120423ED

Page 27813

1 Monday, 23 April 2012

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Good morning, Mr. Butler.

7 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.

8 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

9 JUDGE KWON: Before you begin, Mr. Karadzic, Judge Baird has a

10 couple of questions for the witness.

11 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Butler, as I studied your evidence over the

12 weekend, I realized that there were certain areas where -- small areas

13 where I might need some assistance. Now, it's possible I might have

14 passed them along the way, but all the same, I would need your assistance

15 in these very small areas.

16 My first question has to do with the opening of the corridor for

17 the passage of the column. Now, Pandurevic and Muminovic arrived at this

18 truce and Pandurevic opened the corridor, and in his report he said he

19 let out 5.000 individuals. He -- if I might paraphrase here, he conceded

20 for a certain number of soldiers getting out, but those who passed

21 through were unarmed. So I apprehended that he was saying fundamentally

22 the bulk of that 5.000 was civilians.

23 Now, Borovcanin -- Borovcanin's forces were part of the forces

24 that Pandurevic was using to fight the column, so he was, as it were, in

25 medias res, he was in the middle of things, and between 6.00 and 8.00 on

Page 27814

1 July 16, Pandurevic submits his interim report. At 1300 hours on the

2 16th, Borovcanin submitted his report. And in his report, Dr. Butler, he

3 stated that Pandurevic opened a 1-kilometre-wide corridor to allow the

4 Muslim soldiers to get out. He said the bulk of the enemy column, and

5 his understanding was about 2.005, soldiers managed to break through to

6 Nezuk. So Borovcanin had a different view of the composition of the

7 column.

8 What I'm wondering, Mr. Butler, is how did his superiors react to

9 this -- their superiors react to the striking difference in the two

10 reports?

11 THE WITNESS: Well, sir, what I believe if you look at the

12 sequence of events that follows is that Colonel Pandurevic, by his own

13 admission in the interim combat report, made a decision to let the column

14 through and that he sought to downplay the fact that he had allowed

15 soldiers to escape by seeking to characterise or to downplay the amount

16 of soldiers.

17 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes.

18 THE WITNESS: I mean, the first thing that comes to mind is

19 Colonel Pandurevic and his people weren't close enough to know whether or

20 not those soldiers got out unarmed or not.

21 The second point is, as noted by the commission that came up on

22 the 17th to investigate matters, one of the roles of that commission on

23 the 17th of July was to determine whether or not Colonel Pandurevic's

24 actions were so out of line as to potentially relieve him of command of

25 the Zvornik Brigade or make that recommendation to General Mladic. The

Page 27815

1 army was not happy with that decision to let these soldiers go, the

2 motivation, of course, being that by letting them go, they will face them

3 again in the future.

4 So that is a fundamental difference in how the column is

5 described by Colonel Pandurevic who has a particular reason to want to

6 characterize the column as either unarmed or more civilian in nature,

7 because he is responsible ultimately for letting it go, versus

8 Colonel Borovcanin who did not make that decision and consequently there

9 are no ramifications against him for whether or not the column managed to

10 fight its way out or not.

11 JUDGE BAIRD: But were there ramifications against Pandurevic?

12 THE WITNESS: Well, yes, sir. And I believe that if you look at

13 the 18 July 1995 interim combat report, that is Colonel Pandurevic's long

14 explanation in part as to why he let the column go, the fact that his

15 brigade had taken a significant number of casualties not only during the

16 operations against the column but even previously to that and that this

17 was Colonel Pandurevic explaining to his superiors what his

18 justifications were.

19 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes. My question is did they accept it? Was it

20 accepted at all?

21 THE WITNESS: Colonel Pandurevic was not relieved of command of

22 the Zvornik Brigade, so his explanation was accepted.

23 JUDGE BAIRD: I see. I see. Thank you.

24 Now, my second question touches to a certain extent also on the

25 column. You said that the column was allowed to pass between the 16th

Page 27816

1 and the 17th, and the lines were then re-closed with hundreds, if not

2 more, trapped behind those closed lines, and now reports from the

3 Zvornik Brigade that prisoners were being taken from the 18th to the

4 21st. Now, you said those prisoners have not been accounted for, and you

5 deduced that somewhere in close proximity to where those prisoners were

6 capture, they were summarily executed by either the soldiers or the

7 police who captured them.

8 Now, are you saying then, Mr. Butler, that there would have been

9 several execution sites?

10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I believe that there were a number of

11 small-scale execution sights. One example that I cite is that on both

12 the 16th and 17th of July, 1995, that is vehicle log from one truck from

13 the 7th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade where the driver of that vehicle

14 actually noted down numbers of prisoners that were being transported by

15 that truck on that day. You see no accounting of those particular

16 prisoners anywhere at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters.

17 If one assumes that these people were handled in what would have

18 been the appropriate manner, even in accordance with the VRS's

19 regulations, that truck would have travelled to the Zvornik Brigade or

20 another designated area. Those prisoners would have been dropped off

21 there under the guard to the higher headquarters, which would be the

22 Zvornik Brigade, and they would be accounted for and ultimately moved

23 toward Batkovici. In effect, the same thing that you start seeing

24 happening on the 22nd of July, 1995, but you see no evidence of that.

25 The truck goes to a remote location and then returns back to the

Page 27817

1 battalion headquarters.

2 So I believe that there are a number of examples from the period

3 of the 17th of July till the 21st of July where there are various combat

4 reports that -- or other documents that reflect the Zvornik Brigade or

5 the police forces in the Zvornik Brigade area encountering Muslim groups,

6 and there's no accounting for any prisoners being taken by any of them

7 until the July 22nd report by the Zvornik Infantry Brigade where for the

8 first time they produce a number that says, "We have captured this many

9 prisoners," and perhaps more importantly, actually asked the Drina Corps

10 command for instructions as to how to handle them.

11 JUDGE BAIRD: But there was never any tangible evidence to

12 support this deduction, was there?

13 THE WITNESS: Again, the only actual noted execution would be

14 what I believe is referred to as the Nezuk execution, which occurred

15 by -- which was occurred by a group of soldiers from the 16th

16 Krajina Brigade who were operating under the command of the

17 Zvornik Brigade at the time. So I believe that is again one vignette

18 story that talks about the fact that a group of soldiers were apprehended

19 and were summarily executed shortly after their captured by the unit that

20 captured them. My belief is that that story played out on a number of

21 occasions until the 22nd of July.

22 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Butler, I thank you very much indeed.

23 Dr. Karadzic, thank you.

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.

25 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour.

Page 27818

1 JUDGE KWON: Was Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic's interim report

2 on the 18th of July referred to by Mr. Butler admitted into evidence?

3 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour. It is P00181.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

5 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

7 Good morning to everyone.

8 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

9 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Butler.

10 A. Good morning, sir.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at the interim

12 combat report that was just mentioned, P181.

13 JUDGE KWON: In the mean time while we are waiting, Mr. Nicholls,

14 how about the -- the report about the execution by 16th 1st Krajina Corps

15 members? Have you admitted that document.

16 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm not sure. I'll look, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE KWON: Otherwise you'll deal with it --

18 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes.

19 JUDGE KWON: -- during your re-examination [Overlapping speakers].

20 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour. Yes.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Just bear with me, please. Do we agree, Mr. Butler that, on the

23 18th of July, this report stated that allegedly another brigade of theirs

24 had still not pulled out? Given the fact that the sentence following

25 this one states, as was confirmed in other documents, that they had

Page 27819

1 divided themselves up into brigades at the very beginning of the

2 breakthrough.

3 A. Yes, sir, that is, I think, referring to the last -- the middle

4 lines of paragraph 1 where it is noting -- this is again

5 Colonel Pandurevic's explanation of what he believes that the enemy

6 situation is and how the brigade -- or how the 28th Division sought to

7 withdraw out of the former Srebrenica safe area.

8 Q. Thank you. Here he mentions their brazen behaviour and

9 unexpected moves they made. Were you able to observe that there were

10 instances of fake surrenders during which a surrendering Muslim soldier

11 would detonate a bomb, thus killing himself and the Serb soldiers

12 approaching?

13 A. Again, sir, my analysis is based off of the documents. I don't

14 know whether that did or did not occur or if testimony has been heard

15 relative to that. I am aware that there are some reports with respect to

16 the - excuse me - the situation and that event occurring in the Bratunac

17 area on the 12th and the 13th from the column there, but I don't believe

18 that I've ever heard reports of that occurring from the column in the

19 Zvornik Brigade area.

20 Q. Thank you. Did you wonder what such unexpected moves meant and

21 this brazen conduct as described in the report?

22 A. I take it when one looks at the various reports from

23 Colonel Pandurevic in context, it's his belief that despite the fact that

24 militarily his forces were in place and should have had -- been able to

25 defeat parts of the column or at least stop various parts of the column's

Page 27820

1 attack, because of the casualties that were occurring, that the column or

2 the leadership of the column was so desperate to escape from behind the

3 territory of the VRS that they were making attacks that caused

4 significant casualties, and they were just not being deterred by those

5 casualties. So it was, as Colonel Pandurevic himself notes, a very

6 desperate battle by -- against enemy forces that were extremely

7 determined to break out. So that is what I take by his various reports

8 with respect to the brazen and unexpected moves.

9 Q. Thank you. And you also took note of the fact that in

10 General Pandurevic's words, who -- he was still colonel or

11 lieutenant-colonel at the time, that he suggests that there were more

12 losses than -- than were captured enemy personnel.

13 A. Well, I'm not sure where he may make that suggestion, but I can

14 certainly concur with the fact that in light of the casualties and the

15 combat that was going there, I take it that the enemy losses in both

16 killed and wounded far exceeded any number of prisoners that were at

17 least documented by the Zvornik Brigade as being captured on the 16th and

18 the 17th and the 18th of July.

19 Q. Thank you. So it is the second paragraph of item 1. The enemy

20 suffered significant casualties and dozens were captured. This would

21 reflect, more or less, what you have just said; correct?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Thank you. In the documents you studied, did you come across a

24 piece of information that General Karisik of the police spoke with me? I

25 don't know. It is mentioned in the documents, and I will probably be

Page 27821

1 able to show it during my Defence case. In any case, he asked me to

2 protect Colonel Pandurevic for having made that move.

3 First of all, did you come across the piece of information that

4 General Karisik informed me about that?

5 A. For your first question, no, sir, I am not aware that

6 General Karisik did or did not inform you. I have not seen a document to

7 that -- to that -- that would reflect that, so I do not know that that

8 would have occurred.

9 As part of your second question, in light of the information that

10 I am aware of, that particularly General Mladic was very unhappy with

11 Colonel Pandurevic's decision, it would not surprise me to know that

12 individuals who were supporting Colonel Pandurevic would have approached

13 you directly on this issue.

14 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, no objection. Mr. Karadzic may be thinking

15 of D02002. That's an intercept which refers to Karisik talking to the

16 president.

17 JUDGE KWON: While you are on your feet, Mr. Nicholls, with

18 respect to the question by Mr. Karadzic to Mr. Butler whether there were

19 instances of fake surrenders during which a surrendering Muslim soldier

20 would detonate a bomb, have we seen such document, and which also would

21 tell him not to take prisoners or something to that effect?

22 MR. NICHOLLS: No, Your Honour, not that I'm aware of. There's

23 one incident in the Sandici area where -- where there were reports of a

24 Muslim who was surrendering throwing a hand grenade. I think there was

25 actually testimony about that from a protected witness not very long ago,

Page 27822

1 but there's no report I'm aware of, written report, saying don't take any

2 prisoners because of this danger.

3 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I will leave it at that.

4 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Just one moment,

6 please. Yes.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Is it correct that Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic even went up the

9 ranks and in 1996 made it general, made it to become a general?

10 A. Yes, sir. Colonel Pandurevic, like most officers in the VRS, at

11 the conclusion of the war received a one-grade promotion to the rank of

12 colonel, and in -- I believe it was December or late November of 1996,

13 when then President Plavsic essentially reorganised the Main Staff to

14 become a General Staff and relieved General Mladic and most of the

15 Main Staff officers of their positions, then Colonel Pandurevic was

16 appointed to be the assistant commander for morale, legal, and religious

17 affairs. Essentially he took General Gvero's job and was subsequently

18 promoted to the rank of general-major.

19 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you this: Did you come across an

20 instruction about arresting and detaining POWs, an instruction which was

21 supposed to be issued on the 15 of April, 1995, by the Drina Corps

22 command?

23 A. I am aware of a number instructions through the various course of

24 the conflict that were published by various military levels as to the

25 proper handling of prisoners of war once they would be captured. Again,

Page 27823

1 I may very well have seen that 15 April 1995 document. If you wish to

2 show it to me I can comment on it, but I don't remember the details of it

3 off the top of my head, sir.

4 Q. Thank you. Can we have a look, then, at 65 ter 2063.

5 As you probably know from other cases, as well as from theory and

6 practice, what measures can be taken in terms of POWs; correct?

7 A. I don't -- I don't understand your question, sir.

8 Q. It's a general question.

9 A. Well, I guess -- I mean, there -- there's two things. I mean, a

10 general sense certainly -- and as reflected by this particular document,

11 there were -- or there was an established process in place for dealing

12 with prisoners for two particular reasons. One, they wanted to, of

13 course, safeguard the prisoners, and they wanted to obtain information of

14 intelligence value. The second thing that they are aware of is that

15 there's what we would call an operational security issue, recognition

16 that down the line that a prisoner may be exchanged in the future and as

17 a result that prisoner should not be taken places or shown things that

18 might be of a sensitive military nature, so that in the event that that

19 individual is exchanged, that prisoner doesn't himself become a source of

20 information about what he learned about the VRS after his capture.

21 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that POWs are not to be shown to the

22 media? They are not supposed to be exposed to any humiliation before the

23 public or in the media as part of their status of prisoners of war.

24 A. Yes, sir, I'm aware of those as general provisions of the

25 Geneva Conventions and associated protocols, and I believe they're also

Page 27824

1 codified as such in the SFRY regulations on the application of those

2 conventions.

3 Q. Thank you. Could I ask you to look at the document. Have you

4 taken note of it?

5 A. At least the page that I'm -- I can look at. If you're going to

6 ask me any additional questions, I would like to see the second page as

7 well, please, sir.

8 Q. Could I ask all the participants to go through the document

9 briefly so that I don't need to read it out loud.

10 A. Could we go to the third page of the document, please, sir, at

11 least in English.

12 Q. Just feel free to -- to ask them to leaf through the document

13 once you have read it.

14 A. Next page, please, in English. Okay, sir.

15 Q. Thank you. Can we now go back to page 1. Is it true that from

16 the security administration of the Main Staff they had received a warning

17 that there were violations, because it says here -- it outlines in detail

18 the procedure during the detention or arrest of persons violating rules

19 and regulations.

20 [As read] "We submit to you the instruction inform -- inform

21 military police unit with instruction and act upon the provisions

22 listed."

23 This is what Popovic is passing on from the Main Staff.

24 Now, these provisions, are they consistent with what you know

25 about the internationally laid out procedures that govern the treatment

Page 27825

1 of POWs?

2 A. In the sense that even though they talk about the arrest and

3 detention of POWs and other persons, in that context I take it they're

4 talking about RS and, you know, Republika Srpska citizens who might be

5 arrested for some crime related to the military as well. Yeah, these --

6 these instructions as such, there's nothing in these instructions that I

7 see that would suggest that they violate the SFRY applications on the

8 rules of the law of war.

9 Q. Thank you. Nevertheless, would you agree with me that the first

10 sentence of the "instruction" speaks about POWs and is issuing a warning

11 that violations have been noticed in the treatment of POWs; that is to

12 say, the soldiers of the enemy army? And also under item 1, it reads

13 under 1:

14 "All prisoners, members of the enemy army are to be handcuffed

15 on their hands, tied with anything available immediately after their

16 capture. They are to be searched and all items are to be seized apart

17 from their clothing and footwear."

18 Is this correct?

19 A. Yes, sir. This is what instruction 1 says.

20 Q. Therefore, is it reasonable to assume that if you find personal

21 papers on somebody such as ID, passport, watches, ammunition, et cetera,

22 would it be reasonable to assume that this person had not been captured

23 beforehand? And I'm talking about the belongings found on dead bodies.

24 A. Well, sir, again, these particular instructions apply to what

25 should have happened in the context of individuals being captured and

Page 27826

1 treated in an appropriate manner. Now, whether or not the failure to

2 comply with those types of instructions or to make, as you've noted, the

3 fact that an individual may have -- still have papers on him or may still

4 have a watch and everything else and is subsequently found in a grave

5 somewhere, I don't know that that would be proof that that person could

6 not have been a prisoner at some point prior.

7 Q. Can one deduce, then, that those on whom -- whose bodies nothing

8 was found had been captured previously?

9 A. Again, sir, I don't -- I don't deduce one way or another whether

10 or not the presence of a watch or a document or family items would or

11 would not prove that. If I actually had to take a criteria of equipment

12 to use, what I would suggest is that the presence or the absence of

13 military weapons and equipment in a particular grave site would be a more

14 determinative factor. For example, while -- because soldiers may be

15 rushed or lazy or sloppy, they may not confiscate identity cards, they

16 may not track these people, they may miss personal items, I would suggest

17 that under no circumstances would soldiers searching prisoners that

18 they've just captured allow the prisoner to remain with weapons or

19 ammunition or other items of immediate military value.

20 Q. Thank you. Very well. Did you ever see that an enemy soldier,

21 whether he was killed in combat or in killing, have you ever seen such

22 soldiers being buried together with his arms and weapons, or were those

23 weapons confiscated as trophies?

24 A. Generally speaking, my experience is that clearly individuals who

25 are battle-field casualties are not buried with their weapons. They may

Page 27827

1 be buried with other military equipment that was either damaged or is

2 otherwise too covered in biological materials as to be effectively

3 cleaned. So in that particular sense, the -- you know, you wouldn't

4 normally see those individuals buried with weapons.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can Mr. Butler please

6 be shown item 3 on the next page -- or, rather, on the next page, because

7 my copy is rather bad.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Do you agree that this is a description of how to transport the

10 prisoners, how to prevent them from escape, and the possibility of

11 observing that you yourself noticed? It includes the possibility to have

12 them blindfolded, their hands tied, and even their feet could be tied?

13 A. Correct, sir. Securing a prisoner in that manner to prevent

14 potential escape, as well as to prevent the prisoner from observing

15 things would be an acceptable practice.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be

17 admitted?

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2243, Your Honours.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Did you base your findings exclusively on the documents that were

22 accessible to you, or did you yourself check the veracity of these

23 documents, or did you acquire some documents on your own?

24 A. To answer the last question first, any documents that I may have

25 acquired, I did so under the umbrella of the Office of the Prosecutor as

Page 27828

1 a result of my participation in searches, interviews, things of that

2 nature.

3 As to the second question, as to the veracity of the documents,

4 one, setting aside the fact that in almost all of the cases, particularly

5 of the documents that we used in the early portions of the trials in the

6 Krstic and the Popovic -- I'm sorry, the Krstic and the Blagojevic cases,

7 those documents came out of searches and seizures that the Office of the

8 Prosecutor made from inside the military facilities of the

9 Zvornik Brigade and the Bratunac Brigade. So we were, of course, able to

10 assume at face value that the documents that we'd seized were at least in

11 fact authentic. We found multiple copies of other documents as they

12 passed them forth back to headquarters. So we were able to, you know,

13 continue to authenticate and verify many of the documents.

14 And finally, in my particular opinion, the documents that we have

15 reflect the situation that's occurring on the ground during those

16 particular days. It corresponds very closely to those incidents and

17 issues. So, you know, that is the third component of it.

18 And finally, during the course of interviewing various officers

19 of the VRS, many of these documents were shown to these officers who

20 acknowledged that they were either part of creating or producing these

21 documents, and they also sought to explain what these documents meant in

22 a military context to us.

23 Q. Thank you. In view of your experience elsewhere in the world and

24 your expertise with regard to the military, did you notice that in this

25 particular instance the fact that we had people's army and we had local

Page 27829

1 soldiers who had already suffered casualties and lost family members on

2 both sides, so my question is did you notice any other formal -- of

3 behaviour other than strictly military behaviour?

4 A. Certainly in armed conflict soldiers who are raised locally are

5 going to have personal issues and experiences with conflicts. I suggest

6 to you that that is known not only within the VRS but in all professional

7 military forces. This is why the officer corps of those armies receives

8 the training that it does and why it has the responsibilities that they

9 do to enforce discipline and to enforce the rule of law among the

10 soldiers that they're responsible for commanding.

11 What happened with respect to the personal experiences of

12 individual soldiers within the Republika Srpska and in Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina in losing family members in a conflict is not radically

14 different from what happens in other areas of armed conflicts globally.

15 The fact is that professional militaries recognise that. Professional

16 militaries study history as well as anyone else does, and that in almost

17 all armies - and I say in this particular context certainly within the

18 JNA and the regulations that were adopted by them by the VRS - that fact

19 was recognised and that they had the appropriate regulatory,

20 disciplinary, and even legal means to enforce discipline among their

21 soldiers to prevent or at least mitigate the impact of those issues.

22 I would note that that was made clear by the Main Staff as early

23 as 1992 when guidance was published to the corps reflecting the various

24 criminal and military disciplinary issues that commanders could

25 anticipate facing through the course of the conflict. Not only did they

Page 27830

1 deal with certain issues with respect to desertion, failure to serve, but

2 there's also a particular component in there with respect to the

3 obligations of commanders in preventing or investigating war crimes. So

4 these are not unanticipated events by any military, and they certainly

5 were not unanticipated by the officer corps of the Army of Republika

6 Srpska.

7 Q. Thank you. Maybe I wasn't quite clear when I put my question.

8 Do you believe that the VRS was a professional army?

9 A. The VRS as a total, as most militaries are, are made up of

10 soldiers, most of who are conscripts. They're not professional.

11 However, I believe that the officer corps of the VRS not only was

12 professional in the sense that many of the officers of the VRS were also

13 serving officers of the federal army. Even those VRS officers who were

14 reserve officers had some amount of training prior to the conflict from

15 their -- the rank that they held within the JNA. So I do believe in that

16 particular context the officer corps was professional.

17 Q. Thank you. Did you notice how many troops did the VRS have and

18 how many professional officers they had?

19 A. I couldn't give you a troop number off hand, but certainly the

20 percentage of soldiers to officers, I mean probably you have a situation

21 where 10 per cent of the force, maybe 15, were officers, and the

22 remainder were soldiers. And frankly, more importantly, one of the

23 issues that the VRS systemically had that was problematic was that there

24 was a lack of junior officers at the company -- or at the platoon and the

25 company level, and as noted by the records, many of those junior-level

Page 27831

1 officers were not really officers at all. They were conscripts who had

2 shown the necessary ability and the willingness to take those lower

3 levels of command and were given those lower levels of command because of

4 a result of it. They were often not properly trained in that manner.

5 Q. Thank you. If I tell you that the Army of Republika Srpska for

6 the most part always had --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the figures.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your question, and

9 slow down when you are saying the numbers.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. If I tell you that the Army of Republika Srpska mainly had

13 between 210.000 and 225.000 troops, out of which number professional

14 officers accounted for hardly 2.000, and as you rightly noticed, most of

15 them had higher ranks, would you agree that this is way beyond the

16 requirements?

17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Way below the

18 requirements.

19 THE WITNESS: Again, sir, it -- whether -- whether it was or was

20 not, I would note several factors. First of all, if it falls within the

21 10 per cent range, which I gave earlier, and secondly, I would argue that

22 even though the number of professional officers was low, at least within

23 the context of what the JNA might have in their -- in their view as to

24 what the ratio would be, the fact is that the necessary structures, the

25 necessary laws, the necessary regulations existed to be able to

Page 27832

1 adequately enforce discipline.

2 Q. That's not what I'm asking you about.

3 A. [Overlapping speakers]

4 Q. That's not what I'm asking --

5 A. But what I'm saying is it's not a question of numbers. It is a

6 question of the ability and the willingness of the senior officials to

7 enforce discipline within the structures that exist.

8 Q. Thank you. I'm not asking you anything about from the point of

9 view of enforcement. I am just asking about whether you comprehended

10 what was the essence of the VRS. If I -- my math is correct --

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you didn't simply ask the numbers.

12 You asked whether Mr. Butler agreed -- would agree that that is well

13 beyond the requirements. So you asked about his opinion.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, but this is

15 not 10 per cent. In his response, he said that this number of officers

16 is consistent with his view that 10 per cent is required.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

18 Q. This is 1 per cent; correct?

19 A. Correct, sir. Clearly I haven't had enough coffee this morning

20 to do math.

21 Q. Thank you. Did you ever notice that the majority of soldiers of

22 the VRS lived and stayed in their own homes rather than in barracks and

23 that rotations took place and that they would spend a number of days on

24 the front line and then a number of days back home?

25 A. Yes, sir. I believe for the majority of the VRS that was the

Page 27833

1 practice that was undertaken. Even though military commanders did not --

2 senior military commanders did not approve of it, the lower-level

3 military commanders in light of the circumstances continued that practice

4 throughout most of the war.

5 Q. Thank you. Have you noticed that in view of the territorial

6 principle of both the VRS and the Army of B and H, that many soldiers

7 knew each other from pre-war peacetime and that they shared some history

8 and some past experiences?

9 A. Again, I can't talk about the big global picture with respect to

10 Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I think that if one looks at strictly the

11 Srebrenica-related crime bases and some of the testimony that has come

12 out and some -- it's even reflected in some of the documents that have

13 come out of particularly the actions related to prisoners or captors

14 knowing exactly who the prisoners are, from what villages they are, and

15 what they did pre-war, there was a great deal of commonality between the

16 military forces in that respect.

17 Q. Thank you. You noticed quite accurately that there were far

18 fewer killings in Potocari and that there were many more police officers

19 in army than in Bratunac. Did it ever happen that individuals would go

20 to detention places seeking specific people from specific villages with a

21 view to either liberating them or taking them elsewhere? So here we have

22 a completely personal approach. Have you ever noticed this?

23 A. Yes, sir. I mean, it is one of the phenomenons that is noted by

24 a number of witnesses who testified that through the course of their

25 detention in and around the Bratunac area, that individuals from local

Page 27834

1 areas -- or individuals from the local area would be calling out at these

2 various temporary detention places or on vehicles and trucks looking for

3 individuals whom came from certain villages or certain other locations

4 again that, you know, was familiar to them.

5 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 5, item 15, of your amalgamated

6 statement, you speak about the collection of additional resources of the

7 MUP of Republika Srpska, because they were tasked with completing the

8 transportation of the remaining civilians from Potocari. Did you know

9 that one additional unit, the so-called Jahorina Detachment, was deployed

10 in Potocari, forming a circle defence in order to protect the Muslim

11 civilians from unauthorised and irresponsible attacks.

12 For the benefit of other participants, I can say that this was

13 corroborated by Witness KDZ084.

14 A. Again, sir, I am aware that on the 12th of July, it was not only

15 Sekovici police, it was the 1st PJP and 1 Company from the Jahorina

16 training area that were in Potocari. I'm not familiar with the witness

17 testimony in that particular case, so I can't comment one way or another

18 as to what the company's individual actions were.

19 Q. Thank you. Were you able to observe that during the night

20 between the 12th and the 13th of July in Potocari there were no VRS

21 personnel whatsoever?

22 A. I don't know that, sir. I know that there was a police presence

23 there. I know that there was a military presence there during the day.

24 I have no information which would confirm or deny that the VRS completely

25 left the compound at Potocari during the evening hours of 12 July 1995.

Page 27835

1 MR. NICHOLLS: And I just ask the basis for putting that

2 assertion, the factual basis.

3 JUDGE KWON: Well, I took that to be a question, but I can ask

4 Mr. Karadzic whether it is your submission that there was no military

5 between the 12th and 13th of July?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, we heard about

7 that here from some witnesses that the military wasn't present. I can't

8 give you an exact reference at this point in time. I simply wanted to

9 see with this witness if he was aware of it.

10 JUDGE KWON: Then why don't you ask him whether he knew that

11 whether there was any presence of military without necessarily causing

12 some confusion.

13 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. In your paragraph 5.24, Tisca-Luke, you say that the refugees

17 were forced to get off the vehicles and continue to the Muslim-held

18 territory on foot. Do you believe that a bus full of refugees could

19 approach the confrontation line, and who would then be held responsible

20 if such a bus were to be hit by a Zolja, a hand-held rocket launcher?

21 A. First off, in that particular context where the individuals were

22 taken and coming off the buses, the road was blocked for the most part

23 for vehicle traffic going back and through, so I assume that they left

24 the buses there and had to walk those final several kilometres because

25 the road had on both sides had been made so it was impassable to vehicle

Page 27836

1 traffic.

2 Q. Thank you. So they were not forced. It was the only way for

3 them to cross over to the Muslim side?

4 A. Correct, sir.

5 Q. Thank you. Did you see in certain UNPROFOR reports that the

6 first several groups were awaited with distrust and dissatisfaction as

7 the Muslim army didn't know what the whole thing was about, and that

8 there were even tensions between those arriving and those who awaited

9 them?

10 A. I would agree with your second assertion that certainly the

11 Muslim forces on the ground there would not have been immediately aware,

12 particularly from the first wave of buses that came in, what was going

13 on. Those individuals were, if I recall, accompanied by a Dutch United

14 Nations officer who was able to lay out the framework of what was

15 happening and why these people were showing up at this particular

16 location.

17 Q. Thank you. Did you take a certain position in terms of the cause

18 of death of those found in mass graves?

19 A. I believe that throughout the investigative process with respect

20 to the mass graves identified in the Zvornik area that forensically those

21 courses of death have been termed. As I noted in my report and the

22 analysis and testimony, my role in that part was not to analyse the fact

23 that -- how they died, but was to be able to look at all the other

24 military operations that were occurring in context and be able to provide

25 information back to the investigative teams as to whether or not the

Page 27837

1 locations of the primary grave sites corresponded to locations of known

2 combat activity, and it was my opinion - and remains my opinion - that of

3 the four main primary sites in the Zvornik Brigade area, which would be

4 Orahovac, the Petkovci dam, the Drina River site at Rocevic, and

5 Branjevo Farm, that none of those locations saw significant combat

6 activities or any combat activity for that matter, to be clear, on the

7 day that those individuals were killed at those sites.

8 Q. Did you follow testimonies in this case in order to update your

9 knowledge, and did you follow the recent testimony by Drazen Erdemovic

10 and Amor Masic?

11 A. I am familiar with the testimony of Mr. Erdemovic from previous

12 trials. I have followed no testimony for -- related to this specific

13 case here. My current workload just does not allow me the time and

14 ability to do that.

15 Q. Thank you. Do you allow for the possibility that some graves

16 were filled up in stages? For example, the grave at Branjevo Farm had

17 previous burials and the burials came in stages. Erdemovic confirmed it

18 as having been informed of it at the time on the 16th of July.

19 MR. NICHOLLS: For the record --

20 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer --

21 MR. NICHOLLS: -- Mr. Erdemovic did not confirm that the grave

22 was filled up in stages. Another complete misstatement of the record.

23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please be precise when you cite the

24 evidence given by a witness.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said that Erdemovic confirmed

Page 27838

1 it -- [In English] Erdemovic confirmed it as having been informed of it

2 at the time on the 16th of July. [Interpretation] I didn't say that

3 Erdemovic could see that. Apparently a guard had told him that there had

4 been burials previously. We can find that in Erdemovic's testimony.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Be precise.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Do you know that other sources, as well as Witness Masovic,

9 confirmed that more graves contained the bodies of those who had been

10 killed as early as 1992?

11 A. Again, sir, what I can say is I do not know what individual

12 witnesses have testified. I am aware that as part of the overall

13 forensics process that, particularly now, there has been for the last

14 five or at least eight years, maybe even longer, a robust process by

15 which to DNA and identify the remains in the graves and, of course,

16 cross-index the identities of those individuals in the graves with when

17 they were identified as missing off of the various ICRC and other lists.

18 So I expect that there is a scientific way that has been undertaken to be

19 able to distinguish individuals who were killed in July of 1995 versus

20 individuals who were killed -- or at least -- or at least identified as

21 missing in earlier stages of the war.

22 Q. Thank you. Do we agree that the DNA methods cannot ascertain

23 either the time of death or time of burial or cause of death?

24 A. Again, sir, you're now kind of migrating out of an area which I

25 have anything other than a layperson's experience with. What I can say

Page 27839

1 is I am aware that there are other investigative and forensic techniques

2 that the investigation teams through the years have used to ascertain

3 those issues, but again, I have no particular expertise in those.

4 Q. Thank you. I'd like to draw your attention to paragraph 7.72.

5 Do you recall what alternative measures to accommodating prisoners were

6 proposed by Colonel Pandurevic? It is page 80 in of the Serbian of your

7 amalgamated statement.

8 A. Well, sir, referring to that, and this brings us back to the

9 15 July 1995 interim report, my interpretation is that he's talking about

10 the prisoners in this context, and I don't believe he's offering an

11 alternative to accommodating them other than potentially letting them go.

12 There's nothing in this document which suggests that he's suggesting that

13 they move to another location or anything else. It simply says, "If no

14 one takes responsibility, I will be forced to let them go."

15 I am, of course, aware that Colonel Pandurevic himself offers a

16 different interpretation to this, and I just thought I needed to mention

17 that under -- under the circumstances.

18 Q. Sir, I'll read out the second quotation by Pandurevic from item

19 7.72, and I would kindly ask the interpreters to interpret it in the

20 spirit of the Serbian language, especially in the terms of the phrase "I

21 would be forced let them go." It says following:

22 "This command can no longer take care of these problems, as it

23 has neither the material or other resources. In case no one took over

24 this responsibility, I would be forced to release them" or "to let them

25 go."

Page 27840

1 [In English] I suppose this -- this is "to release them," better,

2 more accurate than "to let them go."

3 [Interpretation] Obviously, the genus of the language would

4 require the term "to release them" instead of "to let them go through."

5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not see a semantic

6 difference.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. In other words, Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic is saying, "If I

9 can no longer take care of them, I will set them free."

10 A. That is, frankly, how I interpret this particular comment. Again

11 given the time of what is occurring and where the prisoners are, even at

12 this particular time that he's aware of this and he's writing this, there

13 are still prisoners still alive at Rocevic who have not been killed, as

14 well as prisoners that are alive at Branjevo and at the Dom of Kulture.

15 So when I evaluate this with other information and documents

16 relating to this, I take this that Colonel Pandurevic is aware of the

17 prisoners. He is aware that they are being executed. He is aware of the

18 significant drain that the obligations to guard these prisoners, kill

19 these prisoners, and then bury them is having on his military unit. And

20 it's a time when he has no military reserves left. The threat of the

21 column continues to grow each hour. It is a reflection on his part that

22 he has actions that he can take relating to the prisoners that would not

23 make his superiors at the Drina Corps and the Main Staff happy. So he is

24 seeking to use that issue as leverage to get additional resources to deal

25 with the situation in Zvornik.

Page 27841

1 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, no objection, but that's -- just to make it

2 easy for the record, that's P00138 is exhibit number of the report we're

3 discussing.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Thank you. Mr. Butler, with all due respect, aren't you

6 speculating a bit too much given the fact that we have a crystal clear

7 text? There are no forces at his disposal to take care of the prisoners,

8 and unless another command took care of them, his only alternative for

9 him was to set them free. How do you come to your conclusion that he was

10 aware of the killings? Let's stick with the text. How does this text

11 imply he was aware of the killings?

12 A. Well, sir, again taking this document in context with all of the

13 other things that are occurring and what Colonel Pandurevic knew and

14 should have known, first of all, Colonel Pandurevic does not return to

15 his area until the morning of the 15th of July. So I do take it that

16 he's not going to have an immediate awareness of what has been happening

17 in the Zvornik Brigade area other than what he has received in reports

18 and various telephone calls.

19 I understand that shortly after his return to the Zvornik Brigade

20 area, and in fact his headquarters, there is a meeting that he sets up

21 with all of the relevant military and police commanders who are now

22 engaged in the Zvornik area, and that all aspects of what has been

23 happening on the ground are going to be briefed to him by all of these

24 individuals. So they're going to tell him what the situation is with the

25 enemy forces. They're going to tell him what the situation is with all

Page 27842

1 of the friendly forces, the police and military forces. I understand

2 that the issue of prisoners being stored in the area also came up. So

3 Colonel Pandurevic, just by virtue of being a competent and diligent

4 military commander, is going to have all of this information.

5 Now, the next piece of information that I relate to is the last

6 sentence or, I guess, the only sentence of the paragraph above that, the

7 obligations of security and restoration of the terrain, the phrase is

8 "asanacija," which is a medical term relating to the burying of bodies

9 and biological wastes. Who's -- if they're not killing the prisoners,

10 just who is Colonel Pandurevic concerned about burying? So he must know

11 this.

12 Q. That would be my next question. The remark in the brackets

13 "SIC," is something you inserted or does it figure in the original text

14 next to "asanacija terena"?

15 MR. NICHOLLS: I say we should bring up the report and -- then,

16 Your Honour, the one we're talking about. We might as well look at the

17 report rather than quotes from the report -- in Mr. Butler's report. I'm

18 speaking of the interim combat report.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, while we're waiting for that document, do you

20 remember who put that "sic"?

21 THE WITNESS: I am not sure. Like I said, I have to look at the

22 document. I know that from previous cases that it's not a clean

23 translation between the phrase or the word in Serbo-Croatian "asanacija"

24 and the English translation "restoration of the terrain." I put it in my

25 English language one to highlight that fact that one should go back to

Page 27843

1 the Serbo-Croatian explanation of "asanacija." You know, in English

2 "restoration of the terrain," you know, could reflect, you know, moving a

3 hole on a golf course somewhere. It doesn't accurately reflect the type

4 of activity which was done which is most accurately reflected in the

5 definition of "asanacija" in various JNA military lexicons or

6 dictionaries. So that is why I put the phrase "sic" in English, to

7 prompt somebody to go back and look at that.

8 Q. Thank you. Are you familiar with the legal provision in our body

9 of law concerning "asanacija terena" following floods, combat, et cetera,

10 and what does it entail? Could you provide us with a brief answer if

11 possible, as I have a small number of other documents I wish to cover.

12 A. Yes, sir. It's not a legal term. It's -- basically it's a

13 technical term at least in a military context. It reflects to burying

14 the bodies of individuals who are killed, and of course it could apply to

15 a nonmilitary context, but essentially it is the disposal of biological

16 waste projects that are a result of combat, flood, or other disasters in

17 a proper manner to preclude diseases from breaking out as a result of

18 them.

19 Q. Thank you. Were you able --

20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic. How much more time

21 would you need to conclude your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

22 THE WITNESS: I will do my best to conclude in 15 to 20 minutes,

23 and I believe Mr. Nicholls will need some time as well. I will do my

24 best to conclude in 15 to 20 minutes.

25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll continue in the next session.

Page 27857

1 (redacted)

2 [Open session]

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We are now in open session.

4 Yes, Mr. Butler.

5 THE WITNESS: When one deconstructs that particular crime base

6 and what happened at that time, once the shooting starts there are four

7 things that are ultimately happen -- or could potential -- four potential

8 outcomes for the individuals in the warehouse: As a result of the

9 immediate shooting they're killed, it's an instant fatal injury; they're

10 injured and their injuries are so severe that despite medical attention

11 they will still die; the third option is that their injuries, with

12 medical attention, will allow them to survive; and the fourth possible

13 outcome is they will either not be injured or their injuries will be so

14 slight that they will not require any medical attention.

15 So you have four potential outcomes. And then if we use the

16 figure of a thousand, just to keep the math simple for me, in one

17 category of individuals who suffered almost instantaneous injury that was

18 fatal, you have the number 997, and then all the way in the other

19 category of individuals who were -- either suffered no injuries or such

20 minor injuries that they were able to subsequently escape, you have the

21 number three.

22 Simply by random distribution alone you would expect to see

23 individuals inside the warehouse who were subsequently wounded and then

24 later died after receiving medical treatment or were wounded and survive

25 after medical treatment. So as part of excluding the issue that this was

Page 27858

1 a one-time impulse event as a reaction and that there was no ultimately

2 premeditated plan to kill the individuals in the warehouse,

3 investigatively we looked for evidence that wounded Muslims from the

4 Kravica warehouse were brought to any medical facility. There are no

5 record of them at the Bratunac facility, at the United Nations medical

6 facility, at Milici, at Zvornik. There's no effort whatsoever to bring

7 any wounded Muslims to be medically cared for. So even if I accept in

8 argument the fact that the individuals at the Kravica warehouse, that the

9 event was predicated by an impulse act of a potential escape, at some

10 point shortly thereafter, somebody made a decision that the ultimate goal

11 was that everyone inside that warehouse would ultimately be killed.

12 So this is an example - I'm sorry if it's a bit long - of how we

13 did look at, or certainly I did look at, from an investigative and

14 military analytical sense all of the various alternatives before I came

15 to a conclusion that not only the most likely alternative but the only

16 logical one was related to a criminal act in that particular case.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. In your report, did you present to the Chamber and other

19 participants all these options and alternatives and processes through

20 which you arrived at your conclusions? Did you explain this process of

21 how your deduction and other cognizance exercises were carried out?

22 A. No, sir. In the context of my written document, I did not. That

23 was ultimately raised in various trials. Questions of my process and my

24 methodologies and the assumptions that I used in various issues were

25 raised both by the Prosecutors and by various legal counsel for the

Page 27859

1 Defence in a number of cases so that the Court could completely

2 understand the basis by what I was finding in my various -- the

3 conclusions that I made in various reports.

4 Q. Mr. Butler, how can the Chamber arrive at a conclusion since you

5 are providing speculations only? You claim that there was plan to kill

6 all those people in the cooperative even though you know that there were

7 only a few guards. You know that one of the prisoners approached the

8 guard, tried to snatch a rifle from him, and it obviously shows that this

9 was not planned beforehand. Nevertheless, you are presenting to the

10 Chamber as a fact that that was planned, I don't know on the basis of

11 which, and in addition to that you are working for the Prosecution.

12 A. Well, sir --

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, proceed.

14 THE WITNESS: Setting the issue of bias aside, again I would

15 remind you that the basis of my analysis, and again even setting the

16 witness testimony aside, is based off the probabilities of various events

17 occurring.

18 The fact is I believe that there were more people there guarding

19 the prisoners. It was not just a few people guarding nearly a thousand.

20 Knowing the weapons that were used, because that evidence is available

21 forensically from post-conflict evaluations of the Kravica warehouse.

22 Again, when you lay all of those things out in context, even if I were to

23 assume that the initial predicate event was a reaction to an attempt by

24 Muslims to escape - and that were the only intent - you would see

25 outcomes for other people in the warehouse that would reflect injuries

Page 27860

1 that were treated at various medical centres. The fact is that did not

2 occur. There's no evidence of that, and I know that investigatively that

3 was looked at. So I'm telling you that I know things as a certain fact.

4 I was not at the Kravica warehouse, but I believe that based on all of

5 the information and looking at these groupings, the statistical groupings

6 that were occurring, the only logical inference that can be drawn is that

7 at some juncture a decision had been made that everyone inside that

8 warehouse would be killed. Once that decision occurs, it is no longer an

9 impulse reactive event. It becomes a premeditated plan.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Butler, first of all, there was no attempt to escape. A

12 rifle was snatched and fire was opened at the guards. Have you ever

13 established the number of the guards that were guarding these thousand

14 prisoners? Has everyone ever established the number of the guards?

15 JUDGE KWON: I think the witness has answered this question. Why

16 don't you move on. It's time for you conclude, Mr. Karadzic.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you know if there were 1.000 prisoners or a hundred or so

20 prisoners? If there were 1.000 of them, where had they come from?

21 A. I don't have an exact figure off the top of my head.

22 Investigatively, I'm aware that the number of prisoners that are

23 associated with the Kravica warehouse runs from a range of 500 up to a

24 thousand. I just chose the number thousand to make the math a little

25 simple for the example that I used. And my understanding

Page 27861

1 investigatively, is that the prisoners who came from -- who were in the

2 Kravica warehouse on 13 July 1995 were those prisoners who had been

3 brought in either by vehicle or had walked from Sandici and

4 Konjevic Polje. There may have even been prisoners brought in from as

5 far as Nova Kasaba.

6 Q. All of this in the area of "maybe," Mr. Butler; right? Did you

7 see in photo images these thousands of prisoners in Kravica and on the

8 meadows? Have you ever established the exact number of imprisoned

9 people, or did you go along with the Muslim propaganda?

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, this is all beyond his -- his evidence

11 in chief he gave. He came as a military expert or military analyst to

12 help the Chamber understand the military context.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Tell me, Mr. Butler, do you think that -- but let's start with

16 this: Once the column has passed through, under whose control was the

17 territory of the Zvornik Brigade?

18 A. Even before the column passed through, the territory of the

19 Zvornik Brigade is under -- is under the control of the VRS, specifically

20 the Zvornik Brigade and its commander.

21 Q. Thank you. Do you believe or do you have any proof that the

22 hygiene and sanitation measures involving the burial of enemy soldiers

23 was carried out in single graves wherever the bodies were found, or were

24 they collected and then buried in common graves?

25 A. My understanding is that as a result of the fact that many of the

Page 27862

1 areas that the casualties from the column were located in had unmarked

2 minefields and things of that nature with very few exceptions. It is my

3 understanding that most of the people who fell as part of the column were

4 not recovered until after the end of the war when mine -- mine

5 identification units were going through those areas to mark off the areas

6 for mines. That's why I believe that forensically there are distinctions

7 made between those individuals who are fallen in the category of the

8 surface remains, which would be most of the column, versus those

9 individuals who are believed to have been victims of mass executions in

10 various places.

11 Q. Mr. Butler, I am a bit concerned about what you believe. With

12 the exception of Pobudje, which was in the area of the Bratunac Brigade,

13 did you acquire any proof that there were surface remains found in the

14 area of the Zvornik Brigade, and if you did, where were they found? As I

15 said, with the exception of the Pobudje Brigade area of responsibility.

16 No dead bodies were found, Mr. Butler.

17 A. Again, sir, I don't know the specifics of the surface remain

18 retrieval. I -- that was not an area that I was required to delve into.

19 It didn't have any bearing particularly on what I was doing, so I have no

20 information one way or another other than my general understanding of

21 when surface remains started to be recovered. I believe that there are

22 aspects of the investigation related to Srebrenica which will reflect the

23 more accurate numbers related to those.

24 Q. Thank you. Based on the route of the lorries, your conclusion is

25 that they were transporting dead -- dead bodies.

Page 27863

1 Now, as for other supplies such as those of ammunition, food, and

2 other supplies, was that also carried out by lorries?

3 A. I apologise, sir. I -- I don't understand your question. In

4 which context are you referring to where you talk about -- I'm not

5 making -- I don't assert that lorries were trans -- or moving the dead

6 bodies with the exception of those vehicles that have been specifically

7 identified as moving people from schools to grave sites. There were

8 vehicles that were also carrying ammunition and other supplies. We have

9 a comprehensive list of all of the vehicles belonging to the

10 Zvornik Brigade. So it's pretty easy to distinguish from those documents

11 what vehicles were carrying what.

12 Q. Thank you. You said today that you managed to reconstruct the

13 routes of individual lorries on the basis of which you concluded that

14 those lorries were used for the transportation of corpses; is that

15 correct?

16 A. No, sir. What I said today was that in one particular instance

17 which occurred on the 16th and 17th of July, by looking at the vehicle

18 record of one lorry, we were able to determine that prisoners were

19 carried from a position that corresponded to the 7th Battalion

20 headquarter to a remote location, and then that vehicle returned, that it

21 did not bring the prisoners to the higher headquarters of the

22 Zvornik Brigade like it was supposed to.

23 There are other vehicle records which talk about issues related

24 to the bringing of prisoners to other places relating to the mass

25 executions, and I believe that many of those records have been

Page 27864

1 corroborated by testimony of various vehicle drivers who do describe what

2 they were carrying on various days.

3 Q. Have you noticed or could you discern whether these drivers were

4 aware of where they were taking those prisoners? Maybe they were taking

5 them to a point where they would be exchanged.

6 A. As a general practice, the vehicle drivers, because they were

7 required personally to account for the vehicle miles and the fuel that

8 was used in the vehicles, kept generally accurate records of where they

9 were going and what they were doing in those vehicles.

10 Q. My question was: What were they told? What were they told about

11 the destination of the prisoners, and did you hear that they were

12 surprised that it had to do anything with executions, because they were

13 told that they were taking those people to be exchanged. Did you know

14 that?

15 A. I am aware that generally a number of individuals who were

16 dealing with prisoners were initially told that they were taking people

17 to various sites to be exchanged, and I agree with your assertion that

18 many of those people were quite surprised to learn when they arrived at

19 various locations that the prisoners were not being exchanged.

20 Q. Thank you. Did you read a report by the Dutch institute NIOD

21 relating to the Srebrenica events?

22 A. No, sir, I have not.

23 Q. Do you believe that it would have been useful if you had read it,

24 because we are talking here about a competent institution that dealt with

25 the same thing --

Page 27865

1 JUDGE KWON: I feel like it's time to cut you off. You said you

2 would need 15 minutes, and now you are turning this witness -- trying to

3 turn this witness to a fact witness. Conclude your cross-examination.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I finished -- I'll

5 finish shortly. I'm only going to show the witness one more document.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Have you read a report by the UN Secretary-General on the fall of

8 Srebrenica?

9 A. Yes, sir, I have.

10 Q. Do you agree with that report?

11 A. I don't know whether I agree with it or not, because the

12 conclusions -- I mean, there are many conclusions the report draws. I

13 draw on the report because I believe it is a useful factual summary of

14 the events that occurred up until the beginning of July 1995.

15 The one note that I make and the one reason why I do hold a

16 reservation on the United Nations report is that that report was in fact

17 published prior to the trial of General Krstic, and I am sure that the

18 United Nations did not have access to much of the evidence that was later

19 used by the Office of the Prosecutor in the case relating to Krstic and

20 other accused in the subsequent years. So kind of like my own reports

21 which go up to the year 2003, while it may very well be accurate, it's

22 got -- it has to be recognised that there is a larger body of information

23 now available and that that should be factored into the general

24 conclusions as well.

25 Q. Are you aware of a recently given statement by Mr. Akashi and

Page 27866

1 Mr. Bildt that pertain to Srebrenica? And, of course, the statements

2 given by Mr. Stoltenberg, which speak of the fact that the war could have

3 ended earlier and in which he also describes the conduct of the Serbian

4 side.

5 A. Again, sir, I may have at some point been aware generally of a

6 statement, at least by Mr. Bildt, who I think gave one many years ago to

7 the Tribunal. I have not followed the proceedings here, so I do not know

8 what, if any, of those individuals might have said about anything related

9 to this particular case.

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, your last question.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I please have 1D5556. And this

12 is going to be my last question.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Mr. Butler, while we are waiting, you are, of course, familiar

15 with the term "reductio ab absurdum," [as interpreted] which means that

16 it would have been better to have the whole process rather than only the

17 result.

18 A. I'm not familiar with the term, but I take it it's leading

19 somewhere.

20 Q. It should read "deductio ab absurdum," absurd deductions. But

21 let's leave that aside. Have you ever seen this document that was in

22 possession of the OTP?

23 A. Without an English translation, I -- I couldn't tell you whether

24 I've ever seen this document or not just by the appearance of it, sir.

25 Q. Thank you. It was disclosed to us by the OTP only three days

Page 27867

1 ago, so we didn't have time to translate it.

2 Can we now have page 2, and I'm going to read it to you. It says

3 Geneva, 19th July, and paragraph 3 says:

4 "In his speech, Bildt ascribed more critical comments and

5 responsibility (for the fall of Srebrenica) to the offensive actions

6 carried out by the BH Army and the HVO while he underlined that the

7 Bosnian Serbs genuinely were more in favour of the cessation of

8 hostilities."

9 Now, did you know anything about this? Have you ever heard about

10 these views of Mr. Bildt?

11 A. Sir, I've heard an awful lot of points of view from a lot of

12 individuals at various political levels in the international community

13 about Srebrenica. They're not relevant to my analysis.

14 Q. Thank you. I regret to say that you have been biassed, but

15 nevertheless, Mr. Butler, I would like to thank you for your testimony.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.

17 MR. NICHOLLS: Is this document being tendered?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, certainly. I apologise.

19 MR. NICHOLLS: So I think we'll have no objection, but it should

20 be marked, Your Honour, first. We need to take a look and see what it is

21 exactly. I don't believe we have a translation yet.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 MR. NICHOLLS: Actually, Your Honours, let me reconsider. The

24 witness wasn't able to speak to it at all and said it wasn't relevant to

25 his --

Page 27874

1 military perspective to where the front lines would be would be in the

2 Zvornik and Karakaj area. The fact that bus and trucks filled with

3 prisoners were easily able to continue northward, and in fact did,

4 through Petkovci and Rocevic and Branjevo, there's no military reason why

5 they could not have continued all the way to Petkovci. I mean, the road

6 was not threatened in any sense. So the fact that they did not go to

7 Petkovci was by -- I'm sorry, they did not go to Batkovic was by design.

8 It was not as a result of military necessity.

9 Q. All right. Now, Mr. Karadzic asked you questions about whether

10 truck drivers were told that prisoners would be exchanged when they were

11 bringing them sometimes to kind of remote mountain top areas like Bisina,

12 for example. Did you find any evidence that prisoners were somehow taken

13 and actually were exchanged during the 14th, 15th, 16th of July in

14 Zvornik municipality?

15 A. No, sir. I mean to the contrary. As -- as I've noted earlier,

16 by the 14th and 15th, I think by the early morning of the 15th, certainly

17 the police and the military forces are aware that a senior police

18 official had been captured by the column, and I know that there was a

19 number of discussions that went back and forth relating to whether or not

20 this senior RS police official was still alive and whether or not it

21 would be possible to exchange him. At that point in time, one would

22 think that, you know, Colonel Pandurevic and the Zvornik Brigade still

23 had, you know, several thousand prisoners alive that had there actually

24 been an intent to exchange those prisoners for this police captain, that

25 they would have easily had the ability to do so. So there's no evidence

Page 27875

1 of those types of exchanges occurring in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade

2 during that period.

3 Q. Now, one point you made during your cross-examination just now

4 was about the killings at the Kravica warehouse, that there was no

5 evidence whatsoever that you found that any prisoners were provided with

6 medical care and either died or survived after medical care. What I want

7 to ask you is just to round that out, what about the other major

8 execution sites, Orahovac, Branjevo, Petkovci, Pilica, Kozluk. In any of

9 those cases did you find that any prisoners had survived and been

10 provided medical care?

11 A. Well, there are two instances that I'm aware of. One instance is

12 well documented where four individuals who apparently survived the

13 Branjevo Farm massacre were later recaptured by the VRS. They were

14 interviewed, and there were actually stories that were made as a

15 statement as to where they were captured and everything else to

16 camouflage the fact that they were massacre survivors, and I believe

17 those four individuals are still missing. I believe I documented that in

18 my narrative under the -- I have an addendum to chapter 8 about prisoner

19 issues. I am aware of a second issue where a prisoner survived an

20 execution I believe in Kozluk, escaped to Serbia, and then was later

21 brought back and is now again missing.

22 I'm not aware of -- with the exception of one instance, a child

23 survivor of Orahovac, who did make it to the Zvornik Brigade medical

24 centre. That is the only instance I'm aware of where people from mass

25 executions, who survived them initially, received any medical care.

Page 27876

1 Q. Thank you. And the Kozluk survivor, I'll lead for a minute, is

2 that Resid Sinanovic?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Let me move on now quickly to some questions about the corridor

5 that came up today. There were some questions from His Honour as well as

6 some follow-up questions by Mr. Karadzic.

7 We looked at P04956. We don't need to bring it up now, but

8 that's an intercept from the 16 July in which the Drina Corps is calling

9 down to the Zvornik Brigade saying they need permission from the main

10 head of state, and they're talking about the opening of the corridor.

11 Mr. Karadzic in his questions talked about getting information

12 from Karisik and that he supported Mr. Pandurevic's decision.

13 MR. NICHOLLS: I'd like to look at P01412, please. That's the

14 56th session of the RS Assembly session -- 52nd session, excuse me, on

15 5th August 1995. And if we could go to 19 in English and 17 in Serbian.

16 That's it. If we can now go to page 19. Second paragraph.

17 Q. This is Mr. Karadzic speaking:

18 "As you know we had success in Srebrenica and Zepa. There were

19 no objections or remarks on that success. Of course, many stupid things

20 were done afterwards because many Muslim soldiers were wandering around

21 in the woods and we suffered casualties then. Still, we did not suffer

22 any casualties during the action."

23 And then if I can continue now to e-court English page 23,

24 Serbian page 20. What I'd like you to look at is the bottom of the

25 second paragraph. Mr. Karadzic continues:

Page 27877

1 "The Turks from Gorazde could get there whenever they want. The

2 same as 9.000 armed Turks in the woods and mountains could have taken

3 Srebrenica again."

4 We scroll down in the English.

5 "They could have burned Milici, Vlasenica and Zvornik. People

6 from that area can tell you about it because it could have happened if

7 they were smart enough and if they had a command. It's a landing

8 division with 9.000 men. It could have been a landing operation. Only

9 our men and dear God could save us. About 50 to 60 of our men got killed

10 there trying to block them but several thousands of soldiers eventually

11 managed" - turn the page - "to pass. And now Srebrenica division has

12 been formed, lined up in Tuzla in order to get back to Srebrenica. We

13 were not able to surround and destroy that enemy because we were in a

14 hurry to get to Zepa, and we assigned two generals to Zepa to waste 15

15 days in negotiations with jackasses and idiots who are wasting their time

16 instead of letting Rajko Kusic finish all of it or maybe General Krstic

17 who proved to be very good."

18 So my question is the 50 or 60 men that Mr. Karadzic speaks about

19 who got killed trying to block these men from Srebrenica who were the

20 Srebrenica Division in Zepa, what does that refer to?

21 A. Those would be casualties primarily from the Zvornik Infantry

22 Brigade, but there were some police casualties that were incurred on the

23 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th trying to block the column from successfully

24 escaping the territory of the RS. I think most of the casualties

25 occurred the evening hours of the 15th and the morning hours of 16th July

Page 27878

1 1995.

2 Q. Okay. Now, second question: Does this provide you with any

3 information either way about the knowledge of the leadership of whether

4 the men in that -- or whether the -- I should say the people in that

5 column who managed to pass were soldiers or civilians?

6 A. No, sir. I mean, I believe that everybody knew that the people

7 who were in the column were for the most part either armed or unarmed

8 soldiers or -- or at least military-aged men.

9 As I've discussed earlier, in the -- you know, when -- when you

10 look at the context of what happened on the 15th of July, you know,

11 Colonel Pandurevic is not interested in letting the column pass. He's

12 interested in doing a military solution because he believes he has the

13 means to and he understand that that's the intent of his superior

14 commanders. He only makes the decision out of military interest to let

15 the column pass on the afternoon of the 16th for a discrete period of 24

16 hours because he essentially has no choice. I mean, he has no ability

17 militarily to stop it. His units are obtaining significant casualties.

18 He doesn't believe that the Serbian blood being expended to that point is

19 worth the gain, so he does so.

20 And, of course, by doing that and essentially defying his

21 instructions from his superior command, he now has a motive to downplay

22 what the actual impact of that would be with the fact of how many

23 soldiers had been let out or military-aged men had been let out, and also

24 to misrepresent the characteristics of that column, and this is where he

25 starts talking about civilians being part of the column.

Page 27879

1 And again going back to the earlier point, the other people there

2 who -- aren't saying that. They're all noting accurately that what we

3 were engaged in in that context was combat against a column of, you know,

4 military-aged men, a significant percentage, you know, maybe up to

5 one-half, who were armed.

6 Q. Thank you. And then last question on this and I'll move on. But

7 in this session we see on the 6th of August where then President Karadzic

8 says there were no objections or remarks on the success in Srebrenica and

9 Zepa, and then complains that this group of men were not surrounded and

10 destroyed.

11 By that time, has -- as far as you know, has word spread about

12 the mass executions in the Zvornik Brigade AOR? So this is 6th of

13 August.

14 A. Absolutely, sir, and this is why I believe that this particular

15 document, especially for me, was -- was very important, and of course I

16 was glad to get access to it naturally after I had written my reports,

17 because this particular meeting comes two days after President Karadzic

18 is seeking to essentially dismiss General Mladic from the command of the

19 Main Staff.

20 Now, in light of my knowledge of the earlier indictments for

21 President Karadzic and that he was indicted under 7(3), it's inescapable

22 that -- you know, here we have, less than three weeks after Srebrenica,

23 an attempt by the president of the republic to fire General Mladic who

24 many would view as responsible in part for Srebrenica as well, and

25 obviously that would have an impact on 7(3) and, in getting back to the

Page 27880

1 earlier question, to Rule 68 obligations.

2 So a big part of what I tried to do as part of my research while

3 I was here is to find whether or not there was any evidence whatsoever

4 that one of the motivations for President Karadzic really trying to

5 leave -- relieve General Mladic of command was as a result of the orders

6 he gave which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people at

7 Srebrenica, if there was a way to divorce that somehow. If this was

8 President Karadzic's reaction that, you know, this is what he was trying

9 to do. And you know, this as well as all of the evidence that I've come

10 across to date, there's no information that suggests that.

11 The reasons that he fired or sought to fire General Mladic had to

12 do with a variety of other issues, and nowhere is he saying, you know,

13 One the reasons why I wanted to terminate General Mladic's service as the

14 commander of the Main Staff, as well as other officers involved in

15 Srebrenica, was because I do not agree with the illegal activities that

16 occurred there and this is my way of seeking to remove them from

17 positions of authority.

18 So I see this as a very significant document in trying to address

19 what were or were not the motives of President Karadzic for trying to

20 remove General Mladic from the command of the Main Staff on the 3rd and

21 4th of August of 1995.

22 Q. All right.

23 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 02269, please.

24 Q. And while that's coming up, I'll tell you, Mr. Butler, this is

25 the VRS Main Staff military prosecutor's office guidelines for

Page 27881

1 determining criteria for criminal responsibility, and I just want to

2 confirm you were discussing a document at pages 7 and 8 today, in the

3 context of the discussion Mr. Karadzic was asking you about, whether

4 there were command and control issues because of the nature of the VRS

5 conscripts. Let me put it generally like that. My question is: Is this

6 the document you were referring to when you said that commanders were

7 provided with information as early as 1992 about ways to deal with these

8 problems of revenge, crimes, et cetera?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. Could we go to -- I may have miscited you.

11 MR. NICHOLLS: It's page 7 of the English, sorry. Page 23 of the

12 B/C/S. I'd like to go to there quickly.

13 Q. If you look at the second paragraph under heading 3, criminal

14 offences against humanitarian and international law. There's a

15 discussion of crimes against humanity and how they occur. Is that the

16 part you were talking about?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 MR. NICHOLLS: And if I could go to page 8 of the English, which

19 should be page 25 of the Serbian. Now at the top. Look at the first two

20 paragraphs. It's generally about the responsibility of officers,

21 including for officers learning of crimes. Is that -- were you

22 discussing this section as well? I just want to see if I'm correct in

23 the part you were referring to.

24 A. Yes, sir. And this is again where I note the fact that it's not

25 the actual number of the officers which is responsible for the discipline

Page 27882

1 of the soldiers. It is the willingness and ability of those officers to

2 use the various criminal and -- law and military disciplinary systems in

3 order to implement proper discipline within the armed forces.

4 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this, Your Honour?

5 JUDGE KWON: Cover page and those two pages.

6 MR. NICHOLLS: It's actually, Your Honour, the English is nine

7 pages. I would -- I would prefer to tender the entire --

8 JUDGE KWON: But the B/C/S version is 36 pages.

9 MR. NICHOLLS: I believe that's because of blank pages inserted.

10 JUDGE KWON: Mm-hmm.

11 MR. NICHOLLS: It's not a very good scan but we're talking about

12 nine pages of text.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.

14 MR. ROBINSON: We don't object to tendering the entire document,

15 Mr. President.

16 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll admit it.

17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4978, Your Honours.

18 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. This would be a good time, Your

19 Honour, for taking the break.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I, Excellencies, just one

21 question.

22 JUDGE KWON: That means you have more questions.

23 MR. NICHOLLS: I do have more questions, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE KWON: How much more, Mr. Nicholls?

25 MR. NICHOLLS: Probably about 20 minutes, Your Honour.

Page 27883

1 JUDGE KWON: We better take a break now. We'll have a break for

2 now and resume at 1.30.

3 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

4 --- On resuming at 1.33 p.m.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.

6 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. All right. Almost -- almost done, Mr. Butler. Just a few more

8 topics I'll try to move through quickly. The first thing is I'm going to

9 ask you to cast your mind back to around March, April 2009. You were

10 asked on 19th of April why there was no report in this case, and you

11 answered that you weren't asked to write one. I'd ask you to just think

12 about that.

13 In March at a Status Conference, 24th of March, we told the Court

14 we were -- that we thought you were preparing a report and would prepare

15 one, and on the 15th of May, 2009, when we filed your 94 bis notice, we

16 noted on it that it had been impossible to complete one by the dead-line.

17 So just try to think back. Do you remember whether we had discussions

18 about doing an addendum and updating the various reports and whether you

19 had time to do it or not?

20 A. In the context of the question from Mr. Karadzic, he asked if I

21 was ever doing a specific report on the Supreme Command, and to my

22 knowledge I was not asked specifically to do that. I was asked and

23 having asked in the past whether or not it's possible to do updated

24 versions of a variety of other reports, and my answer back generally is

25 that my current work schedule just does not give me the opportunity to

Page 27884

1 take the time that I need to be able to do that. So I expect that, yes,

2 at some time you possibly did ask me to update some of the other reports

3 and narratives, and I probably told you I was just not able to do that,

4 but again I don't believe we ever specifically discussed a Supreme

5 Command specific report like the Main Staff report.

6 Q. Now -- thank you. You've helped me with that. Now a completely

7 different topic, and that's Directive 4. At 27652 to 653, in

8 cross-examination Karadzic put it to you that he hadn't read Directive 4.

9 He said:

10 "Thank you, but I tell you that if I had read this directive -

11 which I didn't, because I didn't sign it," and then he continued.

12 And he also asked you:

13 "You have no proof that I read this directive or commented upon

14 it; correct?," on the same section.

15 So I'm going to ask you some questions about that now.

16 MR. NICHOLLS: And first could I have P00970 at page 240 in

17 English and 207 in the Serbian original. That's the 50th Assembly

18 session, 15 and 16 April, 1995.

19 Q. And what I'm going to do, Mr. Butler, is show you a few documents

20 and then I'll ask you a question putting them all together rather than

21 each one.

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. So I will be asking you about these.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I only say this: These

25 questions may be a result of my imprecision. I asked about the time when

Page 27885

1 the directive was created and not whether I learned about it later on.

2 Perhaps this can save us some time.

3 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, if Mr. Karadzic will stipulate that he read

4 Directive 4 and approved it, then I can skip this whole line, because

5 that's what I'm seeking to establish, that he read it and that he

6 approved it for the Main Staff.

7 JUDGE KWON: I don't think Mr. Karadzic would agree to it.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. I could only comment on how I

9 did not sign many of the directives, but at the time of this directive's

10 creation and implementation, I was not familiar with it and there is no

11 proof I was.

12 MR. NICHOLLS: In that case I'll continue because that's exactly

13 the point.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.

15 MR. NICHOLLS:

16 Q. Right now here this is General Mladic speaking at the 50th

17 Assembly session and we won't go into it, but that was a long contentious

18 session we know. The one -- the part I want you to focus on, it's in the

19 top paragraph. General Mladic says:

20 "Some of these decision were only presented to you,

21 Mr. President, and others you participated as a member of the Supreme

22 Command. Some of the directives you signed, not all of them, though.

23 Before we constituted and oriented ourselves, I used to sign them."

24 So keep that in mind.

25 MR. NICHOLLS: I now would like to look at P01415. That's the

Page 27886

1 Assembly session from October 1995, page 84 in English, page 108 in the

2 Serbian. And while it's coming up --

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think we had this in

4 Serbian, what Mr. Nicholls just presented.

5 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let -- let us show the accused the B/C/S

6 version of Mladic's words.

7 MR. NICHOLLS: I hope I have it correct. I had 207 in e-court.

8 It was a little bit hard to find because of the time.

9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let us continue with this 1415 first

10 then.

11 MR. NICHOLLS: I have a hard copy I can give to Mr. Karadzic.

12 So then 1415, e-court, page 48 in the e-court, page 108 in the

13 Serbian, please.

14 JUDGE KWON: I was told that we have P970 in the monitor.

15 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, I'd like to move on to the next one if

16 possible. 1415.

17 Q. And just to save time while it's coming up I'll read out the

18 portion we'll see that I want you to focus on. This is

19 President Karadzic speaking.

20 "I have examined, approved, and signed seven directives. No one

21 submitted the 8th and 9th to me, not even to read it let alone to sign

22 it, because General Gvero and the others wrote whom they should obey. I

23 cannot be held responsible for the events from the 8th and 9th Directive.

24 I will not stand for that."

25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Can we follow? I think I saw that

Page 27887

1 passage in the previous page, but it moved. Yes.

2 MR. NICHOLLS: I didn't see it I'm afraid, Your Honour. My notes

3 say it's page 84 of the Serbian -- of the English. That's the correct

4 page. It's in the paragraph which begins: "We must look at army

5 publications," second paragraph on the screen.

6 JUDGE KWON: So you referred to the passage that it says, "I have

7 examined, approved, and signed seven directives."

8 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, and then says, "... but not the

9 8th and 9th.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

11 MR. NICHOLLS:

12 Q. Have you had a chance to read that, Mr. Butler?

13 A. Yes, I have.

14 Q. All right. Now the third document is D02149, a Defence exhibit.

15 MR. NICHOLLS: And if I could have the English page 13 and the

16 Serbian page which is 8.

17 Q. And what this is, Mr. Butler, the Defence put into evidence

18 General Manojlo Milovanovic's notes of meetings and conversations with

19 President Karadzic during the war period. And I would like you to read

20 his 10 November entry at the top there. You can see particularly point

21 2, General Milovanovic has written that Karadzic will soon receive

22 Main Staff directive number 4 regulating the activities of the newly

23 formed Drina Corps, et cetera. I will -- and I therefore ask him to

24 review and approve it. And then he continues his notes:

25 "In the following days the Supreme Commander had offered

Page 27888

1 suggestions, verbally approved Directive number 4, and returned it for

2 the Main Staff commander's signature in view of the fact that this

3 directive provides for issues of a purely military organisation."

4 Have you seen that Mr. Butler?

5 A. I've read it, sir. Yes.

6 Q. I want to skip ahead to P04248. Just to remind us we saw this

7 before but this is the timetable. Keeping in mind that Directive 4 was

8 dated and issued the 19th of December, we've seen General Milovanovic's

9 notes from -- sorry, 19th of November, 1992, we've seen Milovanovic's

10 notes from earlier in November. This military -- this timetable for the

11 military and political seminar four days after directive 4 was issued,

12 opening speech by the president and then the briefing by

13 General Zivanovic. This is the 23rd of November. I won't bring it up

14 again.

15 But at P02716, Mr. Karadzic's notebook, we saw from that day, the

16 23rd of November, he wrote "Colonel Zivanovic," and then, "Tasks:

17 Vitinica, Sapna, Teocak, Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, Gorazde." Do you

18 remember that? We looked at that entry.

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Now I want to move to the next day, 24 November, and then I'll

21 ask you to some questions.

22 MR. NICHOLLS: P02058.

23 Q. This is a Drina Corps demand document, 24 November 1992, very

24 urgent decision for further operations. I'll wait for it to come up.

25 Are you familiar with this document, sir?

Page 27889

1 JUDGE KWON: For the record, it's Exhibit P2085.

2 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, Your Honour.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I believe I've seen this document at

4 some juncture during the past couple of years.

5 MR. NICHOLLS:

6 Q. Okay. And we that this is pursuant to the directive of the

7 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, strictly confidential -- I'll

8 skip, 19 November 1992 directive, Directive 4:

9 [As read] "Launch an attack using the main body of troops and

10 major equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses,

11 exhaust them, break them up, or force them to surrender and force the

12 Muslim local population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica,

13 and Gorazde," the same four places we saw written in Mr. Karadzic's

14 notebook from the day before.

15 So my question is: Putting together all these documents I've

16 shown you, General Milovanovic's notes, the Assembly sessions, and the

17 fact that this conference was held the day before Zivanovic issued the

18 Drina Corps Directive 4 implementation, from your military analysis, what

19 does that show about the Supreme Commander's involvement in the issuance

20 of Directive 4 and the subsequent order?

21 A. Again, in -- in the context of the documents that have just been

22 reviewed, whether he signs Directive 4 or not, the Supreme Commander

23 cannot be ignorant of what the goals of objectives of that directive are

24 specific to the Drina Corps in light of the fact that he attends a

25 Drina Corps conference where to a large degree the details as to how the

Page 27890

1 Drina Corps and its subordinate brigades are going to implement that plan

2 are discussed.

3 So I mean I don't see -- like I said, I mean obviously there is

4 no signature from President Karadzic on the document, but in light of

5 what happens with respect to the fact that he's at this particular

6 conference and he's being briefed by the relevant commanders as to their

7 military goals and intentions in light of the plan that they've received,

8 the Supreme Commander can't be ignorant of that. He has to know this.

9 What point in time or what day he may have read Directive 4 I can't

10 possibly say, but he had to know what the Drina Corps's roles and

11 missions are in order to participate intelligently in the conference that

12 occurs on 23 November of 1992.

13 Q. Thank you. I want to quickly move on to another small topic. It

14 was put to you on 20th of April at T-27725 to 27726 that it was only on

15 the 9th of July that the Serbian forces considered the possibility of

16 entering Srebrenica and you agreed discussing the Krivaja 95 operation

17 plan. What I want to show you is a couple documents from earlier in the

18 year to put some context into what the VRS's intentions may have been

19 regarding Srebrenica and the enclaves.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: So if I could have 65 ter 02071, please. And

21 while it's coming up, I'll also say it was -- you were questioned about

22 Muslim forces attacks in June and that the Krivaja 95 could have been

23 reaction to those attacks.

24 This document from the 15th of May, command of the Drina Corps,

25 it's signed by then a -- the deputy, Krstic, which states:

Page 27891

1 "Urgent order to stabilise defence around Zepa and Srebrenica

2 enclaves and establish conditions for the liberation of the enclaves."

3 Can you just tell us what this document adds to the picture, if

4 anything.

5 A. Even though we discussed as a pin point in time the Krivaja 95

6 operation, I mean, going back to Krivaja 95, the genesis for the intent

7 there was incorporated in Directive 7 and 7.1, which came out in March of

8 1995. After that, you had a series of orders in the intervening months

9 from the VRS and other units dealing with how they were going to

10 implement various portions. This particular one talks about military

11 operations to potentially cut the lines of communication of the

12 28th Division between Srebrenica and Zepa.

13 So there was always -- you know, since -- since March of 1995,

14 there was always that intent to do that. I guess the question is again

15 going back to at what point in time did an actual assault on the town of

16 Srebrenica become feasible as a military operation, and that's where I

17 believe my testimony is that while it's not implicit in Krivaja 95's

18 operations plan, by the 9th they had achieved such military success that

19 that became a viable military objective.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender that, Your Honours?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I ask Mr. Nicholls to ask the

22 witness to read out the first paragraph, because it's part and parcel of

23 the document and it is also important to providing an answer to

24 Mr. Nicholls's question as to why.

25 MR. NICHOLLS: No, I don't want to read out the first paragraph.

Page 27892

1 I mean, the whole document if it's admitted will be there. Just for

2 time, I don't --

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree. We will receive it.

4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4979, Your Honours.

5 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 02072, document from the next

6 day, also Drina Corps, also signed by Deputy Krstic.

7 Q. Just tell us what this is just to fill out this little chapter.

8 A. Yes, sir. Again as noted in Directive 7, they wanted to

9 implement these plans against the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves as early

10 as possible. One of the problems that they had was they did not have the

11 adequate amount of forces. At approximately this time, Muslim military

12 forces in both the 1st and 2nd Corps are carrying out large-scale attacks

13 against corresponding VRS army and police forces, and at this particular

14 point, they're noting that, you know, it's [indiscernible] to disregard

15 the previous order because they do not have adequate military forces

16 available in order to conduct them.

17 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. Would I tender this, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4980, Your Honours.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P00168, please.

21 Q. I'm going to ask you about a different topic now, Mr. Butler.

22 This is from T-27734 to 35, a long discussion between you and

23 Mr. Karadzic about the numbers of prisoners on the 13th of July and the

24 aerial photo from Nova Kasaba, and I won't go through all that again, but

25 it was put to you that commanders brag about the number of prisoners

Page 27893

1 they've taken and that there were far fewer.

2 This document, the same time as the aerial, 1400, dated 13 July

3 1995, from commander of the 65th Protection Unit, Milomir Savcic, and it

4 states at the beginning:

5 "There are over a thousand members of the 28th Division of the

6 so-called BiH Army captured in the area of Dusanovo (Kasaba). Prisoners

7 are under the control of the Military Police Battalion of the 65th

8 Protection Regiment. Assistant commander for security and intelligence

9 affairs of the Main Staff VRS proposes the following."

10 Now when it says "assistant commander for security and

11 intelligence affairs proposes," who is that, even though it doesn't say

12 his name?

13 A. That would be General Tolimir, sir.

14 Q. Okay. And my question is again based on your military analysis

15 and experience and looking at all these documents that you have regarding

16 the Srebrenica operation, when General Tolimir is making a proposal for

17 what to do and how to treat a group of prisoners, is it feasible that

18 he's got inaccurate, inflated information from the documents you've seen

19 in the other evidence through bragging of lower commanders?

20 A. No, sir. I mean, given the context of who this is being sent to

21 as a proposal, I mean, it's being sent to the commander of the

22 Main Staff, you know, one would think that General Tolimir would seek to

23 be operating off the most accurate information that he was able to obtain

24 before making such a proposal to his superior, General Mladic.

25 Q. And just very quickly as a follow-up, you talked quite a lot over

Page 27894

1 the last few days about the logistics involved with so many prisoners,

2 whether it's for ultimately a murder operation or the logistics that

3 would be involved for transporting them, providing food, water, medical

4 care, et cetera, just how important is it to have an accurate prisoner

5 count when a force is taking thousands of prisoners for the logistical

6 purposes you've talked about?

7 A. It's -- it's critical, because the number of prisoners that in

8 your -- that fall into your custody have a direct impact on so many

9 different military issues that have to be accomplished. The number of

10 prisoners has an impact on how many people have to be detailed to guard

11 these individuals, how many vehicles have to be detailed to move these

12 individuals to whatever designated location, how much water needs to be

13 ordered, how much food needs to be ordered, what -- what or how much

14 medical support might be required. All of these types of what we would

15 call life-support measures require some form of an accurate accounting of

16 how many prisoners, even your best estimates of how many prisoners that

17 are going to be falling into your custody or are falling into your

18 custody so your rear-service professionals can deal with these conditions

19 appropriately.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 MR. NICHOLLS: If I could have 65 ter 01952.

22 Q. This is my last topic. It's very quick, Mr. Butler.

23 Again on the 20th of April at 27748 to 27749, there was a

24 discussion essentially about reporting to the president. And

25 Mr. Karadzic asked you about some reporting on the 15th of July and said:

Page 27895

1 [As read] "Is this supposed to alarm the president of the

2 republic who has a thousand other things to do?"

3 And is part of your answer you said:

4 [As read] "The second issue I would again note that the military

5 was not your only mechanism to receive information, particularly

6 information that would potentially alarm you."

7 And then you discussed a report of prisoners escaping from

8 Pilica. First question --

9 A. The document that's up here has no correspondence to that. 0 --

10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

11 MR. NICHOLLS: This time I think I read it out correctly. It

12 should be 019 --

13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

14 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I was waiting for the French translation

16 to be completed. Now you can continue, Mr. Nicholls.

17 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour. I apologise, Your Honour.

18 Q. The first question I was going to ask is in that part of your

19 testimony you referred to a 15 July report of prisoners escaping from

20 Pilica. Is this the document, the MUP document, you were referring to?

21 A. Yes, sir. If you look at the last paragraph of this particular

22 document, you'll note it says that on the morning of 15 July, a group of

23 about a hundred captured Muslims from Srebrenica managed to escape from

24 Gornja Pilica, Zvornik municipality.

25 My understanding is that ultimately that that report turned out

Page 27896

1 to be inaccurate, but in the context of what we were discussing, my -- my

2 opinion is that, you know, a report of a hundred prisoners of war

3 essentially who escape well behind enemy lines in -- in the northern

4 Zvornik municipality would be in a report that would be of sufficient

5 gravity so that it would be rapidly escalated and there would at least be

6 inquiries as to -- excuse me, whether or not the information is accurate

7 and, if so, what was being done to resolve the situation.

8 Q. Thank you. And may I -- and as you say, this report goes

9 directly to Tomo Kovac, the deputy minister.

10 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender this Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4981, Your Honours.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us just check this. Is this

14 being sent to the president?

15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll -- we can see that.

16 MR. NICHOLLS: I have no further questions now. Thank you very

17 much.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, Excellencies, just a bit of

19 time, a very little bit of time.

20 JUDGE KWON: Before you put the question, let us know what kind

21 of question you are going to ask the witness, Mr. Karadzic.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it is a fact that one needs

23 to spell out precisely whether civilians were mentioned at the meeting

24 and whether I denied insight into the forth coming action in Directive 4,

25 or am I claiming that I did not deal with the details that are contained

Page 27907

1 MR. TIEGER: I'm not sure what additional information we could

2 elicit. I mean, the -- the situation would presumably be the same, that

3 this is not a document which the witness remembered at the time he was

4 shown in court, and I wouldn't expect him to have any further data about

5 that at this point.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE KWON: So we'll stand by our practice that this document

8 will not be admitted as associated exhibit. So we'll admit 1527, which

9 is an order from this witness.

10 Very well. Mr. Djeric, as you noted that your evidence-in-chief

11 was admitted in -- in the written form in lieu of your oral testimony,

12 and now you'll be further examined by Mr. Karadzic in his

13 cross-examination. Do you follow, Mr. Djeric?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I understood it, this is an

15 abbreviated version of my previous testimony.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. You signed the so-called amalgamated

17 statement, which is an excerpt from your previous testimony. That was

18 admitted in lieu of your testimony in chief by the Prosecution to save

19 some time.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

24 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Professor Djeric.

25 A. Good afternoon, Doctor.

Page 27908

1 Q. Since we haven't got much time left today, I simply wanted to go

2 through a couple of general matters for the benefit of the Chamber.

3 First of all, do you agree that save for the fact that we may

4 have heard of each other, we hadn't known each other before the

5 multi-party system was introduced; that is to say, before the changes

6 made to our system?

7 A. That is correct. We did not know each other.

8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please

9 be asked to approach the microphone.

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, just a second.

11 Mr. Djeric, would you be kind to come closer to the microphone so

12 that the interpreters could hear you clearer.

13 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that following that period we did not

16 come -- become close personally, rather, we had fair business

17 communication?

18 A. Yes. We were on official terms.

19 Q. Thank you. Is it correct or do you recall that as part of the

20 SDS there was a cadre commission which, among others, proposed you to be

21 made part of the joint BiH government as part of the Serbian quota, and

22 the posts in question were won by the SDS at the elections?

23 A. I don't know that. I don't remember that. I don't know how the

24 commission worked. I only know that I arrived on your invitation, and I

25 came to see you as the party president. I never met any president of the

Page 27909

1 personnel commission. It was an internal party matter since I was not a

2 member of that party.

3 Q. Thank you. I am waiting for the interpretation, and could you

4 please do the same.

5 Do you know Mr. Rajko Dukic?

6 A. I did know Rajko Dukic, but it has nothing to do with this. I

7 knew Dukic as a company manager of the bauxite company from Milici.

8 Q. And you had known him long before the period in question;

9 correct?

10 A. Well, not long before, but somewhat before.

11 Q. If I told you that he was the president of the personnel

12 commission of the SDS, would you accept that?

13 A. I really don't remember that. I don't know what is there for me

14 to accept or not.

15 Q. Professor Djeric, I'm trying to establish the following: How

16 come that you, who were not a member of the SDS, were proposed to me as a

17 member of the joint government, and I called you to a meeting to see you,

18 whereupon I agreed with that proposal? Did you know that I could reject

19 the proposals of the personnel commission but provided I had sound

20 reasons to do so?

21 A. I don't know about that. I wasn't familiar with the personnel

22 policy of the party, and there's nothing I can say with that -- in that

23 regard.

24 JUDGE KWON: Both Mr. Karadzic and Professor Djeric, you are

25 speaking the same language that should be translated into the working

Page 27910

1 language of the UN, i.e., French and English. I would ask you to put a

2 pause between question and answer. Would you please bear that in mind in

3 the future.

4 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Is it correct, Professor Djeric, that you were nominated for the

8 position of development minister because of your theoretical knowledge

9 rather than due to your managerial competencies as you had not worked in

10 any company for a long time?

11 A. That is correct. When I came to see you, you agreed with the

12 proposal. In other words, you accepted me as a potential development

13 minister provided that the prime minister designate Jure Pelivan agreed.

14 Q. In your system could Jure Pelivan not agree provided he had firm

15 reasons to do so?

16 A. Well, you see, I'm not very familiar with it. You are much more

17 familiar with it as the party president and the people who were members

18 of the parties which created the system.

19 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that then, as today, we held

20 Professor Aleksa Milojevic in high regard?

21 A. You did much more than the rest, you and Momcilo Krajisnik.

22 Q. Is it correct that in the RS government, Professor Milojevic was

23 given the mandate that you assumed in the joint government of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

25 A. That is correct.

Page 27911

1 Q. Do you agree in terms of that analogy that such mandates are

2 given to experts who are held in high esteem?

3 A. I don't know what was the influence of that particular factor,

4 and what exactly was the importance of Mr. Milojevic's ties with the RS

5 leadership, and especially with Mr. Krajisnik. So I have to speak openly

6 and clearly. That's why I say that.

7 Q. Did you have any ties with me when you were nominated minister in

8 the joint government and later on prime minister?

9 A. I did not. There were no personal ties or friendly ties or any

10 other ties save for the official ones.

11 Q. Thank you. If you try to recall the composition of the Serb

12 component in the joint government, would you agree that save for

13 Velibor Ostojic and perhaps an assistant minister or two, the rest were

14 not members of the SDS? Or perhaps I should assist you? Ranko Pejic or

15 Ranko Nikolic who was the justice minister in the previous system as

16 well. Then Ranko Pejic and Momcilo Pejic were the officials in the

17 previous system, Professor Nadezhdin [phoen] was an eminent professor at

18 the school of veterinary sciences but was not a member of the SDS. Do

19 you agree that the personnel commission proposed experts to me

20 irrespective of their party affiliation?

21 A. There's nothing I can say in that regard. I don't know who

22 proposed people to you. The only thing I can confirm is that most of

23 that cadre was outside the SDS. They were intellectuals, so to say. The

24 mechanism of making proposals is something I wasn't privy to. It was a

25 party matter, and I could not observe it directly.

Page 27912

1 Q. Thank you. I won't go into the proposal mechanisms then.

2 Do you agree that the deputy prime minister was Miodrag Simovic,

3 who was also not an SDS member, and he had been an official in the

4 previous system?

5 A. I don't know whether he was an SDS official, but I do know that

6 he was a deputy prime minister and that he had been an official in the

7 previous political system.

8 Q. Thank you. If I told you that Mr. Velibor Ostojic, who passed

9 away in the meantime, was one of the founders of the SDS and had a

10 membership card with the number 2, while mine had the number 1, would you

11 agree that in such party systems it would have been more logical for

12 Ostojic to act as a deputy prime minister rather than Mr. Simovic?

13 A. I can agree with that. That was the practice of -- in such

14 systems.

15 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that it was customary for a party leader

16 to be nominated or run for president or prime minister, and in

17 parliamentary systems, he always ran for prime minister. Is that

18 correct?

19 A. Yes, there is such practice.

20 Q. Do you agree that in 1990 I did not run for any position, and if

21 you could observe that, I suggested other party leaders in various

22 municipalities not to run for positions but to work for the party alone?

23 A. I know that you did not run at the time. These are facts that

24 can easily be confirmed or verified.

25 Q. Thank you. Were you witness to the initial agreement of the

Page 27913

1 three parties in power and the increase of tensions until the system

2 caved in or broke down?

3 A. Your question is not clear to me. Was I witness to what? I

4 followed it from a distance, but I wasn't in the focus of negotiations,

5 talks, or anything like that. I wasn't close to the centre. I could

6 simply follow things from outside, but I wasn't in the middle of such

7 talks or arguments. There's nothing I can say about that. I wasn't a

8 direct participant.

9 Q. Thank you. It is understood that you were not in the political

10 part of the government but, rather, in the expert part. However, during

11 government sessions, could you observe that for a while there was a good

12 working relationship and that later on it deteriorated?

13 A. That is correct, and it can be checked in documents and explained

14 by many facts, one I which would be the fact that the ministers in the

15 joint government, some ministers, worked alongside me and creating a

16 government programme. A programme was created and accepted by all

17 institutions as a sound one. It was a development programme for the

18 entire country. It was accepted and approved as a solid document, and it

19 couldn't have been solid without good co-operation and a good working

20 atmosphere of everyone involved in terms of further development of the

21 country, and I use that to illustrate my previous statement.

22 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that that was the reason why the SDS

23 proposed you for the government, so that you could work on the future

24 development of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

25 A. Well, I suppose as much. That is my assumption, and I believe it

Page 27914

1 was the only argument in my favour, in the favour -- in favour of my

2 nomination, as I have stated before.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Do we agree then that all three parties approached the change of

7 system, not only of regime but of system, of the system of

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina in good faith and that that was another reason why we

9 nominated experts to the government rather than party men? We acted in

10 good faith, hoping that Bosnia-Herzegovina would survive and that the

11 socialist system should be changed in favour of a multi-party system,

12 including its economic basis?

13 A. I agree, and I would say that there is a number of arguments that

14 corroborate it.

15 Q. Thank you, Professor.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, you are probably

17 thinking it is time; correct?

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Before we rise, Mr. Robinson, just I was

19 wondering if the Defence is also minded to file a response to the second

20 motion, Prosecution motion for the admission of -- a bar table motion for

21 the admission of intercepts?

22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, and I'm happy to let you know

23 that that will be filed tomorrow.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

25 Mr. Djeric, we will adjourn for today and resume tomorrow at

Page 27915

1 9.00, but could I advise you that as a witness you are not supposed to

2 discuss with anybody else about your testimony. Do you understand that,

3 sir?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I already know that,

5 actually, from what happened before, but it is by no means superfluous to

6 say is once again.

7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 [The witness stands down]

10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m.,

11 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 24th day

12 of April, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.