121128ED

Page 30524

1 on 92 ter so that that would obviate any unnecessary work for the

2 Defence.

3 We came back to the Court on October 15th, the

4 Pre-Trial Conference, and advised that despite our efforts, there was no

5 success in the attempt to reach a workable solution. We told the Court

6 about the hundreds of witnesses for whom there was neither a statement

7 nor an adequate factual summary. We identified for the Trial Chamber the

8 nature of some of the so-called summaries, including things along the

9 lines of significant senior figures in the military or the police who we

10 were advised would testify about their roles and activities regarding

11 Srebrenica and its aftermath, obviously wholly topical and useless

12 description of the fact that the witness will testify about a

13 particular -- in the context of a particular component or the 90 separate

14 municipality witnesses who were expected to "explain why some Muslims

15 preferred to leave the municipality" or the many cut-and-paste summaries

16 where the name of one municipality was substituted for another because

17 the sweeping generalisations provided would work as well in one

18 municipality as another.

19 We told the Court that the situation was neither acceptable nor

20 workable, and despite our efforts, we had been told that we could not

21 expect to receive summaries even past the first quarter of the next year,

22 and as we explained that means we would be operating in the dark and were

23 operating in the dark with respect to the municipalities, the Srebrenica

24 component and the hostage component. We told the Court at that time that

25 we needed dead-lines. The Court -- and we suggested some specific

Page 30525

1 dead-lines, in fact. The Court urged us again to go back to the accused

2 and try to do what we could to work out some compromise solution, and we

3 did just that. We went back. In fact, we took up on a suggestion that

4 the Trial Chamber had made which I think was made at page 28839 of the

5 Pre-Trial Conference where the Court suggested going back to the witness

6 list and seeing if there are some witnesses that the Defence team already

7 knows it would not be calling, and we sought as at least a preliminary

8 matter the provision of some kind of A and B list or will call or won't

9 call list so we could at least begin to assess the magnitude of the

10 problem in light of a more realistic assessment of that list.

11 That -- there was a delay in providing that, but when we finally

12 got it, it quickly became apparent that that list was useless. We

13 quickly found people who had been on the so-called B list, that is the

14 less likely to be called list, appearing on the list of people soon to be

15 called, and we found people who had been on the A list who were dropped

16 completely from the case. So it became clear to us, and it's been

17 acknowledged by the Defence, that that was not a useful list and provided

18 us with no further insights or opportunities to craft an appropriate

19 compromise.

20 So I'm back today to seek dead-lines. And I need to emphasise,

21 Mr. President, that this is not a failure of negotiation; it is instead a

22 failure by the Defence to complete the tasks envisioned by the Rules and

23 required by the Rules that would allow a reasonable and even generous

24 compromise to take place. The Rules obviously envision that when -- when

25 a party assembles its witness list it goes out, it identifies witnesses,

Page 30526

1 it then goes out to find out what relevant information those witnesses

2 may or may not have, and then in some fashion, usually through a factual

3 summary as contemplated by 65 ter(G), it transmits that information to

4 the other party and to the Court sufficiently in advance so that the

5 integrity of the proceedings and the efficiency of the proceedings are

6 not impaired.

7 And instead of complying with that Rule, it appears that the

8 Defence instead went out, identified witnesses, and then instead of

9 perfecting that process as the Rules contemplate, it simply threw that

10 name on a list and went out to find more witnesses. And so what we have

11 is a list -- a lengthy, bloated, excessive list of people, many of whom

12 the Defence has not only failed to identify what relevant information

13 they have but has failed to communicate with at all. As

14 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff mentioned to Mr. Robinson during the course of our

15 discussions, this is not a witness list. This is a wish list. It's only

16 the image of a witness list.

17 So instead of operating within the meaning of the Rules and the

18 spirit of the Rules at a time when that was provided, the Defence used

19 that time to simply assemble the largest possible witness list and now

20 is -- is trying to do the work it should have done earlier at the expense

21 of the Prosecution and indeed the Court.

22 So we don't have the information we're entitled to have months

23 after we were entitled to have it, which has manifold effects. We can't

24 do the preparation, research or investigation that would otherwise be

25 possible. We can't identify recurring themes and make assignments in a

Page 30527

1 rational and efficient way. We can't identify the extent to which

2 witnesses contradict each other. There are a myriad ways in which we are

3 handicapped and unfairly prejudiced by the practice that the Defence has

4 introduced, and indeed it's a reflection of what the Court alluded to at

5 page 28827 of the Pre-Trial Conference:

6 "We are at this point very concerned that you and your legal team

7 appear to be openly disregarding all the rules and practices established

8 and followed during the Prosecution case."

9 Mr. President, under these circumstances, we continue to operate

10 in the dark with respect to the municipality, Srebrenica, and hostage

11 components. We can't begin under these circumstances. It's extremely

12 unfair, and we need the concrete dead-lines we proposed earlier. We had

13 previously proposed November and December. That was about a month ago.

14 That means November -- that meant November for completion of the

15 municipalities component and December for completion. That means getting

16 all the statements in or summaries in - and I'll speak about that in just

17 a second - by the end of those particular months. So now that would mean

18 completion of the municipalities and the hostages component, information

19 and provision of that information by the end of December, and Srebrenica

20 by the end of January.

21 Now, again we don't insist on a needless formality; that is the

22 Defence goes out and gets statements and then spends additional time

23 transforming that information into a 65 ter summary. Obviously this is a

24 92 ter case. The Defence has to go out now and meet the witnesses and

25 get the information that they failed to get earlier. That's -- they need

Page 30528

1 to do that in the form of statements. There is no reason to do it twice.

2 They should simply get it in the form of a statement or draft statement

3 as they've been doing and transmit that to the Prosecution and to the

4 Court.

5 Now, as mentioned, we spoke to Mr. Robinson in the context of our

6 efforts to reach some workable mutual accord. He suggested that the

7 Defence's working -- the Defence won't be able to do it because their

8 prioritising one component at a time and only staying so far ahead. What

9 we said in response I'll say to the Court as well, and that is that

10 presumes the deployment of their resources to a -- toward a fixed

11 objective, and that is the completion of all the 65 ter summaries or in

12 this case all the statements for a witness list that has been repeatedly

13 identified as excessive, as containing witnesses who provide irrelevant,

14 marginal, or manifestly needlessly cumulative information and that's been

15 alluded to by the Court on a number of occasions.

16 If the Defence finally undertook a realistic appraisal of the

17 witness list and focused on the witnesses who are most needed, then, in

18 our submission -- and deployed their resources appropriately, the kind of

19 obstacles that they have insisted prevent their compliance with the Rules

20 of this Court would dissipate. In any event, the Court cannot permit

21 this flouting of the Rules which has now gone on for an excessive --

22 well, been excessive for quite a while, but this now threatens to further

23 affect the Prosecution's ability to prepare for witnesses as it is

24 entitled to do. We struggled through the Sarajevo component. That was a

25 bit different because the Defence had front loaded it slightly but during

Page 30529

1 the process we learned what an adverse impact it can have on our ability

2 to prepare for their remaining components and that's why I'm before the

3 Court today and now advising the Court that no compromise solution has

4 been reached or appears possible and dead-lines need to be imposed.

5 Thank you, Mr. President.

6 THE ACCUSED: May I respond?

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was listening to French translation.

8 Yes, Mr. Tieger. To be clear, what are the specific remedies you

9 are seeking that is to be done within the respective dead-line again?

10 MR. TIEGER: The submission of, in this case, statements for the

11 witnesses who are to be called for the municipalities and hostage

12 component by the end of December, and the submission of statements for

13 witnesses who are to be called for the Srebrenica component by the end of

14 January, and in the event that -- for witnesses who now appear on the

15 list and statements are not provided, those witness are considered to be

16 no longer on the list because the Rules have not been complied with. And

17 if the Defence later wants to -- seeks to add them to the list for good

18 cause obviously the Rules provide for that possibility if good cause

19 exists.

20 JUDGE KWON: And what about the summaries?

21 MR. TIEGER: Well, the Rules obviously -- excuse me. Excuse me,

22 Mr. President. The 65 ter(G) refers to summaries, but we are operating

23 in a 92 ter environment, so knowing that the Defence has to prepare the

24 92 ter statements, it's not our intention to make them prepare the

25 statements as they will be doing and then spend additional time

Page 30530

1 converting those into summaries. So the statements will suffice in lieu

2 of the summaries, and we've been clear on that with them from the outset.

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

4 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Robinson. Would you like to respond?

5 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency. I'm waiting

7 for the interpretation to finish.

8 I'm grateful to Mr. Tieger for having raised the topic, but I

9 would like to remind you that I have prepared tens of witnesses that the

10 Prosecution gave up on and also some municipalities that were dropped

11 from the indictment at a later stage. That is one thing.

12 Secondly, I would like to remind you of over 100 cases of

13 violation of Rule 68.

14 Also, I would like to remind you that during the Prosecution

15 case, we had only two investigators who were supposed to match the years'

16 long investigation carried out by the Prosecution. We come from a system

17 that involves investigating judges who carry out an investigation for

18 both sides. Here we are helpless. There is no way we can conduct the

19 kind of investigation that the Prosecution had conducted. Secondly, we

20 haven't been given enough time. Our modest request was to start in

21 March, and that was very restrictive too.

22 Further on, if you look at all the resources they had, primarily

23 all the human resources they had, and if you look at what we have,

24 although many people work for my Defence free of charge, pro bono, and

25 they can barely keep up with the tempo. We will be examining two or

Page 30531

1 three witnesses a day, after all, so it is absolutely impossible for us

2 to meet any dead-lines in this situation without new people and possibly

3 more time. Also, when the Prosecution was in a similar situation, they

4 were given certain breaks, and they could prepare.

5 That is what I know. Those are the facts. That is what we're

6 grappling with. Maybe Mr. Robinson can add something from a legal point

7 of view, but, Your Honours, there is no way of conducting a trial that

8 would be fair for us, us who come from a different system where a proper

9 and fair investigation is carried out on behalf of both parties before

10 the trial actually commences.

11 If our requests are not met, a shadow of doubt will be cast on

12 the legality of the proceedings and the Tribunal itself. Perhaps

13 Mr. Robinson can add something to that.

14 Anyway, may I conclude by saying that we are falling on our face.

15 We are working so hard, all of us. All of those who are working pro bono

16 are also falling off their feet, but there is such a lot of work, and

17 there are many details involved. There are a lot of adjudicated facts

18 and so on and so forth. So if we see, for example, that a witness is

19 denying an adjudicated fact, then we are not going to dwell on the

20 matter; then we have to deal with the same matter with another witness,

21 but that takes time.

22 If the Trial Chamber accepts these dead-lines that we're going to

23 ask for certain breaks, it would be a great pity indeed if these

24 proceedings were to be unfair or incomplete.

25 Could Mr. Robinson please say something from a legal point of

Page 30532

1 view.

2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. First of all, I want to say

3 that we have done everything possible to work with the Prosecution to

4 give them as much information as we have concerning the testimony of the

5 people that we want to call as witnesses. So we have now disclosed some

6 160 statements in e-court which are available to the Prosecution at the

7 rate of about 25 witnesses for the first month, and I expect it will pick

8 up a little bit now that the times for cross-examination will be

9 shortened, but that's six months or more worth of advanced notice of what

10 exactly the witness will say in court since we hardly ever elicit any

11 additional information from the witness.

12 So we also tried to give the Prosecution disclosure of everything

13 that we have concerning these witnesses. It's essentially an open file

14 disclosure policy. The problem is that we don't have more information

15 about what some of these witnesses are going to say until we interview

16 them. We could provide a summary that's of greater detail as required by

17 the Rule if some of those are deficient, but even as the Prosecution

18 recognises, to do that will essentially be speculating or guessing or

19 imagining what these witnesses would say unless we've actually had the

20 opportunity to interview them and take a statement from them, and that

21 wouldn't be of value to anyone and would just use up the very limited

22 resources that we have. But if there's been a failure under Rule 65 ter

23 to provide an adequate summary in any particular case, I would urge on

24 the Prosecution to file a motion to identify the particular witness

25 number and we will do our best to enhance the summary if that's what is

Page 30533

1 required to comply with what the Prosecution feels it needs. But as a

2 practical matter, we simply don't have the resources to take statements

3 from all of the witnesses that we intend to call by the end of December

4 or by the end of January, and if there's been one principle that the

5 Prosecution has made very successful -- very successfully advocated

6 before this Chamber, it is that evidence is not excluded when there is a

7 delay in disclosure, and so to ask us to face the sanction of excluding

8 evidence for which we have been unable to have an investigator take a

9 statement from a witness by the end of December or the end of January is

10 really not very practical and certainly not reciprocal when you take into

11 account over 400 statements that the Prosecution failed to disclose to us

12 during the -- by the dead-line it was given, for which not a single piece

13 of evidence was ever excluded, or the thousands of Rule 68 documents

14 which the Prosecution failed to provide with -- within the time required

15 by Rule 68 for which not a single document was ever excluded.

16 So I think it's better for the Prosecution and the Chamber and us

17 to continue to try to work together with the limited resources that we

18 have to do the maximum, to give the Prosecution as much notice as we can

19 of evidence, and if they're disadvantaged by late notice, then the

20 Chamber can employ the remedy which it did in our case, which is to

21 postpone the cross-examination of the witness or maybe even postpone

22 their appearance as a result of any prejudice caused to the Prosecution.

23 Thank you very much.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE KWON: Could you like to add anything, Mr. Tieger?

Page 30534

1 MR. TIEGER: Well, I'm just -- only -- there are many things I

2 could go into. I think the Court can probably take the comments on board

3 and assimilate them, but I can't help but note that there's not even a

4 shred of acknowledgement of what the Court has alluded to previously and

5 that is the nature of this witness list and its manifestly excessive

6 nature and the impact it has on this very problem. Instead -- instead

7 the discussion is, again as it was when we were talking to Mr. Robinson,

8 assuming that the Defence resources are being deployed against an

9 intractable and fixed obstacle or issue and that is the witness list and

10 the attempt to provide information pursuant to the Rules for all of these

11 witnesses. In many respects, it gets back to the original decision by

12 the Defence to assemble an extremely unrealistic so-called witness list

13 in contravention of the Rules, one that has been recognised by the Court

14 to be unrealistic on numerous occasions.

15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. The Chamber will take this issue under

16 advisement and issue a ruling in due course.

17 Unless there are any other matters, we'll bring in the witness.

18 MS. WEST: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning,

19 Your Honours. Just an administrative matter from yesterday. When we

20 ended with the witness we were speaking about document 65 ter 09365. I

21 would like to ask that that be admitted into evidence, please.

22 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted.

24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6005, Your Honours.

25 [The witness takes the stand]

Page 30535

1 WITNESS: VELIMIR DUNJIC [Resumed]

2 [Witness answered through interpreter]

3 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Dunjic. I apologise for your

4 inconvenience. There were matters to deal with on the part of the

5 Trial Chamber.

6 Once the witness is in the --

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning to you too.

8 JUDGE KWON: I'd like to note that the Chamber is sitting

9 pursuant to Rule 15 bis, with Judge Lattanzi being away due to her urgent

10 personal matters.

11 Yes, Ms. West, please continue.

12 MS. WEST: Thank you. May we have 65 ter 24201, please.

13 Cross-examination by Ms. West: [Continued]

14 Q. Good morning, Mr. Dunjic. Yesterday when we broke --

15 A. Good morning to you as well.

16 Q. Yesterday when we concluded, we had just been speaking about the

17 arrests that took place in December of 1992, and early on in your

18 cross-examination you had conceded that you were dismissed from the VRS

19 in January of 1993 and that dismissal was involuntary. I'd like to focus

20 in on that.

21 Sir, isn't it true that in the middle of January you were told by

22 Commander Galic that by January 26 you were going to be -- you were going

23 to have to leave and your contract would not be extended?

24 A. That is not true.

25 Q. Okay. But as we saw in the last document from yesterday, wasn't

Page 30536

1 it true that by the end of December -- or excuse me, by December 16, the

2 day after the arrests, the SRK was already considering your dismissal?

3 A. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, whether they considered that after I

4 left, I don't know, but the document that was shown to me yesterday is a

5 document in which the colonel I arrested proposes those measures. That

6 is that. It's not about the decision or meeting in the corps.

7 Q. Thank you. Mr. Dunjic, isn't it correct that between August --

8 excuse me, September of 1992 when you joined the Igman Brigade and

9 January of 1993 when you were dismissed, that Brne and his paramilitary

10 unit were never meaningfully under the command of the SRK?

11 A. First of all, let us clarify something. I was appointed

12 commander of the Igman Brigade. I did not just join it. That was my

13 first point.

14 Secondly, although I find you highly likable, you cannot -- you

15 cannot suggest to me that although according to Galic's statement there

16 were 1 per cent or according to my statements there were 3 per cent of

17 volunteers, and you are ignoring the ruling of the Supreme Court.

18 According to the ruling of the Supreme Court, they lost the attribute to

19 volunteers. They joined the military, and they're not paramilitaries

20 therefore.

21 I commanded thousands of men, and I did not focus on those units.

22 I did not focus on that unit only. That was minor compared to the total

23 manpower. I had other problems there as well. I mentioned in the

24 beginning that I was the only professional soldier in the unit.

25 According to your documents, according to the documents you have, you saw

Page 30537

1 in my statement that there was fighting every day, that there was

2 shelling every day. And yesterday I also omitted to tell you when you

3 asked me about the conversation with Prstojevic, most of the

4 conversations that we had had to do with the shelling of the transformer

5 station at Vrelo Bosne, the destruction of that station which was later

6 destroyed. Anyway, the focus of my work was defence, defence from

7 everyday attacks, care for civilians and even care for civilians on the

8 other side, if you will, in relation to the transformer station and the

9 cuts in water supplies, but this unit was a volunteer unit, not a

10 paramilitary unit.

11 Q. Okay. And again, for the fourth time you've brought up the

12 Supreme Court decision and we'll get into that, but at the moment we're

13 talking about your dismissal. Now, we're going to look at the document

14 before us and this is dated 18 January, but it speaks about an event that

15 happened on the 14th of January, and it talks about an incident that

16 occurred in your apartment between members of military police and

17 Brne's Chetniks, and it says - and this is a MUP document - We have

18 learned on that day the commander of the SRK Corps, Galic, gave a

19 cocktail party at a hotel in order to celebrate his promotion to the rank

20 of general and on which occasion he informed you to leave your command

21 post on January 26 and that the corps will not extend your contract.

22 Sir, this in fact did happen; correct?

23 A. Not correct.

24 Q. [Overlapping speakers] go ahead. I'm sorry. You said?

25 A. Not correct. First of all, that's not the way correspondence

Page 30538

1 evolves in the military. My superior officer does not say you're going

2 to stay until then and then you're not going to be there. This is done

3 in writing.

4 Secondly, I did not come to the Army of Republika Srpska on the

5 basis of some contract. I came on the basis of an order, and I can leave

6 the army on the basis of an order and those were the rules that were in

7 force in the Army of Republika Srpska and in the JNA as well.

8 Q. Thank you. But let's go on to what happened after the party.

9 And following the end of the ceremony, Major Dunjic invited General Galic

10 to his apartment in Hadzici, telling him that he did not need an escort

11 and they were going to his apartment, Dunjic's apartment, for a drink.

12 Once they, Dunjic and Galic, arrived at his apartment, they were joined

13 by Brne's men and after a while persons present came to provoke

14 General Galic and the general was forced to endure the unpleasantness.

15 So, sir, after -- on this evening after this cocktail party, was

16 there an occasion when you went back to your apartment with

17 General Galic?

18 A. I'll tell you about that, but after that I would kindly ask for a

19 private session, closed session, if possible for private reasons,

20 primarily for the sake of General Galic, Your Honours, if that would be

21 possible.

22 Q. Well, why don't we first -- why don't you first tell us what

23 happened at the apartment.

24 A. First of all, it's not that I invited General Galic to my

25 apartment. We were celebrating in the Srbija Hotel in Ilidza and

Page 30539

1 Mr. Morillon was present, the commander of the Foreign Legion, and that

2 unit of the UN. Mr. Galic was present, I was present, and presidents of

3 municipalities were there. There was this official protocol involved.

4 Mr. Galic spoke, Mr. Prstojevic spoke, Mr. Morillon spoke, and I did too.

5 There were cocktails. After the official part, I left that party, and I

6 went to my apartment, and Galic came to my apartment at his own

7 initiative, and privately. He [Realtime transcript read in error "I"]

8 did not come to the command post. He came to my apartment.

9 Should I go on?

10 Q. [Overlapping speakers] this --

11 A. I've asked kindly --

12 Q. This document written a few days after this event discusses some

13 actions that took place there and it uses the word "unpleasantness," and

14 so should we assume from the event that took place on that evening that

15 your dismissal soon followed?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is a small imprecision in the

17 transcript. Line 24, [In English] "I did not come to the command post."

18 [Interpretation] The witness said that "he" did not come to the command

19 post. He said that he, the general, did not come to the command post.

20 So if that matters, then it should be corrected.

21 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

22 Q. Sir, can you answer my question. Did you shortly thereafter

23 leave the SRK?

24 A. It's not that I left shortly afterwards. I was replaced in

25 writing. I received an order, and I obeyed that order.

Page 30540

1 Q. This document goes on, and it says:

2 "As soon as the military police found out Galic's whereabouts,

3 his escort immediately went there to get him, at which time the clash

4 between him and Brne's Chetniks occurred and also fire was opened from

5 sidearms. From Hadzici General Galic was transferred from Butile and

6 subsequently on to Pale."

7 And then in the last paragraph:

8 "We have been informed in the army circles across the area of

9 Hadzici, Ilidza, and Butile there are rumours that the general was

10 arrested on that occasion and the reason being cited for this is that he

11 had dismissed Major Dunjic from the SRK."

12 Sir, the decision to arrest General Galic, failed decision to

13 arrest General Galic, on that evening, that was a decision that you made

14 all your own just like the arrest you made in December; correct?

15 A. No, that's not correct.

16 Q. After --

17 A. Can I explain why it's not correct? First of all, you said

18 Mladic and it's not Mladic, it's Galic, and then also there was no

19 decision and General Galic was not arrested, and after that there was no

20 clash with the military police. This entire document is incorrect,

21 because it's not correct that Brne's Chetniks were there. That's not

22 correct either. I was in my apartment as a private person.

23 Commander Galic came with his own escort, armed, into my apartment, and

24 there were a few people there. One was a member of the Ilidza MUP, and

25 then later on the chief of the Ilidza MUP came as well. There were no

Page 30541

1 Chetniks there as you put it, Brne's Chetniks. That is the way you are

2 putting it. Let me be very precise.

3 MS. WEST: Your Honour, may I tender this document?

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6006, Your Honours.

6 JUDGE KWON: The witness once stated that he wanted to go into

7 private session, but the Chamber saw no reason, so I don't think we need

8 to deal with it.

9 MS. WEST: I don't.

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.

11 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We can deal with that in

12 redirect if Dr. Karadzic thinks it's something that should be brought up.

13 JUDGE KWON: If necessary.

14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue Ms. West.

16 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President.

17 Q. Sir, you just mentioned a short time ago that you left shortly

18 thereafter. How quickly did you leave the area?

19 A. Well, I believe that was two days after the order, so two days

20 later I left on my own for Serbia. I believe it was two days later. I

21 can't tell you with great precision, perhaps a day or two or three, but I

22 left the command post immediately and then privately I returned and went

23 back.

24 Q. And even after you left, isn't it true that Brne and his unit

25 went on to live up to his criminal reputation? You knew about that, did

Page 30542

1 you not?

2 A. No. Once I received the order, I was absolutely not interested

3 in any of that. Once I received the order to leave the post of brigade

4 commander, I had no further interest in that, absolutely nothing, after I

5 left that area. This would have been the 26th or the 27th of January, so

6 I didn't care anymore about the unit or anything else, because I was

7 disappointed. I was disappointed by this decision and the actions that

8 led to this incident. This is why I requested a closed session.

9 Q. Who took over the command of the brigade after you left?

10 A. I believe a few days after I left Mr. Spasoje Cojic arrived but I

11 didn't see him.

12 MS. WEST: May we have P02305.

13 Q. This is something that happened a couple weeks later. I'd like

14 to see if you know about it. This is another MUP document, and it

15 regards that gentleman.

16 We're just going to read the first paragraph. It's

17 February 12th, official note:

18 "We are in possession of intelligence that paramilitary

19 formations, more specifically the group commanded by

20 Branislav Gavrilovic, aka Brne, knew the exact date of the arrival of the

21 new commander of the Igman Brigade and were even preparing his

22 liquidation. Namely, the mentioned group of Chetniks, while the brigade

23 was commanded by Major ... Dunjic, had the freedom of decision and

24 practically implemented some of their own ideas, both in the political

25 sphere and in military life."

Page 30543

1 Sir, up until that point, and this is February of 1993, would you

2 agree that Brne's unit under the power of the local civilian political

3 authorities and the republican level political authorities operated

4 outside the command of the SRK and under your command, which is the

5 reason you were dismissed?

6 A. Well, now you're confusing me. Yesterday, you suggested that

7 Mr. Gavrilovic had problems with Prstojevic, whereas now you're

8 suggesting that he was under their command. So all of this is absolutely

9 unclear to me. And as for this document, I don't know anything about it.

10 Q. Okay. Thank you. We'll move on.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the reference

12 which would suggest that Brne was under the command of the republican

13 leadership, under their influence? Fifteen, 16, 17.

14 JUDGE KWON: Ms. West.

15 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President. This regards evidence that

16 you received in Prosecution case in chief. An example of that would be

17 the intercept we showed yesterday between Brne Gavrilovic and Seselj

18 where Seselj indicated that he had just spoken to -- he had called

19 Karadzic's office and left a message that he was going to take all the

20 paramilitaries out if Karadzic didn't do something about it. You also

21 received evidence that -- you've also received evidence that other

22 members of the republican political leadership, for example, Plavsic have

23 had involvement with the paramilitaries and that's the basis of my

24 question.

25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's move on.

Page 30544

1 MS. WEST: Thank you.

2 Q. I just want to briefly go back to something that you talked about

3 yesterday, and you spoke about this a few times, and you said that

4 ideological differences somehow influenced whether people understood

5 units to be paramilitary or not. And at transcript 30506, you said:

6 [As read] "I'm telling you that paramilitary units in the heads

7 of many officers of the former JNA were paramilitary only because they

8 were called Vucak, Wolves, and other names, and by the same analogy the

9 Deltas and the seals are also paramilitary formations. Those how those

10 people reasoned due to ideological differences, whereas I was not

11 interested in any ideological differences."

12 So I just want to touch upon this briefly because it still

13 remains a little bit unclear to me. Is it your testimony that someone

14 who had a more objective perspective, someone who was not burdened by

15 ideological differences may not consider, for example, Brne's unit to

16 then paramilitaries? Do I understand this correctly?

17 A. Yes, you understood me perfectly well.

18 Q. Thank you. May we have P02855, please. So I want to take your

19 example and then show you a document and ask you a question about this.

20 And in particular you mentioned the Wolves. We're going to look at a

21 document from July of 1992, and it's a report on paramilitary formations

22 in the territory. And this is a report from Tolimir at the time. And in

23 the first paragraph he writes:

24 [As read] "Paramilitary formations and groups are an important

25 feature of the war in the former Yugoslavia. The paramilitary formations

Page 30545

1 in the territory have special identifying names."

2 And he lists the names. And one of the names he lists are the

3 Wolves, which is something you mentioned. And they display iconography

4 ranging from Orthodox ornaments and symbols to Chetnik and Vietnam war

5 symbols. And then he goes on and says:

6 "Their main characteristics are as follows: They're mostly

7 composed of individuals of low moral quality and in many cases of persons

8 previously prosecuted for crimes and offences and even convicted for

9 crimes of murder, robbery, larceny, and the like. And very often such

10 units have in their rank pathological criminals whom the conditions of

11 war and general lawlessness have brought to the fore."

12 And if we can turn to page 4 of the English and page 5 of the

13 B/C/S, please. It's towards the bottom in the English and it's going to

14 be at the top of the B/C/S. It speaks about the Wolves detachment:

15 "The detachment of Veljko Milankovic from Prnjavor has about 150

16 men and is, as of recently, formally under the command of the 1st KK.

17 Members of this detachment are involved in extensive looting and recently

18 attacked the Tactical Group 3 command post, arresting one SR BH army

19 colonel in the process."

20 So now we've taken your example, the Wolves. Would you agree

21 with me from what we've read, and maybe perhaps from what you might have

22 known, would you agree in this case even an objective observer might

23 consider this behaviour that I've described to be a negative influence?

24 A. Madam, 20 years after the war, this statement -- or, rather, this

25 document will provoke a reaction among the people from where the Wolves

Page 30546

1 are. They will provoke laughter first and then disappointment. Mr. --

2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter could not catch the name.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Was a fighter for the Serb matter

4 for the survival of the Serb people in this area and his unit,

5 irrespective of this document, cannot be classified as a paramilitary

6 unit, and you can check that now 20 years after the war.

7 MS. WEST:

8 Q. Thank you for your comments. I just want to address one last

9 topic with you, and it's something that you yourself has brought to your

10 attention and today you did it for the fourth time. You -- you mentioned

11 a Republika Srpska Supreme Court decision of 1992, and as I understand

12 it, you're suggesting that it's -- this decision gave you a reason or

13 gave you some sort of rationale as to why you legitimately took Brne's

14 group under your command and they weren't paramilitaries anymore. They

15 didn't qualify as paramilitaries anymore. Can you explain this to us?

16 A. Yes, I can. I did not care about ideological differences. The

17 unit, or, rather, the Savo Derikonja Detachment, was already there within

18 the area of responsibility of the brigade when I arrived. I abided by

19 the decision of the Supreme Court. And this unit, as I've already said

20 in my statement, had not committed any crime that would be a breach that

21 would constitute a breach of the Geneva Conventions, and you also saw and

22 I told you a moment ago what the percentage of men in that unit was. You

23 could see that I did not pay much attention to this unit, not because I

24 wanted to cover anything up, but because our focus was totally elsewhere

25 and not on what you've been insisting on for the past two days.

Page 30547

1 Q. Sir, the concept of the Supreme Court decision giving you some

2 cover was not at all mentioned in your statement, yet you have four times

3 brought it up during your testimony. Was this decision discussed for the

4 first time during your proofing with Mr. Karadzic?

5 A. No. No. I didn't even discuss this either with the Defence team

6 or Mr. Karadzic, the decision of the Supreme Court. And as I've already

7 told you, it wasn't just a decision that guided me but also my

8 ideological beliefs. I didn't care where a fighter came from or what

9 their past was. All I saw was a fighter who would obey my orders, and I

10 didn't care about what their future would be or what their past was. I

11 was focused as a professional soldier only on the defence of some 10.000

12 or so Serb people there, whereas who was a member of the Radical Party or

13 the Communist Party or the SDS, I couldn't care less. Whether someone

14 had been -- had served a prison term before they arrived there, that was

15 irrelevant to me. All that I cared about was that they would obey my

16 orders. And again, I have to repeat that they constituted 1 to

17 3 per cent of the total number of men in my unit. So not only was I not

18 interested in this or involved in thinking about this, that was not the

19 primary concern of mine.

20 Q. I noticed yesterday and again today that you have some written

21 notes in front of you that you refer to. Are those your own handwritten

22 notes?

23 A. Yes, these are my own notes, handwritten notes.

24 Q. And I see that they're on the back side of the actual statement.

25 Were these notes taken recently during your proofing or are these notes

Page 30548

1 from some other time?

2 A. Well, first of all, this is not a statement, but I did also jot

3 something down on the statement itself, but the documents that I received

4 jogged my memory, so then I just jotted some things down, and I don't see

5 that there's any problem with that. As a responsible person, I felt that

6 I needed to prepare for this.

7 Q. Nor do I. I was just enquiring about the notes. Can we have

8 65 ter 17403. Sir, I want to show you one more document. 17403, please.

9 And I suspect you probably haven't seen this before. This is the

10 Official Gazette of Republika Srpska, and we're going to focus in on

11 numbers 743 and 744, and in the English, that would be page 3, please.

12 And for 744, this speaks about a decision that took place in the Assembly

13 on August 12th, 1992. This is about -- less than a month before you

14 came. And the Assembly adopted the following decision on the

15 establishment of the Supreme Court of the Republika Srpska, that the

16 Supreme Court Republika Srpska is being established, and then the next

17 cite, 744, says the Assembly during the session held on

18 November 24, 1992 - so this is well after you came - adopted the

19 following decision on the appointment of the judge of the Supreme Court

20 of the Republika Srpska and then it gives the name.

21 Mr. Dunjic, it's difficult to see how the Supreme Court's first

22 decision could have been in effect giving you leeway to adopt

23 paramilitaries into your brigade in September of 1992 when the judges had

24 not yet fully been appointed by November of 1992. Can you understand how

25 this doesn't make any sense?

Page 30549

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is misleading.

2 JUDGE KWON: Why do you think it's misleading? What's your

3 basis, Mr. Karadzic?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, because the judges were

5 changing all the time. I mean, one judge would be appointed, another one

6 would have left. And it doesn't show here that the -- that this was a

7 complete panel of judges. It was just the appointment of this one

8 particular judge.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat the last

10 portion of his reply.

11 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your last sentence, Mr. Karadzic.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When the suit was established,

13 there were already Chambers that could operate, that could work, and

14 there were two levels of court. They could work at two levels. But the

15 judges kept changing. There were new judges being appointed, other

16 ones -- the old ones would have left, and so on. And it doesn't say

17 anywhere here that the court was in fact established in November.

18 JUDGE KWON: The witness has heard already what Mr. Karadzic

19 said, but would you like to respond, Ms. West, or reformulate your

20 question?

21 MS. WEST: I think at this point maybe we'll show him another

22 document and then we can go from there. P01468, please. And these

23 are --

24 JUDGE KWON: Number again.

25 MS. WEST: P01468.

Page 30550

1 Q. These are minutes from an Assembly session end of October, early

2 November 1992. And if we can go to page 2 of the English we're looking

3 at the agenda and it's number 31. And on the agenda at this date there

4 is a draft decision on appointment of the Republika Srpska Supreme Court

5 judges. So Mr. Dunjic you've -- you've seen these documents. You've

6 heard my question. You've heard even Mr. Karadzic's comments, but can

7 you tell us how it is in -- on September 4th 1992, when you entered --

8 appointed brigade commander, a Supreme Court decision already existed

9 somehow making paramilitaries legal and legitimate members of the VRS?

10 A. Well, obviously you either did not read my statement properly or

11 perhaps you did it deliberately, but I state there that soon, and I

12 didn't say on the 4th of September, I said that soon that unit was placed

13 under the command, under my command. And I said yesterday that in the

14 second half of 1992, there was a decision that provided for these units

15 being treated not as paramilitary. They wouldn't have that attribute.

16 But, rather, as volunteer units. And I didn't mention the

17 4th of September, nor did I say that in my statement.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Dunjic.

19 MS. WEST: Thank you Mr. President. I have no further questions.

20 JUDGE KWON: Do you tender that Official Gazette?

21 MS. WEST: Thank you for that reminder. Yes.

22 MR. ROBINSON: We object, Mr. President. There's no basis for

23 it. The witness hasn't provided any basis for the point upon which

24 Ms. West sought to make; in fact, there is to problem with the

25 Official Gazette in principle, but there's no relevance given the answer

Page 30556

1 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Sladoje.

2 A. Good morning.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D6400 in

4 e-court. We have it in Serbian, too, although this is sufficient.

5 Mr. Sladoje will probably be able to recognise it.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Mr. Sladoje, did you provide a statement to the Defence team and

8 is it the statement that is before you?

9 A. Yes, it is.

10 Q. I'm waiting for interpretation, and I would kindly ask you to do

11 the same since we speak the same language, and we don't want to create

12 problems for the interpreters.

13 Does this statement contain accurately what you stated?

14 A. It does.

15 Q. Thank you. Did you sign the statement?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions here today as the

18 ones that were put to you during the taking of the statement, would your

19 answers be basically the same?

20 A. Yes, they would.

21 Q. Thank you. I will now read out the summary in the English

22 language.

23 JUDGE KWON: If it is admitted.

24 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

25 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honours. Just before any

Page 30557

1 ruling on the admission of the statement, I'd have one request. The

2 redaction, and I've spoken to my friend Mr. Robinson about this, the

3 redaction of paragraph 28 of the statement which relates to a dropped

4 incident.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was about to raise that issue, but both

6 parties agree to that redaction.

7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we'll agree to that redaction.

8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Then -- otherwise no objection to the

9 admission of the statement as well as four associated exhibits?

10 MS. EDGERTON: Correct, none.

11 JUDGE KWON: I have one point with respect to one associated

12 exhibit, but there's no problem in admitting them at this moment. Shall

13 we give the number now.

14 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. Statement 65 ter 1D6400 will

15 be Exhibit D2479; 65 ter number 1D8556 will be D2480; 65 ter 1D8557 will

16 be Exhibit D2481; 65 ter number 1D8558 will be Exhibit D2482, and

17 65 ter number 1D8559 will be Exhibit D2483.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 [In English] Mile Sladoje is an economist by education and

21 training. He completed his compulsory military service in Kragujevac and

22 Ruma in 1973 and 1974 in the artillery branch. He first learned about

23 the arming of Muslim forces in 1991, when a Muslim business associate

24 asked him if he was interested in selling ammunition, offer which he

25 declined.

Page 30558

1 He was a member of the 1st Battalion of the Ilidza Brigade. From

2 April 1992 until June 1992, he was commander of the Nedzarici Barracks.

3 From June 1992 until March 1993, he was assistant commander of the

4 battalion for moral and religious affairs. From March 1993 until

5 October 1993, he was battalion commander, and then when three battalions

6 merged into one, he was appointed assistant commander for logistics and

7 half a year later assistant commander for the newly formed battalion.

8 His battalion did not have a single professional officer nor trained

9 snipers.

10 Following March 1992, local Serbs held neighbourhood watches in

11 front of their houses. After successfully repelling an attack by Muslim

12 paramilitaries on 8th of April, 1992, local Serbs continued to organise

13 themselves and eventually formed a line of defence, which remained more

14 or less unchanged until the end of the war.

15 The opposing units belonged to the 101st and 102nd Brigade of the

16 1st Corps of the BH Army. His battalion was in an inferior position

17 since buildings in the area under Muslim control were mostly high-rises

18 from where they fired with snipers. Muslim forces also blocked access to

19 their positions with mines. Their front lines were only 30 to 50 metres

20 away from his unit's position. All positions held by the opposing

21 brigades were in civilian areas. There was not a single entire --

22 entirely civilian settlement there in which they did not have an enemy

23 unit or a military target. His unit also had knowledge of the existence

24 of enemy military targets in the depth of the enemy territory.

25 The orders of the brigade were to use ammunition sparingly and

Page 30559

1 only when attacked by the enemy. His battalion conducted exclusively

2 defensive operation -- operations except for a single occasion when they

3 improved their tactical position on Stupsko Brdo to facilitate defence.

4 The goal of his battalion was to defend their houses, protect the

5 civilian population, and prevent Muslim forces from reaching Ilidza. Had

6 the opposing forces broken out in the parts of Sarajevo under Muslim

7 control -- under Serbian control, it would have had a critical impact on

8 the other fronts on the -- in the course of the war in BH. The permanent

9 order for his battalion was to open fire only in response to enemy fire

10 and only at observed firing positions. It is possible that there were

11 civilian collateral casualties on the line of disengagement since their

12 firing positions were in the vicinity or in apartment buildings

13 themselves.

14 He had no intention of causing civilian casualties or terrorising

15 or exerting psychological pressure on civilians under the control of

16 Muslim authorities and has never heard anyone in his unit, the superior

17 commands or civilian authorities had such intentions. His unit never

18 received or issued any such order, orally or written. On the contrary,

19 superior commands and him personally issued orders that civilians in the

20 part of the city under Muslim control should not be the target of an

21 attack. Conversely, civilians in his zone of responsibility, including

22 women, were often targeted by snipers or subjected to the artillery

23 attack. His unit built makeshift sniper barriers from the blankets,

24 tarpaulins, wooden planks and plywood which blocked the view of the enemy

25 snipers.

Page 30560

1 His brigade complained to UNPROFOR about frequent enemy attacks

2 from civilian zones. When fired -- when fire was returned, they would

3 complain that his unit was targeting civilian facilities.

4 The brigade did not prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid,

5 except when they had information that they were bringing -- were being

6 used for illegitimate purposes as was in case in 1994 when flack jackets

7 were confiscated from the French battalion convoy. Soon afterwards the

8 rapid intervention forces targeted Serbian positions with particular

9 intensity on civilian buildings, causing several civilian casualties.

10 They had knowledge that goods from humanitarian aid convoys had passed

11 through their zone of responsibility and were being sold in the black

12 market and exorbitant -- exorbitant prices and the Serb civilians had to

13 pay to be able to flee from -- to Serb-held territory.

14 Regarding incidents at Hakije Turajlic 33 [sic] in Dobrinja on

15 12th of July, 1993, Mile Sladoje states that no orders to target

16 civilians were issued and that no line of sight existed between their

17 positions and the scene of the alleged incident.

18 Regarding incident in the area of Alipasino Polje on

19 22nd of January, 1994, Mile Sladoje states that there were no mortars at

20 Home for the Blind and that no one from their command ordered the

21 shelling of the place of the alleged incident.

22 Regarding the incident of 18 June 1995 --

23 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, I wouldn't normally interrupt

24 Dr. Karadzic at this point, but we've just agreed to redact that

25 evidence.

Page 30561

1 THE ACCUSED: Mm-hmm. This one is redacted, yes? Okay.

2 Regarding the incident near the junction of Nikole Demonje at

3 Bulevar Avnoja in Dobrinja on 25th of May, 1994, Mile Sladoje states that

4 no orders to fire at that intersection were issued, that no line of sight

5 existed between their positions and the scene of the alleged incident and

6 that they did not have snipers with that kind of range in their

7 battalion.

8 Regarding incident at Djure Jaksica Street in the west end of

9 Sarajevo on the 26th of June, 1994, Mile Sladoje states that no orders

10 were issued to fire at the girl who was allegedly killed at the scene of

11 this incident.

12 [Interpretation] Thank you. I have no questions for Mr. Sladoje

13 at this point in time. I turn the floor to the Prosecution.

14 JUDGE KWON: Before that, shall we upload 1D8558. Which is

15 entitled as "Military positions of ABiH in civilian zones."

16 In para 18, the witness stated that a police station, RTV

17 building, wire factory, the UNPROFOR base, Astra and Uniklima, all these

18 buildings were marked, but I wonder whether the UNPROFOR base was also

19 marked on this map.

20 Mr. Sladoje?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The PTT in Djering [phoen]

22 building.

23 JUDGE KWON: So UNPROFOR was based on that building.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

25 JUDGE KWON: As you noted, Mr. Sladoje, your evidence in chief

Page 30562

1 was admitted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony, and now you'll be

2 cross-examined by the Prosecution.

3 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

4 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

5 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

6 Q. Mr. Sladoje, we've already met one another yesterday.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And thank you for that. I'd like to start your cross-examination

9 by asking you to confirm a few of the things we discussed, if that's

10 okay. So first of all, can you confirm you were actually based in

11 Nedzarici area throughout the war?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And your battalion headquarters was initially located at the

14 barracks and in the barracks compound in Nedzarici?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And at the end of 1993, when the first 1st, 2nd and

17 3rd Battalions of the Ilidza Brigade which covered Nedzarici,

18 Aerodromsko Nasilje, and Kasindol were amalgamated into one battalion,

19 this headquarters was moved to a location on Kasindolska Street.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. In March 1993, you succeeded Radivoje Grkovic as commander of the

22 Serb portions in Nedzarici when he left the 1st Battalion.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And you were eventually replaced by Svetozar Guzina, who took the

25 post of battalion commander when the three battalions were joined into

Page 30563

1 one?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And yesterday, you agreed with the estimate that the

4 Nedzarici Barracks compound was about 300 to 350 metres from the school

5 for the blind; correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And the Faculty of Theology -- as for the Faculty of Theology

8 which you mentioned in your statement, would you agree with the estimate

9 that it's about 200 metres from the barracks compound?

10 A. Between 150 and 200.

11 Q. Thank you. And yesterday I showed you a map that you saw was a

12 black and white version of your own marked map which is now D2481, but

13 that had been extended to show the approach to the airport, and I asked

14 you to mark your battalion's entire area of responsibility on that map.

15 Do you remember that?

16 A. Yes, absolutely.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have a look, please, at 65 ter 24222.

19 Q. And I hope shortly on the screen you'll be able to see the map

20 you marked yesterday.

21 Now, we see -- well, first of all, do you recognise the map that

22 you marked yesterday on the screen in front of you?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And the -- do the green lines on this map extend -- or more

25 accurately, do they represent the complete area of responsibility of your

Page 30564

1 battalion?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And the green dot on this map with the letters KP on it, do you

4 agree that the green dot denotes the location of the check-point on

5 Kasindolska Street?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And that check-point is on the road that the UN used to and from

8 the airport; correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And that check-point was under your battalion's control?

11 A. It was not under our control, because one could freely pass

12 through.

13 Q. Who operated that check-point?

14 A. No one did.

15 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour. I

16 realised that I've completely forgotten, in fact, it's not necessarily

17 for the Prosecution to request that, but I've forgotten to request that

18 the witness be given a caution pursuant to Rule 90, and those sorts of

19 matters, obviously better late than never. So if I could just pause and

20 extend my apologies for having forgotten.

21 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Yes. Mr. Sladoje, although you have

22 already started giving evidence, I would like to draw your attention to a

23 particular Rule here at the Tribunal. Under this Rule, Rule 90(E), you

24 may object to answering a question from the Prosecution or the accused or

25 even from the Judges if you believe that your answer will incriminate

Page 30565

1 you. I mean by "incriminate," I meant something you say may amount to an

2 admission of your guilt for a criminal offence or could provide evidence

3 that you have committed an offence. However, even if you think your

4 answer will incriminate you and you do not wish to answer the question,

5 the Tribunal has the discretion to oblige you to answer the question.

6 But in such a case, the Tribunal will make sure that your testimony

7 compelled in such a way shall not be used as evidence in other case

8 against you for any offence other than false testimony.

9 Do you understand what I have just told you?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Sladoje.

12 Yes, please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

13 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, and apologies again.

14 Q. And we'll move on from that last point, Mr. Sladoje, to just

15 conclude this brief section related to our discussion yesterday. Can you

16 confirm that yesterday you also indicated you were linked with the

17 Ilidza Brigade command by way of an induction communication system?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And you also had means -- you were also able to communicate with

20 the brigade command by telephone?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And you would use couriers during combat activities in the event

23 other means of communication were inoperative?

24 A. This is correct.

25 Q. The Ilidza Brigade command was headquartered on the Velika Aleja

Page 30566

1 in Ilidza in the former Sipad building?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. And battalion commanders briefed the Ilidza Brigade commander

4 every day by telephone?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And battalion commanders also attended briefing meetings at the

7 brigade headquarters, but those were held no more than once a week at

8 best and also depending on the need.

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, that concludes the areas we discussed yesterday.

11 I'd like to move on to some specific parts of your statement and refer to

12 paragraph 6 to begin with where you mention two areas, Vojnicko Polje and

13 Mojmilo. And in that regard I'd like to show you a photograph. It's a

14 panoramic photograph, 65 ter number 24212.

15 Do you see a photograph on the screen in front of you?

16 A. I do.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Now, I wonder if my colleague would be able to

18 just zoom in one magnification. Thank you.

19 Q. Now, Mr. Sladoje, this picture was taken in August 1996 from

20 scaffolding at the theological faculty, and I'm just wondering if you

21 could tell us do you see these two areas you referred to in paragraph 6,

22 Mojmilo and Vojnicko Polje? And if you need to have this zoomed in a bit

23 more, just say.

24 A. Yes. Mojmilo is to the right and Vojnicko Polje to the left.

25 There is more to those areas than we can see here, but there they are.

Page 30567

1 MS. EDGERTON: Could my colleague then zoom in on the hill in the

2 centre of this photograph, please.

3 Q. Could I invite you, Mr. Sladoje, to take the marker in front of

4 you and draw a circle around the area you recognise as Mojmilo?

5 A. [Marks]

6 Q. Would you mark that with an M?

7 A. [Marks]

8 Q. And Vojnicko Polje?

9 A. [Marks]

10 MS. EDGERTON: And for the record, that's marked with a VP.

11 Q. Could we have you put your initials on this zoomed-in image and

12 date that, please. It's the 28th of November today.

13 A. [Marks]

14 MS. EDGERTON: Could that be a Prosecution exhibit, please.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6008, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE KWON: Do you want to tender the previous map marked by the

18 witness?

19 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, of course, Your Honour, and apologies. I had

20 completely forgotten.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted as Exhibit P6009.

22 MS. EDGERTON: Now, could we go back to the underlined panorama,

23 65 ter 24212, and zoom a little bit to the right.

24 Q. Now, Mr. Sladoje, would you agree that to the right of the area

25 you marked as being Mojmilo you see part of Dobrinja?

Page 30568

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Are those the apartment buildings in the distance?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Could you just mark Dobrinja, as you've done before, with a

5 circle.

6 A. [Marks]

7 I made a mistake. It looks like D6, whereas it should be D5,

8 because that's the name of the settlement, Dobrinja 5.

9 JUDGE KWON: You can delete it and rewrite.

10 THE WITNESS: [Marks]

11 MS. EDGERTON:

12 Q. Thank you. Now, what's the apartment blocks that you see even

13 further to the right of Dobrinja 5?

14 A. That is also Dobrinja, Dobrinja 1, Dobrinja 2, and Dobrinja 3

15 and 4 would be further afield, but we can't see it here.

16 Q. So the apartment blocks to your right you recognise as the areas

17 of Dobrinja 1 and 2?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Could you just mark those the same way, please, with a D1 and a

20 D2.

21 A. [Marks]

22 One cannot see Dobrinja 2 in the photograph. The buildings here

23 are in Dobrinja 1, whereas Dobrinja 2 and its buildings are behind that.

24 It's not easy to mark it here.

25 Q. That's fine. Could we get you to sign and date this image,

Page 30569

1 please, and we'll do one more marking on this panorama before we leave

2 it.

3 A. [Marks]

4 MS. EDGERTON: Could that be the next Prosecution exhibit,

5 please.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6010, Your Honours.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. If we could go back to the unlined

9 panorama, please, 24212. And if we could go over to the left-hand side

10 of the image now, please. Thank you.

11 Q. Now, is that the area -- is that part of the area of

12 Alipasino Polje that you see to the left-hand side of the panorama,

13 Mr. Sladoje?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Could you mark that for us, please.

16 A. [Marks]

17 Q. And just sign and date, please.

18 A. [Marks]

19 MS. EDGERTON: And just on this panorama, that would be the next

20 Prosecution exhibit, please, Your Honours, and I'll move on.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6011, Your Honours.

23 MS. EDGERTON: Thank --

24 JUDGE KWON: Do you not think that we need to admit the whole

25 panorama as well?

Page 30570

1 MS. EDGERTON: Mr. Reid was asking me that very question,

2 Your Honour, and I wasn't sure yet, but now that we've come to the end, I

3 think it's quite appropriate.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Exhibit P6012.

5 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

6 Q. Now, Mr. Sladoje, based on the information in your statement,

7 would you agree that these are some of the civilian areas where people

8 lived in apartment buildings that you've described?

9 A. Yes, civilians did live there. These are civilian

10 neighbourhoods, but between Nedzarici and these buildings there was a

11 line of separation and fighting took place there.

12 Q. And based on the evidence in your statement, you would agree that

13 these areas Vojnicko Polje, Mojmilo, Dobrinja, Alipasino Polje are all

14 areas that you could reach with your weapons? They were in range of your

15 weapons?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And also in your statement you said there was not a single

18 entirely civilian settlement there which didn't have an enemy unit or

19 other military target in it. So from that, could we say that there's

20 actually no area that you saw on this panorama where you didn't expect

21 civilians to be?

22 A. That's not what I stated. There were civilians there, but among

23 the civilians it was the military that was using practically all

24 buildings for their purposes. Say in Mojmilo it was the sports hall that

25 was used for putting up units. Elementary schools, kindergartens and

Page 30571

1 other big buildings were used for these purposes. Most often that's what

2 they did. They located their units among the civilian population and it

3 is impossible to say practically for any area that there were no units --

4 there were no civilians there. People had to live somewhere.

5 Q. In paragraph 12 of your statement you said the permanent order

6 for your battalion was "to open fire only in response to enemy fire and

7 only at observed firing positions." So I want to ask you to explain what

8 that means. Does that mean it's okay to shoot provided you were only

9 responding to enemy fire from positions you saw firing?

10 A. Well, you explained it very well. I wouldn't have anything

11 special to add to that.

12 Q. And was there a requirement that your response -- no. I'll move

13 on, actually.

14 Now, if we go over to paragraph 18 and the map you marked as

15 D2482, you named a number of what you considered to be military targets,

16 and I'd like to look at D2482, which was 65 ter number 1D8558.

17 Can you see that clearly, Mr. Sladoje?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So, now, were able to -- you marked the Standard factory, the

20 Zora chocolate factory, and the TAM factory. Were you able to see those

21 locations from your positions?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And would you agree with me that these were -- these locations

24 were actually front-line locations? They aren't in depth at all, are

25 they?

Page 30572

1 A. No. They were in depth of the territory in terms of the

2 separation line. They were further away.

3 Q. How far?

4 A. Well, the Standard would be, say, 1 kilometre, perhaps somewhat

5 less. I'm not quite sure. If we'd start with the Standard building,

6 then we could go on the same number of kilometres. The student

7 dormitories, the wire factory is a bit further off. I marked those

8 locations because that's where soldiers were involved in preparations.

9 That's where they were receiving ammunition. They used this for their

10 normal purposes, and they also had machinery in these factories. I was

11 familiar with these factories. So they used this for their own purposes.

12 Q. And these places, some of which you've just mentioned and some of

13 which you've not, Geodeski, Vodovod, RTV, Astra, Uniklima, RNK, Tornica

14 Zica [phoen], those actually weren't in your direct line of sight, were

15 they?

16 A. No. No. We couldn't see Uniklima, Astra, Boras, the land survey

17 institute. They're further away, so we could not see those facilities.

18 However, according to the intelligence we had and according to what we

19 heard from people who were coming from Sarajevo, we knew that these

20 buildings were used for military purposes.

21 Q. And, actually, you couldn't see the UNPROFOR headquarters from

22 your locations either, because we just saw on the panorama that you had

23 the skyscraper apartment buildings of Alipasino Polje in the way.

24 A. They could be seen from the left-hand side of the positions that

25 we held. It wasn't a particularly good view, but you could see the

Page 30573

1 configuration of the building.

2 Q. Now, you named streets. You named Prvomajska and Geteova Street,

3 and to your knowledge because you're from Sarajevo, those were also

4 residential areas where civilians lived in apartment buildings, weren't

5 they?

6 A. Yes. But also there were soldiers in each and every

7 neighbourhood. The civilian population lived in Nedzarici. There was

8 the barracks there. There was this unity of the army and the civilian

9 population, because impossible to live in any other way. That is to say

10 that not a single neighbourhood was civilian only. It is a neighbourhood

11 where people live, but also the military was stationed there, and that is

12 practically the way it is in all urban areas where there was a military

13 presence.

14 Q. So you must accept, given what you've just said, that there's a

15 pretty high risk of civilian casualties when firing on any of these areas

16 in the depth of the city.

17 A. Correct, but how can you expect us not to open fire if our

18 positions are jeopardised? And the other side includes both civilians

19 and soldiers. They are both present there. So it is the soldiers who

20 are firing at us that are jeopardising the civilians on that side.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to intervene in the

22 transcript. The witness said, "How could we open fire at enemy soldiers

23 who are jeopardising our positions and our soldiers and civilians."

24 JUDGE KWON: "How could we not open fire."

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How can we not open fire? How can

Page 30574

1 we not open fire if we are jeopardised. How can we not open fire at

2 enemy soldiers.

3 JUDGE KWON: We can carry on. Do you confirm having said that,

4 Mr. Sladoje?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will repeat it once again. This

6 is what I said: If fire is opened by the enemy side against our

7 positions, it is not possible. Perhaps this would be a clearer answer:

8 It is not possible for us to fire at military objectives only without

9 jeopardising the civilian population because they were there and very

10 often civilians were used for that kind of thing. Even if they were not

11 used for that kind of thing people had to live there and military units

12 operated from such an area, so in fact they were among civilians and that

13 is why this happened, as I stated. There was this collateral damage

14 among the civilians because we fired at military targets. I do not

15 exclude the possibility of civilian casualties.

16 MS. EDGERTON:

17 Q. Thank you. You talked in your statement about a couple of

18 incidents, one of them being the shelling of a waterline on 12 July 1993,

19 and you said you heard about this incident a few days after it allegedly

20 happened. I have two questions. First of all, why do you say

21 "allegedly" in your statement? Are you disputing the incident took

22 place?

23 A. I am still not sure that the incident did occur because the

24 Muslim side often took advantage of such gatherings. Even when there was

25 a cease-fire, all of a sudden incidents would occur during those days.

Page 30575

1 My suspicion is that they did this on purpose in order to accuse us and I

2 heard about that in incident on television. It was possible to watch BH

3 television. I found out about that, and later on I did not investigate

4 the matter and also I did not have an opportunity of seeing any kind of

5 ballistic findings, but my suspicion is that these shells were fired from

6 Butmir. There was a factory there Hidrogradnja, or, rather, Sigma. And

7 most often that's where they operated from because that is across

8 Nedzarici and most often it was the people and commander of Nedzarici who

9 were accused because this was coming from that side and what is

10 symptomatic is that they would have people gather to play ball in such

11 areas; for example, a little girl playing in an area where there were

12 operations. This is simply something that is staged, rigged, incorrect

13 therefore.

14 Q. You said it was possible to watch BiH TV. So what did you hear

15 about this incident on BiH TV?

16 A. Well, I just heard that it happened. It was those brief news and

17 nothing more than that. Also, the accusation that this had been fired

18 from the positions in Nedzarici.

19 Q. Now, just about your positions. In respect of this incident, you

20 also said that no line of sight -- there was no line of sight between

21 your positions and the scene of the incident, but you have some

22 experience now, after your training with the JNA and your service, some

23 experience with mortars, don't you?

24 A. I don't know.

25 Q. Well, do you know that -- you must know that a mortar is an

Page 30576

1 indirect fire weapon?

2 A. I absolutely agree with you. May I just ask you something,

3 please?

4 Q. If you have a question, Mr. Sladoje, I think it's more

5 appropriate that you direct your questions to the Chamber rather than to

6 me.

7 A. I do apologise. I didn't know what the rules were.

8 Mr. President, may I put a question to the Prosecutor?

9 JUDGE KWON: No. You're not supposed to ask a question, but in

10 the course of your response if there's anything you'd like to add, you

11 may do so, Mr. Sladoje.

12 MS. EDGERTON:

13 Q. Now, you've just agreed that a mortar is an indirect fire --

14 A. I understand. Thank you.

15 Q. Sorry for interrupting. I didn't mean to. You just agreed that

16 a mortar is an indirect fire weapon so you must also know that mortar

17 crews don't actually need a line of sight to acquire and engage a target.

18 A. You're absolutely right. I know that. However, there is this

19 other thing. When I said that we did not have a line of sight, that

20 meant that at that point in time when there was a gathering taking place

21 somewhere, we had no idea that people were gathering there. We could not

22 see that. We did not know that. So that's why I'm saying it. That's

23 why I'm putting it that way. I mean, it would be a layman's -- a

24 layman's statement if I were to say that a mortar can open direct fire

25 only. Of course I know how a mortar fires. So that is where the

Page 30577

1 difference is.

2 I believe that you were in Nedzarici and in Dobrinja, and it's

3 probably clear to you what the positions are, where we were and where the

4 other side was.

5 Q. Just to move on to another one of those incidents, and it's a

6 sniping incident. You talked about it in your statement, and it involves

7 an allegation of firing - and I'll give you exactly the paragraph

8 number - firing at an intersection on Bulevar Avnoja and

9 Nikole Demonje Streets in Dobrinja, and you said that the distance

10 between the target at that intersection and the theological faculty was

11 over 1.500 metres away. So I'd like to ask you since you know the

12 distance between the target and the faculty, do you have any idea of the

13 distance between the target and the confrontation line?

14 A. Well, I knew that earlier on because I lived in that area and I

15 knew how far away Dobrinja was, and that's why I stated that. This

16 incident if it occurred about 1.500 metres away, we did not have a sniper

17 rifle with that kind of range. The range of a sniper rifle is usually

18 between 800 metres and 1.200 metres. And I know that you assumed that it

19 was fired from the Faculty of Theology. We did not have a sniper there.

20 There is that opening there, and it was claimed that that was a sniper

21 nest.

22 We did have a recoilless gun there, and we used it in

23 contravention of military rules because we had no other way of dealing

24 with the guns at Alipasino Polje. We could only do it by using a

25 recoilless gun.

Page 30578

1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please

2 be asked to speak into the microphone. Thank you.

3 MS. EDGERTON:

4 Q. I'm going to ask you some more questions, Mr. Sladoje, and when

5 you do that you might have to lean forward a little bit more so the

6 interpreters can hear your answers more clearly.

7 This Chamber has actually received evidence Mr. Sladoje that the

8 gap between the incident location and the confrontation line is

9 approximately 550 metres. And for the record that's in P1620, page 54.

10 Would you agree with that?

11 A. Perhaps I could agree as far as the front of our defence position

12 is concerned, because there is one position at Dobrinja 5, and then

13 there's also Dobrinja 2 and 3 there. And from these positions one could

14 not operate at all because if you noticed these buildings in Dobrinja 5,

15 there is this entire line there. There is the line of separation there,

16 so you cannot really operate in that way from these positions where these

17 positions are 550 metres away. Now, if what you mean is the

18 Faculty of Theology, that is further afield. Now, I don't know which

19 positions you're referring to. From which position did you think that

20 this could be engaged?

21 Q. [Microphone not activated] Well, I think I was --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

23 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.

24 MS. EDGERTON: Pardon me, Your Honours.

25 Q. I think I was pretty clear. My question was about the distance

Page 30579

1 between the incident and the confrontation line, and I understand you to

2 agree that it was approximately 550 metres between the incident site and

3 your forward defence positions.

4 A. I agree, but I do not agree with another thing you said. You

5 insist that we fired from the point where the distance between our sides

6 was the smallest. I don't see how you can claim that, that it came from

7 the forward line or that it came from Stupsko Brdo. I mean, there was

8 also the Stupsko Brdo where we had positions by the institute for the

9 blind. That is where we differ. I explained that, and could you please

10 check this once again. Our closest separation line with Dobrinja 5 was

11 100 to 150 metres perhaps even not that much. However, this Dobrinja 5

12 sheltered Dobrinja 2 and Dobrinja 3. We could not operate there if --

13 Q. Mr. Sladoje, we're getting a little bit off topic, and I'm going

14 to try and bring you back to the topic by calling up something for you to

15 look at. It's P1620, page 54, please.

16 JUDGE KWON: I was told that we will not broadcast this.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

18 Q. Now, can you --

19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

20 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, pardon me.

21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, can you explain why this should be

22 confidential?

23 MS. EDGERTON: I actually have no idea, Your Honours. I was

24 completely surprised to hear that it should not be broadcast.

25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

Page 30580

1 JUDGE KWON: I was told that certain part of this document is

2 confidential, and we have a public redacted version as P1621. Shall we

3 use that?

4 MS. EDGERTON: Again my apologies. I'm doing that a lot this

5 afternoon.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

7 MS. EDGERTON: Now that we have this, can we just enlarge the

8 photo on the top of the page. Thank you.

9 Q. Now, Mr. Sladoje, the blue circle on this photo, which is the top

10 photo on page -- on P1621, page 54, the blue circle marks the location of

11 the incident. The arrow where you see the box that says "550 metres" is

12 the approximate location of the confrontation lines. Can you just answer

13 yes or no, would you agree with that?

14 A. I cannot discern or recognise this.

15 Q. This is a satellite image that marks the location of the incident

16 in green, anti-sniping barriers, that marks the location of the

17 confrontation lines at 550 metres from the incident location. Would you

18 agree that 550 metres is an accurate estimate of the location of the

19 confrontation lines from the incident location?

20 A. I do apologise, but I'm saying once again I'm not familiar with

21 this image. Can you please explain it a bit to me. Where does this red

22 marking start? Where is this actually from? I mean, please help me with

23 this. Help me identify this position here.

24 Q. We'll move on and I'll come back to it in a different way. Thank

25 you.

Page 30581

1 I want to come back to the subject of humanitarian aid. In your

2 statement at paragraph 23, you said that in the fall of 1994, you stopped

3 a convoy of French battalion at the intersection of Kasindolska Street -

4 that's the check-point that you said nobody ran - and confiscated 90

5 flack jackets intended for Muslim forces. So under whose orders did you

6 do that?

7 A. We found out by way of intelligence that the French, the French

8 battalion, were transporting flack jackets, and this was not humanitarian

9 aid. We received this intelligence from the brigade command because that

10 is at brigade level, and at the intersection at the check-point we

11 stopped the French soldiers and we found 90 flack jackets. On the basis

12 of my statement, you said now that it had been unmanned. Well, it wasn't

13 manned all the time, but it was from time to time. There wasn't any need

14 for someone to be there all the time because our positions were nearby

15 and all humanitarian convoys went by normally unless in such situations

16 when we received this kind of information beforehand. It is a fact we

17 took away flack jackets. I think you would agree with that, that flack

18 jackets are not humanitarian aid.

19 Q. And when you received this information from the brigade command,

20 nobody told you that the flack jackets were actually the property of the

21 UNPROFOR French battalion?

22 A. They were the property of the French battalion, but the French

23 battalion was deployed at the airport. It didn't have a unit of its own

24 in Sarajevo. So there was no need for it to transport these flack

25 jackets. I don't believe that soldiers from another country would

Page 30582

1 transport flack jackets to another army, because each army has their own

2 logistics.

3 Q. And what did you do with the flack jackets? Where did they go?

4 A. We handed them over to the brigade command, and of course they

5 were later used by the soldiers.

6 Q. Later used by the Serb soldiers.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So they were never returned to the UN forces?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Could we have a look at P2455. It's a document that's

11 unfortunately only in English, so I'm going to read you a passage that

12 I'd like to ask you about. It's an UNPROFOR Weekly Situation Report for

13 the week of 5 to 11 March 1995. And if we could go over to page 5,

14 paragraph 12, there's something I want to ask you about.

15 This says that on March 9 1995 - and it's about a halfway through

16 the paragraph - the Serbs stopped a French truck with 126 new advanced

17 flak jackets valued at 350.000 Deutschmarks and the Serbs took the truck

18 and the flak jackets but allowed the soldiers to go free. So reading

19 this, it actually sounds like there was more than one instance where you

20 confiscated flak jackets. Am I correct in that?

21 A. In the area of responsibility of my battalion, or, rather, the

22 1st Battalion command there was only one such instance. Perhaps this

23 happened elsewhere, but I'm not aware of that case, that incident. But I

24 declare with full responsibility that this happened only once, as I've

25 said. Whether the figure was correct I'm not absolutely certain, but it

Page 30583

1 did happen as I related it here.

2 Q. All right. So perhaps we're talking about the same incident

3 because earlier in this paragraph the author writes:

4 "At the infamous Sierra 4, an illegal Serb check-point on the

5 main road from the city to the airport, another hijacking has taken

6 place."

7 So could we be talking about the same incident?

8 A. It is possible. Sierra 4 is precisely the check-point that I

9 indicated, that I marked, but I repeat, I only know of one incident and I

10 was present when it happened. Now, whether this was elsewhere or whether

11 there was a difference in the number of these flak jackets, I really

12 don't know, because I have no reason to deny it, nor am I trying to do so

13 because I know that there was a report of -- by the UNPROFOR. There was

14 also a report compiled, and there is no reason for me to deny this. I

15 never even tried to do so, because that's how it is.

16 Q. Now, let's look at another document, 65 ter number 90240. It's -

17 again in English, unfortunately - an UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo Weekly

18 Situation Report for 7 April 1995, and at page 2 of this document it --

19 under the heading "Problems at Sierra 4, city blockaded," it has

20 something I'd like to ask you about.

21 MS. EDGERTON: Page 2. Oh, and the document's only got one page

22 uploaded, so I think we'll probably just move on, Your Honours.

23 Q. I actually have only one last question to ask you about, and it's

24 about paragraph 25 of your statement where you talk about the

25 Fatima Gunic school, and you said that, "If the former name of the school

Page 30584

1 is the Andrija Raso school ..." You had some information from a cousin

2 who said that the school was used to house soldiers. So my question to

3 you is: Assuming this school was previously the Andrija Raso school and

4 it did at some point house soldiers, to your knowledge was it fired on by

5 the VRS?

6 A. Well, first, I would like to correct something. I didn't say

7 that my cousin provided this information. I received that information

8 from other sources. Now, she lived in Mojmilo, and she worked at the

9 school Andrija Raso, and she left Mojmilo in 1992, in May, and based on

10 intelligence, that's where we got information that there was -- there

11 were soldiers deployed at the school, and at the point where we were

12 absolutely certain that there were soldiers deployed at a school, that's

13 the only time that we would open fire. Otherwise, absolutely not,

14 because the school would be for children and that would have been against

15 all rules and international laws.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to intervene here.

17 The witness also said, and it didn't make it into the transcript, that

18 there were soldiers in other schools too.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My apologies. When I mentioned all

20 schools, I mean where we were, at the area where we were, Alipasino Polje

21 and so on. So that is -- those are the schools that I'm referring to. I

22 don't know what happened elsewhere in the centre or Novi Grad areas. I

23 wouldn't know about that. I was not really interested because we weren't

24 anywhere near there.

25 MS. EDGERTON:

Page 30585

1 Q. Did you know that the Andrija Raso school was renamed the

2 Mesa Selimovic school in November 1994?

3 A. I didn't know that. And what I said was if that was the school

4 that I meant -- now, I know where Andrija Raso school was, but in view of

5 the fact that almost all street names have changed in Sarajevo, every

6 square and everything, I really wouldn't know what new names would be.

7 I'm not really a tourist guide.

8 Q. Did you know who Fatima Gunic was?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Well, Fatima Gunic was a teacher, and she was killed in a

11 shelling on 9 November 1993, in a makeshift classroom. Had you heard

12 anything about that?

13 A. No.

14 Q. She was giving lessons at the time, and a shell fell in front of

15 or outside of the barricaded makeshift classroom, and some children were

16 also killed and there was an investigation. Had you heard about that

17 investigation? You watched the media?

18 A. No. No. I really haven't, not really, nor do I know that that

19 happened, nor do I know who this Gunic person was. I really don't know

20 anything about that.

21 Q. Did you know that -- so then you heard no information to the

22 effect that the shell was actually found by local investigators to have

23 been fired from Nedzarici?

24 A. I've never heard of that.

25 MS. EDGERTON: All right. Your indulgence for just a moment,

Page 30587

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kovacevic, before you start giving evidence, I

2 would like to draw your attention to a particular Rule at the Tribunal.

3 Under this Rule, Rule 90(E), you may object to answering a question from

4 the Prosecution or the accused or from the Judges if you believe that

5 your answer will incriminate you. When I say "incriminate," I mean that

6 something you say may amount to an admission of your guilt for a criminal

7 offence or could provide evidence that you have committed an offence.

8 However, even if you think your answer will incriminate you and you do

9 not wish to answer the question, the Tribunal has the discretion to

10 oblige you to answer the question, but in such a case, the Tribunal will

11 make sure that your testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used

12 as evidence in other case against you for any offence other than false

13 testimony.

14 Do you understand what I have just told you?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

17 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before we begin, could we please

19 have the term "discretion to oblige you" to be interpreted to the witness

20 as something that is binding rather than a measure of coercion.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Now, I take it Mr. Kovacevic has

22 understood it. Let's continue.

23 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

24 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Kovacevic.

25 A. Good afternoon.

Page 30588

1 Q. Should I address you by rank since you have been trained at our

2 military academy?

3 A. Feel free to do so.

4 Q. You are still in our armed forces, although it has been

5 significantly reduced.

6 A. Yes, I'm warrant officer first class these days.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please 1D6401 in e-court.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. And while we're on that topic, the highest rank in the army

11 nowadays is that of brigadier; correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Thank you. Did you provide a statement to my Defence team,

14 Mr. Kovacevic, and can you see it in the English language before you?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Does it contain what you have stated? In other words, is it

17 accurate? Was it read back to you, and did you sign it?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Thank you. If today in this courtroom I were to put the same

20 questions, would your answers be basically the same?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender the 92 ter

24 package.

25 JUDGE KWON: Any objections, Ms. Sutherland?

Page 30589

1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, to the fourth document --

2 fifth document, 1D08458, on the grounds of relevance.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a response?

4 JUDGE KWON: Just a minute. Which is dealt with in para 20,

5 Ms. Sutherland?

6 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. It's concerning 1997, and I

7 just don't see the relevance to the charges in the indictment.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

10 Following the Dayton Accords, all officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina had

11 to undergo strict background checks by the OACD and the

12 High Representative when they were allowed to continue working in any

13 public institution, including the armed forces. Only those who had not

14 committed mistakes in the past have been allowed back, in other words,

15 who had a clean slate to start. This is very important from the point of

16 view of credibility as well as conduct during the war.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will receive it. After reading out the

19 summary, I would like you to deal with the previous one, 1D8457, with the

20 witness directly, because it's not clear from the statement what this

21 item relates to, if you wish to tender that. Please continue -- we'll

22 admit the statement.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2484, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE KWON: And we will admit the first four items first. Shall

25 we give -- but the first item is the one which is already admitted, so

Page 30590

1 we'll give numbers for the number 2, 3, and 4. So 12193 will be admitted

2 as Exhibit P?

3 THE REGISTRAR: 2485; 1D8455 will be Exhibit D2486; 1D8456 will

4 be Exhibit D2487.

5 JUDGE KWON: And 1D8458?

6 THE REGISTRAR: Will be Exhibit D2489, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would now like to

9 read out the summary of Mr. Kovacevic's statement in English.

10 [In English] Zoran Kovacevic was mobilised on 8th of May, 1992,

11 as an ordinary private into the ranks of Vogosca Brigade in an infantry

12 unit for the protection of the explosive stores in the Pretis special

13 purpose production company. In the second half of 1992, he was

14 transferred to the Artillery Unit. In mid 1993, he went to Banja Luka to

15 complete officer training where he gained the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. On

16 28th of June, 1994, he entered the 16th Krajina Motorised Brigade of the

17 1st Krajina Corps. After that, in late 1994 or early 1995, he returned

18 to the 3rd Sarajevo Brigade as an artillery support battalion commander.

19 In March 1992, Zoran Kovacevic saw armed Muslim paramilitary

20 units riding Volkswagen vans with revolving lights, wearing green and

21 dark red berets.

22 The object of his unit's interest was the Zuc facility which was

23 located between Serb and Muslim units and the city and it -- it was the

24 enemy's units located -- where they have been located. His understanding

25 of the strategy and the objective which the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps laid

Page 30591

1 down was regard -- with regard to the city of Sarajevo were of a

2 defensive nature. Neither he nor his unit understood those actions to be

3 part of a systematic or widespread attack on civilians. He had knowledge

4 that the objective of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command was to block

5 the forces of the 1st Corps of the BH in the city in order to prevent

6 their exit and use on other fronts in BH. This breakthrough would have

7 had negative consequences for the VRS on the remaining fronts and the

8 course of the war in BH.

9 The BH 1st Corps army -- 1st Corps was in the city of Sarajevo

10 under the control of the Muslim authorities in the period from April 1992

11 to December 1995. The units of the 1st Corps of BH Army opposed to

12 him -- his unit were 111th, 112th, and 105th Mountain Brigades which held

13 the dominant points of Zuc, Orlic, Hum, Grdonj, Brijesce Brdo, and

14 Sokolje. They also had positions in civilian zones including mortars

15 stationed in the Sarajevo maternity hospital. They also mounted

16 multi-rocket launchers on vehicles and modified anti-aircraft defence

17 weapons for fire against ground targets. His unit had knowledge that

18 there were military targets behind the lines.

19 His unit took precautionary measures to avoid firing on civilian

20 facilities located in the zone of responsibility of the 1st BH army corps

21 and to reduce collateral civilian casualties. In addition to this, his

22 unit on more than one occasion abandoned combat or fire operations

23 because of the disproportionate danger of civilian casualties in relation

24 to the military objective to be achieved. He had no knowledge that any

25 casualties of battle were civilians.

Page 30592

1 Neither he nor members of his unit or higher or lower commands

2 had any intention to cause civilian casualties in the part of the city

3 under Muslim control or accomplish psychological impact or conduct a

4 campaign of terror against them. He was never ordered either verbally or

5 in writing by higher command or civilian authorities to carry out attacks

6 on civilians of public transportations in the part of the city under

7 Muslim control, nor did he ever issue such orders. On the contrary,

8 instructions received from the higher command or civilian authorities

9 were that the fire should be open exclusively at military targets

10 threatening their forces. Verbal orders from superior command, as well

11 as those issued by Zoran Kovacevic to his subordinates stated that

12 civilians in the city under Muslim control must not be the target of an

13 attack.

14 His unit's crews were not fully manned. Its members were not

15 professional soldiers but reserves. That means local people and the

16 unit's command staff was not comprised of professional officers either.

17 The ammunition situation in his unit varied, but as time went on

18 ammunition became scarcer and were forced to turn to war time production

19 ammunition. Orders from the higher command regarding the expenditure,

20 especially of artillery ammunition, prescribed that it had to be used

21 sparingly. Squandering of the ammunition was not allowed. He had

22 knowledge of the existence of manufactured -- manufacture of modified

23 aerial bombs for firing on ground targets due to the shortage of -- a

24 shortage of the classic artillery ammunition, while in the

25 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps there were aerial bombs that were unused because

Page 30593

1 of the no-fly order that was in place.

2 Regarding incident Markale I on 5th of February, 1994,

3 Zoran Kovacevic states that to his knowledge, there were no artillery

4 units or mortars on that axis. Secondly, knowing the configuration of

5 the market and the distance from the possible firing point on that axis,

6 he considers the possibility of a hit on that spot to be minimal and that

7 it borders on the impossible.

8 Regarding incident at Dositejeva Street 4A on 16 of June, 1995,

9 to Zoran Kovacevic's knowledge, nobody from Pretis or his brigade

10 launched an aerial bomb on 16th of June, 1995, at Dositejeva Street.

11 [Interpretation] Thank you. During examination-in-chief, I would

12 kindly ask that the witness be provided a hard copy in Serbian, perhaps

13 the one I have in my hand. Thank you.

14 Q. Could I ask you to read out paragraph number 5 for your own sake.

15 You don't have to do it out loud. I just want you to be acquainted with

16 its contents. Have you read it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Thank you. Could we look at 1D8457 next. Did you read the

19 entire paragraph, because it goes on to page 2.

20 A. Yes, I have read it all.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we zoom in, please. Could we

23 focus on the circle which delineates the 20-kilometre perimeter. The

24 picture's not the best, but did you make certain markings on the map?

25 A. I can barely see anything.

Page 30594

1 Q. Do you see red markings, squares, rectangles, to the north of

2 Vogosca?

3 A. I can see three such shapes.

4 Q. Thank you. Can you explain the Chamber what the circles is and

5 what the markings stand for regarding paragraph 5 which you read.

6 A. The red shapes probably depict firing positions, and the circle,

7 inside the circle we have the city area of Sarajevo with its environs.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps the witness could be

10 assisted in marking Dobrinja -- sorry, Vogosca, and then the hills

11 between Vogosca and the city, and I would like him to mark Zuc on the map

12 as well.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This should be Vogosca.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Thank you. Mark it with a V.

16 A. [Marks]

17 Q. And the range of hills you marked, what is that?

18 A. That's the general area of the Hum and Zuc features.

19 Q. Can you put a Z with a diacritic and an H.

20 A. [Marks]

21 Q. Thank you. Can one see the central part of the city to the south

22 of Zuc and Hum from Vogosca?

23 A. No. There is no line of sight.

24 Q. As for the positions refers to in paragraph 5, can you tell us

25 what was their position on the map?

Page 30595

1 A. They were turned towards Zuc.

2 Q. Did the positions have to do with the howitzer battery that is

3 mentioned in paragraph 5?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Thank you. Could I also ask you to place a date and your

6 initials in the lower right-hand corner.

7 A. Today's date?

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. [Marks]

10 Q. Another thing, perhaps I'm asking much, but can you depict the

11 axis towards Dositejeva Street and what would be the distance

12 approximately?

13 A. I apologise. I have no idea where Dositejeva Street would be

14 here.

15 Q. Thank you. In any case, it's quite far to the centre of

16 Sarajevo; correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I seek to tender this.

19 Perhaps it could be under the same number with the markings, of course.

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be admitted as the next Defence

21 Exhibit.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2488, Your Honours.

23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kovacevic, as you have noted, your evidence in

24 chief was admitted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony. Now you'll

25 be cross-examined by the Prosecution -- Prosecution.

Page 30596

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may, two or three short

2 questions as part of my examination-in-chief.

3 JUDGE KWON: I see no problem. Please continue then.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Mr. Kovacevic, what was the ethnic make-up of your brigade? Were

7 there people of other ethnicities in your brigade, and if so, which?

8 A. I don't know about the various brigade units.

9 Q. How about your unit?

10 A. In my artillery battalion there were Croats and Bosniaks or

11 Muslims.

12 Q. If the Serbs were obliged to respond to call-ups, were Croats and

13 Muslims obliged to do the same or were they mobilised by force?

14 A. Members of other ethnicities also volunteered to the unit and

15 they were made part of it. They had never been officially mobilised

16 though.

17 Q. Thank you. So at first they were volunteers, but did they enjoy

18 the same status as VRS soldiers?

19 A. Yes, certainly. They were members of the VRS, and all VRS

20 members enjoyed the same rights.

21 Q. Thank you. Given the fact that you had artillery pieces, did you

22 have observation points and where?

23 A. Our observation points were for a while at the firing lines while

24 at other times we used forward observation points at the lines held by

25 the infantry.

Page 30597

1 Q. Were you in communication with them, with the people at the

2 observation posts?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Was the same situation in place throughout the war when you

5 returned to Vogosca?

6 A. Yes.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. At this stage I have no

8 more questions of Mr. Kovacevic.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

10 Yes, Ms. Sutherland.

11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Cross-examination by Ms. Sutherland:

13 Q. Mr. Kovacevic, thank you for meeting briefly with myself and an

14 investigator on Monday. I hope we will be able to move through the

15 examination efficiently. I would ask you to focus on the question and

16 answer the question that I put, because we are limited in time. I only

17 have one hour to put some questions to you.

18 You said on Monday that you were mobilised -- when you were

19 mobilised in May 1992, you were part of a platoon of 25 to 30 men; is

20 that right?

21 THE INTERPRETER: Could Ms. Sutherland speak into the microphone

22 right in front of her. Thank you.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't say it was a 25- to

24 30-member detachment. Oh, you mean the infantry unit. Yes, that unit

25 numbered 20 to 30 men. The unit that was the protective platoon for the

Page 30598

1 ammunitions depot.

2 MS. SUTHERLAND:

3 Q. And two or three months later you transferred to the artillery

4 unit of the Vogosca Brigade and Zeljko Blavacenin [phoen] was the

5 artillery unit commander?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. He reported to the brigade's chief of artillery

8 Sretko [phoen] Gracanin. And Gracanin's superior was Trifunovic, the

9 Vogosca Brigade commander, yes?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You left the area to go to Banja Luka for officer training around

12 the 1st of September, 1993, didn't you?

13 A. Well, that's about right. It wasn't really training. It was an

14 officer school of the VRS. There is a difference between training and

15 education.

16 Q. You said when you returned to the area in late 1994, early 1995,

17 that you were made commander of the mixed artillery battalion of the

18 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade which was formally known as the

19 Vogosca Brigade; is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And Gracanin was still the brigade's chief of artillery and his

22 superior was the commander of the brigade?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. I want to talk to you about the type and number of artillery

25 weapons you had in the period 1992 to mid-1993. You had artillery

Page 30599

1 positions at Krivoglavci, Blagovac, Hotonj, and Gradacac. What type and

2 calibre of the two howitzer did you have at the Blagovac position?

3 A. One howitzer, 105 millimetre; and a 122-millimetre howitzer.

4 Q. So besides the weapons that you mention in your statement in

5 paragraph 4 and the one that you just mentioned now, or, the two that you

6 mention now, the 105 millimetre and the 122 millimetre, the brigade also

7 had a number of other weapons, didn't they?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You had 128-millimetre Plamen?

10 A. Yes. That is a 128-millimetre Plamen, and I heard a Praga, which

11 is not the case. It's not Praga. It's 128-millimetre Plamen.

12 Q. That's what I -- that's what I said. It was obviously -- I

13 didn't speak clearly enough. You also had 155-million howitzers in

14 Tihovici [phoen] and Zemina Ravan [phoen] and in Kremes, did you not?

15 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel please repeat the names.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [Previous translation

17 continues] ... the interpretation. We had 122-millimetre howitzers.

18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

19 MS. SUTHERLAND: I will repeat the question.

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

21 MS. SUTHERLAND:

22 Q. You also had 155-millimetre howitzers in Tihovici, Zemina Ravan

23 and in Kremes, did you not?

24 A. In 1992, those were not the positions in 1992, the ones you

25 referred to just now.

Page 30600

1 Q. I was talking about the period 1992 through 'til 1993, September,

2 when you went to Banja Luka.

3 A. There was a howitzer battery, a 122-millimetre howitzer battery

4 at Kremes. 120-millimetre mortars at Krivoglavci, Blagovac, and Hotonj.

5 A 76-millimetre gun, B-1, at Gradac.

6 Q. What about a 76-millimetre gun, ZiS 3, Z-i-s 3, in Blagovac?

7 A. A 76-million ZiS gun. I believe there was one in Hotonj but it

8 didn't belong to my unit.

9 Q. But Hotonj was part of the Vogosca Brigade, yes?

10 A. Yes. But not all artillery belonged to my unit.

11 Q. At the moment I'm asking you about what the brigade had. What

12 about 122-millimetre howitzer D-30 in Zimena Ravan?

13 A. A 122-millimetre D-30 howitzer was at Blagovac. So there were

14 two howitzers, a 105 millimetre and a 122 millimetre D-30 howitzer. They

15 were the Blagovac.

16 Q. Thank you. The brigade are also had -- or the Artillery Unit

17 that you were in also had a tank T-55 and a Praga, did it not?

18 A. That's not artillery. A tank is an armoured mechanised asset, a

19 Praga is an anti-aircraft asset, so these are not land artillery pieces

20 and this could not have been part -- within my unit; within the brigade,

21 yes, but not in my unit.

22 Q. You're right. You're absolutely right. Sorry. I -- I -- I

23 should have said to you: You had within your Artillery Unit drivers for

24 these vehicles, did you not?

25 A. Vehicle drivers. Well, they would be within those units that

Page 30601

1 service them. These were drivers of special combat vehicles.

2 Q. Okay. And in 1995, did you have any other artillery weapons that

3 you haven't already mentioned?

4 A. A howitzer battery, a 122-millimetre howitzer battery at Kremes;

5 a 105-howitzer battery - I can't say exactly in what sector they were.

6 In the background of Rajlovac some place - then there was a B-1 battery

7 at Krivoglavci; one Plamen VBR; one Oganj VBR, and that would be about

8 it.

9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Could we have 65 ter 12191.

10 Mr. Kovacevic, this is a list of persons in the artillery

11 section, and we see that you're listed at number 2.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. [Overlapping speakers] under. The document is undated, but if we

14 go to the last page we can see that it's signed by Robert Jovanovski.

15 When did Jovanovski take over as the commander of the

16 Sarajevo 3rd Infantry Brigade?

17 A. Yes, yes, but that wasn't the 3rd Infantry Brigade, the

18 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade but, rather, the Vogosca Brigade. That's

19 as far as the brigade is concerned. Now, Robert Jovanovski took over

20 from Miladin Trifunovic. This was, as far as I recall, in 1992, perhaps

21 the second half of 1992.

22 Q. Or at the end of 1992?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And we see here that there are drivers for the Pragas and the

25 T-55 tanks.

Page 30602

1 A. Yes. You can see that, but could we see the top of this document

2 or, rather, the first page. This is a list of conscripts in artillery.

3 Now, at this time, the word artillery comprised everything. In other

4 words, whatever was in the artillery battalion and then also what was in

5 the light rocket and anti-aircraft battalion, and in the armoured

6 mechanised unit. So this is an overall list probably for rations of

7 cigarettes or whatever.

8 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P6013, Your Honours.

11 MS. SUTHERLAND:

12 Q. Mr. Kovacevic, you mention in your statement that you had a

13 120-millimetre M-38 howitzer, and in fact you've just testified today

14 about the Blagovac Battalion having -- or, at their artillery position

15 having a D-30 howitzer. There's quite a -- there's a difference in the

16 ranges between those two weapons, is there not? The M-38 has a range of

17 11.800 metres, while the D-30 has a range of approximately 15.300 metres.

18 A. Correct, but this is not a 120-millimetre howitzer but rather a

19 122-millimetre M-38 howitzer.

20 Q. I'm sorry if I misspoke if I said 128. I meant 122. But you

21 agree with me, don't you? Yeah.

22 A. Yes, if you mean the range, yes. These are the technical

23 specifications for those weapons, and it's correct. One of them has a

24 slightly shorter range and the other one longer, and of course these

25 figures approximately are correct, 11.800 and 15.300.

Page 30603

1 Q. And also you said in your statement that -- that you had a

2 76-millimetre old gun, an M-48(B-1) and then you mentioned today that you

3 had the more powerful 76-millimetre ZiS-3 gun at Blagovac and there's a

4 quite a difference between these two guns is there not? The M-48 has a

5 range of 8.750 metres, and the ZiS-3 has a range of 13.000 metres; is

6 that right?

7 A. I don't know that the range of ZiS is 13.000 metres, but that

8 asset was not with me. What I had was --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat the weapon, please.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for the range, it is correct.

11 With D-1 it's 8.750 or something. As for ZiS, I don't really know.

12 That's an anti-armour asset.

13 MS. SUTHERLAND:

14 Q. The interpreter didn't catch the weapon you were first referring

15 to. That was the M-48, wasn't it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. You mentioned also that the brigade had multiple-rocket

18 launchers. This is an anti- -- an area anti-personnel weapon not

19 suitable for point targeting in urban environment because its range of

20 error is too great, isn't it?

21 A. Multiple-rocket launchers are not anti-aircraft assets.

22 Multiple-rocket launchers are --

23 Q. [Overlapping speakers] Anti-personnel. Anti-personnel.

24 A. Those are multiple-rocket launchers. That's -- that's land

25 rocket artillery which implies that they can be used against targets on

Page 30604

1 the ground. They're not -- it's not an anti-aircraft weapon.

2 Q. No. I said -- I'm sorry. It must have been a mistranslation. I

3 said anti-personnel weapon. So you agree that it's a land -- to be -- to

4 be used on the ground. It's also right, isn't it, that the range of

5 error is -- is -- is quite large?

6 A. I don't understand what you mean by "range of error."

7 Q. It's not -- it's not precise.

8 A. It is precise as specified according to the technical

9 specifications. These are multiple-rocket launchers used to target

10 targets on the ground. I can't say they're not precise. It depends on

11 the target. It is true that it is an area weapon, and in that sense it

12 should be rather precise. I don't know how to put this. It's not a

13 rifle so that you can pinpoint a target. Artillery weapons are

14 different. They have a breadth, a width, a depth, an azimuth, and so on,

15 so they are defined according to several parameters. These are

16 multidimensional targets.

17 Q. During the two time periods that you were there, 1992

18 through 'til September 1993 and then again late 1994, beginning of 1995

19 until the end of the war, did the artillery positions remain the same?

20 A. They remained more or less the same perhaps with some slight

21 adjustments, yes.

22 Q. And what do you mean by some slight adjustments?

23 A. Well, perhaps they were moved by a hundred, 200 metres along the

24 line, the front line, because -- well, we had a defence line behind our

25 backs, and this was the only artillery that we had at our disposal so

Page 30605

1 that sometimes it had to be turned against the outer ring. So

2 practically we operated in semi -- in a semi-surrounding position. We

3 were turned -- we had positions towards the town but also behind our

4 backs. So the territory -- our territory there was very narrow, perhaps

5 3 to 4 or 5 kilometres.

6 Q. And during the -- the two time periods that we just talked about,

7 did the weaponry stay at the locations you've mentioned in your statement

8 throughout that period?

9 A. At the locations that I mentioned in my statement, yes.

10 Q. How many 122-millimetre howitzers did the unit -- did the brigade

11 have in 1995? The brigade.

12 A. In 1995, toward the end of 1995, I believe that there were four

13 of them.

14 Q. You mean the 122-millimetre D-30s or all?

15 A. All 122-millimetre weapons.

16 Q. And let's say in -- in May, May 1995.

17 A. I don't know exactly about May 1995, but at the end of 1995 there

18 were probably six to eight.

19 Q. And so we've just gone through quite a number of additional

20 weapons that -- that the -- that -- that your unit had and the brigade

21 had. Why did you minimise the holdings of the artillery in your -- in

22 your statement?

23 A. In my statement, I did not even mention the number of weapons. I

24 only mentioned howitzer battery.

25 Q. I'm talking about the types of weapons. We've just gone through

Page 30606

1 quite a number of additional weapons that -- that you had. Many?

2 A. I don't see what additional weapons. There was that

3 122-millimetre calibre, 105, 76, VBR, Oganj. I don't know what's

4 additional.

5 Q. The different types of 76-millimetre guns, the fact that

6 122-millimetre hasn't been mentioned in your statement at all.

7 A. Yes. Yes. I did mention 122-millimetre weapons in my statement,

8 but here it says 120-millimetres M-38, but I said 122 millimetres. Here

9 it says 120 M-38.

10 Q. I want to move on now to -- you mentioned that orders came from

11 higher command levels regarding the expenditure of ammunition especially

12 artillery, that it must be used sparingly. Did you mean that an order

13 came from the corps?

14 A. Yes. All orders came from higher commanders. In other words, we

15 received orders from higher commands and the orders on the expenditure of

16 ammunition was they had to be used sparingly.

17 Q. And so the brigades had to change their attitude towards the way

18 artillery was being used. What needed to be changed?

19 A. The expenditure of ammunition should be minimised. That was

20 received at the brigade. And then from the brigade I received an order,

21 an order for operation. And there was nothing for me to think about as

22 far as the expenditure of ammunition was concerned.

23 Q. And as part of that order -- or did -- did the -- did the

24 brigades have to submit daily ammunition expenditure reports to the SRK

25 command?

Page 30607

1 A. If you believe me, I don't know. The brigade was my superior

2 command, and I received my order from them, whereas the brigade would

3 report to their superior command. I believe that was the way it should

4 be, but I don't really know. I had no insight into how the brigade

5 operated, nor was it necessary for me to have that kind of insight.

6 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation] [In English] I shouldn't rather

7 than it was necessary. [Interpretation] May I intervene in the

8 transcript. The witness said I should rather than it was necessary.

9 MS. SUTHERLAND:

10 Q. Mr. Kovacevic, what wasn't necessary? What did you say was

11 necessary?

12 A. Because that was the superior command. What the -- what the

13 superior command did, that wasn't something that I had to know. I didn't

14 have to know about that. That's how the military structure functions.

15 Q. But you were advised by the -- the command through the brigade

16 that -- that artillery was being squandered because it was often fired

17 are --

18 A. I'm not receiving interpretation.

19 Q. Are you receiving it now?

20 A. Yes, now I hear it.

21 Q. But you were informed by the command through the brigade that the

22 reason that ammunition was being squandered was because it was being

23 fired at inhabited settlements and specific buildings when there was no

24 combat action whatsoever; is that right?

25 A. That is not right. The corps command had nothing to tell me.

Page 30608

1 They would relate it to the brigade, and the brigade received orders that

2 they should not squander ammunition, but what you've just mentioned,

3 that's rather broad. So that's not how it was. We were to prevent

4 squandering of ammunition and to spare -- use it sparingly, because we

5 didn't -- there wasn't much of it. But the context in which you put it,

6 that's not -- that was not the reason why ammunition was to be used

7 sparingly.

8 Q. I thought you said that the -- the -- the order that came down

9 from the corps command was then -- that order was passed on to your

10 brigade, was it not, down through the brigade?

11 A. Yes. An order came to the effect that we have to use ammunition

12 sparingly, but not for the reasons that you mentioned.

13 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we can quickly have P2668, please.

14 Q. Mr. Kovacevic, this is -- this is the order from

15 General Milosevic, and if you can see the second -- second paragraph

16 there. Does this refresh your memory as to the order that came down from

17 the corps?

18 A. This is an order from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command sent to

19 and then it says there who it was sent to, to brigade commands. This is

20 the first time ever that I see this order. And I wasn't even supposed to

21 see this. This was an order sent to the brigade from the superior

22 command -- or, rather, it was sent to the brigade which was my superior

23 command.

24 Q. Okay. I will move on. In paragraph 12 of your statement, you

25 said that you had knowledge of military targets behind the lines, the

Page 30609

1 command post communication centres, artillery and mortar, and you said:

2 "Despite this, during the conduct of combat and fire operations

3 against military targets located in civilian zones, we took measures to

4 reduce collateral civilian casualties ..."

5 How do you reconcile that with what you state in paragraph 10,

6 and I quote:

7 "There was no uncertainty in myself or my unit during conduct of

8 combat or fire operations as to whether operations or fire were being

9 directed towards civilians. In other words, we/I never accepted such a

10 possibility and continued fire despite this."

11 A. Could you please repeat your question. I understood all the rest

12 surrounding it, as it were, but could you repeat the question itself,

13 please.

14 Q. Well, you're saying on the one hand that you took precautionary

15 measures to reduce collateral civilian casualties, but earlier on in your

16 statement you say there was no uncertainty as to whether operations of

17 fire were being directed towards civilians, and you never accepted such a

18 possibility and you continued to fire despite it. So I'm just -- how do

19 you reconcile those two -- two statements?

20 A. I did not say that despite everything I continued opening fire.

21 As for what the statement says, it means the following: Civilians were

22 not the target of the artillery units, my artillery. Civilians were not

23 the targets of the operation of the artillery units.

24 As for paragraph 12, the enemy units were often positioned in

25 civilian buildings and facilities where civilians moved about. I said

Page 30610

1 that these were artillery --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The witness will have to

3 slow down.

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. -- Mr. Kovacevic, interpreters are saying to ask

5 that you are speaking a bit too fast. Could you slow down and repeat

6 your answer.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Certainly. So military targets in

8 terms of the deployment of enemy forces was such that they were

9 positioned in civilian locations. So these were their staffs,

10 communication centres, artillery positions, their mobile mortars, their

11 mobile multiple-rocket launchers, and that is why I said that despite all

12 of that -- that despite all of that, we did not open fire at military

13 targets located in civilian zones. Or if that was necessary, we took all

14 measures to diminish or reduce collateral civilian casualties.

15 MS. SUTHERLAND:

16 Q. But what you say in your statement was that -- is that the three

17 BiH Army units opposing you all positions in civilian zones. That's what

18 you say in paragraph 8. And so then if you are responding to fire from

19 those units, then you are firing back into civilian zones, are you not?

20 A. No. Military zones. If you put a tank somewhere, that's a

21 military target.

22 Q. You've said in paragraph 8 that -- that -- first of all, you say

23 in paragraph 7 that you are responding -- you're responding to fire from

24 the city, and you say in paragraph 11 that you received verbal orders

25 that civilians in the city weren't to be the target. Are you talking

Page 30611

1 about -- are you talking about returning fire on the positions that

2 opened fire on your unit?

3 A. As far as the zone of operation of my unit is concerned, the city

4 had nothing to do with that. I said at the very outset it was the Zuc

5 feature, Zuc. As far as fire from the city was concerned, and there was

6 such fire, that fire was opened at the municipality of Vogosca

7 practically every day. We did not respond to that fire, the fire coming

8 from the urban zones, because that goes beyond the area of responsibility

9 of my brigade.

10 Q. Why did you --

11 A. The area of responsibility is Zuc.

12 Q. Mr. Kovacevic, but in your statement in paragraph 7 you say:

13 "... when conducting combat operations, firing or responding to

14 fire from the city."

15 So you're talking here about responding to fire in the city.

16 A. Fire in town? I cannot see that now, but I personally and my

17 unit when opening fire carrying out combat operations, we did not

18 understand that as part of a systematic or widespread attack on

19 civilians. We did not respond to fire from the city of Sarajevo. The

20 zone of responsibility of my unit is Zuc and what I've already mentioned.

21 So it is the broader area of Zuc. The city was not within the area of

22 responsibility of my brigade. Rather, it was the feature of Zuc.

23 Q. And on the map earlier today you drew a circle which went right

24 down to -- to the -- to the city, did it not?

25 A. Yes. To the city itself but not into the city, no.

Page 30612

1 Q. So you said you've never had any knowledge that there were any

2 civilian casualties during the war. Is that your testimony today?

3 A. I did not have such knowledge.

4 Q. Never once a commander ever said to you that despite all these

5 precautions that you -- that it wasn't working and that civilians in

6 Sarajevo were being killed and injured?

7 A. No. The commander never said that to me.

8 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... [overlapping speakers]

9 A. As far as Sarajevo was concerned -- sorry. Once again you're

10 talking about Sarajevo. The zone of operation is the hill of Zuc. That

11 is where the enemy's front end was. Sarajevo for me was the depth. The

12 city of Sarajevo, that is.

13 Q. You just said the hill of Zuc, but you said a moment ago -- or

14 you said in your statement that -- that the BiH units opposing you all

15 had positions in civilian zones. So where were the civilian zones in

16 Zuc? If you're now saying it's the hill.

17 A. Yes. A hill is a geographic feature that can be populated. As

18 far as Zuc is concerned, it's mostly Serb villages.

19 Q. And you said that your commander never once said, but did you

20 hear from anybody that there was ever any civilians killed or wounded

21 during operations, your combat operations?

22 A. I'm not aware of that.

23 Q. You didn't hear about any people being taken from the detention

24 facilities in Vogosca to work on Zuc who were killed and wounded?

25 A. No. I have no knowledge of that.

Page 30613

1 Q. You agree that the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade is in the

2 north-western part of the front; correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And you purport to have absolutely no knowledge at all on the

5 technical details of the workings of a modified air-bomb.

6 A. No.

7 Q. You said you have --

8 A. No, I did not say no knowledge. I said that I did have some

9 knowledge, that I heard about that, but as for knowledge concerning

10 operations, no.

11 Q. You said you have some knowledge on the existence of a

12 manufacture of modified aerial bombs which the SRK had in its arsenal.

13 Is that the knowledge you're talking about?

14 A. Yes. Yes. That is what I heard. It wasn't official. I heard

15 that that existed.

16 Q. And you said it was because of the lack of ammunition and also

17 because of the no-fly zone. It wasn't possible for them to use the

18 aerial bombs in a conventional way by dropping them from aeroplanes.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. You're aware, aren't you, that by June 1995, the -- the

21 3rd Sarajevo Infantry -- the brigade had a modified air-bomb launcher,

22 didn't it?

23 A. Probably.

24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can we have Exhibit P01283, please.

25 Q. This is dated the 15th of June, from the corps commander

Page 30614

1 Dragomir Milosevic, on the delivery of information on the launching gear

2 and aircraft weaponry. And it says that four modify air-bomb launchers

3 will be given to the four brigades in the north-western part of the

4 front. Does that refresh your memory as to whether the -- you had a

5 launcher?

6 A. This is a document of the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,

7 and this is the first time I see it. Documents of the corps arrive in

8 the brigade. I was not in any kind of contact with corps documents.

9 Q. I understand you may not have seen --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please speak into the

11 microphone.

12 MS. SUTHERLAND:

13 Q. I understand that you may not have seen this specific order, but

14 does it remind you of the fact that there was an aerial -- a modified

15 air-bomb launcher in your area?

16 A. Probably. I can say neither yes nor no.

17 Q. And do you recall in July of 1995 having to give an aerial

18 air-bomb that was within your zone of responsibility to Major Simic as

19 part of the Talas-1 plan of operation?

20 A. I don't know anything about that, really. This is the first time

21 I hear of this.

22 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have Exhibit P01300.

23 Q. Do you see there in paragraph 2:

24 "Major Simic shall obtain two aerial bombs of 250 kilogrammes

25 from the corps reserves which are currently located at the

Page 30615

1 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade (the ones that were return from the Trnovo

2 front) and demand the approval for obtaining another 2, 250 kilogramme

3 from Pretis"?

4 Do you recall now whether you provided this air-bomb to

5 Major Simic?

6 A. Again, this is an order of the command of the

7 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Again, this is one of the orders that I see for

8 the very first time here. I see that it says the 3rd Spbr, but this is

9 an order from the corps to the brigade. I really do not know.

10 Q. I understand that you haven't seen --

11 A. I don't have to know about this at all.

12 Q. I understand you haven't seen the document, but do you recall the

13 event? Mr. Kovacevic, do you recall the event?

14 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure you -- the witness heard the

15 interpreting.

16 MS. SUTHERLAND: Oh, sorry, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your question.

18 MS. SUTHERLAND:

19 Q. Mr. Kovacevic, I understand that you may not have seen this

20 actual document, but -- but do you recall this event occurring?

21 A. No. No. I do not recall this.

22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can we have Exhibit P01314, please.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel please speak into the

24 microphone.

25 MS. SUTHERLAND: My apology to the interpreter. I have two

Page 30616

1 microphones on.

2 Could I have Exhibit P01314, please.

3 Q. Sir, this is a document dated the 25th of July, 1995, and it's

4 from your chief. If we can go to the second page. It's from Gracanin, a

5 request for further ammunition replenishment and it includes aerial

6 bombs, a request for aerial bombs. Do you see that?

7 A. Yes, I see that. Item 6 and item 7, I think.

8 Q. So you did have modified air-bombs in your zone of

9 responsibility, didn't you?

10 A. I cannot claim that. That is what is asserted by this document.

11 I cannot assert that.

12 Q. Sir, is it your testimony that -- that you as commander of the

13 mixed artillery battalion didn't know that you had modified air-bombs in

14 your zone of responsibility?

15 A. I am not claiming that there weren't any there, but I cannot say

16 either yes or no. This is a request for the replenishment of ammunition,

17 and there is ammunition requested here for weapons that I do not have. I

18 even see tanks here and self-propelled weapons.

19 Q. And Mr. Gracanin was chief of artillery of the brigade?

20 A. The chief of artillery of the brigade is in the brigade command.

21 He is in the brigade command. He's an organ of the brigade command, yes.

22 Q. You knew that they were being assembled in the Pretis factory

23 which was in Vogosca didn't you?

24 A. I had some knowledge, but I did not know. I'm saying that I had

25 some knowledge in terms of that is something that I had heard of. So I

Page 30617

1 had such knowledge.

2 Q. And when did you gain this knowledge?

3 A. I cannot say exactly now. I don't know. It's been a long time.

4 But I had heard of that.

5 Q. You stated in paragraph 23 that to your knowledge nobody from

6 Pretis or the -- or the brigade launched a bomb on the

7 16th of June, 1995, at Dositejeva Street. As I've just shown you a

8 document dated the day before which shows that they -- the brigade had a

9 launcher, so it is possible that an air-bomb was launched from the

10 Vogosca zone of responsibility on that day.

11 A. I am not competent to give an answer to that. I really cannot.

12 I don't even know where Dositejeva is, as far as paragraph 23 is

13 concerned. I don't even know where this street is.

14 Q. Well, if you don't know where the street is, how -- how do you

15 know that nobody could have launched an aerial bomb to it?

16 A. I assume that that didn't happen. It would have to be heard,

17 wouldn't it. This is probably a weapon that creates a great deal of

18 noise. It should be heard, I assume.

19 Q. And it's your testimony that you don't recall hearing an air-bomb

20 on the 16th of June, 1995?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. In paragraph 22 you offer certain views on Markale I incident.

23 You weren't in the Sarajevo -- Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in -- or, part of

24 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in February 1994, were you?

25 A. That's right.

Page 30618

1 Q. But you say it was explained to you that the trajectory of the

2 12-millimetre mortar shell -- no. It was explained to you the trajectory

3 of it, and also the alleged incoming trajectory pointed towards the

4 village of Mirkovci -- Mrkovici. Who explained this to you?

5 A. I saw that on television. So on television there was this

6 Russian officer, I believe, who gave an expert opinion then, and that's

7 when I saw that. And when I spoke to my colleagues and friends, they

8 said too, that that was the trajectory. It was all over the media. As

9 far as -- as far as this is concerned, if we were to link up at the

10 azimuth the trajectory, I mean, we're talking about laws of physics,

11 aerodynamics, ballistics, targeting tables. When you combine all of that

12 with the terrain the result is that there is a minor possibility of that

13 kind of thing happening, perhaps, but only in extreme weather conditions.

14 Q. And you said to your knowledge that there were no artillery units

15 or mortars on that axes -- axis. This Trial Chamber heard evidence from

16 experts in relation to this incident and also from a commander of -- of a

17 brigade who testified that there were two 120-millimetre mortars and two

18 82-millimetre mortars at the Mrkovici artillery position.

19 MS. SUTHERLAND: And for Your Honours and the accused, that's at

20 page 29598, and there was also a map which was marked and tendered.

21 Q. So given that, the statement that you made that there were no

22 artillery units or mortar on that axes is not correct?

23 A. In the statement I said that to the best of my knowledge along

24 that line there were no artillery units or launchers. I am not asserting

25 anything because I was not there. Therefore I cannot claim anything.

Page 30619

1 However, to the best of my knowledge knowing the situation in that

2 theatre of war, I think that it is absolutely impossible.

3 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

4 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm not getting any interpretation.

5 JUDGE KWON: Could you -- could you turn off your microphone,

6 both of them, so that -- yes.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Perhaps it would be a good

8 thing if the distinguished Ms. Sutherland could say specifically whether

9 she is referring to an azimuth of 18 degrees, because that is what is

10 contained in the statement. Also, in the previous statements of this

11 witness that had been mentioned. So Serb commanders claimed that it had

12 to do with 18 degrees, and this is what this witness confirmed, that to

13 the best of his knowledge this did not happen at 18 degrees. And then

14 what we were also discussing, it was 45 degrees.

15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. But for planning purpose, how much

16 longer would you need, Ms. Sutherland.

17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Five minutes.

18 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any re-examination?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just two brief questions. I need

20 two minutes at most.

21 JUDGE KWON: I was told that your time is up, but could you try

22 to sum up as soon as possible, Ms. Sutherland.

23 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.

24 Q. And I was referring to the line of trajectory, not the -- not the

25 degree. In any event, I want to move on, and I want to very, very

Page 30620

1 quickly, if you can assist the Trial Chamber, I want to show you a map,

2 and that is P05926. It is a map of Sarajevo and -- and the environs of

3 the city. And I just want you to -- to look at the legend on the map,

4 and you can -- you can confirm it yourself, but the legend is that one

5 square box on this map is 1 kilometre.

6 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we can zoom in a little bit so that we

7 have Sarajevo at the bottom of the map and we have Vogosca in the middle

8 of the map. No, down the other way.

9 Q. Now, if you agree with me, we can check the legend - if you want

10 to you can confirm it yourself - but one of these squares equals

11 1 kilometre. So can you just count from Vogosca down to the city as to

12 how many kilometres it is from Vogosca into the city.

13 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we can blow it up a little bit more.

14 Q. From Vogosca town down to -- going directly north -- south,

15 sorry, do you count five squares?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So the artillery positions, one was in Blagovac and the other one

18 was in Krivoglavci, which is just a little north of Vogosca town. That

19 would -- that would make it at most 6 kilometres, wouldn't it, from

20 those --

21 A. Yes.

22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you very much, Mr. Kovacevic. I have no

23 further questions.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.