand this fact, that you were kept almost until

15 the end? In other words, were you aware that the Serb side was waiting

16 with your release until they got back their own four soldiers who had

17 been captured?

18 A. No, I was not aware. In the meeting I had with

19 President Koljevic on the 15th, he said he was hoping that I would have

20 been released earlier, but that there was some technical problems. And

21 that's all he said. What those technical problems were supposed to mean,

22 either transportation, I don't know.

23 Q. In this case against Ribic, you testified to this circumstance.

24 That's on pages 181 and 182. That was reported on the local news; that

25 is to say, that these four Serbs were held prisoner.

Page 11184

1 Were you -- is it correct, in fact, that these four Serbs were

2 taken prisoner on Vrbanja Bridge?

3 A. I had heard on the -- actually, I think it was on my shortwave

4 radio that a French position on the Vrbanja Bridge had been attacked by

5 Serbs, wearing French uniforms with UN blue helmets, and that a battle

6 had ensued, and that the French had captured four of these Serbs. That's

7 all I know. How it was linked -- if it was linked to our release, I have

8 no knowledge of that.

9 Q. You think that Serbs wore French uniforms; is that right?

10 A. That's the way it was reported.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have heard evidence and seen

12 statements here to the effect that Muslims put on French uniforms and

13 that was the reason why the Serbs and Muslims clashed on Vrbanja Bridge.

14 Let's see 65 ter 13544. 13544.

15 THE REGISTRAR: This is an associated exhibit, the OTP

16 notification, Mr. Karadzic.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, perhaps the Prosecution has

18 the translation.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. You say here that the president of the republic ordered that

21 UNPROFOR members located -- no, that's not it. It should be an order to

22 release UNMOs; 17 June. Yes, this is 17 June.

23 You see here an order was given to free detained -- it's point 11

24 below:

25 "The Command of the SRK shall, by 1400 hours," on such and such a

Page 11185

1 date, "hand over to the authorities of the MUP of Republika Srpska 26

2 members of the UN who are being released. The release and hand-over of

3 the detained members shall take place only after the UNPROFOR brings to

4 the Garrison Lukavica four captured members of the VRS."

5 Do you see that it's an all-for-all exchange?

6 A. What I see on the text is that General Mladic is instructing some

7 of his commanders not to release us, the 26 UN members, until after the 4

8 VRS members or Bosnian Serb Army soldiers or members are released to

9 Lukavica Garrison.

10 Q. Well, the language is different, that they will be released once

11 the others are released. It does not say they will not be released.

12 There is a slight difference. One group will be released as soon as the

13 other group is released. Does this look like an exchange to you, Major?

14 A. I think there's a problem. If you say -- your version does not

15 match the English translation here. The English translation, you can see

16 it's the "26 UN members will only be released (only be done after

17 UNPROFOR brings four captured VRS members to the Lukavica Garrison."

18 So the four Serbs have to be released first before we can be

19 released, is the way I understand that paragraph.

20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I note the time. Do you need more to

21 conclude your cross-examination?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think, Your Excellency,

23 that we have gone through most of it. I have a few questions left, but

24 basically we can conclude soon. Are we supposed to conclude now?

25 JUDGE KWON: Can you conclude in five minutes' time?

Page 11186

1 Do you have re-examination, Mr. Tieger?

2 MR. TIEGER: I can curtail it, in the interests, Your Honour, but

3 there is one matter I'd like to address. I will simply see if I can --

4 I'll do it as efficiently as possible or perhaps just be permitted to

5 point the Court to documents that may cover the issue as well. So I'll

6 be as quick as possible.

7 JUDGE KWON: Try to conclude in three minutes, Mr. Karadzic.

8 Yes.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Major, you wrote a letter to Captain Vojvodic; right?

11 A. No, I don't recall writing a letter to Captain Vojvodic. It was

12 to Colonel Djurdjic and Major Batinic.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Djurdjic, sorry. Let me just try

14 to find this letter.

15 Is it turned on -- sorry, is it exhibited as part of an exhibit?

16 JUDGE KWON: I don't think so, Mr. Karadzic.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, obviously it hasn't even been

18 up-loaded.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Do you recall that letter to Captain Djurdjic?

21 A. Yes, that was -- I mean, not the detail in my memory now, but it

22 was written on the evening of the 29th of May, at the request of

23 Captain Vojvodic, concerning the meeting with Professor Koljevic, and he

24 said he wanted -- or Colonel Djurdjic wanted to know the details of what

25 I wanted to discuss with Professor Koljevic.