110210ED

Page 11477

1 JUDGE KWON: And let us bring in the witness.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to express my gratitude for

3 your understanding.

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 WITNESS: RUPERT SMITH [Resumed]

6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, General. My apologies for the delay

7 again.

8 Today, we will be sitting until 4.30 in the afternoon, but the

9 second break will be an hour for lunch instead, which will take place at

10 12.30.

11 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 Good morning to all.

14 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

15 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning to you, General.

16 Yesterday, we agreed that the Bosnian side -- or, rather, the

17 Muslim side launched its large-scale offensive, that they were firing at

18 us from the total exclusion zone, and that the UN forces knew about that.

19 Do you recall that when the agreement on the total exclusion zone was

20 reached, the Serb side retained the right to take its weapons out and

21 defend itself, and that that was regulated by the relevant protocol, and

22 that was also recognised at each and every meeting that was held?

23 A. I recall that in 1994, that something like that was in the

24 agreement, yes. I don't remember the details.

25 Q. Thank you. May I remind you that at meetings with

Page 11478

1 Ambassador Akashi and with General Rose, as well as in the protocol

2 itself, it was specified that if the United Nations cannot prevent or

3 stop an attack that is already underway against the Serbs, the Serbs have

4 the right to take their own weapons and defend themselves. Afterwards,

5 they're supposed to return the weapons. My thesis is that that is

6 something that is well known among the officers there, or, rather, the

7 armed forces of the UN. Do you agree that you were aware of it too?

8 A. I was aware that there was this set of protocols. Again, without

9 seeing them, I cannot recall the detail.

10 Q. And there is no doubt that it referred to our right to take

11 weapons from the weapon collection points, right, to take these weapons

12 and to return them once the danger is over; right?

13 A. Again, without looking at the documents, I cannot recall the

14 details of this arrangement.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We're going to look at

16 the protocol briefly.

17 D717, could we have that in e-court. Page 4 of this document,

18 please. I believe that it's the second paragraph or the paragraph under

19 number 1.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Could you please cast a glance. Do you agree that this

22 unequivocally reiterates our right to use our weapons if the

23 United Nations cannot ensure the observance of the zone by the Muslim

24 side? Right?

25 A. Which paragraph am I being asked to agree to? I haven't read the

Page 11479

1 whole document yet. That's why I'm asking which paragraph are we --

2 Q. Item 1.

3 A. Paragraph 1, numbered "1"?

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. I agree that it says that -- at the beginning, UNPROFOR -- that

6 in the event of UNPROFOR withdrawing from the weapon collection points,

7 which is what I think that is referring to, without the agreement of the

8 BSA, or that it withdraws from its interposition areas between Serb and

9 Muslim lines - that's the first set of conditions - the BSA reserves the

10 right to redeploy its weapons. Again I'm assuming from the weapon

11 collection points. While in the event of a Muslim attack on the Serbs

12 which UNPROFOR is not able either to prevent -- either prevent or stop,

13 immediately the BSA reserves the right to implement adequate measures of

14 self-defence. Now, I'm not clear from that whether, actually, it says,

15 other than you can withdraw, redeploy weapons in the first set of that

16 paragraph, whether that first bit applies to the second. But, yes, you

17 have -- there is some form of agreement there in which, in those

18 circumstances, you can start to take other actions of some kind.

19 Q. Thank you. Let's see, in your book, which is 1D3196 [as

20 interpreted], on page 10 -- in e-court, it's page 10; otherwise, it is

21 page 346 and then it flows on to 347 of your book - that you understood

22 that fully and that it is included in your book.

23 Could we please see D3196 in e-court. Your book is, of course,

24 "Utility of Force":

25 [In English] "The NATO capability was subsequently used after a

Page 11480

1 particularly murderous attack in early 1994 on the Markale Market Square

2 in Sarajevo. The aim of the operation was to reinforce the safe area by

3 declaring exclusion zones around it. Each zone was to be empty of all

4 Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and, if not, would be attacked from the air.

5 From the point of view of NATO, and in particular of US advocates of this

6 idea, this was a simple proposition."

7 [Interpretation] Can we now please see another page.

8 The top of the next page, on the right:

9 [In English] "... But from the UN and UNPROFOR points of view,

10 such an action would be partial; it would also prevent the Bosnian Serbs

11 from defending their people in, for example, their part of Sarajevo.

12 These differences led to the two weeks ..."

13 And so on.

14 [Interpretation] So the first thing to be noted here is that it

15 is understood that only the Serbian weapons would be re-deployed from the

16 exclusion zone, and that was not the essence. The essence is that all

17 the weapons should have been removed from the exclusion zone, but I can

18 see that even you, in your book, completely understood that this was our

19 right.

20 Please have a look at this:

21 [In English] "... the meetings went on and on."

22 [Interpretation] It's in the middle. It says "years of service

23 in NATO," and then it follows -- have you found that, General?

24 A. I've got to: "The meetings went on and on," yes.

25 Q. Please have a look at this passage which says that the meetings

Page 11481

1 went on and on, but in the end the agreed result was another variant of

2 the hostage and shield, as you call it, weapons would be collected at

3 collection points and held under UN control, a word which you believe was

4 open to interpretation, but the Serbs were able to maintain them in case

5 they needed it for self-defence, in which case they would be returned,

6 and so on.

7 Would you agree that even though you were not there at the time,

8 that we requested that this should be called "monitoring" rather than

9 "control," and that that was accepted; namely, that the United Nations

10 would be monitoring this? And the other thing, which is the most

11 important, that it was clear to everyone that it was our right to use the

12 weapons for self-defence; right?

13 A. I don't recall the word -- the monitoring. I do recall, as I've

14 said in the book and, I think, earlier -- no, I didn't say it earlier --

15 that the actual control was open to interpretation. So that may have --

16 the "monitoring" word may have appeared, for all I can recall. And, yes,

17 there was a recognition that in -- for the need of self-defence, weapons

18 could be withdrawn.

19 Again, I don't recall under what arrangements this was to be

20 done. It certainly would have involved the United Nations having some

21 hand in releasing the weapons.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 I would tender these two pages.

24 But with all due respect, General, it was not envisaged that we

25 should ask for permission. Once we were attacked and if the UN could not

Page 11482

1 order them to stop, we were authorised to use our weapons.

2 Can these two pages be admitted, please?

3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you're not giving evidence. You put

4 your questions.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just asking if this is so.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Is it right that it was not envisaged that we should ask for

8 permission?

9 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, General: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

10 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, that -- I just have to note, I mean,

11 that wasn't in the guise of a question, it wouldn't have been transformed

12 into a question without the Court's intervention, and there should be no

13 pretense that those efforts at commentary are anything but. It's fine

14 now if the -- upon the Court's urging, if that's translated into a

15 question, the witness can deal with it as he wishes. But it should not

16 be the constant burden of the Court or the Prosecution to monitor and

17 point out its occurrence.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

19 General, could you answer the question?

20 THE WITNESS: Yes, I'll just refresh my memory as to -- no,

21 again, I cannot the precise details, but I am -- I believe that there was

22 some arrangement by which we would have been involved in the release of

23 those weapons.

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, do you have any objection to the

25 admission of those two pages?

Page 11483

1 MR. TIEGER: No, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.

3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1009, Your Honours.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 Q. Would you agree with me that in addition to the fact that the

6 understanding was that only Serbs were supposed to remove the weapons,

7 though the agreement implied all weapons, that in some places the rule

8 was that only the Serbian side would be bombed if it violated this rule?

9 Is that so?

10 A. "That in some places, the rule was that only the Serbian side

11 would be bombed if it violated this rule." I don't think that was in any

12 agreement at all. In theory, the exclusion zone applied to all sides,

13 and there were weapon collection points for the Bosnian Army as well as

14 the Bosnian Serb Army.

15 Q. Thank you. Would you agree with me, General, that, so to speak,

16 from your arrival to the area, you had a feeling that the bombing should

17 take place?

18 A. No, I had no feeling that it should take place.

19 Q. On the occasion of your arrival to the post as a commander, you

20 had 20.000 soldiers who were subordinated to you and who were allowed to

21 use force only for self-defence; is that correct?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Would you agree that in your documents and discussions, the

24 possibility of bombing was already mentioned in the first week of April,

25 and during the month of April, and especially during the first week of

Page 11484

1 the month of May?

2 A. Yes, the probability of this occurring was becoming -- it was

3 increasing.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like us to have a look at

5 another page from your book. It's 1D1396 [as interpreted]. It's page 7

6 in e-court. The previous document, 1D3196, and if we could have a look

7 at page 7 in e-court, which is page 340 from the book.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. The first paragraph says:

10 [In English] "But by the time I assumed command in 1995, there

11 were some 20.000, the original deployment in 1992 was 5.000, all bound to

12 their respective national headquarters and all prohibited from using

13 force, except in self-defence, by the mandate of the Rules of

14 Engagement."

15 [Interpretation] Is that correct?

16 A. That's what is written there.

17 Q. And would you agree with me that in spring 1995, first of all in

18 May, but even before that, before the bombing of Serbian positions, the

19 Serbian Army was defending itself from the Army of BiH, which had

20 launched a large-scale offensive? It was precisely during that spring?

21 A. Yes, there had been two offensives.

22 Q. Thank you. However, it happened that there was an opinion, and I

23 could say that you had arrived with an intention to end the war, and in

24 order to end it, that it was necessary to bomb the Serbs, and that the UN

25 should change the mandate and be able to use force? Would you agree?

Page 11485

1 A. It happened -- I did not arrive with an intention to end the war.

2 Q. But was your position that the United Nations should resort to

3 force? The use of force, I mean.

4 A. No, it was not my position, and it certainly wouldn't have been

5 one at all at the beginning of my tour.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have a look -- or,

7 rather, could this page 340 be admitted into evidence, please?

8 JUDGE KWON: That page will be added to the previous portion;

9 i.e., Exhibit D1009.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Could we now please see page 15 in e-court of this same document,

12 which is page 356 of the book.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. While we are waiting for this to appear on the screen, General:

15 In the first week of May, you said, and you repeated it in your statement

16 and we shall come back to that, that you were under great pressure that

17 the bombing should take place. Who was exerting this pressure?

18 A. There was pressure from the NATO authorities, who were watching

19 the circumstances in and around the exclusion zones. There were the

20 demands from the Bosnian government in addition.

21 Q. Thank you. So that was the reason why your first request to bomb

22 the Serbs was refused at the command in Zagreb; correct?

23 A. I don't know that that was the reason. I deduced the reason --

24 wrong. I think the reason was connected with the -- with two factors:

25 One, I'd started and had said, We don't want to do that, and then I had

Page 11486

1 this apparent change of mind. And the second reason was, I think, to do

2 with the politics in NATO and the UN at the time, but I'm not sure of

3 that.

4 Q. Can I please turn your attention to the last passage in --

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

6 MR. TIEGER: I should have risen earlier and should -- and I will

7 be asking, as a general matter, for references, specific references to

8 page numbers of any document or statement in which it's asserted

9 something was said. So could I just have the page reference or paragraph

10 reference number to the --

11 JUDGE KWON: Refusal from the --

12 MR. TIEGER: The reference to pressure in the witness's statement

13 that was the predicate for this series of questions.

14 JUDGE KWON: Could you give the page number of --

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can withdraw this question

16 temporarily and we'll come back to it with a document.

17 But can I turn your attention to the last paragraph on page 356,

18 General, beginning with the words: "By the time I arrived ..."

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Can you please read that?

21 A. "By the time I arrived in the theatre, it appeared that the media

22 unanimously ..."

23 Do you want me to go on? How far do you want me to go?

24 Q. Well, perhaps, since everybody can read it, you can just give us

25 your comments.

Page 11487

1 A. Of the whole paragraph, onto the next page, or just --

2 Q. This page.

3 A. This page, right.

4 Yes, I think that was the situation at the time with the media,

5 and an explanation of why -- well, beginning of the explanation of why.

6 Q. Thank you. Can you please look at page 357, lines 11 or 12:

7 "Given this background, I sought to establish ..."

8 [In English] "Given this background, I sought to establish a

9 clear media policy as soon as I arrived in theatre, as with the use of

10 force it seemed to me the key lay in the ability to escalate."

11 [Interpretation] Is that right?

12 A. That's what it says, yes, and that's what I thought at the time.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Can these two pages be admitted?

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, those will be added to Exhibit D1009.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 Q. So these preparations to use force, and in such a way, at that,

18 namely, that there can even be an escalation, was the basis of your

19 preparation for using force against one side only; isn't that right?

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

21 MR. TIEGER: I'm -- the reference to the preparations to use

22 force is a reference to what is in evidence already? I didn't see it in

23 that passage, and I don't recall the witness referring to it earlier.

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, be cautious when paraphrasing the

25 previous answer of the witness.

Page 11488

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we are going to see that

2 paragraph now. We're going to have it called up. But before that, I

3 would like to hear the witness's answer. I believe that is fully

4 legitimate, that I put the question and then I give proof of what I have

5 been saying.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Have you started preparations for the effective use of force

8 against one side, at that?

9 A. I am -- I am confused. You have given me a paragraph to read

10 about my policy towards the media. I don't see that that's got anything

11 to do with the use of force.

12 In writing in this paragraph, I allude, I think, to an earlier

13 discussion in this book about the theoretical background to the use of

14 force, in which I explain about escalation, and I don't see that anything

15 in this has to do with one side or the other of this unfortunate

16 conflict.

17 Q. Well, right here in this paragraph, it says:

18 [In English] "... as with the use of force it seemed to me the

19 key lay in the ability to escalate."

20 [Interpretation] But that is not only related to the media. It

21 has to do with the entire attitude towards the warring parties and also

22 these preparations to use force against one side only.

23 Let me help you. Let's look at paragraph 96.

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that's another statement of yours.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 2686. It's your

Page 11489

1 amalgamated statement. Page 24, paragraph 96.

2 JUDGE KWON: Do we have a hard copy of his amalgamated statement?

3 General, do you like to have that statement before you?

4 THE WITNESS: I think it would help, yes, if it's --

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you for your preparation, Mr. Tieger.

6 THE WITNESS: I think it's coming up on the screen.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at page 24 now,

8 paragraph 96. We have it in e-court too:

9 [In English] "Late April/early May, we got the Joint Commission

10 Observers in Srebrenica. These JCOs had been included, if I recall

11 correctly, in the COHA at the end of 1994 as part of the observer and

12 control mechanisms of that agreement. I would have been involved in the

13 process of sending them in. They were valuable to me for communications

14 and their ability as forward air controllers. As it got harder and

15 harder to communicate with the enclaves, it was more important that I had

16 a reliable form of communication with them, so I deployed JCO teams into

17 Srebrenica and Gorazde. NATO nations had forward air controllers in

18 their units who were practiced and certified to operate with NATO air

19 forces, and this is where the JCOs were drawn from."

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. At the end of April and the beginning of May, as soon as the JCOs

22 were established, were you not thinking straight away that you needed

23 these forward air controllers and that that was a preparation for the

24 bombing that would ensue?

25 A. The -- I wanted to get, as it said in this document, the JCOs

Page 11490

1 into Srebrenica for the two reasons; for air control, tactical air

2 control party or forward air controllers, and for communications. The --

3 it was certainly -- they were certainly there to be able to control

4 aeroplanes, and I was making sure I was capable of doing that in all the

5 enclaves.

6 Q. Do you recall that the United Nations forces were in our country

7 on the basis of our own consent, and that that had been a prerequisite

8 for their presence?

9 A. I recall that was the -- their original deployment was covered by

10 that, yes.

11 Q. Do you agree that any change in the mandate would have to be

12 given our approval so that we would accept you as a neutral presence? Is

13 this not a change in your mandate, given these forward air controllers

14 and preparations for an attack against one side only, the Serb side?

15 A. This is not evidence of that at all. If you read the rest of the

16 paragraph, you'll see why I wanted to put the JCOs there. And the reason

17 was that the forward air controllers with the Dutch unit were no longer

18 current because they hadn't been able to practice and maintain their

19 certification with NATO.

20 Q. Thank you. So then you asked NATO to bomb the Serb positions.

21 You are the commander of UNPROFOR, and you're preparing forward

22 air controllers, and that meant the involvement of the UN forces into a

23 conflict with the Serbs. As you say in your text, moving on from

24 confrontation into conflict; isn't that right?

25 A. I'm not sure how this is connected with the Srebrenica situation,

Page 11491

1 because they -- there wasn't bombing there until much later in the year.

2 Or is this question not connected with the previous?

3 Q. I'm just trying to show here that you sent JCO teams to

4 Srebrenica and Gorazde that were actually forward air controllers. They

5 were not observers. They were capable of guiding NATO aircraft. There

6 was bombing in Gorazde, later on in Srebrenica as well, and before that,

7 in May, there were bombings in Pale and elsewhere.

8 So this is my question: In that way, did you not bring together

9 NATO and the UN in your very own person? You are asking for the bombing

10 to take place, and your soldiers are forward air controllers for the

11 NATO air force. Is that not this move from the state of confrontation

12 with the Serbs into conflict with the Serbs?

13 A. Under the resolutions of the -- that followed on from the -- and

14 gave the authority to the exclusion zones and the safe areas, I was part

15 of the system that had been established to maintain the safe area and

16 exclusion zones -- safe areas and exclusion zones. Part of that system

17 included NATO. And, therefore, I made sure that I had the ability to

18 control NATO aeroplanes for the close air support and self-defence of the

19 NATO forces in those enclaves. And for that purpose, I deployed the

20 necessary units.

21 Q. If I understand this correctly, we never gave any kind of

22 approval for any kind of NATO presence in the enclaves. Right?

23 A. This wasn't a NATO presence. This was a United Nations presence.

24 Q. Page 11, which is page 348 in e-court, can we have a look at that

25 page of your book now and see what you say there. Yes, yes, the book.

Page 11492

1 We need the previous document, 1D396; page 11 in e-court. It's

2 348, then, in the first half of the book. It's around line 10:

3 [In English] "One is, in effect, negotiating by threatening or

4 using force in confrontation, not conflict. Technically, both NATO and

5 the United Nations were in confrontation with the Bosnian Serbs, but NATO

6 was focused only on the Bosnian Serbs, whilst UNPROFOR was dealing with

7 all sides ..."

8 And so on.

9 [Interpretation] So it is my position that from the very outset,

10 it was the Serb side that was the target, and that the use of force was

11 envisaged for the Serb side.

12 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. My question is: Since we can see here that the General was aware

15 of what NATO was doing, doesn't this paragraph show that you were aware

16 of the fact that NATO had this one-sided orientation against the Serbs

17 only?

18 A. Yes, it does show that.

19 Q. Thank you. Tell us, did this, in a way, become a personal

20 conflict for you, too, that you had completely sided with one of the

21 parties in the conflict?

22 A. No, it does not.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 Could we have a look at a few other paragraphs in this document.

25 But before that, can I tender this page?

Page 11493

1 JUDGE KWON: That page will be added as well.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A bit of patience now, please,

3 because I would like to show a few short paragraphs from your book. It

4 is page 353 in the book, itself, but it is page 13 in e-court.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. 353: "In May ..."

7 It's the last paragraph:

8 [In English] "In May, I attempted to reinforce the exclusion zone

9 around Sarajevo, which had been violated with the breakdown of COHA when

10 the Serbs resumed shelling the city and withdrew some weapons from the

11 agreed collection points. To this end, I used NATO to bomb Bosnian Serb

12 ammunition supplies. Whilst I did not see this in such terms at that

13 time, I was in a confrontation with Mladic over this ..."

14 [Interpretation] Further on -- well, in a way, you were in this

15 sort of personal conflict with Mladic, and it seems that, to a large

16 degree, this had become personal. Right?

17 A. The word is "confrontation," not "conflict." And if you like, I

18 will tell you what I think those two words mean.

19 JUDGE KWON: Please, please, by all means, General.

20 THE WITNESS: A conflict is a fight, a battle, an engagement. A

21 confrontation need not be violent at all. It is when you do not share

22 the same outcome in your -- in the intentions that you are pursuing.

23 Is that sufficient?

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Yes. That was my understanding of your distinction between these

Page 11494

1 two concepts.

2 Can we look at 354, the next page, which is 14 in e-court, and

3 then I would like us to have a look at a few brief paragraphs. And, of

4 course, I'm counting on having these pages that I'm quoting admitted

5 eventually.

6 354, can we have that, please. And now we are going to see where

7 this is. Line 5 from the top:

8 [In English] "I put the threat into effect. I moved from

9 confrontation to conflict."

10 [Interpretation] Is that it? It is here where you crossed this

11 border between confrontation and conflict by bombing the Serbs?

12 A. That is what I've written there, and that is what happened, yes.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Can we NOW also have a look at another passage from the same

15 page. Just a second so I can find it. Lord Owen is mentioned. It's the

16 upper half of the second paragraph.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Can you see "Lord Owen":

19 [In English] " ... I had lost a battle or confrontation. In

20 thinking this through, I came to the conclusion that I had to understand

21 the use of force in a different way; that it had to be applied to alter a

22 decision-maker's mind, and that this understanding must affect my choice

23 of targets."

24 [Interpretation] And then let us have a look at page 18 in

25 e-court. It is page 362 of the book, but it's near the top:

Page 11495

1 [In English] "... but as the lady said, you can't be a little bit

2 pregnant, and you can't be a little bit interventionist either. If you

3 stand in the middle of someone else's fight, you must expect to be pushed

4 around. And if you do intervene, decide if you are fighting one or all

5 of sides and get on with it."

6 A. Can I see the page before 362, page 361, to see how that

7 paragraph is actually situated?

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. [In English] "... but if there was any doubt about the matter,

11 the directive issued to me by the NATO in late May -- by the UN in May,

12 clarifying that the safety of forces was more important than implementing

13 the mandate."

14 A. Thank you.

15 JUDGE KWON: Now your question, Mr. Karadzic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the other page be admitted,

17 please?

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Does it follow from this that you did take sides in the civil

20 war?

21 A. No, it doesn't. You're forgetting that I am reacting to a set of

22 circumstances that I haven't created.

23 There are two parties in a confrontation and a conflict, and this

24 one was even more complex because -- as you pointed out, it's a civil

25 war, so there's another set of confrontations and conflicts going on at

Page 11496

1 the same time.

2 And the last bit of the book you showed me, where I'm doing the

3 thing about "can't be a little bit pregnant," is a reflection on the

4 events after the -- it's a lesson I'm drawing from these events. It

5 isn't the -- it isn't necessarily how I'm thinking about it on the day

6 in, for sake of argument, May.

7 Q. Do I understand properly, General, that there were levels of

8 intervention? The first was the close air support, the close support

9 which was envisaged as assistance to units which were under attack; is

10 that correct?

11 A. That is correct. You reacted, and that was one of the reactions

12 in those circumstances.

13 Q. Do you remember that General Mladic told all commanders, If my

14 forces attack you, please feel free to respond, and I will accept that;

15 no one must attack you, you are free to respond? Are you aware of this

16 position of his?

17 A. I don't recall that, no, but it may have been said to one of my

18 predecessors.

19 Q. That's right. The next was a punitive measure, the so-called

20 air-strikes. So air-strikes are not close air support, they're a

21 punitive measure; correct?

22 A. They are punitive and reactive.

23 Q. So if a cannon or a tank happens to be in a place where it must

24 not be, it will then be fired on; correct?

25 A. Not automatically, but it could have been, yes.

Page 11497

1 Q. However, the bombing which took place in May was neither the

2 close air support nor an air-strike against a disobedient piece of

3 weaponry, but it was strategic bombing with the aim of diminishing the

4 Serbian defence power; is that right?

5 A. No, it was not. It was -- the requirement was to re-establish

6 the exclusion zone and to see the weapons that had been removed from the

7 weapon collection points back in the weapon collection points.

8 Q. But you did not bomb the weapons which were not returned, but an

9 ammunition depot, and yesterday you said that that changed matters once

10 you destroyed such an amount of ammunition; correct?

11 A. That was one of the reasons that target was chosen, yes.

12 Q. Further on you say, on page 76, that the aim was also to

13 intimidate Pale, because the ammunition depot was right next to Pale?

14 A. Page 76 in the book?

15 Q. No, no, that's the page of the transcript. 76 is the page of the

16 transcript of yesterday's session.

17 A. Ah-ha. I don't think I used the word "intimidate." I think I

18 said that it could be heard or seen.

19 Q. Yes, to leave an impression. That was what you said; right?

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. And also you believed that the Serbs should return the weapons

22 they had taken in order to defend themselves.

23 Would you agree that weapons are not returned in the midst of an

24 offensive, that the offensive was not over yet and that the conditions

25 for returning the weapons had not been met yet? And, excuse me, it's not

Page 11498

1 recorded in the transcript that the witness confirmed what I asked him,

2 that he said, Okay, in response to my last question.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, the General confirmed with the word, leaving an

4 impression. Can you proceed to answer, please?

5 THE WITNESS: The requirement that I had placed and why I had

6 requested NATO to conduct the bombing was for those weapons to be

7 returned. It was -- and they were not.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] All right.

9 Q. And did the Muslims -- but we'll come back to that later.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please see another

12 section of the book.

13 Can this page be admitted first or can I count on it that all the

14 pages that we will present would be attached or, rather, added to the

15 exhibit which is already admitted?

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be done. So far, pages 353 to 354,

17 and pages 361 to 62 will be added.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 358 is also something we had a look at, or, rather, we'll do it

20 now.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. So you decided to intervene. And after the crisis with the

23 bombing, you decided to introduce another formation called

24 "Rapid Reaction Forces"; is that correct?

25 A. They didn't -- they weren't called that at that stage. During

Page 11499

1 that crisis, I started to form a reaction force, yes.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 Can we please see page 358. Here it is.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. "The RRF," that's how it begins. It's the fourth line from the

6 top:

7 [In English] "The RRF was to be commanded by a French brigadier

8 general with a multinational headquarters. Subsequently, Britain

9 deployed an airmobile brigade to the Dalmatian coast, and this, too, was

10 available to me on request. The force was not to adopt the UN

11 blue helmets or paint their vehicles white; it was an unmarked UN force.

12 This was fine by me. They were to fight, and I did not want them to look

13 like the UN. I particularly wanted the guns. In comparison with

14 aircraft, guns with the appropriate target-locating and fire-control

15 systems apply fire as accurately, can maintain the fire for longer, are

16 not weather dependent, and would be under my command. They could, in the

17 right quantities and deployment, defeat the Bosnian Serb artillery."

18 [Interpretation] So you envisaged that they would not look as the

19 United Nations, and you wanted to have adequate weapons under your

20 control so that you could defeat Serbian artillery; correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. But in the United Nations, they were not too enthusiastic about

23 these ideas, namely, that the United Nations should be turned into one of

24 the warring parties; correct?

25 A. They accepted the use of this force. It was part of the

Page 11500

1 United Nations. There was an argument about having it or not, but,

2 nevertheless, that's what they decided in the end.

3 Q. Also without our agreement; correct?

4 A. I don't recall.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would ask for this page to be

6 admitted -- actually, to be added.

7 And could we now please have look at 1D395 -- 1D3195.

8 JUDGE KWON: That page will be added.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3195, please.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. That is your interview dated the 12th of January, 2000 - page 8,

12 paragraph 30 - which you gave to the Dutch Institute. Please have a look

13 at this paragraph:

14 [In English] "Smith was still upset because of the fact that the

15 UN did not allow him to bring artillery to Sarajevo. The British had the

16 artillery, but it had to stay on ships in the Adriatic and could not be

17 used on land on orders from the UN. Artillery would have been more

18 useful than aeroplanes."

19 [Interpretation] So there was no enthusiasm about your action,

20 your preparations to fight against the Serbs by using artillery and

21 Rapid Reaction Forces. The British artillery decided to remain on ships.

22 Did you get the artillery that you had asked for eventually? Did

23 you get it so that you could overpower the Serbs?

24 A. The -- I want to go back to this document you've shown me and the

25 paragraph 30 on page 8. It refers -- that refers to my time in the

Page 11501

1 Ministry of Defence in London, and I think the year in question is 1993.

2 And it's a discussion -- or what occurred was that there was the

3 potential to deploy artillery with the initial British battle group in

4 that year after some incident in the vicinity of Tomislavgrad, and that's

5 what that paragraph is referring to. It's got nothing to do with my time

6 as a UN commander some years later.

7 Q. Thank you. But obviously your position at the time was already

8 that artillery should be introduced on your side into this civil war;

9 correct?

10 A. It is not correct in those terms. The -- my position was that if

11 you are faced by artillery attacks, which was the case in this particular

12 deployment, and you wish to defend yourself, then you should take some

13 artillery with you.

14 Q. Thank you. Can you please have a look at the following passage,

15 which says -- the next passage, 31 -- can we please move on to page 9.

16 Please have a look at what is here, and then let us show page 9 and have

17 a look at what's on top of that page.

18 It says here that both the Muslims and the Croats opposed this

19 because they were afraid that this force could be used against them as

20 well. Is this an excuse, after all, that the Muslims and Croats were

21 afraid of the Rapid Reaction Forces because you had made them aware

22 earlier that you were partial to them, that you were on their side, and

23 that the conflict -- that you had been in conflict with your superiors

24 before because of this partiality of yours; isn't that correct? Was it

25 practically possible that the Muslims would be punished by use of

Page 11502

1 weapons?

2 A. It was perfectly possible for that to happen should such a

3 situation -- such a situation occur that would require that reaction.

4 And I'm -- I don't see how you're making the linkage that I had made them

5 aware that I was partial to them. The whole of that paragraph 31 in the

6 document that you've referred to me is concerning the

7 Rapid Reaction Force and my arguments as to why I only wanted it if I

8 could use it.

9 Q. Is it correct that you came into conflict with your superiors

10 about your will to use force?

11 A. Confrontation, perhaps, but not conflict.

12 Q. Thank you. Let's have a look at page 4 of this document,

13 paragraph 12, then.

14 Here, your confrontation with General Janvier is mentioned about

15 the use and deployment of helicopters for supplying the enclaves, and so

16 on; is that correct? You say here:

17 [In English] "It was the only time that Smith and Janvier

18 disagreed. Smith said that at a certain point, the young Turks in Zagreb

19 turned against Janvier because they agreed with Smith. They, too, were

20 in favour of the use of force, as opposed to Janvier."

21 [Interpretation] Is that correct?

22 A. That's what's written there. And I should make the point, from

23 this paragraph, that the argument between General Janvier and I was about

24 the interpretation of our orders, as opposed to the use of force, itself.

25 Q. And the "young Turks" means, figuratively, radicals, those who

Page 11503

1 were ready to fight; is that correct?

2 A. No, those were -- there had been a leak of some documents showing

3 my position, and those were the people I was referring to.

4 Q. Thank you. So you were slowly creating the conditions for a

5 conflict with Serbs, and you were even happy about this conflict; isn't

6 that correct?

7 A. I was creating the conditions so that I could react effectively,

8 if I needed to, with the Bosnian Serbs.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Could we now please have a look at the document 1D3196, page 18

11 in e-court. It's page 363, and I will read it, and we'll find it. It's

12 somewhere -- page 18 in e-court. It's fine, we have it here on the

13 screen. It's page 363 of the book, and close to the top of the page, it

14 says the following:

15 [In English] "Having made the threats, we could be sure Mladic

16 would take measures to counter it. I explained I was quite happy to

17 fight the Bosnian Serbs."

18 [Interpretation] Is that correct?

19 A. Or anyone else, for that matter. It's my profession, or was.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 Let us now take a look at page 20 in e-court, which is two pages

22 on. It's page 366 of the book. And, again, I'm interested in a passage

23 which is close to the top of the page.

24 [In English] "I did not want the Serbs to have the

25 initiative ..."

Page 11504

1 [Interpretation] It's the first paragraph that begins on this

2 page:

3 [In English] "In essence, I wanted to be the one who chose when

4 and where we fought, and what about, and so the preparations continued.

5 We made plans for what we would do for attacks on each of the safe areas,

6 and the Rapid Reaction Forces continued to deploy, always making itself

7 look as much as possible like part of NATO. In parallel, we had been

8 slowly reducing the size of the British contingent in Gorazde ..."

9 [Interpretation] And so on.

10 So you were preparing for a fight against the Army of

11 Republika Srpska, and you withdrew your British soldiers from Gorazde so

12 that they wouldn't be taken prisoners; correct.

13 A. Wouldn't be used as hostages. That was the reason for removing

14 them.

15 Q. And further on you say --

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this page be admitted, please?

17 JUDGE KWON: Both page 363 and 366 will be added to the book

18 exhibit.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. So you managed to be more clever than Mladic about Gorazde,

21 because he promised to you that in case of crisis, UNPROFOR would be

22 allowed to pass through our territory in peace with all weapons, under

23 the conditions that it did not leave the weapons to the Muslims; correct?

24 A. I think that was the arrangement, yes.

25 Q. But you certainly didn't tell him that the crisis would occur

Page 11505

1 when you entered into a war with his troops; correct?

2 A. I didn't know that that would be the crisis. I was going to be

3 withdrawing those people anyhow.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have a look at your

5 statement, the amalgamated statement, page 50. You have it with you, and

6 I'm interested in paragraph 197.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Did the withdrawal take place on the 25th of August?

9 A. Which paragraph were you referring to? I'm sorry. 197?

10 Q. Here it is. We have it on the screen now, 197.

11 On the 25th of August, you began preparations by having a meeting

12 with Mladic to withdraw your soldiers from Gorazde; correct?

13 A. Correct, yes.

14 Q. We can see the passage. Let us not read it. Is it the same

15 August during which the Markale II incident happened as well as the

16 bombing?

17 A. Yes.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 Is it the appropriate time for our break?

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, if it is convenient.

21 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.

22 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

23 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 11506

1 Q. So, General, it seems to me that already on the 25th, on the

2 25th of August, you knew that a crisis was in the making, and that's why

3 you took your soldiers out; right?

4 A. No. I'd been trying to remove people from the -- these exposed

5 positions for some time. I think you'll find that much earlier in the

6 month, if not before, we've been telling everybody that the British were

7 not going to replace their people in Gorazde, and nor were the

8 Ukrainians.

9 Q. Thank you. But at the time, you already knew -- or, actually,

10 you took part in making the plans for using force against the

11 Army of Republika Srpska, and what was being awaited was just a good

12 opportunity; right?

13 A. It wasn't a question of waiting for the opportunity. It was the

14 question of waiting for the event to occur. We had to have an attack on

15 a safe area first.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 1D3196, your book, can we have a look at that again. It is

18 page 20 in e-court, and in the book it is 367. It's around the middle of

19 367:

20 [In English] "So in the end ..."

21 [Interpretation] Line 12 or 13:

22 [In English] "So in the end, the decision taken at the

23 London Conference came down to this: If I was to use the forces

24 available to me, NATO and the Rapid Reaction Forces to the best effect, I

25 had to seize the first opportunity presented by an attack on Sarajevo

Page 11507

1 and, if at all possible, ignore attacks on the other safe areas. Having

2 done the planning with NATO, I was aware there were only so many targets

3 suitable for the attack. The more we could mix the mode of attack - air,

4 artillery and the battleground - the greater our options and effect; by a

5 wide margin, this was achieved best around Sarajevo. My

6 Rapid Reaction Forces was an ad hoc force ..."

7 And so on and so on.

8 [Interpretation] So the opportunity arose for Sarajevo, at that.

9 While planning, it was Sarajevo that people had in mind, whereas the

10 other safe areas were outside your planning altogether. So the

11 opportunity arose on the 28th of August; right.

12 A. No. Plans were made for all the safe areas. The point was that

13 I could execute the plans -- the best plan to execute was the one around

14 Sarajevo.

15 Q. Please have a look at the last paragraph in the book

16 [as interpreted]. It says that a shell fell, and that was the

17 opportunity; right:

18 [In English] "The Serbs were already claiming it was nothing to

19 do with them, and that the Bosniaks had fired on their own people, but

20 there was no evidence to support this contention. Nonetheless, I --"

21 A. Where is this?

22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. What page?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The same page, the last paragraph.

24 367:

25 [In English] "On the 28th of August ..."

Page 11508

1 THE WITNESS: I see it, sorry.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. I didn't start reading from the very beginning of the paragraph.

4 But further on, you say:

5 "Nonetheless, I wanted to establish ..."

6 [In English] " ... beyond a reasonable doubt that the shells were

7 fired from Serb territory before our attack was initiated.

8 General Janvier was on leave at the time, and the key was mine to turn."

9 [Interpretation] Isn't that right?

10 A. That is correct, and that this -- this incident was the --

11 required me to react to it.

12 Q. Thank you. As for the decision to bomb the Serbs, you made it on

13 the 28th of August, in the evening; right?

14 A. Let me -- I think it was that date, yes, but it may have been --

15 it was certainly in the evening.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 Can this page be admitted, added to that exhibit?

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, these two pages will be added.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go back to the

20 amalgamated statement. The number is -- you have a hard copy. Please

21 look at page 52, paragraph 202 [as interpreted]:

22 [In English] "I made the decision with Cincsouth to initiate a

23 bombing campaign as a response to this shelling."

24 [Interpretation] It is paragraph 203. The transcript says "202."

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11509

1 Q. So on the evening of the 28th, as is written here, you made the

2 decision to initiate the bombing campaign; right?

3 A. That is right. It would have been later on that evening.

4 Q. You don't know what time?

5 A. I can't recall.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 Can we have a look at paragraph 200 on page 50.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. You say that two teams investigated the site of the incident;

10 isn't that right? One was an UNMO team, and the other was a team from

11 Sector Sarajevo; right?

12 A. Yes, it says that.

13 Q. Then in the same paragraph, you say:

14 [In English] "The UNMOs automatically carried out an

15 investigation and recorded the data they collect. So there were two sets

16 of investigations. Investigations took place with a slightly different

17 set of competency. Between these two, we found ourselves with a certain

18 amount of disagreement as to what had occurred. None of these

19 investigations concluded that the killing shell had come from Bosnian

20 positions, but there were two different views as to the direction the

21 rounds came from."

22 [Interpretation] Let us now see what the conclusion of the

23 UNMO team was.

24 Paragraph 207 now, page 52. Then we have to move on to 53:

25 [In English] "At 1823 hours on the same day, Mladic reported to

Page 11510

1 me that the results of his investigations concluded that no BSA forces

2 were involved in the attack on Markale Market. I informed him that the

3 UNMO investigation was progressing slowly, but they had established that

4 the round responsible for killing the victims was a 120-millimetre mortar

5 round probably fired from the south."

6 [Interpretation] Is that correct? 1823, this is the conversation

7 between you and Mladic, according to this paragraph of your statement;

8 right?

9 A. Yes, that's what it says, and I think that's what happened, yes.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So on the 28th of August, at

11 1900 hours, UNMOs held a meeting with the Muslim police.

12 Can we have P150. Page 2, page 2 of 150.

13 Towards the very bottom of page 2, this is what it says,

14 paragraph 3. I'm going to read it out now:

15 "The investigation team tried very hard to prove that the attack

16 came from the Serb side, due to the normal use of heavy mortars, that is

17 likely, but there is no hard proof on this fact."

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. So, 40 minutes after your conversation with Mladic, the

20 investigation team cannot establish, despite of their wish and effort to

21 blame the Serbs, that it had actually come from the Serb side; right?

22 A. That's what he has written there, yes.

23 Q. Thank you. In the same document, if we look at number 2 -- I

24 believe that is page 1. Can we go back to the first page of this

25 document.

Page 11511

1 The bearings, in combination of the estimated angle of impact,

2 could give no evidence on the origin of fire, since it is not known with

3 which charge the projectile had been fired; right?

4 A. Yes, it says that.

5 Q. So on the 28th of August, in the evening, you had no way of

6 knowing beyond a reasonable doubt that this incident in Markale was

7 caused by the Serb side?

8 A. The date, again, and time of this UNMO report?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. It was the meeting on the 28th at 1900 hours.

12 A. By that time, the -- in my headquarters, we have other sources of

13 reporting, and I can't recall the exact flow of the -- and what order

14 these reports came. And I would not have seen that particular one,

15 either, the one up on evidence at the moment.

16 Q. One of the two investigations, General, 40 minutes after you

17 informed Mladic that it had probably come from the south, says that the

18 site from where it was fired cannot be established. But let's move on.

19 The next morning, on the 29th of August at 10.00, you said to

20 General Mladic that it was established beyond reasonable doubt that the

21 incident in Markale II was the doing of the Serbs. This sounds like a

22 conclusion of a full criminal investigation that leaves no doubt

23 whatsoever and that does not involve any further investigations. Isn't

24 that what you informed him of?

25 Let me help you. Let's have a look at the amalgamated statement,

Page 11512

1 paragraph 208 on page 53. Can we have the previous document, the

2 amalgamated statement, page 53, paragraph 208.

3 Please have a look.

4 At 1000 hours, you said to Mladic that it was established beyond

5 reasonable doubt; isn't that right?

6 A. I have said that it was beyond reasonable doubt that the shells

7 had come from BSA territory and that the firing point was some

8 three and a half to four kilometres south-west of the impact point, and

9 this was a result of my own investigation that I was required to make in

10 order to make the decisions that were required of me of the

11 London Conference.

12 Q. Thank you. Was that the position of the United Nations? Who

13 carried out this investigation that you relied upon?

14 A. The UNMOs and forces -- and people drawn from the forces under my

15 command. And the position of the United Nations was that as a result of

16 the London Conference, the decision as to whether or not to turn the key

17 rested with the military commanders, and at that time I was the military

18 commander with that decision to make.

19 Q. Thank you. We'll go back to that, but let us see what the

20 position of the UN was.

21 Can we have P0 -- or, rather, P906. It's a telegram that was

22 sent at 10.36 on the 29th of August, 1995, by General Janvier to

23 Kofi Annan. At that time, he was head of peace operations.

24 The 29th of August, at 10.36. Please look at the date.

25 "UN restricted," and so on and so forth. So it is Annan who is sending

Page 11513

1 this telegram.

2 And now let us look at page 3, "Sector Sarajevo":

3 [In English] "The sector has become very intense with a moderate

4 level of firing incidents (1.746 recorded). The most active areas were

5 in Nedzarici, Igman, airport, Mojmilo and Grbavica."

6 [Interpretation] By the way, General, Nedzarici and Grbavica, are

7 they Serb neighbourhoods within Sarajevo?

8 A. Grbavica, was, yes. At least I think it was.

9 Q. Nedzarici, as well, if you recall. But let's move on.

10 A. I don't remember these things that well.

11 Q. [In English] "At 11.10, five 120-millimetre mortar shells

12 impacted down-town. One mortar impacted in Markale [B/C/S spoken],

13 killing over 30 persons and injuring more than 80 others. This mortar

14 shell was assessed to be fired from 170 degrees magnetic. Investigation

15 to determine the distance to the firing point is ongoing. The definition

16 of firing positions for mortar rounds is very difficult, as it is

17 impossible to determine the level of charge used to fire the

18 projectiles."

19 [Interpretation] So at 10.00, you informed Mladic that it is

20 beyond any reasonable doubt, and your commander, General Janvier,

21 40 minutes after you, says that that is not the case; that it was not

22 established, that it cannot be established?

23 A. I cannot account for what is going on in the headquarters above

24 me.

25 Q. This is the position of the United Nations; right?

Page 11514

1 A. What you've shown me is a report from my superior headquarters.

2 I don't know that that's got -- gives you any idea of the position of the

3 United Nations at the time.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 Can we see what you say in your amalgamated statement. Page 51,

6 paragraph 201.

7 You say the Cymbeline radar failed to pick up the trajectory of

8 any shell. Let us see -- can you read that part that starts with: "The

9 Cymbeline radar covers an arc ...," et cetera?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You say that the Cymbeline radar failed to pick up the trajectory

12 of any shell in a built-up area:

13 [In English] "If you want to fire a mortar at a short range, you

14 must fire it at a high trajectory which would have crossed the arc. So

15 these shells must have been fired from far away from the confrontation

16 line and at a lower trajectory."

17 [Interpretation] That was your conclusion; right?

18 A. That was part of that investigation, the conclusions from that

19 investigation.

20 Q. Let us leave aside the fact whether you can fire using mortars in

21 such mountainous terrain and in that way. We're going to prove that some

22 other way. However, your investigation did not prove that that is

23 actually how this happened.

24 So let us look at P1445 now.

25 JUDGE KWON: General, in the meantime, did you report to the

Page 11515

1 headquarter in Zagreb about your own investigation?

2 THE WITNESS: I'm sure I must have had a telephone conversation

3 or two. But because General Janvier was on leave at the time, and

4 because I had the key, and because the decision now lay with the

5 military, not with the political authorities, I suspect I was doing -- I

6 was not doing a great deal of informing my superiors at the time, since

7 the decision lay with me.

8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

10 Q. Have a look at this document, paragraph 2 on page 3 -- actually,

11 the last page of this document. We see what the document is. It has

12 already been admitted. The last page, paragraph 2, "Cymbeline":

13 [In English] "Cymbeline radar was operating, but the elevation of

14 the antenna was higher and would have detected, hence, in a higher

15 trajectory. At least several of the five rounds would have been detected

16 if fired close to the confrontation line. If fired from a longer range,

17 the arc of trajectory would most likely have been below the beam of the

18 Cymbeline radar; thus, not detected ."

19 "Most likely." [Interpretation] "Most likely," what does that

20 sound like to you? Does it sound like "beyond reasonable doubt"?

21 A. He used the words "most likely." And while it is not an absolute

22 positive, it is most likely to be positive.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 Can we now show a diagram that will show what it was like. Can

25 we have 1D2830. We're not tendering it. We'd just like to have it

Page 11516

1 displayed.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. General, do you remember that the angle of descent was

4 67 degrees?

5 A. I don't remember the angle of descent, no.

6 Q. General --

7 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

8 Yes, Mr. Tieger.

9 MR. TIEGER: This is a variation of an objection that has been

10 raised before in connection with similar efforts. This document is about

11 to be put to the witness as if it reflects facts established, from which

12 questions can be posed. We don't know the provenance of this document.

13 I think that's why it hasn't been tendered previously. It appears to be,

14 as we understand -- as I understand these documents, compilations

15 assembled by someone associated with the Defence. On what basis, we

16 don't know.

17 JUDGE KWON: Since the Defence is allowed to put his case to the

18 witness, so we'll allow him to proceed. But I'm not sure whether the

19 General is an appropriate one to be asked about these questions.

20 What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not going to tender it now.

22 We'll do it later with someone else.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. My question is, General: In view of the mountainous terrain, in

25 view of the fact that it was a built-up area, do you see that the

Page 11517

1 calculations show that under an angle of 67 degrees, the trajectory would

2 have been higher if the distance was greater, not lower? This is a

3 graphic display of the range tables, with variations for different

4 charges, from plus 1 onwards.

5 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, General: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

6 MR. TIEGER: Well, this question seems to embrace a combination

7 of the concerns that I expressed and the concern the Court expressed;

8 that is, it asks the witness, who is, as the Court indicated, is not the

9 appropriate person to render opinions about this document, which

10 implicates the concerns I expressed before. So it is inappropriate for

11 several reasons.

12 JUDGE KWON: I think we have heard evidence to the effect that

13 the trajectory must have been low. In light of that evidence, the

14 Defence -- the accused is entitled to put the question whether, in view

15 of the mountainous terrain and in view of the fact that it was a built-up

16 area, that the trajectory would have been higher if the distance was

17 greater, not lower.

18 Can you answer the question, General?

19 THE WITNESS: I can't answer it from the evidence put on the

20 screen, but I make the point that the comparison being made is with the

21 Cymbeline arc and the trajectory of the round. I -- it's not a question

22 of the range of the -- the range table that you have displayed here. I

23 don't -- it could easily have been on that -- I don't -- I can't answer

24 the question against the investigations that we were carrying out and use

25 that range table.

Page 11518

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 Q. The basic issue is a logical one, a general issue. Do you still

4 claim that the greater the distance, the lower the trajectory, or is it

5 the other way around, which is our theory, by the way?

6 A. On the basis of this chart, which I don't fully understand or

7 recognise, that's what this chart is showing, but I'm not sure that's

8 correct or needs to be correct.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's according to the firing

10 tables, but we'll deal with it later.

11 Can we see 1D2231 to see how this looks in relation to the

12 Cymbeline beam.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. This is it, General. With a 0 plus 1 charge, this shell could

15 cross the beam that was set as 548 metres. Any higher charge would

16 certainly have been picked up. Do you agree that the radar would have

17 covered anything beyond 548 metres, anything coming from above that

18 level?

19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.

20 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.

21 And I don't want this to get confused with the Defence's

22 obligation to put its case, not merely the right to do so, but this -- I

23 recall this particular exhibit. I recall it was objected to, I think, at

24 least twice by Mr. Gaynor. The Court understood the basis for that

25 objection, it was upheld, and I'm surprised to see it pop up again,

Page 11519

1 particularly in this context. It was rejected in the context of

2 presentation to experts who would have been in a better position to grasp

3 the problems with the document, but as was noted earlier, there's --

4 there were questions about not only the document's provenance but the

5 premises upon which it was based. I don't think we should be seeing

6 constant efforts to circumvent the Court's earlier ruling.

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, my understanding is that the accused is

8 now putting his case, and this document is being used as an aid to

9 explain the situation or what he has in mind. So on that basis, allow

10 him to proceed.

11 And I wonder whether the General would be able to answer the

12 question, having understood that situation.

13 THE WITNESS: Indeed, and I don't understand the chart. I

14 don't -- it's not really clear to me, what's being said, and I don't

15 think I can help the Court. The -- apart from the fact that this is some

16 16 years before this investigation took place, the business of the radar,

17 and the trajectory was part of the investigation. It wasn't the

18 investigation.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 We won't be tendering this now, Your Excellency, but it's just as

21 you understood it. I was just trying to elicit the witness's opinion to

22 his best ability.

23 Let's see what you said in paragraph 200 of your statement,

24 page 51.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11520

1 Q. Paragraph 200:

2 [In English] "Because the attack was so significant ..."

3 [Interpretation] We can go back to -- for the other participants,

4 we need the next page:

5 [In English] "Because the attack was so significant, I wanted to

6 be absolutely sure that all the data had been collected, and so I had a

7 second iteration of this investigation in which my senior intelligence

8 officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Powers, was instructed to collect all

9 available data from other sources ..."

10 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.

11 I would like to ask you for a specific explanation which you seem

12 not to have taken into consideration, and we'll look at it now.

13 And I beg all parties for a little indulgence. It will take

14 12 to 13 minutes.

15 1D2838, please.

16 [Video-clip played]

17 "It's just a -- first of all, I want to introduce myself. I'm

18 Colonel Demurenko, Chief of Staff Sector South Sarajevo. But really

19 today, it's not important, because I'm like -- only not like chief of

20 staff, but like citizen of my country and like a professional military

21 man, colonel. I want to explain any details of investigation which was

22 provided UN -- so-called UN expertise about very terrible events which

23 were a few days ago. As you know, it was Visoko, in down-town, when,

24 after explosion of mortar, mortar shell, on 10 Central Street of the

25 city, that after what was approximately 35 people died and more than 80,

Page 11521

1 in accordance with the report, wounded. And as a professional man, I

2 cannot agree with argument of UN specialist about reasons and sources of

3 this shelling. It is absolutely unacceptable for me and for my military

4 friends in this area, consent of this argument, and therefore I will try

5 to explain any new details which I know.

6 "Firstly, if you know, the main serious facts for us is

7 following. This is the material -- maybe one portion of all material of

8 UN specialist about this shelling. This is a shoot report with -- it's

9 entered on French language, but with a very strange conclusion. This

10 conclusion include idea about this shelling was from Serbian side, I mean

11 Bosnian Serbs.

12 "This is a small picture which explained angle on the street,

13 Marsal Tito, and angle which was between ground and shell, mortar shell.

14 It's very important for us. I will explain it following, afterwards.

15 "This is a copy of photo pictures of this place. This is a

16 street. This is a place where it is exploded of the shell.

17 "This is very important for us, showing a picture. As you can,

18 this is direction of fire [indicates], this is place of

19 explosion [indicates]. And in accordance with the investigation,

20 direction of fire was 176 degrees, or in accordance with the

21 French custom, 2976 mils. Really, this is the south-east area. It's

22 very important for us also.

23 "This is a picture about -- it's very interesting. This material

24 of Bosnian police, I mean government Bosnian police. It's about angle

25 between ground and shell. As you can see, 70 degrees.

Page 11522

1 "And last paper is really -- this is a small slice of copy from

2 map.

3 "And this is my idea, which I can explain all this paper.

4 "In accordance with this material, I believe that specialists

5 which was participated in this investigation was very professional and

6 honest people. And so, therefore, in accordance, once again, with this

7 official investigation and material, we have any picture. It's symbolic.

8 You know, this is Sarajevo [indicates], this is the confrontation line,

9 green [indicates]. This is the two building and place where is explode,

10 this shell [indicates]. In accordance with this material, direction of

11 fire was 100 -- 106 degrees. In accordance with another material, it's

12 once again very interesting question why, in UN, we have two different

13 material of investigation, but not different, and one conclusion. But in

14 accordance with another material of investigation, they said about

15 another angle.

16 "About first, once again, we know what was used. It's a

17 120-millimetres mortar shell. It's a former Yugoslavia weapon, and

18 before it, it was Soviet system. I know it very well because I'm field

19 commander, like a professional soldier. Many times, I participated in

20 real, practical shelling and managed them; I mean, my artillery officers.

21 "In accordance with the main documents for this system, this is a

22 table with whole data about characteristics of this system. We can see

23 that for this system, normally used six standard charge -- charges,

24 charges. And in accordance with this angle, 70 degrees, and this is the

25 direction 176, we can, after comparison with the standard data, see on

Page 11523

1 following map. First explosion, it could be in accordance with this,

2 once again, this degrees and this degrees [indicates]. In this area

3 [marks], 900 metres. Next, in this area [marks], this is really 1.400.

4 Next, 2.000 [marks]. Really, this is on confrontation line.

5 Theoretically, it could be from Serbian, theoretically. I will, once

6 again, explain it. And the next three [marks] are the 2.700, 3.400, and

7 the last charge they can use for 3.600.

8 "Today, personally, with my special -- not special, very small

9 investigation group, including artillery officers, we was on this place

10 [marks], this place [marks], this [marks], this [marks], and this

11 [marks], really by my [indiscernible], and I can affirm absolutely,

12 without -- or beyond any doubts, this is place unacceptable or unsuitable

13 for firing position, mortar shell. No perspective, stay on this position

14 and shell to this area. And therefore, conclusion of material of

15 investigation was wrong.

16 "Now I said only about terrain where is located Serbian troops,

17 and special without my proposals about this area. This is not my job.

18 I'm soldier, I'm colonel, and this is a business for special group

19 like -- maybe for this group necessary include criminal persecutors,

20 members of court-martial, I don't know. Maybe it's a ballistics person

21 and so on and so on. So really, for us, it's necessary understand it,

22 that it was wrong.

23 "About another direction, this is the distance between place of

24 explosion and place of fire position was 2.100 metres [marks]. Same, I

25 was here today, absolutely no perspective locate firing, battery, or

Page 11524

1 platoon, or even one mortar for this area, because this is a really rock

2 slope and forest, and no perspective fired from this position. I can

3 affirm it, and I will have today a photo picture about each of these

4 places.

5 "I can show for you also a map with exactly direction -- one,

6 this direction [indicates], and another alternative direction, and

7 I think the most problem for official investigation group was following:

8 They investigate only angles and directions, and automatically thinking

9 about Serbian so-called aggressions against civil population in Sarajevo,

10 but I think it's not correct. You agree with me. It's necessary more

11 deep investigation. We can organise ballistic expertise, for example,

12 from this place [indicates] or from all place on this area, and we can

13 use the smoke shell for identification place where is exactly can locate

14 this fire position.

15 "And maybe now not necessary more detail explanation, because I

16 have no time enough for this. But, once again, I want statement that it

17 was wrong material, it was absolutely bad conclusion, not correct, and

18 subsequences of -- or the consequences of this event is very bad, because

19 this is Sarajevo. Around Sarajevo, you can listen sound of shelling, and

20 yesterday we had air-strikes around this area. Every hour, civilian

21 people and military personnel is wounded and died. I think it is

22 absolutely unacceptable, especially unacceptable for professional

23 military personnel.

24 "We cannot agree when we following after any strong group and no

25 chance explain our separate point of view. We have it, separate point of

Page 11525

1 view. And, once again, I am not like a citizen of my country. I must

2 said let's stop them, stop false and falsehood and lie about Serbian

3 aggression in this area. And especially -- especially - I stressed on

4 that - I don't speak about Bosnian terrain. It's not my business. I

5 don't want accuse against somebody or anybody. This is a problem for

6 professional criminalists [sic], not for us. But for us, necessary every

7 time repeat, please -- or investigate it absolutely correctly, with full

8 argumentation, or stop it, and stop all type of action, I mean UN, NATO

9 and so on, against this country.

10 "And also I want to speak on -- few words on my native language,

11 because I think it's necessary explain why -- more preferable for me,

12 American mass media and mass media of Russia.

13 "In USA, I had few years ago my military education. I love

14 really this country, and I believe that this country can support all type

15 of activity and military peacekeeping in this country."

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you for your patience and

17 your attention. I would like to thank all the participants.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. General, this Colonel Demurenko visited all putative potential

20 firing positions. Did you visit any of those locations before making

21 your decision?

22 A. No, I didn't.

23 Q. Did you include in your report this opinion from

24 Colonel Demurenko, who is also the chief of the Sarajevo staff?

25 A. I think he was the deputy commander of the Sector Sarajevo, and

Page 11526

1 he was holding the report that was produced by Sector Sarajevo as part of

2 this investigation.

3 Q. Considering that he's a very experienced artilleryman and a

4 professional soldier, did you somehow take his opinion into account when

5 writing your report about this incident?

6 A. Not -- not directly. He was in the subordinate headquarters, and

7 I had their report. And I think he is reporting some days -- or this

8 television thing you showed us is some days after I've actually made the

9 decision.

10 Q. Well, it seems that was a day later. Is it the case that he had

11 to hold this press conference because his report could not find its way

12 to the United Nations?

13 A. I don't know. I remember him doing this. I -- but no more.

14 Q. Do you recall who decided that his report should not be forwarded

15 or should not be built into your report?

16 A. It would seem his report is after I've already made the decision.

17 I was confident then and I am confident now that Sector Sarajevo, as a

18 headquarters, conducted a proper investigation, and I can -- and I

19 understand that he, as the deputy commander, would have had every

20 opportunity to put his case in that investigation.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this video-clip in its

22 entirety?

23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.

24 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 11527

1 JUDGE KWON: Based upon the witness's confirmation that

2 Colonel Demurenko had this interview at the time, we'll admit this.

3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1010, Your Honours.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 Let us now see how you explained this episode with

6 Colonel Demurenko in your report. 1D3198, please.

7 That is an information report dated 28 August 2003, but it

8 regards this incident.

9 Can we see page 3, please.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Paragraph 4:

12 [In English] "There had been pressure from Admiral Smith to

13 punish by bombing the Serbs. One of the two deputies in Sector Sarajevo

14 was a Russian colonel who said that the mortars must have been fired from

15 within the confrontation line. He argued that we didn't understand the

16 nature of Warsaw Pact-sourced ammunition. Another theory was that the

17 Bosnians fired a round in after the Bosnian Serbs. I didn't accept the

18 argument that the Bosnians were shooting at their own people, without

19 proof. There will always be conspiracy theories."

20 [Interpretation] I believe it is praiseworthy that you don't want

21 to accept anything without proof, but does that also apply to the Serbs,

22 that nothing should be accepted without proof, even if it seems to

23 indicate that the Serbs are to blame?

24 What I was trying to ask, General, is that I can compliment you

25 on needing proof to blame the Bosnians, but does it also apply to the

Page 11528

1 Serbs? Do you need proof to blame the Serbs?

2 A. That's why I carried out this investigation, to decide whether or

3 not -- wrong -- to decide who was responsible for putting these rounds

4 into the market-place.

5 Q. Let us see what you told Mladic and how you informed him of the

6 pressures you were under.

7 Are you the kind of man who gives way under pressure, General?

8 A. That is for others to decide.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see in e-court 1D3171.

10 This is a transcript of your conversation with General Mladic.

11 Can we see page 3.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. We see this bit where Mladic says:

14 "It's therefore very important that a mixed commission visits the

15 site immediately."

16 [In English] "I am prepared to send two officers immediately,

17 with General Smith's guarantee for their safety, to examine the entire

18 situation on site and assess the case with representatives of the other

19 side and UNPROFOR forces."

20 [Interpretation] So Mladic is suggesting that the other side, the

21 Muslim side, be also present, and you say:

22 "All right."

23 Then the General says:

24 "As I have said before, I will see what can be done with this

25 idea, but you will understand the pressure I'm under at this moment."

Page 11529

1 And then Mladic goes:

2 "I fully understand, and I would not want the General to succumb

3 to pressure. But in the interests of peace, to contribute to clearing up

4 this whole case ..."

5 [In English] "... particularly because these forms of pressure on

6 their own are very indicative and probably a part of a preconceived plan.

7 I would not want to have anyone succumb to the atmosphere of pressure,

8 but to examine the entire case properly and rationally, at the level of a

9 mixed commission."

10 [Interpretation] Could you now help us understand what kind of

11 pressures you, in your high position, could have been before you made the

12 decision to bomb the Serbs? Who -- who is the person who was able to

13 exert pressure on you?

14 A. Yes. The -- could I know which of those three telephone calls

15 we're referring to here? Is this the first, or the second, or even the

16 third?

17 Q. I think it was the first or the second. The third one was on

18 the 29th.

19 A. Right, so it's either the first or the second one. Do we know

20 which one?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can find out.

22 Let's see the first page.

23 JUDGE KWON: It does not show the date.

24 THE WITNESS: I think we're on the 28th --

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At night.

Page 11530

1 The Prosecution may assist us, but I think it's the second one.

2 THE WITNESS: This looks as though it's the first call.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It could be.

4 THE WITNESS: Well, he's saying -- I assume he's heard about it.

5 He says he's only heard about it "five minutes ago."

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Yes, so it must have been at that time.

8 That's your first conversation, and then you're looking for

9 details. He's asking for time to ask his people. You say you already

10 have reports from your people.

11 And on page 3, we see that you said you were under pressure, and

12 you were asking General Mladic to appreciate that. I'm now asking you to

13 explain to the Trial Chamber who it was who was able to exert pressure on

14 the UN force commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15 A. I think I'm using the phrase as much as a -- explaining the

16 significance and importance of the situation, as much as personal

17 pressures, as it were. Nevertheless, there was a pressure for me to make

18 a decision that was required of me, if not now, very soon. The people in

19 Zagreb, the Bosnian government, and a bit later, I think it was, the

20 NATO headquarters in Naples are communicating me -- with me and asking me

21 what I'm going to do.

22 Q. Well, General, Mladic is not asking you to do anything here.

23 He's only asking you to conduct an investigation, and he's offering and

24 suggesting a mixed investigative commission consisting of the UNPROFOR,

25 the Muslims and the Serbs. Why was that unacceptable?

Page 11531

1 A. Because it was me, not a joint commission, that had to make this

2 decision, in the first place. And, secondly, as I thought about it more,

3 it was going to be impractical to carry it out because I didn't

4 anticipate the Bosnian government would tolerate any -- a joint

5 commission in this issue. But, primarily, this was a decision I had to

6 make, and I was getting on with making it.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Nobody's questioning

8 that you were the one making decisions. This is only a question of

9 investigation.

10 Can this be admitted, this part of the transcript, or perhaps the

11 entire transcript?

12 JUDGE KWON: Shall we mark it for identification, following our

13 practice?

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As usual.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI D1011.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D3196, please. That's

18 a page from the book. Let us see what you wrote in your book about that.

19 1D3196. In e-court, it's page 21, and it's 368:

20 [In English] "Mladic wanted a joint commission. I said we would

21 have to consult my higher headquarters. I was stalling."

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Did you actually ask your command, your superior command? Let's

24 see what --

25 [In English] "I'm not sure Mladic knew that the battalion had

Page 11532

1 gone until I told ..."

2 [Interpretation] Find this passage. It's the second paragraph on

3 the page, five lines down:

4 [In English] "I'm not sure Mladic knew that the battalion had

5 gone until I told him, in a telephone conversation on 28 August, and that

6 I had decided the mortar round had been fired by his troops. He

7 immediately threatened what he would do to the battalion, and I ended the

8 conversation. I would like to know what happened in his headquarter when

9 he learned they had already left under cover of his order; the thought

10 gave me pleasure at that time. I then turned the UN key, and

11 Admiral 'Snuffie' Smith, the NATO Southern Region commander, turned the

12 NATO key, Smith to Smith, as it was known. Force was finally about to be

13 applied according to a plan."

14 [Interpretation] A long, carefully-planned operation of applying

15 force to the Serbs. The occasion was the shelling at Markale. And you

16 go ahead with it, "Smith to Smith"; correct?

17 A. It wasn't long in the planning. The -- you can trace this

18 incident, if you like, back to the decisions made in the

19 London Conference, and that's what I'm referring to in the middle of that

20 paragraph. I'm connecting those events, if I remember the rest of -- the

21 earlier part of the discussion in the book.

22 I'm trying to find this bit about you -- yeah, I've got it now,

23 yeah.

24 Q. Could you please look at page 369:

25 [In English] "On my part, I would choose the targets that achieve

Page 11533

1 the objectives I had set myself, and as part of my overall plan for the

2 use of force, for in addition to NATO's air power, I also had the

3 artillery and the battle groups of the Rapid Reaction Forces to employ in

4 concert with the air attacks."

5 [Interpretation] Have you found it?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So were you a warring party that had nothing to do with the

8 UN mandate and our approval, in view of your presence in Bosnia?

9 A. We had everything to do with the UN mandate. We were in the UN,

10 and I had certain mandates to perform; the continuing delivery of aid and

11 the safe area and exclusion zones, to list them. And the nature of the

12 execution of that mandate, as I've just said, changed after or as a

13 result of the decisions of the London Conference. But we were in the UN,

14 and we were reacting to the circumstances that had been created.

15 Q. As for the London Conference and Plans A and B, we are going to

16 deal with that as this cross-examination continues.

17 However, General, you were rather happy with this use of force,

18 and I have the impression that you were fascinated by General Mladic. Is

19 that correct?

20 A. Fascinated, probably not. Very interested, as the person I was

21 dealing with, yes.

22 Q. However, from time to time, one gains the impression that you're

23 waging a personal war against Mladic, and your soldiers and Mladic's

24 soldiers, and civilians, are getting killed in the process. Actually,

25 not yours; only Mladic's. Did you try to vanquish Mladic during the war?

Page 11534

1 A. I would want to place on record that I certainly had some

2 soldiers killed, and by Bosnian Serb fire, at that.

3 Q. The first question, whether you wished to vanquish Mladic,

4 humiliate him, simply win, and did that contribute to our suffering?

5 A. No, I didn't want to humiliate him, and I wasn't interested in

6 increasing the suffering of anybody. What I was faced was a commander,

7 and the burden of what I was required to do and play a part in was to

8 change the intentions of that commander and the -- and those around him,

9 such as yourself. And in that sense, of course it's personal.

10 Q. Let us leave aside the fact that you did not have the right to do

11 that, because we did not allow you to enter our country on that

12 condition.

13 So let us look at this, 369.

14 JUDGE KWON: You should put your question instead of making

15 statements. I'm telling you this umpteen times.

16 Let's proceed.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 Q. You are objecting, since I'm such an amateur, but I'm going to

19 learn in time.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. General, please look at the 15th line from the bottom:

22 [In English] "Within three days, the siege of Sarajevo was

23 broken. The third set of targets were those intended to change Mladic's

24 intentions by attacking his personal sense of control. Clearly, the

25 combined effects of the first two categories of targets impacted on his,

Page 11535

1 too. All the bombing was aimed at undermining him as a commander, but I

2 also sought to attack specifically his needs to control. An example of

3 such a target was a military facility in the village where his parents

4 were buried. I was --"

5 Pardon.

6 "... where his parents were buried. It was attacked repeatedly,

7 in the knowledge that in Mladic's culture, a failure to protect the bones

8 of one's ancestors is something of a shameful dereliction of family duty.

9 Matching these attacks, and to increase the pressure, we told the Bosniak

10 press that Mladic could not look after his parents' remains."

11 [Interpretation] General, which mandate allowed you to attack a

12 culture in this way and to inflict such humiliation?

13 A. Again, the mandate was that that flowed from the security

14 zones -- exclusion zones and the safe areas and the London Conference,

15 and the -- if General Mladic was humiliated, all he had to do was to

16 stop.

17 Q. But, General, this was sacrilege in relation to things held

18 sacred by him, the graves of his parents. And you informed his

19 opponents, the Bosniak press, that now he couldn't do anything about it.

20 Is that not a personal war, General? Would Mladic have ever done that

21 kind of thing to you?

22 A. Oh, I think so, if he had the opportunity.

23 Q. Was this a personal war, on your side?

24 A. I've told you, I needed to change -- I understood that I needed

25 to change this commander -- General Mladic's intentions, and explained in

Page 11536

1 the book, is how I was setting out to do it. And I didn't bomb the

2 graveyard. The military target was what was bombed.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

4 MR. TIEGER: Just for the record, I think the witness was turning

5 his microphone on as -- I'm not sure his first words were caught, but

6 maybe they'll be caught on the tape, which I think was "I told you," was

7 the -- I think the first few words he began the sentence with.

8 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, General?

9 THE WITNESS: I didn't know I had the microphone off. It's on

10 again now.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did say that at the beginning, yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Is it not clear, on the basis of all of this, that in planned

16 fashion, and quite consciously, you became a wartime ally of our enemy,

17 and that you did not start disciplining the Army of Republika Srpska or

18 punishing it, but simply you tried to change the situation on the ground,

19 at the detriment of the Serbs, in order to make it possible for the

20 Muslims and Croats to have a better negotiating position? Right?

21 A. No, I was not doing anything to improve the -- by my actions, an

22 intention to improve the situation for the other party. Inevitably, what

23 we were doing, attacking the Bosnian Serb Army, would alter that balance.

24 That, I quite agree. But that was not my purpose. My purpose was to

25 reimpose the exclusion zones and to get the weapons withdrawn from them.

Page 11537

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Let us now look at the

2 next page, 370, and then we're going to tender all three pages. So it's

3 the same document, next page.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Towards the bottom:

6 [In English] "With the start of the second phase of the

7 NATO-UN action, the Croatians and the launched a joint offensive towards

8 Banja Luka from the positions gained in South-West Bosnia and the

9 Krajinas in August. They made a rapid progress, aided, no doubt, by the

10 effects of the bombing."

11 [Interpretation] Have you found that part?

12 A. Yes, I have. It's the bottom paragraph.

13 Q. The Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had its own air force. They got

14 one in you, in NATO. You were meeting those needs of theirs in the war;

15 right? Quite simply, you helped them succeed; right?

16 A. Where have I said that in that paragraph?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, not in that paragraph, but

18 you'll see another document.

19 Can these three pages be admitted?

20 1D3192, could we call that up, please?

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. General, is it correct that you were making whatever they

23 expected come true? In other words --

24 A. Who is "they," and what were they expecting?

25 Q. The Muslim Army, they needed this. They needed you to bomb

Page 11538

1 certain targets for their purposes and to make it possible to change the

2 situation on the ground.

3 General, this is a letter sent to you by the commander of the

4 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic. If you ask a question, you have

6 to wait until you hear the answer from the witness.

7 Do you like to comment on the last statement?

8 THE WITNESS: Needed you to bomb? They may have wanted me to

9 bomb certain targets.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

11 Continue, Mr. Karadzic.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Could you please have a look -- could you cast a glance at this

14 and look at these targets that were ordered or commissioned by

15 General Delic. Look at them and see how many you actually did hit. This

16 is information provided to you as to which targets should be hit around

17 Sarajevo.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

20 Mr. Tieger.

21 MR. TIEGER: And can we see the portion of the document or any

22 previous evidence that supports the assertion that these were targets

23 ordered or commissioned by General Delic?

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. The first sentence:

Page 11539

1 "Please forward the following data to the NATO South Wing Command

2 so that their aircraft could take action against the mentioned targets in

3 the exclusion zone around Sarajevo."

4 And further up, it says "The Republic of Herzegovina," the

5 "General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina," "the 4th of September,

6 1995," "For UNPROFOR BH Command, attention General Smith."

7 So General Delic is sending you a list of desirable targets so

8 that you could forward those to NATO so that NATO could hit those

9 targets.

10 Have you kept this letter somewhere in your own archives?

11 A. No, I don't remember it. Is there any evidence that it was

12 received? I mean, it may have been. I don't recall it at all.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we review the remaining pages?

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. The remaining pages -- if we had enough time, General, we would

16 have collated this list with the list of sites that were actually

17 targeted. You will see that what he had asked for was honoured, to a

18 large degree.

19 And then the last question before the break -- or, actually,

20 could this be admitted?

21 General, is it correct that you made an effort to that effect and

22 that, basically, there was no difference between the United Nations and

23 the NATO force?

24 Could this be admitted?

25 A. No, I don't -- there's a NATO force and a United Nations force,

Page 11540

1 and they were separate.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, as to the admission of this document?

3 MR. TIEGER: Well, I have a couple of concerns.

4 First of all, I don't see that the witness was able to tell us

5 anything about it. Secondly, there were assertions apparently premised

6 in the document that the witness didn't have an opportunity to answer,

7 because they were overtaken, as is kind of a common practice, by multiple

8 questions, the last one of which was answered. So what we have on the

9 record thus far is assertions about this document by the accused, and

10 little more.

11 JUDGE KWON: This document was addressed to General Smith, and

12 you don't remember having received this kind of document?

13 THE WITNESS: I don't remember. I'm not saying it wasn't. It

14 may have been received and nobody did anything with it. I note it isn't

15 signed. The -- it's also on --

16 JUDGE KWON: This is an English translation.

17 THE WITNESS: Oh, I see.

18 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to see the original?

19 THE WITNESS: No, no, if the original's got --

20 JUDGE KWON: But it's not signed in the original, either.

21 THE WITNESS: Well, then my point is -- stands.

22 The -- what I'm -- the point I was about to make was that the --

23 this is on the 4th. We've actually -- I'd have to check to be absolutely

24 sure of the chronology, but I think we're at -- we've -- we have been

25 carrying out the -- what came to be called the air/land plan for some

Page 11541

1 three days, if not four days by now, and most of the artillery targets

2 that we attacked, as opposed to reacted to, have been struck by this

3 stage.

4 That's my only comment on it at this stage. Without a map and so

5 forth and a chronology of what was fired at, I couldn't make a further

6 comparison with any accuracy.

7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.

8 In light of the fact that this document was addressed to the

9 General, and the General put some context in this document, on that basis

10 we'll admit this. We'll give the number.

11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1012, Your Honours.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I --

13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

14 It's time to take a break, Mr. Karadzic, but if --

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to ask whether I could put

16 just one more question so that we would round off this topic.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but I wanted to revisit the one issue which

18 relates to the intercept which we admitted as D1011 being marked for

19 identification. But at the time, it didn't occur to me it was an

20 intercept. It's a conversation between General Mladic and General Smith.

21 So if General Smith could confirm that such conversation took

22 place, we have a basis to admit it.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, such a conversation took place.

24 JUDGE KWON: So that will be admitted in full.

25 Yes, one last question before the recess -- before the break,

Page 11542

1 Mr. Karadzic.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Actually, my question had to

3 do about the unity achieved; namely, that the UN army and the NATO army

4 became one.

5 Can we now have the book again, that is, 1D3196, page 23 in

6 e-court and it is page 372 in the book, itself, and then we would add

7 these pages to what has already been admitted.

8 Please have a look at this, 372, towards the bottom of the page:

9 [In English] "November 2004, the EU took over with the force of

10 7.000. In truth, it was essentially the same force. When the UN forces

11 became NATO's, most of the troops already on the ground remained,

12 swapping their blue berets for national ones and the UN flag for NATO's.

13 When the EU took over from the NATO, the same troops largely remained

14 once again, swapping their NATO flag to the EU one. We only have one set

15 of forces, which are always double or triple earmarked for all the

16 different organisations and purposes in which they are used."

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Is this part of your book evidence of the fact that you were

19 aware of that? And we saw that you said earlier on that you made every

20 effort for the Rapid Reaction Force to resemble NATO as much as possible.

21 A. It is part of my book, and what I'm saying there is what I've

22 just said to you before.

23 We have one group of soldiers. They are differentiated by the

24 organisation they're answering to or -- and are directing their

25 activities and the mission or purpose for which they are being employed,

Page 11543

1 and so you can find the same forces moving between NATO and the UN or, as

2 I describe in the book, the European Union, drawn from the member nations

3 concerned.

4 Q. That has a different name in our language in the wars that were

5 fought in our part of the world. Those wearing three caps, two are in

6 your pocket, and the third one's on your head, depending on who's in

7 power.

8 JUDGE KWON: Another statement.

9 Given that we have already added page 368 to the exhibit, we'll

10 add pages from 369 until the end, i.e., page 373. Although you didn't

11 refer to page 371, it would be better to admit all the pages -- relevant

12 pages.

13 Yes, Mr. Tieger.

14 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour.

15 Before we break, I just wanted to seek some clarification as we

16 pursue the witness scheduling issues the Court mentioned.

17 The Court indicated, in its oral remarks, that it was minded to

18 continue hearing witnesses until the first week of March, which raises a

19 slight ambiguity I wanted to resolve, whether that meant -- since

20 March 1st falls on Tuesday, whether that meant the end of the --

21 JUDGE KWON: Until the 3rd of February.

22 MR. TIEGER: Okay.

23 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, the 3rd of March, being a Thursday.

24 MR. TIEGER: Okay. Thank you, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE KWON: We'll resume at 1.30.

Page 11544

1 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.38 p.m.

2 --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 Could we now see 65 ter 9903. I'm not sure if we have the

6 English version. Perhaps we can put up only the English on the screen.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. While we're waiting: General, do you recall that telephone

9 conversation in which General Mladic informed you that he had prohibited

10 all fire on the city? That was the conversation regarding Markale on the

11 28th.

12 A. I recall conversations on that day. The specific one when he

13 said he'd prohibited fire, I don't know which one that was.

14 Q. Would you please look at this. Here, the deputy commander of the

15 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, Colonel Cedomir Sladoje, is issuing an order and

16 saying, point 1:

17 "I caution again, all the unit commanders, pursuant to my order

18 on restricting fire at the city of Sarajevo without approval from the

19 corps command post.

20 "... by 1400 hours, inform the corps command whether you opened

21 fire between 1000 and 1200 hours at Sarajevo ..."

22 "... if you have inform us -- if you have, notify the target,

23 calibre, weapon," et cetera.

24 Do you know that even before that date when you spoke to

25 Karadzic [as interpreted], all fire upon the city was prohibited?

Page 11545

1 A. I didn't know that, and I don't think it was, in that I recall

2 that fire was -- rounds were -- did come into the city.

3 Q. But that was the case only when we were being shot at. Returning

4 fire is legitimate. I'm talking about fire without the approval of the

5 corps command. This says it's prohibited to fire without the approval of

6 the corps command.

7 A. I didn't know and I wasn't privy to the correspondence or orders

8 of that corps commander.

9 Q. All right. Do you recall that in that conversation, Mladic

10 promised you to investigate the incident?

11 A. Yes, he said he'd investigate.

12 Q. Do you see this document, where information is being sought, as

13 part of the investigation, that Mladic had promised?

14 A. Whether that's because of the Mladic promises, I don't know, but

15 I can see the corps commander wishing to gather this information.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 Can this be admitted?

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.

19 MR. TIEGER: It's not clear to me it falls precisely under the

20 guide-lines. But I think sufficient context has been provided, so I

21 don't object.

22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

23 It will be admitted as ...?

24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1013, Your Honours.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3177 in e-court,

Page 11546

1 preferably in English.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Would you now kindly look at a short summary of this crisis,

4 penned by a very renowned doyen of journalism, David Binder. It says:

5 "Amid the roar and blinding flashes of NATO's air-strikes against

6 the Bosnian Serbs, the impetus for the bombing was obscured. The

7 August 28 explosion is in a narrow, enclosed market in the centre of

8 Sarajevo that killed 37 people. Within a day of that explosion,

9 investigators for the UN Protection Force, under Lieutenant-General

10 Rupert Smith, concluded beyond all reasonable doubt that the lethal

11 mortar round had been fired from a Bosnian Serb position in the suburb of

12 Lukavica, one and a half to three and a half kilometres south-west of the

13 market-place. On August 30, NATO's bombs began to fall.

14 "The crucial UN report on the market massacre is classified

15 secret, but four specialists - a Russian, a Canadian and two

16 Americans - have raised serious doubts about its conclusion, suggesting

17 instead that the mortar was fired not by the Serbs, but by the Bosnian

18 government forces."

19 [Interpretation] Were you aware that in addition to that

20 Russian deputy commander of the Sarajevo Sector, there were also one

21 Canadian and two Americans who doubted the investigation?

22 A. No, I was not aware.

23 Q. And were you aware that this UN report was classified secret?

24 A. I'd have to go and look at it, but no.

25 Q. Could you now look at the next paragraph:

Page 11547

1 "Similar suspicions were raised following the February 5, 1994,

2 mortar shell explosion that killed 68 Sarajevans in the adjacent Markale

3 market-place. The origin of that shell was never determined officially.

4 The UN's after-action report in 1994 (also classified secret) was based

5 on separate examinations of the impact site by 11 artillery specialists

6 over a period of 9 days and ran 46 pages. General Smith's report was

7 based on three hours of on-the-spot investigation and covered only

8 one page."

9 And a bit further below, Colonel Demurenko is mentioned:

10 "On August 29, Demurenko announced that the probability of

11 hitting a street less than 30 feet wide from one or two miles away, the

12 distance to the nearest Serb artillery positions, was one to

13 one million."

14 Are you aware of and did anyone agree with this conclusion that

15 the probability of this round being fired from Serbian positions was one

16 to a million?

17 A. I'm not clear precisely what's being measured here, but the

18 civilian areas of Sarajevo was a substantial target.

19 Q. Well, this is a general statement, and like all general

20 statements, they are rejected by the Defence.

21 Let's talk about a specific incident: Markale, 28th August.

22 Did you agree, did the United Nations agree, or anyone else --

23 did anyone else agree with the claim made by Colonel Demurenko that the

24 possibility of hitting a nine-metre-wide street - I think 30 feet is

25 about nine metres, right? - is one to a million?

Page 11548

1 JUDGE KWON: The General answered that he didn't know what

2 measures were taken at the time.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. My question is: Were the United Nations aware of this estimate

5 that the probability of making this shot was one to a million? That's

6 all.

7 A. I do not recall, and it was me who had to be aware of it, that

8 this was brought to my attention. And, as I've said, I don't understand

9 why it should have been, since the civilian areas of Sarajevo were a much

10 greater area than nine-metre wide.

11 Q. Well, General, you concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the

12 Serbs fired that round, and that also implies an intention to hit that

13 place crawling with civilians. That estimate, one to a million, probably

14 refers to that.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But let's see another document,

16 1D3119. We can remove this one for a while.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1D3191.

18 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, I just have to question the logic

19 behind your last question.

20 The fact that a mortar round lands in a particular place, and is

21 fired from a particular direction, may give rise to an assessment of

22 where it came from, but it doesn't necessarily imply an intention to hit

23 that exact spot. We've already heard testimony, in respect of mortar

24 fire, that the -- as it were, the circle of error with a mortar round,

25 even firing two mortar bombs from the same tube one after the other, can

Page 11549

1 be considerable. So for my part, I find that question a non sequitur.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

3 But the point is that I'm charged with intentional fire at a

4 group of civilians on the market-place. That's one. And, second, these

5 experts say that the possibility of hitting that specific street

6 deliberately is one to a million.

7 Let us now look at this telegram sent by General Janvier. It's

8 an authorisation for NATO action:

9 [In English] "... hope that when taken with our Z-1535 and Z-1537

10 on the 29th of August, and our Z-1560, dated 1 September 1995, you will

11 have enough information to answer any further technical questions on the

12 matter."

13 [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, then.

14 Under 1, it says:

15 [In English] "The American journalist who rang "Tanjug" quotes

16 Colonel Andrei Demurenko, Chief of Staff Sector Sarajevo Headquarter, as

17 having reportedly told TASS that hitting a nine-metre-wide street from a

18 distance of three to four kilometres would be a million to one chance.

19 There is no disagreement about the difficulty of deliberately hitting

20 such a target. It is, however, most likely that the shot was just

21 fired -- be fired from the general area. That it landed in the market

22 square was a great misfortune that bear [sic] the odds."

23 [Interpretation] And then below, in the second paragraph, towards

24 the middle:

25 [In English] "The point that any fire from far out would be blind

Page 11550

1 fire is agreed; as explained in the above paragraph, it is not believed

2 that the shot was aimed specifically at the market-place."

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. General, this is a telegram from General Janvier that confirms

5 that it is unlikely that this was deliberate fire on this place, but I

6 put it to you that it could not have been fired from the Serbian side at

7 all, and I'm going to try to prove that.

8 Were you aware of this opinion of General Janvier's?

9 A. I don't recall ever having seen this document before.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Can I tender this document?

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.

13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1014, Your Honours.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we go back to 1D3177, please.

15 It's David Binder's report. Page 2.

16 It says:

17 "The Canadian specialist, an officer with extensive service in

18 Bosnia, said, in a telephone interview, that the UN report, which he'd

19 seen, was highly suspect. He cited anomalies with the fuse of the mortar

20 shell recovered from the market-place crater. Unlike the fuses of

21 four other shells that hit Sarajevo that morning, this one, he said, had

22 not come from a mortar tube at all. He added that he and fellow

23 Canadian officers in Bosnia were convinced that the Muslim government

24 dropped both the 5th February and the 28th August mortar shells on the

25 Sarajevo markets.

Page 11551

1 "A US administration official who may not be identified further

2 says, 'It is impossible to see the street level of the market-place from

3 the distance and location of the Serb gun positions.'"

4 Is this correct? Do you know that this street was not in the

5 field of vision of any Serb position?

6 A. I don't know for certain.

7 Q. Apart from that, says this American official:

8 "A projectile fired from such a distance would have a high

9 trajectory. But since the characteristic whizzing sound could not be

10 heard, the shell could not have fallen from a great height."

11 He also says:

12 "The trajectory of the shell was rather low, which indicates a

13 range of several hundred yards."

14 That is to say, Bosnian government positions, or:

15 "... perhaps this modified mortar shell was dropped from

16 somewhere in town or thrown into the market-place from someplace in the

17 vicinity."

18 Have you ever heard any of these opinions?

19 A. I'm not sure which ones you're -- of the list you've -- do you

20 want me to comment on all of them?

21 Q. I'll finish to see the summing up by Mr. Binder:

22 "The UN command in Sarajevo has offered a point-by-point rebuttal

23 to these arguments. Curiously, it agrees with the dissenters on three

24 basic points --"

25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it is not the time to read out this

Page 11552

1 clipping. What is your question to the General?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the question is contained

3 here.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Did you agree that the shell had a low trajectory? Did you agree

6 that if it had been a Serbian shot, the probability was one to a million,

7 and, thirdly, that whoever was shooting was shooting blind? All these

8 things indicate that it is unlikely to have come from Serb positions. Do

9 you agree with this statement made by the UN, based on this telegram by

10 General Janvier, who confirmed this a moment ago?

11 A. No, I don't. My quick read of the beginning of that document

12 that you refer me to gives me no indication that the UN have said any of

13 those things in the way you have put them in that question.

14 Q. Well, that's contained in the telegram by General Janvier. Do

15 you want me to put it back on the screen?

16 Can I have that document back, please, 1D -- no, it's D1014.

17 D1014.

18 I'll read it to you while we're waiting.

19 In the first paragraph, it says --

20 A. It's on the screen. It can be -- I've read the front. We can go

21 to the next page. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: I don't have it on my monitor.

23 JUDGE KWON: I don't either. Yes, now it --

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. In the first paragraph, it says the odds are a million to one.

Page 11553

1 Then in the middle of the second paragraph:

2 [In English] "The point that any fire from far out would be blind

3 fire is agreed."

4 [Interpretation] "The point that any fire from far out would be

5 blind fire is agreed."

6 So it's agreed that it would be blind fire. And then --

7 A. Where is the word "blind fire"?

8 JUDGE KWON: In the middle of the second paragraph.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It begins with the words: "The

10 point ..."

11 THE WITNESS: I was still on the first paragraph numbered 1.

12 Okay, he writes there "blind fire." It did not aim specifically

13 at the market-place.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. And then it goes on to say:

16 "It should also be pointed out that the Yugoslav mortars fire at

17 a higher trajectory at a shorter range."

18 This is a matter for ballistics experts, but you do see, don't

19 you, that the United Nations took this into account, your subordinate

20 commander agreed, and the United Nations agreed on certain points?

21 A. I can see that he is saying that there, and this is all

22 second-guessing the decision that had already been reached.

23 Q. This was from the 31st of August. This is only proving that the

24 decision was made too hastily. Your own commander seems to be saying

25 that.

Page 11554

1 A. I don't see where he says I made a hasty decision.

2 Q. Well, you are saying that by saying the decision had already been

3 reached, for better or worse. You made your decisions several days

4 before, and on the 31st your subordinate commander is making certain

5 points and reservations and expressing doubt about the conclusions. It's

6 not the telegram that is wrong, it's the decision that was wrong.

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.

8 MR. TIEGER: Well, it just seems to me, to be fair to the

9 witness, since we're running back and forth between two documents, I

10 don't see "reservations" in the document attributed to Janvier, and the

11 effort that's being made here is to try to link the factors or the

12 reservations expressed in the Binder article to some parallel facts

13 discussed in the Janvier report. But if Dr. Karadzic wants to confront

14 the witness about alleged reservations expressed by Janvier in that -- in

15 the document he wrote, then he should point those out, rather than build

16 them as an assumption to the question when the witness is being bounced

17 back and forth between two documents.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

19 Since I believe the General would be capable of dealing with this

20 question, I'll ask him to proceed to answer.

21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

22 I'm not quite clear if I've got a question outstanding or not at

23 this stage. No, I don't think I have.

24 JUDGE KWON: His question seems to be the one that

25 General Janvier was expressing his reservation and alluding to the effect

Page 11555

1 that your decision was wrong. So what is your comment to that?

2 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't see where he is saying he is

3 disagreeing with me.

4 The point I was trying to make earlier, I think, has just been

5 made by the -- Mr. Tieger.

6 You've -- this is all after my decision, and it's my commander,

7 as it were, producing arguments contrary to those such as you raised from

8 the article by this man, Binder, which is published a whole month later.

9 They are not actually -- Binder's article is -- is something that's much

10 later than the questions that General Janvier is attempting to provide

11 answers for in -- or comments that he's effectively trying to answer in

12 this paper.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the distinguished Mr. Tieger

14 doubts the fact that this is Janvier's, then we can have the first page

15 displayed again.

16 1D3177, perhaps we could go back to that document now. Page 2.

17 The second page, please.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Another US administration official, who may not be identified,

20 says --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note : We have not found that

22 particular section.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. And then it says that the command accepts these three matters

25 contained in the telegram of General Janvier's. And then Binder says:

Page 11556

1 "Why would the Bosnian government be killing its own people? It

2 is a fact that a week before the massacre in the market-place, the

3 government forces launched a fierce attack against Vogosca --"

4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The page has just been

5 displayed now.

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, with that speed, the interpreters

7 cannot catch up with you. So indicate the page and read slow.

8 And we can all read this document. What is your question,

9 Mr. Karadzic?

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Were you aware that this offensive had started around

12 mid-August -- or, rather, after the 20th of August? A week before this

13 incident, there was this strong Muslim offensive?

14 A. I can remember that there were some actions around Gorazde in the

15 August time. And if I recall it correctly -- yes, if I recall it

16 correctly, the judgement was that they -- this was fighting along the

17 front-line and that the essential element -- the civil element of the

18 safe area was not threatened.

19 Q. You mean the Serb civilians that were targeted by the Muslims?

20 A. No, I'm talking about the action around Gorazde.

21 Q. All right. And now the second paragraph from the bottom, for the

22 interpreters and the other participants:

23 [In English] "Then the ambassador -- the assistant secretary,

24 Richard Holbrooke, went --"

25 [Interpretation] "... went to the Balkans to push

Page 11557

1 President Clinton's peace plan. Only a pretext was needed. It is clear

2 that the air-strikes had already been planned before Holbrooke went to

3 the Balkans to push the peace plan."

4 So:

5 "Only a pretext was needed."

6 Targets were bombed only 39 hours after the explosion.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: This is not on the screen.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps we should have the next

9 page.

10 And now the last paragraph:

11 "Once the bombing was underway, General Rasim Delic, commander of

12 Bosnian forces in Sarajevo, began picking targets - phoning

13 Admiral W.A. Owens, vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, daily

14 with his wish list of sites. The Pentagon then passed these on to NATO

15 in Naples. As one US officer put it, 'We have become the Muslim

16 Air Force.'"

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. There you are, General. This is how this renowned US journalist

19 sees this entire action, and I'm sure that he has excellent sources.

20 Were you aware of this?

21 A. I have not heard of this Mr. Binder before, so -- and if I have,

22 I've never kept his name in my memory. And I'm not aware that he'd

23 written this article on the 2nd of October, some month after the events.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a very well-known

25 journalist, very highly regarded, but all right, General.

Page 11558

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you can go to the witness stand and

2 give evidence. Refrain from making statements.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 I believe that we are going to be able to deal with everything

5 through other witnesses, so there will be no need for me to testify.

6 Can this document be admitted?

7 JUDGE KWON: I don't see any basis, Mr. Karadzic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is an analysis of a

9 respectable journalist regarding the crisis that this witness spoke

10 about. It's a question of context, and it provides a thorough review of

11 what was going on, actually. And worldwide, there was this suspicion

12 with regard to the interpretation that had been provided for this

13 incident.

14 JUDGE KWON: By now, you should be familiar with the Chamber's

15 practice. We do not admit a third party's news clipping. You can call

16 Mr. Binder or Mr. Demurenko or the Canadian officer or US officer.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we'll probably do that.

18 Can we have 1D408, then.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. You say, General, that you did not target civilian targets during

21 that campaign; is that correct?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. This is what we have now, a report of the War Presidency of the

24 Municipality of Stari Grad up to the 31st of August.

25 Could we scroll down a bit, and let's look at the penultimate

Page 11559

1 paragraph.

2 I am being informed here, as the president of the republic, about

3 what was going on:

4 "On the 30th of August, 1995, NATO forces bombed our positions,

5 settlements and roads and caused significant material damage, and three

6 civilians were injured on that occasion."

7 General, sir, settlements, as in neighbourhoods, and roads, are

8 they civilian targets?

9 A. Very probably. There were civilian buildings and so forth there.

10 I don't know -- you'd need to give me the grid references and so forth,

11 and I'd need a list of where we attacked to tell you whether or not we

12 thought there was a military target there. I am confident that in each

13 case that we attacked the targets, particularly on that opening stage of

14 the campaign, that we had made great care that, A, that there was a

15 military target there, and that there was the very least possibility of

16 damage to civilians.

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, before continuing with this line of

18 questions, could you help us -- help me as regards how this is relevant

19 to your case?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, this witness and

21 many other witnesses, in their very general statements, say that it was

22 Serbs who were firing at Sarajevo, disregarding the fact that Sarajevo

23 was full of legitimate military objectives, brimming with such targets,

24 and we are going to prove that.

25 If we show the next page -- or, rather, the last page, we are

Page 11560

1 going to show that the Rapid Deployment Force was firing and that

2 civilians were getting killed.

3 The core of the matter is --

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic. Yes. Are you in the course of

5 answering my question?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes. I am trying to say

7 that it is legitimate to question the credibility of this witness to show

8 that he was an interested party, a warring party.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE KWON: If it is to be found relevant, it is only marginally

11 relevant. I'll allow you to continue on this question, but conclude this

12 part very briefly, Mr. Karadzic.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

14 I'm going to abandon this topic, but let us just have a look at

15 this last page to see that civilians were getting killed as well and that

16 Hresa and Biosko were two neighbourhoods that were bombed, and that

17 apartment buildings were damaged, and that two children were wounded,

18 livestock were killed, and so on.

19 First of all, let us see what all of this looks like. And,

20 secondly, from the next topic, you will see what General Mladic's

21 thinking is with regard to this crisis.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. So you see that civilian neighbourhoods were being bombed,

24 General, Gradiste, Bulozi, Hresa and Biosko were bombed as well.

25 Nikola Kosmajac, you see his name and surname, a civilian, he was killed

Page 11561

1 in that attack, and four other civilians, two of whom were children, were

2 wounded, and a great deal of damage was inflicted. Is that what is

3 written here?

4 A. That is written there, yes.

5 Q. So this is a report sent to the president of the republic. It's

6 not a media thing of any sort. It is a report sent by the authorities.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

9 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour --

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, yes.

11 MR. TIEGER: Yeah. I don't think, in this case, the witness has

12 provided any illumination on this. And also, at the moment, I want to

13 see the original, which I haven't had a chance to see in full yet. So at

14 the moment, I object.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the Serbian version?

16 The Serbian version is in e-court. Here it is.

17 The first page -- sorry, it has a number and a date.

18 Can we have page 2 now.

19 Here it is, a seal and a signature.

20 And can we see the third page. That is an appendix, because the

21 bombing took place after the report was written. This is the addendum,

22 where it says exactly what happened. This is an absolutely authentic

23 document.

24 JUDGE KWON: Would that change your mind?

25 MR. TIEGER: Well, we have a signed document in Cyrillic. Then

Page 11562

1 we have an undated, unsigned supplemental -- so-called supplemental

2 report in different type-set and in Latin. And so it does not change my

3 objection; it underscores it.

4 JUDGE KWON: The witness did not say anything about this

5 document, so we will not admit this. You will have another opportunity

6 to tender that through another witness.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 The witness doesn't have to say anything. It was his soldiers

9 who did this, under his command.

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I withdraw the objection.

12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.

13 MR. TIEGER: Well, it's not something -- I don't want to be on my

14 feet during -- any more than necessary during the course of these

15 proceedings. And very often, of course, the commentary is injected well

16 before I can rise, but it is a recurring pattern. It is not a reflection

17 of Mr. Karadzic's experience or lack of experience in the courtroom. He

18 knows very well the prohibition and the nature of the commentary, and

19 willfully persists on doing so. And I want to note that it happens far

20 more frequently than anyone is really in a position to explicitly note in

21 the record or object to. Otherwise, we'd be on -- I'd be on my feet all

22 the time and the Court would be making admonitions much more often than

23 it already is.

24 JUDGE MORRISON: And, Dr. Karadzic, what you've got to remember

25 is that interjections by you are not only ill placed, they have

Page 11563

1 absolutely no evidential value whatsoever unless they are in the form of

2 a question. And as I've said to you before, a question isn't evidence.

3 It's the answer to the question that's evidence. If a witness adopts

4 what you say or agrees with what you say, all well and good, but

5 otherwise it's simply the independent evidence of the witness that

6 counts.

7 So you complain about not having enough time on some occasions.

8 If you waste it by interjections and comments, then you only have

9 yourself to blame.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 But with all due respect, I had a good look at this, and I saw

12 how one of the Prosecutors was examining during the Milosevic case, and I

13 learned that from him. If necessary, I'll give you the name.

14 Could I have 1D3160.

15 Actually, it's Mr. Nice, who was very creative in that regard,

16 and I thought that I could treat witnesses that way, witnesses of the

17 other side.

18 JUDGE KWON: Unacceptable, Mr. Karadzic.

19 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, yes. First of all, that's an

20 unacceptable comparison, and, in any event, it's a useless comparison.

21 What a Prosecutor may or may not have done in another case has no bearing

22 upon your case.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3160, could we have that, please.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Do you remember -- actually, no, this is not you. This is an

Page 11564

1 unidentified speaker, an unidentified speaker. The identified speaker is

2 General Mladic.

3 And now we could move on to the second page to see what it was

4 that General Mladic was saying at the time about the very same things.

5 A. Can we go back? I think you've got two unidentified speakers

6 there. I saw a "C" and a "D." Which one am I paying attention to? Oh,

7 I see, it's a second call, is it?

8 Q. Yes, yes, it's a different person.

9 A. I see. So it's "D" you want me to pay attention to?

10 Q. Yes, yes. "C" is some intermediary, someone who made sure that

11 the connection was there.

12 Here, Mladic says:

13 "Well, from 200 hours last night until now, they have been

14 attacking. They have attacked a number of positions in Republika Srpska,

15 both military and civilian."

16 And further on, it says:

17 "They also attacked civilian targets, especially in the sector of

18 Sarajevo, Hadzici, Vogosca, and so on. There are several hundred people

19 wounded and killed."

20 And also he says further on:

21 "They attacked everything around, and it's not important now if

22 they attack this and that. I don't want to go into details. They

23 attacked everything. Material damage is enormous, and there are many

24 casualties, both soldiers and civilians."

25 Further on, he says:

Page 11565

1 "Yes, yes, particularly in Blazuj, because there they started

2 attacking with artillery the day before yesterday, and they hit a church

3 in which 47 people were wounded and one person was killed."

4 And then he says:

5 "On Assumption Day."

6 That is a big holiday, a big Serbian -- or, rather, a big

7 Christian holiday.

8 And then Mladic says:

9 "Yes, yes, even some schools were hit."

10 And all sorts of things happened on that day.

11 Could we see the next page. You see:

12 "Mladic: We did not fire a shell, and there is not a single

13 shell that could kill hundreds of people, even if they were all in a

14 barrel."

15 Perhaps it's the previous page in English, actually. Oh, yes,

16 it's toward the bottom of the page:

17 "Firstly, we did not fire the shell, and, secondly, no mortar

18 shell can hurt over 100 people, even if they had all been in some

19 big barrel. It is absolutely clear that this is their media trick, just

20 like Markale I."

21 You see, in a private conversation, in the absence of the public,

22 General Mladic is fully convinced of what he is saying; that so many

23 people could not have been killed by a single shell and that this was

24 designed in the same way that Markale I was.

25 A. I don't know the date of this document, which would be

Page 11566

1 interesting to know.

2 Q. Around the 4th or 5th of September. We're going to see that from

3 another document. At any rate, during the bombing, from the beginning of

4 the bombing onwards, because he says they are still bombing.

5 A. Well, it doesn't tell me that Mladic is convinced of it at all.

6 If it tells me anything, he's trying to convince Unidentified Speaker D.

7 Q. General, sir, this is a private telephone conversation. It is

8 not intended for the public. He is speaking to a friend of his,

9 obviously, and he is assuring the friend that that was not the case.

10 Now, we are talking now about Mladic's state of mind, about

11 Mladic's genuine belief and position. This is an intercept, just as we

12 admitted another intercept along the same lines.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, how do we know this is a private

14 telephone conversation between friends?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it has the same status like

16 the intercept with Krajisnik, Excellency. This man is talking as well,

17 but, at any rate, it's not an official conversation.

18 JUDGE KWON: You ask a question instead of --

19 MR. TIEGER: And --

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

21 MR. TIEGER: If I may, Your Honour, I was also going to note, in

22 addition to the general area that you alluded to, that Mr. Karadzic did

23 ask a question, General Smith answered the question, and now Mr. Karadzic

24 is engaged in arguing with him about that answer. His question has been

25 asked and answered.

Page 11567

1 JUDGE KWON: True, I agree with you.

2 Proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Just the last part:

5 "Well, they did it at Markale again, because Markale is well

6 known, and we really have nothing to do with it."

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. General, sir, I'm not asking you to say whether you had heard

9 this conversation before. I'm asking you whether this is consistent with

10 what Mladic was saying to you; namely, that the Serb side was not

11 responsible for what happened then.

12 A. He had said that to me.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Can this be admitted?

15 JUDGE KWON: Again, we see no basis to admit this intercept

16 through General Smith.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, a moment ago we admitted a

18 very similar document, an intercept with Krajisnik. I am talking about

19 admissibility. Krajisnik is talking to an unidentified speaker again.

20 The witness confirmed that this is consistent, that Mladic had said the

21 same thing to him. We are showing that Mladic was saying this to people

22 off the record. This confirms Mladic's conviction that that is what the

23 situation was.

24 JUDGE KWON: What is the exhibit number of the Krajisnik

25 intercept?

Page 11568

1 MR. ROBINSON: It's P2272 and also P2271.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

3 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. I know you want to deliberate, but if I

4 could make a couple of quick points before you do.

5 To refresh your recollection about the Krajisnik intercept, it --

6 making the comparison between the two and pointing to the fact that they

7 both may have involved an interlocutor who was not an official is an

8 irrelevancy. In the Krajisnik intercept, we see Mr. Krajisnik, a close

9 confidant of the accused, a leading member of the Bosnian Serb

10 leadership, talking about the Bosnian Serb leadership position on

11 hostages and the uses to which the threats against those people would be

12 made, so it's a direct expression of that.

13 This intercept, Dr. Karadzic tried to get some acquiescence from

14 the witness that this is a reflection of General Mladic's true

15 conviction. The witness said, I don't see that at all, it looks like

16 he's trying to convince someone else. And, in fact, in a portion of the

17 intercept that Mr. Karadzic failed to put to the witness, and that's at

18 page 15, you see the -- you see General Mladic saying:

19 "Do the best you can to inform the world through our influential

20 people."

21 In other words, again, just as the witness surmised, trying to

22 persuade the interlocutor to do something on the basis of alleged

23 information that Mladic was providing him.

24 Those are two quite different circumstances.

25 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to add, Mr. Karadzic?

Page 11569

1 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.

3 MR. ROBINSON: If I can just add that, if you look at the

4 transcript, I believe General Smith said this is consistent with what

5 General Mladic had said to him. You admitted a lot of evidence along

6 those lines during this trial, if it's consistent with the position, so

7 I think this is an easy call for you and it falls squarely within your

8 guide-lines.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 JUDGE KWON: We tend to agree with Mr. Robinson's observation.

12 The witness confirmed that part of Mladic's word were consistent with

13 what he heard, so on that basis we'll admit this. But we mark it for

14 identification, following our usual practice.

15 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1015, Your Honours.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3159 is the next document I would

17 like to ask for.

18 This is a conversation between General Mladic and

19 General Perisic. It is very important that you see, General, what kind

20 of relationship they have and the exchange they have about this incident.

21 Perisic is finished. Now a professor has come. That's towards

22 the bottom. We have to show the bottom of the page.

23 Mladic says:

24 "So all this media scene at Markale," and that's the pretext they

25 found --

Page 11570

1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter hasn't found this in the text.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

3 Mladic says:

4 "They are bombing and imposing a solution by force."

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Do you agree, General, that it is this bombing campaign that

7 imposed a solution? It is the bombing campaign that led to the peace

8 conference, that was its purpose, and that's how it was planned, as we

9 will show tomorrow?

10 A. I don't agree with you. The bombing did not impose a solution.

11 The peace process with -- led by the late Richard Holbrooke, was underway

12 before the end of August. And as you've read my book, you will know

13 there is a period, at the very early stages of the bombing, when

14 Richard Holbrooke is denying its connection with what he is doing.

15 Q. Thank you. How many times did you speak to Mr. Holbrooke on

16 28th and 29th August?

17 A. I think I only spoke to him once, but it may have been twice.

18 Q. The 28th or the 29th?

19 A. I don't remember. I think probably the 28th.

20 Q. Thank you. We'll come back to that tomorrow.

21 Let's see what Mladic says here:

22 "Well, connect this. They have no reason to bomb us. They are

23 bombing targets that are 200 kilometres away from Markale, Professor."

24 And then he goes on to say there are no heavy weapons involved:

25 "We are not in a conflict with them. Let them withdraw their

Page 11571

1 heavy weapons."

2 We can now go back to page 1, where Perisic is unable to help

3 him. He says:

4 "I can only wish you good luck with it."

5 And there's nothing else he can do. And then with the professor,

6 Mladic repeats what he said before; that it was a completely staged

7 incident in Markale I as in Markale II.

8 Is that consistent with what the Serbian collocutors, including

9 Mladic, told you?

10 A. I'm sorry, I can't see what you've just pointed to me on the

11 screen.

12 Q. Well, let's finish with page 1. Mladic says they are bombing

13 centres, and Mladic -- in English, it's the next page. Oh, no, on this

14 page, for instance, Perisic says -- all right, that's gone.

15 Mladic says:

16 "Well, brother, help ..."

17 And so on. And Perisic -- no, that's not here.

18 Can we see the next page.

19 So it's all based on this media orchestration at Markale, and

20 this is their direct pretext and justification to bomb and impose a

21 solution by force. And he's telling this professor they are bombing

22 targets 200 kilometres away from Markale. Is this consistent with what

23 the Serbian side told you all the time about this crisis?

24 A. I thought we were looking at the Perisic-Mladic conversation, but

25 we're now -- we've got another "Unknown" on the line.

Page 11572

1 Q. Well, let's see what this unknown collocutor -- who this unknown

2 collocutor is. Some sort of professor.

3 Is what Mladic is telling this professor consistent with the

4 general Serb position as presented to you during that crisis? Our

5 position was that this was orchestrated by the Muslim side, to bring

6 about the bombing and impose a solution by force.

7 A. I don't think I had another conversation with General Mladic than

8 the last one of those three that we've already discussed. I think it's

9 the 29th of -- takes place on the 29th of August. I don't think I had

10 another conversation with Mladic since then, so I can't tell you if

11 that's what he thought.

12 Q. But the Serbian side did tell you they believed it was

13 orchestrated by the Muslim side; is that right?

14 A. What Mladic told me, that he suggested that this was -- that the

15 Bosnians had fired this mortar round, themselves, at their own people.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 Can this be admitted on the same basis, marked for

18 identification?

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, this is different from the previous

21 intercept. The witness was not able to confirm anything about the

22 content of this document. We'll not admit this.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree. We'll try to -- we'll try

24 to have it admitted through another witness.

25 Can we now see 1D3173. Only the English version should be on the

Page 11573

1 screen, and I will quote from it.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. General, this is a letter where the Eastern Bosnia Corps Command

4 informs they had received a copy of a letter sent by General Mladic to

5 General Janvier on the 5th of September. Sorry, the 4th of September is

6 the date of Mladic's letter, this letter, wherein the Eastern Bosnia

7 Corps Command is sharing certain information with its own officers, and

8 they quote a letter from General Mladic to General Janvier, dated

9 4th September. It says they are dealing again -- it regards, again,

10 Markale I and Markale II, and it says the public is not informed of all

11 sorts of manipulations about Markale I.

12 And on page 3, we can see the most important points made in this

13 letter, and this document will be the last in this series on this

14 subject. In English, it could be page 4.

15 Towards the bottom of the next -- of the page, it says:

16 "Contrary to the provisions of --"

17 Could we see the previous page, just the bottom of the page.

18 That's where the beginning of this sentence is.

19 It says:

20 "Contrary to --"

21 Can you see that?

22 "Contrary to the provisions of this convention --"

23 "In the Sarajevo safe area, contrary to the provisions of this

24 convention, in addition to civilian population, the United Nations also

25 protect part of the units of the 1st Muslim Corps, which is ..."

Page 11574

1 Next page, please.

2 [In English] "... organising eight brigades ..."

3 [Interpretation] And so on.

4 May I ask everyone to look at this paragraph. It indicates also

5 the fire-power of these brigades.

6 Were you aware of these brigades and their fire-power located in

7 the heart of Sarajevo, in the total exclusion zone?

8 A. I'm sorry, it went very faint in the thing. I think -- just let

9 me read.

10 Can I ask a bit more about this letter? I'm not clear. I

11 thought --

12 JUDGE KWON: Let's show the last page of this letter. It was

13 written by General Mladic. The previous page.

14 And shall we show the first page.

15 The Eastern Bosnia Corps was copied.

16 THE WITNESS: Got you, right. Now I understand.

17 And your question was: Was I aware of all -- no, I'm not aware

18 of this letter or of that list that -- in those what looked like two

19 paragraphs you had up on the screen.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Were you aware of those eight brigades, numbering about

22 20.000 soldiers, and this fire-power in the heart of the city? Did your

23 people inform you of all the assets in the possession of the Bosnian Army

24 in the total exclusion zone?

25 A. I was informed of what we thought both yourselves and the

Page 11575

1 Bosnian Army had, and I don't recognise that list at all.

2 Q. Thank you. Look at paragraph 2, the second paragraph, where

3 General Mladic explains to General Janvier what is located in the Serbian

4 part of Sarajevo, around that zone, and how many brigades are facing --

5 are confronting Serbian Sarajevo from outside the city. There are

6 eight brigades confronting them from within the city and

7 eighteen brigades -- eighteen Muslim brigades, three Croatian brigades,

8 and six independent battalions outside the city, also facing the Serbian

9 part of Sarajevo.

10 Were you aware that the Serbian part of Sarajevo was sandwiched

11 between all these forces gathered from all the areas of Bosnia; Tuzla,

12 et cetera?

13 A. They were not sandwiched.

14 Q. Then I have to show you a map, General, to see if you could

15 agree. But please look at the two paragraphs below this one while I find

16 the map.

17 You see, in the third paragraph, that General Mladic is informing

18 you about 342 heavy weapons of various calibres, 25.000 -- that is to

19 say, 35.000 Muslim soldiers with 865 heavy weapons, et cetera, in the

20 ring around Sarajevo. Did you know that the Muslim army had all this

21 fire-power and manpower?

22 A. No, as I say, I do not recognise this -- these numbers or that

23 number of weapons.

24 Q. Shouldn't you be able to recognise them, General, because you

25 were supposed to oversee the other side too?

Page 11576

1 A. If I don't think they're correct, then how can I possibly

2 recognise it?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 65 ter 13636.

4 65 ter 13636.

5 Can this letter by General Mladic to Janvier be admitted?

6 And can we see just one more page, the last page, where he

7 proposes that a joint expert commission be established. The last

8 paragraph on the last page.

9 He proposes that a joint expert commission be established

10 urgently to investigate into Markale II and the special ammunition used

11 by NATO Rapid Reaction Forces, with toxic and radioactive

12 characteristics, the consequences of which are well known to you.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Were you aware that the NATO Rapid Reaction Force used toxic and

15 radioactive ammunition?

16 A. The Rapid Reaction Force under my command was not using

17 radioactive ammunition, and I don't see how you can have a piece of

18 ammunition as toxic. You don't eat it.

19 Q. And the bombs that were dropped on Hadzici and other

20 neighbourhoods, did they contain depleted uranium?

21 A. I doubt -- I doubt it, and that you would have to ask an

22 air force -- a NATO officer -- I'm sorry, a NATO Air Force officer.

23 Q. Was there any artillery outside your control and outside your

24 command in that area? Were there any national contingents outside of

25 your control, contingents that you did not trust and were unable to

Page 11577

1 control, perhaps?

2 A. No, the artillery group of the Rapid Reaction Force was under my

3 command.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 Can this letter be admitted?

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.

7 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.

9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1016, Your Honours.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 13636, please.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. General, are you familiar with this map, and does this show the

13 20-kilometre total exclusion zone?

14 A. I'm trying to see the scale. Yes, okay. Yes, that's

15 approximately 20 kilometres, I think, yeah.

16 Q. Do you agree that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, on the one hand,

17 is confronting the 1st Corps inside the city, and, on the other hand, it

18 is bordering territory controlled by Muslims and Croats?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you know that our artillery pieces in this zone were unable to

21 fire, whereas the artillery of the Muslims and Croats in that area were

22 trained at us, and they were able to fire because they were not

23 controlled by you?

24 A. I don't understand the question at all. Your artillery was

25 firing, and firing into Sarajevo.

Page 11578

1 And you asked me about a sandwich, and I can't see how the

2 Bosnian Serb forces are in a sandwich at all. It's Sarajevo that's in

3 the sandwich.

4 Q. Could you follow the blue line, General. Do you agree that the

5 blue line is the Muslim combat line, the whole length of the front, and

6 aren't we encircled in this north-west part? We are semi-encircled, like

7 the inner part of Sarajevo is also semi-encircled?

8 A. No, you are not encircled. You've got plenty of space to your

9 east.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

11 Is this map in evidence? It is.

12 Just one more question before the break.

13 1D3229, please.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. This is from the Drina Corps Command. The date is

16 14 September 1995. It explains that the president of Republika Srpska

17 and Richard Holbrooke, the US Deputy Secretary of State and also

18 representative of the US Contact Group, in the peace talks, reached a

19 framework agreement on cessation of hostilities inside the Sarajevo zone

20 and cessation of the NATO bombardment of Republika Srpska. And, point by

21 point:

22 "Both parties to the conflict shall cease all operations within

23 and around the zone of exclusion of heavy weapons in the Sarajevo area."

24 Can we lower the page, please.

25 Point 4:

Page 11579

1 "In the total exclusion zone --"

2 And we need the next page in English:

3 "All heavy weapons of the Muslim Army whose calibre exceeds

4 82 millimetres for mortars and 100 millimetres for artillery, and all

5 tanks in the zone of exclusion around Sarajevo, shall be placed under the

6 control of UNPROFOR."

7 Do you agree that it was only then, at that time, that the

8 objective was reached, the objective of giving the same treatment to the

9 Muslim side that the Serb side enjoyed?

10 A. That implies -- I don't really understand your question again.

11 Let me -- let me read it:

12 "Do you agree that it was only then, at that time, that the

13 objective was reached ..."

14 Q. Perhaps it was not interpreted very well. My theory is that it

15 was only then, after the bombardment and after my agreement with

16 Holbrooke that everything should cease, it was only then that the

17 decision was made to control Muslim weapons, too, in that area, in that

18 zone; that the total exclusion zone should apply to them as well, but not

19 in a make -believe way, but in a real way, that Muslim weapons should

20 also be placed under control.

21 A. No, I don't agree with that. There was a weapons collection

22 point -- there was at least one inside Sarajevo, and, to the best of my

23 memory, the weapons that were in there stayed in there throughout this

24 period of -- of the bombing.

25 Q. General, have you seen the consumption, thousands of shells that

Page 11580

1 were fired at us from Sarajevo city and other thousands that were fired

2 at us from Central Bosnia? These shells which were falling on us and

3 were fired from the city of Sarajevo were from the total exclusion zone.

4 Mladic mentions 342 artillery pieces, and these artillery pieces have not

5 been placed under control, General; correct? How could they have fired?

6 Did they fire at us with your approval or did they fire --

7 JUDGE KWON: Make your questions simpler.

8 Mr. Tieger.

9 MR. TIEGER: This is a mix of commentary and a string of

10 questions, to which -- apparently designed as rhetorical questions to

11 which the accused is seeking no answer, and they serve, therefore, as

12 commentary. So as the Court noted, if he wants to put questions, he

13 needs to do so in an understandable way.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. The question is simple, General. Did the Muslims use their heavy

16 artillery pieces and fire at us from the centre of the city with your

17 approval or were they firing from weapons which were outside of your

18 control?

19 A. They did not fire with my approval.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 It's probably the time for the break.

22 Could this document be admitted?

23 JUDGE KWON: I'd like to hear from you, Mr. Tieger.

24 MR. TIEGER: I'm going to leave that in the Court's hands,

25 Your Honour. I don't -- I don't see a great deal of illumination. On

Page 11581

1 the other hand, I don't have a strong objection to it.

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.

4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1017, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at

6 3.35.

7 --- Recess taken at 3.04 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 3.34 p.m.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Could we now see 1D3185.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, we are coming back to the early days of your mandate and

14 your stay with us. This is a letter which you and your associate,

15 Enrique Aguilar, wrote to Professor Koljevic on the 4th of February.

16 You were asked on the first day, General, about convoys and these

17 humanitarian issues. Do you know who, among us, was charged with the

18 convoy issues and humanitarian issues?

19 A. I don't remember, although I seem -- I mean, I'm prompted by this

20 letter to -- that our point of contact was the -- Professor Koljevic.

21 Q. Thank you. Will it remind you if I tell you that

22 Vice-President Koljevic, who is a Shakespearean scholar and a renowned

23 university professor, was the president of our Committee for Co-operation

24 with United Nations, which was also in charge of humanitarian issues?

25 Were you aware of that?

Page 11582

1 A. Yes, you reminded me. Yup.

2 Q. Would you agree that a president cannot --

3 JUDGE KWON: Can you scroll down? Can you scroll down a bit

4 further to see Professor Koljevic's signature.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Would you agree that this is a high level, that a vice-president

7 should be the chairman to the Committee for Co-operation with

8 United Nations, that is to say, the UNPROFOR?

9 A. Yes, he's a senior person.

10 Q. Thank you. So on the 4th of February, it seems that your stay

11 was marked by good understanding and co-operation with the Serbian side,

12 both the civilian and the military structures. Does this document

13 testify to that?

14 A. It testifies that we communicated our intentions. I don't know

15 that it -- you know, what happened next. I don't know what the result of

16 this was.

17 Q. General, do you remember that this document also concerns the

18 civilian use of the airport for both sides? Ilidza-Lukavica, this is

19 where the Serbs would pass, and Butmir-Dobrinja is the route along which

20 the Muslims would pass along? Is that what this document envisages?

21 A. It certainly refers to those routes and the times people would

22 travel on them.

23 Q. Would you agree, General, that in that case, civilians did not

24 have to use the tunnel at all, because for the civilians from both sides,

25 it was possible to cross across the airport during two hours in the

Page 11583

1 morning and in the afternoon?

2 A. I don't see why that precludes them using the tunnel. They had

3 an alternative, that's all.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 Can this be admitted, please?

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1018, Your Honours.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see 1D3161.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General Mladic writes to you on the 11th of February. He's

11 responding to your letter dated the 10th of February. Can you please

12 have a look at this.

13 He says, in the middle of the first paragraph:

14 "In our letter number 06/17-40 of 17th of January 1995, we

15 informed General Rose of the Muslim force's offensive activities in this

16 area ..."

17 [In English] "... by which they flagrantly violate the agreement

18 on cessation of hostilities signed on 31st of December, 1992."

19 [Interpretation] Further on, he informs you that they are

20 carrying out offensive activities in a continuous manner against

21 Fikret Abdic, which is another Muslim faction that we were on good terms

22 with, on the entire territory of the Bihac pocket.

23 And, finally:

24 [In English] "I am convinced that the unconditional withdrawal of

25 the Muslim forces to the lines of 31st of December, 1994, would

Page 11584

1 contribute to the peace and stability in the region. Therefore, I expect

2 you to become engaged in this matter in order to calm down the conflict

3 between the forces under Fikret Abdic's and Alija Izetbegovic's command."

4 [Interpretation] Do you remember this letter, and isn't it

5 somewhat strange for Western stereotypes that a Serbian general is trying

6 to calm down an inter-Muslim conflict?

7 A. No, he's telling me to calm it down, while he will endeavour to

8 remain neutral.

9 Q. Yes, precisely so. He cannot become involved in this, but he

10 wants the inter-Muslim conflict to calm down so that the cessation of

11 hostilities would work. Do you remember this letter, General?

12 A. I don't remember the letter, specifically, but I certainly

13 remember the incident he's referring to or the incidents he's referring

14 to.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we scroll down a bit -- could we

16 please do that? No, the other way.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. We can see "Sarajevo HQ, crypto," so it was received there;

19 correct?

20 A. Oh, yeah, and I'm sure it was, but I -- I just don't remember the

21 letter, itself, very clearly, while I remember the circumstances that are

22 referred to in it. Indeed, I've signed it, so there's my initials there,

23 on the 12th of February.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 Can this be admitted?

Page 11585

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1019, Your Honours.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see 1D3186.

4 We can have the translation on the screen, yes.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Two days later, General Mladic is writing to General Smith, and

7 he says:

8 "Mr. General, the Muslim forces from the area of Bihac have again

9 launched a fierce offensive in the direction of Ripac, Skocaj and

10 Medjudrazje, south of Bihac."

11 That means the Serbian territories:

12 "For the third day running, they have brutally and

13 indiscriminately destroyed Serbian towns and villages using all the

14 weapons that are available to them. They loot and torch the houses ..."

15 And so on and so forth.

16 The following paragraph:

17 "Since the signing of the agreement on the cessation of

18 hostilities, this has been the second major Muslim offensive from the

19 so-called Bihac protected zone."

20 Further on, it says that:

21 "It is indicative that this offensive, too, was undertaken ahead

22 of the scheduled meeting of the commanders of the warring parties which

23 is to be held on the 15th February 1995 ..."

24 Were you aware of this abuse of the Bihac protected zone which

25 was used in this manner by the Muslim forces?

Page 11586

1 A. As I said, I can remember this -- the fighting taking place

2 there, yes.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Can this be admitted?

5 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit D1020.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see 1D3216.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. 1D3216, please help me to identify this. It's NorlogBat,

9 BH Command, UNPROFOR, the 12th of February, 1995.

10 Could we please have a look at the next page.

11 It's a daily sitrep. We can see it here, "General Overview," and

12 then five or six lines down it says:

13 [In English] "Friday night, an aircraft was observed flying at

14 low altitude over the area east of Tuzla, with every indication that it

15 was going to land. It was assumed that this would happen in Tuzla East,

16 where there is an extended highway strip. The UN APCs which were sent

17 out to investigate the matter were prevented by the BiH Army from doing

18 so. It therefore cannot be confirmed whether the aircraft actually

19 landed or not or whether a load was dropped at low altitude."

20 [Interpretation] Do you remember that at the time, a resolution

21 on a no-fly zone was in force?

22 A. Yes, there was a no-fly zone, yes.

23 Q. Does this UN sitrep talk about the violation of the no-fly zone

24 in Tuzla, which was a territory under Muslim control?

25 A. It describes an aeroplane flying low, at a low altitude. I don't

Page 11587

1 think anyone's established whether it's -- at that stage, whether it was

2 a cleared flight or not, since the no-fly zone was conducted by the

3 NATO authorities.

4 Q. But is it obvious that the Muslim army prevented the UNPROFOR

5 from checking this and that --

6 A. That is correct, yes. It says it there.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 Can this be admitted, please?

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.

10 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I don't have any objection to this

11 document. But in other circumstances, I may well raise the lack of

12 utility in asking a witness simply to confirm that that's what a document

13 says.

14 JUDGE KWON: Given your position and given the context, we'll

15 admit this.

16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1021, Your Honours.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 Can we now please see 1D3162.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. This is the 14th of February, 1995, and it says: "To the

21 UNPROFOR Command, Sector North-East," and so on.

22 Can we please have a look at the next page now.

23 This telegram is forwarded. You are sending a letter of

24 General Mladic, addressed to General Smith, which says in the first

25 paragraph:

Page 11588

1 [In English] "We are gravely concerned over the frequent use of

2 Tuzla Airport by the Muslim side. The aircraft are bringing weapons,

3 ammunition and war material for their needs."

4 [Interpretation] And further on, it says:

5 [In English] "Unfortunately, this pirate activity of their

6 aircraft is enabled by the NATO air force, and the Muslim army does not

7 allow your force to control the loads."

8 [Interpretation] And further on it says:

9 [In English] "I ask you to take urgent measures to stop these

10 peace-threatening activities. Otherwise, we will be compelled to take

11 the necessary measures regarding the Muslim side's violation of the Tuzla

12 safe area, which is, in the presence of your forces, turning into a war

13 base for Islamic countries."

14 [Interpretation] Do you remember this crisis, General?

15 A. I remember the incidents, yes.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have it admitted, please?

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1022, Your Honours.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see 1D3163.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. This is also correspondence between you and General Mladic, who

22 is writing to you on the 24th of February and says -- the letter is

23 addressed to the attention of -- he's writing to the command in Zagreb,

24 but it's also forwarded to you and General De Lapresle. And it says

25 that:

Page 11589

1 "On the 23rd of February, 1995, at about 2010 hours, a transport

2 plane, with weapons and military equipment, landed again at

3 Tuzla Airport's secondary runway. It was escorted by two NATO fighter

4 aircraft ..."

5 In the second paragraph, it says that:

6 "... the NATO and UNPROFOR forces ..."

7 [In English] "... were there and at Tuzla airport itself."

8 [Interpretation] So they were there:

9 [In English] "Those forces are doing nothing to prevent the

10 violation of the relevant UN Security Council resolution prohibiting the

11 import of weapons and military equipment.

12 "General, you have accepted the obligation to control the

13 airspace over former BH, and you are very eager, both verbally and

14 practically, to do so with regard to the Serb side."

15 [Interpretation] Do you remember this protest?

16 A. Yes.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have a look at the

18 next page now.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Would you agree with me that two resolutions were violated here,

21 the resolution prohibiting the importation of weapons and the resolution

22 prohibiting flights?

23 A. We don't know what came in on those aeroplanes. I will agree

24 with you that there was every indication from our own reporting on the

25 ground that an aeroplane on occasions had landed at one of the

Page 11590

1 alternative airstrips in the vicinity of Tuzla. We never, in UNPROFOR,

2 got to the bottom of it as to just who was responsible and how they were

3 avoiding the NATO no-fly zone measures.

4 Q. Thank you. Can you please have a look at the paragraph beginning

5 with: "Although we try not to --"

6 [In English] " ... regard this situation as an example of open

7 partiality towards our enemies, it is difficult to avoid such an

8 impression. Our suspicions, that senior UNPROFOR representatives had

9 insisted on the signing of the agreement on cessation of hostilities in

10 order to enable the Muslims to have a reprieve and to gain time to

11 regroup and supply themselves with weapons, ammunition and equipment to

12 continue their bloody campaign, are unfortunately becoming reality."

13 [Interpretation] And in the next passage, double standards are

14 mentioned, and so on and so forth.

15 Do you remember that this letter came to your hands, though it

16 was sent to Zagreb but also to you and General De Lapresle for your

17 information? Do you remember the crisis surrounding these events?

18 A. I've told you I remember the events and I remember the general

19 sentiment of those -- of those -- of that paragraph.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could this be admitted,

21 please?

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1023, Your Honours.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have 1D3187.

25 1D3187.

Page 11591

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Yes. The date is the 3rd of March. Once again, a letter from

3 General Mladic for General Smith. And it says that he believes that a

4 meeting of the Joint Commission will not be held on the 10th of March

5 either, because the Muslim side is obstructing the agreement.

6 "For the past two months, they have been performing offensive

7 operations, without being publicly held to account for it ..."

8 And so on. And then the next sentence says:

9 "On the contrary, the international community and UNPROFOR have

10 tolerated violations of the agreement and have rewarded the Muslims,

11 secretly arming them during the cessation of hostilities by allowing a

12 pirate aircraft to land at the airport in Tuzla under the escort and

13 protection of NATO planes, which was also recorded by UNPROFOR on the

14 10th, the 12th, the 17th, the 23rd and the 24th of February, 1995."

15 Are you aware that on these five days, the UNPROFOR registered

16 violations of the no-fly zone in the area around the Tuzla Airport?

17 A. I don't know whether it was those days or not, no. And I'm -- I

18 don't -- I'm not surprised at this letter, but I don't remember this

19 particular exchange.

20 Q. Thank you. On the last paragraph, it says here -- or, rather,

21 the penultimate one, that:

22 "As you know from daily reports, the Muslims violate the

23 provisions of the comprehensive cease-fire agreement ..."

24 And that since the 23rd of December until the 2nd of March, 1995,

25 they committed 803 violations.

Page 11592

1 The following paragraph says that the front-line has moved and

2 that they took some of our territories in the vicinity of Bihac and so

3 on.

4 Do you remember that they had some successes in the middle of the

5 cessation of hostilities and that they took control of some of our

6 villages?

7 A. Again, I -- I remember that fighting was developing during that

8 time, and I remember that there were some of those incidents and they

9 were carried out by the Bosnian government forces. But I'm -- I

10 couldn't -- no, I just don't know whether it was on those days or in

11 those places.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 We'll show the map of their advances later on. It is not our

14 map, but a US one. Thank you, General.

15 Could this be admitted, please?

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1024, Your Honours.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see

19 65 ter 12301. 65 ter 12301, please.

20 Has it been admitted?

21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this is Exhibit P2256.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So much the better.

23 Could we please have a look at the last page.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. This is, as you can see, the regular combat report from the

Page 11593

1 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, dated the 12th of March, 1995, where it is

2 reported about numerous attacks within the Sarajevo zone.

3 Can we please go back to the previous page. Yes, that's it.

4 You can see that in the zone of responsibility of these brigades

5 of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, the cease-fire was violated permanently

6 with regrouping, digging the trenches.

7 And can we now please have a look at the last page. One more,

8 please.

9 Please have a look at item number 8, "Conclusion."

10 "The enemy is active --"

11 "Conclusions, estimates and decisions:

12 "The enemy is active in different places with different sorts of

13 weapons, regardless of the presence of UN units. The enemy does not

14 select its targets, which is especially characteristic for the urban

15 parts of town where they even kill children.

16 "Continued intensive activities, increased engineering works,

17 movements and re-deployments are to be expected.

18 "The decision to use the SRK units has not been changed and the

19 SRK command and brigades organs are engaged in preventing the enemy

20 activities and losses."

21 Does this look to you like offensive operations conducted in the

22 middle of a cease-fire, General?

23 A. It's certainly active operations. What the objective of these

24 were and whether they were carrying out an offence or merely conducting a

25 series of minor attacks along their front-line, I've got no way of

Page 11594

1 measuring on one -- on one situation report. But certainly fighting is

2 being reported.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 We now please see P2248. It's a Prosecution exhibit.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. This is my memo sent to the Government of Republika Srpska, the

7 presidents of municipalities, and the Main Staff of the Army of

8 Republika Srpska. It says:

9 "Pursuant to," which laws, "and in order to successfully stop the

10 enemy offensive and conduct a counter-offensive, I hereby order:"

11 And the measures are then enumerated which the civilian

12 authorities should take in order to ensure that people and assets are

13 mobilised in order to prevent and stop the enemy offensive, and to launch

14 the counter-offensive in those areas where we had lost some territories.

15 So the four-month cease-fire did not end, and we were forced to

16 mobilise all the forces we had, including even workers, to defend

17 ourselves from this offensive.

18 This was issued on the 26th of March, and do you remember that as

19 early as in March, this offensive launched by the BiH Army was already

20 well underway? Do you remember that, General, because these activities

21 of theirs had become an offensive, so much so that we had to use and

22 mobilise all our forces, even our civilian sector, so that they would

23 help the army?

24 A. I remember being shown this letter a couple of days ago, and I

25 remember that the Bosnian government had conducted two large attacks

Page 11595

1 during March.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 Can this be admitted? Oh, sorry, this is already an exhibit.

4 Can we now see 65 ter 10616.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. This is a telegram of the UNPROFOR, dated 18 March 1995. And

7 below, under "Highlights," it lists various topics:

8 "The parties to the conflict openly express willingness to return

9 to war ..."

10 "The grip around the enclaves is tightening, the blue routes and

11 the air bridge are closed and convoys are problematic."

12 Number 3:

13 "Friends of the Federation meeting produces $300 million in

14 pledges."

15 And:

16 "Tudjman's announcement that the UN can remain in Croatia prompts

17 Karadzic to reject control of the RS-RSK border by the UN."

18 Can we now see page 5 of this document.

19 Paragraph 12, the last two sentences:

20 [In English] "The US, the EU and other friends announced pledges

21 of US dollars 300 million in support of the Federation. There was also

22 talk by US officials, though as of yet no confirmation, that the

23 government was going to send a retired military official to advise the

24 Federation army on military matters."

25 [Interpretation] Do you know that at that moment, we were under

Page 11596

1 triple sanctions; the embargo of the international community, an embargo

2 imposed by Yugoslavia, and we could expect nothing better from the

3 Federation or Croatia? We were completely blocked, and here the friends

4 of the Federation offer $300 million plus experts to help their army.

5 Did you know about this?

6 A. It doesn't say that -- they say they discuss it. They don't --

7 it's not being offered -- I beg your pardon. They discuss the retired

8 military official. They don't say they're going to provide him. But I

9 didn't know about it in those terms as spread out there. That -- that

10 there was US support for the Federation, I did know, but not in those --

11 in that detail, in those terms.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 I should like to tender this.

14 JUDGE KWON: I think this has been also admitted as

15 Exhibit P2257.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 Can we now see 65 ter 3888, P2261.

18 There it is.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. This is the 22nd April, three months into your tenure, and this

21 is a meeting in Sarajevo and in Pale, first a meeting with Bosnian

22 government officials.

23 First of all, General, I must say that this -- these terms,

24 "Bosnian government" and "Bosnian Serbs," are unfair, because from the

25 beginning we were equal parties to the conflict.

Page 11597

1 Do you know that we had that status of equal parties to the

2 conflict, and they could not have possibly been the Bosnian government?

3 A. I'm sorry. What do I know?

4 Q. Never mind. I withdraw that. It doesn't matter.

5 What matters is that they are -- we are being treated as rebels,

6 although we started off as equal parties to the conflict.

7 Let's quote from here:

8 "The BH official sounded criticised COHA, the UNPROFOR mandate,

9 and the situation at Sarajevo Airport. On the subject of an extension of

10 the COHA, Silajdzic maintained that any extension was not in their

11 interest, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement ..."

12 And so on.

13 Do you see that the Muslim side was against the Cessation of

14 Hostilities Agreement and they said it was not in their interest?

15 A. Silajdzic was saying it, and he was part of their leadership.

16 Q. Do you agree that we never said we were in favour of breaking

17 that agreement, that cease-fire; on the contrary, we often protested

18 because the other side was breaking it?

19 A. I don't remember -- "do you agree that we never said we were in

20 favour of breaking that agreement." I don't remember you saying that you

21 were in favour of breaking the agreement, but I'm equally not clear that

22 that's what they're saying in this paragraph. He's talking about an

23 extension of it.

24 Q. Well, if I read this correctly, Silajdzic maintained that any

25 extension of that cease-fire or cessation of hostilities was not in their

Page 11598

1 interests. That's in paragraph 2. And a few days before, less than a

2 month before, they had started a major offensive in end March.

3 Doesn't this clearly say that Silajdzic maintained it was not in

4 their interest to extend the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement?

5 A. It says that, yes:

6 "Silajdzic maintained that any extension was not in their

7 interest."

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 Next page, please.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Let's see what Karadzic says, paragraph 8:

12 [In English] "When the matter of extension of COHA was raised,

13 Karadzic retorted that it has been breached so massively by the Muslims

14 that it does not exist. He asserted that the agreement had simply given

15 the B and H the opportunity to rearm and reorganise, and, 'The Serbs will

16 no longer enter into agreements which would be detrimental to

17 ourselves.'"

18 [Interpretation] Do you agree, then, it was our position that

19 that agreement was never really in effect, as far as the Muslim side is

20 concerned, and they used cease-fires for regrouping and rearming, and

21 that was at our expense, to our detriment?

22 A. What you're quoted as saying is that it didn't exist anymore and

23 that you certainly didn't want to extend it.

24 Q. It's not that we didn't want to extend it. It's that we don't

25 see any use in agreements that they would not honour, but instead use to

Page 11599

1 get stronger. The reason why we didn't want to extend it is that they

2 were using it to their advantage. Was that my position?

3 A. That's what you were saying there, yes.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

5 Paragraph 9, second sentence:

6 [In English] "Karadzic denied responsibility for attacks

7 on UNPROFOR personnel, but accepted that there had been mistakes."

8 [Interpretation] Do you recall this?

9 A. I'm trying to find -- which paragraph are we in, I'm sorry,

10 paragraph 9?

11 JUDGE KWON: Nine, third line.

12 THE WITNESS: I don't remember the specific point, no.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Can this document be admitted? It's already an exhibit. Thank

15 you.

16 65 ter 18972, please.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. While we're waiting, let me try to refresh your memory, General.

19 General Mladic always said, If our renegades or individuals from

20 our side attack the UNPROFOR at any time, the UNPROFOR is free to

21 retaliate. And I was always saying that our army was not doing that in

22 an organised manner, and if any incidents happened, we would investigate.

23 Let's see this document, where the Main Staff of the Army of

24 Republika Srpska -- it's a strictly confidential document dated

25 12 March, 1995, sent to all corps. It's first a piece of information,

Page 11600

1 followed by an order. And then it says -- there is a passage where:

2 "The Army of Republika Srpska and its Main Staff, as well as

3 other institutions in Republika Srpska, have many objections to the

4 biased behaviour of UNPROFOR members which is frequently discussed at

5 meetings held with UNPROFOR representatives. We firmly believe that

6 these United Nations forces should be given full support in carrying out

7 their tasks."

8 And then further down it says:

9 "In the past also, there have been cases of robbery against

10 members of the UNPROFOR, but such cases have become more frequent in the

11 past months, especially in the zone of responsibility of the

12 Sarajevo Romanija Corps. There were cases of groups of armed and

13 masked men stopping UNPROFOR vehicles and taking their vehicles, weapons

14 and personal effects at gunpoint."

15 And now the last paragraph, if we can scroll down:

16 "Such and similar acts --"

17 It's on the next page, maybe:

18 "Such and similar acts of robbery constitute the crime of robbery

19 under Article 150 ..."

20 And so on and so on.

21 "... entailing a sentence of minimum five-year imprisonment ..."

22 Et cetera. And:

23 "Because of all the above, I hereby order:

24 "1. Engaging all available forces ..."

25 Et cetera, et cetera.

Page 11601

1 We can look at this entire order, a secret document whereby it is

2 very strictly ordered to respect the status of the UNPROFOR, to engage

3 security organs and military police to investigate such incidents,

4 recover stolen property, et cetera, and I will personally take

5 appropriate measures against the corps commanders in whose zones of

6 responsibilities such acts happen.

7 Do you see from this that General Mladic, indeed, ordered any

8 such incidents to be strictly punished?

9 A. Yes, I can see that.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Can this be admitted?

12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.

13 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.

15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1025, Your Honours.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see briefly P2263 in

17 e-court.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. This was written by one of your officers,

20 Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter. The date is 1st May 1995, and then there is a

21 subheading "Meeting with Bosnian government officials."

22 Mr. Akashi, General Smith and General Janvier met Dr. Ganic and

23 Ambassador Sacirbey. The topic was the extension of the Cessation of

24 Hostilities Agreement.

25 Next page, please. There it is.

Page 11602

1 [In English] "Although the criticism was not personalised, the

2 meeting was a clear attempt to dramatise the situation in Sarajevo and to

3 denounce the failure of UNPROFOR to respond in a forceful and punitive

4 manner against the Bosnian Serb siege of Sarajevo and Bosnian control of

5 Sarajevo Airport."

6 [Interpretation] Was this pressure by the Bosnian government, the

7 pressure that you were talking about?

8 A. It's an example of their continual theme of our relationships

9 with that group of people.

10 Q. And their purpose and their wish was to have you fighting against

11 the Serbs for them and to punish the Serbs?

12 A. Just as the Bosnian Serbs wanted us to act against the

13 Bosnian government forces, so it applied in the other direction. Both

14 parties were -- had this theme in our relationships together.

15 Q. Except we didn't want you to fight for us. We only wanted you to

16 caution and punish them as you cautioned and punished us, whereas they

17 wanted you to create a state for them, to wage war on their behalf.

18 You are aware, aren't you, that the Bosnian Muslim side tried,

19 throughout the war, to involve NATO into that war on their side?

20 A. I've told you before I'm a -- I was a UN officer.

21 Q. Thank you. Can you look at this meeting with Bosnian Serb

22 officials:

23 [In English] "A meeting was held at Pale between Mr. Akashi and

24 Dr. Karadzic. Karadzic's party included Krajisnik ..."

25 [Interpretation] And so on. And it says:

Page 11603

1 [In English] "He referred, however, to the situation in

2 Sector West and claimed the Croats had attacked RSK territory and had

3 shelled two Bosnian Serb towns. He stated that the BSA would retaliate,

4 but that the retaliation would be directed at military targets only."

5 [Interpretation] Do you recall, General, that on that day, on the

6 30th of April, and the 1st of May, Croatia took the rest of

7 Western Slavonia and the rest of Sector West, and many Serbs fled to

8 Republika Srpska as refugees?

9 A. Again, I couldn't be certain of the dates, but I remember the

10 event, yes.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this already an exhibit? It is.

12 Can we now see 1D3189.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Do you remember, General, that on the 15th of May, the Muslims

15 started that offensive that lasted until the end of May and spilled over

16 into June?

17 We remember it all, but they started their offensive on the

18 15th of May, and the 16th of May, Professor Koljevic, president for the

19 State Committee for Co-operation with the United Nations and

20 International Humanitarian Organisations, is addressing this letter to

21 Yasushi Akashi, saying that:

22 "The Serb side is quite prepared to reopen Sarajevo Airport at

23 the earliest possible date ..."

24 And in the last paragraph:

25 "Moreover, given the overall deterioration of the military

Page 11604

1 situation in the region of Sarajevo, the Serb side is ready to meet the

2 other side in the conflict on the highest level of political

3 representation. We thus hope it will be possible to prevent the

4 escalation of current military activities."

5 Do you agree that this is a last-ditch, desperate attempt by

6 Professor Koljevic to prevent such an escalation by offering to reopen

7 the airport?

8 A. He's certainly making that offer. I'm -- I don't know that it's

9 a last-ditch attempt. And you asked me if I remembered, and put all this

10 in relation to a Bosnian government offensive. And as I've said before,

11 I can't recall the dates, but somewhere around the middle of May, there

12 is an up-surge of fighting in the vicinity of Sarajevo. And that may be

13 connected with this, the reference to the deterioration in the military

14 situation.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Can this be admitted?

17 I want to show just one more document on this topic, and then

18 we'll be done for today.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1026, Your Honour.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3165.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. While we're waiting: General, you do remember who

24 Aleksandar Ivanko is, don't you?

25 A. Yes, I do.

Page 11605

1 Q. This was from his press briefing. But lower down:

2 "84 explosions were reported yesterday, mainly in Nedzarici."

3 And then it goes on to say:

4 "In the area of the airport, Igman/Butmir, Halilovici,

5 Sharpstone, and the red building ..."

6 And so on.

7 [In English] "The UN camp at Zetra went to state red for several

8 hours from 10.30 yesterday. After 6.00, 120 mortar rounds impacted in

9 the vicinity."

10 [Interpretation] And towards the end, it is:

11 "It is thought the BSA are targeting Zetra because of the BH Army

12 firing point close to the camp ..."

13 [In English] "A number of the protests at the highest level have

14 been sent to BH."

15 [Interpretation] Do you agree that on the 22nd May, it had

16 already been seven days of this, and only then did the Serbs respond, and

17 that's when the UNPROFOR sent a protest to the Bosnian government?

18 A. I don't know that that's correct, that it went on for seven days

19 and the very first response was on this -- is reported in this press

20 release.

21 Q. But this is an authentic document from a press briefing given by

22 a spokesman.

23 A. I'm not questioning the document. You've shown me a document.

24 I think it was dated the 16th or 15th. And you're now showing me one of

25 the 22nd. I'm -- the first one says that there was a deteriorating

Page 11606

1 situation, which I agreed I could remember, but I couldn't agree the

2 dates. And you're now showing me one dated six or seven days later which

3 reports the events of the previous 24 hours, and I'm -- I can't make the

4 connections you're asking me to make.

5 Q. Here is the connection: We agreed they started their offensive

6 in mid-May. On the 22nd of May, the spokesman of your command holds a

7 press briefing, informing that shells fell on Nedzarici, a Serbian

8 neighbourhood, they also fell on Sharpstone, which is the Serbian defence

9 line, and that the Serbs responded by fire on Zetra. I'm just trying to

10 come to the moment, and we will come to that tomorrow, the end of May and

11 that crisis. The Muslim offensive is going on at full blast, and it's an

12 exchange of fire. It's a week before the bombing campaign started.

13 A. What you asked me was that -- to say -- to agree with you that it

14 took seven days for the Serbs to respond, and I am not agreeing with you

15 that that was the case.

16 Q. Let's leave that aside. I don't know when we responded, but we

17 responded by fire against Zetra on this day.

18 Do you agree that an offensive was underway and that your

19 spokesman was well aware that shelling was targeting Nedzarici, a Serbian

20 neighbourhood, and Sharpstone as well, and that the UNPROFOR sent

21 numerous protests to the highest level of the Bosnian leadership? Is

22 that written in the last sentence here?

23 A. I am entirely content to agree to what is written in that last

24 two paragraphs of that page you've got on the screen, the one beginning

25 with "84 detonations," and the other one, "Two civilians were killed."