111031ED

Page 20631

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

3 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Mujadzic.

4 A. Good morning.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I must say that

6 this will take even more time because technical means are not working. I

7 can simply not print my own materials. We've been working on that but

8 the job is still pending, so it will all be slowed down by the fact that

9 I couldn't do that.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Doctor, you shared with us what Brdjanin told you only today.

12 Why didn't [Realtime transcript read in error "Detention Unit"] you say

13 that publicly before the Assembly so that Brdjanin may be admonished for

14 what he said?

15 A. Mr. Brdjanin said that publicly, and besides me, many other

16 public figures heard that, including politicians and citizens. I was not

17 the only one who heard his statement. The information even reached

18 Sarajevo and judicial and enforcement bodies. It was a public statement.

19 Everybody heard that. So it was not my exclusive responsibility to

20 launch an initiative for Mr. Brdjanin to be admonished or punished for

21 his political statement.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I'm sorry to interrupt, but I do

24 need to clarify this. This is not the first time Dr. Mujadzic has

25 mentioned this. He said it in his Brdjanin testimony at transcript page

Page 20632

1 13306.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect, I did not

3 claim that it was absolutely the first time he said it today. My

4 question was why he did not present that issue before the Assembly, which

5 was the only legitimate body that could consider that. Why didn't

6 somebody file a criminal report? Why didn't he file a criminal report?

7 Because if it was said in a serious tone, it should have been subject to

8 a prosecution.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that -- was that a

10 question for me, Mr. Karadzic?

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. This is just my response to Madam Sutherland and a clarification

13 of my question. I didn't say this was the first time you mentioned this.

14 I just thought that this should have been dealt with in time if it had

15 been said seriously, if it was not a joke.

16 JUDGE KWON: Just before we go further, I'm just wondering

17 whether the transcript is correct when -- just second. It's page 16,

18 lines 6 and 7. Did you mention the detention unit? "Why Detention Unit

19 say that publicly before the Assembly so that Brdjanin may be

20 admonished?"

21 MS. SUTHERLAND: I think it's, "Why did you not say that

22 publicly," perhaps.

23 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Everything is bad. I didn't say

25 this was the first time he said. I asked why those things were not said

Page 20633

1 publicly, why Brdjanin was not prosecuted for what he said, why the issue

2 wasn't raised before the Assembly. If it was said seriously, he should

3 have lost his office as a result of that.

4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, Mr. Karadzic is making comment. If

5 he can put a question to Dr. Mujadzic.

6 JUDGE KWON: I take it that this is the -- this is a question for

7 Dr. Mujadzic. Can you answer the question, Doctor?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I was just one of the

9 deputies in parliament, and I had no political or any other prerogatives

10 to put that in motion. There were many more politically responsible and

11 other individuals who could have set that in motion, so I can't really

12 answer why that wasn't done.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Thank you. Dr. Mujadzic, today you repeated, and I believe that

15 you've said this in your earlier testimony as well, that my speech of the

16 15th of October, 1991, when our deputies walked out of the parliament,

17 you said that that address of mine was a warning to you and that it was

18 a -- something that told you that you should start with defence

19 preparations.

20 A. Well, I don't think I really said that, and I didn't mean the

21 speech, that address before the parliament. I was talking about the

22 global and general situation and the tendencies at the time.

23 Q. Well, if I had the materials that I need printed out, I would be

24 able to give you a reference, but let me remind you. You said and you

25 interpreted a speech of mine. You said that I said you were not ready

Page 20634

1 for war yet. So let me remind you of this: In this speech that the

2 Trial Chamber is familiar with, I was urging you not to go the path of

3 war and force and secession because that would lead to hell. And I said

4 at that time that the Muslims could not defend themselves, finding

5 themselves between Serbs and Croats, and I paraphrase Mr. Filipovic who

6 had earlier said at the earlier session the following words: If these

7 policies should continue my nation will disappear. And as I had been on

8 good terms with Mr. Filipovic, he had asked me not to quote him because

9 then he would be subject to attack. So my thesis was not that this

10 should not be done but that you wouldn't be able to defend yourselves in

11 case war broke out.

12 A. Mr. Karadzic, let me just clarify something. The speech you

13 referred to and you're talking about the 15th of October, 1991, whereas I

14 believe that the address that you would like to refer to is something

15 that happened later in the Assembly. I don't think it was on the 15th of

16 October, 1991. I think, rather, that that speech of yours was related to

17 the referendum which would have been later, in 1992, I believe.

18 Q. Thank you. Now, you are right in one sense. I did address the

19 parliament in -- on the 25th of January, 1992, when Mr. Cengic and I -

20 and this transcript has been admitted into evidence here - Mr. Cengic and

21 I spoke. We came out together, and we proposed that this referendum be

22 postponed until regionalisation was put in place and in that event the

23 Serbs would also vote in the referendum and it would be legitimate.

24 However, the disappearance of one of the ethnicities, that was something

25 that was mentioned in October, wasn't it?

Page 20635

1 A. The 15th of October, 1995 [sic]?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. I'm not sure that your speech in the Assembly was then. I

4 believe that that was later, Mr. Karadzic. If we mean the same speech,

5 the speech in which you said what you've just mentioned now, that the

6 Muslims would be unable to defend themselves, the Bosniaks would be

7 unable to defend themselves in a war should it break out and that in that

8 case our option if we were continue that path would just lead to hell and

9 eventually lead to the disappearance of Bosniaks. If you're referring to

10 that speech, I think that was -- that came much later than October 1991

11 and I would appreciate it if someone knows this as a fact. Perhaps they

12 can help us so we can determine, establish when exactly this speech was.

13 Q. Thank you. You can be sure that it was on the 15th of October?

14 JUDGE KWON: I remember you rose.

15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I just wanted to clarify the answer

16 the witness gave as to the date in the transcript, page 19, line 15, it

17 says the 15th of October, 1995.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

19 MS. SUTHERLAND: I don't know if Mr. Karadzic wants to clarify

20 that with the witness as to the year.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. The speech that I am referring to and we have already admitted it

23 into evidence here and I believe we've already also seen a video, video

24 footage of it, was on the 15th of October, 1991. That was when our

25 deputies walked out and do you remember, Dr. Mujadzic, that on the 24th

Page 20636

1 of October we established an Assembly of the Serbian people in Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina, and this was precisely because of the walkout on the 15th of

3 October.

4 A. Yes, I do recall that.

5 Q. Thank you. Now let me ask you this: Is it correct that you as a

6 national entity, as an ethnic entity, actually waged war against Serbs,

7 against Croats, and even against parts of the Muslim ethnicity, the Abdic

8 followers in the Cazin Krajina?

9 A. Well, I wouldn't really put it that way, Mr. Karadzic. We didn't

10 wage war on Serbs or Croats or Muslims. We defended Bosnia-Herzegovina

11 from those who were putting it in jeopardy. Not all Serbs were putting

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina in jeopardy, not all Croats, or all Muslims. And I'm

13 sure you know that there were quite a few Serbs in the Bosnian ranks of

14 the Bosnian Army, as well as Croats, and that there were a number of

15 deputies of Serb ethnicity who remained throughout the war members of the

16 parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same is true of Croats. And

17 this up to the highest levels of power including the Presidency of Bosnia

18 and Herzegovina, including Tatjana Lujic Mijatovic, for instance, who was

19 a member of the Presidency of Serb ethnicity. In other words, we never

20 waged war on Serbs.

21 Q. Thank you. Doctor, my apologies, but I haven't been given enough

22 time so please let's not try to joust here politically. Now, did you

23 defend Bosnia from some Serbs, some Croats, and some Muslims where you

24 fought the Serbs for three years, Muslims for one, and Croats for one

25 year? So did you actually wage three wars?

Page 20637

1 A. Well, these were three different series of events.

2 Q. Thank you. But tell us what was this war about? In what sense

3 did you -- or were you defending Bosnia?

4 A. We were defending Bosnia from aggression.

5 Q. Now, tell us, please, am I correct? Bosnia as we have it today,

6 the Dayton Bosnia, was never in dispute -- or, rather, from the moment

7 that we accepted Bosnia's independence, in other words, Bosnia was not

8 defending itself. It wasn't a fight for the freedom and independence of

9 Bosnia. Rather, it was a fight other whether it would be a unified

10 unitary Bosnia or not.

11 A. Mr. Karadzic, there were negotiations before the Dayton Accords

12 where there were attempts to regionalise Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if

13 you recall, I believe there was an agreement with Lord Carrington and

14 there were several such agreements, actually, where attempts were made to

15 regionalise Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to come up with a political

16 solution and find a compromise, and I believe there were a number of

17 negotiations on that issue, as far as I can recall.

18 Q. Thank you. Now, this is an entire new set of questions so I have

19 no time to go into that, but the fact remains, doesn't it, would you

20 agree, that the Serbs were in favour of remaining within Yugoslavia; that

21 was the first option. The second priority was for the Serbian parts to

22 remain within Yugoslavia. And the third option or rather concession was

23 to accept an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina within its existing

24 borders on condition that we get our own constituent entity; correct?

25 A. Well, I could agree with the two first statements you made, or

Page 20638

1 theses. It is true that the SDS insisted on Bosnia remaining in

2 Yugoslavia, and it is true that the SDS insisted on those parts of Bosnia

3 where the Serbs had a majority to remain in some kind of administrative

4 connection with Yugoslavia, but I don't recall that the

5 Serbian Democratic Party ever supported, under any conditions, an

6 independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7 I wish to God we had such negotiations. Perhaps we could have

8 come up with some kind of solution in that case.

9 Q. Well, Doctor, this wasn't really a question. What I'm -- what

10 you've -- what we see in the transcript is another question that's not

11 really a question. That's part of the answer.

12 Now, Dr. Mujadzic, let me just remind you. My address in the

13 Assembly together with Mr. Cengic on the 25th of January had to do with

14 the referendum and that the Serbs would remain and take part in the

15 referendum if the government agreed to regionalisation before that. So

16 already at that time we were accepting an independent Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina, but can you tell me, was that the first time that there was

18 agreement that Bosnia would remain independent and then up until the 18th

19 of March this thesis was being worked on and almost finalised. The only

20 issues that remain to be cleared up were some issues relating to the

21 armed forces and some adjustments to the maps; do you recall that?

22 A. Well, of course I remember.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat what agreement

24 exactly he's referring to.

25 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry to interrupt you, Dr. Mujadzic, because

Page 20639

1 both of you are speaking the same language which should be interpreted

2 into English and French, I would appreciate it very much if you could put

3 a pause before you start answering. In any event, the interpreters

4 couldn't follow your response, so could you kindly repeat it.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My apologies. I will try to make a

6 pause before I actually begin answering to give enough time to

7 interpreters to do their job. So let me repeat what I've said in answer.

8 Mr. Karadzic, I do remember that you talked with Cengic, and of

9 course I remember the Lisbon agreement, and I remember the proposal for

10 regionalisation that was included in the agreement. The only thing that

11 I honestly cannot recall is that detail that the Serbian Democratic Party

12 ever accepted an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina under any conditions.

13 I'm not saying that's not the case, but I can't remember that. Would you

14 have -- could you point out some detail in order to corroborate that?

15 And of course if I see such a document of course I would accept your

16 claim. In other words, I'm not saying that what you're claiming is not

17 correct, it's just that I do not remember it that way.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Thank you. We do have evidence and exhibits on that, but I've

20 already said that part of the Lisbon agreement was that Bosnia and

21 Herzegovina was accepted by Serbs within the existing borders, and we

22 wanted some ties with Yugoslavia.

23 Now, can you tell me --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat his question.

25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please repeat your question.

Page 20640

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Does Dr. Mujadzic -- Dr. Mujadzic, do you stand by what you've

3 said in your earlier testimony that this speech of mine was a warning

4 light that you realized that you should then start your preparations for

5 war and that it was only then that you started preparing for war?

6 A. We began some more serious thinking about how to defend Bosnia

7 and Herzegovina at that time, because after that speech of yours, we were

8 forewarned. We were also reminded of some facts, and your statement was

9 absolutely true. We were totally unarmed. We were not organised, and we

10 had absolutely no chance for any kind of defence at that point in time.

11 It was zero. In other words, after those words of yours, that was just a

12 reminder to us what the factual situation was at the time.

13 Q. My apologies but that was not my question. My question was had

14 you already embarked on preparations for war even before that or was it

15 only from that point onwards?

16 A. At this time, we gave some serious thought to the defences of

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina and what our capabilities were. True, there were

18 some earlier thoughts about that, about what to do with in the event of

19 some political difficulties that might result in an aggression against

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina, because we had already seen what would happen in

21 Slovenia and Croatia, and of course we were aware completely that the

22 political developments could bring Bosnia and Herzegovina into similar

23 situation, and of course it is true that there was already some thinking

24 about some action that needed to be taken in terms of defence.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now have

Page 20641

1 1D2906 in e-court, and I need page 8. Could we please zoom in on the

2 left bottom part of the column.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

4 Q. This is a series of articles, an interview with you, in the New

5 Mirror, "Novo Ogledalo," of March 1995, and let me read it:

6 [As read] "And then when all -- when there is no more room for

7 political dialogue, then what follows is an armed conflict, and prompted

8 by this I invited some of my colleagues at the Krajina level where we

9 organised already in early January 1991, we held a first meeting where we

10 analysed the possible consequences of the further evolution in that

11 direction. And it was our conclusion then that war was inexorably coming

12 closer and we should start preparing for defence at that time, and I

13 would like to stress out that it never occurred us to that we should be

14 the ones to initiate conflict, that we should do anything politically or

15 in any other way to provoke the other side. We simply understood that

16 the way the events were going, they were going against our wishes and our

17 commitments. In other words, a month after the election" --

18 JUDGE KWON: I note that only partially it has been translated.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it is possible, because we

20 used the second part with another witness.

21 JUDGE KWON: My question is whether why it's not uploaded. Let's

22 proceed.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know whether this part was

24 translated; it should have maybe. But Excellency, really, we are under

25 such pressure that the Defence feels disabled in many ways. Everybody

Page 20642

1 admits that this is a mega-trial but nothing else is mega. Everything

2 else is average; the number of people working on this case, the resources

3 that I have, so if it's a mega-trial then there should be a mega-defence.

4 JUDGE KWON: Let's not spend our time on those issues. That has

5 already been addressed and discussed. Not now. Let's proceed.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Dr. Mujadzic, you said that already a month after we jointly

8 established the new democratic government you started preparations for

9 organising a defence; right?

10 A. I've just confirmed what I've already said to you, and I said

11 that in greater detail in my statement in the Tadic case. I explained in

12 detail why I had come to such a conclusion. It was not a personal

13 conclusion on my part; it was the conclusion of other people. If

14 Their Honours allow me to, I will mention a few things that led me to

15 think along those lines.

16 However, I would also like to point out that what I said here was

17 that we did not want to provoke the other side in any way. We were not

18 the ones who were destroying Yugoslavia. That is what this text says

19 further on. We were in favour of peace and preserving Yugoslavia at all

20 costs, and Mr. Izetbegovic and all of us from the SDA made a huge effort

21 to preserve Yugoslavia, because we realized that the Bosniaks would be

22 the greatest losers if there were to be a conflict or a war, and that is

23 why we tried to avoid any possibility of a war, and we made all kinds of

24 concessions to the other side in order to avoid that.

25 Q. With all due respect, Dr. Mujadzic, these are reasons that I'm

Page 20643

1 not challenging. However, I am interested in a fact. In January 1991,

2 did you have these meetings? And just look further on. In

3 Velika Kladusa, you had a meeting, and there's this question here. How

4 about showing the middle part on our screens now. Mujadzic says this

5 meeting was held sometime in mid-January 1991 in Kladusa. There it is,

6 question and answer.

7 A. Yes. I'm not denying that. The elections were held in

8 September, and from September until January was four or five months, and

9 many things happened. Let me just summarise briefly.

10 Q. Oh, please don't justify what you did. I'm not challenging that.

11 These were your rights. But weren't the elections held on the 18th of

12 November?

13 A. I think that the elections were held earlier, Mr. Karadzic, if --

14 they were a bit earlier.

15 Q. The 18th of November. All right. That can be checked easily.

16 Tell us, please, did you, I mean you the Muslim community, did you take

17 steps to establish this Patriotic League, and did you make a decision to

18 that effect on the 30th of March, and did you actually establish it on

19 the 30th of April?

20 A. The answer is no.

21 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the 30th of April, 1991, is the date

22 from which years of service in the BH Army are recognised according to

23 BH law, two different individuals.

24 A. I don't know about that, Mr. Karadzic.

25 Q. We'll have a look at this, but I want to say that this is spelled

Page 20644

1 out in the law now, that that is when the defence forces of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina came into being. Is it correct that Sefer Halilovic came to

3 see you in Prijedor in order to take care of that precisely, the

4 establishment of the Patriotic League in September 1991, for instance,

5 before my speech?

6 A. Yes, in 1991.

7 Q. Is it already in September --

8 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow to which question the witness said,

9 "Yes," because you ask so many questions.

10 Dr. Mujadzic, yes to which question? That you met Mr. Halilovic

11 in 1991?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes.

13 JUDGE KWON: Is that all, or -- or whether you answered

14 positively that he raised the issue of Patriotic League?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My answer was yes, meaning that

16 Mr. Halilovic was in Prijedor. However, the answer is no when he said

17 that the Muslim community raised the issue of the Patriotic League. That

18 is what I said was incorrect, but it is correct that Mr. Halilovic came.

19 Mr. Karadzic is constructing certain things through his

20 questions. The Muslim community is a concept that I'm unaware of. I

21 know that there is the Islamic community but I don't know what this

22 Muslim community is. The Patriotic League was an initiative of

23 Sefer Halilovic, a personal initiative of his. He never belonged to the

24 SDA. He was never a member of the SDA. The Patriotic League was

25 supported by the Party of Democratic Action, but there were members who

Page 20645

1 had nothing whatsoever to do with the Patriotic League, and the

2 Patriotic League was a defence front. There was no direct link with the

3 Party of Democratic Action. The Party of Democratic Action was just one

4 of the parties that supported such activities, because they considered

5 the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be an objective fact.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Thank you. Thank you. You're a remarkable speaker, and it would

8 be wonderful to listen to you, but let us deal with specific questions

9 now.

10 Is it correct that Sefer Halilovic came to see you in Prijedor in

11 September 1991 to work on the establishment of the Patriotic League in

12 Prijedor; right?

13 A. Yes. I've already answered that question in the affirmative.

14 Q. Thank you. With which Serb representatives did he discuss the

15 establishment of the Patriotic League?

16 A. I don't know. I'm not sure whether he had discussions with some

17 people. At the time, Sefer Halilovic was outside the system of the SDA.

18 He had the right and freedom to do whatever he wanted. Now, whether he

19 talked to some persons who were of Serb ethnicity, I don't know. I don't

20 know whether that happened in Prijedor. I know that he did that in other

21 parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I know, for sure, that some members of

22 the Patriotic League were ethnic Serbs.

23 Q. Thank you. From whom was he given this total freedom to do

24 whatever he wanted?

25 A. Each and every citizen in Bosnia-Herzegovina - it was a free

Page 20646

1 state at the time - had the right to start any kind of initiative,

2 especially if that initiative was patriotic, in a patriotic sense. So

3 this was personal initiative of Mr. Sefer Halilovic's.

4 Q. So Mr. Sefer Halilovic who left the JNA decided to establish a

5 military organisation with a military staff, with a civilian staff, a

6 political staff, and he could do that in full accordance with the law as

7 he prepared the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina while sidestepping the

8 Serbs and I think the Croat representatives as well, the official

9 representatives.

10 A. I wouldn't agree with that, Mr. Karadzic. Have you ever read the

11 platform of the Patriotic League? If you've read the platform of the

12 Patriotic League, then you can see from the platform that it is broad

13 based and that it involves potentially all citizens who support

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that there is no reference to the

15 Party of Democratic Action in that platform. Also, there is no exclusive

16 mention of the Bosniak community, the Muslim community, whatever you

17 wish. The Patriotic League had a very broad-based platform, and it

18 included all patriots who supported Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19 Q. Thank you. Does that mean that these meetings were public

20 meetings, that they were followed by the media as well?

21 A. I don't know to what extent this was given publicity. I don't

22 think it was exactly public at the time. It was the JNA that was still

23 the official army in the area. In my previous speeches, I explained why

24 such initiatives had been initiated. In Croatia, the JNA had already

25 acted as the de facto Serb army, although de jure was still the Yugoslav

Page 20647

1 army.

2 Your Honours, sorry, may I just explain this. For me, Yugoslavia

3 means all citizens of the former Yugoslavia of all ethnic and religious

4 backgrounds. At the moment when the war was underway in Croatia, the JNA

5 was practically a Serb army exclusively.

6 Q. However, in the top echelons of that army, and we don't have

7 enough time to deal with it now, there was Anton Tus, a Croat. The

8 minister of defence was a half Croat, half Serb from Croatia. The head

9 of the air force was a Croat. The deputy chief of General Staff was a

10 Slovene, Brovet. So there were many of them. So most of these people

11 who were in the highest positions of responsibility were non-Serbs, but

12 let's leave that aside, Doctor. This is what I'm interested in only: Do

13 you remember actually --

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D264 can we have that called up?

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Do you mean that Izetbegovic, Kljuic, and I constantly worked on

17 monitoring the situation and making efforts to ease tensions and that we

18 sent you instructions on the establishment of mixed groups that were to

19 follow any increases in these tensions that should be reported back? Do

20 you remember that?

21 A. Yes, I remember that agreement. However, as for the

22 implementation of such activities on the ground, there was no adequate

23 co-operation on the part of the Serb Democratic Party. I've already

24 explained that in my previous statements. Even in the election campaign

25 this co-operation was refused by the SDS in Prijedor, because our party

Page 20648

1 called for co-operation, co-operation from the SDS and the HDZ. However,

2 such activities were adamantly refused by the SDS in Prijedor.

3 Q. Thank you. We don't have time to go into each and every minute

4 detail.

5 Did you delegate, if I can put it that way, your own members in

6 order to establish these groups that would supervise -- or, rather,

7 monitor things that were happening and then report back to their own

8 headquarters? The 27th of August, 1991.

9 A. I don't remember exactly. I think that we had some preliminary

10 talks with the representatives of the SDS and the HDZ along those lines,

11 but I think that as for the implementation of this agreement it was never

12 actually carried through. Unfortunately, I know that no such agreement

13 functioned on the ground.

14 Q. Thank you. Right now on 3571, plus 15, my technical equipment

15 doesn't seem to be working --

16 A. 3586, possibly.

17 Q. You are saying -- and I thank you for that. You are talking

18 about Ustasha crimes in the Second World War and you admit that Serbs had

19 this reflex. Well, that's not exactly the way that you put it, but that

20 they had cause for concern.

21 Now, what does it say here? Line 16. I'll read it in English so

22 that they interpret it better.

23 [As read] "[In English] From the historical point of view until

24 1942 Prijedor was controlled by so-called Ustasha government. This was

25 the government of the Independent State of Croatia and its dictator,

Page 20649

1 Ante Pavelic. It was a time in which particularly the Serb people

2 suffered a great deal of damage and loss of lives, especially from

3 Potkozarje. Many Serbs from Potkozarje perished in the camp at

4 Jasenovac. So that's -- that's the way Serbs from the region perceived

5 the situation from a position full of pain in terms of Second World War."

6 [Interpretation] So you are not mocking these victims.

7 A. No, I'm not. I'm aware of the history of that area, and the fact

8 that I referred to all of this guided our relations with the

9 Serbian Democratic Party. You do remember, Mr. Karadzic, that there was

10 is this initiative of the Prijedor Bosniak intellectuals during the

11 Second World War. This initiative was signed by 86 Bosniaks from

12 Prijedor and it was sent to Ante Pavelic asking to stop the persecution

13 of the Serbs and you also know that many Bosniaks defended and protected

14 many Serbs, even Srdjo Srdic, who was president of the SDS in Prijedor

15 was protected by Bosniaks from Kozarac. His family was supposed to be

16 killed including himself. He was a child at the time. However they were

17 taken out of Prijedor, protected, so Srdjo Srdic who was at the time

18 president of the SDS always referred to that, saying that that showed the

19 good co-operation between the Bosniaks and Serbs in Prijedor during the

20 Second World War. Of course, we took this into account, and we tried in

21 every possible way to have the Serb people in the area of Prijedor know

22 that our position is still the same, namely that we want to have good

23 relations with the Serb people in that area and that of course if

24 anything were to happen again, we would again protect the Serb people as

25 we did in the Second World War.

Page 20650

1 Q. Thank you. I'm asking you about this because we have witnesses

2 appearing here who say that they laugh when we mention Serbs victims in

3 the Sana River valley, and I thank you for not doing that. And --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not catch the page

5 reference.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. You said that all parties were against the policy of the

8 Serb Democratic Party and then today you said to us that many Serbs

9 stayed in parliament and so on and so forth, and this is what I'm going

10 to put to you now, I'll put our position to you now about the facts

11 involved. Is it correct that, in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

12 among different political parties there were 86 Serbs, 72 Serb MPs were

13 in the SDS and 14 were in other political parties. If you don't know,

14 can you take my word for it? It can be checked. That's the way it was.

15 A. I assume that your figure is correct. I'm not exactly sure of

16 the number, but I believe that that was the case. If that is what you

17 say, it does correspond to what I remember.

18 Q. Do you agree that of the 86 MPs, 83 were members of the

19 Serbian Assembly and that the Assembly still has that number of MPs in

20 memory of the first composition of the Assembly, 83 out of 86 made up the

21 Serbian Assembly?

22 A. Mr. Karadzic, I didn't know that. However, I'm sure that that

23 can be checked very easily. We can very easily find out how many Serbian

24 MPs remained in the parliament when the SDS walked out. I believe that

25 the number was more than 3 Serb MPs, but I don't have any arguments to

Page 20651

1 support my belief. As I said, I believe that that argument can easily be

2 checked. There are documents issued by the Assembly of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and minutes. It can be easily checked how many Serb

4 MPs remained after the SDS walked out.

5 Q. Thank you. On page 1835 [as interpreted], plus 18 -- 3571 plus

6 18, you speak about the reasons for which Yugoslavia had broken up, and

7 you say that the main reason was the appearance of Milosevic and his

8 request for the voting according to the principle: One person, one vote.

9 Do you know that the first major separatist movement happened in Croatia

10 in 1970 and 1971 and that it ended up in the shakeups and in Kosovo it

11 was in 1986?

12 A. Yes, if you are referring to Savka Dapcevic, of course, I

13 remember. Of course I was still a child but I remember subsequent

14 comments about those events.

15 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that Mr. Milosevic and you claim that

16 we supported him, that he always supported our opponents in any -- in

17 every elections? The first time he supported Ilic, the second time,

18 Radisic, the third time Mladen Ivanic, and the fourth time

19 Biljana Plavsic, but only then when she had turned against the SDS.

20 A. I cannot provide any comments as regards the relationship between

21 Milosevic and the SDS. I don't think I know enough about those relations

22 in order to provide any comments. I'm not sure that I'm familiar with

23 this photo, Mr. Karadzic, but if you claim that that was the fact and if

24 you have support for your arguments, I don't have a reason not to believe

25 you.

Page 20652

1 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to ask you this -- actually, I would

2 like to put certain things to you because I don't have enough time to go

3 into any detail. I'm putting to you that there were two original

4 proposals tabled by the Muslim side and directed at the Serbs with regard

5 to the future of Bosnia. The first proposal was by Mr. Izetbegovic, who

6 told us that Bosnia should be independent but that it should consist of

7 three parts. The second proposal was by Mr. Zulfikarpasic, the leader of

8 another Muslim party, for Bosnia to be unitarian, that Serbs should --

9 Serb should give up on regionalisation but that Bosnia should remain in

10 Yugoslavia.

11 Do you know that we accepted both proposals that, we both -- both

12 those proposals?

13 A. I assume that in the first part of your question you were

14 referring to the Lisbon agreement. Is that correct, Mr. Karadzic?

15 Q. Even before that, Dr. Mujadzic. In the month of May,

16 Mr. Izetbegovic tabled a proposal for Bosnia to be divided. We were

17 taken by surprise. You can see that from my telephone conversation with

18 Milosevic that is already on file here. And then can we look what

19 Mr. Zulfikarpasic had to say about that in his book. I would like to

20 call up --

21 JUDGE KWON: Just one by one.

22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, what's the question that

23 Mr. Karadzic is putting to the witness?

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Can you now answer the question? The previous

25 question, whether the Serbs admitted both proposals.

Page 20653

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first part of the question

2 dealing with the Bosniak proposal about the division of Bosnia into three

3 parts, the only proposal that I remember in that sense was the proposal

4 or the draft of the Lisbon agreement. I don't remember. Mr. Izetbegovic

5 never mentioned before us that he had talks with members of the SDS. The

6 only thing that we were aware of were negotiations leading to the Lisbon

7 agreement that were public. So, Mr. Karadzic, I am not aware of any such

8 agreement.

9 As for the second part of your question, Zulfikarpasic and

10 Muhamed Filipovic's proposal for Bosnia to remain in Yugoslavia, we

11 supported that proposal, Mr. Karadzic. You will remember that the SDA,

12 in its statute, had an element -- one of its main elements is the

13 preservation of Yugoslavia. The SDA was absolutely in favour of the

14 preservation of Yugoslavia for reasons known to you. There were a lot of

15 Bosniaks living in Sandzak and other parts of Croatia and in other parts

16 of Yugoslavia and it was in our best interests for Yugoslavia to remain

17 integral, for two reasons: The first reason was the fact that we knew

18 that if Yugoslavia was to break up that that break-up -- that there was a

19 possibility for the break-up not to be peaceful, and if that came true we

20 could not defend ourselves.

21 And the second reason was that we were politically motivated to

22 preserve Yugoslavia, because Bosniaks, and you know that perfectly well,

23 do not reside only in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24 Q. Thank you. I don't have time to --

25 JUDGE KWON: We'll have break for a bit more than 15 minutes and

Page 20654

1 resume at 12.35 sharp.

2 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 12.37 p.m.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Dr. Mujadzic, I will put it to you what the situation looked like

8 from our position. The first idea for a division of Bosnia was put forth

9 to us by Mr. Izetbegovic, and it was not just to us the proposal but also

10 to Mr. Zulfikarpasic and it was first published in the Zagreb

11 Vecernji List, and Mrs. Plavsic commented with the words that it's

12 interesting and that we will review it. Now please take a look at

13 1D4647. That is from a book by Adil Zulfikarpasic, articles and

14 interviews published in 1991, in late 1991, and this particular article

15 relates to August 1991. So this is the title page. Can we see the

16 second page in e-court, please. Can we zoom in for the benefit of

17 Dr. Mujadzic.

18 Please can you look at what he says here. He speaks about the

19 idea. Maybe you want to read it for us.

20 A. You want me to read the second paragraph which starts on the

21 second page about Alija Izetbegovic?

22 Q. No, below that starting with "That idea ..." the third line

23 under the question.

24 A. [As read] "The idea cannot be taken as something real. Alija

25 scared me several times when he said, 'Let the Serbs take what belongs to

Page 20655

1 them. Let Croats take their own, and we will take our own.' It seems

2 that he really accepted the creation of a Muslim conclave if Bosnia was

3 ever to be divided.

4 Q. Thank you. So not only to us but also to Mr. Zulfikarpasic

5 Alija Izetbegovic presented his idea. We were of the opinion that both

6 ideas were legitimate and honest. If they wanted an independent Bosnia,

7 they should give Serbs at least what they had in Yugoslavia, and if they

8 remain in Yugoslavia, the Serbs would not be entitled to autonomous

9 regions. We accepted both of those ideas in the shape of the Lisbon

10 agreement and in the shape of the historical Serb and Muslim agreement?

11 A. Can I take things at a time, Mr. Karadzic. First of all, if

12 we're talking about the Lisbon agreement, I believe it would take us too

13 far and we don't have that much time to look at the reasons why the

14 Lisbon agreement fell through, why the implementation didn't succeed.

15 There are many reasons for that.

16 Q. I'm sorry. I don't really like to intervene but what I'm

17 interested in now is this: Did you know that we accepted both ideas and

18 let me also present a third idea to you. The third idea was pushed by

19 Mr. Silajdzic for an independent unitarian Bosnia and this is something

20 that neither us nor Croats could accept, and that's why were at war;

21 right?

22 A. You want me to answer your last question first about the war and

23 why the war was waged or do you want me to confirm that there were all

24 three ideas on the table?

25 Q. The first question. Do you know that we accepted the first and

Page 20656

1 the second variants? Do you agree with that?

2 A. I personally know only about the Lisbon agreement. I'm not

3 familiar with Zulfikarpasic's book and I didn't know that Mr. Izetbegovic

4 had a conversation with you and talked about the division of Bosnia. I

5 believe that the mood in the general public and the SDA would have been

6 against a division of Bosnia. I believe that people were more in favour

7 of the de-unitarisation of Bosnia and Bosnia remaining within the

8 boundaries with some elements that would be more close to the Lisbon

9 agreement.

10 Q. Thank you. But you're familiar with the historical Muslim and

11 Serb agreements, so these are the two variants. But do you know that

12 Mr. Izetbegovic signed on the 16th of September, 1993, together with my

13 proxy, Mr. Krajisnik, a declaration according to which the

14 Republika Srpska, if the Muslim side got 33 per cent of the territory,

15 that the Republika Srpska would be entitled to a referendum to vote on

16 its independence?

17 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'm not aware of that.

18 Q. But --

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, can this be admitted?

20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, can I remind you that in general, the

21 reasons for the war are not relevant for your case. Bear that in mind.

22 As -- as to the specific passage read out in relation to this

23 book, is it something written by Mr. Zulfikarpasic or something written

24 or said by Mr. Maric? Can you help us, Dr. Mujadzic? Because I see the

25 name "Milomir Maric" at the bottom, at the end of this page.

Page 20657

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I personally never read this book.

2 However, as I'm looking at the page, I would say that this was an

3 interview with Mr. Zulfikarpasic in which Mr. Milomir Maric conducted the

4 interview. I can only hope that he conveyed the words of

5 Mr. Zulfikarpasic authentically.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance,

7 Your Excellencies, not only were his words conveyed faithfully but

8 Zulfikarpasic actually included that interview in his book, which means

9 that he accepted the interview to be a true reflection of what was said.

10 He included the interview in his book.

11 JUDGE KWON: I take it that you are also minded to tender the

12 witness's newspaper article, which was 1D2906?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellencies, but we'll come

14 back to that interview.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Ms. Sutherland.

16 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, the witness wasn't familiar with

17 any of the contents on the page that was just put to him. I don't see a

18 basis for admitting it.

19 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to reply, Mr. Robinson, on this

20 issue, Mr. Zulfikarpasic's book?

21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I'll let Dr. Karadzic reply

22 to that.

23 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Zulfikarpasic was one of the main

25 protagonists of the political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was the

Page 20658

1 initiator of the second variant which was for Bosnia to remain in

2 Yugoslavia and we give up on regionalisation. He confirms that

3 Mr. Izetbegovic was in favour of the first variant which was the division

4 of Bosnia, a Bosnia outside of Yugoslavia. So this is really relevant.

5 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit the witness's newspaper article, marking

6 it for identification pending full translation. We'll give the number

7 for that.

8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI'd D1834, Your Honours, and for

9 correction the document admitted on Friday as D1833 -- 1832 will in fact

10 be 1833 which is public redacted version of Exhibit 1523.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

12 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I'm sorry. I was responding to

13 your question I thought you were wanting my position on this document in

14 front --

15 JUDGE KWON: I'm coming to it. And in relation to this,

16 Zulfikarpasic's book, witness has not confirmed anything and I don't

17 think it is relevant or necessary to understand the context or

18 credibility of this witness's evidence. So we'll not admit this at this

19 moment.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. I have to go back to the interview again. Is it true that you

23 very early on concluded that it -- it would be very hard to defend

24 Prijedor and that your strategy was to defend the left bank of the Sana

25 river in which a lot of Sanski Most and Bosanski Novi would not be part

Page 20659

1 of the territory you would defend?

2 A. That's correct. With a slight correction here, Mr. Karadzic.

3 That was not my personal plan. That was a plan proposed by people who

4 knew something about strategic defence preparations, who were experts in

5 the area. I, as a political figure, accepted the reality of the

6 situation given the fact that the potential ratio of forces was

7 absolutely negative at our expense -- or, rather, in favour of the other

8 so I accepted that to be the reality, although many in Prijedor and

9 Kozarac did not come to terms with that very easily. But that was the

10 reality.

11 Q. Thank you. I did not mean that that was your personal plan, but

12 that was a plan that you testified about as a position that was taken.

13 Did you say that the plans were hindered by the takeover of parts of the

14 Bosanska Krupa on the right bank of the Una by the Serbs, that that

15 hindered your plan to connect parts between the Una and the Sana with

16 Cazin Krajina?

17 A. Yes, it's true I stated that. For the Trial Chamber to be what

18 Mr. Karadzic is talking about, maybe we should show a map to look at the

19 valley of the Una and the valley of the Sana. We should perhaps look at

20 the geographical relations between the two regions and explain why it was

21 believed that the left bank of the Sana was taken as the line that would

22 possibly be defended.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we then briefly see 1D4275,

24 please? This map is painted in different colours for different

25 ethnicities but it will clearly show the positions of all these things

Page 20660

1 that you mentioned so can we have 1D42 -- 4647, please now while we're

2 waiting could we just find out when the strategic plan was -- yes, this

3 is the number we need. So could we please zoom in on the left upper

4 corner.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

6 Q. Mr. Mujadzic, when was this plan drafted?

7 A. Mr. Karadzic, I can't really recall all these events because this

8 was 15, 16 years ago but I do think that it was sometime in late 1991 or

9 early 1992 or thereabouts.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, please take a look at this map. We see part of

11 Bihac and all the way up to the Una River we see that on the right-hand

12 side we have Serb areas and to the left are Muslim areas and then we see

13 Prijedor, Sanski Most and Kljuc. They are all on the Sana River;

14 correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Perhaps you could draw a line and we would appreciate the usher

17 to -- the usher's assistance in this. Now, could you just draw the line

18 along the Una River. You are well familiar with it, aren't you?

19 Now, please if you can use a red pen, because that will make it

20 easier to distinguish here. Would you please draw a line along the

21 Una River.

22 A. The Una River should be -- well, it runs through Bihac, and then

23 Bosanska Krupa, and then to Bosanski Novi. So this is just a rough

24 sketch. I'm not sure that that this is a very accurate depiction.

25 Q. Would you please just put a letter U for Una or number 1.

Page 20661

1 A. Well, yes. Here I'll just write down "Una." Now, the

2 Sana River, the source was somewhere near Kljuc. It ran through Kljuc,

3 Sanski Most, Prijedor, and then finally it joined Una at Bosanski Novi.

4 Now, what I described earlier -- or, rather, the plan, the

5 defence plans, was to actually link up Bosanska Krupa, and I will put a

6 dotted line there, with parts of Prijedor and possibly Sanski Most and to

7 try to defend part of the territory of the Krajina on the left-hand side

8 of the Sana River. This would exclude all urban parts of Bosanski Novi,

9 Prijedor, and Sanski Most and Kljuc, because they lay for the most part

10 on the right bank of the Sana. But in any case, there was an obstacle, a

11 geographic obstacle, and this was considered a geographic obstacle by

12 those people who were planning the defence of Bosanska Krajina, and they

13 felt that the only possibility was for the Cazin Krajina, which had a

14 Bosniak majority, that they should assist in this effort. And when

15 Bosanska Krupa was taken by the Serb army, in other words, these lines

16 here, the line was cut off. And the Bosniak Croatian -- or I beg your

17 pardon, Bosniaks, and part of the territory I was referring to, was

18 isolated and any kind of defence would be unsuccessful. The situation

19 was rather desperate, and we knew that that we did not have the

20 capabilities to mount a proper defence.

21 Q. Thank you. Would you please put a CK where the Cazin Krajina is

22 because you mentioned that area for the Trial Chamber, or perhaps you can

23 just draw a circle around it.

24 A. You mean the Bihac region.

25 Q. Yes. You mentioned the word Cazin Krajina.

Page 20662

1 A. Well, the Bihac region is this entire area, predominantly Muslim,

2 beyond the river --

3 Q. Can you please put a BR there?

4 A. Yes, the Bihac region, that's BR. Then we have the Sana River

5 which had another densely populated area of Bosniaks.

6 Q. Yes. Could you please put an indication where the Sana is.

7 That's on the right-hand side and the Una is on the left-hand side?

8 A. [Marks]

9 Q. Thank you. Now can we agree that the Serbs in Bosanska Krupa

10 took control only of the right-hand bank of the Una whereas the left part

11 remained under Muslim control?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Gojko Klickovic, president of the

14 Crisis Staff of Bosanska Krupa was absolved of any responsibility before

15 a Bosnian court?

16 A. I'm not aware of that detail, Mr. Karadzic.

17 Q. Thank you. Dr. Mujadzic, would you please sign and date this

18 map.

19 A. We are the 30th?

20 Q. I believe it's the 31st.

21 JUDGE KWON: 31st.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 31st. Thank you.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Well, perhaps you can find an area with a light background but it

25 doesn't matter. This is fine.

Page 20663

1 A. [Marks].

2 Q. Thank you. Before we remove this exhibit let me ask you, do you

3 remember that the first Cutileiro map envisaged that all these green

4 areas and the sand-coloured areas should be part of a Bosniak Muslim

5 canton and we accepted that?

6 A. Yes, I do remember that the valley of the Una and Sana were

7 supposed to be one canton and I believe it should have been called

8 Prijedor-Bosanski Most whereas Kljuc would be outside of it. I believe

9 that Prijedor and Sanski Most were supposed to be one region, the -- that

10 part.

11 Q. That was the first proposal, but do you remember when the

12 Cutileiro maps came there was no mention that these territories should be

13 contiguous, that they could be separate in different areas?

14 A. Well, yes, we can agree with that.

15 Q. In the second proposal, Cutileiro's map envisaged that a large

16 part of Prijedor and large parts of Sanski Most should be part of the

17 Cazin Krajina; do you remember that?

18 A. Yes, I do. But Mr. Karadzic I believe that when speaking about

19 this portion of the cantonisation process, if you recall, there was a lot

20 of resistance by the Croats from the HDZ and some other political

21 circles, and I believe there were some disagreements there between the

22 SD -- I don't think the disagreements were between the SDA and the SDS,

23 as far as I can recall.

24 Q. Well, thank you. In the end they did accept this proposal but

25 they were hoping that perhaps they could just join Croatia territorially,

Page 20664

1 so maybe that's why. Well, anyway, thank you.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this map,

3 please.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1835, Your Honours.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Now, it will be difficult for me to identify the page, but

8 perhaps 220 of Exhibit 3517, but I'm not absolutely certain. Now, on

9 this page you talk about when happened in Prijedor. You provide some

10 examples to point out that there were other places where these things did

11 not happen.

12 [As read] "[In English] At the same time, if you compare these

13 with some other localities in Bosnian Krajina such as Sipovo which had a

14 clear Serb majority and were only -- and were there only about 20 per

15 cent of Bosniak, we see that there were almost no crimes committed in the

16 area with the exception of several individual killings. The similar

17 situation can be found in some other areas of Bosnian Krajina, that is

18 the areas which had a Bosniak minority such as the town of

19 Bosanska Dubica and some others."

20 [Interpretation] Would you agree that to this we could add also

21 Gradiska, Srbac, Laktasi, even Prnjavor, and that in these municipalities

22 other than the opportunistic killings there were no major problems?

23 A. Yes, that's correct. That's what I said.

24 Q. Thank you. Now, can you see this green area, Srbica. Can we go

25 back to the earlier image, please. Can you see in Srbac this large green

Page 20665

1 area and would you agree that this is Bosanski Kobas?

2 JUDGE KWON: Before that: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.

3 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour. The answer that the

4 witness just gave is: Yes, that's correct. That's what I said. Was he

5 agreeing that he said that apart from Gradiska, Srbac, Laktasi and even

6 Prnjavor, that in these municipalities other than the opportunistic

7 killings there were no major problems or was he agreeing that he said

8 that in relation to Bosanska Dubica?

9 JUDGE KWON: Can you help us, Dr. Mujadzic?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I mentioned, by way of example,

11 Sipovo municipality and Bosanska Dubica. As for other municipalities in

12 the area of Bosanska Krajina, I do know that in Laktasi -- or no, rather,

13 in Kotor Varos, there were some problems and also in Laktasi, there were

14 problems. As well in -- as well as in some other municipalities, but we

15 can't go that far and analyse each of the 17 municipalities in

16 Bosanska Krajina, but what I said was in the context of a possible

17 analysis of why there were so many crimes in the Sana River valley where

18 there was a large concentration of Bosniaks and I'm referring to Kljuc,

19 Sanski Most, and Prijedor primarily.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Thank you. But Madam Sutherland should have probably put this to

22 you during her cross-examination -- additional examination, but I

23 would -- I will clarify it. Other than these opportunistic killings,

24 there weren't major problems either in Gradiska, or Srbac, Laktasi, or

25 Prnjavor. Can you see that Bosanski Kobas, for instance, remained in

Page 20666

1 that area throughout the period, there was one killing?

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, put your question one by one. If you

3 make compound questions, you will be worse off.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Well, you agreed with me, didn't you, that in the list of

6 municipalities that you listed as examples we could add Gradiska, Laktasi

7 and Prnjavor. In other words, other than opportunistic and individual

8 killings, there weren't major problems or that it couldn't be compared to

9 the situation in the Sana River valley?

10 A. I'm not sure about Bosanska Gradiska, Mr. Karadzic. I believe

11 there were some problems there as far as I can recall, and I believe that

12 there were some difficulties in Laktasi. I believe that Bosanska Dubica

13 had a rather calm period, and I believe that Sipovo fared rather well and

14 I believe I mentioned those municipalities to contrast that with the

15 municipalities in the Sana valley -- Sana River valley.

16 Q. Would you agree that other than one killing where some Ljubomir

17 was killed in Srbac the same thing applies?

18 A. Well, yes. We could agree that Srbac too was rather quiet and

19 peaceful.

20 Q. Thank you. We don't need the map any more, thank you. You go on

21 to say in this same part of your testimony that you consider that the

22 Sana River valley was strategically significant for both parties and that

23 is why there was bloodshed there; correct?

24 A. I said that the Sana River valley was of strategic significance

25 for the plans of the army -- or, rather, later that would be the

Page 20667

1 Serbian Army. And that's because Banja Luka was a mere 60 kilometres

2 away, which is about 35 to 40 miles from the Sana River valley, and that

3 there was a large concentration of Bosniaks there. I believe some

4 120.000 to 130.000 Bosniaks live in that area, and that this was the

5 reason why Major Zeljaja was given this special task to cleanse the

6 valley of the Sana River.

7 Q. Well, since you already mentioned that, let me ask you this: Who

8 was it who started the fighting in the Sana River valley? Who opened

9 fire first that led then to the developments later on?

10 A. Mr. Karadzic, personally I think that this entire operation in

11 the Sana River valley was planned by the military top brass in Banja Luka

12 and that it was precisely implemented and co-ordinated by Major Zeljaja.

13 I also know that Bosniaks were aware that operations of this type are

14 possible and that there were plans for them, and they were very careful

15 not to provide any trigger for -- that would then lead to such an

16 operation.

17 Q. Yes, but do you remember that in many meetings that you attended

18 you carried out preparations having a view that -- or believing that

19 there will be a war? So can you tell us when the plans of the SDA were

20 drafted?

21 A. I can't recall the exact date, Mr. Karadzic, but I believe that I

22 said something to that effect earlier -- early on, but this was more than

23 15 years ago, so a lot of time has passed. Perhaps you can look at my

24 earlier statement, but I know that this happened after the war broke out

25 in Croatia. So it must have been either in the second half of 1991 or in

Page 20668

1 early 1992, perhaps January or February, but I'm not really absolutely

2 certain and I cannot tell you the exact time or period.

3 Q. Thank you. Can we -- I think it's 4647. No. 2906. 1D2906. Do

4 you agree -- or, rather, did you attend this meeting at Dom Milicija on

5 10th of June, 1991 when, the Council for National Defence or security was

6 established?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You see this here. In this interview, you say that this council

9 was established when the Cutileiro Plan went down the drain. Let's just

10 wait for a second and see which page this is.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says 51 on that page. I mean in

12 the magazine itself. Can we leaf through it further? I think's page 6.

13 No, no, more than that. This is number 2, whereas we need part 3. Page

14 10. Yes.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Please take a look at this. In the upper left-hand corner --

17 A. Could you zoom in a bit, please.

18 Q. Could you please zoom in a bit, the upper left-hand corner. And

19 you say that the war had not started in Slovenia yet. There was a major

20 step forward made, the first serious activities of the Patriotic League

21 started when a meeting was held after the gathering at Dom Milicija after

22 the failure of the Cutileiro Plan. So when the Cutileiro Plan failed,

23 the alliance for national security was established. Is this not a

24 mistake? On the 10th of June there was no war in Slovenia, and there was

25 no Cutileiro Plan. You actually created this alliance, as it were,

Page 20669

1 without any of this having happened.

2 A. Mr. Karadzic, could you please remind me of the date of the

3 Cutileiro Plan? It is possible that I made a mistake in this interview.

4 However, this text was never approved by me at the time, so I'm not sure

5 how much of this is relevant from the point of view of authenticity.

6 Q. Thank you. Well, you know that in the West the journalists do

7 not let you give any kind of approval at a later stage. Whatever you

8 said, you said, and that's it. The 13th of February was the first time

9 the Cutileiro Plan was discussed in 1992. However, on the 10th of June,

10 1991, there was no war in Slovenia, and you said when the war in Slovenia

11 had not even started yet. You said that this was a major step forward,

12 serious activity of the Patriotic League, and that this started on the

13 10th of June; right? Because the meeting at Dom Milicija took place on

14 the 10th of June.

15 A. As for the organisation of the council for national security. I

16 don't understand what you're trying to say putting this question. The

17 council for national security is a council. Quite simply, it looked at

18 various issues. The Bosniak people were concerned from the point of view

19 of safety and security and I think that such a -- such an institution was

20 supposed to exist anyway. The very fact that a council for national

21 security exists does not imply anything else but the Bosniaks thinking

22 about an institution that would consider the security and safety of the

23 Bosniak people.

24 Q. Thank you. Look at what it says here. Certain persons were

25 elected to this alliance at republican level, people from the top

Page 20670

1 leadership, and then this was transferred to regional level. So

2 political and military political nuclei were created that had some kind

3 of political co-ordination, some military staffs at regional level, and

4 then this was transferred to municipal level, and so on. The first

5 specific activities involved a call that Hasan Cengic made. Later on, he

6 would be known as the main coordinator and initiator of the

7 Patriotic League. You say that coordinators of the SDA were invited,

8 you, yourself, were invited and let's see what Rusmir Mahmutcehajic said?

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could we please see this

10 on the screen.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. You say further down somewhere, first, Rusmir in his introductory

13 statement say what lay if store for us. This was July 1991 and this is

14 what he says verbatim: [As read] "Brothers, what we have ahead of us is

15 a difficult and bloody war. Prepare yourselves, because we will be

16 attacked by the Serb army or the JNA. They will be merciless. They will

17 destroy and torch everything. However, we need to preserve our dignity.

18 We have to behave in accordance with Islamic rules and our own written

19 rules that are no different from the Geneva Convention. We should not

20 kill children ...," and so on and so forth.

21 So do you agree that Mr. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic had no cause to say

22 this on the basis of anything that had actually happened in July 1991?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can we now have the text

24 on the monitor so that the gentleman can see it? Can we scroll down so

25 the witness can see this?

Page 20671

1 A. Rusmir, well, I confirm the authenticity of this having happened,

2 and I confirm that Rusmir spoke along those lines as you said. So this

3 is quite authentic. All of us were surprised, personally speaking, by

4 what he said. He is an historian, a Bosnian intellectual. He is

5 well-versed in history. He had some kind of intuition. He was like a

6 prophet, if you will. Prophet. What was the word?

7 Q. "Prorok" is the word for prophet.

8 A. Thank you. He knew that this kind of thing would happen, so he

9 prophesied it, and that's what happened.

10 I repeat that this was an individual initiative by

11 Rusmir Mahmutcehajic as an intellectual. However, you know full well

12 that the political leadership of the SDA, including Alija Izetbegovic,

13 kept saying right up until the beginning of the war that a war would not

14 actually happen. You know of these words of Alija's. Like Mahatma

15 Gandhi he spoke about peace; he said that there would be no war. So in a

16 practical terms at that point in time, nothing was happening. In a

17 practical and organisational sense, this is an isolated event when Rusmir

18 Mahmutcehajic, as an independent intellectual, yes, truth to tell at that

19 time, also a member of the SDA, spoke like a prophet and said that it was

20 highly likely that this kind of thing would happen.

21 Q. Thank you. We will see on this page that some practical steps

22 were taken after all. Let me ask you something else. Is it correct that

23 Mr. Izetbegovic said that because that is what the people wanted to hear

24 and that that was the reason? You said that on the previous page of this

25 interview.

Page 20672

1 A. I personally think that Mr. Izetbegovic believed that himself,

2 because I had an opportunity of discussing this with Mr. Izetbegovic

3 myself. We were all aware of the fact that a war could break out, but in

4 our heart-of-hearts we thought that a solution would be found

5 nevertheless and that it would be averted. We were hoping that at the

6 end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century something like that

7 could not happen in Europe. So --

8 Q. Thank you. Fine. Let us look a bit further down. You describe

9 Sefer Halilovic in the beginning of 1991 -- or, rather, in the beginning

10 of September 1991, Sefer Halilovic came to Prijedor, then Cazin, Cazinska

11 Krajina, and that there was this plan for all of it. The republican

12 staff of the Patriotic League drew up this plan. Can we now have the top

13 of the right-hand column. Changes -- no assessments, professional

14 assessments. They were presented -- just a moment, please. They were

15 for the most part majors, captains, military experts who presented the

16 entire situation, political, military, strategic, et cetera. After

17 Sefer Halilovic was there, Sulejman Vranj came, sometime in the beginning

18 of November, 1991, and his task was to carry out regional co-ordination,

19 to establish co-ordination between the republican staff and regional and

20 Municipal Staffs, and to carry out activities aimed at establishing

21 military staffs.

22 Can we go a bit further down. You say specific tasks are being

23 given. Atif Saronjic, nicknamed Dugi, was given the task of teaching

24 people how to use explosives. That's what written here; right? Sefer

25 conducted political general talks with us, whereas this Saronjic was

Page 20673

1 doing more specific things.

2 A. That is what is written here.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just have the previous page

5 now. Oh, all right. No, we don't have to really. We shouldn't waste

6 any time.

7 Can we have the next page now.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Karadzic, can you read this? I

9 think it's very important to read the sentence that follows the last

10 sentence you had read in the previous article. Could you please do that.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot hear

12 Mr. Karadzic.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Atif Saronjic, is that what you mean?

15 A. No, no, the previous article. You read that sentence and then

16 there's another one that follows it, that refers to the platform of the

17 Patriotic League.

18 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we upload it again? Yes. Could you read

19 it out.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Just show me where it is and then I'll read it out.

22 A. It says:

23 "We conducted general political talks about whether we accept the

24 Patriotic League having a platform, a broad-based platform, that it

25 should be a broad front of all forces irrespective of faith, ethnicity,

Page 20674

1 that honour the platform of the then Presidency of the BiH that wish to

2 defend Bosnia as an equitable community of all peoples ...," and so on

3 and so forth.

4 Q. Very well. Thank you. I have to skip from one topic to another.

5 You spoke about mobilisation in 1991. Towards the end of the

6 second mobilisation, there were some Chetnik insignia that appeared, and

7 you agree that the Presidency recommended that people do not respond to

8 the mobilisation; right?

9 A. You're talking about the mobilisation at the time when there was

10 a war in Croatia; right?

11 Q. Yes. The spring of 1991 and September 1991.

12 A. Yes, that was the recommendation of the Presidency. That's

13 right.

14 Q. Thank you. Do you agree, or rather, do you know that the JNA or

15 the Army of Republika Srpska did not tolerate Chetnik insignia and that

16 that could have only been some show-business Chetnik?

17 A. Maybe that was your official policy, Mr. Karadzic, but the

18 situation on the ground was different. I would like to refer to the

19 previous part of my testimony that has to do with mobilisation, the

20 5th Kozara Brigade, Colonel Colic and what happened in Jaruge in Kozarac.

21 If that could be found, perhaps? It's explained there in detail why --

22 actually, that this was not just an individual, Mr. Karadzic. At least

23 in that unit that was a mass phenomenon.

24 Q. Did you just let slip when you said that the Serb Radical Party

25 took part in the elections in 1990?

Page 20675

1 A. The Serb Radical Party took part in this coalition with the SDS.

2 I think I explained that. There was this coalition between the SDS and

3 the Serb Radical Party during those elections, and the representatives of

4 the Serb Radical Party were part of the joint list of the SDS and the

5 Serb Radical Party. Mr. Vracar, for example, was on the republican list

6 of members of parliament. Milomir Stakic, himself, was vice-president of

7 the Serb Radical Party. Later on he became vice-president of the SDS

8 when the elections took place once again in the SDS in Prijedor.

9 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the Serb Radical Party was founded

10 in February 1991?

11 A. Are you referring to republic level, Mr. Karadzic?

12 Q. In Belgrade, it was established in February 1991. Before that,

13 it had not existed. There was the People's Radical Party headed by the

14 lawyer Guberina, but it had a different programme.

15 A. I can assure that you in Omarska there was a Serb Radical Party

16 and that Mr. Stakic was its vice-president and Vracar was its president

17 and that the Serb Radical Party was a guest at the founding Assembly of

18 the SDS in Prijedor and Milenko Vracar, who was president of the SDS when

19 the Yugoslav anthem was sung and when everybody got up, he was the only

20 person to remain seated, because he said that was not the anthem of the

21 Serb people. He said that the anthem of the Serb people is

22 "Boze Pravde," and he protested against the anthem of Yugoslavia. I

23 don't know whether you're aware of these details, Mr. Karadzic, but it is

24 beyond dispute that the Serb Radical Party existed in Omarska. Now

25 whether it was official at the level of Yugoslavia or Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Page 20676

1 that's a different question altogether.

2 Q. Thank you. This comes as news to the Radicals as well because

3 they could not have been established before the party was established in

4 Belgrade. However, let's leave that aside. On page 52, I assume that

5 this is 3571 plus 2. You said that the Territorial Defences had actually

6 become republican armies; right?

7 A. That was correct in the case of Slovenia. Later on it became

8 correct in the case of Croatia as well, and partly it became correct in

9 the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other words, for the

10 Honourable Chamber to understand the discussion at the moment, I would

11 like to say that the Yugoslav People's Army underwent a process that

12 started in the early 1980s, around 1985 and 1986, and gradually actually

13 became more and more Serbian. The process was long. And then the 1984

14 constitution was ignored and that's why the Yugoslav People's Army

15 decided to eliminate the organisation of the Territorial Defence in

16 various republics and place the Territorial Defence directly under its

17 own command and organise it differently, without paying any respect to

18 the republican borders.

19 I explained that in greater detail in my previous testimony, and

20 I said that Slovenia managed to take over the weapons from the

21 Territorial Defence, that no other republic managed to do that. The

22 Yugoslav People's Army confiscated all the equipment and weapons, which

23 means that both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had only small nuclei

24 organisation in terms of human resources as the basic cells of the future

25 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Page 20677

1 Q. Thank you. And now I have to put to you this: Do you agree that

2 decision on the placement of the weapons of the TO was made by the

3 Presidency of the SFRY before the first democratic elections, which means

4 that a decision was taken by the Communist powers?

5 A. Mr. Karadzic, this is precisely what I have just mentioned and

6 what I explained in greater detail in the Tadic case. There I spoke

7 about a gradual process which led to the victory on the part of the

8 nationalist forces among the ranks of the Communist league.

9 Q. Please let's not go into any political debate.

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic -- Mr. Karadzic, do not interfere with

11 the witness when he's answering the question.

12 Please proceed, Dr. Mujadzic.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. I have specific questions. My question is this: This was not

15 done by our administration. This was done before the election; right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Thank you. You said on page 51 when you stopped the JNA convoy

18 in August 1991, in your statement and in your testimony 3571 plus 51, you

19 said that you did that because you believed that the JNA had to be placed

20 under civilian control and that you as an MP stopped the convoy and

21 sought explanation. Do you agree that the civilian control over the army

22 is not something that is in the hands of the republican bodies or federal

23 MPs, it is only the Presidency that has that control?

24 A. I agree with you completely, Mr. Karadzic. The commander of the

25 Yugoslav People's Army was the Presidency of Yugoslavia. However, what I

Page 20678

1 wanted to achieve in that conversation and I explained that in greater

2 detail, was merely information. The population was disturbed by the

3 appearance of the troops and weapons in Prijedor, because they knew what

4 was going on in the neighbouring Republic of Croatia. Again I'm

5 referring you to the Tadic and Stakic case where I explained why people

6 were concerned with such a huge concentration of military force in

7 Prijedor. They were concerned primarily because of the events in Croatia

8 where the Yugoslav People's Army, which, de facto, reacted as a

9 Serbian Army at the time because it already had a 90 per cent lead in

10 Serbian cadre.

11 Q. Thank you. However, on page 55, you say that the Croatian forces

12 crossed over to the Bosnian side and opened fire on Bosanska Dubica,

13 Knezica, for example, 50 kilometres in Prijedor, and that they also

14 instilled fear among the Serbian population?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that Bosnian cities were bombarded

17 from Croatia as well?

18 A. Yes.

19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I would like you to leave five minutes

20 at the end of today's session. So you have five minutes to continue.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Five minutes today,

22 Your Excellency?

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 20679

1 Q. I have to talk about the initial causes of the crisis in

2 Prijedor. Do you agree that even before the elections you had problems

3 with posters, because the Serbian side wanted a reference to be made to

4 Yugoslavia? Do you agree that the first solemn declaration was in

5 dispute not because the Serbs wanted Serbia -- Yugoslavia to be mentioned

6 first and then Bosnia, but because the Serbs wanted the declaration to be

7 taken in the way it was mentioned in the constitution? Yes or no?

8 A. Mr. Karadzic and Your Honours, I apologise. I've just been asked

9 two questions. Again, I have to ask you whether you agree we take each

10 question at a time. You mentioned two completely different events that

11 had nothing to do with each other. One was in Prijedor and the other was

12 in Sarajevo, the republican level. Can I take events one at a time?

13 Q. Yes, but briefly, please. What was the sticking point, in your

14 view?

15 A. As far as the common poster, is concerned and that poster was

16 proposed by us, our proposal was that the three parties, in order to

17 achieve better co-operation and tolerance, to present joint posters and

18 to appear in rallies together. I explained that already in the Tadic and

19 Stakic cases. Those things were absolutely denied by the

20 Serbian Democratic Party, because there was a radical stream represented

21 by Mr. Vracar, and Stakic said they didn't want anything to do with the

22 Turks and Ustashi.

23 Q. Very well. I'll withdraw my question about the solemn

24 declaration. Is it true that the agreement about the division of power

25 at the republican level between myself, Mr. Izetbegovic, and Mr. Kljuic

Page 20680

1 was somewhat different from what you did in Prijedor, and you spoke about

2 that on page 66 -- or rather 3571 plus 66 in the transcript that has been

3 admitted,

4 A. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

5 Q. Do you agree that the source of the major crisis in Prijedor was

6 the fact that the Serbs were not allocated a seat of -- as the police

7 commander? Do you agree that it was a custom during the socialist era

8 and according to the agreement that we signed that if the chief of police

9 was from one ethnic group, the commander had to be from another ethnic

10 group?

11 A. Yes, that's correct, and we supported that SDS initiative, but

12 that was not the reason why the agreement was not implemented. We had a

13 conversation in the hallway of the Assembly, and Jovan Tintor was there,

14 Mr. Srdjo Srdic, and yourself and some other people were present, I

15 believe, and I explained to you in great detail why there were discords

16 and why the implementation was halted. I expressed at that moment my

17 personal readiness to agree to any concessions in order to give the

18 Serbian side the security that we don't have any hidden agenda, that we

19 had conceded, and that the Bosniak side should have had about 55 per cent

20 of the power in view of the electoral results. The Croatian Democratic

21 Union had to be given 4 or 5 per cent because they had only two MPs and

22 the Serbian Democratic Party was supposed to be given about 45 per cent

23 however we accepted and our proposal was that the Serbian Democratic

24 Party and the SDA should be given an equal number of positions or -- or

25 seats, and then that both sides should cede a certain number of seats or

Page 20681

1 positions to the Croatian Democratic Union. But I believe, Mr. Karadzic,

2 that you will remember that Srdjo Srdic said, "We will not allow an

3 Ustashi and Muslim coalition." And then I said, "Srdjo, you don't have

4 to worry. If we're going to do that, we will make further concession. I

5 have to consult with my organisational bodies first but I can say that

6 the SDS will be allowed to take 50 per cent and let the SDA and the HDZ

7 share the remaining 50 per cent in order to achieve that agreement."

8 And finally that agreement was implemented and then

9 Velibor Ostojic, who attended the Assembly that was implemented in

10 Prijedor and he had been sent to seal at that deal and implement that

11 agreement. As far as the police commander was agreed, we -- is

12 concerned, we agreed to him being a Serb. We had some technical

13 difficulties. We implored with the Serbian side to give us an adequate

14 candidate. We could not have any influence on that the Serbian candidate

15 proposed, a candidate who was not sufficiently --

16 JUDGE KWON: My apologies to interrupt, but we have to stop here

17 today. We'll continue tomorrow morning at -- at 9.00.

18 Probably you will be aware of this, but while you're testifying

19 here, you're not supposed to discuss with anybody else about your

20 testimony. Do you understand this, sir? So while we discuss of --

21 THE WITNESS: Yes.

22 JUDGE KWON: -- discuss a couple the matters, you may be excused.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

24 [The witness stands down]

25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, we are seized of a motion from the