130115ED

Page 31850

1 to an admission of your guilt for a criminal offence or could provide

2 evidence that you have committed an offence. However, even if you think

3 your answer will incriminate you and you do not wish to answer the

4 question, the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the

5 question, but in such a case, the Tribunal will make sure that your

6 testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used as evidence in other

7 case against you for any offence other than false testimony.

8 Mr. Gagovic, do you understand what I have just told you?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I understood

10 everything.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

12 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

13 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Gagovic.

15 A. Good morning, Mr. President.

16 Q. Have you given a statement to the Defence team?

17 A. I have.

18 Q. Thank you. Have you read that statement and signed it?

19 A. Yes. I have read and signed it.

20 Q. Thank you. Do you have the B/C/S version before you?

21 A. I do.

22 Q. Thank you. Is everything in the statement an accurate reflection

23 of what you said?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Thank you. If I were to ask you these same questions today,

Page 31851

1 would your answers be generally the same?

2 A. I believe they would be the same.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this statement, 1D1 --

5 1D6180.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, with the redaction I referred to. That's

7 92 ter statement will be admitted into evidence. Shall we give the

8 number.

9 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2738. Thank you.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

11 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, turning to the associated exhibits,

12 we would ask permission for the Court to add three of those documents to

13 our 65 ter list. Those are numbers 1D10065, 67, and 68.

14 JUDGE KWON: Have they been uploaded into e-court?

15 MR. ROBINSON: As far as I know, but I can check.

16 JUDGE KWON: If the court officer could confirm.

17 By way of example, can we see the 1D10065?

18 Are we having a difficulty problem with the videolink?

19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

20 JUDGE KWON: So, Mr. Robinson, I take it that you are not

21 tendering 1D6184, which has been referred to in para-9.

22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. In light of the decision of the Chamber, we

23 won't tender that. Looking through e-court quickly, it looks like the

24 three documents that I mentioned are in e-court but not with

25 translations, so if that's the case, we'll either have to lead them live

Page 31852

1 or give up on those.

2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

3 You have no objection, Mr. Tieger, as to 1D1836 and 1D4202?

4 MR. TIEGER: Actually, Mr. President, first of all, 1D01836 is

5 already in evidence as P01509.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. P1509. Yes.

7 MR. TIEGER: Yes. With respect to 1D04202, I looked at that in

8 connection with the previous standards that I understood to have been

9 established for admission in this Chamber, a matter that I've discussed

10 on other occasions with Mr. Robinson, and I tried to reconcile it with

11 some of the recent rulings concerning documents that reflected the

12 statements by SDS officials promulgated through official organs clearly

13 intended to reach the public and to state their position on various

14 matters during the course of the war. This document seemed, as far as I

15 can tell, is a reflection of information provided by a particular source.

16 This witness can tell us nothing about who that source is or the relative

17 accuracy of this information. It's -- my view was that if the other

18 documents I mentioned didn't come in in light of what I would consider to

19 be their probative and reliable nature on their face, this -- this kind

20 of document would -- would fall somewhere below it in terms of

21 admissibility.

22 As the Court is aware and as Mr. Robinson is aware, I'm generally

23 an advocate of broad admission and the assessment of the totality of the

24 evidence, but in this case I'm trying to reconcile the standards in this

25 courtroom and the various documents which are tendered, and for that

Page 31853

1 reason I bring the Court's attention to the nature of this document and

2 the comments, the limited comments, made by the witness.

3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, would you like to respond?

4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think with respect to that

5 document, what the witness said to it -- said about it in paragraph 5 is

6 that he can agree that the contents of the reports we received from the

7 corps chief of security looked exactly like this. So I think it would

8 probably be more useful to have that document put to him and see what he

9 could say about the document before you decide about its admission.

10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.

11 The Judges cannot see the e-court documents at the moment, but

12 with that understanding, shall we continue?

13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

14 JUDGE KWON: In addition, there seems to be some further problem,

15 but let's give it a try and continue, see how it evolves.

16 Yes, Mr. Robinson.

17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Dr. Karadzic is having

18 trouble actually finding things on -- getting e-court also, but --

19 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] Your Honours, good morning. I'm

20 unable to hear the English channel --

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

22 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] -- in Belgrade.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, that's the problem that I referred to.

24 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] The witness is able to hear the

25 B/C/S, but I'm unable to listen to the English channel.

Page 31854

1 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we rise for ten minutes and try to sort it

2 out in the meantime. The Chamber will rise for ten minutes.

3 --- Break taken at 9.34 a.m.

4 --- On resuming at 9.51 a.m.

5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, you are hearing me in your language?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am. I am.

7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Then let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] I would now like to read

10 Colonel Gagovic's summary in the English language, and then I will shed

11 light on the document 4202.

12 [In English] Milosav Gagovic was a professional soldier. In

13 1992, when war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was the assistant

14 commander for logistics of the 4th Corps of the JNA in Sarajevo. From

15 May 1992, he was acting commander of the 4th Corps of the JNA.

16 Milosav Gagovic considers that the replacement of the

17 single-party social system with multi-party brought turmoil to the ethnic

18 and religious relationships between the people in BH. The political

19 disagreements between the SDA, SDS, and HDZ transferred to their people.

20 Alija Izetbegovic stressed his wish to create an Islamic state, whereas

21 Radovan Karadzic stressed that everyone in BH should receive equal

22 treatment. During the fighting, Colonel Milosav Gagovic noted that all

23 the power in the authorities in B and H was concentrated on

24 Alija Izetbegovic, who was able to influence many events in B and H.

25 To realise their goals, the SDA and the HDZ began to illegally

Page 31855

1 form paramilitary and police forces. Milosav Gagovic was also aware that

2 a known terrorist trained members of the HDZ paramilitary units.

3 Further, the Croatian authorities released prisoners who had been

4 convicted for the most serious crimes of extremes -- extremism,

5 terrorism, and radicalism.

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. -- Mr. Karadzic, was that not the part of what

7 has been excluded?

8 Yes. Was that the point, Mr. Tieger?

9 MR. TIEGER: Yes, and I believe other portions of the anticipated

10 summary also contain some of the redacted material. So the accused

11 should be attentive to that, I think.

12 JUDGE KWON: Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic? Please continue.

13 MR. KARADZIC: Okay. Then I will skip the next paragraph

14 concerning JNA, Listica, Mostar. I do hope it's going to be relevant.

15 Milosav Gagovic considers that Alija Izetbegovic used the

16 referendum regarding the independence of BH to brand the Serbs as an

17 enemy of the other two peoples. This then began a witch hunt against

18 Serbs in Sarajevo which began with the killing of a Serbian wedding

19 guest. Further attacks took place and armed gangs stormed apartments at

20 night, looting them and abusing the people inside. Members of the

21 paramilitary groups were seen parading in villages and singing

22 chauvinistic songs, insulting Serbs. Serb civilians formed guards at the

23 entrances to buildings and barricades were elected. Families began

24 receiving threats over the phone, and abusive notes were thrown into

25 letterboxes. At the time, many people left their properties.

Page 31856

1 Further, HDZ paramilitary formations murdered over 30 Serbian

2 elderly, women, and children in Gornji Malovan village on the 5th of

3 April, 1992. The first armed attack against the JNA followed shortly

4 after this. On the 22nd of April, 1992, Muslim forces attacked the

5 civilian population of Ilidza. A number of JNA soldiers were attacked on

6 the way to assist the civilians. Between 22nd of April and the 2nd of

7 May, 1992, Muslim paramilitary groups attacked the military district

8 group and barracks almost every night. These then became general attack

9 against the JNA features in Sarajevo. The paramilitary -- the military

10 hospital in Sarajevo and the Marsal Tito Barracks were under blockade,

11 and the airport in Butmir was attacked too.

12 JNA forces captured Alija Izetbegovic when he landed in Sarajevo,

13 as they believed he was in charge of the army that carried out the

14 attacks against the JNA. Negotiations were held, and the attacks on the

15 JNA were suspended on 2nd and 3rd of May. However, despite agreements

16 previously made, a convoy was attacked and JNA soldiers were killed. A

17 few soldiers were captured and imprisoned on which occasions they were

18 beaten abused. Further attacks were launched on the JNA military

19 features every day and the soldiers were under blockade at the barracks.

20 Throughout this the JNA command attempted to resolve the matters

21 peacefully by reaching agreements.

22 Muslim paramilitary units attacked JNA depots to obtain large

23 quantities of weapons. Many weapons had already been removed by them

24 illegally. Although agreements had been made to allow the JNA to remove

25 some weapons from the depots, Muslim forces attacked the vehicles

Page 31857

1 carrying these weapons and removed them from the lorries.

2 Milosav Gagovic was aware that Muslim forces used civilian

3 features to attack the Serb positions. Muslim forces constantly opened

4 fire against the Serbian residential areas and the JNA barracks. If the

5 Serbian artillery attacked parts of the city, these were attacks against

6 noticed military targets.

7 Milosav Gagovic, colonel, was co-operated with the legal

8 representatives of -- and ministers in the corps' zone of responsibility.

9 He did not co-operate with any paramilitaries. Crisis Staffs in those

10 areas formed Territorial Defence units where Serbs were the majority.

11 The JNA and Serbian Territorial Defence were not working towards the

12 division of Sarajevo. Their only task was to protect their homes and

13 their families.

14 And that would be the short summary.

15 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, I'd like to ask you to look at a

16 document which we have assigned the number 1D04202. I hope you have it.

17 A. Yes, I do have the document.

18 Q. It's not the document we have in e-court now. Can we please have

19 1D04202. Yes, this is it.

20 Colonel, sir, please look at the date, the heading and the

21 addressee, and then please turn to page 2, the bottom of the page.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you see the paragraph which reads:

24 "The nature of these meetings is still at the level of initial

25 organising efforts," et cetera, and then the sentence: "He claims that

Page 31858

1 he toured the areas of Sandzak, his native, Prijepolje, Rudo, Foca ..."

2 and then you can turn the page.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. "... Visegrad and other areas in the Drina valley." And now he

5 says here that the best organised illegal units are Muslim units in Foca,

6 that they have 2.000 members, that's units for special operations are

7 being formed and they should be given priority, that all the vital

8 facilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are being monitored and that --

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic. Mr. Karadzic, it's very leading.

10 Mr. Karadzic --

11 Mr. Tieger, would you like to say anything? I remember you rose.

12 MR. TIEGER: Yes, thank you, Mr. President. No, the -- you

13 anticipated me, and I think that's particularly the case in the context

14 of the objection that was raised and the ostensible purpose for bringing

15 this document to the witness's attention.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, would you like to respond.

17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I actually asked Dr. Karadzic

18 to ask the witness a general question about this document before calling

19 his attention to the specific part of the text and I think he should do

20 that.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologies.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Colonel, sir, were you able to have a look at page 3?

25 A. Yes.

Page 31859

1 Q. Were you familiar with these issues? Did you learn them from

2 this document or did you know of these issues from your general

3 knowledge, and how does this fit into your knowledge of the events ahead

4 of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

5 A. I did say in my statement that we at the corps command had

6 regular briefings by the corps commander -- or with the corps commander

7 of the situation in the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps.

8 Therefore, all the developments taking place in that period were the

9 subject of our briefings, including this particular information. The

10 undersigned Colonel Simovic briefed us on this matter and told us that

11 the eastern part of Bosnia was more busily working with the Sandzak area

12 and the area in Montenegro. So that when I saw this document, I clearly

13 said that I was aware of these issues. Not only concerning these areas

14 but also other areas that were matter of our briefings. Though I don't

15 think that the name of our former chief of the 4th Corps,

16 Fikret Selimovic, who was by that time already on the side of those who

17 were forming the SDA paramilitary formations.

18 Q. Thank you. I was waiting for interpretation. Can you look at

19 the first paragraph on page 3, which reads that some -- that he wanted to

20 attack some military depot but that the SDA leadership would not give

21 their consent. Can you tell us what -- can you tell us what was the

22 influence of the SDS over the JNA at the time?

23 A. At the time, the SDS didn't have any influence over the JNA at

24 the time, and this was true of all the other political parties. At the

25 time, the JNA was still the people's army, the army of all the various

Page 31860

1 ethnicities, and was recruited from the ranks of all the various

2 ethnicities except for those who refused to respond to call-ups, and at

3 that time it was already something that members of the Muslim and Croat

4 ethnicity did, and we already had the Rump Presidency at the time.

5 Q. As for your command, in early December of 1991, were there still

6 senior officers of Muslim and Croat ethnicities?

7 A. Yes. General Ante Karanovic, the chief of staff, was Croat.

8 There was Rasim Delic who was the operative in the operations department.

9 There was Muharem Nadza, colonel, and there were quite a few junior

10 officers, there were lieutenant-colonels who were in the command corps --

11 in the corps command.

12 Q. And who was the commander of the 10th Brigade at Lukavica?

13 A. It was Kari Kasanovic [phoen], Lieutenant colonel, and the head

14 of the artillery regiment --

15 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness be asked to slow down and

16 repeat his answer.

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, could you -- could you repeat your

18 answer, and when answering the question, please slow down for the benefit

19 of the interpreters. Thank you.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes. [Interpretation] I said that the corps

21 command at the time included Muslim and Croat senior officers. The chief

22 of the staff was General Ante Karanusic [phoen], a Croat, a native of

23 Split. The operations officer in the first sector was Rasim Delic who

24 later became the commander of the armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

25 that's to say the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was Colonel

Page 31861

1 Nadjak, a Muslim, the chief of ON Nov sector. The chief of the Motorised

2 Brigade, Enver Kari Kasanovic. He was a lieutenant-colonel of the JNA.

3 The commander of the 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment at Kiseljak,

4 Lieutenant-Colonel Polutak. The commander of the 6th Proletarian Brigade

5 in Doboj was Lieutenant-Colonel Cazim Hodzic. They were officers who

6 held key positions and they were Croats and Muslims. Of course, there

7 were more officers also among those who held lower-level positions across

8 the brigades until 1992.

9 Q. One more question, Colonel. On page 3, it is stated that he

10 asked that a unit of specialists be set up for covert execution or

11 assassination. Was there anything that hinted at this?

12 A. Well, we knew of a list of people who were members of the JNA of

13 Serb and Montenegrin ethnicities who were on this list for assassination

14 or liquidation. There were already telephone threats to family members

15 of these JNA officers, threatening messages placed in their letterboxes.

16 The flats of some of the officers were stormed as well. We knew that

17 they planned their quiet liquidation, because we knew that they would

18 offer a taxi service to transport senior officers from the point of

19 Assembly to unknown locations where they would be subjected to blackmails

20 or liquidations.

21 Q. Okay.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I have no

23 further questions based on this document. I would now like to tender it

24 into evidence.

25 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Tieger?

Page 31862

1 MR. TIEGER: I have to under the circumstances I'm afraid I have

2 to renew the same objection. I cannot see how the fact that this witness

3 received the document somehow cleanses it of its underlying issues of

4 unreliability. To analogise to the case I raised before, in comparing it

5 to documents that had been rejected, it would be as if someone said, "I

6 received the official SDS organ which contained the interview of this SDS

7 official who wanted us to hear these things." Now, presumably that

8 wouldn't have changed the Court's ruling in that case, although, as the

9 Court is aware, I continue to believe that such information shouldn't be

10 admitted.

11 In this case, however, we have an informant, about whom we know

12 nothing, about whom the witness apparently knows nothing, and this

13 information which has been the subject of the discussion about whether or

14 not it is sufficiently reliable for admission should -- should be

15 admitted. And nothing the witness said to that added in any way.

16 The witness contextualised it in a sense but that doesn't change

17 the admissibility issue because in the previous case, as I mentioned

18 before, the -- that issue concerning admission, whether it was

19 contextualised, affirmed, or whether it served as impeachment also

20 existed in the previous case as impeachment, so we get to the underlying

21 issue of -- apparently of reliability, and that's -- which is why the

22 accused was asked to address this document. And we now understand that

23 this witness has been receiving information of this sort, which is

24 essentially a statement from the agent Semso about whom we know nothing,

25 which is much less than we knew about the person who was making the

Page 31863

1 statement that we -- that was tendered in the instance I described before

2 but was rejected.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. The simple answer to this is

5 this goes entirely to weight, and you've admitted before many documents

6 similar to this on behalf of the Prosecution reports of state security,

7 reports of Muslim police organs who took information from other people,

8 so I don't think that this is inadmissible for the reasons stated by

9 Mr. Tieger.

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, the Chamber agrees with Mr. Robinson's

12 objection. The witness confirmed some part of the document, and as you

13 indicated, contextualised the document. We'll admit it as Exhibit D2739.

14 But there seems again to be another problem with the videolink. Just let

15 us check.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the meantime, may I ask --

17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Tieger.

18 Yes. Yes, Mr. Tieger.

19 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, just to raise one point and not to --

20 this is not to revisit the ruling itself, just to make a point because

21 these issues are recurring and sometimes it's useful at the moment to

22 make an observation that may bear on future tendering and discussions of

23 admission.

24 First of all, I would ask the Court in the future to consider the

25 circularity of the confirmation. I mean, you say that the witness

Page 31864

1 confirmed the information. The witness was getting this information.

2 That was the source of his information. So there's a circular aspect to

3 this. He's saying I knew about this based on this kind of document.

4 Again, that has the problem.

5 Secondly, I think it will bear on and I will -- we -- I think it

6 sheds light on admission and tendering of -- of other types of documents,

7 the type I described, and that's all I wanted to mention.

8 JUDGE KWON: Let's deal with the issue when it arises.

9 Mr. Karadzic, have you completed your examination-in-chief?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, your Excellency. In -- on

11 page 18, in line 25 and on page 19, line 1, Mr. Tieger mentioned the SDS

12 out of the context. I don't see what this sentence means at all. This

13 isn't a report by the SDS but by an official organ of the JNA?

14 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Robinson knows what the reference meant and can

15 explain it to the accused.

16 JUDGE KWON: Let's leave it there.

17 Mr. Karadzic, the witness statement said that he was an acting

18 commander of the JNA 4th Corps in Sarajevo in June 1992. Could you ask

19 him what military positions he took after that and when he retired.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Colonel, sir, who was the commander of the 4th Corps before you

23 took up that position?

24 A. It was General Djurdjevac, Vojislav Djurdjevac.

25 Q. Thank you. Before the next commander was appointed, you were

Page 31865

1 acting commander, were you not?

2 A. Acting commander of the 4th Corps. Stand-in commander of the

3 4th Corps.

4 Q. So acting commander would be different from the stand-in

5 commander, would it not?

6 A. Yes, yes.

7 Q. And how long did you stay in that position for?

8 A. From the 11th of May until the 20th of May when the 4th Corps of

9 the JNA was reformed or transformed. And I stayed in Lukavica until the

10 1st of June because of the units that were under a blockade in the

11 barracks in Sarajevo. I stayed until the blockades were lifted, and the

12 last was -- blockade was lifted on the 5th of June at the Lukavica

13 barracks.

14 Q. Thank you. Do you recall when it was that General Mladic came to

15 the 2nd Military District and who had appointed him?

16 A. General Mladic came to the 2nd Military District on the 10th of

17 May. He took up the position of acting commander of the military

18 district, and he was appointed by the national secretary for People's

19 Defence.

20 Q. Thank you. Do you recall was the decision taken significantly

21 ahead of the outbreak of the conflict?

22 A. I don't know if it was taken earlier on, but it was

23 Milutin Kukanjac who held that position before him.

24 Q. What became of you later? What were the positions that you held

25 subsequently and until what time?

Page 31866

1 A. After this position, I applied for retirement, but before that I

2 used up my annual leave for three months, and officially it was on the

3 1st of November, 1992, that I was retired.

4 Q. Thank you. Colonel, I don't have any further questions for you?

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, as you have noted, your evidence in

7 chief has been admitted in most part in written form, i.e., through your

8 written statement. Now you'll be cross-examined by the representative of

9 the Office of the Prosecutor.

10 Mr. Tieger.

11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

12 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

13 Q. Good morning, Colonel. I presume you can hear me. It seems --

14 A. Good morning. I can hear you very well.

15 Q. Excellent. Colonel, I want to ask you about a number of

16 documents, in particular intercepted telephone conversations in which you

17 participated. I noted in your Dragomir Milosevic testimony that at one

18 point you asked one of the attorneys why they -- why that person hadn't

19 shown you a particular intercept that you considered existed reflecting a

20 conversation you had, and I'll try to put as many of the precisely

21 relevant ones to you as I can at the moment.

22 First, Colonel, I would like to ask you about 65 ter 30743. And

23 for the benefit of the registrar who will be showing you documents and

24 who may already be aware of the organisation of the binder of hard

25 copies, they are presented in D order, P order, and then 65 ter order,

Page 31867

1 all of which are presented numerically. So the 65 ters will be found

2 toward the back of the binder, and this one is 30743.

3 Now, Colonel, I can play you a portion of this if necessary, but

4 as I said, I understood from your Dragomir Milosevic testimony that you

5 were aware of the fact that many telephone conversations had been

6 intercepted and recorded, and so in the interest of expediency, I'm

7 presenting you with the transcript of those conversations. And this is

8 one that is dated the 11th of May, 1992. And if you look --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And it's between -- first, as we see in the transcript, between

11 yourself and General Mladic. And you are advising him that Baros is on

12 the phone. And then General Mladic goes on to speak with Mr. Baros, and

13 I'll ask you about that in a minute.

14 At this time -- at this time, Colonel, 11 May, where -- where

15 were you and General Mladic located?

16 A. I was in Lukavica --

17 Q. And --

18 A. -- at the barracks called Cedo. General Mladic came to Lukavica

19 from time to time. He came on the 10th to tell us that he had assumed

20 the duties of the commander of the 2nd Military District, and he was

21 moving from unit to unit getting to know people, and he met General Baros

22 by telephone. Because Baros did not have his own telephone he was using

23 mine, and contact was made with him from one radio to another because he

24 was in the Marsal Tito Barracks.

25 You have this conversation, which I didn't know about, because

Page 31868

1 out of decency and subordination I did not listen to everything, but I

2 know that Baros was told that Mladic had taken up the place of

3 General Kukanjac as commander of 2nd Military District.

4 Q. All right. Now, as we see from the discussion as it continues,

5 Baros raises the issue of people coming to the gates, and in that case

6 that would have been, as you've explained, to the Marsal Tito Barracks;

7 is that right, Colonel?

8 A. Yes. Concerning these people that Baros is talking about, they

9 were practically civilians who were intimidated in the city of Sarajevo.

10 They were leaving their homes and fleeing to the Marsal Tito Barracks,

11 which was the closest one to them, being located in the centre of the

12 city, near the railway station.

13 Q. Okay. Colonel, you've indicated that out of decency and

14 subordination you didn't listen to the entire conversation, but as we

15 continue in the discussion, and I turn your attention to the fourth page

16 of the transcript, the B/C/S transcript before you, we see that

17 General Mladic advises Baros that Gagovic is listening, and he will

18 continue, and then you and Baros can continue the conversation that had

19 begun before you got General Mladic on the line.

20 A. Yes. But before that, the general warned me that I can continue

21 with Baros.

22 Q. Yes. I can see that in the transcript. And after returning now

23 to the earlier part of the discussion shortly after General Mladic began

24 talking with Baros and Baros identified the nature of his concern about

25 people at the Marsal Tito Barracks, General Mladic reassures him and

Page 31869

1 tells him to hold on tight and that negotiations will proceed that day

2 concerning release of property, people, and weapons; correct? And I

3 think you'll find that on the second page of your transcript.

4 A. As far as I know, Baros was preoccupied with the civilian

5 population that was at the Marsal Tito Barracks. There were many

6 families, including women and children; families, many of them of

7 military personnel; and some families whose men had already left

8 Sarajevo, leaving them behind. And there was pressure from Muslim

9 military units to surrender, leave behind all the weapons. Baros said

10 there was no danger that they would do that, because he was prepared to

11 defend the barracks.

12 Q. Well, and General Mladic offers him further reassurance about

13 holding tight, and that is when he reminds him that you are still in a

14 better position than they, meaning the Muslims are, that they have been

15 sealed off.

16 "The entire town has been sealed off, and the entire Muslim

17 population. They can't touch you. I will put it to them today in no

18 uncertain terms, because if they dare touch a single hair on the head of

19 any of our members or on the head of any member of our soldiers'

20 families --"

21 A. Well, you see, I don't know how much you know about the

22 environment of Sarajevo. Many areas in Sarajevo and around were

23 populated by Serbs, and in those areas Serbs self-organised themselves to

24 defend their homes and property. That is the kind of encirclement

25 surrounding that Mladic was talking about. And there were daily raids by

Page 31870

1 Muslim units on all sides that created panic among the Serb population,

2 intimidating them so that they would leave even those peripheral areas

3 like they left the central areas of Sarajevo.

4 You know, I had my own private apartment. I wanted to live in

5 Sarajevo among my friends, but I had to relocate my family because there

6 were daily threats. Those were the paramilitary units that were

7 supported and given incentives by the authorities. They wouldn't have

8 been doing those things if they had no support from the government.

9 Q. Colonel. Colonel.

10 A. And when I say authorities, I mean the authorities led by the

11 president of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic.

12 Q. Colonel, I have a limited amount of time with you. I -- this

13 is -- these are matters that you had an opportunity to and in fact did

14 raise in the statement you provided the Defence. I'm asking you specific

15 questions about certain issues that arise, and in this particular case

16 about this intercept. I will appreciate it in future questions if you

17 can concentrate on the issue at hand, the question raised, and you can

18 leave it to the Defence if they want to ask you for further elaboration

19 of the context or reasons for those issues. Thank you.

20 MR. TIEGER: Just before the break, Mr. President, I would tender

21 this document.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit it.

23 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P6069. Thank you.

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, we'll have a break for half an hour and

25 resume at 3 past 11.00.

Page 31871

1 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

2 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

3 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any problem with the videolink?

4 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, if that's directed toward -- okay.

5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, do you hear me in your language?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Now we can see you, Mr. Gagovic.

8 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Q. Colonel, I'd next like to turn to another conversation that took

11 place on the 19th of May. This time first between you and

12 Lieutenant-Colonel Jankovic and then Jankovic and General Mladic, and

13 that's found at -- that's 65 ter 30775. I'll give you just a moment to

14 orient yourself on that transcript, Colonel. It's not terribly long, and

15 as you should see from a glance, it is another occasion on which you

16 answered a --

17 A. All right.

18 Q. -- answered a phone call and put General Mladic on the line. And

19 again, this is about the -- initially about the evacuation of the

20 barracks issue, as you can see; correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. General Mladic explains to -- seeks information from Jankovic

23 about what the Muslim interlocutor wants, and learns, as you see in the

24 first page of the transcript, weapons in the same state they found them

25 in, and General Mladic talks about the circumstances in which they, and

Page 31872

1 particularly the Muslims, will be able to enter the barracks, that is,

2 when they pass the separation line Jankovic indicates they want it before

3 and General Mladic says that won't happen. I take it that's consistent

4 with your recollection of circumstances at the time.

5 A. This was a relocation of the recruits from the Marsal Tito

6 Barracks after the lifting of the blockade. Jankovic was there with his

7 team to get things done, to relocate the barracks. However, there was a

8 dispute because the representatives of the Muslim side insisted that

9 nothing can be removed from the barracks apart from the personal

10 belongings of the recruits and officers. However, there were many

11 teaching aids in the barracks, although it may sound strange to you that

12 we considered artillery and other pieces as teaching aids. So Mladic was

13 not was not agreeable to that manner of evacuation. Instead, he wanted a

14 real assessment made as to what can be removed and what cannot, and the

15 objective was to relocate the recruits somewhere in the area of Grbavica.

16 I just established this connection, did not participate in this

17 conversation, but you know that all the telephone and other

18 communications went through my telephone number, because all the other

19 telephones were cut off apart from mine that was wire-tapped all the

20 time. So nothing could be decided in the corps command without my

21 knowledge or without my intervention.

22 Q. And -- thank you, Colonel. And again as we saw in the previous

23 conversation which took place on the 11th, General Mladic reassures

24 Jankovic in this case in two ways. Number one -- and you can find this

25 on page 2 of your transcript. Number one, he explains that -- that

Page 31873

1 Jankovic is in a better position than the Muslims, and he says, "We can

2 stay in our barracks a year. It's not the barracks which lack food in

3 Sarajevo." And then he also explains that if there is a threat coming

4 from the Muslim side that there will be dire consequences. That's the

5 section you'll see related to bringing in cisterns, that is Sarajevo.

6 Then he should bring cisterns in as happened in Mostar. "Tell Jovo

7 Divjak that him and I know one another very well." And then he

8 continues, "But he can bring in a cistern, but in that case he would

9 sentence first himself and then entire Sarajevo to death."

10 So in both conversations, Colonel, is it correct that

11 General Mladic was offering reassurance to the other military officials

12 he was speaking to by saying their situation was better than the Muslims'

13 and that the Muslims should not dare to take action because there would

14 be extreme consequences if they do; is that correct?

15 A. I would like to go into that conversation between Mladic and

16 Major or Lieutenant-Colonel Jankovic, simply because I did not follow

17 that conversation after making contact. And I made the contact because,

18 as I told you before, my telephone was the only one available to make

19 contact with the corps command.

20 Mladic, like all the negotiators, wanted to take as much as he

21 could, and there were threats to officers and personnel in the

22 Marsal Tito Barracks. This reference to cisterns filled with explosives

23 that would be driven up to the barracks was one of these threats, and

24 such a cistern would have the effect of an atomic bomb. But Mladic was

25 telling Jankovic that these were empty threats, a shot in the dark, as it

Page 31874

1 were. That's how I understand it.

2 Q. Thank you, Colonel.

3 MR. TIEGER: I tender this document, Mr. President.

4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Turning -- turning to the

5 authenticity or foundation for the admissibility of intercepted

6 conversations, I'm wondering if the Prosecution can advise us if this

7 particular intercept is among those in the record of the case which was

8 identified by the intercept operators or their supervisors as being an

9 authentic intercept. And the reason I raise that is because of the fact

10 that we've been trying to have our intercepts admitted, and the

11 Prosecution made a filing in December basically saying that essentially

12 we'll have to call the Muslim or Croat intercept operators back if we

13 want to have our intercepts admitted. So if that's going to be the way

14 we have to proceed, then I want to make sure that before the Prosecution

15 has any intercepts admitted that there's some foundation in the record

16 that it's been identified by the intercept operators or witnesses as one

17 of those which was authentic and reliable.

18 JUDGE KWON: You did not object to the admission of previous

19 intercepts, because the witness was one of the interlocutors.

20 MR. ROBINSON: Exactly.

21 JUDGE KWON: But here Mr. Gagovic does not appear.

22 MR. TIEGER: He does, Mr. President.

23 MR. ROBINSON: Other than answering the phone and passing it to

24 Jankovic, but he doesn't appear in the substance of the conversation.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger, would you like to respond?

Page 31875

1 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President, I would. Thank you. First of

2 all, I can -- let me respond directly to Mr. Robinson by saying that

3 this -- this was authenticated in P4635, row 453, but more to the point,

4 I think -- I think it's --

5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. If it has been authenticated in that

6 exhibit, Mr. Robinson would withdraw his objection, I take it.

7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's correct.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be admitted.

9 MR. TIEGER: Yeah. But we're not trying to -- we are not and

10 were never trying to raise unnecessary hurdles to the admission of

11 intercepts. I think our acknowledgement in the filing we made was

12 consistent with the position we've taken about the intercepted

13 conversations and their reliability overall. So I don't -- I don't want

14 to sign on to the representations made by Mr. Robinson. And finally,

15 there maybe intercepts which -- that I'll be tendering here which are not

16 necessarily authenticated. So I -- sorry, I know you don't want academic

17 discussions --

18 JUDGE KWON: Let us proceed.

19 MR. TIEGER: -- but we'll get there.

20 JUDGE KWON: All right. Thank you. This will be admitted as

21 Exhibit P6070.

22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

23 Q. Colonel, in paragraph 39 of your statement, you made some

24 observations about bombings or bombardments in Sarajevo. I wanted to --

25 to draw your attention to one contemporaneous event about which you were

Page 31876

1 aware involving the bombardment of Muslim settlements in the area about

2 which you were contacted by a man named Zekerijah Smajic. I take it you

3 recall Mr. Smajic who was a well-known journalist from Jutel?

4 A. Yes, I do, correct.

5 Q. And just so the Court is aware, Jutel was a media outlet which

6 was somewhat of a symbol of multicultural Yugoslavia. Is that fair?

7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, could you kindly repeat your answer.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was Jutel's intention. It was

10 set up as a Yugoslav broadcasting channel, but it did not contribute much

11 to the progress of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the

12 contrary, sometimes even fuelled up the ongoing conflict between the

13 peoples in the former Yugoslavia.

14 MR. TIEGER:

15 Q. Can we turn to 65 ter 30745, please, and take a look at the

16 discussion that took place between you and Mr. Smajic on the 11th of May,

17 1992.

18 Now, it's a little bit longer than the other -- the

19 [indiscernible] conversations we looked at, Colonel, so let me try to

20 draw your attention to particular portions and identify where they can be

21 found in your transcript as well as in the English version.

22 So first of all at -- on the first page we see that Mr. Smajic

23 introduces himself, including some mention of his military background,

24 and also identifies himself as an inhabitant of the settlement Bresje.

25 That's found at -- so the introduction I mentioned about the military is

Page 31877

1 found at page 1 of your transcript, and the mention that he's an

2 inhabitant can be found at page 2.

3 He then explains that he got involved in some peace missions

4 after the shocking attack the day before yesterday and visited the

5 settlement of Sokolje. You can see that on page 2 as well. And then as

6 you'll see toward the bottom of page 3 of your transcript, he begins

7 talking about the all-out cannonade including attacks on the settlements

8 Boljakov Potok, Sokolje, and Bresje Brdo of the areas that he had visited

9 yesterday.

10 He continues to tell you that he believes that is in response to

11 or was connected to another shelling aimed at the barracks of Rajlovac

12 but that he says that came from the hill of Zuc and is 99 per cent sure

13 it was a case of intentional provocation.

14 He goes on at -- toward the bottom of page -- excuse me. The --

15 toward pages 4 and 5 of your transcript, talking about a conversation

16 that he had with Colonel Miletic -- excuse me. You tell him about a

17 conversation you had with Colonel Miletic, and that in response, after

18 hearing Miletic saying that he was being shelled from Brijesko Brdo, you

19 called Abdic and asked for his intervention to stop that in order to

20 prevent the responsive shelling and destroying facilities, houses, and

21 especially prevent killing people.

22 And then Colonel, we also see reference by Smajic to basically

23 again a denial that people from those areas are shelling. That they're

24 all in shelters.

25 Finally two more references I wanted to bring your attention

Page 31878

1 to -- well, first of all, Colonel, and before I go on to the final two

2 references, can I take it given the somewhat dramatic nature of this

3 phone call and the plea we were hearing from Smajic that you recall this

4 conversation and the information you were receiving about the shelling of

5 these three Muslim settlements?

6 A. I remember this conversation well. I knew Mr. Smajic from

7 before. He knew me as well. He knew that the JNA was a mediator for the

8 civilian population, that it protected the civilian population regardless

9 of ethnicity or religious affiliation. That's why he called me. At the

10 same time from Rajlovac, a person called Miletic, who was a director in

11 the military factory, complained of having been shelled, that shells were

12 falling on Rajlovac and the airport which was an auxiliary airport. On

13 the other hand, Hajrija called me to say the same things happened in his

14 area, that mortar shells were falling, that the population was scared,

15 and he asked me to do whatever was in my power to prevent all that.

16 Since Mr. Fikret Abdic represented the Presidency of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the 4th of May in a negotiation with the JNA I

18 talked to Fikret and asked him to talk to Miletic, because I spoke to

19 Miletic as well. I wanted the three of them to find -- find a solution,

20 because it was not just one side that provoked the other. Everybody

21 provoked everybody else. Who was it who started with provocation first

22 is something that I can't answer. And as for Zekerijah's words, that

23 nothing happened in his village, that fire was not opened from his

24 village, it was his village that fire was opened on. There were some

25 renegade Muslim groups that had at their disposal mortars. They would

Page 31879

1 mount those mortars on a lorry, they would fire a projectile or two on a

2 location, then they would change locations, and they never gave a second

3 thought to the place where the projectile would fall. Sometimes there

4 were projectiles fall among their own. Sometimes they fell on the

5 Serbian side.

6 I spoke to all three of them, and at the end, we could not

7 conclude who was it who opened the fire first, where the projectiles came

8 from. Mr. Smajic had been an anti-aircraft officer. He then completed

9 his university studies. He became a journalist. He's still a

10 journalist. He was a good journalist then, and he continued being a good

11 journalist. He's a good man and a good professional. And regardless of

12 his professionalism and knowledge of military issues, I'm sure that he

13 could not devise where the projectiles came from. He could only assume

14 as did I, as did Fikret, and as did Mr. Miletic.

15 Q. Well, Colonel, one the things you told Mr. Smajic was that when

16 he was asking for those salvos and destruction to stop was that the

17 party, and you can look at it in context by which it seems clear you

18 meant the SDS, has significant influence. They are armed en masse. They

19 picked up the arms from Faletici. They have lethal weapons at their

20 disposal. And that's found, Colonel, at page -- the second-to-last page

21 toward the bottom of your transcript.

22 So it's correct, is it not, Colonel, that when Smajic called you

23 to beg for intervention to stop the shelling, you referred to the massive

24 arming of the SDS and their possession of lethal weapons?

25 A. I wouldn't say that I had an occasion to discuss that. I didn't

Page 31880

1 mention the SDS, because the SDS did not have any weapons as a party.

2 The term that sometimes appears in my conversations and in the

3 conversations conducted by others refers to something that was used by

4 the other side, the Territorial Defence which was a territorial structure

5 among Muslims and Serbs alike is something that they did not want to

6 refer to as the Territorial Defence. They called it the SDS army,

7 because at the same time they called their own armed forces the

8 Territorial Defence. However, the SDS as a party, as far as I know,

9 never had any armed formations.

10 Q. Colonel --

11 A. Up to the moment when the Serbian Army was set up, they did not

12 have any army, because members of the Serbian ethnicity responded to the

13 JNA call-ups, and able-bodied men joined units of the JNA, either as

14 former recruits or volunteers. They replaced Muslim and Croat members of

15 the JNA who at that time from the end of 1991 onwards had stopped

16 responding to the JNA call-ups.

17 Q. And that's --

18 A. You were talking about lethal weapons, something that I

19 mentioned, but I don't believe that I ever used that term, because

20 everybody knows very well what lethal weapons are. At that time, neither

21 side had those. They could only have conventional weapons of the

22 infantry weapons type. I don't know whether I've answered your question.

23 Q. I believe you did.

24 MR. TIEGER: I tender this, Mr. President.

25 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I don't have any objection, but

Page 31881

1 with respect to this last question and the answer from the witness, I

2 don't think Mr. Tieger was that fair to the witness, because he made his

3 question very general, and then at the end of the question tied it into a

4 particular portion of this transcript. I think it would have been better

5 if he would simply have placed before the witness page -- what appears on

6 the bottom of page 8 of the English, the two answers that relate first

7 to -- with respect to Mr. Krajisnik, and then exactly what Mr. Gagovic is

8 recorded as having said, and ask him the question in light of that,

9 because his attention was never directly called to that particular answer

10 he gave, and I think the answer that he's giving, which seems to be from

11 memory, is not very responsive.

12 MR. TIEGER: I'm not sure how accurate that is. I thought I

13 directed the witness's attention to that portion of the transcript

14 explicitly and told him exactly where it could be found in his

15 transcript.

16 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I don't want to say anything in front of the

17 witness, but if you look at the answer that the witness gave that's in

18 the transcript, I think if he had read that answer, he would not have

19 given the response that he gave to Mr. Tieger's question. So I don't

20 think it was -- at least the way Mr. Tieger posed the question which

21 started from the general and went to the specific was sufficient to alert

22 the witness to actually read that portion of his answer and make an

23 answer that's responsive.

24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Mr. Gagovic, having heard Mr. Robinson

25 and read the remainder of the document, would you like to add anything?

Page 31882

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't see here what the

2 Prosecutor alleged, that I connected the arming of the Territorial

3 Defence with the event described to me by Mr. Zekerijah. It seemed that

4 the Territorial Defence had obtained a certain quantity of weapons when

5 it came in conflict with the Muslims in Faletici and that it was stronger

6 and that they had weapons, but those were conventional weapons such as

7 rifles, 79 millimetres and 76.2 semi-automatic weapons. Those were not

8 lethal or destructive weapons, and in that area where that case happened

9 that Zekerijah described, it's not there. It's a different part of the

10 world north-west of Sarajevo in the direction of Pale.

11 MR. TIEGER: This -- apparently there is no objection to the

12 admission of this document.

13 Q. Let me ask the witness the following: I want to draw your

14 attention to have you confirm something you said during the course of

15 your testimony during the Dragomir Milosevic case. And that is in

16 connection with depots and who took ammunition, and you said beginning at

17 page 8690 and extending into page 8691 of the Dragomir Milosevic

18 transcript:

19 "Smaller depots were spread throughout Sarajevo and the

20 environments. The largest one was in Faletici. Paramilitary forces of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina tried to get into these warehouses to get the weaponry

22 and prior to that they carried out large quantities of weaponry illegally

23 to say so. Then there was conflict between the forces of the Territorial

24 Defence of the Republika Srpska and the BH Federation forces and the

25 majority of the weaponry ended up in the hands of the Army of Republika

Page 31883

1 Srpska."

2 Now, that's a direct quote from the testimony you gave in the

3 Dragomir Milosevic case. Can you confirm that, Mr. -- Colonel Gagovic?

4 I'm not seeking --

5 A. Well, I have not changed that statement with my previous answer.

6 I said the same. Perhaps not in so many words. But in Faletici there

7 was no artillery ammunition. There were no artillery pieces, only the

8 infantry weapons were there, only personal infantry weapons such as

9 rifles, automatic weapons, and machine guns, but not lethal weapons that

10 could be used in the area mentioned by Zekerijah Smajic. It is true that

11 those two armed components conflicted in Faletici and that the

12 territorial forces which belonged to the Serbian side overpowered the

13 other side. They prevailed because they were stronger.

14 Q. Colonel, when you referred to the taking of weapons from Faletici

15 in speaking to Mr. Smajic, you're referring to exactly the same event

16 you're talking about in your -- you talked about in your

17 Dragomir Milosevic testimony, that is the taking of weaponry by the

18 members of or people associated with the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence

19 or, as you say in the Dragomir Milosevic testimony, the Army of Republika

20 Srpska. Isn't that right?

21 A. That happened only in the Faletici depot. The two armed

22 components conflicted, the Muslims on the one side, the Serbs on the

23 other side. The Serbs had prevalence and they managed to get hold of the

24 weapons from at that depot. As far as I remember, I testified about

25 that. But I did not mention that in my conversation with Zekerijah. He

Page 31884

1 mentioned something completely different, the arming of the Serbian Army,

2 i.e., the Territorial Defence of Serbia on the one side and the Muslim

3 Territorial Defence on the other. And I still claim that both used to

4 try and get hold of the weapons that belonged to the city of Sarajevo

5 from their weapons -- from their depots, some of them which were in the

6 city of Sarajevo. And when it comes to the operative part and the

7 manoeuvre part of the Territorial Defence, their weapons were stored in

8 Faletici.

9 MR. TIEGER: Again, Mr. President, I tender this document. I

10 tender the intercept.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Shall we give the number?

12 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P6071. Thank you.

13 MR. TIEGER:

14 Q. In connection with the taking of weaponry by the Bosnian Serbs

15 and their success in Faletici, I want to direct your attention to

16 65 ter 12028. And this is Mr. Milovan Bjelica speaking in

17 Srpsko Oslobodjenje, a publication set up by the RS on the 27th December

18 1994. If you turn to -- you'll see the third column of that article, and

19 it begins on the bottom half of the third column. He's asked about how

20 did you arm the people and explains in particular --

21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Let's make sure that the witness has

22 the document.

23 MR. TIEGER: Sorry.

24 Q. I see from the screen that was just put in front of you, Colonel.

25 If you can direct your attention to the third column, and the question

Page 31885

1 begins, "How did you arm the people ?" And it begins:

2 "Serbian Democratic Party organised all activities related to

3 preparation and organising of people for defence."

4 It talks about taking weapons in various places. And then it

5 concludes at the bottom of that paragraph:

6 "And our greatest success was taking the equipment and weapons

7 from Faletici."

8 And as he continues in the next full paragraph after that, it

9 talks about a confrontation at the -- at Faletici between the forces of

10 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb forces and their success in

11 prevailing in that confrontation and pulling out the weapons.

12 Now, I take it that in that respect you can confirm, as you did

13 before, that this is the same event you were talking about, that is the

14 removal of weaponry by Bosnian Serb forces after a confrontation with

15 Muslim forces or BiH forces.

16 A. I have read that part. I believe that this refers to that same

17 event. However, it was not that the weapons were only in Faletici.

18 There was a lot of it in the city of Sarajevo, in many facilities that

19 held the weapons of the Territorial Defence. After that case, the Muslim

20 side made a request to the JNA command, i.e., to the General Staff, to

21 compensate them for the two-thirds of that weaponry, because they

22 believed that that was as much as belonged to them. The General Staff

23 responded favourably and tried to implement that compensation, i.e., to

24 restore the weapons to the Muslim side from the depot in [indiscernible].

25 Several trucks of weapons arrived and they were supposed to be stored

Page 31886

1 in -- on the premises of the PTT engineering where UNPROFOR soldiers were

2 billeted. General Louis MacKenzie is well aware of that.

3 Q. Colonel, can I stop --

4 A. However, it was agreed that the weapons would not be

5 distributed -- yes?

6 Q. I'm always in the Trial Chamber's hands, but I believe you

7 answered my question and then went on to address some other issues.

8 MR. TIEGER: I think the Chamber is in agreement with me. Thank

9 you.

10 I tender this document, Mr. President.

11 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President. This is the same

12 category of documents we dealt with with the Tintor and Mrs. Plavsic

13 statements -- after the fact statements before Christmas recess and I

14 think it falls into the same category. This is a 1994 interview by

15 Mr. Bjelica which is reflecting back on events in 1992, and all the

16 witness has said about it was that it refers to the same event, and so I

17 don't believe that there is any basis for admitting it.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.

19 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I have to say these are constantly

20 moving goal posts by the Defence. This -- first of all, the objection

21 raised by the Defence earlier with respect to the Tintor documents that

22 Mr. Robinson has now cited was already a shifting of the standards for

23 admission that existed before, but just dealing with that now, what

24 happened before was that the argument was there was no affirmation of the

25 document. There is affirmation here. In addition, this document can

Page 31887

1 serve as either affirmation or confirmation or corroboration of what the

2 witness said with respect to the Faletici incident, or it would be the

3 basis for potential impeachment of that.

4 I had a discussion with Mr. Robinson some time ago. This is --

5 the issue about these documents is general reliability. This document is

6 clearly reliable for all kinds of reasons. It's produced through

7 Srpsko Oslobodjenje, a Bosnian Serb -- an RS publication. It's done

8 during the course of the war, not belatedly. Those were all standards

9 Mr. Robinson identified and agreed to in the previous discussions, that

10 is the ones that preceded the Tintor issue. It's affirmed to a

11 significant measure by the witness. There is no reason why the

12 Trial Chamber should be precluded from hearing this evidence. The fact

13 that it doesn't -- if we're going to -- if we're going to --

14 JUDGE KWON: By the way -- just, I'm sorry to cut you off, but my

15 question is this: Not all the documents have been translated and the

16 relevant part was read to the witness and we heard his answer. Do we

17 need to admit this separately in practical terms?

18 MR. TIEGER: I'm not sure if that means -- if -- if the issue

19 is -- if -- if what I -- yeah, I think we do, Mr. President. I mean, I

20 paraphrased. I don't mind -- I'm agreeable to the admission of only

21 those portions of the document to which I referred plus any necessary

22 contextualisation introducing the individual, but it cannot be the case,

23 I submit, that we -- we hear the entirety of a document that relates

24 information provided by an unnamed informant about whom we know nothing,

25 but we don't hear precise focused information from an SDS official

Page 31888

1 through an official SDS publication designed for dissemination and to be

2 heard by the public and the world.

3 This is clearly significantly more reliable information and

4 should be admitted for that -- for that reason.

5 Now, I could read -- I could read into the record the entirety of

6 the exchange in the document verbatim, but I did not do so, and this is a

7 faster way of doing it.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. The Chamber will admit only those part

10 put to the witness. Shall we give the number. 6072. Yes,

11 Exhibit P6072.

12 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

13 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Just so I understand,

14 are you admitting that to -- in the context to the witnesses answer as

15 opposed to for the truth for all purposes?

16 JUDGE KWON: That goes to the weight, Mr. Robinson, but I will

17 consult with my colleagues.

18 MR. ROBINSON: Before you do, if I could just be heard on this.

19 This is also something that Mr. Tieger and I are always arguing over and

20 discussing.

21 So let's say that Mr. Bjelica had testified in one of the

22 early -- in the Tadic trial, one of the earlier trials, and had said

23 something like this, and then would you admit his testimony, because if

24 the witness simply said yes that talked about the same event, would you

25 admit his testimony into evidence from the Tadic trial into this trial?

Page 31889

1 And I would suggest that you would not.

2 And the reason we're objecting to these and what distinguishes

3 these from other documents is that these are not contemporaneous but they

4 are reflective recollections of what happened years before the event, and

5 for that to be admissible, we think the witness ought to be here to be

6 questioned about it.

7 And that's difference between other documents and these documents

8 like Tintor, Mrs. Plavsic book, and this, because when a witness is

9 simply recounting his recollection after the fact of an event, that's

10 like testimony, and that's in a different category than contemporaneous

11 things that are said at the time, and that's why we think that you have

12 throughout the case drawn a line for admitting contemporaneous documents

13 that a witness could comment on and not admitting documents which were

14 not contemporaneous but were -- where people were reflecting upon events

15 that they'd experienced, and we believe that that affects the fairness of

16 the trial and not necessarily a question of reliability. Testimony would

17 be reliable, but nevertheless, we don't think it should be admissible

18 without a witness coming and being able to ask the witness about that

19 recollection that they're giving about past events.

20 So that's the basis for our objection, and we think that by

21 admitting this and having it go to the weight, it defeats the purpose of

22 our objection, which is that the fairness of the trial is maintained by

23 not allowing people to be giving evidence on reflection of events that

24 occurred earlier. Thank you.

25 MR. TIEGER: And, Mr. President, if I may. A moment's

Page 31890

1 reflection -- sorry.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

3 MR. TIEGER: I'll also try to listen to the French transcript, I

4 take it.

5 I was about to say that a moment's reflection, maybe not even

6 that, would make clear that this is not analogous to testimony. If it's

7 analogous to anything, it's far more analogous to the Assembly sessions,

8 for example, which both parties agreed should properly be before the

9 Court and are indeed before the Court.

10 We are not suggesting that everything that is said at any point

11 should be admitted to the Court. It's a case-by-case basis. What I am

12 saying is that this bears no relationship to the rationale which would

13 preclude the admission of previous testimony without abiding by the lex

14 specialis provided. If you're going to draw any analogy at all, I

15 suggest you -- that the analogies relevant here militate strongly in

16 favour of admission, because we've admitted documents of the -- of the

17 same sort. So when you have a document like this intended to for

18 dissemination generally during the events in question, that is during the

19 course of the conflict through an official publication by an official,

20 that's without -- setting aside efforts to spill over into other

21 potential documents, looking at this -- this particular document or any

22 documents that are exactly of that nature, it's clear that there's more

23 than ample reliability and they fall within the category of documents

24 that we have admitted without question, and both sides have urged the

25 Court to admit and consider in this case.

Page 31891

1 JUDGE KWON: I think this is just a storm in a teacup. The part

2 read to the witness is very short paragraph, and the witness confirmed to

3 a certain extent with the content of the paragraph. So I didn't see any

4 problem with admitting that paragraph.

5 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Mr. President. Just to clarify.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

7 MR. TIEGER: It's just so we don't get lost. I referred to what

8 technically constitutes three paragraphs but --

9 JUDGE KWON: No. But I limited to the one paragraph starting

10 with "How did you arm the people?" I think that's the part that was read

11 to the witness.

12 MR. TIEGER: Yeah but I -- no, I --

13 JUDGE KWON: Well, I'd like -- if you need other paragraphs, why

14 don't you put those to the witness.

15 MR. TIEGER: I did, Mr. President. I talked about the battle at

16 Faletici, the confrontation with Muslim forces. That's -- and I

17 indicated to him that was contained in the next full paragraph, so I

18 think I explicitly referred to the paragraph that begins: "How did you

19 arm the people," and then the next small paragraph and the next full

20 paragraph after that. Those were very explicit references - if the Court

21 will check the transcript - with the paraphrase of what that contained.

22 JUDGE KWON: Could you gave the para -- the transcript page and

23 line number?

24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. 41 --

25 JUDGE KWON: 41, from line 10.

Page 31892

1 MR. TIEGER: Correct. So it ends "Our greatest success was

2 taking the weapons and equipment from Faletici."

3 JUDGE KWON: Faletici.

4 MR. TIEGER: And as he continues in the next full paragraph,

5 "after," et cetera. That's just what I referred to a moment ago.

6 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, the --

7 MR. TIEGER: I referred to that first paragraph which ends with

8 that sentence in order to orient the witness. And then I said:

9 "As he continues in the next full paragraph after that, it talks

10 about a confrontation at Faletici between the forces," et cetera, et

11 cetera.

12 All that's contained in the paragraph that begins:

13 "It was probably Gagovic."

14 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure the witness answered or commented

15 anything about the next paragraph but let's leave it. I will have a

16 consultation with my colleagues.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will defer the ruling on this issue in

19 due course.

20 Yes, let's continue, Mr. Tieger.

21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

22 Q. Mr. Gagovic, I want to follow up on the events in those

23 particular settlements that were the object of -- or the subject of

24 discussion on the 11th of May with Mr. Smajic, and in that connection I'd

25 like to turn to 65 ter 32794, and these are conversations that took place

Page 31893

1 some days later on the 16th of May.

2 There are two conversations in this exhibit. Let me turn to the

3 first one, Colonel, and that reflects a telephone call you made to

4 Mr. Vukota asking first is he there. He says, hey there old pal. You

5 ask what's up. He talks about pressures from all sides, from Pofalici,

6 Velesici, Boljakov Potok, Buca Potok. They are a group of crap,

7 unbelievable. He says he's striking but he's got no wheat, et cetera.

8 First of all, Colonel, can you tell us who Mr. Vukota was? If

9 you need more time to look at the document, that's fine too. I'm not

10 trying to rush you through.

11 A. Lieutenant Vukota Vukovic had a doctorate in political sciences

12 and was a teacher at the school in Rajlovac. Since he hailed from the

13 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he stayed behind in Rajlovac. As far as

14 I remember, he was the one who called me.

15 On the first day, the Muslim forces committed a massacre in

16 Pofalici. I think that's common knowledge. Elderly people and women

17 were -- and children were killed. Even an elderly person bearing my

18 family name was killed. He was informing me of the fact that this group

19 of people, of the Muslims, were heading from Buca Potok towards Zuc and

20 Rajlovac. This was a threat to the Serbian population that had already

21 fled from elsewhere to Rajlovac.

22 In that conversation I told him, well, you do have these forces,

23 and put up resistance. Don't allow them to break through. From what I

24 can see here, he was saying that they were putting up resistance but said

25 that they were lacking in grain. I think he meant ammunition. That's

Page 31894

1 all that I remember of this conversation with Mr. Vukota Vukotic, unless

2 there was another person by that name, but I don't think so. He worked

3 in the military school centre in Rajlovac. He was not within -- under

4 the command of the corps forces. He worked there as a person who had a

5 Ph.D.

6 Q. And can you continue to read the rest of the exhibit, the rest of

7 the document where there's another phone call between you and Vukota. Is

8 that a continuation of the same issue regarding with a little more

9 specificity about what should be targeted?

10 A. That conversation happened on the same day, I'm sure. I asked

11 about the situation in the field. I asked if they were able to resist

12 these manic hordes, as I called them, that were advancing toward the

13 population. The answer was that they were still advancing and that with

14 some assistance they would be able to prevent these attacks. It was

15 common knowledge that if the JNA provided support, then they would

16 provide a barrage fire between the parties to the conflict. In this way

17 they would halt these forces, would not allow them to advance. They

18 would be forced to stay where they were or even pushed back to the

19 positions that they started from.

20 On that same day, I spoke to General MacKenzie and Fikret Abdic,

21 but I don't see any record of my conversations here. General MacKenzie

22 intervened with the president of the Presidency, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.

23 In the afternoon hours, the attack against Rajlovac across Zuc was

24 aborted, was stopped.

25 Q. And with respect to barrage fire, that's the -- if we look at the

Page 31895

1 first page of the first intercept --

2 A. [No interpretation]

3 Q. Sorry, I didn't get a translation, Colonel. I was just asking

4 you that you mentioned common knowledge that JNA provided support.

5 That's a reflection of the exchange between you and Vukota, "Just tell me

6 where I should cover you from," and his comments, "Strike with all your

7 strength on those. You won't be wrong;" correct?

8 A. You see, the terminology used by people who were not familiar

9 with military matters was quite random. In the army, you cannot fire

10 with all your might. You need to use precision fire. You need to open

11 fire only in the areas where the population is to be protected, to

12 prevent this horde from making an onslaught and repeating the massacre

13 that was committed in Pofalici where they killed everyone in their way.

14 There were women and children killed, even an elderly pair aged 99 who

15 were not even able to move or go out of their house.

16 This is where the home of General Mladic's mother was located as

17 well --

18 Q. Colonel --

19 A. -- that's to say in Pofalici. It was torched that day.

20 Q. Colonel --

21 A. He didn't know that his mother had managed to flee and he was

22 addressing --

23 Q. I -- again, you've moved beyond my questions and that's why I

24 interrupted?

25 MR. TIEGER: I tender 65 ter 32794, Mr. President.

Page 31896

1 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted.

3 THE REGISTRAR: P6073, thank you. P6073.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. So pending the Chamber's ruling, shall we mark

5 it for identification, the Exhibit P6072. That's Bjelica interview.

6 We'll mark it for identification pending the Chamber's ruling.

7 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. Colonel, in your statement, in paragraph 36, you talk about

10 co-operation with the legal representatives of the people in the corps's

11 zone of responsibility. I'm sorry. I'm going to get to that in just a

12 moment, but I want to ask you one follow-up question to the documents we

13 just looked at. We looked at a conversation you had with Mr. Smajic on

14 the 11th of May, and we then looked at another conversation on the 16th

15 of May. I just wanted to turn quickly to your testimony in the

16 Dragomir Milosevic case at pages 8706 and 8707, because it referred to a

17 date in between that time. And there you say, and I'm quoting now:

18 "I had full control over members of the 4th Corps --"

19 And the question was, by the way, whether or not you, in terms of

20 military control, whether you had full, complete control, and that's the

21 question you were -- as acting corps commander, and that's the question

22 you were asked. And then you said quote:

23 "I had full control over members of the 4th Corps, but I did not

24 have full control over the Territorial Defence troops. That was

25 established on the 12th of May by Republika Srpska in an effort to start

Page 31897

1 putting together its own armed forces, its own army."

2 And I just -- I wanted you to confirm that that was your

3 testimony in the Dragomir Milosevic case, sir.

4 A. As far as I remember, I did say something along those lines in my

5 evidence and that's exactly how it happened. The Territorial Defence of

6 the Serb republic, that's to say the municipalities inhabited by the

7 Serbs, was at municipal level, at local commune level. The

8 municipalities established Crisis Staffs and this part of the Territorial

9 Defence, which was the territorial side of it, the immobile one, was

10 under the command of the Crisis Staffs. The corps command had under its

11 command the operative and manoeuvre units. My statement was along those

12 lines. As a stand-in commander of the corps, I was fully apprised

13 about -- of everything that was happening in the area that was under the

14 corps command.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, in -- I note that I am at about the

17 allocated time. However, I wanted to mention that in view of the

18 circumstances, the videolink, the nature of the intercepts, the longer

19 time taken by the accused, what I hope is my focus on relevant issues, I

20 hope that the Court will permit me to continue, but I wanted to note my

21 awareness of the allocation.

22 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed. But do you think you can finish

23 before the break?

24 MR. TIEGER: I'm going to try. I think that is a genuine

25 possibility.

Page 31898

1 Q. Now, Colonel, just before we paused there, I had indicated to you

2 that I wanted to ask you about paragraph 36 of your statement where you

3 talk about co-operating with both Mico Stanisic, the Serbian minister of

4 the interior, and Delimustafic, the Muslim minister. And in that

5 connection, I wanted to turn your attention to 65 ter 32789.

6 Now, this is a very short conversation, Colonel, that took place

7 on the 14th of May. You get a phone call from the communications centre

8 of the Serbian ministry indicating that the minister wants to speak to

9 you. He says -- he identifies himself as Mico Stanisic and asks if

10 you're okay. You say great. Asks what's up. You say, "Well, we are

11 waging war." He says due to the confidence of the number, I am not going

12 to -- I just wanted to tell you that I'm here in Vraca. So you can call

13 me if you need anything." And he gives you what appear to be a couple of

14 code-names, Karlo and Miler. As we see in other references, Miler is

15 apparently a reference to him.

16 This is a reflection, Colonel, of one brief contact you had with

17 Mr. Stanic?

18 A. Yes. Precisely so.

19 MR. TIEGER: Then I would tender this, Mr. President.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a telephone contact.

21 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P6074. Thank you.

24 MR. TIEGER:

25 Q. And I wanted to bring -- also draw your attention to your contact

Page 31899

1 with at least one other Bosnian Serb political or military official, and

2 you had repeated contact with Mr. Prstojevic; is that correct? The head

3 of the Crisis Staff and military figure in Ilidza.

4 A. Well, a military figure, I'm not sure about that, but he was the

5 president of the Serb municipality of Ilidza, and by virtue of his

6 position he was also the commander of the Crisis Staff. The municipality

7 of Ilidza fell under the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps, and

8 that they knew that the army was the one that that protected the civilian

9 population. They had a small force and they had had already two attacks

10 by the Muslim forces, and by that time they had quite a few victims --

11 Q. Colonel, please?

12 A. -- and after the 14th of May -- yes?

13 Q. That's an example of what I'm -- just describing to you. I asked

14 you a simple question and you proceeded to use that as a platform for

15 telling me everything you think I might want to hear about Ilidza. So

16 please wait for the question. Okay. By the way, when you say -- when

17 you say you're not sure about him being a military figure, does that mean

18 you don't know -- you didn't know at the time whether he was involved in

19 military affairs or is that a kind of subtle criticism of his military

20 prowess?

21 A. Precisely. He did not have military training. It's just his

22 position made him number one at the Crisis Staff.

23 Q. Okay. Thank you. Let me look quickly at three phone calls you

24 had with him. The first one is D01217.

25 It's very short. I'm looking to see whether you have it in front

Page 31900

1 of you yet. Ah. I'm not trying to rush the registrar.

2 Okay. It's Prstojevic calling you again. You say, "Hello,

3 Nedzo." He says "Great leader," to you, and he's indicating he doesn't

4 have powder for recoilless guns and asks if it can be brought to him and

5 notes that four personnel carriers are in the middle of combat.

6 In connection with the same matter I wanted to turn to P5667

7 before I seek any comment from you.

8 The previous conversation was on the 14th of May. This is on the

9 15th of May. The initial part of the conversation is trying to get ahold

10 of Prstojevic. You tell him, "You wanted to speak to me Nedeljko. Good

11 morning." He says, "Good morning. Listen, great leader," and you say

12 there are no great leaders we are all, et cetera, and he tells you he

13 needs urgent protection and he needs two armoured personnel carriers.

14 And you go on to explain to him that essentially armoured personnel

15 carriers don't grow on trees and in any event, you know the terrain he's

16 talking about and you think infantry alone will do.

17 And you can look at the second page of the intercept to confirm

18 that.

19 A. Ilidza was, I would say, one of rare Serb populated areas in

20 Sarajevo attacked by Muslim armed forces on two occasions. They suffered

21 civilian losses, and of course the JNA, because there were no particular

22 armed forces there except for the weak Territorial Defence, and there was

23 this prior decision by the Presidency and the command of the military

24 district that on the line between Serb territorial forces and the Muslim

25 forces --

Page 31901

1 Q. Colonel, Colonel, I'm sorry.

2 A. -- that a mechanised unit would come --

3 Q. It may be the case that the accused wants to ask you about the

4 precise circumstances in Ilidza in respect of the TO, the JNA, and so

5 forth, but I'm focusing for the moment on your contact with and

6 relationship with Mr. Prstojevic, and I might as well bring your

7 attention to one further document in connection with that. That's 65 ter

8 30 -- 32791?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to correct something

10 in the record. On page 56, line 22, the witness said mechanised units

11 that were using those APCs, and he probably meant to relate the APCs with

12 the conversation under review, and that's not in the transcript. That

13 mechanised unit was placed between the warring parties, and Prstojevic is

14 obviously asking for those same APCs.

15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, did you hear that? Do you confirm it?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think I've said that. That

17 was a JNA unit that was on the separation line between the armed forces

18 of the Serbian Territorial Defence on one hand and Muslim armed forces on

19 the other hand, and naturally all those municipalities and all these

20 units wanted to have some armour, and they wanted us to assign those two

21 APCs to them to feel safer when they toured positions in those armoured

22 personnel carriers. And I told them that armour is not to be used in

23 those hills. They should instead build a fortification for cover.

24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's move on. Do you have the

25 intercept Mr. Tieger referred to in front of you?

Page 31902

1 Yes. Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

3 Q. Now, in this intercept, Colonel, we see once again a

4 conversation. This was on the 16th. So we've seen them three days in a

5 row. We see Mr. Prstojevic getting in contact with you again. We see

6 the top of page 3 in the English and it's the middle of your page 3, I

7 believe. He reaches you. "Hello. He's here. You can talk to him, just

8 one moment, please." You say yes. Mr. Prstojevic again says, "Great

9 leader, I salute you." You say, "Hi there." Some pleasantries are

10 exchanged. Then he goes on to talk about the situation and some of his

11 needs. You can read on to see if that generally reflects the

12 conversation.

13 A. I don't see where --

14 Q. It's -- go past the first two pages and get to the third page of

15 your transcript, Colonel.

16 He -- after the introductory portion I talked about, he goes on

17 to talk about the people at Orao, his need for a trailer truck, and

18 asking you to assist him in sorting that out. Then he also talks about

19 the situation at Buca Potok, et cetera. Did you see that in the

20 transcript, Colonel?

21 A. Yes, I see that passage, but I don't see anything particular

22 about it apart from -- can I continue?

23 Q. No, that's --

24 A. Apart from the fact that Prstojevic was asking for --

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, what is your question, Mr. Tieger?

Page 31903

1 MR. TIEGER: Yes.

2 Q. Do these three intercepts, Colonel, reflect the general tone of

3 your contact with and Mr. Prstojevic and the general frequently of that

4 contact? Or was this an unusually busy period in your recollection?

5 A. That was a common occurrence precisely in those days because

6 Ilidza was attacked for the second time and it was in danger. Some

7 Muslims had already managed to get in the settlement itself, and we had

8 an intercept, including Abdic, where we were trying to intervene to repel

9 those Muslim forces which we actually managed to do. And he is asking

10 here for another vehicle apart from the two APCs in order to be able to

11 conduct some other business, and I told him that the JNA was not in a

12 position to help him. He should go to Orlovo. They had that industry

13 and could give him such vehicles.

14 I don't know why he addresses me as "Great leader." He must be

15 using that regional custom. But at one point I told him that we don't

16 have any more great leaders, that he should stop, but I see that it's

17 mentioned several times here.

18 Ilidza, generally speaking, was the most exposed part of Serbian

19 Sarajevo.

20 Q. Thank you, Colonel.

21 MR. TIEGER: I'd tender 32791, Mr. President. I have one --

22 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

23 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted as Exhibit D6075.

24 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I have one additional document, maybe

25 two, but I'd suggest we take the break now otherwise everyone's going to

Page 31904

1 be a little edgy. I mean, obviously I'm at the Court's disposal. I can

2 do what you want, but my suggestion would be we simply break now and I'll

3 conclude very quickly when we resume.

4 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

5 JUDGE KWON: How long would you need, Mr. Tieger, could conclude?

6 MR. TIEGER: Well, one document and one transcript reference. I

7 could optimistically say -- well, I mean these things are taking five to

8 ten minutes and sometimes longer if we get a little --

9 JUDGE KWON: If you could conclude in five minutes, please --

10 MR. TIEGER: I don't know that I can, but I'll do my best.

11 Can we turn please to P32787. I'm sorry. That's 65 ter 32787.

12 My apologies. The registrar may have understood without even mentioning

13 that.

14 Q. Colonel, you testified during the Dragomir Milosevic case at

15 page 8706 that you were in constant contact with, among other people,

16 Hasan Efendic. And this is a telephone conversation with

17 Colonel Efendic. First of all, can you confirm that that was your

18 testimony in the Dragomir Milosevic case, and then I'll move on to ask --

19 talk about the intercept.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, in this particular conversation on the 17th of May, the two

22 of you are talking about -- reach each other and provide each other with

23 an update on events including the discussion about movement from and

24 within the barracks and what happens to the weaponry; correct?

25 A. Yes. As far as I can see, that's how the conversation went.

Page 31905

1 Q. Okay. And then as we continue, there's a reference by

2 Colonel Efendic to the hope that people shouldn't get killed on both

3 sides and then the expression of the view that they're going to be

4 killed, and you say to him, "I agree completely that the lives of people

5 are the priority." And Efendic continues: "Let me tell you, they'll get

6 killed." So you're discussing the risk to various -- to people within

7 Sarajevo; correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And then you talk about who has been talking about various issues

10 of various people, who is in charge. Efendic suggests that you're the

11 boss, and you're the boss to Kukanjac as well. You say, "The hell I am.

12 It's just a coincidence," et cetera. You goes on to say you've always

13 been in favour of peaceful solutions and you feel bad that a single

14 bullet was shot in this town in the first place. Is that a -- sorry, I

15 didn't hear your response, sir?

16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear what the Colonel

17 said.

18 MR. TIEGER:

19 Q. Colonel, the interpreter did not hear what you said. If you

20 could just --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. Is that an accurate reflection as far as you recall --

23 A. First of all it's a conversation that I had with Hasan Efendic, I

24 believe at his initiative, but I'm not sure. I can barely read this.

25 It's a manuscript. I had problems with a group of my own members of the

Page 31906

1 armed forces that went renegade and started attacking barracks under

2 blockade and then they were also firing from mortars at JNA units in

3 Lukavica and forced the JNA members to respond with fire, and in this

4 exchange civilian population could suffer losses too. I was saying,

5 though, that there is nothing more valuable than human life, and that's

6 what we should strive for, but he stressed that he was impotent ...

7 JUDGE KWON: I think it's time to take a break. We'll break for

8 45 minutes and resume at 20 past 1.00.

9 --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.

10 --- On resuming at 1.27 p.m.

11 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

13 Q. Colonel, just before the recess, you were talking a bit about the

14 conversation you had with Hasan Efendic, and you had mentioned the fact

15 that the JNA received fire and responded with fire and in this exchange

16 civilian population could suffer losses too. And then you related that

17 back to a comment in the intercept concerning the lives of people being

18 the priority. So that's by way of background.

19 If we look at page 2 of the -- I think it's fairly deep into the

20 conversation, it's almost towards the end of the conversation, as

21 mentioned before, you talk about your regret -- or you express to Efendic

22 your regress that a single bullet was fired in the first place in the

23 town, and then Efendic says, "Well, buddy, you're destroying it." And

24 then by way of response, you ask -- you tell Efendic to ask a commander

25 there whether they were allowed to fire a bullet before someone fired at

Page 31907

1 them.

2 A. Yes, that's it.

3 Q. And then -- and then you tell him with respect -- apparently with

4 respect to his comment well, fuck it -- excuse me, well, buddy, you're

5 destroying it. You say that that status has remained the same, not

6 firing apparently until --

7 A. I don't have that document with me.

8 Q. I'm sorry. I didn't realise it had been moved. Let's try to get

9 that back in front of you.

10 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Registrar, that is 32787, 65 ter.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't find it here, the bit that

12 he's reading. In this document, there is the conversation between me and

13 Hasan Efendic about the evacuation of the cadets of the military school

14 from the Marsal Tito Barracks. That was the drift of the conversation.

15 The two of us were talking about the possible scenarios of what could

16 happen unless a peaceful evacuation of the barracks is allowed. We

17 concluded that this would not be to the benefit of either of the sides.

18 MR. TIEGER:

19 Q. The part I'm referring to --

20 A. I don't see where it is where the two of us --

21 Q. It should begin on page 4 of the transcript in front of you, the

22 B/C/S transcript.

23 A. Colonel Cadja was on the commission that was negotiating the

24 blockade of the barracks on behalf of the JNA General Staff. In this

25 section, we're not talking about any fighting, exchange of fire or

Page 31908

1 anything. Hasan didn't know what my function was at the time.

2 Q. And we went over that a little bit earlier. The part I'm

3 referring your attention to, look down to about the bottom two -- the

4 bottom third of the page, and then you say, "No. No. I've always been

5 in favour, as they say, and the peaceful solutions." And that's where

6 you say you feel bad that a single bullet was fired. He said --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. He says --

9 A. In our conversation, he was accusing me of --

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, please. Could you hear the question

11 and answer it, please. So let Mr. Tieger complete his question first.

12 MR. TIEGER:

13 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I realise it's difficult given the lag

14 sometimes to know when to begin.

15 So as you complete that portion of your discussion with

16 Mr. Efendic you continue - and that continuation of the discussion will

17 be found at the top of page 5 of your transcript - you say to ask him,

18 apparently, Enver, about whether they're -- he's allowed to fire a bullet

19 before someone fires, and then you say that status is the same, and then

20 by way of reacting apparently to Efendic saying, "Well, buddy, you're

21 destroying it." You point out: "But fuck it. You know when a shooting

22 occurs, then you know how the army reacts. They fire with whatever they

23 have. That's it." And that was all part of your discussion with

24 Mr. Efendic to explain the concerns he had about the city being

25 destroyed; is that right?

Page 31909

1 A. I don't know. This is an odd conversation. I remember my

2 conversation with Hasan Efendic well. He was offering me the duty of the

3 commander of the Territorial Defence for Bosnia-Herzegovina. He wanted

4 me to take up that duty because the cadets and the last of the forces of

5 the JNA were supposed to leave the territory of the BH. I suggested that

6 he found -- find a common language with the commander of the

7 Territorial Defence, because they were Bosnians, whereas I was from the

8 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I said that as soon as they allowed me

9 to leave, as soon as the blockade of the barracks was lifted, that I

10 would leave for my homeland. I don't know about the exchange of fire.

11 There may have been some. But this was at the time when I was still the

12 commander of the army. That was the 17th of May. I had already reformed

13 the JNA. By the 20th of January, the transfer of all the members of the

14 JNA who were from Yugoslavia was supposed to take place to Yugoslavia.

15 The 17th, the 19th of May, up to the 1st of June, I was there with my

16 assistant for political work, Colonel Jakovljevic, two members of the

17 escort, and a driver. However, at that point I did not offer as an

18 explanation the fact that I didn't have an army. Rather --

19 Q. No. I think you had previously discussed the -- the issue of the

20 JNA firing in response. It appears this is as far as we'll get with

21 further elaboration of this conversation, so I'll move on quickly to the

22 last very short subject.

23 MR. TIEGER: And I'll tender this conversation as an intercept,

24 Mr. President.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No objection.

Page 31910

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be admitted as Exhibit P6076.

2 MR. TIEGER:

3 Q. And the last thing I have, Colonel, is just to ask you to confirm

4 something you said in the Dragomir Milosevic case when you were talking

5 about who you were in contact with. I had mentioned earlier that you

6 testified about being in constant contact with Colonel Hasan Efendic, and

7 that's found at page 8706, and what you said there is, I quote, and after

8 talking about being in constant contact -- well, I'll read the whole

9 paragraph.

10 "I was in constant contact with the subordinate commands. I was

11 in constant contact with Fikret Abdic, a member of the BH Presidency;

12 with General MacKenzie; with Colm Doyle until the 7th of May, his tour of

13 duty ended then; and I was in constant contact with Colonel Hasan

14 Efendic, the commander of the Main Staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and --

15 and with the leadership of Republika Srpska.

16 "Q. By leadership of Republika Srpska, who in particular are you

17 referring to, sir?"

18 That's a quote of the question that was asked. And then you

19 answered:

20 "Well, specifically, we were in communication with the President

21 of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, at the time."

22 And then you go on to explain that you were in contact with your

23 subordinate commands by telephone.

24 Can I ask you simply to confirm that that was your testimony in

25 the Dragomir Milosevic case.

Page 31911

1 A. I never change my evidence. There's no reason for it. We were

2 really in contact with all these institutions and individuals.

3 Q. Thank you, sir.

4 MR. TIEGER: And I have nothing further, Mr. President.

5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

6 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, your Excellency, several

8 questions, and I will do my best to be as short as possible.

9 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

10 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, I need a few clarifications, brief

11 ones.

12 A. Go ahead, Mr. President.

13 Q. Let us start from the last. Are there two Hasan Efendics, or is

14 that the same Hasan Efendic who was elected on the 6th of April, or the

15 8th of April, and who replaced General Bajcetic.

16 A. That's the same Hasan. There was one Colonel Hasan Efendic who

17 was commander of the Main Staff of the Territorial Defence of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, of the Muslim Croat part that is.

19 Q. Thank you. Did you ever see the directive that he issued on the

20 12th of April and re-issued on the 28th or 29th of April about placing

21 extensive obstacles on roads and barricades and attacks on the JNA?

22 A. Yes. I did have this order of his. I believe that we intervened

23 with him as well as with the president of the Presidency of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, on this issue. Alija Izetbegovic

25 said that it was something that the commander did independently and that

Page 31912

1 this was not the position of the Presidency.

2 Q. Can you tell the Chamber what was going on in the field in view

3 of the 22nd of April and the attack on Ilidza, as well as the 2nd and the

4 3rd of May in Sarajevo, and the 15th of May in Tuzla? Were these

5 developments the result of what the Presidency intended or the result of

6 the orders of Hasan Efendic?

7 A. What happened in reality was the result of what Hasan Efendic

8 wanted, all these attacks on the barracks --

9 JUDGE KWON: Although the witness answered. Yes, Mr. Tieger.

10 MR. TIEGER: Yes. I'm objecting because I don't see how this

11 arises from the cross-examination. Furthermore, it's in elaboration of

12 the accused's examination-in-chief, insofar as I can recall, apparently

13 referring to documents that no one bothered to upload so we never saw the

14 translation for. So it's -- it's not comprehensible to me why we are

15 revisiting the statement and the examination-in-chief when not triggered

16 by inquiries made in cross-examination.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond?

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My learned friend Mr. Tieger has

20 suggested in his question -- questions that the JNA had demonstrated

21 their intention to open fire on the town while representing Hasan Efendic

22 only as a peace-loving lamb. Instead, we can see that in this document

23 he said that he should have opened fire sooner. I wanted to offer an

24 opportunity to the witness to tell us who this man was and what the

25 consequences of his actions were.

Page 31913

1 JUDGE KWON: So you opted not to tender that document or deal

2 with this document with that witness but now your going to deal with it.

3 Is that the case as indicated by Mr. Tieger.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I only wanted -- I don't know if

5 the Prosecution tendered this document, 32787. I believe that the

6 Prosecution tendered this document, and I want the witness to give us a

7 more in depth insight into it.

8 JUDGE KWON: I understood that you were going to deal with one

9 of -- there were three documents that were not translated.

10 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President, those three documents that were

11 not translated, we've abandoned those because they were admitted under

12 different numbers so we're finished with that. And I think that what

13 Mr. Tieger is referring to some intercepts that we had thought we might

14 use during the direct examination but opted not to use them, one of the

15 reasons being that we hadn't gotten anybody to send them to Ram in

16 Belgrade. So this I think falls squarely on the issue of whether the

17 Prosecution's intercepts that it played with Efendic is something that

18 Dr. Karadzic is entitled to respond to by showing the activities of

19 Efendic at the same time period.

20 MR. TIEGER: Well, whether it's dispositive on this issue or not

21 I am not sure, but it's not accurate to say that I was referring to

22 intercepts. I understood the accused to be turning now to 1D10067, as I

23 think the Court did as well, and in the manner that I don't think is

24 appropriate given the fact that he declined to do so at the appropriate

25 time. That's what I understand this is about, that we're re-opening the

Page 31914

1 direct examination for that reason. But in any event, that's what I was

2 referring to and not intercepts.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. That document is already admitted, so I

5 don't believe that Dr. Karadzic is seeking to admit it through the back

6 door during his re-examination.

7 JUDGE KWON: Then shall we move on.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My apologies. Perhaps I wasn't

9 clear enough. I was dealing with the last document tendered by the

10 Prosecution, 32787, the conversation between Colonel Gagovic and

11 Colonel Efendic.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Colonel, sir, have a look at page 2, the portion where Efendic

14 says: "The only thing we're doing is guaranteeing freedom for the

15 families, the cadets, and everyone else." And he wants to disarm the

16 artillery. Do you see that? It's the bottom half of page 2.

17 A. I understand this without looking at the document. I recall this

18 conversation with him. He could not be trusted precisely for the reason

19 that he decided that as many members of the JNA as possible be captured,

20 neutralised, killed, and at any rate not allowed to cross the border into

21 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This decision of his was already

22 being implemented on the 2nd of May and the 3rd of May, and on the

23 15th -- this was in Sarajevo, and on the 15th of May in Tuzla. There was

24 a unit deployed in Husinjski Rudara [phoen] barracks, and there over a

25 hundred members of the JNA came in harm's way.

Page 31915

1 Q. Thank you. So on the 17th of May you weren't able to trust his

2 guarantees; right?

3 A. Yes, definitely. There was a group of people who was speaking to

4 the General Staff and with some other institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

5 including Fikret Abdic and Hasan Efendic about the lifting of the

6 blockade of the barracks. And in this particular instance I said that

7 this man could not be trusted in view of what his previous actions were.

8 So he seized an opportunity in the case of these attacks to say, "Well,

9 you opened fire previously," and so on and so forth.

10 Q. I apologise. I'm waiting for interpretation, and please do so as

11 well.

12 Let me ask you this: It has to do with those telephone

13 conversations. Can you tell us where Varos was? Where were you, where

14 was Jankovic, and where was Mladic, physically?

15 A. Physically, Mladic was in Han Pijesak. Varos was in the

16 Marsal Tito barracks under a blockade. I was in the Lukavica barracks.

17 And Jankovic was the person who arrived there with a team of people to

18 evacuate the cadets of the secondary military school and the military

19 academy from the Marsal Tito Barracks.

20 Q. Thank you. What is the distance between you and the Marsal Tito

21 Barracks and between you and Mladic in Han Pijesak approximately?

22 A. Approximately between me and Mladic there was about 70

23 kilometres. I'm not sure. And between me and Marsal Tito Barracks there

24 was about 6 to 7 kilometres approximately.

25 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir. I just wanted to establish whether any

Page 31916

1 of your collocutors were in the same room with somebody else, but they

2 were not, were they?

3 A. No, no. We were all in different locations as it were.

4 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether you were abreast of the law

5 of All People's Defence and the doctrine of armed people?

6 A. Yes. I knew those things well. I had been through all the

7 military schools. I was also familiar with international laws and the

8 provisions of the Geneva Conventions dealing with prisoners of war and

9 the civilian population and so on and so forth. So I was familiar with

10 all those things.

11 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us who was it who had the right to use

12 Territorial Defence units? Which legal entities had the right to use

13 Territorial Defence units?

14 A. First of all, there --

15 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Your Honour --

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- it's a fact that territorial

17 units were connected to their own territories, as the name has it. They

18 are connected to municipalities, local communes, or companies. Even

19 universities in Sarajevo had their own Territorial Defence units. And

20 municipalities had the right to use them.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir.

23 JUDGE KWON: The last part of your question was very much

24 leading. Bear that in mind.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise. I'm in a

Page 31917

1 hurry, that's why. But I'm convinced that the colonel is very familiar

2 with that law.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. I'm asking you this, Colonel, sir, because you were asked about

5 your influence, i.e., your connections with the territorial units and the

6 units of the Territorial Defence that were under the authority of the

7 municipality. As far as you know, when it comes to the

8 Territorial Defence organisation, was anything done against the law at

9 the time?

10 A. No, nothing. This would be my shortest answer: No.

11 Q. Thank you. You were also asked, i.e., you were requested to

12 confirm that you had contacts with the President of Republika Srpska --

13 or, rather, the president of the Presidency at the time, Mr. Karadzic.

14 Can you tell the Trial Chamber whether Karadzic ever asked you to do

15 something that would be contrary to the law or that would be against your

16 role as the JNA?

17 A. Just the opposite. For as long as I was in that position and

18 while General Djurdjevac was in that position before me, you never tried

19 to request us to do anything against the law. I personally can say that

20 you requested your subordinates, your officers, not to dirty their hands

21 and treat the civilians, prisoners of war, and especially the wounded in

22 an inhuman way.

23 Q. While you were there did the JNA intentionally open fire on

24 civilians in Sarajevo? Did they do anything else in order to terrorise

25 the civilians in Sarajevo?

Page 31918

1 A. Never. No single shell was ever fired to inflict losses on

2 civilians. However, when fire was opened on the barracks, when mortar

3 fire and higher calibre fire was opened by the Muslim formations, things

4 like that happened. I believe that General Lewis MacKenzie understood

5 that. He was the UNPROFOR commander. However, those armed Muslim

6 components had mobile units on vehicles on which they mounted mortars,

7 and they would leap from one place to another. They opened fire. So

8 sometimes the civilian population suffered because fire was opened on

9 them. On one such occasion two soldiers were killed at the Lukavica

10 barracks.

11 Q. Thank you. Did you know somebody on the Serbian side starting

12 from the highest republican level to the municipal level who advocated a

13 position that the civilian population in Sarajevo had to be fired upon

14 and terrorised? Did you ever come across such an institution or such an

15 individual?

16 A. I never came across such an individual or such an institution.

17 At the time when I was there, the Serbian people did not have any

18 aspirations towards Sarajevo. They didn't have any aspirations

19 whatsoever towards Sarajevo. They only organised the defence of their

20 lives, their houses, their properties that surrounded Sarajevo. However,

21 you have to understand that Sarajevo was under blockade from inside, not

22 from the outside. Those people who wanted to leave Sarajevo could not

23 leave it because of the internal blockade that was organised by --

24 organised by the Muslims. Only those with fat pockets could bribe

25 somebody and leave the city.

Page 31919

1 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir. Just one more document and one more

2 question. A reference was made here, Colonel Miletic, maybe he was

3 major, I don't know what his rank was, he was in a conversation with you.

4 Where was he at that time?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D6303.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 A. Miletic was in Rajlovac. He worked in a factory that

8 produced ...

9 There was some interruptions. I don't know whether I completed

10 my answer.

11 Q. Colonel, sir, only half of your answer was recorded. You said

12 that he was in Rajlovac. Was there a military institution there? Were

13 there barracks there?

14 A. The centre of military schools was there, the airforce academy,

15 and the secondary military school was there. There was an auxiliary

16 airport there that was used for the training of some of those students

17 and high school students.

18 Q. Thank you. Could you please take a look at the document in front

19 of you. This is an intercepted conversation between you and Miletic.

20 Could you please tell us whether this document shows clearly who was

21 shooting at whom. Zekerijah says one thing and Miletic tells you what he

22 told you. Can you tell us what transpired on the 11th of May?

23 A. Fikret Abdic got involved in that conversation. He was in charge

24 of contacts with the JNA, General MacKenzie, and all the others who were

25 there. However, none of them, including me personally, could conclude

Page 31920

1 where the fire came from and disturbed people in the suburbs of Sarajevo

2 and Rajlovac.

3 Q. Thank you. Mr. Miletic offered you his telephone to demonstrate

4 to you the thunder going on in his territory and the shooting that comes

5 from the surrounding areas. Did you hear that?

6 A. Yes. I could hear the noise, but even the scouts noticed that in

7 that area of Rajlica [as interpreted] one could observe mortar shells.

8 Q. Whose shells were those? Who fired them?

9 A. Members of Muslim formations did that. I believe that

10 Sefer Halilovic was in command of those forces. Later on, he became the

11 commander of the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir. I have no further questions. Thank you

13 very much for your effort in coming to the location to provide your

14 evidence.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 JUDGE KWON: Are you tendering that?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, your Excellency. I would

18 like to tender 6303.

19 JUDGE KWON: That will be the next Defence exhibit. Yes,

20 Mr. Tieger.

21 MR. TIEGER: Well, in light of the nature of the questioning that

22 is about the sounds, and I think the Court will need it well to have the

23 audio to hear whether, in fact, the alleged sounds can be heard. So

24 we -- we will provide that audio. I think the nature of the questioning

25 pretty much compels that.

Page 31925

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

2 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

3 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Professor Hatchett.

4 A. Good afternoon.

5 Q. I would like to call up 1D05638 in e-court, please.

6 Professor Hatchett, or Dr. Hatchett, I don't know how to refer to you,

7 your career is rather impressive. Have you provided a statement to my

8 Defence team?

9 A. I have, sir.

10 Q. Thank you. Do you see that statement in front of you on the

11 screen?

12 A. I do.

13 Q. Thank you. Did you sign the statement?

14 A. Yes, I did. That's my signature.

15 Q. Thank you. Does this statement truly reflect what you stated for

16 the benefit of the Defence team?

17 A. Yes, it does.

18 Q. Thank you. If I were -- I were to put the same questions to you

19 today in this courtroom, would your answers be more or less the same as

20 they are in the statements of yours?

21 A. Yes, my answer would be the same as I've indicated here.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

23 statement pursuant to Rule 92 ter.

24 JUDGE KWON: And the associated exhibits.

25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. With respect to the

Page 31926

1 associated exhibits, there's three that we're tendering. One is the

2 excerpt of the video, which is 1D5593, and then the map and the article

3 in the newspaper.

4 JUDGE KWON: So you are not tendering the entire video?

5 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.

6 JUDGE KWON: Any objections, Mr. Tieger?

7 MR. TIEGER: No, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE KWON: So witness's 92 ter statement as well as three

9 associated exhibits will be admitted into evidence. Let us give the

10 numbers for them now.

11 THE REGISTRAR: They shall be given numbers D2741 to D2744.

12 Thank you.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

14 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. And now I'm going to

16 read a short summary of Dr. Ronald Hatchett's statement in English.

17 [In English] Dr. Ronald Hatchett served for 20 years as a

18 United States airforce officer working on intelligence and

19 politico-military affairs. After his military service, he served as a

20 civilian representative of the United States Secretary of Defence for

21 multinational security organisations in Europe. After leaving government

22 service in 1988, Dr. Hatchett taught at universities in Texas and

23 recently retired as the director of the centre for global studies at

24 Schreiner University.

25 On 13 to 18th September, 1992, Dr. Hatchett visited Pale with

Page 31927

1 other members of the Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, a

2 non-Partisan research centre devoted to the -- to studying affairs in the

3 Balkans.

4 During his time in Pale, Dr. Hatchett participated in meetings

5 with President Karadzic and other Bosnian Serb civilian and military

6 leaders. He was struck by the efforts President Karadzic was willing to

7 make to end the fighting and save civilian lives. In particular, when in

8 the midst of the discussion General Tolimir tried to get Dr. Hatchett to

9 say as a former military officer that the way to end the fighting around

10 Sarajevo was an all out Serbian military assault, Dr. Karadzic firmly

11 rebuked him saying, "I'm not going to launch a major military assault on

12 a city full of people, killing thousands on both sides, when I know that

13 we will not be allowed to keep this territory in a peace agreement."

14 During the discussions, at no time did Dr. Hatchett ever hear

15 Radovan Karadzic express the view that the Republika Srpska should be

16 ethnically pure and not include Bosnian Muslims and Croats.

17 Hatchett videotaped an interview with Dr. Karadzic during his

18 visit to Pale. He asked Dr. Karadzic what his position was on ethnic

19 cleansing. Dr. Karadzic responded that ethnic cleansing has never been

20 the policy of Republika Srpska and that after the end of the war, it

21 ought to be the obligation of all three republics to enable the refugees

22 to -- who wish to come back to their own homes to do so.

23 Dr. Hatchett had a private meeting with President Karadzic during

24 his trip to Pale. Dr. Karadzic told him that he had a proposal for

25 ending the war and asked Dr. Hatchett to take it back to the highest

Page 31928

1 level of the -- that he could reach in the United States government.

2 Dr. Karadzic's proposal was that Bosnia will remain a single

3 country comprised of two autonomous republics, Republika Srpska and the

4 Muslim-Croat federation. Each republic would have their own constitution

5 and government and will control domestic affairs within its territory,

6 including border access. The central government will represent Bosnia in

7 international organisations. Positions in central government will be

8 equitably shared between Republika Srpska and Muslim-Croat federation.

9 Bosnian territory will be split up proportion 49/51. He proposed a US

10 meditation -- mediation at a location away from media necessary, similar

11 to Camp David mediation between Egypt and Israel in 1979.

12 Dr. Karadzic also provided Dr. Hatchett a map which showed the

13 proposed division of territory. There was never any question that

14 Muslims and Croats would be allowed to live in the Serb areas, and Serbs

15 would be allowed to live in Muslim and Croat areas of the proposed

16 territories and that the rights of minorities would be respected.

17 Dr. Hatchett believes that President Karadzic genuinely wanted an

18 end of the war and thought that as a former US government official, he

19 might have the contacts to help him achieve this. Dr. Hatchett managed

20 to get the proposal to President Clinton who was reportedly excited about

21 it. However, he later learned that the proposal had been shot down by

22 the state government -- State Department.

23 Subsequently, the United States decided to convene negotiations

24 in a controlled area at a military base in Dayton, Ohio. This was

25 similar to what Dr. Karadzic had proposed in September 1994. The

Page 31929

1 agreement that was reached at Dayton in November 1995 resulted in the

2 same proportion, 41 -- 49/51 division of the territory that Dr. Karadzic

3 had proposed in September 1994. The map produced in Dayton does not

4 differ significantly from the map given to the -- to Dr. Hatchett by

5 Dr. Karadzic in September 1994. The political division -- divisions

6 agreed to in Dayton are also similar to those proposed by Dr. Karadzic in

7 September 1994.

8 [Interpretation] That would be a short summary of Dr. Hatchett's

9 statement.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Dr. Hatchett, I'd like to ask you as a man with rich experience

12 in military matters, have you had the opportunity to look at the nature

13 of the war primarily around Sarajevo, and the nature of the whole

14 conflict related to what is sometimes called a siege, that conflict in

15 the city that lasted 42 months?

16 A. While I was there, I was given the opportunity to visit Sarajevo.

17 In fact, I went down into the built-up area of Sarajevo where there was

18 still quite a significant Serbian population occupying a portion of the

19 city living there --

20 JUDGE KWON: Before you continue, Mr. Hatchett, yes, Mr. Tieger.

21 MR. TIEGER: Well, I was trying to define exactly where this was

22 going, but if it's seeking some form of expert opinion, it's way too late

23 for that. And furthermore, it -- this appears to be moving into an area

24 that has nothing to do with the statement and was in no way notified to

25 the Prosecution. So I'm a little -- I thought it might relate in some

Page 31930

1 way, but I am having trouble seeing how it's about to, and I wanted to

2 stop it before it moved any further if that's correct.

3 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. President, the question I believe it was

4 intended to elicit Dr. Hatchett's observations when he was in Sarajevo

5 which are depicted on the video that was disclosed to the Prosecution.

6 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let us continue then.

7 Would you like to respond, Mr. Tieger?

8 MR. TIEGER: I do. If there was an intention of eliciting from

9 this witness some view of -- some opinion on documents submitted, that

10 should have been done previously and it was not. And this is --

11 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, view of -- view on documents? I don't

12 follow. What documents do you have in mind?

13 MR. TIEGER: When -- in the normal course of business if a

14 witness is going to be asked to comment upon and evidence is going to be

15 elicited from a witness on materials, then the -- the adverse party is

16 notified of that, and there's been no such notification whatsoever. This

17 is coming entirely out of the blue. It's not in the statement. It's not

18 in the summary. It was in no way -- it's not in a proofing note. It was

19 not -- no indication that the witness would be asked to address such

20 issues has been provided to the Prosecution whatsoever.

21 JUDGE KWON: But speaking for myself, as long as the question is

22 limited to his observation during his visit to Sarajevo, I don't see much

23 problem, but I'll consult my colleagues.

24 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Can I also point out to

25 you that in the summary it says during their stay in Pale his group

Page 31931

1 toured the VRS positions in the hills above Sarajevo as well as the area

2 of Gorazde. So between the disclosure of the video and this portion of

3 the summary, I don't think there's anything wrong with asking him about

4 his view of what he saw in Sarajevo.

5 MR. TIEGER: That's entirely the point, Mr. President. I mean,

6 he focused on a very narrow part. I have no issue if he wants to

7 elaborate some ambiguity in the part that was notified, but this is

8 frankly a kind of trick to identify a very narrow portion and then claim

9 that it gives rise to the opportunity to raise issues that extend far

10 broader than -- than that which was notified.

11 Now, again, if it's about that particular portion and that

12 particular portion only, of course it's fair, but that's not what seems

13 to be happening. Instead, because the word "Sarajevo" is mentioned

14 somewhere in the statement, now the Defence apparently feels free to ask

15 them anything they want about Sarajevo. And the issue is not whether the

16 witness is properly in a position to comment upon observations he may or

17 may not have made, the issue is fair notice, and opportunity to prepare

18 for cross-examination. And that's a point that Mr. Robinson raised

19 repeatedly. We always tried to provide that, including sometimes sending

20 proofing notes very, very late in the evening just to ensure that some

21 notice was provided in an appropriate fashion.

22 JUDGE KWON: In terms of that notice, Mr. Tieger, in case of a

23 partial Rule 92 ter witness as was indicated with respect to this

24 witness, to what extent does one party have to notify the other as to the

25 part that is to be led live?

Page 31932

1 MR. TIEGER: That's the same situation as with a viva voce

2 witness where you provide an adequate 65 ter summary talking about --

3 providing a factual summary of the issues that the witness will be

4 discussing, the evidence that will be elicited from the witness. If it's

5 not provided, then the other side has a fair point that they're not in a

6 position to prepare for the evidence that is sought to be elicited.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, could you tell us the part of the

9 summary that you referred to? Where is it?

10 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. It's the second to last sentence:

11 "During their stay in Pale, his group toured the VRS positions in

12 the hills above Sarajevo, as well as the area of Gorazde."

13 JUDGE KWON: During ... so you referred to para-14 of his

14 statement.

15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. It's also included in paragraph 14.

16 [Trial Chamber confers]

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, instead of posing a very general

18 question, could you put your question more specifically with respect to

19 any part of his statement.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, your Excellency. Thank you.

21 I just want to say that I believe Dr. Hatchett accepted to take my

22 message to President Clinton and his government only because he was

23 satisfied that my intentions were honest.

24 JUDGE KWON: That's not an appropriate comment. Just put your

25 question, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 31933

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Dr. Hatchett, you referred to one of the conversations where you

3 were present wherein military logic told General Tolimir that the war has

4 to end in victory, and you knew that I said that that would not happen.

5 Can you tell us your conclusions about the nature of that war in Sarajevo

6 and around Sarajevo?

7 MR. TIEGER: Objection.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I don't follow your question, Mr. Karadzic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, your Excellencies, I believe

10 Mr. Hatchett referred to my words, "I'm not going to launch a major

11 military assault on a city full of people," and Dr. Hatchett knew exactly

12 what my intentions, and he had observed the city and the fighting, and

13 I'm asking him as such what he concluded, not as an expert.

14 JUDGE KWON: You could ask him how did he understood your comment

15 or whether he understood your intention, but asking him the nature of the

16 war with respect to that comment is far-fetched, I take it.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

19 Q. Could you please answer, Dr. Hatchett, the question kindly

20 phrased by the Presiding Judge and tell us what you saw. What did you

21 witness while you were there?

22 MR. TIEGER: Wait, wait. I don't understand why we're going in

23 circles like this, and I think it's -- it's particularly inappropriate to

24 suggest that the accused has adopted the formulation of the trial Bench

25 and then revert back to his original formulation. That's not at all what

Page 31934

1 the Court was suggesting, and again it's -- these are repeated efforts to

2 do what the -- to try to elicit evidence in a manner the Trial Chamber

3 has said first is not appropriate and then has provided specific guidance

4 for a potentially appropriate way to do so, which is being ignored by the

5 accused.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'll have to rephrase

8 it once again.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Dr. Hatchett, could you tell the Chamber what you saw in

11 Sarajevo, and how does that compare with other cities under siege?

12 JUDGE KWON: Notice, Mr. Tieger?

13 MR. TIEGER: Yes, it's the same issue. And I don't -- I guess

14 this is now sort of a stand-off on who's more stubborn, Dr. Karadzic in

15 continuing to pose the same question over and over, or me in repeatedly

16 getting up to make the same objection which the Court has sustained.

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, could you advise Mr. Karadzic how to

18 proceed.

19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.

20 [Accused and Defence counsel confer]

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I'll try again, because

22 I wonder why Mr. Tieger is afraid of what Dr. Hatchett might answer --

23 JUDGE KWON: That's not an appropriate comment at all.

24 Unacceptable.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Tieger said I was stubborn, so

Page 31935

1 I had to respond.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Dr. Hatchett, can you tell us what you saw in Sarajevo, and how

4 does that relate to the claims that the city was under siege?

5 MR. TIEGER: I don't know exactly what Mr. Robinson explained,

6 but it's difficult to see the difference between this question and the

7 previous formulations. It's the same problem. We were not advised that

8 this witness would be offering a comparative review of cities under siege

9 based on what he saw previously. That's not in the statement. Based on

10 what he saw in Sarajevo. That's not in the statement. And based on a

11 kind of quasi-expert opinion that was not noticed and that is certainly,

12 in any event, belated.

13 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, this question doesn't relate

14 to other cities or asking him to be an expert. He went and saw Sarajevo,

15 and he's being asked whether or not from what he saw did the city appear

16 to be under siege.

17 JUDGE KWON: If it relates to issue of siege or encirclement or

18 whatever, I would like the accused to move on.

19 Move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I think we are missing

21 a good opportunity to hear from a professional, experienced witness, and

22 to help us understand things, but I don't have anything more. I hope

23 that perhaps the Trial Chamber might put these questions.

24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Mr. Hatchett, as you have noted, your

25 evidence in chief was in most part -- in whole admitted in writing, and