Page 32786

 1                           Tuesday, 29 January 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

 9     Good morning to everybody.

10                           WITNESS:  DRAGOMIR MILOSEVIC [Resumed]

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General, sir.

14        A.   Good morning.

15        Q.   General, yesterday you mentioned Hrasnica.  You said that it was

16     swarming with soldiers.  Do you know what was the head count of the

17     104th Brigade run by Fikret Prevljak and what was its lethal power?

18        A.   Yes.  As regards the information about this area, it was

19     well-known.  The situation in that area was well-known.  Regarding your

20     statement that the area was swarming with troops, that was a problem that

21     was not of a major importance to us.  The movements of the troops who do

22     not open fire were not a priority problem for us.

23             Obviously movements, manoeuvres, and any such actions are of some

24     importance; however, there was another aspect and another type of

25     activities that posed a greater danger to us.  This boils down to several

Page 32787

 1     procedures which could not be tolerated.  That means that infantry and

 2     artillery held under control or under fire various areas in the Sarajevo

 3     region.  I'm talking about the village of Grlica, the village of

 4     Vojkovici, parts of Gornji Kotorac, and also one part of the territory of

 5     Ilidza.  I'm coming back to the area and to that axis that we are

 6     discussing at the moment and this is the axis leading from Hrasnica to

 7     the slopes of Mount Igman in the direction of the battalion that was in

 8     charge of the defence in the Nedzarici sector.  The essence of their

 9     intense activities and their constant movements and their abuses was in

10     opening fire on the small village of Grlica.  I don't know why the

11     village is called that way.  And very often, perhaps not every day, but

12     very often civilians who were going about their business got killed there

13     every day.

14        Q.   You mentioned Grlica.  Let me just clarify for the participants

15     in this trial.  Is Grlica a type of dove, a small dove?

16        A.   I don't think that that's that important.  I'm not saying it's a

17     dove.  It's a bird in any case.  Grlica is a bird.

18        Q.   How often did they open fire and from what localities?  I'm

19     talking about the 104th Brigade.  How often they opened fire on the parts

20     of the Serb Sarajevo that you mentioned in your previous answer.

21        A.   In my previous answer, I did not mention how they opened fire on

22     the Famos factory in Sarajevo.  One part of that factory was occupied by

23     the units of the 1st Corps in initial struggle, and most of that factory

24     was on the part of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and it was in production.

25     That factory was to be destroyed.  One part of the factory was burnt to

Page 32788

 1     the ground.  It produced gearboxes for certain types of vehicles.  And

 2     then they continued to open fire on the remainder of the factory that was

 3     still intact.

 4             As far as defence goes, on one side of the factory were the

 5     forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and on the other side of the wall

 6     there were others.  There was practically no distance between them.  On

 7     the other side of the wall were the units of the 104th Motorised Brigade.

 8     I said yesterday that that brigade had at its disposal many more lethal

 9     weapons than the other brigades in the 12th Corps.  They had a contingent

10     of 180- [as interpreted] and 82-millimetre mortars.  They had

11     76-millimetre cannons, so-called ZIS cannons.  They had a large number of

12     recoilless guns and anti-aircraft mortars, 20/1, which means a

13     one-barrelled cannon, and 20/3, which is a three-barrelled cannon.  That

14     would be the number of assets and weapons from which they could open fire

15     as they willed because they had that contingent of weapons and they --

16     good position, an elevated position, from which they could open fire on

17     the areas that I have just mentioned.

18        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  You mentioned that that looked like a

19     close contact struggle because there was practically no distance between

20     them, but that was not recorded.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

22             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, but the transcript,

24     page 3, line 9, reads "180- and 82-millimetre mortars," and perhaps --

25     and I suspect the General didn't mean 180-millimetre mortars which to my

Page 32789

 1     knowledge don't exist.  Perhaps he could be asked to clarify.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When a word comes out of one's

 3     mouth and it has nothing to do with reality, it cannot be valid.  I don't

 4     know how this number, 180, came up, why I said that.  But it was not that

 5     figure, obviously.  I wanted to say 120-millimetre mortars and

 6     82-millimetre mortars.  I wanted to say what I knew that they had.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Do you remember the last question of

 8     Mr. Karadzic's or shall I ask him to repeat it?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would be grateful if the question

10     was repeated.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, sir, it was not recorded that you said that they were on

13     both sides of the wall.  They were at close quarters.  There was no

14     distance between them.

15        A.   Well, yes, I understand.  I can clarify possibly.  On that

16     stretch, or rather, in that whole area of struggle or the area of contact

17     they were not close.  They were at close quarters.  It was not any other

18     category of fighting that may take place in a conflict.  That will be

19     that.

20        Q.   Are you saying that the confrontation line went through the

21     factory?

22        A.   Yes, yes.

23        Q.   Did you destroy the part that was under Muslim control?

24        A.   No, we did not.

25        Q.   When was it that you became fully aware of the infrastructure of

Page 32790

 1     the power and the deployment of the 104th Brigade and its firing

 2     positions?

 3        A.   I knew that my predecessors - and I'm talking about General Galic

 4     and the commanders who were in charge of the Ilidza Brigade and the

 5     2nd Sarajevo Brigade - I knew that they had the same feeling, that they

 6     were aware of the same fact from the very beginning of the conflict.

 7     However, they -- their power continued to grow over a period of time, I

 8     would say, and this is something that I am certain of.  However, I'm not

 9     claiming that for a fact here.  I don't have that possibility.

10             Fikret Prevljak was the commander of that brigade at one time.

11     Later on he left to become the commander of the 12th Division.  I felt

12     and we actually concluded that if a professional is not in command of an

13     area, somebody like a career officer, then we had a lot more problems

14     with the troops on the ground because there are no rules.  I also know

15     that Mr. Fikret Prevljak was at odds with UNPROFOR.  He even planted

16     mines on General Gobillard's route.  They were removed.  I would like to

17     add to (redacted)

18     (redacted) although he explained to Colonel Radojcic what things he

19     experienced at the hand of Mr. Fikret.  My conclusion at this place on

20     this occasion, which I arrived at earlier on, is that the tensions, the

21     feelings, and the ideas as to how to conduct fighting with us, how to

22     engage us, is something that he inherited from his predecessors in a very

23     dirty way.

24     (redacted)

25     (redacted)

Page 32791

 1     (redacted)

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Um, and I think lines 24 and 25 as well because

 4     that kind of signals the reasons why we might be redacting.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, sir, could you please give us the names of some firing

 9     positions and their localities in the field itself and particularly on

10     Mount Igman above Hrasnica.  Where was fire opened from at us?  What was

11     in the centre of Hrasnica and Sokolovic Kolonija, the entire locality?

12        A.   I fully understand your question.  First of all, let's talk about

13     the locality of Hrasnica as a neighbourhood.  Hrasnica is a very large

14     neighbourhood.  Let's remind ourselves of its appearance.  According to

15     what we knew, according to what we established, that neighbourhood was

16     covered in totality by the forces that were deployed, either by the

17     forces that opened fire from within or that were on furlough there or

18     reservists who were on standby to be used on a given axis.  The locality

19     itself, the area, the territory of the neighbourhood was encumbered by

20     the military factor and the artillery assets, i.e., mortars,

21     120-millimetres, which opened fire from that area, as I have already told

22     you.

23             Furthermore, the slopes of Mount Igman, in this case the eastern

24     slopes of Mount Igman which tower over the area that I have been talking

25     about, which is Vojkovici, Grlica, Kotorac, and one part of Lukavica and

Page 32792

 1     finally one part of Dobrinja, those slopes are conducive to direct fire.

 2     They enable opening direct fire which excludes the use of calculations or

 3     a team in charge of fire.  The marksman is given co-ordinates and can

 4     open fire directly.  The entire road leading from Hrasnica further up

 5     towards Igman and further afield along the front line were covered on the

 6     left and on the right by assets which allegedly were deployed to protect

 7     convoys and their troops pulling out.  But I would say that they opened

 8     fire at us without any necessity to do so, without any -- respecting any

 9     rules.

10        Q.   General, sir, please forgive me for not being clear enough.  I

11     always include Sokolovic Kolonija and Butmir in my question when

12     discussing Hrasnica.  Was this a single space, a single area; and if you

13     can, tell us which units were in Sokolovic Kolonija and Butmir?

14        A.   There was a battalion in Sokolovic Kolonija which -- out of the

15     five they had.  Another one was in Butmir.  So they had a battalion of

16     soldiers that was positioned in Sokolovic Kolonija.  You understood

17     properly the setting.  It is true that Sokolovic Kolonija was the kind of

18     location which -- from which the forces of the SRK at Ilidza could be

19     threatened.  So it was turned towards Ilidza, given its close proximity.

20     From Ilidza to Hrasnica, one needs to go through Sokolovic Kolonija

21     first.  It was a threat to the area held by the Ilidza Brigade which was

22     close to the sports centre and the swimming pool and the spa area.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.  What can you tell us about Donji Kotorac and

24     Butmir?  Who controlled it, what assets they had, and how distant were

25     they from our lands and the airport?

Page 32793

 1        A.   My answer is this:  First of all, they weren't too far away from

 2     the airport.  I can't say precisely what the distance was, perhaps a

 3     thousand metres, but I never gave it much thought.  I simply knew it was

 4     close.  Donji Kotorac and Butmir are close to the airport.  Donji Kotorac

 5     and the distance between Butmir and Donji Kotorac is the area which was

 6     an open space that our forces couldn't use.  If we were to discuss the

 7     issue of the siege of Sarajevo, in that direction the encirclement was

 8     not complete.  There was a way out of Sarajevo in the sense that no

 9     forces of ours were there.  The space is some 1.000 metres between

10     Kotorac and Butmir.  It is all further afield from the airport and they

11     controlled it.  They used it normally and it was all in the valley of the

12     Zeljeznica river.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday, in your order of the 6th of April, which

14     is P01201, you say that targets should be chosen in Hrasnica or

15     Sokolovic Kolonija as being the most profitable, causing the greatest

16     material damage and loss in terms of personnel.  Sokolovic Kolonija and

17     Hrasnica, were they equally important as military targets?  And can you

18     tell us what did you want to say when you said that greatest losses

19     should be inflicted in terms of human casualties, who did you mean?  Do

20     you want us to recall the document?

21        A.   I see it before me.  I will do my utmost and tell the Chamber the

22     following.  I believed one needn't ponder much further when I state, for

23     example, that greatest human and material losses should be inflicted.

24     Under no conditions and in no one's mind there should be a conclusion

25     that it was our wish or intention or that it could have pertained to

Page 32794

 1     civilians.  If one were aware of the extent of coverage they had in that

 2     area and the amount of assets they had there, it would be clear.  All I

 3     had in mind were military targets.  It was superfluous -- it would have

 4     been superfluous of me to tell the brigade commander in charge to provide

 5     any further instruction or detail or description of what I meant in terms

 6     of the target we wanted to hit.  It was simply military parlance.  There

 7     was no other target.  There's only a military target.  A civilian cannot

 8     be a target; they're simply not treated as targets.  They're no threat to

 9     our activity.

10        Q.   General, sir, the artilleryman that the order was issued to,

11     could he have understood it in any different way as if you were asking

12     him to inflict civilian losses?  This was, in fact, sent to the brigade

13     commander; correct?

14        A.   No, the document was drafted -- it was sent to the brigade

15     commander, but the document was prepared and drafted by the chief of

16     artillery, Colonel Tadija Manojlovic, and I signed it.  He brought the

17     document to me, and when I read it, I found nothing of importance to

18     correct in terms of content because we were in perfect understanding.  I

19     asked him whether he meant only such targets which opened fire and we

20     agreed that the document should remain as such.

21        Q.   General, sir, how do we know that it was Tadija Manojlovic who

22     drafted the document?  Can we see it anywhere?

23        A.   There should be, yes, MT.  That is the creator of the document.

24     RM stands for the stenographer or the dactylographer, the person who

25     typed it up.  It's just above my signature.

Page 32795

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 1D7719 next.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   This incident found its way in your indictment as well as your

 5     judgement; correct?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   How is this incident treated by UNPROFOR?  Was there a protest or

 8     was there an investigation?  Was anything done at the time?

 9        A.   I cannot confirm that now.  I really can't recall what the

10     procedure was in terms of reacting to it or any investigations.  I only

11     recall that -- how things developed in my trial.  Yes, I tried to explain

12     to my counsel the sense or the meaning of the phrase "choose a target."

13     I provided him with sufficient information in order to represent me

14     appropriately.  I really do not recall what went on in terms of any

15     investigations or UNPROFOR reactions and everything that resulted from

16     it.  I do know, though, that in the area, due to the impact of the aerial

17     bomb, an elderly person was killed.  And some of the people who were

18     there in the immediate vicinity, in terms of observers and UNPROFOR

19     personnel, they had their own conclusions.

20        Q.   Can you tell us whether there was a significant military target

21     close by in the area where the aerial bomb fell?

22        A.   That is what the observers stated as well.  In the immediate

23     vicinity there were artillery pieces, such as 120-millimetre mortars.

24        Q.   Thank you.  What about the Aleksa Santic school, is it close by,

25     and what do you know about what was in the building of the school during

Page 32796

 1     the war?

 2        A.   The Aleksa Santic school is where some type of manufacture took

 3     place of lethal assets for the needs of the units.  Hrasnica received

 4     certain materiel that could be turned into lethal assets as they were

 5     being transported in and out of the city.  I know they produced certain

 6     kind of ammunition such as hand-grenades and rifle grenades.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  General, this report is dated the 8th of April but

 8     refers to the 7th of April, 1995, that's what we see on page 1.

 9             Can we go to page 2.  It is an UNPROFOR report rather than an

10     UNMO report.

11             Kindly listen to me.  I'll read it out in English.  I'll read out

12     item 2.

13             [In English] "Central and Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina."

14             [Interpretation] And you will receive interpretation.

15             [In English] "Central and Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina:

16             "(a) Sector Sarajevo:  The situation is assessed to remain

17     stable.  The level of firing incidents will likely continue to rise.  The

18     rocket which impacted in Hrasnica was most likely retaliation for the

19     mortar round fired from Hrasnica some minutes before."

20             [Interpretation] What do you think of this report?  Is it

21     accurate?  Did they inform their superiors truthfully?

22        A.   It is accurate.  I think, sitting here, that this assertion by

23     UNPROFOR is something that did not come up during my trial.  That was the

24     first thing I wanted to say.  I know what the observers had said, but

25     this doesn't ring a bell.  My counsel did not have occasion to lead this

Page 32797

 1     in the courtroom as to what was the reason for opening fire.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2817, Your Honours.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, sir, you mentioned today that on both sides of the

 8     so-called Igman route or Igman road there were military facilities,

 9     units, and firing positions.  A witness here told us at page 8012 - I'll

10     read it out in English again so as to have a better interpretation.

11             [In English] "The Igman mount road was being used by civilians to

12     go in and out of the town.  The Serbs had been engaging the route.  We

13     had protested against the Serbs from engaging that route."

14             [Interpretation] What was the Igman road used for?

15        A.   The extent of my knowledge is based on what we could observe and

16     monitor on a daily basis.  We followed the route and that direction up

17     Mount Igman.  It was primarily used for military needs.  It was used

18     primarily to move columns, to bring in weapons, equipment, and supplies

19     to Hrasnica.  To us that road was of military importance and of a

20     military nature.

21        Q.   How did you know, General, that it was used for military supply

22     and unit movement?

23        A.   One could clearly observe that.  It was obvious, I'd say.  One

24     could differentiate between a civilian and a military column, including

25     vehicles and people.  When it happened that they had a military column

Page 32798

 1     going that way, just before they would try to create a smoke-screen.

 2     They would activate some kind of asset to create a smoke-screen in order

 3     to prevent us from realising that it was a military column.  Nothing

 4     similar happened when civilians moved about.  They clearly identified it

 5     for us what they did at any given moment.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And how were things during the night when it comes to

 7     the use of that road?

 8        A.   The situation was the same as it was during the day.  During the

 9     night one could see the headlights well.  However, night movements were

10     not what we were interested in and we never opened fire on them.

11        Q.   There was a witness who mentioned on pages 8080 and 8081 an

12     incident and the fact that you reported to the Main Staff that the

13     UNPROFOR had gotten involved in the conflict and that they opened fire.

14     Can you briefly tell us whether you remember that incident and how it

15     came about.

16        A.   Thank you for reminding me.  This is correct.  UNPROFOR -- and I

17     don't know what the intention was, whether there was co-ordination among

18     the troops of UNPROFOR, but in any case they found themselves in the

19     parts of the column in order to serve as their cover-up and thwart our

20     fire, given the fact that we were never supposed to open fire on them,

21     whatever they may have been involved in.  However, they did not get

22     involved only to provide cover but they also opened fire on us.  As a

23     result, we considered them a target like we would any other force that

24     opened fire on us.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 32799

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D40604, it

 2     concerns Butmir, Sokolovic Kolonija, and Hrasnica.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Earlier today you said that they used the area and that they used

 5     the road for bringing the troops in and out and for bringing in supplies.

 6     You said that it was easy to deliver supplies and combat assets and

 7     equipment into Hrasnica.  What do you know about those assets and

 8     supplies, how did they arrive in the city?

 9             The number is 1D40604.

10             Do you remember the question, General, sir?

11        A.   Yes, I do.

12        Q.   General, sir, do you remember when the tunnel was opened?  Do you

13     remember whether this transfer took place even before the tunnel was

14     opened, although you may have not been there at the time?  First of all,

15     tell us about the document, what is it?

16        A.   When it comes to the date and the contents of the document, I

17     have to say that I was there, I was the commander of the 1st Romanija

18     Brigade, so that period is related to me in one way or another.  First of

19     all, the tunnel was opened and became operational in 1993, and the

20     document speaks about activities that were going on in 1992.  In any

21     case, those assets were transferred through the airport.  There was no

22     other way.  There was no other route.  I've never seen this order before.

23     At that time they could not transport anything through the tunnel; they

24     could only do it via the airport.

25        Q.   How does this tally with your experience regarding the transport

Page 32800

 1     of assets and equipment into the city itself?  Can you please clarify

 2     this, why would they need 100-millimetre projectile for a tank?  Why did

 3     they need projectiles for self-propelled anti-aircraft gun in the city

 4     itself?

 5        A.   I can only share my thoughts.  If assets are brought in such as

 6     ammunition and other equipments, that means that they had the assets that

 7     were necessary to open fire on us.  The conflict had already started and

 8     this is the conflict that we have been talking about all the time.  This

 9     shows that they had available assets inside and the document here speaks

10     about resupplying ammunition for those combat assets that were in the

11     city.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, maybe - if I may - the way for

16     Dr. Karadzic to deal with documents like this is to establish some

17     foundation first before he then shows him the document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, would you like to make any observation

19     in response to Ms. Edgerton's observation?

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I don't think that that has

21     been the practice that the Prosecution used during its direct examination

22     and I don't think that that is required and also I don't think that

23     affects the issue of whether the document is admissible.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may add, I believe that I did

25     lay the foundation.  I reminded the witness of what he had already said.

Page 32801

 1     He said that supplies arrived in Hrasnica and then I asked him whether

 2     those supplies were then transferred from Hrasnica into the city and then

 3     he answered.  This document only illustrates things that he already spoke

 4     about, that he already testified to.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Just -- but further, Your Honour, this is about

 8     leading the witness and to -- and in line of -- in line with the

 9     guide-lines Your Honours had suggested some time ago, I think it would

10     and -- it would be appropriate for Dr. Karadzic to, rather than lead the

11     witness with the document, establish some manner of foundation, ask him

12     what he knows, and then show the document to him, which would then not be

13     leading the witness.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Did he not deal with a supply of ammunition or

15     weapons into Sarajevo before putting this document to the witness?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Quite so in different ways, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, the -- I agree in principle with

18     what Ms. Edgerton says, but you may find it of use because if you

19     establish the ground before, it concentrates the witness's mind nicely on

20     the issue and most likely produce a shorter, more succinct answer, which

21     is going to take less of your time.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will receive it.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2818, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.  I'm

Page 32802

 1     trying to keep things short.  I am mindful of the time.  Sometimes it

 2     backfires.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, sir, earlier today I asked you where you became aware of

 5     the infrastructure and firing positions in Sokolovic Kolonija, Stojcevac,

 6     Butmir, and other areas within your zone of responsibility.  I am

 7     interested in Sokolovic Kolonija, Hrasnica, and Butmir, i.e., those parts

 8     which were south of your zone of responsibility.  Just a while ago you

 9     said that fire was opened almost daily.

10             I want to show you a document which was signed by somebody on

11     your behalf.  It is 1D8006.  There is an obvious mistake when you look at

12     the stamp on the last page.  The year depicted on the stamp is 1993,

13     whereas in the heading it's the year 1992.  Let's see who signed on

14     behalf of General Milosevic and let us also look at the stamp where you

15     will see that the year was 1993, not 1992.

16        A.   It is true that when it was sent from the printer it was in 1993,

17     whereas in the heading I did see that the year was 1992.

18        Q.   Since we're here, could you please look at bullet point 7 and

19     could you please tell us what losses you suffered on that day.  You don't

20     have to read.  You just tell us what losses you suffered on that

21     particular day.

22        A.   Under losses or casualties there is a division into those who

23     were killed, those who were wounded, and the wounded were then divided

24     into those who were seriously wounded, on the one hand, and those who

25     were slightly wounded, on the other hand.  There are also the names of --

Page 32803

 1     first of the person who died and the unit that he belonged to and

 2     everything else, and the same applies to the wounded, their names, their

 3     units, whether they were seriously wounded or slightly wounded.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go back to the first page,

 6     please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, sir, there is a description of places from which fire

 9     was opened at us.  Could you please read that paragraph.  Where was fire

10     opened from and what were the effects of that fire?

11        A.   From Sokolovic Kolonija, Stojcevac, Butmir, Stupsko Brdo,

12     Hladnjaca, from infantry weapons, snipers, 82- and 120-millimetre

13     mortars, on Ilidza.  Now I'm reading the localities on which fire was

14     opened, Ilidza; Doglodi, which is a village; Luzane, which is a part of

15     Ilidza, a residential part of Ilidza.  There were two seriously wounded

16     fighters, three slightly wounded fighters, and three civilians.  In this

17     case the civilians were wounded as well and so were my men.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19        A.   And then it goes on to say that all of that was the area

20     bordering on Ilidza and the Ilidza Brigade and that's where fire came

21     from.

22        Q.   How often were such incidents described in your reports?

23        A.   Very often, very often.  Reports show that.  You can see

24     everything from reports.  You can see what happened on a certain day, and

25     in this case I can only confirm that a writing of these reports and their

Page 32804

 1     analysis, the analysis of what was happening on a daily basis served as

 2     information as to what were the enemy's intentions towards us.

 3        Q.   General, sir, this says that this is the situation as it was at

 4     1700 hours.  How often -- how frequently did you send those daily

 5     reports?  Should one expect another report to have been issued on the

 6     same day?

 7        A.   Not on that day but there could have been an interim combat

 8     report.  This is a regular combat report which provides the information

 9     about the situation of the past 24 hours.  However, any incidents that

10     may have happened in the meantime, grave incidents, new situations, are

11     included in an interim report which is sent to the superior command.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2819, Your Honours.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D7514.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   This is a regular combat report which was sent on the

19     16th of July, 1993, at 1700 hours.  Could you please tell us where was

20     fire opened on that day?  We can all read it, but let's look at the

21     bullet point starting with 2305 hours from the Visoko direction and at

22     2300 hours, Sokolje, and so on and so forth.  Could you please read

23     bullet point 1 before bullet point 2.

24        A.   Well, it says here information on the enemy.  In a nutshell, it

25     says that the enemy was very active in the zones of responsibility.  The

Page 32805

 1     report goes on to mention the axis, the axis of the Igman Brigade, the

 2     Ilijas Brigade, the Vogosca Tactical Group, that tactical group later on

 3     changed its name and it was no longer a tactical group, it was the 3rd

 4     Sarajevo Brigade.  Within that tactical group, there was the Kosevo

 5     Brigade and there was all -- there is also an indicator pointing to the

 6     fact that there was the 1st Romanija Brigade and the 1st Sarajevo

 7     Brigade.  So the first bullet point shows the axis and the deployment of

 8     forces and then it reports on their activities, mentioning the times when

 9     fire was opened, either during the day or during the night.  In this

10     case, I would say that there are details of that fire, where it was

11     opened, and how strong it was.

12        Q.   What we are missing in the transcript is that their activities

13     were recorded by the minutes as well.  We see sometimes in the report

14     such as 2130, et cetera.  Was such detail required of your analysis,

15     always to record the exact time?

16        A.   I also see here that the enemy forces, with the assistance of

17     UNPROFOR, crossed over the airport runway, moving towards Butmir and

18     Sokolovic Kolonija.  It is visible movement given the proximity of the

19     Ilidza Brigade forces.  They could see such movement and could see that

20     UNPROFOR tolerated it.  Although the airport had not been handed over to

21     that end, it was to be used for other purposes.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please go down to the bottom

24     of the page so as to see whether it's your signature.  And can we have

25     this admitted?

Page 32806

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it is my signature.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2820, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D32000.  1D32000.

 6     This doesn't seem to be it.  1D32000.  No -- yes, that's it.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   So as not to waste time, General, sir, kindly introduced --

 9     introduce the fourth, or rather, the penultimate bullet point in item 1:

10     "At around 1245 ..."

11        A.   The fourth item?

12        Q.   The fourth bullet point of item 1.  How many Muslim soldiers were

13     moving about from Sokolovic Kolonija or to Sokolovic Kolonija?

14        A.   Do bear with me.

15        Q.   It says:  "At around 1245 ..."

16        A.   Now I understand.  It's not the fourth row.  I was looking for

17     the fourth row.  You say "bullet point."  I wasn't aware of that.  Sorry.

18             "At about 1245 about some 300 Turks moved from Hrasnica to

19     Sokolovic Kolonija and groups of motor vehicles came from the direction

20     of Igman to Hrasnica on several occasions."

21             So this movement was detected and the forces specified as well as

22     their direction.  We have this estimate of 300 people, which is a force

23     of respectable size, moving in that direction.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the next page.

Page 32807

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   By the way, you didn't sign it, someone else did.  Perhaps you

 3     can tell us who, or rather, whether it was you or not.

 4        A.   Can I provide an explanation regarding the signature?  Authorised

 5     personnel could sign documents, but they should note that they were

 6     acting on behalf of someone else because the person authorised to issue

 7     such orders happens to be absent at that moment, whereas the person who

 8     signed it had the authority to do it in the other person's stead.

 9        Q.   Can we look at item 8.  It refers to an estimate by your side as

10     to what that kind of movement could mean.

11        A.   Yes.  The meaning is clear.  It was our conclusion because any

12     observed event needs to be interpreted by our side and what it means for

13     us.  It was our conclusion that they were grouping forces in the area of

14     Hrasnica and Sokolovic Kolonija and Stojcevac.  The concentration of

15     their forces meant something to us, either they were preparing an attack

16     or some other kind of activity.  In any case, we had to be aware of it.

17     It should not go unnoticed and without an adequate interpretation by our

18     side.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Just a brief lexical reference.  How did we call

20     those Serbs who were converted to Islam, who became Turks?

21        A.   How we referred to them?

22        Q.   The word in the first line.

23        A.   I know what you're referring to.  I was never in favour of

24     labelling anyone.  They were our enemy and that's what the document

25     should have stated.  Perhaps words were used that were not necessary and

Page 32808

 1     I was against that.  I never supported such practice.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that in addition to this term there was

 3     a derogatory term for Muslims and do you know what it was or is?

 4        A.   That's exactly what I was referring to.  I do know of the term

 5     but I don't want to utter it even if it were in the document.  I think

 6     they were referred to as "balijas," although I have no clue what it

 7     actually means, or this word "poturice," or "Turks."  I remember someone

 8     asking:  What are Turkish people doing in Bosnia?  It seemed to have been

 9     an intelligent person to put that question.  It wasn't fair on our part

10     to use such words.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just for record, could you read out paragraph 8.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can you zoom in?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Or if you agree, Ms. Edgerton, that the "read"

16     should read "real."

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Of course.

18             JUDGE KWON:  There is a issue with interpretation.  Let's move

19     on.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "It is noteworthy that the Turks

21     are concentrating forces in the Hrasnica-Sokolovic Kolonija sector

22     amounting to a realistic attack on the positions of the Ilidza Brigade ."

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have it admitted?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2821, Your Honours.

Page 32809

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D32003.  We'll skip

 2     some documents as we don't have enough time to go through each and every

 3     report.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, sir, it is a regular combat report issued at 5.00 p.m.,

 6     referring to the 10th of August, 1993.  The second paragraph, where it

 7     refers to the sports centre, could you read it out loud.

 8        A.   Item 2:  "The units engaged" --

 9        Q.   No, the bullet point:  "From the sports centre."

10        A.   "From the Hrasnica sports centre, during the day, a

11     20-millimetre gun fired four shells in the area of our positions as well

12     as one shell from the 82-millimetre mortar."

13             The next bullet point:

14             "Throughout the day the enemy opened sniper fire on Grbavica,

15     Lukavica, Dobrinja, and Vojkovici."

16        Q.   Where is the Hrasnica sports centre and was it the only instance

17     of fire being opened from the Hrasnica sports centre?

18        A.   It is in Hrasnica itself.  It is a location in Hrasnica on its

19     eastern side, unless I have forgotten some things in the meantime.  I

20     know where it is because they had the Famos football club which existed

21     there and enjoyed quite good ratings.  It was in a lower-rank league

22     level of competition, but it is in any case in Hrasnica, close to the

23     railroad.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have it admitted?

Page 32810

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  The document's authentic, Your Honours.  On that

 3     basis, I don't have a problem with it coming in.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2822 , Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  The last document from

 7     this batch of reports is 1D7517.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   General, sir, the document is dated the 6th of November, 1994, by

10     which time you had already become the corps commander; correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   The second bullet point in item 2:

13             "In the area of responsibility of the Ilidza Brigade ..." and so

14     on and so forth.

15             Can you read it out loud, please.

16        A.   Please bear with me.  This item indicates the degree of threat

17     for the Ilidza Brigade and the territory of Ilidza municipality.  Since

18     the first part refers to activity coming from the direction of Hrasnica

19     and Sokolovic Kolonija, it goes on -- or rather, it's the same commander

20     confirming what kind of activity was in his area of Brijesce, just

21     further afield from Rajlovac.  It was relatively close and from there

22     they could engage Ilidza.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.  Did you retaliate by firing an aerial bomb

24     in this situation?  Or in the previous case when they opened fire from

25     the sports centre, did you launch an aerial bomb?

Page 32811

 1        A.   You mean in Hrasnica?

 2        Q.   Did you retaliate against the firing positions where the fire had

 3     come from at Hrasnica and Sokolovic Kolonija and the sports centre?

 4        A.   We did return fire concerning the instance involving Hrasnica

 5     that we had on the screen, but whether it was on this specific date, I

 6     can't confirm that at this time.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the next page.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   General, the item number 2, "Our forces," please read out the

11     first five or six lines.  Perhaps you can start from the sentence:  "In

12     the area of the Nisic plateau ..."

13        A.   Yes.

14             "In the area of the Nisic plateau during the day there was fierce

15     fighting along the entire front line" --

16        Q.   Sorry to interrupt.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in the

18     English, please.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "... due to strong artillery and

20     infantry fire, our forces were forced to retreat repeatedly.  By 4 p.m.

21     they were at the line Bibici village - Gradina," and we have the trig

22     point, 1121, "Nanici - Borak" --

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   That's fine.  We don't need all the locations.  What does it mean

25     due to strong artillery and infantry fire and their superiority in the

Page 32812

 1     field?

 2        A.   Well, it's logical, the logic being that no one can attempt a

 3     breakthrough by using infantry along an axis unless they have strong

 4     artillery support.  It is a precondition for any infantry advance.  In

 5     this case, we established that the enemy force was of such high morale

 6     and supported by their artillery so that we had to use ours to respond.

 7        Q.   When did the offensive at the Nisic plateau begin?  This is dated

 8     the 6th or 5th of May [as interpreted], but when did the fighting start?

 9        A.   I tried to provide information and indicators showing their

10     decision to engage in offensive action in the second half of the year.

11     But, to be more precise, on the 1st of August, the 1st Corps achieved

12     success in Nisic.  On the 1st of August, via the village of Brgule, which

13     was a Serbian village -- I'm telling you what the axis was because their

14     movements started from Dastanjsko, all this was in the wider area of the

15     mountain.  So from there, they were firing from Brgule part of the Niksic

16     plateau and they took part of the territory on the 1st of August, as I've

17     already said.

18             In their first regrouping and when they prepared additionally,

19     they continued this activity, which you can see here took place in

20     November.  This was a fierce attack and they arrived close to a line

21     running from Olovo to Sarajevo.  And for their television, they reported

22     on television that they had already broken through to Nisic and arrived

23     there, but that was not true because we managed to stop them.  We

24     invested a huge effort and managed to stop them there, and that's where

25     the line remained until the end of the war.  We were at threat, the

Page 32813

 1     threat was enormous.  There would have been no further resistance and

 2     they would have managed to breakthrough to Vogosca and join their forces

 3     in Sarajevo.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 19, page 26, it's not the

 5     5th or 6th of May but the 5th or 6th of November.  Can we go back to page

 6     1, please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, sir, what does this mean:  "IKM Nisici village"?  And

 9     who was there at the time?

10        A.   Well, it's clear, of course.  "IKM" means "forward command post."

11     What was the problem for the command there and for the functioning of the

12     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was that we had to have part of our forces to

13     monitor the situation and to command the corps.  Part of that had to be

14     in Nisici and the other part in -- another part in Trnovo.  And the rest

15     of the command was in Lukavica.  The commander was duty-bound to be

16     either at a forward command post himself or to have his Chief of Staff or

17     chief operations officer on the ground there in order to command the

18     forces and make sure that the enemy did not break through due to poor

19     command.

20        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  Please can you give us brief replies

21     because the Chamber already knows a lot about how the army functioned.

22     Can you tell us who was at this forward command post at Nisici at the

23     time we're referring to, in November 1994?

24        A.   If you let me look at the signature, I'll tell you who it was.

25     You see, the document was processed.  I was at Nisici at the time because

Page 32814

 1     it's not signed because I couldn't be in the operations room to sign this

 2     myself, but I was there.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May it be admitted?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2823, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly look at P2420,

 8     Exhibit P2420.  Thank you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   General, sir, the first sentence says that there was information

11     that the civil authorities met the commander, that was on the

12     7th of November, and that they met on the 5th of November.  So in view of

13     the fact that you were at Nisici, what can you tell us about this

14     document?  Did a meeting take place and did you attend it?

15        A.   As I said yesterday, I am certain that this is fabricated.  I

16     don't know for what reason.  I have no idea why somebody would want to

17     invent such a document, but I can affirm that I never had any kind of

18     meeting with the civil authorities, let alone a meeting at which the use

19     of certain units in combat was discussed.  I reject this totally.

20             And I know that the OTP conducted an investigation and

21     interviewed Mr. Prstojevic, the president of Ilidza municipality, as a

22     person who was one of the leaders at the time, and he also stated that

23     this meeting was never held, that he knew nothing about it.  And he also

24     stated that what it says here, that I discussed things with someone else,

25     that he thought that I, as a normal person, would never agree to what is

Page 32815

 1     described here.  And this is in the interview between the OTP

 2     investigator and that gentleman, but the record of this interview never

 3     arrived here at the ICTY.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Before the break another question.  Was your command

 5     ever influenced by the civilian authorities and especially the SDS or its

 6     leaders?

 7        A.   No, they had no influence whatsoever on my work.  My

 8     understanding was that the civil authorities understood that they were

 9     unavailable to influence me, not because they were prevented from doing

10     their work but because they saw that it would not be rational or

11     intelligent to try.  When it comes to imposing standpoints and so on,

12     they refrained from that sort of thing.  They didn't become involved in

13     that.  I am glad that they took my requests into account.  Of course I

14     did have to have certain contacts with them, but it's well-known that the

15     army can only deal with army matters and not engage in political affairs.

16        Q.   And the civil authorities of Republika Srpska, did they interfere

17     in purely military matters?

18        A.   No, no.  I never experienced that from any person or structure of

19     the government, either through any activities carried on by the cabinet

20     or the Presidency.  We never had an opportunity to meet; but when we did

21     meet, we never discussed combat activities to be carried out by the

22     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  And the politics never influenced the military

23     situation.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it the right time for a break,

Page 32816

 1     Your Excellencies, or should I continue?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Before we break, can we see the previous document

 3     again, Exhibit D2823.

 4             General, if we see the first page of this document, we know that

 5     it was sent by SRK to the various units, such as Main Staff,

 6     Herzegovina Corps, Drina Corps, and the forward command post in Nisic.

 7     Am I correct?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, you are, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  But how do we know that it was sent from the IKM?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document was not sent from the

11     forward command post.  It was sent from the command, and it says here

12     that a copy was sent to the forward command post.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Then you said we can know that by this

14     document you were in Nisici at the time.  Could you explain a bit further

15     how we can know that.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For me as the commander to know

17     what the contents of the message were that was sent to the Main Staff

18     after the document was processed, it -- from the forward command post the

19     document was sent to the operations centre, and then in the operations

20     centre all the documents were brought together and compiled into a single

21     document.  And then a copy was sent to me for me to see what was actually

22     forwarded to the Main Staff.  So that was one reason.

23             Secondly, as I know that because of the threat when the

24     1st Romanija Corps and some of the forces were at great risk, as soon as

25     I received the information about the combat activities and the

Page 32817

 1     breakthroughs, I had to be there and I was there, I did go there.  And on

 2     my honour, I confirm that I was there.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But it says -- it was omitted in

 4     the interpretation that the General said:  I was unable to sign.  Maybe

 5     he could explain why he was unable to sign the document.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  He said that in his earlier answer.  For planning

 7     purposes, how much longer do you need, Mr. Karadzic?

 8                           [Defence counsel confer]

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At least by the end of today.  I

10     hope I'll be finished today.  If I ask the General to make his responses

11     very brief, although his exhaustive replies are useful, if I can get

12     succinct replies I will be finished today.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll have a break for half an hour and

15     resume at 11.06.

16                           --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, sir, the use of snipers is very prominent in the

22     indictment against me.  I have to ask you, in general terms, a very

23     general question:  What is a sniper in a military formation and how is it

24     used?  What is a sniper rifle?

25        A.   A sniper rifle is an infantry weapon.  It is used by the

Page 32818

 1     infantry.  As a matter of fact, we had sniper rifles, 7.9-millimetres,

 2     M76.  Its calibre was 7.9, as I've already told you.  That rifle fired

 3     sniper ammunition and optical sights for spotting targets.

 4        Q.   When you say "sniper rifle ammunition," would you say that this

 5     differs from other 7.9-calibre ammunition and especially from the

 6     7.62-millimetre automatic rifle ammunition?

 7        A.   Yes, there is a difference, absolutely.  You cannot use the same

 8     type of ammunition in a sniper rifle of 7.9-calibre.  You cannot use the

 9     same calibre ammunition that is intended for other types of weapons.  A

10     sniper rifle has its own sniper rifle ammunition.

11             I'll try and be succinct in providing my answer.  Maybe this was

12     already enough.

13             In any case, my defence counsel could not distinguish between

14     those two things, so when the Prosecutor put to him:  See how much

15     7.9-calibre ammunition you order and that was to be used in sniper

16     rifles, I tried to explain to him that that ammunition could not be used

17     in sniper rifles and that the quantities ordered could not be used in

18     evidence that that ammunition was used by sniper rifles.  I could not

19     explain that to him and he never used my argument.

20        Q.   Could you please remind us what other purposes does the

21     7.9-millimetre ammunition have?

22        A.   It can be used for the rifle M48.  This is an old type of rifle

23     that was used by the JNA and that was part of the armament of our army,

24     the Army of Republika Srpska.  Furthermore, a machine-gun can also use

25     7.9-millimetre ammunition, and I believe that the story ends there.  I

Page 32819

 1     don't want to go into any other types of ammunition, such as Zbrojovka.

 2     The most important types of weapons are the two that I mentioned at the

 3     beginning of my answer.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  What kind of fire was opened by machine-guns and what

 5     is the average consumption of ammunition?  Can bursts of fire be opened?

 6     How many rounds does a machine-gun use?

 7        A.   M42 machine-guns are automatic weapons with high velocity.  It

 8     has a belt.  I can't remember the velocity of firing, but those bursts of

 9     fire cannot be compared with the fire opened by a sniper rifle because a

10     sniper rifle can fire only individual bullets.  And another thing that

11     I've not explained so far is the fact that the sniper rifle is a

12     semi-automatic rifle so it cannot fire bursts of fire.

13        Q.   In other words, if somebody was hit by a single bullet which was

14     part of a burst of fire, could that have been a bullet fired by a sniper

15     rifle?

16        A.   No, no.  It could not have been fired by a sniper rifle because a

17     sniper rifle cannot fire bursts of fire.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please tell us whether an investigation or

19     an analysis of projectiles could yield a conclusion as to whether a

20     bullet was fired from a sniper rifle or from an M84 or a machine-gun?

21        A.   I'm sure that it would be possible, but I'm not saying that as an

22     expert but as a person who knows, who was told, that those are two

23     different rounds, two different bullets.

24        Q.   Did you ever receive an analysis as the Chief of Staff or a corps

25     command or the results of an investigation that provided a conclusive

Page 32820

 1     finding as to whether a bullet was fired from a sniper rifle or from some

 2     other rifle?

 3        A.   No, never in the course of the last war.

 4        Q.   In all of your units, did you have sniper rifles?  Did you have

 5     them at the forward front line turned outwards and turned inwards and why

 6     did you have them?  What was their intended use?

 7        A.   All units had sniper rifles.  It was our obligation, it was our

 8     duty, to provide every combat unit with its sniper rifles and a dedicated

 9     marksman.  That principle applied across the board in the entire zone of

10     responsibility, and especially in the areas where there was a high

11     concentration of enemy sniper rifles, that's where we had our sniper

12     rifles and our marksmen as well.

13             Furthermore, it was not easy to choose marksmen and it was not a

14     simple procedure.  A marksman had to possess certain qualities.  First of

15     all, they were not supposed to have a criminal record.  They could not be

16     short-sighted and they had to be patient and they had to be trained.  If

17     they are not trained, formally trained, if they had not been trained by

18     the JNA, their military specialty was 11-101 [as interpreted], just like

19     any other marksman, but their military specialty was specified and they

20     were known as marksman specialists and that was their qualification from

21     the JNA.  And then the officers would decide whether those people would

22     be hired.

23             Let me add to that that our soldiers did not want to be

24     sharpshooters, given the close vicinity of the front line, the high level

25     of danger, and especially because they placed more trust in weapons that

Page 32821

 1     could open bursts of fire in close contact because they were more

 2     efficient and they provided more security.  Another thing was that

 3     sharpshooters were static.  They had to remain in one place and they had

 4     to be very patient.  They had to be very focused in order to be able to

 5     spot the enemy sharpshooter.  That was their main task, to observe enemy

 6     sharpshooters.  We arrived at the information that on the opposite side

 7     there was quite a lot of people who used those weapons against us and

 8     they had to be engaged.  And another task of a sharpshooter was to detect

 9     other targets that may have been of significance for the enemy and for us

10     they posed a threat; for example, other weapons or important military

11     personnel.

12             Let me say at the beginning of my answer that no matter who a

13     sharpshooter was, they were never issued an order to open fire on

14     civilians and they never did that.  They were never told to do that and

15     they never did it.

16        Q.   You mentioned that your enemy on the other side had sharpshooters

17     which opened fire.  When did they first obtain sniper rifles and when

18     were they active and where?

19        A.   Within Sarajevo there was a special MUP brigade which was always

20     known as the Brigade Bosna or the Bosnia Brigade.  Those men were

21     primarily trained as sniper shooters.  They knew how to use sniper

22     rifles.  That was their paramount quality.

23             Second of all, we knew that there was a group which was known as

24     Seve.  They were our archenemies.  They were deployed in the school of

25     machine engineering.  They were on top of the building of the Assembly,

Page 32822

 1     the building of the government.  They did not think twice who to shoot.

 2     They killed civilians as well.  They had to be detected and that's why we

 3     had sniper shooters, to engage them.  They had sniper rifles but they

 4     also had the rifles known as Dragon.  I don't know what its specific

 5     characteristics were.  I only know that those rifles were better than the

 6     7.9 semi-automatic rifles.

 7        Q.   Are we talking about the 5.56- or 12.7-millimetre calibre?  I'm

 8     talking about the Dragon.

 9        A.   I don't think it's 12.7, it's too large.  I don't know.  I don't

10     want to speculate.  I don't know much about that rifle, but I know that

11     they had it because I was told that by others who knew more about it.  I

12     knew it was the so-called Dragon rifle.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D40665.

14     1D40665.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't see anything.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   I'm going to read, General, sir, I'm waiting for the English

18     translation.  The document was issued on the 6th of March, 1993.

19             The efficient engagement of sniper shooters.  And it says:

20             Further to letter strictly confidential so and so, I hereby issue

21     the following order.  First of all, all sniper shooters in battalions

22     should be on duty in all weather conditions whenever possible.

23             And now the rest -- may be we can go to the following page in

24     English.

25             All sniper shooters have to be qualified as soldiers, sniper

Page 32823

 1     shooter capable of returning fire and performing tasks during night or

 2     day.

 3             Did the other side have conditions in place to use sniper rifles

 4     during night and did they indeed use them?

 5        A.   Yes.  It's not about sniper fire at night.  It's fire opened at

 6     night with a -- from a weapon which is not a sniper rifle.  It is a rifle

 7     with a passive optical sights.  Passive optical sights imply that through

 8     them you can observe targets during night and you can open fire during

 9     night as you could during the day.  In any case, when it comes to sniper

10     rifles we're talking about a different thing.  Sniper rifles are one

11     thing and passive optical sights are another thing and they're used at

12     night.  Maybe the distinction that was made here is not good.

13        Q.   And what about this order where it says that they should be used

14     in all weather conditions, they should be used at all times?  How is that

15     possible?

16        A.   That means that they opted for that type of fire, for that type

17     of activity and actions, i.e., that they wanted to use those weapons all

18     the time en masse in order to neutralise or destroy our positions.

19        Q.   Was Sulejman Imsirevic's order carried out?  Is that how they

20     behaved?  Is that what they did?

21        A.   The events and developments on the ground confirmed that this

22     order was implemented because we experienced that fire.  That fire was as

23     it is described in here.  That fire was opened and it -- and we felt it

24     on our own skin.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to ask my associates to

Page 32824

 1     talk to the CLSS to complete the uncomplete translation, and in that

 2     respect I would like to offer this document into evidence.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, if it is your case and the evidence of

 4     General Milosevic that the Serb forces never issued an order to open fire

 5     on civilians and that it never took place, that would be it for your

 6     defence.  Why do we need this kind of evidence, i.e., the sniping on the

 7     part of Muslims, at all?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, the witness gave

 9     me a reason for which he had sniper rifles.  The goal was to neutralise

10     Muslim sniper rifles in town and to neutralise other legitimate military

11     targets.  As for the Muslim sniper shooters in town and where they were

12     employed and how they operated, this is what this document describes and

13     confirms.  They were active all the time.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Please bear in mind that you were never indicted for

15     having snipers at all.

16             Ms. Edgerton, about this document.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Well, Your Honour, I actually don't think we know

18     what it is, what military unit it relates to, under whose command the

19     unit fell, what zone it operated in.  We know absolutely nothing about

20     the document.

21             JUDGE KWON:  But did the witness not confirm Sulejman Imsirevic?

22             MS. EDGERTON:  He confirmed that -- he said in response to

23     Dr. Karadzic's question:

24             "Was Mr. Imsirevic's order issued?"

25             He said:

Page 32825

 1             "Yes."

 2             I don't think that satisfies any of the issues I just raised.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Milosevic, could you kindly read out the title

 4     of this document because it hasn't been fully translated.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm providing the following answer.

 6     These are the early days of their existence and you see that their name

 7     at the time was the command of the military unit and its number was 5457,

 8     which implies that it was a military composition.  Second of all, they

 9     were deciding how they would engage their manpower, how they would

10     operate.  There are no ambiguities there.  However, the most important

11     thing is that the document shows that from day one they had at their

12     disposal this contingent of weaponry which could open fire in a certain

13     way.  So it was no novelty.  Later on --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Milosevic --

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- that they continued to operate

16     on the same principle and that it -- that continued throughout the war.

17             JUDGE KWON:  What I asked you is to read the title of this

18     document because it's not fully translated in English.  The English says:

19             "More efficient engagement of" and illegible.  Engagement of

20     what?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sniper shooters, snipers.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit it.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2824, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 32826

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, sir, while you were still in command of the

 3     1st Romanija unit, did you have information on the activity of their

 4     snipers?

 5        A.   Yes, we did.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D7518.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   This is one of your documents.  It is a regular combat report.

 9     The stamp reads the 25th of July, 1992.  Kindly look at line 3 of item 1.

10             "During the day the enemy continued with intensive sniper fire,

11     engaging almost the entire line of defence of the brigade, with

12     particularly strong fire from the IV," or Executive Council, "building,

13     the Marsal Tito barracks and Pofalici (the wide high-rise) ..."

14             Further below it mentions Banja Lucka Street where a soldier was

15     killed.

16             "The sniper fire at this point is so strong that it is virtually

17     blocking the entry of pedestrians to the settlement of Grbavica."

18             Do you recall this and what can you tell us about it?

19        A.   I think it suffices for me to confirm whether what is stated in

20     the document indeed took place.  Everything developed literally the way

21     put here, including their firing position and the area which they

22     targeted.  They influenced every aspect of life in the area.  I can

23     confirm what the document states.  One could clearly observe and feel

24     that.

25        Q.   The wide high-rise you mentioned in Pofalici, was that a

Page 32827

 1     residential building?

 2        A.   Yes, of course.

 3        Q.   General, sir, tell us what was the position on using snipers in

 4     the city on the part of the SRK and what was the policy of the other

 5     side, that is to say, the 1st Corps of the Army of BH?

 6        A.   What do you mean exactly "position"?  I can specify the

 7     regulations we set in place according to which instructions were issued

 8     to our officers and snipers, their soldiers.  That's what I can discuss.

 9        Q.   General, actually I was interested in the interest of the SRK.

10     Were you interested in maintaining and perpetuating sniper activity and

11     what was the interest of the 1st Corps regarding the same issue?

12        A.   I hope I'll answer clearly since I'm now providing my opinion and

13     that's what I can formulate.  When we learned of their activity being

14     used en masse and excessively, I dare say, we had to create a structure

15     which would address that.  In order to efficiently engage such opposing

16     forces we tried to aim our activities at that but were never fully

17     successful.

18        Q.   Why were you in favour of anti-sniping agreements?

19        A.   It is well-known once you receive such extensive activity from

20     the other side which becomes unbearable, one looks for a way out.  And it

21     is only good that there were some sort of mediators or go-betweens who

22     were attempting to reach an agreement.  In this case, it would have made

23     it easier on us to a certain extent and indeed the agreement was reached.

24        Q.   While we're still on page 1, I'll read out the following and

25     perhaps you can confirm whether I read it accurately.  The diplomacy or

Page 32828

 1     something else and UNPROFOR for sniper cease-fire.  It seems to be a

 2     handwritten remark.  Is that something of yours or was it written by

 3     someone from your command who received the report?

 4        A.   This is not my handwriting.  Yes, I'm aware of this suggestion.

 5     When I ordered that contact be established with UNPROFOR in order to

 6     raise the issue of sniper cease-fire, in particular by the other side, we

 7     had to work with them on reaching an agreement.  It is not my handwriting

 8     but the suggestion is mine.  We were trying basically to contact UNPROFOR

 9     through our security organ.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 2, item 8, or

12     maybe the last page or the third page, whatever it is in the English.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   So as not to read out the whole thing, what was your suggestion

15     in item 8?

16        A.   I suggested what it says, I've been saying it all along.  The

17     intensity of sniper fire by the enemy has risen to such level where we

18     need to come up with a solution in order to have it stopped.  That would

19     be it.

20        Q.   Thank you.  How did your suggestion fare?  Was an agreement

21     reached?

22        A.   Yes, on the 14th of August, that is to say, shortly after I

23     assumed the duty of corps commander, which was on the 10th, the agreement

24     was reached on the 14th.  It was signed at the airport.  I signed for our

25     side and Mr. Karavelic, the 1st Corps commander, signed on behalf of the

Page 32829

 1     other side.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  The following sentence of yours which says:

 3             As of the moment when cease-fire was announced until today we

 4     have been suffering more losses due to sniper fire than we had before the

 5     cease-fire.

 6             Is that accurate?

 7        A.   Yes, that is actually what happened to us.

 8        Q.   Did cease-fire agreements allow for sniper activity?

 9        A.   Of course once there is an agreement in place it is understood

10     not to use them.  That was the agreement.  One needs both sides for an

11     agreement.  You cannot agree on something unilaterally.  The agreement

12     was reached and it was a temporary cease-fire, in my view.

13        Q.   General, can you tell us why it took two years to actually

14     implement your proposal, that is to say, that the other side would accept

15     your proposal and that UNPROFOR would secure the implementation, why the

16     two years?

17        A.   Everyone is aware of their reasons.  I only know that it should

18     have taken place earlier.  Now, why the other side was not prepared to

19     accept that, well, they needed the situation in which there were constant

20     provocations in order to draw fire so that they could portray themselves

21     as the side in danger and that they could be considered the side that is

22     in danger by our activity, as our side being the main reason of their

23     plight.

24        Q.   Which side are you referring to?

25        A.   The side where the 1st Corps was, that is to say, the Muslim

Page 32830

 1     side.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2825, Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have 1D7519.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   It is your regular combat report dated the 25th of July, 1992.

 9     In item 1 you say:

10             "The enemy is continuing with intensive sniper fire ..."

11             In the third paragraph you say:

12             "The brigade units during the day did not engage although they

13     were incessantly fired at from snipers."

14             In item 5 you say:

15             "The morale in our units remains unchanged as compared to the

16     previous day.  There are frequent violations of cease-fire by the enemy

17     which is keeping our fighters and civilians tense around the clock.  We

18     demand that UNPROFOR be informed."

19        A.   I have nothing else to say, other than it was an indication that

20     we were looking for a way out, even communicating with some other factors

21     who could restrain the enemy side in this activity of theirs.  In this

22     particular instance, the sniping was so threatening that the entire issue

23     of waging war any further came into question because one cannot survive

24     long under such circumstances and we had to come up with someone to

25     protect us.

Page 32831

 1        Q.   General, in item 5, did you enjoy any of the benefits of

 2     cease-fire on the Serb side?

 3        A.   The situation of the civilians and the people there in general

 4     was such that they were constantly feeling threatened, endangered.  I

 5     cannot describe it fully.  Perhaps I can only say that I had entire

 6     groups of people come begging for some additional protection in the areas

 7     where they lived.  They thought that perhaps we could step-up our fire in

 8     order to restrain the other side.  And they would tell us, for example,

 9     that the elderly people could not enjoy their senior years, their

10     children could not enjoy their adulthood, and their grandchildren could

11     not enjoy their childhood.  We tried to convince them to the best of our

12     power that we would try and do something, and this included engaging

13     other instances to communicate with the other side.

14        Q.   [No interpretation]

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic repeat his question.  The

16     speakers overlapped.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

18             Could you repeat your question.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Did UNPROFOR manage to achieve anything with regard to your pleas

21     in July 1992?

22        A.   I cannot confirm whether they achieved anything then.  I can

23     confirm, however, that in the contacts with UNPROFOR commanders or some

24     of their senior structures, I was happy to hear that they had a proposal

25     which I accepted.  They called it "no death day," to have a day without

Page 32832

 1     deaths.  And they asked me if I would accept it.  And my response was:

 2     Would you ask a person dying of thirst whether he wants to drink?  Of

 3     course.  There were requests which I accepted and I stressed that no such

 4     day can come about unless the other side honours it as well.  And they

 5     said they would try to achieve that.

 6             Even if there was a day like that, the very next day people were

 7     being killed again.  I believe the other side was looking for a solution

 8     as well.  I accepted UNPROFOR's proposal but it didn't live too long.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Did the SRK undertake any counter-measures at a

10     certain point, organising their own sniping unit and to what end?

11        A.   Well, the end or the aim was always the same, which was to

12     counteract those engaging in the very same activity.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2826, Your Honours.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have P1010 in e-court.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   General, the document is dated the 4th of November, 1992, the

19     command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  It was sent to all units.  It

20     is -- its reference line reads:  "Designating locations for snipers in

21     the zones of responsibility."

22             It reads:

23             "Based on reports of the commands of subordinated units on the

24     enemy sniper activities, the identified fire positions at certain axes

25     and the enemy troops' passages to Dobrinja from Butmir via the

Page 32833

 1     airport ... I hereby issue the following ..."

 2             Do you recall this?

 3        A.   It is not important whether I remember it or not.  I know the

 4     gist or the point of this order.  It was our side looking for a way to

 5     counteract their activity and to address their movements and other sorts

 6     of activity.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Before I move on, do we have a permission or an order

 8     to engage civilians or to undertake any illegal activity by sniping?

 9        A.   That is impossible.  There are no circumstances or situations in

10     which the commander at any level could even contemplate, let alone say

11     it, to open fire at non-military targets.  In this case, too, such orders

12     could not be issued.  No one would be allowed to target civilians.

13        Q.   Thank you.  My question was not interpreted completely.  I asked

14     whether the preamble specifying the reasons also refers to any targeting

15     of civilians?

16        A.   No, there is no such thing.

17        Q.   As regards the well-known sniping incidents, did anyone from the

18     SRK take part in investigations?  Were there any investigations which

19     could conclusively find what sort of ammunition was used and what was the

20     firing position?

21        A.   There were always investigations in such situations when we knew

22     what had happened, when we received information that something had

23     happened.  When we were not aware of something taking place, then no

24     investigation was possible.  What is important, though, is that when we

25     were aware of a particular incident there was an investigation.

Page 32834

 1        Q.   Did you have occasion to participate in on-site investigations on

 2     the other side?  Were you allowed to take part in order to objectively

 3     ascertain the facts?

 4        A.   That was not possible, nor was it allowed.  I know that the

 5     Main Staff issued a request to that effect.  They wanted an investigation

 6     to be carried out by a team of people who hailed from the territory of

 7     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, or rather, those who were members of the

 8     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  In the indictment against me, several incidents are

10     mentioned and it is claimed that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps opened

11     sniper fire on trams and other means of public transport.  What can you

12     say about that?

13        A.   I can say that I know that this is part of your indictment.  Now

14     I hear it from you.  It was also part of my indictment.  I can't say

15     anything else but that.  I know that in situations when fire was opened

16     from the other side and then we responded by fire, either cross-fire or

17     fire opened in one direction, I know that it could happen that due to

18     that fire bullets could also hit trams.

19             I had information to the effect that - and I will share that with

20     you although I could not verify that information - that citizens were

21     told not to worry when they took trams, fire would be opened to protect

22     you.  As a result of that, citizens dared get on the trams and travel in

23     the direction of the city.  That should not have been done because when

24     they opened fire we had to react, we had to respond by opening fire

25     against them.  And when we did that, an odd bullet could hit a tram.

Page 32835

 1     That's what I know from the indicators that I had at my disposal.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D32009.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   This is your regular combat report issued on the 19th of August,

 5     1993.  And now I would like to show you the second page.  We don't have

 6     the time to go through the entire document.

 7             It says here:  In the course of the day, the enemy opened sniper

 8     fire on Lukavica, [indiscernible] and Vojkovici from its position and

 9     especially from Mojmilo and Dobrinja.

10             Are these civilian settlements that are enumerated here,

11     Grbavica, Lukavica, Nedzarici, and Vojkovici?

12        A.   Yes.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get the following page in

14     Serbian as well.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Bullet point 8.  It says here:  Conclusions, forecasts, and

17     decisions.

18             "The enemy violates the cease-fire and provokes.  On the whole

19     our forces are adhering to the cease-fire and return fire only when

20     authorised.  And now it is expected that the enemy will increase

21     operations particularly on Sarajevo to provoke our forces into opening

22     fire.

23             "The enemy is continually digging in and getting closer to our

24     lines at Stojcevac, Dobrinja, Stupsko Brdo, and Mojmilo."

25             Would this constitute crawling towards our conditions [as

Page 32836

 1     interpreted] by means of digging in and digging trenches and is that

 2     allowed during a period of cease-fire?

 3        A.   We called this biting into our positions.  This is a type of

 4     activity which, under the guise of reinforcing one's position, sees

 5     soldiers moving closer towards the units of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,

 6     which constitutes a threat to the further course of the conflict and our

 7     existence.  The agreement implied that the front line would be peaceful

 8     in every aspect and at all times.  It excluded anything else including

 9     additional digging in.

10        Q.   And what about this, Serbs are digging in groups of 10 to

11     15 people?

12        A.   Those were people who found themselves in their prisons.  The

13     biggest number of people was in the silos in Tarcin, and those people

14     were engaged to dig trenches and shelters.  Those men actually

15     constructed the tunnel under the airport.  They were the ones who dug it

16     out.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And now the last sentence says the following:

18             "The units have been ordered to open sniper fire on targets

19     observed" --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, could we ask the General to read out

21     that sentence.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The units have been ordered to

23     exclusively open sniper fire on the targets they observe that pose a

24     threat to our soldiers."

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 32837

 1        Q.   General, sir --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, just a second --

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   -- this word, has it been stricken through or underlined?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I think I heard "samo" from the witness but it

 6     was not translated.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter notes that the word "samo" can

 8     be interpreted as "exclusively."

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.

10             Please continue.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, what do you think, is this word "samo" stricken through

13     or underlined?  What do you think, does this remain as part of your

14     order?

15        A.   Yes, it's underlined.  This "samo" is underlined.  It's not very

16     clear.  It's a bit badly done, but the entire sense remains as it is.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2827, Your Honours.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Given that order that you issued, would you say that this implies

22     opening sniper fire on civilians?

23        A.   No, no.  Everybody understood that.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to call up

Page 32838

 1     65 ter 12336.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   This was signed on your behalf by somebody else.  We will see it

 4     on the last page.  However, this is a regular combat report issued at

 5     1700 hours on the 10th of August, 1994.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll up a little and see

 7     what it says here about the units.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   It says here:

10             "Our units successfully repelled all enemy attacks.  They

11     responded to enemy provocations.  It was the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry

12     Brigade and the Ilijas Infantry Brigade that responded from infantry

13     weapons and mortars as well as by opening sniper fire."

14        A.   And what do you expect from me?

15        Q.   I did not complete.  I'm going to read slowly because we don't

16     have an official translation.

17             Further down it says:

18             "Sniper fire from the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade killed two

19     enemy soldiers.  One of them was a komandir," or a commander, "the

20     UNPROFOR soldiers have informed us about that, seeking approval to pull

21     their bodies out."

22             Did UNPROFOR protest therefore or did they understand that as a

23     legitimate operation and did they ask to pull their bodies out?

24        A.   They didn't -- UNPROFOR did not react adversely.  They understood

25     that fire was opened on military targets during combat.  I don't see

Page 32839

 1     anything in dispute there, but this shows something else.  Our reporting

 2     was done in the way to reflect as things really were.  It -- we did not

 3     try to disguise anything.  We did not try to pretend that we did not open

 4     fire when we did.

 5        Q.   This was strictly confidential and it was sent to the Main Staff;

 6     right?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Four days later, General, sir -- I don't know what we are looking

 9     at.  I don't know what document we are looking at.  I think it's 1D009.

10     Four days later you signed an anti-sniping agreement; right?

11        A.   Yes.  Yes.

12        Q.   I am charged with your alleged control over sniping activity and

13     when you signed that agreement the activities of Serbian sniper shooters

14     stopped.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get this document on the

16     screen.  It doesn't seem to have been admitted into evidence, 1D009.  The

17     following page.  It's -- it's not the document I asked for.  It's 1D1009.

18     1D1009.  Agreement, yes.  Can we see the following page.  It says here:

19     "Subject, agreement on elimination of sniping in Sarajevo."  Page 3, can

20     we go to page 3.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, sir, do you remember - can we scroll up - do you

23     remember whether you signed this agreement two years after your first

24     request that that agreement be signed?

25        A.   Yes, this is obviously my handwriting in the Latinic script.

Page 32840

 1        Q.   Could you please tell us what was sniping fire on the Serbian

 2     side conditional upon?

 3        A.   It's an elementary issue.  When their sniping fire stopped, ours

 4     stopped as well.  There was no need for further sniper fire.  Combat

 5     could go on without opening sniper fire, without using sniper rifles.

 6     They were excluded from combat from there on.  They were excluded even

 7     from hitting military targets.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted if it

 9     hasn't been admitted yet and the previous as well.

10             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification, the previous

11     document.

12             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  But this document is, I think, P861, the

14     anti-sniping agreement.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter number 12336 will be marked for

17     identification as D2828, Your Honours.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P863.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Four days later you issued an order.  I would like to call up

21     P863.  I don't have a Serbian version.  I'm going to read it, therefore.

22             [In English] "Pursuant to the anti-sniping agreement signed at

23     the airport Sarajevo on the 14th of August, 1994, it was given to all

24     troops of Sarajevo-Romanija Corps the following.

25             "Order.

Page 32841

 1             "Stop immediately ... activities and activities from other

 2     weapons -- sniping activities and activities from other weapons from the

 3     front line inside the town of Sarajevo."

 4             [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now bullet point 5.

 5             [In English] "It is the obligation of the commands to prevent

 6     individual unauthorised actions and irresponsible actions."

 7             [Interpretation] General, sir, you issued this order.  Did the

 8     sniping activity stop after that, both from the city and from outside of

 9     the city?

10        A.   Yes, it stopped.  In this case, the units of the

11     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps observed this agreement to the letter.  That kind

12     of fire was discontinued, obviously did not last long on the opposite

13     side.  They did not keep quiet for too long.

14        Q.   Did there come a time after that when that agreement was violated

15     on both sides?  I'm talking about the agreement that was signed on the

16     14th of August and your order issued on the 18th of August.  How long did

17     it all last?  How successful was this exercise?

18        A.   I'm sure that there is no exact date when that kind of conduct

19     stopped and when it started again.  I'm talking about violations of the

20     agreement.  So the date is not important.  I don't have it in any case.

21             In any case, as far as I can remember the cease-fire may have

22     lasted for about a month.  During that time there was no sniping

23     activity.  Sniping activities were suspended or limited.  The agreement

24     was observed and so on and so forth.  And then on our side we resumed

25     after the enemy side started opening sniper fire on us.  During that

Page 32842

 1     period and during all the other periods in question, I confirmed that our

 2     activities against targets outside of those that you mentioned never

 3     existed, and when I say "other targets," I mean civilian targets.

 4        Q.   General, after the agreement fell through, did you or anyone on

 5     the VRS side issue an order on trying to avoid sniper fire or did you

 6     prohibit opening fire at the city?

 7        A.   Well, I don't see the agreement as a complete failure.  I do know

 8     that we did our utmost to honour it and to keep it in place throughout;

 9     however, it did not enjoy that status for long.  As for our orders,

10     limitations, instructions and caution, they were issued even following

11     the violations of the agreement by the enemy.

12        Q.   General, sir, did the Serb side have a military or political

13     interest in continuing sniper activity in Sarajevo and what was the

14     interest of the other side?  Actually, who benefitted from it?

15        A.   The position of the SRK and the position of the other forces and

16     civilians was not such that we saw any interest in increasing that kind

17     of activity or continuing with it in order to expand the conflict.  I'm

18     basically trying to say that it was not in our interest.  I said several

19     times that the enemy side did not see any interest in resolving the

20     situation peacefully and we constantly felt that.

21        Q.   Thank you.  General, I wanted to ask you something about the

22     Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law and the laws of war

23     and how they were respected.  What can you tell us about it in terms of

24     JNA regulation and VRS position as well as the position of the SRK in

25     that regard?

Page 32843

 1        A.   First of all, the rules of the Geneva Conventions are very clear.

 2     There is no need to add or interpret them.  Fortunately, they exist as

 3     such and no one can depart from that framework in -- absent a very solid

 4     reason to do so.  The spirit of those rules was present in the mind of

 5     every member of the SRK.  I repeat, the fighters and people who were

 6     under fire on a daily basis actually kept asking us why we kept bothering

 7     them by saying that they shouldn't act against civilians.  Of course we

 8     clearly told them that we were not interested in civilians.  We had to

 9     keep reminding them irrespective of how responsibly they approached the

10     issue.  That was one thing.

11             Another thing, I know that we do not have enough time but I could

12     tell you every activity and move I made together with the rest of my

13     command in order to honour the Geneva Convention rules to the utmost.  It

14     was done in different ways.  For example, in the commands of battalions,

15     in bold letters there were such rules and it was insisted that the

16     battalion commanders pass that information down through their company

17     commanders and ultimately plain soldiers so that they would not commit

18     such mistakes.  That was one thing.

19             Another thing, we were constantly in touch with many people and

20     through that contact they were made aware of the fact that such conduct

21     would be inhumane, it would not be chivalrous and it would be below

22     anyone's dignity to act against the rules of the Geneva Conventions.

23     That's all I have to say about it.  Although, as I said, I could put

24     forth a number of indicators and examples on how we worked with the

25     people in situ.  I tried every time to tell them what was important for

Page 32844

 1     them as participants in the war.  They never heard from me or my

 2     commanders anything that would indicate that their negative conduct would

 3     be permitted.

 4        Q.   General, given the fact that the corps command and brigade

 5     commands for the most part were comprised of professional military

 6     personnel, whereas the soldiers had served in the JNA, were your

 7     instructions their first encounter with the Geneva Conventions?  What was

 8     their knowledge of the Geneva Conventions and international laws of war

 9     on the part of your commanders?

10        A.   The commanders and officers were completely familiar with it.

11     They were aware of the gist and thrust of the rules.  One learns that

12     through military education.  It was so taught that no one needed any

13     further persuasion.  It was simply a rule that was there.  The soldiers

14     did receive training on that topic.  I'm not asserting that we explained

15     in every detail what would await a person going against that rule,

16     especially in view of the fact that soldiers needn't be burdened with

17     every single rule there was.  But there was knowledge which for the most

18     part came from the officers who were well aware of the rules.

19        Q.   Thank you.  We had occasion to hear the testimony of several of

20     your brigade commanders.  What would be your take on the dignity,

21     professionalism, and humaneness of your brigade commanders?  Did you have

22     any issues with any of them?

23        A.   That's a very good question.  I'm happy that someone is

24     interested in how those people conducted themselves.  First of all, I

25     personally hold each and every of those commanders in high regard.  They

Page 32845

 1     have confirmed themselves as people of military and ethical principles,

 2     aware of their knowledge and ready to apply their knowledge in order for

 3     our side not to be defeated.  That's what I have to say about them.  They

 4     enjoyed my trust and in turn I received theirs.  Never, even in jest or

 5     when chatting, was there ever any thought or word uttered that we should

 6     do something that would be humiliating or detrimental to the level of

 7     those people who were in command of the brigades.

 8        Q.   General, sir, what was the position of your predecessor, that is

 9     to say, the first commander of the SRK, General Sipcic and his commanders

10     vis-a-vis respecting the rules of the Geneva Conventions?  Did you meet

11     with General Sipcic and did you have an opinion as regards that issue?

12        A.   Yes, I think it is well-known and clear that General Sipcic was

13     the corps commander for a very brief period of time.  While he was there,

14     I never saw him make a wrong move or a decision in that regard.  His tone

15     was not extremely commanding, but his conduct was also not detrimental to

16     our side in any respect.

17        Q.   What was the position concerning civilians, especially civilians

18     of other ethnicity in the area of responsibility of your brigade and

19     later on your corps?  What kind of measures were taken to protect them?

20        A.   Yes.  In the area of the SRK, especially in its south-eastern

21     part, there was a number of people of another ethnicity, in this case

22     Muslims.  I know that no crimes were committed against them.  When you

23     asked me earlier how we conducted our investigations, I'm pleased to know

24     that in the area of the SRK there were no crimes such as beatings,

25     detention, torture, mistreating, killings, et cetera.  The same status

Page 32846

 1     was accorded to Muslims as the other citizens living in our territory.

 2     They were not tortured or approached in a negative way.

 3        Q.   Are you talking about the organised forces under your control and

 4     does this include individuals outside of your control?

 5        A.   I'm afraid I do not understand.  Individuals outside my control?

 6     I don't know what it means.  I am talking about the people, territory,

 7     and population in the area of the SRK.

 8        Q.   So you are referring to your soldiers?

 9        A.   Yes.  I'm talking about their attitude towards the civilians in

10     our territory.  There were no crimes committed against people

11     irrespective of their ethnicity in the area of our forces and our front

12     line.

13        Q.   General, did the Muslims and Croats have the same obligation to

14     respond to call-ups like the Serbs?  Did you have soldiers and officers

15     of Muslim and Croat ethnicity?

16        A.   We did, especially in Grbavica.  There was a number of soldiers,

17     Muslims, who were used in combat deployment.  They held the line in that

18     area like any other soldier.  They were members of the SRK.

19        Q.   Did they have the same obligation, both Muslims and Croats in our

20     territory, the same as the Serbs had to respond?

21        A.   No, we did not want to force them.  There was no way or means to

22     force them to join our ranks.  Those who found themselves on our

23     territory could be engaged under work obligation.  There were two

24     categories:  Military obligation and work obligation.  And work

25     obligation was something like the civilian protection, whereby people

Page 32847

 1     were used to work in residential areas and help other people.  They were

 2     engaged in all sorts of tasks in the city.

 3        Q.   And in the corps as a whole, did you have any soldiers or

 4     officers, high-ranking officers, of a different ethnicity?

 5        A.   Yes, we did.  In the corps there were all ethnicities among the

 6     officers, all the ethnicities of the former Yugoslavia, that is.  There

 7     were Croats who were doctors and chiefs of the medical corps -- actually,

 8     there was just one man, Colonel Tonci Posa [phoen].  We also had a

 9     colonel who was the base commander at Pale.  I can't remember his name at

10     the moment, but he was a professional, he was a very good soldier.  I

11     will remember his name.  We also had Lieutenant-Colonel Milivoje Solar.

12     He was a Croat.  Together with his three daughters he spent the entire

13     war at Grbavica.  At the same time, he also got a fourth child, a son.

14     He spent the entire war there.  He was involved in logistics.  There were

15     also soldiers and -- yes, there was also Major Franc Lesnik [phoen] who

16     was a Slovenian.  I had a captain who was a Hungarian.  Those people were

17     involved in the work of the command or in the work of the units.  They

18     performed their duties as officers who knew what they were doing.  They

19     were professionals.

20        Q.   Just one more question before the break.  What was the attitude

21     towards the protection of abandoned property?  Did the army have anything

22     to do with protecting the property of those who temporarily left the

23     area, primarily the area of Grbavica?

24        A.   Your Honours, this is a question very close to my heart, very

25     well-known to me.  I have to let you know that I can't describe

Page 32848

 1     everything.  However, those were initial activities, initial measures

 2     that had to be introduced in order to establish some sort of order.  I

 3     would like to emphasize that I was a huge advocate of order in a

 4     situation when some people did not understand what it meant to live in an

 5     area where things were still not clear enough, and this especially

 6     applies to Grbavica, to an area where from day one some people had their

 7     own agenda which they had carried over from some other times.  And those

 8     activities were so frequent that I had to engage a military police

 9     company in order to reinstate order in the area and protect people.

10     Primarily people who needed protection were Muslims who were there and

11     who feared threats.  When they realised that there was protection to be

12     had, that somebody did not allow unknown people to enter their

13     apartments, they were grateful.  It was my company commander Djurkovic

14     who did that.  I appointed him myself.  Before that he was a company

15     commander, an active-duty officer.  And when the decision was made that

16     people should be sent to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, he left.  I

17     issued him a certificate showing how good he was in my service.

18        Q.   What did you know about the position of the Main Staff, of the

19     Supreme Command, the president of the republic, and the government with

20     regard to your activities to the effect of preserving the lives,

21     property, rights, and security of civilians of other ethnicities in your

22     zone of responsibility?

23        A.   The position was clear and I was happy that the position was

24     clear because it meant that people who lived there were not exposed to

25     any sort of ill-treatment on the part of the soldiers.  They accepted

Page 32849

 1     that protection.  Second of all, the general principle and requirement

 2     was not to do evil unto others.  I accepted that.  Everybody was moderate

 3     in a demanding situation, so there were moderate positions by the

 4     Main Staff, by yourself, and all the other factors that constituted

 5     political power and governed the entire political situation.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, is this the time for

 8     our next break?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at

10     22 past 1.00.

11                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.37 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 1.21 p.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, sir, what measures were applied in order to curb crime

17     in the zone of responsibility of your brigade and, later on, in the zone

18     of responsibility of your corps?  We'll see a document later.

19        A.   There were several measures.  The basic intention was to prevent

20     their movements, especially if it was suspected that they would be able

21     to engage in their criminal activity there.  For example, in the central

22     urban area.  The key measure that I can confirm was applied on my part

23     was to involve them in combat, to make them members of a unit and place

24     them under a certain command.  From there onwards, they stopped playing a

25     criminal role.  In other words, they were mobilised.  They became members

Page 32850

 1     of combat teams, and they could not freely move around.  And that was if

 2     they had displayed some sort of negative behaviour.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D7522.

 4     1D7522.  We have the Serbian version.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   This is an order which was issued by the command of the

 7     1st Romanija Brigade on the 15th of July, 1992.  Somebody signed on your

 8     behalf but your name is typed up.  Can you present the document to us and

 9     why you issued it.  Measure to prevent theft and misappropriation of

10     property, the introduction of a curfew.  Could you please briefly tell us

11     what prompted you to issue this document and what this document implied

12     at the time?

13        A.   Yes.  First of all, I would like to thank you for showing me this

14     document.  I completely forgot about that.  These are measures that I

15     wanted to introduce and I did introduce them because we had to curb some

16     negative behaviours by certain factors who had not grasped the situation

17     as it prevailed at the time.  In any case, these were measures aimed at

18     restoring order and curbing damaging behaviour, theft, burglaries, and a

19     number of other activities that some people may have been prepared to

20     engage in, not realising that we were in a state of war.

21        Q.   Thank you.  We can see that ambulances were allowed to do their

22     job.  Under bullet point 2, where it says:

23             "Measures to prevent theft and misappropriation of property."

24             Could you please tell us whose property was mostly exposed to

25     that type of crime?

Page 32851

 1        A.   Those who were prone to property theft did not ask too many

 2     questions, but they primarily chose to steal from Muslims.  The feeling

 3     that a period of lawlessness had emerged was conducive to such

 4     activities.  Both the introduction of a curfew and the second measure --

 5     let's understand each other.  I didn't even know if I had the right to

 6     introduce such measures, but I didn't pay too much attention whether that

 7     was my legal obligation or not.  I just needed to curb that kind of

 8     behaviour and I had to do it at the roots.

 9        Q.   In that respect, General, sir, can we scroll down a little

10     because on the top of the page we can see that something was scribbled by

11     hand and there is a question mark.  We can't see it in e-court, but let

12     me read this to you.  Somebody wrote down:

13             "Where's the police?"  And there is a question mark after those

14     words.

15             Where were the police at the time?  Were there enough state

16     organs, primarily courts and police, that would have allowed you not to

17     introduce those measures?

18        A.   Of course there were not enough and the police could not be

19     efficient.  Since there was a state of chaos, somebody had to take

20     measures, and I really don't think it is important whether it was the

21     police who did that or military organs, especially in that area that was

22     rather small and order had to be introduced, whereas the police --

23     obviously the police were there but they did not function properly.

24        Q.   General, did someone from the Main Staff, the government, or the

25     Presidency hold it against you, did they complain to you because you had

Page 32852

 1     introduced these measures?

 2        A.   To the best of my recollection, no.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the next page and then

 4     I will ask that this part that was not visible on the screen be shown to

 5     the participants.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Yes, you can see it now in the English translation, yes, "where's

 8     the police."

 9             What it says here in the third and fourth line, all the property

10     that has been stolen where the perpetrators are known has to be restored

11     to its owners.  Was this done and to what extent?

12        A.   Well, of course we managed to do that, but not absolutely, not

13     everything could be detected, not everything could be discovered and

14     restored, but for every citizen who has been robbed or looted, of course,

15     he is happy to have his property restored and we have to make certain

16     this doesn't happen again.

17        Q.   Was any distinction made according to ethnic affiliation?

18        A.   Well, that was the point, not to draw any distinctions.  You have

19     to understand that in that period we still lived in the same way as

20     before, and those who were taking measures wanted to restore things to

21     normal and not have individuals acting wilfully.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the next page?

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   The Geneva Conventions and the rules and customs of war, and this

Page 32853

 1     includes prisoners of war.  Can you explain what you wrote under point 4,

 2     which says "treatment of prisoners of war," or rather, "procedure with

 3     prisoners," and can you tell us what you prescribed when it comes to

 4     prisoners?

 5        A.   In this document and in the practice I wanted to be implemented,

 6     we wanted it to be regulated from the outset how prisoners should be

 7     treated.  I don't think there's anything more just than respecting a

 8     person who has been taken prisoner.  That's what I asked from those

 9     people.  The situation was imposed and they couldn't consider someone who

10     is a prisoner and who is helpless to be someone they could do what they

11     liked with.  This -- they had to understand that this would not be

12     permitted because once you allow this kind of situation to escalate,

13     prisoners will undergo great suffering.  Not just here in this situation

14     but throughout the war, at Ilidza, in the area there, company commander,

15     a Muslim, was taken prisoner and he was beside himself because he thought

16     this was the end.  He thought he was going to lose his life.  And I spoke

17     to him and on the same day he was exchanged for someone else.  So the

18     treatment of prisoners had to be respectful and their lives had to be

19     ensured.

20        Q.   Let's have the next time.  You appointed Captain Simo Sipcic to

21     co-ordinate the work between the civil organs and the army and between

22     the military police and the civil police; is that correct?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   What was the reason you did this?

25        A.   The main reason was that I needed someone who was more familiar

Page 32854

 1     with the area than I was, and with the conditions there.  In this case,

 2     Simo Sipcic was a person who was local.  I don't know whether he was born

 3     there, but that's where he lived and worked, so he was the best person to

 4     act as co-ordinator and as a contact point.  He let me know that he was

 5     willing to do this and I appointed him.  I'm not saying I couldn't have

 6     chosen a better person.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  A hypothetical question, General:  Would it have been

 8     easier for you if we had declared the state of war to introduce order or

 9     would the situation have been the same?

10        A.   Well, I didn't need a state of war to be declared.  What was

11     necessary was for people to understand how they should conduct themselves

12     because regardless of whether there was or was not a state of war, people

13     went through the same thing.  In the beginning it was impossible to

14     appoint someone to do something and put him in a desired situation, but

15     later on you could achieve that with everybody once they understood that

16     without organised work and without a command there could be no successful

17     defence, regardless of whether a state of war was declared or not.

18        Q.   General, this was an order to your subordinates.  It was strictly

19     confidential, of the 15th of July.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May it be admitted into evidence,

21     please?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2829, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we now have 1D7521,

25     please.

Page 32855

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, this is a notice from you to the population, so it's a

 3     shorter version of what was in your order.  Can you tell us what you

 4     informed the population about and why?

 5        A.   Something that is an integral part of the measures needed by the

 6     military organisation.  There can be no defence, there can be no

 7     possibility of putting things right if the population starts leaving and

 8     so on.  If there are civilian family members in the defence area, then

 9     those who are defending the area will defend it better if they know their

10     family's there than if they know their family has left.  So I wanted to

11     restrict the movement of people in order to prevent the area from being

12     depopulated.  That was what I wanted to do, and I think that this was

13     something that was part of the defence of the area.

14        Q.   This second paragraph says that unauthorised persons are

15     prohibited from entering abandoned and empty flats.  This could be done

16     only by the military police.  And in the end, people are warned that

17     there will be severe punitive measures.

18        A.   Yes, that's correct.  In the area of Grbavica there was something

19     called Digitron.  That's where certain groups gathered until I managed to

20     put them under control.  They started asking me on whose side I was.

21     They thought that we were communists who wanted to restore the old

22     brotherhood and unity system.  But later on, those same people came to

23     understand that all this was in their interest and they all managed to

24     fit in with the way that they were supposed to behave and they acted

25     normally.

Page 32856

 1        Q.   Are you refer to their behaviour towards Muslims and Croats in

 2     Grbavica?

 3        A.   No, I'm -- what I'm saying is that some people, when it comes to

 4     Muslims, thinking that I was only protecting Muslims and that I was

 5     working against the interest of those who were self-willed.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence,

 8     please?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2830, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we look at 1D7526.

12             JUDGE KWON:  One question for you, General.  How was this notice

13     notified to the people?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Through certain local communes,

15     representatives of the population.  Through individuals in certain areas,

16     in certain streets or neighbourhoods or parts of the town.  So those were

17     their civil representatives who were well-respected in their communities

18     and it was up to them to communicate this to their neighbours.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, in those local communes, were there any notice boards

22     which could be used to put up notices?

23        A.   Yes, of course there were.  I can't recall whether any of these

24     notices were put up on the notice board, but I wanted it to be

25     communicated to people in a closer way.

Page 32857

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D7526.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   This is a combat report of the 10th of November, when you were

 5     already commander.  It's a regular combat report in which you informed

 6     the Main Staff, the forward command post, and the two neighbouring corps

 7     of what the enemy is doing.  So let's look at the bottom of the page

 8     where it says fire was opened on targets in depth and on infantry

 9     positions in the city.  Can you explain what this means?

10        A.   Well, this is a consolidated, compiled report which has the

11     purpose of informing the Main Staff of combat activities on the entire

12     area.  When it comes to the area that is outside the city, it was fired

13     on in depth, whereas in the city only on positions which were in our

14     immediate vicinity or in shelters, trenches, dug-outs, or fortifications

15     which were directly in front of us without the depth.

16        Q.   In that first instance, what did the enemy have in depth which

17     was worth firing on?

18        A.   I think it's quite clear, they can have artillery there.  They

19     can have reserve there, approaching units.  They can have certain waiting

20     areas for the bringing in of fresh forces, waiting for new tasks.  So it

21     depends on what you discover there, but basically it boils down to

22     artillery weapons.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the next page.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 32858

 1        Q.   Can you please tell us in item 5, morale and security situation,

 2     the first three lines, can you read the sentence and tell us what this is

 3     about?  "To all units ..."

 4        A.   Yes, yes, I see.  I see.

 5             There's no need for me to read what it says here.  We sent it to

 6     all the units, or rather, all the units were given a large number of

 7     copies of Law on the Application of the Law on Military Courts and the

 8     Law on Military Prosecutors' Offices During a State of War.  I can see

 9     that now, that we were supposed to distribute this once a state of war

10     was declared.

11        Q.   General, can you tell Their Honours how the military justice

12     system was organised in the area of the corps, what services were there

13     and what they were doing.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may this document be admitted

15     into evidence?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The military justice system

17     continued operating, it continued to exist, to the best of my

18     understanding, in a similar way as in peace time.  There were military

19     courts, there was a military prosecutor, and there were organs engaged in

20     doing this work.  In -- as part of the Main Staff of the Army of

21     Republika Srpska, there was a legal service which had its chief and, I

22     repeat, there were military courts and a military prosecutor's office

23     doing everything that was done in other situations as well.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted into

25     evidence?

Page 32859

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2831, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D7538.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And while we are waiting, General, how were military courts and

 6     prosecutors' offices allocated with respect to the military territorial

 7     situation?

 8        A.   When it comes to the area of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, the

 9     military court and military prosecutor's office were located in Ilidza.

10     That's where they were and that's where that part of the judiciary was

11     located.  Further, there was a military court for the Republika Srpska,

12     to the best of my knowledge, in Zvornik.  It's quite certain that in

13     other areas there were other military courts, but I can't confirm this

14     although I know they must have been there.

15        Q.   Thank you.  So did I understand correctly that the area of

16     responsibility of a corps had its own military court and military

17     prosecutor's office?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Did you interfere in the work of the military courts and military

20     prosecutor?  How did they conduct their jobs, if you know?  Who could

21     arrest a person and so on?

22        A.   Well, of course I knew, although I didn't interfere.  With the

23     help of my own legal service and the security organ, I submitted criminal

24     reports against persons who had done something unlawful.  And to the best

25     of my knowledge, there were about 70 criminal reports which I signed and

Page 32860

 1     submitted for further procedure.  If there is an understanding that there

 2     was nothing further I could do, I could not prosecute or interfere, I

 3     maintain that I did my job to the best of my ability.  I did not

 4     interfere with the work of the military courts.  I did get First-Class

 5     Captain Jamina [phoen], who was a military prosecutor, to give

 6     instructions to officers in Grbavica and Ilidza to contact the soldiers

 7     to tell them what they could expect if they acted in an unlawful manner.

 8     He did this very conscientiously.  I congratulate him on this.  I'm not

 9     saying this was the only influence on the fighters.  It was one of many

10     influences for them not to commit crimes.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Are you discussing the 70 criminal reports during

12     your command, and in addition to that, were there any reports concerning

13     misdemeanour and, if so, what were the figures in that area?

14        A.   Yes, I was discussing the criminal reports during the period of

15     my command.  I can't tell you anything about misdemeanours because they

16     were of lesser importance at the time to me.  I can't say what the figure

17     was.  I was only discussing the number of criminal reports.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Look at item 5, please.  There is some mention of

19     four criminal reports against soldiers for the crime of theft within the

20     AOR of the brigade.  That was while you were still with the

21     1st Romanija Brigade; correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Does it mean there was one soldier who committed four crimes of

24     theft or four soldiers in a single theft?

25        A.   No, no, no, it wasn't a single soldier.  There were four criminal

Page 32861

 1     reports against soldiers, plural, who had committed the crime of theft in

 2     the area of responsibility of the brigade.  The reports will be passed on

 3     to the office of the military prosecutor for further action.

 4        Q.   That was already on the 4th of July, 1992; correct?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps we can scroll up so that

 6     the General can see the date.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2832, Your Honours.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D7539?

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   While waiting for it, please tell us who is Lieutenant-Colonel

16     Ljuban Kosovac?

17        A.   Colonel Kosovac was assistant commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija

18     Corps for morale and legal affairs.

19        Q.   The date is October 1992.  Was Colonel Kosovac in the unit during

20     your period there when you were the chief?

21        A.   While I was the Chief of Staff he was the assistant commander for

22     morale and legal affairs.  I can't recall when he left exactly.  I don't

23     know if he was still there when I assumed my duties.  I do know, though,

24     that in the corps Colonel Dragicevic was in that position.  He had taken

25     over and it -- I seem to have a recollection that Kosovac by that time

Page 32862

 1     retired.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  What is Colonel Kosovac sending here?  Did you in the

 3     brigade receive these guide-lines for determining the criteria for

 4     prosecution?  Have a look at the first paragraph.  Just tell us briefly

 5     what it's about.

 6        A.   Even without reading I know what he could have asked for.  In

 7     this instance, as the competent organ, he provided guide-lines on how to

 8     behave and what measures to take to normalise the situation in the

 9     prevention of crime for the sake of unified policy relating to

10     prosecution.

11        Q.   So in addition to the crimes against the armed forces or avoiding

12     draft calls, we also have property crime, profiteering, war crimes,

13     et cetera; correct?

14        A.   Yes.  The whole point was to have the forces act in the sense

15     that war crimes should be prevented.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2833, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at 1D07035.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, have a look, please.  The date is the 15th of December,

23     1992.  You are still in command of the 1st Romanija Brigade.

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Item 2, maximum observation and so on.  Does this tally with what

Page 32863

 1     you have told us previously that observation was an ongoing activity?

 2        A.   That type of activity had to be in place at all times; however,

 3     here it is stated that it forms the basis of our guarantee of proper

 4     conduct.  The system of observation, pin-pointing targets, following the

 5     movement of the enemy and its columns, all that was a precondition to

 6     protecting ourselves and in order to take action against such activity

 7     which threatens our side.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the next page and for

10     the time being I would ask that it not be broadcast.  Item 4 in the

11     English, so that's the next page as well.  I'm not certain whether it

12     should be broadcast or not, but it is better to be cautious.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   In item 4 you report that on the 13th of December, at around

15     2200 hours, there was an incident resulting in a death, civilian

16     Ilija Pavlovic was killed and it seemed that another civilian reported it

17     who was Muslim.  There are soldiers referred to, including Pavlovic who

18     went to the apartment of a Muslim woman while drunk and that there was a

19     risk that they would rape her.  Mladen Janic and Glogovac and Buha and

20     Ujic went to the flat.  They found there the above-mentioned soldiers who

21     were completely drunk and they escorted them to the company command.

22             Can you discuss the following paragraph without referring to the

23     names, please.  It seems there was some shooting, too.

24        A.   Yes.  This reminds me of the last name of the person who took

25     measures to prevent this.  It was Mr. Glogovac, I believe, or someone.

Page 32864

 1     He knew what needed to be done, what was permitted, what was not.  He

 2     prevented this situation, and thanks to him, it did not escalate to the

 3     point of a crime being committed.

 4        Q.   This Ibro person, I won't mention his last name, he was Muslim,

 5     and he reported it and his report was acted upon.  That's what the

 6     document says?

 7        A.   Yes.  It means that we trusted that there was something he wanted

 8     to report and followed up on his information.  It was acted on

 9     professionally.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

14             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think we have to put it under seal.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2834, Your Honours.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, did you have any paramilitary units in the corps or in

18     its area, especially as of the moment you became the chief and commander

19     later on?

20        A.   No, there weren't any.  Let me add this:  I have to acknowledge

21     General Galic's efforts.  He acted emphatically in cutting off and

22     removing all such elements.  In that way he made my job easier, since I

23     no longer had to deal with them anymore.  Whatever there was, was under

24     the command of the 1st and 3rd Sarajevo Brigades.  There were no other

25     kind of forces.  When I say "the 1st and 3rd Sarajevo Brigades," I wanted

Page 32865

 1     to say that there were volunteers in their ranks.

 2        Q.   Did the volunteers enjoy the same status, the same rights and

 3     obligations as the regular soldiers?

 4        A.   Yes, absolutely so.  Even more importantly, they were equal in

 5     the sense that they died equally.  A Russian was killed, I even have the

 6     exact date of his death and what happened to him.  There were situations

 7     where volunteers lost their limbs when they stepped on mines.  I think it

 8     was even the same man.  So they lived under the same conditions and

 9     engaged in the same activities as the other fighters.

10        Q.   General, was there uniformity in terms of dress as it had existed

11     in the JNA and appearance?  For example, were there people wearing

12     beards?  Were there soldiers or officers of yours who behaved, let's say,

13     in an unconventional way, standing out in any way?

14        A.   I'd like to say very much so that it was not our priority, it was

15     not a key matter to be followed.  But it is true that in terms of dress

16     and appearance they were all equal.  However, some were not asked to

17     shave their faces.  That remained as the only characteristic which made

18     them stand out.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 15703.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Did the same apply to their hair and personal image?

23             The date is the 27th of August, 1993.  There you report on the

24     measures undertaken regarding the Vaska case.  What was it all about?

25        A.   Well, Vaska, do you want me to read it all because we may lose

Page 32866

 1     time?  Vaska stood out in terms of his appearance, he looked differently.

 2     He knew well, because I had told him that it was not appropriate and that

 3     he looked untidy.  It didn't contribute one bit to his image.  After

 4     several attempts to make him understand and after that failed, we took

 5     measures because he failed to realise that.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In item 1 you discuss his conduct towards UNPROFOR,

 7     and the document then states that Vaska was to follow what you had

 8     prescribed.

 9        A.   Yes, he had that streak in his behaviour and he had difficulty in

10     understanding that it had nothing to do with military structures and

11     civilised behaviour.  The issue of respect of UNPROFOR and their mission,

12     it was important to us, not only that it is respected by most of them but

13     all of them.

14        Q.   Let us look at item 3.  It seems that the offences he had

15     committed before were not forgotten.  Please read it out.

16        A.   "The Corps Command decided, for the time being, to file criminal

17     charges against Vaska, make him responsible for the mistakes he had made

18     previously -- hold him responsible ."

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted, please?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2835, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D7540.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you will conclude your

24     examination-in-chief today?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll do my utmost,

Page 32867

 1     Your Excellencies.  Perhaps I will have a couple of minutes left for

 2     tomorrow -- actually, I could do it on the day of the cross, although I

 3     hope to finish today.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber needs to rise at quarter to 3.00 sharp,

 5     and I would like you to leave five minutes at the end.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  If I have a few

 7     documents left, would it be acceptable if I did it before the

 8     cross-examination starts on the day when it starts?  This would avoid us

 9     having to re-call the General tomorrow.  Or perhaps I can do it over one

10     session tomorrow morning, if that helps.

11             JUDGE KWON:  And there's no change as to the order of witnesses

12     in terms of the agreement between the parties, Ms. Edgerton?

13             MS. EDGERTON:  My understanding of the agreement is that the

14     cross-examination of the General will be put forward to another date, but

15     we haven't in the interim, as this testimony has gone on, finalised when

16     that date might be precisely.  Recalling Your Honour's indication about

17     when you would prefer the cross-examination begin.

18             JUDGE KWON:  If you are ready, I would like to hear it

19     immediately following the examination-in-chief, but it doesn't seem to be

20     the case.  I would like you to start immediately following the conclusion

21     of three witnesses' evidence.

22             MR. TIEGER:  If I can address that briefly, Mr. President, just

23     that -- because I think I had discussions with Mr. Robinson about this.

24     I know I did with someone and I thought it was with him.  We were aware

25     of the Trial Chamber's preference to -- aware both of the estimation that

Page 32868

 1     the witnesses who were expected to commence tomorrow -- and now it's

 2     coming back to me, I think I had this discussion after being notified

 3     yesterday that the Defence expected to take the entirety of the day

 4     today.  We then expected to move on to the other witnesses.  That order,

 5     of course, remained the same in terms of their appearance.  And I

 6     simply -- and then we also acknowledged the Trial Chamber's preference to

 7     begin the cross-examination thereafter, and I simply put down a marker at

 8     that time that we were hoping to do just that and thought we could, but

 9     that if the examinations of the three witnesses who were expected to

10     testify tomorrow did not last the entirety of the day, we nevertheless

11     thought that the cross-examination of Mr. Milosevic should not begin

12     until the earliest on Thursday.  So that was the understanding.  I didn't

13     hear -- so that's kind of the minimum discussion that took place.

14             JUDGE KWON:  That point has been taken.

15             Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Please cast a glance.  This was issued in December 1993.  We will

19     see at the end that Ljuban Kosovac, your assistant, i.e., Galic's

20     assistant at the time, reported about the work of the military

21     prosecutor's office and the military court, both tied to his corps.  It

22     is stated here that during that period of time before you became

23     commander, 79 criminal reports were filed against 90 individuals.  Is

24     that correct?

25        A.   Yes, yes.  That's what I read.  This is the information that was

Page 32869

 1     provided in the form of an analysis.

 2        Q.   Can you please tell us what was the breakdown of crimes?  You

 3     will find it in paragraph 2.

 4        A.   Crimes against property, violent crimes and other crimes.

 5     Violation of guard duty, for example, that would be the first.

 6     Assaulting military personnel, theft, murder, illicit trade, endangering

 7     public traffic, rape, and so on and so forth.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't have to broadcast this.

10     We don't have to pronounce the names of the perpetrators, but I would

11     like to go to the following page.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   General, sir, look at bullet point 9, paragraph 2.  Could you

14     please summarise it or maybe even read the whole of it?

15        A.   Bullet point 9?

16        Q.   Yes, second paragraph below the name.

17        A.   "In order to take preventive action, the Military Prosecutor at

18     the SRK Command visited some units of the Corps, and on that occasion, he

19     informed the commands and relevant organs about the problems encountered

20     in the work of the Military Prosecutor's Office ..."

21             Basically, this is the gist of the problem for which I hired a

22     military prosecutor as a person who played the role that he knew how to

23     play and to influence other people's behaviour.

24        Q.   He mentions problems.  He says that there are shortcomings in

25     reports, there are difficulties in obtaining information, hindered work

Page 32870

 1     of law enforcement organs, poor communication, shortage of staff,

 2     difficult working conditions, and so on and so forth.  Can you confirm

 3     that?

 4        A.   Yes, I can.

 5        Q.   General, sir, were you aware of any case of either successful or

 6     unsuccessful cover-up of a crime by military prosecutors' offices or

 7     officers in your corps?

 8        A.   I don't understand your question.  What do you mean when you say

 9     "cover up"?  How should I be able to cover things up?

10        Q.   Not you.  Was there anybody in your corps, any judicial organs in

11     your corps that tried to cover up a crime?

12        A.   No, I'm not aware of any such instances.  I'm not aware of

13     anybody's intentions of that kind or even successful attempts to do any

14     such thing.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see the first page?

18             While the content of this document referred to criminal reports

19     by Ilidza Brigade, Ilijas Brigade, 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade, why was

20     it sent to -- only to 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade?  Or was it sent to

21     all brigades?  But I don't see that notation from the document.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer?  The 2nd Romanija

23     Motorised Brigade in the meantime had already left the contingent of the

24     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  This is a document that was sent only to them.

25     It is more than certain that there are other documents which were sent to

Page 32871

 1     all the commands.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, we'll receive it.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2836, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, sir, now I would like to draw your attention to the

 8     elements of command and control in the zone of responsibility of your

 9     brigade and then of your corps but in very general terms.  Could you

10     please tell us something about the ways of communication between units

11     and their commands, especially the beginning of 1992?  What was the

12     status of communications, relays, telephones, and what was the

13     accessibility of areas, places, by road?

14        A.   I managed to understand your question.  My view of the system of

15     command was this:  The system of command can only function if they are

16     supported by a good communications system.  This is not the only

17     condition for the good functioning of the system of command and control,

18     but it is one of very important factors.  The system of communications

19     and its capacities are very important.

20             Obviously, at first nothing worked properly.  The biggest problem

21     was the fact that the technical equipment that we had at our disposal was

22     very obsolete.  Those things, the equipment, radios, radio relay

23     equipment, could be intercepted by anybody and that was a big problem for

24     the system of command which needs to be established.

25             There is another principle which is the principle of physical

Page 32872

 1     conduct, immediate contact, and commanding people.  Roads were also

 2     important but it also played an obstacle in communication.  The command

 3     role implies that everybody could receive orders, but this was impossible

 4     because of the distances, weak communications, and many other obstacles

 5     to that communication.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D7527.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   While we are waiting, do you remember Major Pera Jesic?

 9        A.   Yes, I do.  I know the major.

10        Q.   This is an intercept of your telephone conversation which you had

11     on the 24th of May, four days after the Army of Republika Srpska was

12     established.  This was recorded by the Muslim side.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we take a look at pages 4 and 2

14     in Serbian and English respectively.  This is not a good page in

15     English -- no, it is, it is.  Okay.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Look at the Serbian page and see where it says:

18             "Check if you have any communication with them ..."

19             That's what you are asking?

20        A.   Of course, I can see that and I'm asking him to tell me whether

21     there is communication, whether they are in contact with them or not.

22        Q.   At the bottom he says:

23             "We didn't get further away from Sokolac."

24        A.   Actually, he's talking about the interaction in communications,

25     about the non-existence of communications, so he cannot get in touch with

Page 32873

 1     somebody.

 2        Q.   He says -- you ask:

 3             "So what is the situation over there in Rogatica?  You don't

 4     know."

 5             So you didn't know what the situation was in Rogatica?

 6        A.   No, I didn't know.  And this is really good.  Now it takes me

 7     back.  This is a journey down memory lane.  A company remained there,

 8     yes, this was a period that completely escaped me.  When the brigade

 9     arrived, one company remained in the Mesici sector, which is in Rogatica.

10     I wanted to know what was going on with that company because I could not

11     reach them.  I was not in contact with that company that I later on

12     transferred and deployed in Sarajevo.

13        Q.   Where was the 216th, or rather, the 1st Romanija Brigade?  That

14     was on the 24th of May, 1992.

15        A.   We already said that it was in the territory of Sarajevo, i.e.,

16     it was in Vrace, Grbavica, one part of Tilava, in that area basically.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2837, Your Honours.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   We're still talking about command and control, General, sir.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D7528.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Can you tell us something about the reporting system?  How did

25     you report about activities and combat tasks?  Who was it who compiled

Page 32874

 1     those reports?  Were their authors professional officers and can you tell

 2     us something about all that and tie it to this document?

 3        A.   I don't want to read the document.  I know what problems we

 4     encountered in our work.  During that period of time and a bit later, the

 5     organs that collected information, who provided answers, and who were in

 6     command of their units, who were supposed to comply with rules and

 7     regulations that came from higher instances were not functioning

 8     properly, which is not surprising because nobody could do things properly

 9     from scratch.  Nobody could be expected to be the best possible officer

10     from day one.  The system of command is very complex which is always

11     repaired, improved, shortcomings are eliminated, so as to make sure that

12     that system may function as well as possible.

13        Q.   What are the most important conditions that need to be put in

14     place in order to have a good system of command, including technical

15     equipment and personnel?

16        A.   Both are important.  The most important thing is willingness to

17     do things and seriousness in approach.  People who were not trained, who

18     did not have enough knowledge, can make up for the shortcomings if they

19     were willing to learn.  That was the prevailing intention for people to

20     overcome their shortcomings through work and through learning from

21     others.

22        Q.   Can we look at the last page to see that it was delivered to the

23     2nd Sarajevo Brigade, the 1st Romanija Brigade, and that it was signed by

24     Colonel Galic?

25        A.   Yes, yes.

Page 32875

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  The General specifically said he didn't want to

 4     read the document, so I don't know if he's given a basis for its

 5     admission.  All that being said, though, I have no issue about the

 6     authenticity of the document, of course.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I took that statement to mean that he agreed with

 8     the document.  Given your position, we'll admit it.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2838, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, sir, while the document is still on the screen, this was

13     issued on the 7th of September, 1992.  Let's look at the situation as it

14     was two months later.  1D7529.

15             Take a look at the document, please, and then tell us what the

16     document refers to.  Are there still shortcomings in the system of

17     reporting?

18        A.   This was sent by the corps command.  The corps command sought

19     ways to introduce order and rules into the system of reporting.  The

20     corps command needed to know exactly what was happening in particular

21     areas.  Shortcomings were again observed in the system of reporting.

22     There were elements that the corps command needed to have.  That's why

23     they are requesting all the units to work on eliminating those

24     shortcomings, and the main principle was to be accurate in the system of

25     reporting.

Page 32876

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2839, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at 1D7532, to

 6     see what the situation was like eight months later.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Do you remember this document?  It was signed by you.  It is a

 9     request to all brigades and the Vogosca Tactical Group.  You say pursuant

10     to the order of the Main Staff of the 15th of July, 1993, on the same day

11     you request accurate data on troop deployment, specifying the data on the

12     location of your units, et cetera.  The last paragraph:

13             "The data needs to be accurate and precise, showing the location

14     of units where your forces are holding positions."

15             What prompted you to draft this order to all of the units?

16        A.   First of all, it is clear that it was requested by the

17     Main Staff.  They wanted to have more precise information.  Secondly,

18     there must have been inaccuracies in sketching deployments on the map.

19     Therefore, everyone had to verify the position of their forces so as to

20     reflect those positions accurately on the map.  Even the most minute

21     details had to be taken into account when displaying it on the map.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2840, Your Honours.

Page 32877

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at P1763.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   It's a whole year later, that is to say, July 1994.  Why was it

 4     necessary to reissue this type of order?  We saw the one in

 5     September 1992.  That's when it was issued for the first time.

 6        A.   I don't know if you understood me properly at the beginning when

 7     I started discussing the system of control and command.  The system of

 8     command and control is an activity which needs to be improved constantly

 9     and worked on.  Objectively speaking, there may be inadequacies even when

10     there is very strong insistence on abiding by it.

11             In this case, I did not want to have any kind of lack of clarity

12     or something that may result in insufficient information on the

13     situation.  It was very important that the system was properly

14     functioning.  There were constant needs to caution, warn, and improve the

15     functioning of the system.  There were weaknesses and problems that

16     occurred from time to time.

17        Q.   What was the importance of such reports for the commander?

18        A.   He cannot make appropriate decisions if he lacks clear indicators

19     and if he has inaccurate information.

20        Q.   Thank you.  It says that lately all documents are being drafted

21     by commands in a stereotypical way on behalf of the commander.

22     Dead-lines were not being met.  Work was not being done properly.  And we

23     have received orders asking for specific data that need to be honoured.

24        A.   That is all correct.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the last page to see

Page 32878

 1     if you signed it and this has already been admitted.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is my signature.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Immediately following this document you took over command;

 5     correct?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D7537 to see what

 9     things were like in early April 1995.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   At the time you were the corps commander; correct?

12        A.   Yes.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D7537.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we just go back to that first -- the

15     document we've just been dealing with, D2840.  I think it dates from 1993

16     rather than 1994.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that was my understanding.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   General, this is April 1995.  It says:

21             "Despite the warning that you had received earlier you still

22     failed to fulfil your regular planned obligations regarding monthly

23     reports ..." and so on and so forth.

24             So this is another warning.  General, until the very end of the

25     war, was there such thing as full control and -- of the reporting system

Page 32879

 1     within the system of command and control?  Were there always problems or

 2     were you successful in implementing it in full by the end of the war?

 3        A.   Well, we see this is already 1995, so my answer would be no.  I

 4     know that the system that was in place could ensure that we worked

 5     normally, and any kind of intervention of this nature was simply an

 6     expression of the need to have it improved or to do away with

 7     shortcomings.  Since I know how the entire situation ended, I believe

 8     that the system towards the end functioned meticulously.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  General, were you satisfied with the number of

10     professional officers in lower commanding positions and did that have any

11     impact on problems discussed in documents like this one?

12        A.   It's very relative who you are satisfied with or not.  What my

13     aim was to have the people do their best given their ability and given

14     the circumstances.  Anything beyond that was even better and assistance

15     was provided.  I tried to respect everyone because not every person had

16     the same ability and knowledge.  Every one of them was precious for the

17     functioning of the system even with their weaknesses, their flaws, if

18     there were any.

19        Q.   As per establishment, how many professional officers were you

20     supposed to have at junior levels and how many did you have, in fact?

21        A.   Well, we simply put that aside.  We no longer wanted to follow

22     the establishment.  We fought for all personnel that had been highly

23     trained, especially those who had attended the command staff academy.  To

24     a certain extent we were successful but not too much because the corps

25     command was short of officers who had a different range of abilities.

Page 32880

 1             The brigade commanders were the people who knew their job and it

 2     was a comfort to me.  Veljko Stojanovic, who was a moderate commander,

 3     and he managed to defend an area that not many people would be able to.

 4     The same goes for Dragan Josipovic who resembled a chess player when

 5     assessing the enemy and awaiting the enemy's mistake to act.  It was all

 6     up to scratch.  The same goes for Vlado Lizdek.  The staff I had -- well,

 7     I'm grateful to them.

 8        Q.   Thank you, General.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?  And I'd like

10     to conclude for the day.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Conclude for the day.  You need how much to conclude

12     your direct examination?  We'll admit this.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2841, Your Honours.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A session, Your Excellency.  I have

15     three areas to cover, half of this one and another two.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, there's -- there should be a limit.

17     The Chamber will give you half an hour tomorrow to conclude your direct

18     examination.  I think that's more than reasonable.

19             Mr. Robinson, my understanding was that Mr. Krstic's evidence was

20     fixed on the 4th of February.  Was there any change?

21             MR. ROBINSON:  There hasn't been any official change yet,

22     Mr. President, but I was going to ask you in light of the delay of this

23     testimony to postpone that to later in the week.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, any observation?

25             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I need to go over the projected schedule,

Page 32881

 1     including the projected cross-examination, which I imagine is a factor

 2     that Mr. Robinson is considering.  But I take his point -- I take it his

 3     point is a very practical one.  If there's no other reason he wishes to

 4     adjust the schedule other than the time he imagines it will take us to

 5     reach that witness.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  So apparently we have to just determine where we are

 8     given the projections.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  So who is going to inform him and how?

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I think the best thing to do

11     would be to wait until tomorrow and see how things progress, but at some

12     point, perhaps the Trial Chamber can make an order or else we can inform

13     General Krstic and his counsel of the schedule.  I know that the order

14     said that the subpoena was for the 4th of February or a time thereafter.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             I'm not sure whether I can do it in two minutes.

17             The Chamber will now issue its decision on the accused's 76th

18     motion for finding of disclosure violation filed on the 14th of January,

19     2013, having considered the Prosecution response filed on

20     28th of January.  The motion concerns an UNPROFOR report which was

21     disclosed to the accused in December 2012.  The accused asserts that this

22     report was in the Prosecution's possession for a number of years and that

23     its late disclosure amounts to a violation of Rule 68 of the Rules of

24     Procedure and Evidence, and the obligation to disclose exculpatory

25     material contained therein.  As a remedy for the violation the accused

Page 32882

 1     seeks, one, an express finding that the Prosecution violated Rule 68;

 2     two, that witness Thorbjorn Overgard be re-called to be questioned on the

 3     report; and three, that the report be admitted from the bar table.

 4             The Chamber finds that the Prosecution violated Rule 68 by its

 5     failure to disclose the report which it finds to be potentially

 6     exculpatory.  The Chamber reminds the Prosecution that such errors should

 7     have been identified and rectified well before the date of disclosure of

 8     the document which has been in its possession for a number of years.

 9             However, having reviewed the content of the document in light of

10     other similar documents, such as Exhibit P1201, P1782, and P5943, which

11     were available to the accused, and the line of questioning already

12     pursued on the issue this report relates to, the Chamber finds that the

13     accused was not prejudiced by the late disclosure.  In the absence of

14     prejudice, there is no basis to grant the accused's request that

15     Witness Thorbjorn Over gard be re-called.

16             Having said that, the Chamber is satisfied that the accused has

17     adequately contextualised and explained how the report fits into his

18     case.  The Chamber is also satisfied as to its relevance and probative

19     value and notes that it bears sufficient indicia of authenticity for

20     admission from the bar table.  The Chamber, therefore, admits the report

21     into evidence from the bar table and instructs the Registry to assign it

22     an exhibit number once it has been uploaded on e-court.

23             However, on my part, I refer to my partially dissenting opinion

24     in the Chamber's decision on the accused's 37th to 42nd disclosure

25     violation motions of 29th of March, 2011, and decline to make a finding

Page 32883

 1     of violation in the absence of prejudice to the accused.

 2             Shall we give the number?

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Um, if I may, that document was already admitted

 4     today during the course of General Milosevic's examination.  Mr. Reid is

 5     just trying to find the number for me.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.

 7             The hearing is adjourned.

 8                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.47 p.m.,

 9                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day of

10                           January, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.

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