Page 13417
1 Wednesday, 16 March 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Good morning, Mr. Banbury.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much: Good morning,
10 Your Excellencies.
11 WITNESS: ANTHONY BANBURY [Resumed]
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Banbury.
14 Mr. Banbury, now we are going to be dealing with the crisis
15 around Gorazde or the Gorazde crisis. Do you know that General Rose was
16 in Gorazde. We did show this video here but maybe we can see it
17 sometime. So in this footage he identified that the houses that were
18 burned, demolished and looted were actually Serb homes that the Muslims
19 destroyed and the -- and expelled the Serbs before the crisis?
20 A. I'm not familiar with the footage you're -- or I don't know what
21 footage you are talking about. Maybe I've seen it, maybe I've not, I'm
22 not sure. But I have no doubt that there were people from the Serb
23 community as well as the Muslim community who were affected by the
24 crisis, their homes burned, et cetera.
25 Q. In your statement paragraphs 13 to 15, and 23 to 25, you say what
Page 13418
1 you found out, what you got in terms of information about Gorazde. Are
2 you aware that UNPROFOR commanders objected to the one-sided and
3 exaggerated reporting on Gorazde and that they concluded that the
4 situation in Gorazde was not the way it was presented?
5 A. The situation -- the information about the situation in Gorazde
6 was difficult to obtain because of the fighting and limited freedom of
7 movement. We had a hard time getting a very clear realtime picture of
8 the situation in Gorazde in April 1994. I think we had an overall
9 understanding of it, and subsequent events or information that later
10 became available to us that clarified the picture, I think, made it
11 apparent that our initial overall impression was accurate. Of course,
12 more details became available, but I don't think the fundamental
13 understanding of UNPROFOR changed in terms of what had happened in
14 April 1994.
15 Q. Thank you. And now I'm going to show a document issued by
16 General Mladic on the basis of these rumours or Muslim propaganda.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3469, please.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please be asked to speak into
19 the microphone.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Which he issued as if that was correct and later we'll see that
22 the UNPROFOR commanders reported that the reports about the destruction
23 and the casualties were exaggerated.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you've been asked by the interpreters
25 to speak to the microphone.
Page 13419
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. So, Mr. Banbury, this is the 16th of April. In the English it
4 says "probably," but I can see in the Serbian version that it is the
5 16th, where General Mladic personally says Muslim -- via global media,
6 the Muslim propaganda keeps launching disinformation that the members of
7 the VRS started a total annihilation of Muslim population in order to
8 compromise the RS and so on and so forth. And then he orders the cruel
9 treatments are severely forbidden as well as abuse and physical
10 destruction of civil population, and so on and so forth. All commands
11 and members of the VRS -- number 2, all commands and members of the VRS
12 are duty bound to isolate and protect the civil population of Gorazde,
13 and so on and so forth. And down at the bottom, number 5, destruction of
14 moveable and immovable property on the liberated territory by ignition or
15 demolition is forbidden, and so on and so forth.
16 So is this something that fits in with what you know about the
17 eventual actions of our command about which we also informed you at our
18 meetings?
19 MS. EDGERTON: Sorry, just before the witness answers, could we
20 have the English version of the document just reduced a little bit so we
21 could see the stamp. Okay, there's no translation of the stamp on the
22 bottom and there is on the Serbian version. Thank you. Sorry, it was
23 just a little too big, Your Honour, I wanted to see the whole thing.
24 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Dr. Karadzic, could you please just
25 repeat the question at the very end again, please.
Page 13420
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Yes, I will gladly, but before that, I would like to say that
3 this is strictly confidential and it's going through military channels.
4 Strictly confidential. But we did inform you at meetings that we were
5 taking these measures. Is this strictly confidential secret order in
6 accordance with what we informed you about in our meetings?
7 A. You and your authorities in April 1994, I believe, undertook or
8 made a variety of representations to UNPROFOR in terms of your intentions
9 with respect to Gorazde and the population in Gorazde. Honestly, we did
10 not rely so much on documents or even just -- of course, commitments by
11 any of the parties were very important to us, but we measured the
12 behaviour of the parties, that was what was most important to us, and I
13 think the facts that have been established with respect to Gorazde speak
14 for themselves, and it was a very difficult time for UNPROFOR and the
15 population of the community.
16 It -- whatever the commitment by the -- or the orders that may
17 have been issued, I'm sure they were respected in some cases but in
18 others apparently they were not.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this?
21 JUDGE KWON: I don't see any basis to admit this based upon the
22 evidence just given by this witness, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As a secret document this confirms
24 what we were speaking about publicly. We didn't conduct a two-track
25 policy. We are saying what sort of measures we took, and therefore here
Page 13421
1 is Mladic's order. So does this coincide with what we said we were going
2 to do and undertake? Did we undertake those measures?
3 JUDGE KWON: I'd like to hear from Ms. Edgerton first, then.
4 MS. EDGERTON: I think this is an argument that can be made in
5 writing in a separate written submission about this document,
6 Your Honour.
7 JUDGE KWON: And there will be another opportunity for you to
8 tender this document. Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. In paragraph 23 of your statement, [In English] "Weekly BH
12 political assessment for 28th of May to 3rd of June, 1994,"
13 [Interpretation] You say that you recognise the document that you drafted
14 and you say that you believe that the special representative managed to
15 wrangle a commitment out of Dr. Karadzic that all armed Serb forces would
16 be outside of the 3-kilometre exclusion zone around Gorazde. We say that
17 that was our proposal, that those 3 kilometres, that that was our
18 proposal. Do you allow for that possibility?
19 A. I don't recall which side first proposed the idea of a
20 3-kilometre exclusion zone for forces. I would have expected it would
21 have been UNPROFOR because, as I recall, the Bosnian Serb authorities
22 were very reluctant to move their forces back from the right side of the
23 Drina, but it's possible, I suppose.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have
25 65 ter 11655. 11655, and can we look at the following page. Actually, I
Page 13422
1 am afraid that that is not the document. Ah, yes, the following page,
2 please.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Can we look here where it says that the authorities of
5 Republika Srpska have decided, as a goodwill gesture, to immediately
6 implement or facilitate the following, and then we have these items that
7 the authorities of Republika Srpska undertook without any obligation on
8 the Muslim side. Do you agree that this was published and that it was
9 accepted as a goodwill gesture on our part?
10 A. I agree that this document or these commitments were made known,
11 whether it was a goodwill gesture or the basis for making these
12 commitments, there had been NATO air attacks against Bosnian Serb forces,
13 there was a lot of international pressure. I think the motivation for
14 coming to this decision or commitment, it's probably varied. I don't
15 believe that the undertakings made here were ever fully respected though.
16 Q. Well, this part is a bit of subjective thinking, this part that
17 you added. It's just guessing for your own reason?
18 A. No, I don't believe it's guessing, sir. I think it's quite
19 clear, for instance, there was never freedom of movement for all
20 humanitarian workers throughout the Republika Srpska, that's very clear.
21 UNHCR was not able to operate humanitarian convoys in an unfettered
22 nature ever throughout the course of the war, so I don't believe these --
23 I'm quite certain these commitments were not fully adhered to after
24 April 18th, 1994.
25 Q. I was misinterpreted. I said that this part, this added part
Page 13423
1 when you say "I think," that is actually your speculation about our
2 motives. What we have in front of us are facts and your interpretation
3 is an attempt to guess at our motives; is that right? To say that we did
4 that because of threats? You know we downed an aeroplane at the time. I
5 mean, I could say that the bombing stopped because we downed an
6 aeroplane, I mean, wouldn't that be right?
7 A. Dr. Karadzic, you asked me if I agreed if this was a goodwill
8 gesture on your part, so you are asking me to confirm the motivation for
9 making these undertakings and based on your question, I was giving my
10 best response as to what may have prompted you and your authorities to
11 make these undertakings and I don't believe it was a goodwill gesture.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the first page for
13 you to look at.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. But actually, you confirmed that you did receive this text in
16 time, on the 18th of April; is that right?
17 A. The text that's attached to this cover sheet, this is sent from
18 UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb to UN headquarters in New York. I assume
19 that it was shared with UNPROFOR headquarters in Bosnia, the Bosnia
20 command, at the time and that I saw it, but based on this cover sheet and
21 my recollection, I can't recall offhand, but I think it's quite likely
22 that I saw it at the time.
23 Q. Thank you. What I'm trying to do, Mr. Banbury, is to rule out
24 your own and my own psychology, to exclude speculation and to establish
25 the facts, and I hope that we can do that. It's a fact that that day we
Page 13424
1 sent out and we said publicly that this was a goodwill gesture, but you
2 if you have doubts about it, then that's your thing.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, let's not waste time anymore. There's
4 no doubt the document says goodwill on your part, but it's a separate
5 matter whether the witness would agree with it or not.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we admit this?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1152, Your Honours.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. You said that one of your activities was to interpret the
11 UNPROFOR mandate to your colleagues; is that right? That that was a part
12 of your job?
13 A. Yes, correct, interpreting it in more of a political sense or
14 translating what the mandate said into the current operating environment
15 or when confronted with a situation. I was not responsible for giving a
16 legal interpretation of the mandate.
17 Q. Do you agree or is it something that is understandable and
18 acceptable to you that Serbs responded to offensives from safe areas and
19 that specifically this crisis in Gorazde was caused by the actions of the
20 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Gorazde safe area?
21 A. I certainly agree that there were many times when the Bosnian
22 Serb Army was responding to offensive actions by the Bosnian Army, the
23 Bosnian government army. I do not necessarily agree that the actions in
24 Gorazde were in response only to Bosnian government forces' actions, and
25 it's a whole separate matter of what was justified or allowed under the
Page 13425
1 safe area mandate. So I think it gets complicated very fast.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just briefly have D687,
3 please.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. This is from the same day. You and two of your colleagues
6 drafted this telegram from Mr. Andreev, your boss, to Mr. Akashi. Would
7 you agree that was sent on the 18th of April and that you are one of the
8 authors of this document?
9 A. Yes.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 2, please,
11 paragraph 10.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. It states:
14 [In English] "The council must clarify the concept of the safe
15 areas as soon as possible. Until now, they have never been
16 geographically defined and it has never been clear how UNPROFOR was meant
17 to deter attacks on them or whether indeed UNPROFOR should have tolerated
18 their use by the Bosnian Army for military purposes. If the council
19 decides to continue with the concept, it must be willing to give the
20 resources and the political commitment necessary do so. Otherwise, we
21 invite conflict with the Serbs for no benefit to anyone."
22 [Interpretation] This relates to this crisis, your service, the
23 head of the civilians affairs section is asking for a clarification of
24 the concept of the safe areas because the Bosnian Army was abusing it.
25 Would you agree with that?
Page 13426
1 A. I do agree that on this occasion and others we sought
2 clarification of the safe area concept. We sought it for many reasons.
3 I don't necessarily agree that the Bosnian Army was abusing it in this
4 case, that's a separate matter. And in part because of lack of
5 clarification, the concept of abuse or not was subjective.
6 Q. But you agree that this dispatch of the 18th of April was on the
7 topic of the crisis in Gorazde?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D02548.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. This is a statement by Mr. Zametica who talks about -- well, you
13 can look at this here:
14 [In English] "If air-strikes continue, we shall find ourselves at
15 war with the United Nations," says Zametica."
16 [Interpretation] Then he continues on to explain that the Army of
17 Republika Srpska was not shelling Gorazde and that members of
18 humanitarian organisations and members of UNPROFOR cannot be in any
19 danger. And then it continues:
20 [In English] "Muslim war propaganda launches new fabrications
21 from Gorazde which dangerously fuel reckless decisions about the combat
22 use of NATO air force and contributes to the escalation of the war."
23 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. You can see this whole
24 statement. Do you remember our warnings that this was a trap here and a
25 propaganda and exaggeration?
Page 13427
1 A. Yes, I do recall those warnings. I also know that we had
2 personnel in Gorazde who were providing realtime reporting about events
3 that were taking place in and around Gorazde and those reports were at
4 times at odds with press dispatches from Belgrade or, indeed,
5 representations from Pale.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this?
7 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
8 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted given that the alleged
10 speaker, Mr. Zametica, was the spokesman for the Presidency at the time.
11 I think we have basis to admit it. Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1153, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have D137
14 for a minute, please. D137. It's also a United Nations document.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. This is from July 1995, at the time when you were performing
17 these duties in Zagreb where the headquarters of Mr. Akashi were.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 6 now, please.
19 This is a document sent by General Janvier. Can we now look at
20 the third paragraph from the bottom.
21 MR. KARADZIC:
22 Q. [In English] "Similar to what happened in Gorazde spring 1994,
23 the BH can attempt to draw UNPROFOR, including the rapid reaction forces
24 or NATO, into the conflict on the BH side. Sudden abandoning of
25 positions along the confrontation line, the simulation of a collapse of
Page 13428
1 the enclave or alarming reports from the Bosnian side on the situation in
2 the enclave will be indicators for this. A stronger involvement of the
3 international community could be interpreted by the Bosnian Serb Army as
4 an incentive to step up operations and try to eliminate the enclave, as
5 well as retaliate against the UN forces."
6 [Interpretation] So, Mr. Banbury, General Janvier took this as a
7 model of behaviour by the Muslim side when they want to draw NATO in as
8 well as the UN and the international community, to draw them into a war.
9 They pretend that the enclave had collapsed, reports that are sent are
10 exaggerated, and these reports are alarming, saying that everything is
11 disastrous. Do you remember that that was General Janvier's position and
12 that that is what he wrote in this telegram of his?
13 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, yes.
14 MS. EDGERTON: If I may, we've been through this with documents
15 like this before, Your Honour. This is not a document from
16 General Janvier. This is a UNPF, United Nations Protection Force
17 headquarters daily sitrep drafted by someone other than General Janvier,
18 released by someone other than General Janvier, and representing that
19 something this anything produced by General Janvier is actually a
20 misrepresentation. And with respect, that's evident on the front page of
21 the document, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the first page again?
24 Although this has already been admitted. Can we have the first page? It
25 says there: "From General Janvier."
Page 13429
1 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON: I would direct everyone's attention to the
3 drafter's name, to the releasing officer's name, to the signature block.
4 It may come from the office of General Janvier, but it can't be
5 representative as General Janvier's document.
6 JUDGE KWON: A document in the name of General Janvier. Let us
7 proceed.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have
9 65 ter 21146.
10 JUDGE KWON: Did we hear your question and answer from the
11 witness?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did put a question but I don't
13 know whether Mr. Banbury gave an answer.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. So at that point in time you were in Zagreb; right?
16 A. Yes, I was.
17 Q. Did you know that there were such views in the UN about the
18 crisis in Gorazde?
19 A. Yes, I was aware of those views. There were such views within
20 the UN Protection Force headquarters in some -- among some military
21 officers and perhaps civilians. I think they represented a minority view
22 and they were subsequently largely discredited.
23 Q. Thank you. With all due respect, Mr. Banbury, I think that
24 minority and majority pertains to matters related to democratic life in a
25 society, but these are two generals that held this view; right?
Page 13430
1 Please, for the transcript, nodding is not reflected in the
2 transcript, so could you speak up and tell us what your position is?
3 A. I agree that in this case, though General Janvier had those
4 concerns, I don't think they reflect the entirety of his views but he
5 certainly -- he and some of his officers had those concerns, and those
6 concerns on the part of General Janvier did influence his actions. And I
7 think not just senior UN leadership in UNPROFOR but also in
8 UN headquarters later, with the benefit of hindsight, believed that
9 General Janvier's actions based in part on those views turned out to be
10 disastrous for the organisation.
11 Q. But, Mr. Banbury, this is from July 1995, a year and two months
12 after that. So this is a view that was held, and do you agree the
13 General Rose had this same view and that General Janvier based his views
14 on opinions from the ground because he was not in Gorazde; right?
15 A. The possibility or risk that the Bosnian government and its army
16 would try and act in a way to have UNPROFOR act in a way that would be
17 favourable to their cause was present throughout the conflict. Of course
18 the Bosnian government, the Bosnian military wanted us, wanted UNPROFOR
19 to act in a way that would advance their cause and not act counter to it.
20 I think the Bosnian Serb authorities had the exact same interest, that we
21 would act in a way that would advance their cause or did not, at the
22 least, harm it. Both sides were constantly trying to influence the
23 behaviour of UNPROFOR.
24 In the case of this risk that the Bosnian government army would
25 act in a way to draw UNPROFOR into armed conflict with the Bosnian Serbs
Page 13431
1 in the safe areas, we were aware that -- of that possibility, of that
2 risk. I, myself, and -- well, I don't want to speak for my colleagues,
3 but I, myself, do not believe that the Bosnian government army acted in a
4 way to sacrifice their civilians in order to have UNPROFOR call in NATO
5 air-strikes. I think there was a real conflict in Gorazde, there was a
6 real conflict in Srebrenica and the military aspects of both those
7 conflicts are multidimensional, I won't try to analyse them here, but I
8 acknowledge that the risk existed. We were aware of it at the time. We
9 paid close attention to it. We based our actions on the entirety of the
10 situation on the ground according to our best understanding.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have
12 65 ter 21146. Let us see what another general says about the situation.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. This is a document dated the 25th of April. It is
15 General De Lapresle who is sending this directly to Kofi Annan in
16 New York. One:
17 [In English] "The situation in Gorazde has stabilised as the BSA
18 forces have completed their withdrawal from the 3-kilometre line agreed
19 upon between Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Akashi in Belgrade. This phase of the
20 operation is now complete."
21 [Interpretation] Number 3:
22 [In English] "The military situation on the ground in Gorazde is
23 much improved, although sporadic small arms fire is present from time to
24 time. For their part, the BH forces have not been helpful in targeting
25 the withdrawing Serbs with sniper fire. At least, 13 BSA casualties
Page 13432
1 resulted along the east-west road to Ustipraca. The BSA prepared an
2 armoured counterattack but did not execute it and eventually withdrew
3 their forces."
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page?
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Let us look at number 6:
7 [In English] "As soon as BSA withdrawal is complete, I believe
8 that we must focus our attention on two other aspects of the overall
9 problem. The first of these is that of the other safe areas, their
10 definition and our concept of operations with respect to them."
11 [Interpretation] The last sentence:
12 [In English] "I fear that unless the Bosnian Serbs and the BH are
13 brought together in the negotiating process, then we will be faced with
14 another outbreak of intense conflict, initiated by one party or the
15 other."
16 [Interpretation] Does this general instill confidence in you?
17 A. Does General De Lapresle instill confidence in me? Not really.
18 Q. It's a good thing that you are not a military man. But
19 Mr. Banbury, look at the first page, they hit 13 of our men as we were
20 withdrawing. Is that permitted?
21 A. No, they ought not to have done that and there were many
22 instances when the Bosnian government army acted in a way that we did not
23 want them to, that we had asked them not to. I think this is -- you
24 know, this was a war and the sides acted in their interest, not according
25 to UNPROFOR requests. In this case, the -- at this time late April 1994,
Page 13433
1 after the attack in Gorazde, the NATO air power, the plane being downed,
2 the territorial gains made by the Bosnian Serb Army, the Bosnian
3 government, the Bosnian Army were bitterly and deeply disappointed in
4 UNPROFOR's behaviour and believe we had capitulated to pressure from the
5 Bosnian Serbs and that we had relented and acquiesced to gains that they
6 found unacceptability. They were very angry at us and I think they acted
7 in a way to reflect their interest not ours. I think this report also
8 shows again that we factually and accurately reported the true situation
9 on the ground according to the best of our understanding.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1154, Your Honours.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3419, could we have that, please.
15 We are still in April 1994, and this has to do with Gorazde. So
16 this is the 27th of April.
17 Can we look at the next page?
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. We see the part that has been marked here, it says that the
20 situation was becoming stable, that the Serbs withdrew, Serb elements had
21 withdrawn except for two locations where equipment has been disabled and
22 that confirms an assessment that the BSA intends to comply with the
23 ultimatum. No BSA -- oh, no BSA forces remained in the 3-kilometre zone
24 around Gorazde.
25 "There was, however, an incident initiated by the BH who fired
Page 13434
1 50 small arms [In English] rounds at an UNPROFOR patrol from the position
2 west of the Drina River. A strong protest was lodged to the BH command."
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page?
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. This firing at UNPROFOR, Mr. Banbury, does it look like
6 frustration to you, as it does to me, because shooting at UNPROFOR in a
7 situation like this means trying to provoke UNPROFOR; right?
8 A. I agree that the shooting at UNPROFOR by the Bosnian Army
9 reflect -- likely reflected frustration on their part and whether it was
10 mere frustration or designed to provoke a response by us, I don't know.
11 But certainly frustration.
12 Q. Thank you. I'd like to draw your attention to this passage that
13 is marked that says that the assessment is that the efforts made are
14 being sincere and that it's the potential for BH Army attacks that is
15 probably their main concern, since the Bosniaks, the Muslims, have not
16 signed an agreement yet which they would be bound to comply with.
17 Do you agree that the Serb side here -- or rather, that it was
18 reported that the Serb side here was sincerely complying, although the
19 Muslim side hadn't signed this yet, and that this caused concern among
20 the Muslims?
21 A. I note this is a document from the international conference on
22 the former Yugoslavia, not UNPROFOR. These were -- this was a diplomatic
23 conference not a peacekeeping mission. They did not have any presence on
24 the ground, so I think this is thirdhand reporting. The -- I also agree,
25 though, that the Bosnian Serbs at this point in late April were complying
Page 13435
1 with -- were complying with some of the commitments they had undertaken,
2 were generally compliant with the pull-back from Gorazde and the
3 cessation of the attack on Gorazde. There were a number of commitments
4 that we had sought and that we either made and not respected or were not
5 made at all. I don't agree, for instance, that all Bosnian Serb forces
6 had pulled back from the right side of the Drina. We know that, as
7 reported in UNPROFOR documents, that some Bosnian Serb forces had changed
8 into civilian clothes and maintained their weapons in the 3-kilometre
9 zone.
10 As for the Bosnian government not having signed an agreement that
11 they were honour-bound to comply, we were not asking the Bosnian
12 government to sign an agreement. They -- it was a safe area that was
13 being attacked by the Bosnian Serbs. We were asking the Bosnian Serbs to
14 stop the attack and withdraw.
15 Q. Well, that is precisely what we are going to discuss now. First
16 of all, it is our claim that this was a Serb counter-attack. Do you
17 agree that it was a Serb counter-attack?
18 A. I think in a sustained war across a large conflict line it's very
19 difficult to distinguish between attack and counter-attack. What --
20 there may be an attack in one area and the counter-attack may occur at a
21 point of weakness along someone's lines 100 kilometres away, but for the
22 people 100 kilometres away, that counter-attack may appear as an attack.
23 So I think it's very hard to characterise what amounts to an attack or a
24 counterattack. I think it's much easier to characterise what the
25 obligations were with respect to the safe areas. Notwithstanding the
Page 13436
1 fact that the concept was never clarified to the point that we would have
2 liked, there were still some very obvious obligations with respect to the
3 safe area concept, and so I -- I don't want to go on because your
4 question didn't ask me that, but that's my view with respect to attack or
5 counter-attack.
6 Q. Thank you very much.
7 During the interview we agreed that the Serb army consisted of
8 the local population. Do you agree that these people who were liberating
9 right bank were actually freeing their own homes and they stayed at their
10 homes as they were wearing civilian clothes.
11 A. I think we agreed or I agreed during the interview that the
12 Bosnian Serb Army had members within it including those fighting in areas
13 very close to their original homes and that could have an impact on their
14 feelings.
15 With respect to the -- the soldiers in the Bosnian Serb Army that
16 were fighting in Gorazde, in and around Gorazde in April 1994, I, myself,
17 do not know the composition of those forces but I certainly acknowledge
18 the possibility that some of the forces were originally from that area.
19 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to put a document before you that
20 unfortunately has not been translated yet. It has been sent out to be
21 translated, though.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can the previous document
23 be admitted?
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1155, Your Honours.
Page 13437
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. May I draw your attention and the attention of all the
4 participants to paragraph 24 of your statement, which says that you were
5 shown a document that refers to Mladic's order that VRS soldiers within a
6 3-kilometre zone should change into civilian clothes. And then your
7 interpretation is, I'm going to read it out in English:
8 [In English] "This is consistent with my recollection of Bosnian
9 Serb behaviour toward international agreements during this period. As
10 the document demonstrates, they were both audacious and arrogant, they
11 thought they could get away with everything."
12 [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Banbury, is this not a bit of a sign
13 of ill will towards the Serbs?
14 A. Dr. Karadzic, I think there was tremendous ill will shown by the
15 Bosnian Serbs toward UNPROFOR, and there were countless commitments made
16 to us that were not respected and I don't believe there was ever any
17 intention to respect them at the time they were made, so my -- I never
18 had any ill will to any party in the conflict. I did have views toward
19 the parties with respect to how they treated UNPROFOR and how they
20 conducted themselves in the conflict. I don't think this shows ill will,
21 I think that reflected the situation at the time.
22 Q. But the soldiers remaining in that zone was something that had
23 been agreed upon with the UN, that they would stop being soldiers, that
24 they should change into civilian clothes and that they should protect
25 their homes and families by way of their own presence. The document that
Page 13438
1 confirms this is 1D2991. It seems to me that you haven't actually been
2 told everything and that you did not really know about everything from
3 the military sphere; right?
4 A. I am certainly sure that I was not told everything and am not
5 aware of everything that happened in the military sphere.
6 Q. We haven't received the translation yet but I shall read this,
7 not all of it, just the first line:
8 "On the 27th of April, 1994, at a joint meeting between the
9 representatives of the VK RS with the representatives of the United
10 Nations, Mr. de Mello and General Soubirou, it was stated that the
11 cease-fire agreement in Gorazde had been attained and an agreement
12 reached between Mr. Akashi and President Karadzic was fully carried out
13 in accordance with what had been agreed upon and Security Council
14 Resolution 913. The representatives of the UN had only two minor
15 objections. Namely, first of all, that not all soldiers of the VRS were
16 removed from the zone of 3 kilometres on the right bank, and the zone
17 from the villages of Gornje Kolijevke and Rahla, and secondly, that in
18 the zone of the right bank of the river, there is an enormous number of
19 RS policemen and that they were treating UNPROFOR arrogantly."
20 The next paragraph says, it was agreed -- it was agreed that
21 soldiers of the VRS shall wear civilian clothes in the mentioned areas
22 with the explanation that these are local persons who have no other
23 clothing because their village had been razed to the ground by the
24 Muslims. It was also agreed upon that part of the policemen who are
25 locals would change into civilian clothing and that all problems with
Page 13439
1 UNPROFOR would be resolved by way of agreement.
2 Can we look at the last page, it says "Strictly confidential."
3 On the first page it says "Strictly confidential, very urgent," there is
4 a code number as well. And on the last page it says "Major-General
5 Milan Gvero," who attended this meeting with Mr. de Mello and
6 General Soubirou on behalf of General Mladic.
7 Had you known about this agreement, your assessment regarding the
8 presence of these soldiers that were turned into civilians would have
9 been different, probably; right?
10 A. I do not agree with the characterisation of the agreement. I am
11 aware that, from the UNPROFOR perspective, we agreed with the Bosnian
12 Serb authorities that military or police personnel could stay in the
13 3-kilometre zone on the right bank of the Drina if they not only took off
14 their uniform, if they left those forces. They were not supposed to
15 be -- if they left the military, they left the police, they became
16 civilians, then of course they could stay in their homes. They could not
17 simply take off their uniforms and continue conducting themselves as
18 members of the forces, of the military or police forces. The key
19 distinction for us was that they had to leave the police force or the
20 military.
21 And as is clear here, the -- the Bosnian Serb authorities had a
22 very different interpretation, in my view probably a deliberate one,
23 which was to evade the obligation to get their forces out of the
24 3-kilometre zone. The idea wasn't what clothes they were wearing and the
25 ruse that they -- all their civilian clothes were gone, we never believed
Page 13440
1 that for a moment. Despite being told that at the time, we never
2 believed that. Our interest was to get all Bosnian Serb forces, no
3 matter what clothes they were wearing, outside of the 3-kilometre zone.
4 This document here makes clear that the Bosnian Serbs were trying to get
5 around that obligation.
6 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Banbury, that when a man comes and frees his
7 home after two years, that you don't have the heart or the right to send
8 him away from there? Do you agree that it's a very sensitive issue? You
9 don't have the right to send him away from there and you don't have the
10 heart to do it either?
11 A. I agree it's a very sensitive issue. It was a very, very
12 difficult issue for the Serb population on the right bank of the Drina.
13 Nonetheless, it was the UNPROFOR view that there needed to be a
14 withdrawal of all Serb forces from a 3-kilometre zone. We decided that
15 we should allow men to stay behind, including with their weapons if they
16 chose to, but the condition for them staying behind was that they had to
17 leave the military or police forces.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this for
20 identification only, and the translation is coming soon.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification pending
22 English translation.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1156, Your Honours.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3420, please.
25 This is a document of the UNPROFOR Zagreb HQ of the 6th of May,
Page 13441
1 1994.
2 Can we look at the fifth page from this one, please.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Can you look at this assessment and look at this part that is
5 boxed in:
6 [In English] "The BiH apparently attempted to provoke an incident
7 between the BSA and an element of Ukrainian Battalion 2. However, the
8 arrival and deployment of additional troops will help maintain order in
9 the town as well as ensure enforcement of UN resolutions."
10 [Interpretation] Do you agree that as early as May, the
11 6th of May, after all of our withdrawals, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was
12 trying to cause a conflict between the Serbs and the Ukrainian battalion
13 and that this was remarked upon by the United Nations?
14 A. The report says "apparently attempted to provoke an incident." I
15 am personally not familiar with that incident, whether it was ever
16 confirmed that that was the intention. So I have a hard time commenting
17 on that particular incident.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 10 of this
19 document, please.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Can you look at this document where they are informing about
22 convoys, and then it says three convoys were turned back by the Serbs
23 that were going to Srebrenica. So this would then be part of the report
24 that Serbs were creating obstacles for the convoys; is that correct? Two
25 were refused for Gorazde and three for Srebrenica.
Page 13442
1 A. Yes, that's information that conveys some of the problems, a very
2 small portion of the problems we had with respect to our convoys to
3 Srebrenica and Gorazde.
4 Q. This table doesn't state anything about the reasons, does it?
5 A. No.
6 Q. But you would recall from the previous page that there was an
7 incident there caused by the B&H Army between the Serbs and the
8 Ukrainians in relation to Gorazde, this is what we were reading a bit
9 earlier?
10 A. The report referred to an apparent effort to provoke an incident,
11 yes.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at the last page,
14 please.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Here is the summary [In English] of convoys requested from
17 headquarters Pale for 6th of May, 1994.
18 [Interpretation] Confirmations 16, refusals 4, no answer none,
19 and so on and so forth. So 20 per cent were refused.
20 Can you look at the bottom, please, what it says in paragraph 2,
21 DutchBat number so and so:
22 [In English] "The Muslim forces have not ceased their combat
23 activities onto the RS territory. Until yet you have nothing done to
24 prevent this activities. Whatever reasons you may have, your safety on
25 the RS territory is in that way directly endangered."
Page 13443
1 [Interpretation] So we have confirmation that those two convoys
2 for Gorazde were stopped because of an incident, and now we have
3 confirmation that the three that were stopped that were going to
4 Srebrenica for the reason that the Muslim side was carrying out attacks
5 on Republika Srpska territory from Srebrenica, because DutchBat was in
6 Srebrenica, wasn't it?
7 A. I am sorry, Dr. Karadzic, I don't agree that we have confirmation
8 those are the reasons the convoys were blocked because of the incident or
9 the alleged incident in Gorazde or because the Bosnian government forces
10 in Srebrenica were engaged in combat activities.
11 With all due respect, I think it was UNPROFOR's decision, not the
12 Bosnian Serbs, to decide whether or not our convoys were to proceed to
13 the safe areas or to the enclaves in the east. It was a very clear and
14 unambiguous obligation on the part of the Bosnian Serb authorities to let
15 our convoys proceed based on the Security Council resolutions and the
16 obligations with respect to our freedom of movement. The Bosnian Serbs
17 came up with a million different reasons to block our convoys. In our
18 view, none were ever acceptable.
19 Q. Thank you. After the break we are going to deal with the
20 convoys. All I wanted to say was that this document, the table, does not
21 give any reasons, and then we can see in the rest of the document reasons
22 are given that could be taken into consideration.
23 But, Mr. Banbury, every time rejection of a convoy received an
24 explanation, an explanation was given. Isn't it correct that the Serbs
25 did state their reasons? Regardless of whether you accept that or not,
Page 13444
1 the Serbs gave a reason, the reason was either your security or the
2 security or safety of the Army of Republika Srpska?
3 A. It was normal practice for the Bosnian Serbs to give a reason for
4 the rejection. It was not always the case that we received a reason, but
5 the point is there was never, ever, a case where any of those reasons
6 were viewed as acceptable by UNPROFOR.
7 Q. Thank you. But you do not dispute, in any event, that it was our
8 right to determine the conditions under which convoys would move through
9 our territory, through our lines, I'm talking about humanitarian aid and
10 other forms of aid? I mean, we did have the right to do that under the
11 Geneva Conventions; no?
12 A. I disagree entirely with that proposition. The Security Council
13 made very clear in its resolutions that UNPROFOR and humanitarian
14 organisations were entitled to total freedom of movement, and it was not
15 up to the Bosnian Serb authorities at all to restrict our freedom of
16 movement. That was a consistent violation of the obligations of the
17 Bosnian Serbs. Nor was it UNPROFOR's obligation to provide justification
18 for our convoys. The entire convoy regime was totally inconsistent with
19 the obligations imposed upon the parties by the Security Council.
20 Q. Mr. Banbury, we don't have time to look at the Geneva Conventions
21 and other documents that predate UN Security Council resolutions that
22 give us the right to approve and to inspect, but if we have time we will
23 show it. We did tender the Geneva Convention, that section of it that
24 regulates that question.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we admit this document,
Page 13445
1 please.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1157, Your Honours.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3421, please.
5 1D3421.
6 MS. EDGERTON: That wasn't one of the 152 documents we received
7 notification on.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I ask for your kind understanding.
9 Perhaps it just slipped through. We did have the intention to candidate
10 it.
11 JUDGE KWON: Has it been uploaded?
12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
13 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it has been released. So shall you
14 move on to another topic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We will come back to
16 that then. It has been uploaded. We will see it in a minute.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is the 11th of May, from Andreev to Akashi. It's an
19 analysis of the evolving relationship between the B&H government and
20 UNPROFOR. Can you please look at the third paragraph:
21 [In English] "The sense of frustration was much greater following
22 the virtual repeat of the Sarajevo experience in Gorazde. It is apparent
23 that certain circles within the BH government, probably led by
24 Prime Minister Silajdzic, put much at stake politically in their gamble
25 in Gorazde. The evolution of events created heightened expectations,
Page 13446
1 false ones as it turned out, that finally the international community was
2 going to enter into the conflict as a combatant on the BH side. These
3 expectations were passed on to the population through inflammatory
4 statements by the BH officials, and often biased press reports."
5 [Interpretation] And a little bit lower:
6 [In English] "The BH again failed to obtain what is perhaps its
7 primary short-term objective, despite having been so close."
8 [Interpretation] Can we look at the following page.
9 [In English] "The comments coming from BH government directed
10 primarily against the special representative of Secretary-General needs
11 to be seen. These comments, including calls for the special
12 representative resignation, are an attempt by the BH government to assign
13 blame for its own inability to draw the international community into the
14 conflict as a combatant."
15 [Interpretation] And the next paragraph:
16 [In English] "... because it is politically untenable to assert
17 as an objective the participation of the UN/NATO as combatants in the
18 conflict, a pretext was needed. The transit of BSA tanks through the
19 Sarajevo total exclusion zone is simply being exploited by the BH in its
20 quest to divert the attention and blame for the failure to draw the
21 international community into the conflict on the BH side."
22 [Interpretation] And the last page. The last page, please. The
23 last paragraph at the bottom, the last two sentences:
24 [In English] "... were the population to have a better
25 understanding of UNPROFOR's proper role, as defined by the UN Security
Page 13447
1 Council, public opinion might be less subject to manipulation in ways
2 detrimental to our work on the ground."
3 [Interpretation] Was this something that the chief of your
4 civilian sector sent, during the time that you were there, to Akashi, and
5 were these the concerns of the civilian sector?
6 A. Yes. Mr. Andreev sent that to Mr. Akashi at a time when I was
7 working with Mr. Andreev in Sarajevo and I think the document does
8 reflect some of Mr. Andreev's concerns.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we admit this?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1158, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3422.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. If you agree, this is a self-explanatory document. It explains
15 itself so I didn't want to analyse it any further. We have to save time.
16 Do you agree that this is a document sent from Annan to Akashi on
17 the 23rd of May, 1994, and it relates to the situation in Gorazde; is
18 that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Can you please look at the document and then I'm going to
21 introduce the second paragraph.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the following page,
23 please, if you've read this one.
24 THE WITNESS: I have not read the second paragraph yet.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 13448
1 Q. Well, I can help a little bit.
2 A. Okay, finished.
3 Q. Would you agree that Mr. Annan is aware that the media are ready
4 to distort the picture? Would you agree with that?
5 A. I think Mr. Annan and UN officials in general were well aware
6 that the media did not always accurately depict events on the ground,
7 yeah. That's a constant problem with the media.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we now look at the
10 highlighted portions of the text.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. There is an objection by Mr. Gharekhan here and he states:
13 [In English] "I should like to inform you that on 21st of May,
14 following several hours of negotiations laid by the force commander,
15 General de Lapresle, an agreement was signed by General Rose with
16 General Milovanovic of the Serb military leadership relating to the
17 situation in and around Gorazde. In principal points of this agreement
18 as -- the principal points of this agreement are as follows ..."
19 [Interpretation] And now we can all look at the bullet points.
20 And it states here, the second paragraph from this one, that the
21 agreement is to be signed by the government of the army -- by the
22 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and it is also meant to oblige the local
23 Bosnian Army commander not to undertake any offensive actions or forward
24 troop movements into this area.
25 And then the next paragraph states:
Page 13449
1 "However, the government side has so far refused to sign the
2 agreement."
3 So you did, after all, ask the government to sign the agreement,
4 isn't that right?
5 A. This is at the end of May in 1994 and it was a different
6 situation and a different time than in April 1994, but in this case, yes,
7 we were asking the Bosnian government to undertake certain commitments
8 with respect to Gorazde, yes.
9 Q. It states here:
10 [In English] "However, the government side so far refused to sign
11 an agreement which has therefore not yet come into effect."
12 [Interpretation] And then lower down:
13 [In English] "BSA forces have withdrawn from the north side of
14 the river Drina. Forces of the army of the government of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina attempted to move to these vacated positions, but
16 UNPROFOR did not permit them to do so. UNPROFOR itself will deploy in
17 this area."
18 [Interpretation] And the last paragraph on this page:
19 [In English] "There are misleading press reports about Serbs
20 reinforcing within the 3-kilometre zone. These are incorrect. In fact,
21 there is no change within 3-kilometre zone, but outside it, at the
22 confrontation line, they have withdrawn in some areas and reinforced
23 their positions in others."
24 [Interpretation] Do you know Mr. Gharekhan, and do you know about
25 these issues?
Page 13450
1 A. Yes, I know Mr. Gharekhan and, yes, I'm familiar with these
2 issues.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1159, Your Honours.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now briefly look at D707.
7 It's already been admitted. I just would like Mr. Banbury to see what
8 the other side is doing at the same time.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. This is a document of the Muslim side and the topic is Gorazde.
11 I assume that there is a translation because -- yes. You can see here
12 after this operation career and with the intention of getting some
13 activities going:
14 "In order to alleviate the situation in Podrinje and create the
15 basic prerequisites for a long-term resolution of this complex problem, I
16 hereby propose, 1, urgently organise the 8th Corps, (including the units
17 in Srebrenica, Zepa, and Operations Group Pazaric) as announced."
18 Then four names are propose for possible commanders.
19 "The above-named commander should take a group of officers to
20 Gorazde and a unit that should have at least 200 well-equipped soldiers."
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page,
22 please.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Can you please look at paragraph 4:
25 "Significant financial support should be approved and they should
Page 13451
1 be taught to use UNPROFOR as a supplier." And then deliver MTS
2 especially for anti-armour combat to them with special transport, and so
3 on and so forth.
4 Mr. Banbury, would this be the reason for the concern of the
5 Army of Republika Srpska regarding the transports entering the safe
6 areas? This is an instruction from the highest levels to instruct the
7 forces how to use the presence of UNPROFOR for purposes of procurement or
8 supply?
9 A. I can understand the concern. I don't know what they are
10 referring to in paragraph 4, but yes, I can understand the concern.
11 Q. May I draw your attention to what Mr. Izetbegovic wrote at the
12 bottom. I agree more or less with everything except item 2, which refers
13 to the commanders, but he does agree with everything else. And that is
14 the reason, Mr. Banbury, why the Serbian Army must control and impose
15 restrictions regarding the materiel that could possibly be used against
16 it. This is the duty and the task of every army. First of all, to take
17 care of its own security. Is that correct?
18 A. From the UNPROFOR perspective, the primary duties and obligations
19 came from the Security Council resolutions, and the Security Council
20 resolutions demanded that all parties provide UNPROFOR with freedom of
21 movement.
22 Q. We would agree in the -- in your interview and you also mention
23 that at other occasions that I, as the civilian head of state and the
24 army, was not informed about tactical matters. Do you agree that the
25 civilian head must not conclude any agreement that would jeopardise the
Page 13452
1 security of his own army and that he has to allow his officers to do
2 that?
3 A. I think it's normal that the civilian -- that the head of the
4 civilian authority would not normally be involved in tactical military
5 issues or agreements related to tactical matters. What is tactical, what
6 is strategic is a separate issue.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it time for the break or should
9 I continue?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll have a break for half an hour.
11 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Banbury, we have to move away from the issue of Gorazde
17 because there are many other topics we need to cover. Therefore, I wish
18 to remind you that in many paragraphs of your statement, such as 16, 33,
19 43, 44, 65, 69, and 71, through to 172, you dealt a lot with humanitarian
20 issues such as utilities, UNPROFOR's freedom of movement, the airport,
21 and blue and other routes. Due to a lack of time, I will try to
22 summarise because this is all to the detriment of Defence, but I will try
23 to summarise as much as I can.
24 First of all, I wish to present you a document, it's D143, which
25 gives an overview of the movement of convoys in the year 1994. D143.
Page 13453
1 Please read it, I do not wish to read it, I will just summarise so that
2 we can save some time.
3 As you can see, this is an overview of convoys for the year 1994
4 and it says here which check-points they passed through and what were the
5 elements and on the basis of what these convoys were searched.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see the next page
7 now. Here we can see there's a section about behaviour and abuse of
8 mandate by UNPROFOR.
9 Can we also turn to the next page in Serbian.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Please have a look, I will read this for you:
12 "In 1994, as previously, checks mostly revealed the following
13 attempts at abuse: Transport of goods which are not permitted at all in
14 UNPROFOR convoys, transport of goods which do not constitute humanitarian
15 aid in convoys of humanitarian organisations, transport of goods in
16 quantities greater than those permitted."
17 Anyone can read it. Please let's look at the passage beginning
18 with the word "understandably":
19 "Understandably, most cases of attempted smuggling of goods were
20 in the convoys for Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde ..."
21 And it's then mentioned what was most often smuggled, video
22 cameras, cameras, weapons, radios, satellite equipment and antennas,
23 signal equipment, optical instruments, instruments for recording during
24 the night, gear oil, anti-freeze, oxygen bottles, protective vests,
25 helmets and on and so forth.
Page 13454
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please move on to the next
2 page in Serbian.
3 There is no doubt that there would have been very few attempts to
4 smuggle non-permitted goods if these had been confiscated permanently at
5 the check-points. It was confiscated but then it was also given back
6 when the convoys returned. Then the person who is making the analysis
7 says that it would have been better if it had been confiscated
8 permanently because then there would have been fewer attempts to smuggle
9 these goods.
10 Can we now please see the table which is at the end of this
11 document.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Here is the overview, these are thousands of tonnes, for example,
14 the first one: 5.051 tonnes of flour, 381 tonnes of beans, and so on and
15 so forth. Sugar, 180 tonnes and so on.
16 Were you informed, Mr. Banbury, that goods which were not
17 reported were smuggled in these convoys and which do not belong to the
18 sort of goods that the UNPROFOR needed?
19 A. I believe that this document reflects very well the fundamental
20 problem and disagreement between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb
21 authorities, on the one hand, and also UNPROFOR and UNHCR with respect to
22 humanitarian goods. The document characterises goods that are not
23 permitted and lists things like weapons, optical devices, oxygen bottles.
24 It was UNPROFOR's absolute belief or conviction that we were
25 allowed to transport weapons for personnel, our military personnel into
Page 13455
1 Srebrenica, that we were allowed to bring in optical devices like
2 binoculars, also radio sets. These are standard, basic, military
3 equipment that you -- the United Nations provides to its peacekeepers
4 around the world, and in my current role as Assistant Secretary-General
5 for Field Support I'm responsible for in part providing UN peacekeeping
6 forces with equipment around the world. This is basic, standard
7 equipment for UN peacekeepers. The notion that they are not permitted
8 was purely a -- something manufactured by the Bosnian Serbs. We never
9 agreed to it. And it was an absolute violation of their responsibilities
10 under the Security Council mandate to block such goods from going in.
11 The question with respect to -- and I also note that oxygen
12 bottles were called unpermitted goods. Oxygen was there to treat wounded
13 soldiers or soldiers who had some type of medical problem and could have
14 an important role in stabilising them pending a medical evacuation. I
15 also know for a fact that there were many times when medical evacuation
16 requests for UN soldiers in the enclaves were denied by Bosnian Serbs and
17 requests to evacuate people by helicopter were denied and we had to bring
18 in an ambulance which meant extra hours and hours until the soldiers were
19 able to receive proper medical care. Oxygen could be the difference
20 between life and death. So the notion that somehow the Bosnian Serbs had
21 the right to determine that oxygen was not permitted into the enclaves
22 for UN medical purposes for our soldiers, I find totally unacceptable.
23 With respect to the humanitarian assistance, I also, as was
24 indicated in the very opening of my appearance here, served for six years
25 as the Asia regional director for the United Nations World Food
Page 13456
1 Programme, a humanitarian organisation. I believe it is the role of
2 humanitarian organisations to determine what is humanitarian assistance,
3 as well as the quantities required to provide for the civilian population
4 in an area where they are in need of assistance.
5 So I do not agree at all that items that UNHCR characterised as
6 humanitarian assistance could be determined otherwise by the Bosnian Serb
7 authorities. And I also do not agree at all that the quantities
8 required, as determined by UNHCR, were somehow subject to a separate
9 determination on the part of the Bosnian Serb authorities.
10 Q. And do you know that the agreement was that this had to be
11 reported, so why were the goods not listed on a declaration form but
12 then, rather, there were oxygen bottles that were full of gun powder? Do
13 you know that oxygen bottles were used for smuggling explosives in
14 humanitarian and UNPROFOR convoys and usually these bottles were not even
15 listed on the declaration form?
16 A. It was not an agreement that the items would be listed on the
17 declaration form. It was a requirement imposed by the Bosnian Serb
18 authorities under protests from the United Nations because we had no
19 choice but to comply with, in my view, unjust obligations imposed by the
20 Bosnian Serb authorities with respect to the convoys. We did list the --
21 the material on the convoys. It's entirely possible that because of the
22 very onerous bureaucratic requirements that were imposed upon us, the
23 huge number of convoys providing logistical support, food, fuel,
24 ammunition, weapons, et cetera, for large military contingents is a huge
25 operation, complex logistical operation, with many -- and I do this now
Page 13457
1 professionally, this is my job. There's a lot of material, spare parts,
2 et cetera, et cetera. I'm sure that because of the detailed nature of
3 the bureaucratic requirements that were at the insistence of the Bosnian
4 Serb authorities, no doubt UNPROFOR made some errors at times and didn't
5 include everything that ended up on a convoy. What was prepared on a
6 piece of paper 48 hours earlier in one location and what was put on the
7 convoys at another location 48 hours later, when the soldiers were
8 getting ready to go, and they hadn't included something, it's entirely --
9 in fact I would say inevitable that mistakes were made, honest mistake
10 without any ill intention.
11 As for the proposition that oxygen bottles were used to smuggle
12 gun powder or explosives, I'm unaware of any case of that and I don't
13 believe that UNPROFOR intentionally smuggled gun powder in an oxygen
14 bottle ever once during the course of the war.
15 Q. Thank you. We'll have an occasion to see that and we already had
16 one. But can you please tell me this: Do you want to say that the
17 UNPROFOR and UNHCR did not smuggle goods that were not permitted and that
18 these convoys were not abused in order to supply our opponents, the other
19 warring party, with war materiel? You can just answer that with yes or
20 no, if you don't mind?
21 A. I do not agree that there were goods that were permitted or not
22 permitted from the UNPROFOR perspective, so the notion that UNPROFOR or
23 UNHCR smuggled non-permitted goods is not a proposition that I can accept
24 because it was up to UNPROFOR, on the one hand, and UNHCR, on the other,
25 to determine what was necessary for the conduct of our responsibilities.
Page 13458
1 Q. And do you deny that one warring party which allows
2 transportation to cross through its territory and its lines to set the
3 conditions under which this would be done, would you deny that this is
4 part of the Geneva Conventions, I thinks protocol 3, which allows a
5 warring party to determine that? Is a warring party which lets convoys
6 pass through allowed to determine the conditions? Don't speak as an
7 American now but, rather, as a representative the United Nations.
8 A. I'm not an expert on the Geneva Conventions. I do know that the
9 Geneva Conventions do not apply to UNPROFOR. This was with respect --
10 Geneva Conventions applied to humanitarian assistance. The Security
11 Council, acting under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which can
12 oblige member states to act in a certain way and create binding legal
13 international obligations on parties, made very clear that UNPROFOR was
14 to be -- and UNHCR were to be entitled freedom of movement to carry out
15 their responsibilities. We were never granted that freedom of movement
16 including with respect to the convoys in the case of Bosnian Serb
17 territory.
18 Q. Mr. Banbury, freedom of movement was provided but not without
19 control and this is our misunderstanding. You think more like an
20 American, that you are allowed to do whatever you want, wherever you
21 come, but you cannot -- in a sovereign state, you cannot act differently
22 than it was agreed on the basis of various norms. Geneva Conventions are
23 more important here than resolutions of the Security Council, isn't that
24 so?
25 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.
Page 13459
1 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, yes, Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON: It's argumentative and not an appropriate remark
3 to make with respect to this witness, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE MORRISON: Ms. Edgerton, it's all of those things and it's
5 also an attempt by the back door to give evidence yet again.
6 JUDGE KWON: Nevertheless, I trust that the witness is able to
7 answer the question. Do you remember the question?
8 THE WITNESS: I can read it on the transcript, Your Honour.
9 Dr. Karadzic, the restrictions imposed upon UNPROFOR and UNHCR
10 for our activities on territory controlled by the Bosnian Serb
11 authorities were never subject to an agreement. They were constantly
12 under protest by UNPROFOR and UNHCR and indeed at higher levels. The
13 obligations created by Security Council resolutions were paramount and
14 they imposed the requirement for the parties to provide UNPROFOR with
15 full freedom of movement. They repeatedly -- several resolutions
16 insisted upon the access by humanitarian organisations, unfettered access
17 by humanitarian organisations to populations in need. Those obligations
18 were not respected.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you. The misunderstanding will relate to unlimited access,
21 whether there was control or not. Please don't be angry with me. I envy
22 you because, as an American, you can think as you do. I did not wish to
23 be insulting when I made remarks about Americans.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have a look briefly
25 at D695 so that we can see that this was a subject of communication
Page 13460
1 constantly between Mr. Akashi and myself. The document is D695.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Please have a look at this letter which I address to Mr. Akashi
4 on the 24th of June, 1994. And where it says that there was such abuse
5 and also the freedom of movement is discussed, as well as the relations
6 with the Republika Srpska.
7 [In English] "I need hardly remind you that the recent Geneva
8 agreement has provided for cessation of hostilities and the exchange of
9 prisoners. The Muslims are completely ignoring their signature over this
10 agreement."
11 [Interpretation] And a bit lower:
12 [In English] "Apart from this, UNPROFOR forces take little notice
13 of the agreed procedure (for example, undecided [sic] goods and
14 equipment) and display unacceptable behaviour, as if they are an
15 enemy [sic] of occupation. What is even worse, UNPROFOR is allowing the
16 Muslims to use its observation posts and there have been many occasions
17 when the blue helmets have used artillery to fire at Serb positions. I
18 ask you to use your influence in order for UNPROFOR to act in a manner
19 that will inspire Serb confidence. But I shall do everything in my power
20 to remove any obstacles of the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR. Equally,
21 as we are in a very delicate phase, I would like to ask you to try to
22 ensure that no unnecessary problems are being created by UNPROFOR."
23 [Interpretation] You can see still today that we would continue
24 to have misunderstanding not before [as interpreted] one or the other
25 side was evil, but because there was a misunderstanding concerning the
Page 13461
1 mandate. Would you agree that we agreed to your presence under one
2 specific mandate? Yes or no?
3 A. I don't know that you ever really agreed to our presence. In
4 some respects you did and in some respects you didn't.
5 Q. Well, you couldn't have been there if we hadn't given our
6 approval. And do you know that our request was that you could not change
7 the initial mandate without our approval?
8 A. Yes, I know that was the view, your view and the view of the
9 Bosnian Serb authorities, but the mandate was not a question for
10 UNPROFOR, it was only a matter to be determined by the Security Council.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see D966 just for a
12 short time.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. As we are dealing with humanitarian issues, please focus on this
15 one, it's the 29th of June, 1994. It's a weekly situation report sent by
16 Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we now please see page 4 of
18 this document.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. You can look at the first frame, Sarajevo averaged and so on. We
21 can see that the Muslim side violated the cease-fire by targeting Serbian
22 position and that the Serbian Army was restraining from responding. Were
23 you aware of this?
24 A. I was probably aware of that incident at that time. I, at this
25 time, do not recall offhand that particular incident, but I assume that
Page 13462
1 it took place as described in the UNPROFOR document.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have page 6, please.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Here it is. I will read something which begins with "The
6 effect," it's the penultimate passage in the second sentence:
7 "The effect of SDA moves to consolidate power against opponents
8 in Bihac, Tuzla and even in Sarajevo [In English] such as by purges of
9 non-Muslim and independent Muslims from official positions, also means
10 ever less restraint on the Bosnian Army's non-compliance with the
11 cessation of hostilities agreement and on the government's media and
12 diplomatic campaign against UNPROFOR."
13 [Interpretation] So, Mr. Banbury, is it clear that the Muslim
14 side violated all cease-fire agreements to our detriment and even to the
15 detriment of the United Nations?
16 A. The Bosnian government side was often in non-compliance with
17 various agreements including, in this case, the cease-fire agreement.
18 I'm not aware of a single agreement in Bosnia during the UNPROFOR time
19 that was ever fully respected.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now please see
21 1D3429.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. In your statement you said that we closed down the airport
24 because we simply wished to show who was the boss and who was controlling
25 everything in Sarajevo; isn't that so?
Page 13463
1 A. I think in my statement I referred to a quote by you where you
2 had said, through a press outlet, that you had decided to shut down the
3 Sarajevo airport to show the world who was in control.
4 Q. Well, we can agree about the first part, Mr. Banbury, but let's
5 have a look at the second part as well. Let's see what I noted as the
6 reasons.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 4 of this
8 document.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Paragraph (c):
11 [In English] "Dr. Karadzic has passed on communique through BH
12 civil affairs that BSA intend closing airport crossings for civilian
13 traffic. Reasons given as continued smuggling of arms by BiH, continued
14 sniping by BiH, BiH refusal to implement prisoner of war exchange, and
15 BiH failure to honour cessation of hostilities."
16 [Interpretation] These were the reasons, Mr. Banbury, rather than
17 just showing that we were the ones who ruled. Were these the precise
18 reasons as noted here?
19 A. I believe this passage refers to the so-called blue routes that
20 used airport territory. This passage does not refer to closing the
21 airport for flights but, rather, the blue routes that allowed civilians
22 to pass from one territory to the other or from one side of
23 Bosnian-controlled territory to the other through the airport. And these
24 are the reasons you stated at the time for closing of those blue routes.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted,
Page 13464
1 please?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1160, Your Honours.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 1D3427.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. This is a document --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Can the accused please repeat.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters didn't hear you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. I wanted to identify the document, that it's dated the
11 11th of July, Viktor Andreev is writing to Sergio Vieira de Mello and it
12 was drafted by Tony Banbury. Do we agree about this?
13 A. Yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us have page 4, please.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Paragraphs 10 and 11:
17 [In English] "The utilities situation in the city continues to
18 improve, with an emphasis being placed on water-supply due to the hot
19 water. There is enough electricity being produced to meet the needs of
20 the entire city, but cut-offs still occur for as of yet inexplicable and
21 apparently non-technical reasons.
22 "Sniping remains the greatest danger in Sarajevo, with lives of
23 innocent civilians still being lost on both sides of the confrontation
24 line on a regular basis to this insidious menace."
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.
Page 13465
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. [In English] "Prices in Sarajevo markets remain low due to steady
3 access of commercial convoys to the city. Use of blue routes also remain
4 high."
5 [Interpretation] Mr. Banbury, was it clear to you that all these
6 commercial goods could only get in via Serb-held territory and that both
7 commercial goods and humanitarian aid arrived in at least 80 per cent of
8 the quantities that had originally been envisaged?
9 A. The -- the movement of commercial goods in and out of Sarajevo
10 and indeed humanitarian goods varied according to different times in the
11 war. Sometimes access was relatively good, sometimes it was not. At
12 this point in time with the blue routes open, commercial goods were being
13 allowed to transit the blue routes with agreement of the Bosnian Serb
14 authorities, and those commercial goods, as indicated on paragraph 13,
15 had a positive impact on the situation in the city.
16 It's also the case that humanitarian goods were able to move in
17 and out of the city at this time with a positive impact. It was not
18 always that way, but at this point in time, in the week of 3 to
19 9 July 1994, that was the case.
20 Q. Thank you. This is what I'm putting to you, Mr. Banbury, that
21 even incidents that were frequent and violations of the cease-fire did
22 not lead to impediments in terms of life in the city itself. The
23 impediments were caused by the activity of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
24 from the city of Sarajevo. Do you understand that?
25 A. The impediments to life in the city of Sarajevo with respect to
Page 13466
1 humanitarian goods, commercial goods, risk to civilians were always
2 caused by the Bosnian Serb authorities and Bosnian Serb military. The
3 reasons why the Bosnian Serb authorities, the Bosnian military may have
4 decided to cause those impediments and why they fluctuated from time to
5 time, I'm sure those reasons varied and had a lot to with activities of
6 the Bosnian government and the Bosnian military. Nonetheless, the
7 impediments were caused by the Bosnian Serb authorities and Bosnian Serb
8 military.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1161, Your Honours.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. As regards 11, sniper activity:
14 [In English] "Sniping remains the greatest danger in Sarajevo,
15 with lives of innocent civilians still being lost on both sides of the
16 confrontation line on a regular basis to this insidious menace."
17 [Interpretation] Do you find this acceptable, from your document,
18 that there were deaths on both sides of the front line due to sniping, as
19 it was put here?
20 A. Absolutely not.
21 Q. Why did you write this? Oh, it must be a question of
22 interpretation. No, do you understand that that was the case? I mean,
23 of course that you do not say that that was so, but do you accept that
24 this is what the report says?
25 A. That is what the report says and that was happening at the time.
Page 13467
1 Q. Thank you. In one paragraph you say that Mladic confirmed -- in
2 response to the question as to why snipers were active in Sarajevo again,
3 he said that it was because somewhere the Muslims were not observing
4 their cease-fire. But then comes your interpretation, that Mladic
5 admitted that his snipers were firing at civilians. However, that is not
6 what his statement says.
7 And now could we briefly look at P1208.
8 While we are waiting for it, Mr. Banbury, do you agree that
9 sniper activity is legal? This is paragraph 94. That was paragraph 94
10 of your statement where you speak about that. 94 and 95.
11 You thought that Mladic explicitly:
12 [In English] "... explicit recognition by Mladic of BSA
13 responsibility for sniping is somewhat surprising."
14 In 95 you say:
15 [In English] "... they are admitting to use sniping civilians as
16 a punitive measure rather than for military gains."
17 [Interpretation] The problem does not lie in the document, the
18 problem lies in the interpretation. Can you indicate where it was that
19 Mladic admitted that, that there was sniper activity against civilians?
20 A. You, I think, asked me two questions. One was whether sniper
21 activity is legal. I am not an expert on the Laws of War, but I believe
22 in a military-to-military context it is, but I'm not sure. I am fairly
23 certain that sniping activity against civilians is illegal.
24 With respect to where Mladic admitted that there was sniper
25 activity against civilians, in the passage that you referred to where he
Page 13468
1 acknowledged sniping by his forces in the Sarajevo area, it was, in my
2 understanding, a reference to sniping against civilians because it was
3 always in the context of civilian casualties that we were raising sniping
4 with the Bosnian government as well as the Bosnian Serbs. We did not,
5 according to my recollection, really express concern or get involved or
6 object when it was military-on-military sniping. Maybe we may have
7 mentioned it as an issue on a rare occasion, but it was never -- I don't
8 recall ever having done so, it wasn't a priority. Sniping against
9 civilians was very high priority for us. We were working in many
10 different ways to try and limit it and protect civilians, and as the
11 earlier weekly report says, there were civilian deaths on both sides. So
12 it was clear that the Bosnian Serbs were targeting civilians in their
13 sniping and that was our big concern.
14 Q. That cannot be proven, Mr. Banbury. Those are opinions. An
15 example of a lack of understanding is paragraph 94, where there's a
16 reference to Mladic, and also 95. By way of interpretation you are
17 altering what actually happened to civilians.
18 Look at this order of the 30th of June, 1994. Paragraph 3 says,
19 in the strictest possible terms, enemy targets, (officers and soldiers)
20 enemy personnel. So it's officers and soldiers, and that is what Mladic
21 could have admitted, that there was intensified activities, sniper
22 activity, and he did not accept and he did not mention nor would he allow
23 that to be used against civilians. Isn't that right? In paragraph 94
24 there is no admission to that, that it pertains to civilians?
25 A. The -- the fact of Bosnian Serb military targeting innocent
Page 13469
1 civilians in Sarajevo through snipers is extremely well established. I
2 have no idea how many victims of sniping there were, innocent civilians,
3 but there were many, and it was an issue that we worked hard on. We
4 constantly raised it to the attention of yourself, of General Mladic, of
5 other senior Bosnian Serb authorities. There's no question that Bosnian
6 Serb military targeted civilians through sniping in Sarajevo.
7 Q. Do you believe that any gun-fire is sniper fire aimed at
8 civilians?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Do you accept that every one of these assertions with regard to
11 intentional targeting of civilians calls for an investigation to
12 establish who it was that did the firing, whether it was stray bullets or
13 whether it was intentional targeting of civilians? Do you agree that
14 that has to be established by way of an investigation?
15 A. UNPROFOR routinely investigated sniping incidents and sought to
16 determine to the best of our ability the -- or we routinely investigated
17 civilian deaths in Sarajevo caused by gun-fire and sought to establish to
18 the best of our ability the source of the gun-fire, in other words, the
19 direction and whether this was sniping or random gun-fire. The normal
20 personal weapon of soldiers in the Bosnian conflict had certain type of
21 calibre bullets. There wasn't only one weapon but it was the bullets
22 were of a certain calibre. Sniping bullets are of a different calibre,
23 different nature, and as I understand it, though I'm not an expert, cause
24 different kinds of wounds, and so it was normally possible for UNPROFOR
25 investigators to determine whether the -- there was a -- whether the
Page 13470
1 death was caused by sniper fire or was random gun-fire. And I know for a
2 fact that we were able to establish on many occasions that civilian
3 casualties caused by gun-fire were caused by direct sniper fire. And by
4 the way, it wasn't just civilian casualties, there were UNPROFOR soldiers
5 killed by sniper fire.
6 Q. Are you trying to say -- actually, please, for the sake of time,
7 I will really have to ask you to stay tomorrow as well because there are
8 so many subjects that we haven't even touched upon. Are you trying to
9 say that more civilians were killed by sniper fire than by stray bullets,
10 random gun-fire?
11 A. No, I'm sorry if my response was confusing. I am not trying to
12 say that. I'm trying to -- I'm saying that UNPROFOR was able to
13 establish in many cases in Sarajevo that civilians were killed by sniper
14 fire.
15 Q. Can you give the OTP those findings, they would appreciate it
16 highly. These findings where it was established beyond any doubt that it
17 was the Serbs that did the firing. That would be very good and very
18 useful because that would actually refute your assertions. And I have to
19 struggle against them because they are just sweeping statements.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, unnecessary comments on your part.
21 It's argumentative. Come to your question.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we then please have D827.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Please have a look at this, what General van Baal is writing to
25 Jovan Divjak on the 13th of August and the 15th of August. First we are
Page 13471
1 going to deal with the 13th of August --
2 JUDGE KWON: Let us wait until we have the document.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Please focus on this, on the 13th of August, General van Baal is
5 writing to General Divjak, and he is saying what led to the closing of
6 the airport and to delays in flights and closing the UNHCR air-lift. And
7 it says:
8 "Even though you have given assurances to this command of free
9 and unimpeded use of the airport, it again turned out that these three
10 bullets fired from territory held by the RBiH Army resulted in the
11 suspension of air-lifts which are used to provide food to people. In
12 essence, this was an irrational act." And so on and so forth.
13 Can we now have D828.
14 Were those the reasons for the cancellation of the air-lift and
15 is it the fault of the Serbs?
16 A. In this particular incident, the closure of the airport was the
17 result of gun-fire coming from territory controlled by the Bosnian
18 government authorities.
19 Q. Take a look at what General van Baal is writing on the 15th,
20 again to General Divjak of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 "Today, on and 15th of August, 1994, at approximately 1100 hours,
22 a UN aircraft was hit by a single small arms round," and so on and so
23 forth.
24 Then it says your representative officially condemned this
25 practice of targeting aircraft. And then it says:
Page 13472
1 "I'm counting on your full co-operation in the near future to ban
2 these terrorist activities on UN aircraft which are bringing in food for
3 the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
4 This happened only two days later from the same place and at the
5 same time.
6 Is this yet another incident for -- which was not the fault of
7 the Serbs?
8 A. I would like to see the full UNPROFOR report on this incident,
9 but based on this letter, I, in principle, would agree that, yes.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3433, can we have that, please.
12 1D3433.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. 14th of September, 1994. Could you please focus on this. It is
15 Koljevic and Muratovic that are meeting and it was facilitated by
16 Mr. Andreev. And he prosed this agenda, he left them to work on this on
17 their own, and then he returned to see what they had achieved.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have a look at the
19 next page.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. To read it in English:
22 [In English] "On the subject of sniping, they noted with
23 satisfaction the recent reduction of the incidents of sniping. Seeking
24 to build on this foundation, they agreed to explore the possibility of an
25 extended agreement which would include all small calibre weapons.
Page 13473
1 (General Soubirou notes that more Sarajevo civilians are killed by stray
2 bullets from the active front line than are killed by snipers)."
3 "There was no detailed discussion on the routes around Sarajevo,
4 though they did endorse my proposal that the re-opening of the routes be
5 done in three phases: Movement for civilians, movement for humanitarian
6 goods, movement for commercial goods."
7 [Interpretation] Do you know that this meeting was facilitated by
8 Mr. Andreev and do you accept what General Soubirou says, namely, that
9 the front line was nearby and that stray bullets are killing more people
10 than snipers?
11 A. Yes, I agree that this meeting was facilitated by Mr. Andreev.
12 With regard to General Soubirou's observation, I think it needs to be
13 clarified whether he was referring to the entire course of the war, that
14 period right then. I'm not exactly sure what he meant by that, and I
15 think UNPROFOR documentation in terms of investigating civilian deaths,
16 et cetera, would provide greater clarity.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1162, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have 1D3446.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. While we are waiting for it, do you remember that in one of these
24 documents you noted down and informed me that an UNPROFOR convoy was
25 disturbed at the Dobrun check-point by the Army of Republika Srpska?
Page 13474
1 A. I'm sorry, I don't recall that specific incident. I'm sure it's
2 just my memory. If there's documentation or more information about it, I
3 would probably recall it.
4 Q. Well, we have it in one of the documents that we tendered.
5 However, look at my reaction. This is a document whereby the
6 Drina Corps -- or, rather, it is being sent by the Main Staff to the
7 commander of the Drina Corps and it says:
8 [In English] "The president of the Republika Srpska has informed
9 us in writing of incidents of improper and unprofessional conduct by
10 personnel manning check-points towards personnel and convoys of the UNHCR
11 as follows:"
12 [Interpretation] And now you can see this for yourself, I don't
13 have to read it out. You will see what the information provided to me
14 was, how they were disturbed, as it were.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the next page.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. This is also strictly confidential, so it was not meant for the
18 media.
19 [In English] "The president of the Republika Srpska issued a
20 warning to the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army over the improper
21 and unprofessional conduct of the personnel at the Dobrun check-point and
22 requested a detailed investigation of the above-mentioned incidents and
23 requested a list of names at the check-point personnel that inspected the
24 UNPROFOR [sic] on 14th, 16th, 20th and 21st of August, 1994. He also
25 wants to know where the items taken from the convoys are now, on whose
Page 13475
1 orders the convoys' cargo was taken and what measures were taken against
2 those who are responsible for the incidents.
3 "The president of Republika Srpska ordered the Main Staff and
4 Drina Corps command to train the personnel at the check-point in Dobrun
5 and audit their work while inspecting UNHCR convoys announced for 23 and
6 25 of August."
7 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the president of the republic
8 cannot do more than this?
9 A. No.
10 Q. So what is it that the president of the republic can do except
11 for issuing an order to have procedure observed?
12 A. The problem of UNHCR convoys or UNPROFOR convoys -- as was also
13 mentioned in that document where the Russians were turned back because
14 the convoy had mattresses and kitchen utensils, these problems persisted
15 throughout the war and the Bosnian Serb authorities, civilian and
16 military, had a responsibility to ensure such problems did not exist and
17 the means by which they were to fulfill that obligation is something that
18 was really up to them. For UNPROFOR, for me, what mattered was whether
19 the obligations were fulfilled or not. They were not. They were
20 constantly raised -- the concerns were constantly raised with you, with
21 General Mladic, with other senior Serb officials and we were never
22 satisfied with the actions on the ground.
23 Q. The first question, I'm going to try to deal with this on a
24 yes-or-no basis for the sake of time, do you think that the question of
25 military convoys should be resolved by civilian authorities or should it
Page 13476
1 be resolved by the military? How can civilian authorities control the
2 military, your military, as it were? It is your military convoys that
3 I'm talking about.
4 A. The military in principle should operate under overall civilian
5 control. It's the highest civilian authorities that should provide
6 direction to the military.
7 Q. This order of the president of the republic, is that not exactly
8 what you've been saying now? It's an order for the military to correct a
9 mistake?
10 A. Yes, that order is helpful or in principle ought to have been
11 helpful. The order ought to have been followed up and when the practice
12 wasn't adhered to, disciplinary action should have been taken against the
13 chain of command. Further, the whole premise of the check-points and
14 inspections and everything was one that ought not to have been instituted
15 in the manner it was. So, a very different policy, in my view, ought to
16 have been followed by the Bosnian Serb authorities.
17 Q. Well, we can conclude from your answer that either this was
18 respected or the chain of command was disrupted; is that right?
19 A. The policy, from my perspective, needs to be looked at over
20 the --
21 Q. I am sorry, I'm speaking about this order. I'm talking about
22 this order.
23 JUDGE KWON: Please don't interrupt the witness when answering.
24 Yes, Mr. Banbury, please continue.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
Page 13477
1 There were times when the Bosnian Serb authorities let our
2 convoys through, and certainly we were glad that that happened in those
3 circumstances. There were many, many, many, many other times when we had
4 problems with UNPROFOR convoys, UNHCR convoys. The issue of freedom of
5 movement and convoys, from my view, needs to be looked at over the course
6 of the conflict, and we had very significant problems with our convoys.
7 We had military fuel trucks stolen, we had military jeeps stolen, we had
8 weapons stolen, we had supplies stolen, all from the Bosnian Serb
9 military authorities. That had significant military significance. The
10 supplies that were taken from UNPROFOR military by the Bosnian Serbs
11 aided the Serb war effort. So while this order is helpful, the policy
12 implemented on the ground over the sustained period of time that I was in
13 Bosnia was extremely unhelpful.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this?
16 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, I take it you don't have a opposition
17 to the admission of this document?
18 MS. EDGERTON: No, I don't.
19 JUDGE KWON: In relation to this document, what was your -- I
20 didn't follow what your question was. Either this was respected or the
21 chain of command was disrupted. What did you mean? You put the question
22 again to the witness.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This relies on the question what
24 are the options of the president of the republic. If he issues an order,
25 that order is either executed, or if it's not executed, then there is no
Page 13478
1 change [as interpreted] of command. So I was asking Mr. Banbury if we
2 had these two alternatives. It's one or the other, we can't have both.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you agree? The president of the republic can issue an order,
5 can monitor its execution, its executed, so there is a chain of command,
6 or it's not executed and there is no chain of command?
7 A. I agree that the president can issue an order and it should be
8 respected, and if it's not, then it should be -- or the implementation of
9 the order should be monitored. I don't know whether this -- the
10 implementation of this was monitored. I don't know whether follow-up
11 action was taken in incidents where there were -- there was not respect
12 for the conditions in the order. I do know that we did not have the
13 freedom of movement and the conditions we wanted, whether it's at
14 check-points or movement of our convoys.
15 JUDGE KWON: This will be admitted as Exhibit D1163.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Could you please look at your paragraph 56 in your statement of
18 the 1st of September, 1994:
19 "Karadzic said at the Assembly session that the Contact Group
20 plan is dead and that he says, in English, I'm going to read it:
21 [In English] "We will impose sanctions against Muslims so toughly
22 that a bird could not pass through. A rough English version of the
23 Radovan Karadzic speech, Dr. Karadzic speech was transmitted to our
24 office, copy," and so on.
25 [Interpretation] Please now look at paragraph 58 of the
Page 13479
1 3rd of September:
2 [In English] "Karadzic was quoted as saying: In the event an
3 arms embargo was lifted, the Serbs would take UN blue helmets hostage,
4 shoot down a lot of planes and arrest all foreigners."
5 [Interpretation] Are these two statements contained in the two
6 cited paragraphs?
7 A. Yes.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at D703 so that we
9 can see exactly what I said.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. This is my letter to Mr. Akashi:
12 [In English] "Excellency, thank you for your letter of
13 3rd of September. Extracts from my speech, to which you refer, have been
14 reported out of context. We do not, at present, intend to impose any
15 sanctions against the Muslims. A decision to introduce such sanctions,
16 moreover, would not affect normal humanitarian aid provided that the
17 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not blocking humanitarian aid destined
18 to Republika Srpska."
19 [Interpretation] Then it goes on to say:
20 [In English] "Since Yugoslavia is imposing economic sanctions
21 against us, we feel entitled to continue commercial sanctions against the
22 Muslims. As you know, however, this policy does not cover gas, water,
23 and electricity supplies to the Muslims. You are, of course, aware that
24 the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo is openly delighted at the recent turn
25 of events in the relations between Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska,"
Page 13480
1 and so on.
2 [Interpretation] Did you know that Yugoslavia was preventing,
3 completely preventing commercial traffic towards Republika Srpska but
4 also all humanitarian traffic towards the Drina? It wasn't completely
5 preventing it, but it was making it more difficult, and that our threats
6 at the address of the Muslims only had to do with the commercial traffic?
7 A. Yes, I am aware that there were significant restrictions placed
8 on the movement of commercial goods from the FRY, Federal Republic of
9 Yugoslavia, to the Bosnian Serb-controlled area.
10 With respect to your second question, that threats at the address
11 of the Muslims only had to do with the commercial traffic, I think the
12 statements are unclear with that regard, the quote that I have from the
13 speech. In addition, the letter you addressed to Mr. Akashi links
14 humanitarian assistance to Muslims to whether or not Yugoslavia is
15 letting humanitarian assistance pass through to you. That is seriously
16 objectionable. No humanitarian organisation or the United Nations could
17 ever accept that provision of humanitarian assistance to a civilian
18 population in need could be dependent upon behaviour of another group and
19 access to another area.
20 Q. Do you agree that this is an appeal to Mr. Akashi to exert
21 pressure on Yugoslavia to stop disrupting our humanitarian aid?
22 A. I -- I do not read it as an appeal to Mr. Akashi to approach the
23 Yugoslav authorities on this issue. That being said, I'm quite certain
24 that in instances where the Yugoslav authorities were placing limits on
25 the delivery of humanitarian assistance through their territory to the
Page 13481
1 Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR would have raised that concern and insisted that
2 humanitarian assistance be allowed to pass freely through Yugoslavia to
3 the Bosnian Serbs.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3434, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. This is the 15th of September, 1994. Dejan Mihov sending a
8 message to Viktor Andreev. The whole text is very interesting but we
9 don't have time. Can we have page 3, please.
10 Ten days after my letter to Ambassador Akashi, this is what the
11 humanitarian situation looks like:
12 [In English] "... with a good week for the air-lift, 83 flights
13 and two land convoys, the food situation in the city is good. UNHCR
14 transported 1300 metric tonnes of food aid. Due to the fact that
15 100 per cent of the food needs are met, UNHCR and WFP will activate a
16 stockpile project for food for the winter, which will allow the agency to
17 have four weeks' reserve to be used in case of emergency."
18 [Interpretation] Do you agree that my warnings and threats did
19 not result in any shortages or reductions and that the situation is
20 actually satisfactory?
21 A. The passage cited refers to Sarajevo and the -- Mr. Mihov was in
22 charge of Sector Sarajevo. I agree that in that area at that time the
23 delivery of humanitarian supplies was satisfactory.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
Page 13482
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1164, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3462.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. On the same day that Mr. Mihov is reporting about in this
5 previous document, this is what General Brinkman writes to General Delic,
6 the commander of the Muslim Army:
7 "Dear General, on the 15th of September, 1994, two humanitarian
8 convoys were approved to travel between Visoko and Sarajevo as agreed by
9 both warring parties." And so on.
10 And then the next sentence states:
11 "This morning between 1055 and 1105 hours, the second convoy
12 destined for the city of Sarajevo warehouses (the first convoy was
13 destined for Rajlovac)" in the Serbian territory. This is not in the
14 text, I am explaining this to you, you know where Rajlovac is.
15 "As it was stationary, the UNPROFOR check-point Papa Cekrcici, 3
16 kilometres east of Visoko, was engaged by five rounds of 60-millimetre
17 mortar from a B and H baseplate. Miraculously, there were no injuries."
18 And then the details are given.
19 "There was no BSA provocation nor were there any BSA in the
20 immediate area for the mortar to be targeting. This was a direct and
21 deliberate attack against UNPROFOR. This was the first humanitarian
22 convoy to use this route for several months and was meant to represent
23 the opening of the route for this purpose." And so on.
24 Can you see, Mr. Banbury, that the Muslim side is disrupting the
25 road to Visoko that we opened, it was disrupting the road for some reason
Page 13483
1 and it fired five mortars?
2 A. I don't recall the specific incident. I accept that it occurred
3 as described in the letter of General Brinkman. We did at times have
4 obstructions imposed upon us by Bosnian government authorities. They
5 were relatively few, relatively limited and relatively easy to solve and
6 did not constitute a broad-spread practice of stopping our humanitarian
7 assistance convoys.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1165, Your Honours.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. In paragraph 120 of your statement, you speak about the killing
13 of two French soldiers that were erecting anti-sniping barricades in
14 Snipers Alley. Who killed the first of the victims?
15 A. According to the documentation I reviewed on that subject, the --
16 the source of that attack was not able to be determined by UNPROFOR. We
17 don't know who killed them. We don't know where that came from, which
18 side.
19 Q. Does this also apply to the second one?
20 A. No. In the second case, we were able to establish that the
21 source of the fire was from Bosnian Serb-controlled territory.
22 Q. The Defence asserts that the first one was killed by the Muslim
23 side and that the UNPROFOR did state its position on that, and in the
24 second case, it was not possible to establish that even though it was
25 made to look as if it came from the Serbian side.
Page 13484
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have --
2 THE INTERPRETER: And the interpreters did not get the number of
3 the exhibit.
4 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number again.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3450.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. 16th of April, 1995. It's a United Nations document. This is
8 Michael Moussalli and then already Enrique Aguilar instead of the
9 previous person, and at the bottom it states:
10 [In English] "The two French soldiers killed by sniper fire in as
11 many days ... the deliberate targeting of the UNPROFOR soldiers could
12 have an implication for French participants," and so on and so forth.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have the second page.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. It states here that one of the them was killed in Dobrinja on the
16 14th of April, and on the 15th of April:
17 [In English] "Another French soldier was killed by sniping, this
18 time while erecting an anti-sniping barricade on Sniper Alley.
19 Investigation of the first incident has so far proven inconclusive and it
20 is unlikely that evidence will be sufficient to attribute responsibility
21 for the murder. Initial investigation into the second death indicates
22 that the firing came from a building well within the Bosnian
23 Serb-controlled territory, at which a French anti-sniping post returned
24 fire immediately after the incident. The final conclusion of the
25 investigation has, however, not been reached."
Page 13485
1 [Interpretation] So the final results of the investigation did
2 not describe that to the Serbs, is this what the document states?
3 A. No, it said the final conclusion had not yet been reached. The
4 investigation -- investigations of this nature were conducted very
5 thoroughly by UNPROFOR. There were preliminary conclusions based on the
6 fact the firing had come from a building well within Serb-controlled
7 territory, at which the French anti-sniping team returned fire. So we
8 had our preliminary conclusions with which we had some confidence the
9 investigation was going to be completed. I don't know the results, the
10 final results of that investigation. I have no information to indicate
11 that they are anything different than the initial results, but I don't
12 know.
13 Q. Thank you. I know that you are not a lawyer, but do you agree
14 that if it was not established, then it cannot be ascribed to either
15 side; is that right?
16 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it's a question for the witness to
17 answer.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be
19 admitted.
20 MS. EDGERTON: It already is, as a Prosecution exhibit, as part
21 of the associated exhibits for this witness.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. May I draw your attention to paragraph 128 of your statement.
25 Where you talk about -- this is in the second half of the paragraph where
Page 13486
1 you say:
2 [In English] "Gvero said that in the Srebrenica enclave, the
3 Muslim military commander has tens of tonnes of fuel which he got from
4 the convoys entering Srebrenica. He affirmed that they would not allow
5 the enemy to build stocks of food and fuel under the guise of
6 humanitarian aid. Smith said that there was no evidence whatsoever that
7 the Dutch or British had been giving fuel away, and Gvero laughed. Smith
8 asked for evidence as to how the fuel was being sold or given away and
9 Gvero said he would provide this information at a later meeting."
10 [Interpretation] Did you attend this meeting?
11 A. I believe I did. I'd have to confirm that, but I believe, yes, I
12 was there.
13 JUDGE KWON: Before --
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Is what Gvero said correct?
16 A. No.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have D1029 in e-court,
18 please.
19 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, could you give the exhibit number of
20 the previous document for the record.
21 MS. EDGERTON: It hasn't been assigned as yet, Your Honour,
22 because there were a number of associated exhibits, but it was --
23 JUDGE KWON: Could you give us the 65 ter number.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, 10620.
25 THE REGISTRAR: That's been assigned as Exhibit P2486.
Page 13487
1 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you very much.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Could you please look at this report by the Birac Brigade of the
5 12th of May, 1995. Paragraph 4. At the top it states fuel is being
6 smuggled in double -- this is an order, is being smuggled.
7 And then in 4 it states:
8 "Confiscate the surplus of fuel from large tanks leaving just the
9 quantity needed for their journey to the enclave and back to the
10 check-point. On their return from the enclave, return the fuel against a
11 receipt note for quantities confiscated and/or returned."
12 THE INTERPRETER: Before that the accused said: They smuggled
13 fuel in double or large tanks on combat and non-combat vehicles.
14 MR. KARADZIC:
15 Q. So does this indicate that Gvero had a foundation for his
16 assertions, and he got this report from Colonel Andric in this dispatch,
17 so did Colonel Gvero have enough grounds to make this particular
18 assertion?
19 A. General Gvero asserts that in Zepa there were ten tonnes of fuel
20 held by the Bosnian government authorities that had been taken from or --
21 taken from UNPROFOR or given by UNPROFOR. I do not believe there are any
22 grounds for having made that assertion. I'm unaware of any cases where
23 the UNPROFOR was handing over fuel to the Bosnian military, and I
24 certainly do not believe that UNPROFOR willingly or against its will
25 provided ten tonnes of fuel to the Bosnian government forces in Zepa.
Page 13488
1 Q. After the break, Mr. Banbury, we will show you a Muslim document
2 which indicates that, and it's not talking about tens -- scores of tonnes
3 but hundreds of thousands of tonnes. But before that we are going to
4 look at document 1D3460.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3460.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. You recognise this document; is that right? This is already
8 Aguilar on duty.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 2.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. We can see here that UNPROFOR is aware that -- you can see that
12 an offensive is being prepared. And then it goes on to say:
13 [In English] "Adding to fear over the future escalation of the
14 conflict in Bihac, where the BH troops re-organisation and training
15 activities throughout central Bosnia in preparation for a spring
16 offensive. Aircraft sightings over Bosnia were suspected to be part of
17 an effort to reinforce military units during the delivery of equipment
18 and money."
19 [Interpretation] Is Carter's -- so-called Carter's truce in force
20 or in effect at that time? This is the 18th of February.
21 A. Yes, the four-month cessation of hostilities agreement was in
22 principle in force at that time.
23 Q. Thank you. Can you look at what it says about Sarajevo:
24 [In English] "Sarajevo is experiencing one of the best times
25 since the start of the war. The blue routes are open, with more than
Page 13489
1 5.000 people using the routes daily. Availability of gas, water, and
2 electricity has greatly improved, and there are very few incidents of
3 cease-fire violations and firing incidents. Although, BH forces
4 occasionally try to enter the demilitarised zone, the Mount Igman area is
5 generally quiet."
6 [Interpretation] Mr. Banbury, can this be done without the Serbs
7 respecting the cease-fire, and is the Serb contribution here to the
8 improvement of the situation in Sarajevo clear and indisputable?
9 A. Yes, I believe the Serb contribution to the improvement of the
10 situation in Sarajevo at this time is clear.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we admit this?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1166, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's time to have our second break,
15 after which you will have 40 minutes to conclude your cross-examination.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask you to review
17 this again. We are going to leave many topics untouched, and in
18 particular each statement would need to be -- the comments in the
19 statements would need to be clarified. I think we asked for 30 hours for
20 this witness and we got 20 per cent.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE KWON: Just for planning purposes, how long would you need
23 for your re-examination, Ms. Edgerton?
24 MS. EDGERTON: Keeping in mind that the cross hasn't been
25 concluded, right now I'd say 15 minutes.
Page 13490
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll have a break for half an hour and
2 resume at 1.00.
3 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you'll have additional half an hour,
6 which means you'll have to conclude your cross-examination by ten past
7 2.00, which also means the Prosecution will have 20 minutes for its
8 re-examination.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now please see
10 65 ter 22794.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. A little while ago, Mr. Banbury, I promised you a document from
13 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the state security service of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We also have a translation of this document so I
15 would kindly ask if we could show that one as well. It's their document,
16 and as we have no time, can we please move to --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, yes, can we please move to
18 page 7 in the English version and page 6 in the Serbian version of this
19 document.
20 It says here that from humanitarian aid -- in Serbian version we
21 need page 6, rather than page 5, which we can see now, and in English
22 version page 7. The following page in Serbian.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. And around the middle of the page, from humanitarian page many
25 goods were taken aside for the needs of the 28th Division, of which
Page 13491
1 considerable part for Oric were sent at the market by Hamdija Fejzic,
2 Suljo Konakovic, Amir Mehmedovic, and so on. And further down, item 2,
3 Suljo Hasanovic, former chief of the People's Defence Secretariat,
4 according some information Hasanovic took foods and food items from the
5 depot of the -- for the humanitarian aid. This is on page 8 in the
6 English version. And he used to sell some of that on the market with the
7 help of unknown persons and so on and so forth. Suljo Hasanovic. Item 2
8 in the English version.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please see page 9 in the
10 English version, and page 8 in the Serbian version. No, rather, page 7
11 in the Serbian version. The following page in Serbian, yes.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Item 5:
14 "Dr. Avdo Hasanovic, chief of the war hospital in Srebrenica,
15 medicines from the hospital supplies were sold at 100 to 200 German
16 marks, which caused a large number of deaths, mostly among the ARBiH
17 troops."
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And if we could please turn the
19 page in the Serbian text, and in English it's fine. Number 6 at the
20 bottom.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. This is information that Stitkovac was buying oil in Zepa and
23 selling it in Srebrenica.
24 We can turn the page.
25 Item number 6, Stitkovac buying it from the Ukrainian Battalion
Page 13492
1 and selling it in Srebrenica. This is a document from the Ministry of
2 the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, the Muslim one. So,
3 Mr. Banbury, do you see that you were not aware of everything that was
4 going on in the enclaves and that General Gvero, as it seems, knew that
5 better than yourself?
6 A. I have previously acknowledged that I did not know nor did I ever
7 suggest I knew everything that was going on in the enclaves. I do have a
8 lot of experience in humanitarian situations on the Thai-Cambodian border
9 and with the World Food Programme and there -- it is impossible for
10 humanitarian organisations to prevent food from going or humanitarian
11 assistance from going to sources other than its original intention. Some
12 of that is perfectly legitimate. If we give food, dry rations, rice,
13 whatever, beans, to a family and they decide to sell some on the market
14 in order to purchase vegetables or medicine, that's routine and always
15 happens. There's also almost always some misappropriation of
16 humanitarian assistance, whether it's in a place like Somalia where it's
17 very high or other cases where it's very low, it always happens.
18 As for the fuel here, I certainly do not rule out the possibility
19 that the Ukrainian Battalion sold for their own profit some fuel to
20 whoever those people were. Sadly, that, too, happens at times in large
21 peacekeeping operations. I am unaware of that being a very prevalent
22 issue in the safe areas.
23 Q. With all due respect, Mr. Banbury, this does not have do with
24 families selling this at the market, but, rather, state officials. The
25 authorities in Srebrenica are abusing the storage and selling
Page 13493
1 humanitarian goods which we allowed to pass through our territory. And
2 please have a look at this as well, they are also dealing in rifles and
3 ammunition and fuel, which was not brought by UNHCR for certain. They
4 somehow obtained it in some other way. So would you agree that this was
5 an abuse of the storage or the depot rather than that it was a family who
6 gave them that, or a family who put it out on the market?
7 A. I do not rule out the possibility that some of the local
8 authorities in the safe areas in Eastern Bosnia misappropriated
9 humanitarian assistance from warehouses. That is possible.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's very difficult to see a basis
12 upon which we can admit this document through this witness.
13 Ms. Edgerton.
14 MS. EDGERTON: I don't see any whatsoever.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is directly connected with the
18 reasons for imposing restrictions on the sorts of materiel that would be
19 allowed to enter the enclaves. Our army had information that there was
20 trafficking in arms, ammunition, and oil, and believed that such
21 quantities should not enter the enclaves because that was eventually
22 turned against us. Because it wasn't just the civilian population that
23 was there. The enclaves were not demilitarised and it was the army
24 that -- who used the food, used the oil, and there was the smuggling of
25 weapons and so on, if you have a look at item 9 which is on the screen
Page 13494
1 right now. So would you agree that this is the area --
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you did put your question to the
3 witness based upon this document. The witness was not able to give
4 proper foundation upon which we can admit this document, as was the case
5 with General Smith, we'll not admit this.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But he allowed for the possibility
7 that there was abuse and that he was not aware of everything that was
8 going on in the enclaves, and in my view, this is the basis for admitting
9 the document. I believe it should be admitted.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we have given our ruling. Please move
11 on.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now see
13 1D3365, please.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. This is a telegram from Mr. Annan to Mr. Akashi. Please have a
16 look at it. It's the air supply for eastern enclaves from Sarajevo. And
17 then it says in paragraph 2:
18 [In English] "We would grateful if you would provide a
19 comprehensive assessment of the actual supply situation in the safe areas
20 both for UNPROFOR and UNHCR. According to your daily sitreps, UNPROFOR
21 continues to have access by land convoys (although we note the absence of
22 fuel deliveries in recent days). Preliminary information obtained from
23 UNHCR likewise seems to indicate that humanitarian supplies, in
24 principle, do not appear to be running low - we hear they are currently
25 meeting 75 per cent of their targets."
Page 13495
1 [Interpretation] I said a little while ago up to 80 per cent.
2 Would you agree that Mr. Annan and Mr. Akashi agreed, on the basis of
3 reports, that 75 per cent of the objectives, that is to say, the needs of
4 the humanitarian assistance which was envisaged, were indeed reached?
5 A. The cable here from Mr. Annan is referring to other reporting.
6 I'm not exactly sure what reporting that is. It does indicate that their
7 report suggests 75 per cent of the UNHCR targets for the eastern enclaves
8 were being met at that particular time. I know from my humanitarian
9 background that any time we are falling short of humanitarian assistance
10 targets, it poses a very serious problem for the beneficiary population
11 because the 100 per cent target is to meet the bare-minimum requirements.
12 Humanitarian agencies don't provide excess food to people, they provide
13 the bare minimum necessary for a healthy diet, a non -- kind of -- to
14 give them enough nutrition. So anything short of that presents a serious
15 problem.
16 I also note that the fact that UNPROFOR was recommending aerial
17 resupply of the enclaves was a very serious -- indicated a very serious
18 situation that reflected, one, the restrictions in -- the regular routine
19 pattern of restrictions imposed upon us by the Bosnian Serb authorities,
20 and, two, the dire situation that had finally been reached in the
21 enclaves.
22 Q. Mr. Banbury, if the Srebrenica population was 45.000, as reported
23 to you, then perhaps it would be 75 per cent, but if the population was
24 35.000 to 37.000, as the Muslim documents show, then it would be
25 sufficient; correct? Would you agree that if the population was smaller
Page 13496
1 than represented, then it would constitute more than 75 per cent?
2 A. Yes, I agree that if the actual civilian population in, in this
3 case, Srebrenica was smaller than the target population for UNHCR and if
4 the UNHCR stock was 75 per cent for its target population, then the
5 actual per cent of humanitarian assistance available would be higher.
6 That's a mathematical calculation, yes.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1167, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3376.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
13 Q. As early as on the 6th of July, 1995, you were at the
14 headquarters in Zagreb with Mr. Akashi; correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Here is a document which was sent by Mr. Corwin to Mr. Akashi on
17 the 6th of July. I just wish to point the first paragraph to you:
18 [In English] "I had long talk with Professor Koljevic this
19 afternoon in Pale. He said that President Karadzic was very eager to
20 meet with Carl Bildt. The Serbs considered that the situation was
21 deteriorating especially with regard to humanitarian aid and they wanted
22 to meet urgently."
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we turn the page, please.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Here, item 6 and second sentence:
Page 13497
1 [In English] "... several times that he was concerned about the
2 deteriorating humanitarian situation."
3 [Interpretation] Last sentence: In item 7 he expresses, he says
4 that we are not happy about the course that the army might follow
5 considering the situation that we are in. Have you been in a position to
6 see or were you aware about Mr. Corwin meeting Professor Koljevic, and
7 would you accept that Professor Koljevic expressed our concern about the
8 deterioration of the humanitarian situation?
9 A. I know Mr. Corwin did, as part of his responsibilities, at times
10 meet with Professor Koljevic, and I accept that Professor Koljevic, in
11 this particular reference meeting, voiced an expression of concern
12 regarding the deteriorating humanitarian situation. I also note, as
13 clearly reflected in paragraph 7, that there may have been different
14 motivations for that expression and it is not my experience that the --
15 that during my period in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb authorities ever showed
16 a genuine concern for the humanitarian situation of non-Serbs, but
17 instead responded to that situation based on consideration of a wide
18 range of factors and their own assessment of their own interests, and in
19 this case, perhaps an interest that was developing as a result of a
20 changing strategic situation in Sarajevo and in Bosnia in April 1995. Or
21 July 1995, excuse me, in this time.
22 Q. Well, Mr. Banbury, if we had more time, I would try to refute
23 your statement that we didn't need to do many things but we did them
24 anyway. But I see this statement of yours as anti-Serbian; is that
25 correct or not? How can you say that the Serbs didn't do anything that
Page 13498
1 they didn't have to and that they didn't take care about others? What is
2 the basis for such a statement? Do you have any evidence?
3 A. I don't feel I was ever anti any party or pro any party to the
4 conflict. I was pro-UNPROFOR and pro-civilian population. And in my
5 experience in Bosnia, civilian populations on all sides suffered, and the
6 attitude or the behaviour of the Bosnian Serb authorities toward the
7 humanitarian plight of the non-Serb population was reprehensible.
8 Q. You are used to this, Mr. Banbury, because you heard it from
9 Muslim propaganda, isn't that right? It is identical to what the Muslim
10 propaganda was saying. What you are mentioning now is your conclusions.
11 I have no objections to what you wrote. What I'm interested in is why
12 your interpretation of your documents are so drastically different from
13 the documents themselves?
14 JUDGE KWON: Is that a question, Mr. --
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Yes. Why is the interpretation -- I'm asking Mr. Banbury this:
17 Your documents are self-explanatory. They are self-explanatory, so why
18 is your interpretation poorer?
19 JUDGE KWON: Come to specific issues instead of making arguments.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm just responding generally
21 to general statements.
22 Could we now see 1D3371, please.
23 And can the previous document be admitted. I thought it has
24 already been admitted. The witness confirmed that he is aware of these
25 meetings.
Page 13499
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1168, Your Honours.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Now, please focus your attention on this. It's another document
5 from Phillip Corwin to Mr. Akashi. The date is 17th of July. And item 1
6 says that the Bosnian minister, Hasan Muratovic demanded that he leave
7 Bosnia immediately. And he says, "I see this intimidation as part of a
8 campaign," and so on and so forth.
9 [In English] "... to render inoperative the civilian components
10 of the UNPROFOR. The Bosnian government and the BSA as well are not
11 interested in peace talks. They are both interested in military
12 solution. I also think it is a serious matter when the government
13 minister from a member state of the United Nations threatens the life of
14 the United Nations official."
15 [Interpretation] And we can see everything else that's there.
16 Were you aware of such intimidation and do you believe that the
17 United Nations representatives were allowed to criticise the Muslim side
18 openly, to talk openly considering such intimidations?
19 A. UNPROFOR officials, from the Special Representative of the
20 Secretary-General on down, routinely criticised the Bosnian government
21 civilian and military authorities for a whole range of issues throughout
22 the war. I think the historical records speaks to that quite clearly.
23 In the case of Mr. Corwin, and I'm familiar with this case,
24 Mr. Corwin did not have the confidence of many of his colleagues in
25 UNPROFOR. He was not reliable and he was one of the few and perhaps the
Page 13500
1 only person who was ever made persona non-grata from UNPROFOR by the
2 Bosnian Serb authorities. I think this reflects more on Mr. Corwin than
3 on anything else.
4 Q. Mr. Banbury, is there a single Frenchman who is good, in your
5 opinion? Oh, he is American. I thought he was French, because today you
6 disqualified the French generals. Is there anyone who is good enough,
7 Mr. Banbury?
8 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, that's a -- frankly, a ridiculous
9 question.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I withdraw the
11 question. Can this document be admitted, please, because Mr. Banbury is
12 aware of the intimidations mentioned.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1169, Your Honours.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. And I say, the Defence says, Mr. Banbury, that Mr. Corwin is
17 notorious among the Muslims because he talked publicly about the abuse
18 that they carried out.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now could we now please have
20 D1127 to see why he was a persona non-grata.
21 JUDGE KWON: Before that, Mr. Banbury, would you like to comment
22 on Mr. Karadzic's statement, Mr. Corwin is notorious among the Muslims
23 because he talked about the abuse.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I think as I mentioned,
25 it's a -- and it was established, I believe, earlier in the course of my
Page 13501
1 testimony that UNPROFOR, as a regular basis, criticised the Bosnian
2 government leaders, civilian and military, for actions they took which
3 were incompatible with their obligations toward UNPROFOR or the civilian
4 populations. The issue was not one of whether an UNPROFOR official was
5 willing to be critical or not of any party. The issue was one of whether
6 UNPROFOR officials conducted themselves in an impartial manner, a fair
7 manner, an objective manner, and it was my view, and I know for a fact
8 the view of several of my colleagues, that Mr. Corwin did not conduct
9 himself in a manner befitting of an official of the United Nations.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. I have no time to ask you whether this was the official position
12 of Mr. Akashi, but please have a look at item 1, and item 3 as well:
13 [In English] "At the very last minute the Bosnian side this
14 afternoon rejected a proposal to restore utilities to Sarajevo. The
15 Serbian side had agreed to the necessary technical arrangements, arranged
16 by Mr. John Fawcett from the Office of Special Co-ordinator for Sarajevo.
17 But the Bosnian side insisted on UNPROFOR control of Bacevo (Sarajevo's
18 main water-pumping station, which is in Serb-controlled territory) as
19 well as several gas supply points."
20 [Interpretation] We can all read everything. But item 3:
21 [In English] "It appears the Bosnian side did not want the
22 utilities restored. There are several possible reasons: By keeping
23 their own people in need, they hope to gain world sympathy. The press is
24 on their side and one can expect CNN (Clearly Not Neutral) to show
25 pictures of starving Bosnians."
Page 13502
1 [Interpretation] You can see other reasons here, and item 4 says:
2 [In English] "They had requested the meeting, and were clearly in
3 favour of restoring utilities. Our guess is that the 100.000 citizens of
4 Serbian Sarajevo are suffering badly and are quite annoyed with their
5 blood(y) brothers in Pale."
6 [Interpretation] Is it correct that Mr. Corwin is not sparing any
7 of the sides you but that it was only the Muslim side that threatened him
8 with death?
9 A. This is an internal UN communication not designed for public
10 consumption. In it he expresses his speculation as to why the Bosnian
11 government side may have taken a position or not. Suffice it to say that
12 myself and colleagues of mine did not trust Mr. Corwin's judgement or his
13 analysis of the situation and we would not have treated his views very
14 seriously.
15 Q. And do you think that his assessment is incorrect and an
16 incorrect report that the Muslims are obstructing the re-establishment of
17 the operation of utilities?
18 A. I accept that at the conclusion of this meeting, the Bosnian
19 government did not agree to turn the utilities back on. Why they did not
20 do so, I don't know, and I cannot, from my own perspective, trust the
21 assessment in here by Mr. Corwin as to what transpired at that meeting
22 and why one or the other party may have acted in a given way.
23 Q. So you find his speculations to be unacceptable, although he
24 attended that meeting; right?
25 A. I do not place value on Mr. Corwin's speculations.
Page 13503
1 Q. Does that pertain to anybody's speculations?
2 A. No, there are many people whose judgement, assessment, analysis,
3 and, indeed, speculation I would place much higher value on.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D282, can we have that, please.
5 Could I please have the English translation on the other side of the
6 screen.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. This is an order, an order of mine, dated the 11th of July, which
9 tightens responsibility and discipline in terms of passage of
10 humanitarian convoys. Please have a look at this so I don't have to read
11 it out. Please look at paragraph 1 and paragraph 4:
12 "Convoys shall be inspected by joint commissions, a mixed
13 commission," and you see who is there, "between the entry point and the
14 front line, no further inspection shall be made."
15 Were you aware of that? Did you know that we were issuing such
16 orders?
17 A. I was unfamiliar with this particular order.
18 Q. Is that consistent with what we were putting to you as our
19 position?
20 A. Your position had more elements than it, but this order does not
21 appear to me to be inconsistent with the convoy requirements that you
22 placed upon us.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
Page 13504
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1170, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I now please have 1D283.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. While we are waiting for that, Mr. Banbury, if you are objecting
5 to the existence of inspections and controls in general, then I have to
6 understand that as a difference in concepts because it was our
7 understanding that we were entitled to that and that international
8 documents gave us the right to do this. So this may be the source of a
9 great deal of misunderstandings between us. Would you agree on that?
10 A. I do not and did not at the time to -- object to some type of
11 regime through which the Bosnian Serb authorities could receive the
12 necessary assurances from UNPROFOR or UNHCR with respect to the contents
13 of our convoy. Some control regime would have been acceptable. My
14 objection is that, one, there was a policy in place by the Bosnian Serb
15 authorities to block our freedom of movement inconsistent with
16 obligations under Security Council resolutions, and that in pursuit of
17 that policy, a control regime was used that was very onerous on us and
18 very effective in blocking our access to critical areas for resupply of
19 our own troops as well as humanitarian assistance.
20 Q. We don't have time, Mr. Corwin [sic], to prove by way of
21 documents that 75 per cent and even more than that just managed to get
22 through. But please try to focus on this document, an order of the
23 30th of July, where an order is issued by Karadzic for the Ministry of
24 Defence and of the Interior to enable the unobstructed movement of
25 workers of the commission for refugees and humanitarian aid. Just have a
Page 13505
1 look at that, and all state organs should comply with this. You see who
2 the addressees are. Is that in line with our declared position that you
3 were familiar with?
4 A. This refers to workers of the commission for refugees and
5 humanitarian aid. Which commission was that? Was that a mixed
6 commission of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government officials?
7 Q. No, no. This is the commissioner for refugees of
8 Republika Srpska. We had a great many refugees and we had a commissioner
9 for refugees because there were refugees of all faiths and ethnicities.
10 Did you know that we had a lot of refugees in Republika Srpska?
11 A. Yes, I was well aware that there were many Bosnian Serb refugees
12 in the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serb authorities.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?
14 JUDGE KWON: What question did you put to the witness in relation
15 to this document?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Whether this document was an
17 illustration -- or rather, whether it was in line with what we had
18 declared in public in our contacts with the UN. In relation to this
19 question, that is, the question of humanitarian aid and the functioning
20 of humanitarian organisations.
21 THE WITNESS: As I understand this order, it's an order from you,
22 as president of the Bosnian Serb republic, to Bosnian Serb entities to
23 grant Bosnian Serb officials the ability to move in your territory. That
24 was normal practice. It comes as no surprise to me that Bosnian
25 officials were able to move in Bosnian Serb-controlled territory.
Page 13506
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. But this refers to the UNHCR and the UNCP -- oh, sorry, sorry. I
3 got a bit confused. Just a moment. Yes, this says that they cannot be
4 mobilised into units without the consent of the commissioner and so on.
5 So if you agree, it was necessary for me to issue this kind of
6 warning that Serbian humanitarian issues should be allowed unobstructed
7 movement. Is that understandable in view of the fact that there was a
8 civil war going on?
9 A. I'm not sure how to answer that question, Dr. Karadzic. I find
10 it totally normal that if there was a civilian commission working on
11 refugees and humanitarian aid, that a proper order would be given to the
12 relevant authorities to allow that commission or its members to work, and
13 that they ought not to be mobilised for other purposes. It was a policy
14 decision, it's a policy decision that makes sense to me, and an order was
15 given to implement it. I see this as very normal.
16 Q. This is my point, perhaps I wasn't clear enough: Even Serb
17 humanitarian organisations, the Serb commission for refugees, needed my
18 assistance and support. It wasn't only foreign organisations and UN
19 organisations, but Serb ones as well. Do you agree that this document
20 confirms that Serb humanitarian organisations could also run into
21 problems, otherwise this document wouldn't have been issued in the first
22 place; right?
23 A. I see the situation as very different. For anyone to move about
24 the territory of the controlled by the Bosnian Serb authorities,
25 presumably they needed some type of pass or identification to move
Page 13507
1 through check-points, without which they were perhaps subject to
2 interrogation, detention, or whatever. So these authorities were granted
3 permission to move about. If there was a persistent problem during the
4 course of the war and these folks were not able to move about, that would
5 be an analogous situation. The fact that a decision was taken on a
6 policy matter and an instruction was given, I think is very different
7 than the situation in which UNPROFOR found itself.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this being admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, let's move on to another topic. I
10 find it difficult how relevant this document is and I don't think we
11 have --
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
13 JUDGE KWON: Very well, let's move on.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D284.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I thought that it was obvious that Serb humanitarian
17 organisations also needed my protection because there was a civil war
18 going on. Here is another order which says:
19 "Take all measures at all locations to protect and provide
20 security for personnel and vehicles of the UNHCR and UNHCP at their
21 places of residence and during movement."
22 Do you agree that we had publicly declared and every now and then
23 we secretly issued orders aimed at protecting international
24 organisations?
25 A. I don't know if that was standard practice. I see this order
Page 13508
1 signed by you. I assume it's accurate and was written at the time. I
2 note that it was dated 27 October 1995, at the tail end of a very
3 significant military campaign conducted by NATO and by the Bosnian Army,
4 the Bosnian Croat Army and Croatia itself, and this was just before the
5 start of the Dayton peace talks, so the context on 27 October 1995 was
6 very different than the context that existed for a large portion of the
7 time that I was in Bosnia.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this one be admitted?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1171, Your Honours.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Banbury, we don't have time to deal with the crisis in August
14 and September in respect of the NATO bombing Serb -- Serb positions were
15 bombed by NATO and I cannot deal with the crisis in Bihac either.
16 However, I quickly like to go through some documents that I believe you
17 must be familiar with.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3430, can I have that, please?
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. The 17th of August, 1994, from Akashi to Annan. You see the
21 marked part here:
22 [In English] "As can be seen from the proposed agendas of both
23 sides, our basic approach has been that overall military stabilisation,
24 including more military self-restraint on the part of BH side, was a
25 prerequisite for bringing about improvement in specific matters such as
Page 13509
1 re-opening of airport routes, the Tuzla airport, and the better movement
2 of humanitarian convoys. We therefore called for greater co-operation
3 from the BH side in the establishment of our OPs, the exchange of liaison
4 officers, and interposing the UNPROFOR troops," and so on.
5 [Interpretation] Do you agree, Mr. Banbury, that what is
6 particularly being highlighted here is the fact that the Muslim Army
7 should exercise restraint and that that is a prerequisite for the airport
8 routes and everything else that has to do with humanitarian convoys?
9 A. Dr. Karadzic, the statement is accurate but the reason its
10 accurate is because the Bosnian Serb authorities controlled each of those
11 issues; opening of the airport routes, opening of the Tuzla airport,
12 better movement of humanitarian convoys. It was the Bosnian Serb
13 authorities who were imposing limits or preventing all of those and the
14 only way that we assessed we were going to get Bosnian Serb co-operation
15 on those was if the Bosnian government side exercised restraint.
16 So, yes, we wanted the Bosnian government side to exercise
17 restraint that would hopefully then influence decisions on the Bosnian
18 Serb side to open up the airport routes, Tuzla airport, et cetera.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Banbury, the Serb side had the right to ask for peace and for
22 observance of the cease-fire so that it could meet its obligations as
23 well. Do you agree that the Serb side had the right to prevent
24 humanitarian issues from giving an advantage to the other side, the
25 enemy? Yes or no?
Page 13510
1 A. Yes, I agree the Bosnian Serb side had a right to request peace.
2 No, I do not agree that there is any justification for linking access by
3 civilian populations to humanitarian assistance, linking that to any
4 political or military issue.
5 Q. Mr. Banbury, my question is the following: Whether the Serb side
6 was authorised to stop any action that had been abused by the other side
7 in order to gain military advantage. Does international law give us that
8 right?
9 A. I can't make a legal determination particularly with respect to a
10 hypothetical proposition such as the one you just made. I do agree that
11 the Bosnian Serb authorities had a legitimate interest in not having
12 exploitation by their enemy in a way or steps taken by their enemy that
13 would strengthen their military position relative to the Bosnian Serbs.
14 I still do not agree that there's any justification at all to
15 link provision of humanitarian assistance to a civilian population with
16 any other political, military, or other matter.
17 Q. Please have a look at this, where it says that the army of the
18 Bosnian Serbs had previously intended to close the routes following the
19 Muslim offensive in Ozren but had been prevented by doing so by UNPROFOR
20 persuasion.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. The previous page, it says:
24 "However, it was sometimes difficult [In English] to determine
25 exactly who was responsible for the shooting of aircraft, and there was,
Page 13511
1 for example, strong suspicion that the last two firing incidents had
2 emanated from the Butmir side (BH area)."
3 [Interpretation] Is this familiar? Actually, first of all, do
4 you agree that there were lines that were so close that it was hard to
5 determine from where fire was coming, and secondly, do you agree -- or,
6 rather, does this sound familiar to you, that there were these suspicions
7 that the firing had come from Butmir?
8 A. Yes, I agree that the lines of confrontation in the area of the
9 Sarajevo airport sometimes made it hard to determine from where firing
10 against the airport or UN aircraft occurred. Other times we were able to
11 determine where the firing came from. I also agree that there were
12 concerns that there was firing coming from both sides.
13 Q. When speaking of the Muslim side you always have to add the
14 Serbian side at least a bit and that is why I'm so worried about your
15 impartiality, Mr. Banbury.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
17 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to comment on that statement,
18 Mr. Banbury?
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I hope that the documents
20 have shown that UNPROFOR was committed to establishing facts whenever we
21 could and we let the facts and the reality of the situation on the ground
22 determine our behaviour. The officials that I worked most closely with,
23 did not have a -- and it's certainly the case for myself as well, did not
24 have a political agenda, national agenda, a preference for any party. We
25 were deeply concerned about peace, about the impact of the war on the
Page 13512
1 civilian population. We spoke out against any party when they acted
2 against their responsibilities or commitments. There were patterns of
3 behaviour during the course of the war that I think speak for themselves.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Banbury.
5 That will be admitted as Exhibit D1172.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3432.
7 Again, September 1994. We can move on to page 7. It's
8 General de Lapresle, he is sending this document to these addresses down
9 here. And can we now have a look at page 7.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Please look at B, yes. 13 UNHCR and one Red Cross flights landed
12 at Sarajevo airport. So there were 14 flights on that day.
13 [In English] "UNHCR-led convoys delivered a total of 1381 metric
14 tonnes of humanitarian aid."
15 It's on the next page.
16 Do you agree, Mr. Banbury, that the average was over 8, 9, 10,
17 11 flights every day at Sarajevo airport when the airport was operating?
18 A. When the airport was operating, there were a significant number
19 of flights on a daily basis. I don't know the numerical average, but
20 it's in that range probably, yes.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1173, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to abandon this topic as
Page 13513
1 well with regard to convoys. We have to go back to something else.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Banbury, we established and you, yourself, confirmed that you
4 interpreted the mandate of UNPROFOR to your colleagues; right?
5 A. Yes, not a formal legal interpretation but a political one and as
6 it applied to a certain context or situation that may have existed at
7 various times in the -- during the course of the war, yes.
8 Q. Was that mandate fully clear to you?
9 A. There were certain ambiguities in the Security Council
10 resolutions as a result of political divisions within the council and
11 perhaps other reasons, and as a result, the resolutions from the council
12 assigning UNPROFOR its mandate were themselves not always clear on all
13 matters. So the -- there was a built-in lack of clarity in certain
14 respects to UNPROFOR's mandate, so it was not always clear to anyone. It
15 was impossible to be clear because of ambiguous language in the
16 resolutions.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3368, please.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. This is a letter of Mr. Akashi. He is writing to Mr. Annan on
20 the 20th of May, 1995. It has to do with the implementation of the
21 mandate of UNPROFOR, and it says:
22 [In English] "Changes in the body of report have been highlighted
23 for your ease of reference. The observations section has been
24 significantly revised and should replace our previous draft."
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.
Page 13514
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Could you please focus on this. I don't have time to read all of
3 it so could you focus at least on paragraph 3, where Mr. Akashi says what
4 all the ambiguities are.
5 [In English] "UNPROFOR's mandate was further complicated by
6 resolutions that refer to Chapter 7 for security and freedom of movement
7 without clearly addressing the practical ramifications. Finally, the
8 safe area mandate of the council contained in Resolution 836, and
9 particularly its reliance on air power in response to attacks, has
10 brought the force to the edge of an almost untenable balance between its
11 impartiality as a basically peacekeeping operation and the use of force.
12 As a result, UNPROFOR is currently constrained by the nature and the
13 complexity of its mission, their contradictions and forces available to
14 implement them."
15 [Interpretation] Is that right? This is actually what you were
16 speaking about earlier, some of the things you were talking about earlier
17 about, these ambiguities, is that right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 5, please.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. [In English] "The Security Council in authorising UNPROFOR's
23 initial mandate and deployment to Bosnia and Herzegovina did not
24 contemplate an enforcement role. Authority for the use of force did not,
25 therefore, go beyond the right of self-defence inherent to any
Page 13515
1 United Nations peacekeeping force. The requirement to use force only
2 within the confines of conventional peacekeeping principles and practices
3 was also a direct and unavoidable consequence of UNPROFOR's tasks and
4 deployment on the ground." [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.
5 [In English] "The safe operations had, therefore, to be sought
6 through adherence by all parties to a mutually acceptable agreement."
7 [Interpretation] And in paragraph 11, in the middle:
8 [In English] "Despite the constantly precarious status in
9 deliveries to eastern enclaves and Sarajevo, where the problems of
10 access, including the air-lift and airdrops, are intimately linked with
11 the military situation on the grounds. The delivery of humanitarian
12 assistance by UNHCR was, and continues to be, generally successful. This
13 success can be attributed to the intensive negotiations with, and
14 practical co-operation of, the parties on the delivery of humanitarian
15 assistance. During periods of conflict, the use of humanitarian
16 assistance" --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. [In English] "... as a weapon of war has been most apparent
20 through denial of clearance," and so and so on.
21 [Interpretation] Could you please look at paragraph 12.
22 Paragraph 12 talks about Chapter 7 in the context of security of
23 UNPROFOR. And then of paragraph 13, at the bottom, states:
24 [In English] "And the subsequent resolutions cited above did not
25 create new task for UNPROFOR or modify its rule of engagement since it
Page 13516
1 stated previously the normal rule of engagement for all peacekeeping
2 missions permit the use of force in self-defence."
3 [Interpretation] Do you remember -- I am sorry the interpreter
4 does not have the original text. I will try to be more careful. Do you
5 remember, Mr. Banbury, that in our talks with General Rose, we clarified
6 that close air support was an action aimed at defending the forces of the
7 United Nations that had fallen into difficulties and that we accepted
8 that, and that an air-strike is a measure of punishment --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the end of
10 that sentence.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. -- which we do not accept?
13 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters couldn't hear the last part of your
14 question.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. We received an explanation that close air support meant support
17 to UNPROFOR units that had fallen into difficulties and we accepted that,
18 that was accepted by us. On the other hand, air-strikes were punitive
19 measure that we never accepted. We gave our consent for the presence of
20 United Nations that would imply interfering in the war. Do you know
21 about that?
22 A. The text that you cited from the document displayed is more
23 comprehensive and deals with much more than just the issue of close air
24 support and use of air-strikes. To address only your question, I agree,
25 yes, that you and your authorities did distinguish between the use of
Page 13517
1 close air support for the self-defence of UNPROFOR personnel and
2 air-strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets that were not directly
3 linked to self-defence action. I do not recall you ever agreeing with
4 the concept of close air support, while -- although you did distinguish
5 between the two. I also do not agree that the air-strikes were ever
6 punitive in nature. They were meant to achieve specific military aim.
7 They were not punitive.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you have five minutes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was counting on that. I'm going
10 to have one more document. And with a lot of regret, I will have to
11 conclude this cross-examination. Can we now look at page 7, please.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Paragraph 15 here talks about these areas, how these areas would
14 need to be treated as safe areas but that the concept of those safe areas
15 is not defined.
16 [In English] "There was no enforcement component to the safe
17 areas concept at its inception."
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page,
19 please.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Can you look at this highlighted section:
22 [In English] "While air power provides an indispensable factor of
23 deterrence and should ideally be used in a graduated escalatory response
24 to attacks as a last resort, experience has shown that using force
25 against only one party, whether directly or through regional
Page 13518
1 arrangements, alters the perception of the party on the neutrality of
2 UNPROFOR. As the role of the UNPROFOR and UNHCR are often perceived as
3 one, it becomes inevitable that their personnel are identified with the
4 military intervention and perceived as a party to the war. The lightly
5 armed, widely dispersed troops," and so on.
6 [Interpretation] Do you remember that a week after this, NATO
7 executed mass strategic strikes at Serb positions which then resulted in
8 our capturing of UNPROFOR members?
9 A. Yes, I recall that.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please -- well,
11 unfortunately I don't have time for the entire document, but the entire
12 document is available to the parties. I would like to tender this
13 document and then move to the last document, please.
14 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit D1174.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I now have 1D3479, please.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. And I would like to give you an example, an illustration from
18 your statement where my -- it is unacceptable to me how you interpret the
19 gist of the document. I don't have anything against the actual gist, but
20 against your interpretation of it. You said, didn't you, in your
21 statement --
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am sorry, 1D2461.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1D2461.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. In your statement, you said that I said that if the arms embargo
Page 13519
1 is lifted we would attack UNPROFOR; is that right?
2 A. Yes, that's not the exact quote but that was the gist of
3 statement, yes.
4 Q. I say that I said that we were going to allow UNPROFOR to pull
5 out through our territory, that we have nothing against the lifting of
6 the arms embargo because the embargo didn't exist anyway, and that we
7 would make it possible for UNPROFOR to withdraw safely. And then at
8 another occasion, I said that we would consider foreigners unacceptable.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the second part of
10 paragraph 2, please. Can we scroll up a little bit.
11 [In English] "Any such major offensive by his side would clearly
12 make the lifting of the arms embargo inevitable as the world would not
13 tolerate such a serious attack on the territory of B&H. Another
14 consequence would be the termination of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping
15 mission. As there was likely to be resistance to the withdrawal of
16 UNPROFOR by the Muslims, it would be safer for the isolated units of
17 UNPROFOR in the enclaves to withdraw from former Yugoslavia through
18 Bosnian Serb-held territory. His forces would assist the passage of
19 UNPROFOR as they did not want our weapons or equipment to fall into the
20 hands of the BH Army."
21 [Interpretation] Do you remember that this happened, that we made
22 it possible for British troops to pull out from Gorazde before the
23 bombing through Serbian territory?
24 A. I don't recall what troop movement you are referring to. There
25 were troop movements in and out of Gorazde on -- across time, so I'm
Page 13520
1 sorry, I don't recall specifically what you are referring to.
2 Q. Well, we will remind you. But is it not a fact here that I did
3 not threaten UNPROFOR forces over the lifting of the arms embargo and
4 over their possible withdrawal, but that I actually offered assistance?
5 Isn't that correct?
6 A. I do not believe I was at the meeting that is characterised in
7 the document that is displayed. I accept that the document reflects an
8 overall picture of what was stated at the meeting, including your
9 position with respect to the possible lifting of the arms embargo in
10 Bosnia. I do not believe that that changes my earlier statement or the
11 information I have in it.
12 Q. But this is opposite of what you said in your statement, that we
13 would consider them as enemies and attack UNPROFOR if they pull out. But
14 let's look at the following page to see when I exactly said that we would
15 consider foreigners as adversaries.
16 Paragraph 8:
17 [In English] "Dr. Karadzic replied that if any more UNSCRs were
18 passed against the Bosnian Serbs, then they would regard UNPROFOR as an
19 adversary."
20 [Interpretation] The way you see it and the way you interpret our
21 position, obviously we are talking about the position stated at this
22 meeting, you thought that we would consider UNPROFOR an adversary if the
23 arms embargo was lifted and such an assertion is very detrimental to the
24 Defence, but in essence, it is erroneous. And we are showing this
25 document and indicating that the interpretation of the document is
Page 13521
1 actually drastically different. Isn't that right?
2 And I would like the parties to look at paragraph 58:
3 [In English] "In the event the arms embargo was lifted, the Serbs
4 would take UN blue helmets hostage, shoot down a lot of planes and arrest
5 all foreigners."
6 A. I believe that I was simply quoting a statement where you had
7 been quoted. I was not conveying my opinion. It's not my
8 interpretation. I was just factually reporting something that you were
9 reported to have said. I think it's possible that you may have said one
10 thing in one context and something different in a different context.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Well, can we have that document then? I have
12 stated what is said in this document, I never said anything else,
13 Mr. Banbury. I need to clarify each one of these 240 paragraphs and to
14 see why the interpretation you provide is different from the map. Is the
15 map different from the terrain?
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call up that document so
18 that we can see whether that arises from that document.
19 JUDGE KWON: It's time to conclude, wrap up your
20 cross-examination. We'll admit this document.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1175, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: I take it you have concluded, Mr. Karadzic.
23 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I'm sorry to disturb
25 you but I'm wondering if I could be heard very briefly on the issue of
Page 13522
1 time and reconsideration. In particular, we absolutely have no time to
2 deal with the count 11, and I would like to give you five points that are
3 contained in this witness's notebooks about count 11 and let you decide
4 whether you think that's valuable enough to have the cross-examination
5 continue as a very specific example because these proceedings are
6 basically being conducted very exemplary, but it would be a shame to
7 simply lose the ability to defend on part of the case that is less
8 important than others by not having enough time. So if you would allow
9 me, outside of the presence of the witness, I would like to point to
10 five points about count 11 that we simply didn't have time to get to and
11 that I would ask that you consider giving him the time to do that.
12 JUDGE KWON: Was it not your client's choice not to ask those
13 questions? He had ample time asking other questions. I will consult my
14 colleagues.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Mr. Banbury, if you could excuse
17 yourself for a moment.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, getting back to your question, your
20 comment before, I just say there has to be choices made when there's time
21 limitations, and count 11 -- there's consequences of count 11 that are
22 considerably less than the other counts and so I don't think it was an
23 irrational choice for Dr. Karadzic to leave that to the end.
24 In any event, on the 24th of May, 1995, this witness attended a
25 meeting and recorded in his notebooks that Admiral Smith was thinking of
Page 13523
1 hitting -- doing the air-strikes tomorrow using laser-guided bombs. You
2 will be called upon in this case to make a credibility assessment between
3 testimony of General Smith who said that they had no capability to use a
4 laser-guided weapons for the air-strikes and witness B, who we will call
5 in our Defence case who we've presented already his affidavit showing
6 that he was working on the ground as a forward air controller in Pale at
7 the time these bombs were dropped, and this is some evidence that would
8 support the Defence contention on this issue that you'll have to decide
9 for credibility. It's in his notebook. It's an entry, we don't think
10 it's suitable for bar table without giving the witness a chance to
11 explain that entry. That's one example.
12 Another example is that on the 26th of May, at a meeting, after
13 they noted that there were three violations of the exclusion zone, two by
14 the Bosnian Muslim Army and one by the Bosnian Serb Army, Mr. Akashi said
15 that Secretary Albright was upset at their intention to strike the
16 Bosnian Muslim Army. And so as we know, only air-strikes were made
17 against the Serbs, which we contend is part of the equation as to why
18 Dr. Karadzic believed that they had become combatants as opposed to
19 simple peacekeepers.
20 On the 27th of May, 1995, this witness noted in his notes of a
21 meeting that the force commander, General Janvier said that the problem
22 with the weapon collections points was that the circumstances in which
23 the weapons could be used were never defined. That supports
24 Dr. Karadzic's position that when this was negotiated, there was a belief
25 by the Serbs that they could take out these weapons when they were
Page 13524
1 attacked or when they needed them for defensive purposes. And we've had
2 uncontradicted evidence that in the middle of May there was a Bosnian
3 Muslim offensive, which would once again tend to support the Defence
4 contention that the UN had become belligerents.
5 On the 29th of May, this witness noted that General Janvier said
6 that the talks between the UN and the Bosnian Serb Army concerning the
7 exchange of prisoners had been interrupted. This would be the first
8 confirmation that there was on the UN side a negotiations for the
9 exchange of the four prisoners that they had taken on the Vrbanja bridge,
10 an event which would make them equally responsible for hostage taking as
11 Bosnian Serbs, since hostage taking is defined as the placing of a
12 condition upon the release or a harm coming to a person in their custody.
13 And finally, on the 2nd of June, 1995, this witness noted in his
14 notebooks that Fred Eckhart had reported that the Bosnian Muslim
15 General Divjak had said that NATO had chosen their target well, that the
16 Serb attacks on Sarajevo had been impacted by the attack on the Pale
17 ammunition depot, and that the Serbs would need 15 to 30 days to resupply
18 from Serbia, which again supports the Defence contention that the UN had
19 become part of the belligerents and combatants as opposed to a neutral
20 party.
21 So those are examples of cross-examination that simply weren't
22 reached and I would ask that you give us time to be able to do that.
23 Thank you.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Robinson, what sort of period of time are
Page 13525
1 you suggesting, realistically rather than, as it were, optimistically.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I think for -- those five points could be
3 covered in about 30 minutes, perhaps less, but ...
4 JUDGE BAIRD: Perhaps less?
5 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I think I could do it in about 15 minutes
6 but I was giving Dr. Karadzic a cushion, so perhaps less.
7 JUDGE MORRISON: Perhaps Dr. Karadzic would borrow your cushion.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, do you by any chance know whether
10 Mr. Banbury will be available tomorrow?
11 MS. EDGERTON: He could be available for a period of time in the
12 morning, but he is due and required back in New York later on in the day
13 tomorrow.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may assist.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE KWON: Let's bring in the witness.
18 [The witness takes the stand]
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Banbury, I apologise for your inconvenience.
20 Given the importance of your evidence as well as the subject matter
21 raised by Mr. Robinson, the Chamber has decided to allow the accused to
22 have additional half an hour tomorrow morning, so my question to you is
23 whether you would be available tomorrow morning for about less than an
24 hour in the morning?
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, in the interests of fairness to
Page 13526
1 the accused and justice, I'd be happy to be available.
2 JUDGE KWON: I appreciate it very much. We'll rise today and
3 resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.28 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 17th day of
6 March, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.
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