130507IT

Page 37784

1 Mr. Piletta-Zanin?

2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Very

3 briefly. I understood that the burden would be too heavy for the

4 Prosecution. I'm prepared to help the accused [as interpreted] and

5 finance it myself to have a few copies, just 30 copies -- 30 seconds

6 before the witness's examination. If it's too much to ask, then I shall

7 withdraw my request, but I had hoped we would be on the same wavelength.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Line 1, page 8, instead of

10 "I'm prepared to help the accused," please read "I'm prepared to help the

11 Prosecution."

12 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber finds that the request of

13 Mr. Piletta-Zanin is not warranted in the circumstances, and if the

14 witness is not able to understand the question, he can ask clarification

15 with the Prosecution.

16 Let's continue.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

18 Q. Now, General, you've actually had the first page of this document

19 in front of you for quite a while now because of that intervention. I'd

20 just like to have us flip over to page 4 of the document, the last page,

21 so that you can see.

22 Is that your signature on the document, General?

23 A. Yes. That is my signature.

24 Q. Okay. So if we could go back over to page 1. This is -- sets

25 out, as far as I can see from the document, the conclusions and tasks

Page 37785

1 from a symposium on the military and political situation in the

2 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps together with your staff, local municipality

3 presidents, brigade commanders, General Mladic, and General Tolimir,

4 among others; correct?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. Now, if we could go over in both documents to English page 2 and

7 B/C/S page 2, paragraph 1. Under the -- under the heading "Tasks," we

8 see the following: 1 --

9 A. Can we please zoom in as I cannot see it and follow the document

10 in this way. My glasses are not good enough -- or, rather, they are, but

11 my eyes are not good enough. Thank you.

12 Q. No problem. Launching persistent -- among the tasks are

13 launching persistent and crucial defence along the reached lines,

14 particularly in the Sarajevo region, defending the territory of the

15 Republika Srpska, observing the unconditional cease-fire, providing that

16 the "Poturice" do the same, manoeuvring forces, firepower, and timely

17 redeploying forces to improve the operational position of the corps

18 forces. And then after that a number of offensive tasks are listed, and

19 they're listed to start, as we see, if we go over to the next page, on 18

20 November 1992. So I have a question about this.

21 JUDGE KWON: Next page only for the English.

22 MS. EDGERTON: For the English, yes. Apologies.

23 Q. General, during your testimony in chief, His Honour Judge Kwon at

24 page 37580 asked you what the word "Poturice" meant because it was used

25 in a document signed by your Chief of Staff, and you said that it's a

Page 37786

1 derogatory word for Muslims and that it was not a term that you would

2 use, but you've actually used it in this document, haven't you?

3 A. Well, it's obviously in the document, but the question is who

4 wrote the document? I did approve it. It's a question whether I wrote

5 it. But it was the usual thing to use that term. Then called us the

6 Chetniks. We called them "Poturice" or others. The Ustashas. That was

7 the way people communicated at the time. Though I still stand by what I

8 said, namely that the term "Poturice" is a term which is not acceptable,

9 at least not in this time. Perhaps at that time it was like this.

10 Q. So when you told His Honour Judge Kwon that you would never use

11 the word, that was incorrect, wasn't it? You've used it here.

12 A. No, I never said that, but as far as I remember, I said that this

13 is not the way I would express myself, rather than never. "Never" is a

14 heavy word to be used, especially under the circumstances of a civil and

15 inter-religious war. That is a term that was quite frequently used in

16 mutual communication and so on. As I say, later on when I moved -- you

17 have to realise that this was a moment when I just had arrived. I had

18 many problems. That was only a month after my arrival in the corps. So

19 I did not manage to have the corps under my control, if I can put it that

20 way, let alone control what was written and how.

21 What I said is that this is not the usual term that I would use,

22 "Poturice," even though I may have used it occasionally. I cannot

23 exclude that as a possibility.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MS. EDGERTON: Could I have this document as a Prosecution

Page 37787

1 exhibit, please.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit it.

3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6297, Your Honours.

4 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

5 Q. Now, General, you actually continued to use that word,

6 "Poturice," in describing the opposing forces, and you used that word in

7 your reports to the Main Staff, didn't you?

8 A. It's possible. I don't know what are all the words that were

9 used in reports within a two-year period. I cannot remember whether the

10 word "Poturice" or Muslim armed forces or the BH Army or whatever it was

11 called was used, but --

12 Q. All right.

13 A. Well, I have not answered yet.

14 Q. You said "it's possible" at the beginning of your answer,

15 General, so --

16 JUDGE KWON: Let me him finish the answer.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Fine.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When we discussed this document,

19 you intervened several times that I didn't sign this document, but I did

20 sign it, and I have confirmed it. There is no dilemma about it. But we

21 said that these were reports or documents written by the corps command

22 not personally by the commander, even though I was the one who signed

23 them. I always signed and there is my signature in the end, whether it

24 was me as the Chief of Staff or someone who was authorised to sign the

25 document. As for the term itself, as I said, a new Chief of Staff

Page 37788

1 arrived then. It's possible that he drew up such documents, and it's

2 possible that I used it.

3 Right now I cannot even remember that, whether that was a usual

4 word for me at the time. I don't think so, but even if I did use it,

5 there is nothing so special about it.

6 MS. EDGERTON:

7 Q. Thank you. What we'll do, General, then, is we'll go on to

8 another topic that we began with actually last week, and it's the subject

9 of protests. We were discussing it, actually, when we broke off, and

10 maybe I'll see if we can come at it another way. Maybe I could ask you

11 to confirm this: During your tour as commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija

12 Corps, you were informed that shelling and sniping by your forces into

13 Bosnian-held Sarajevo caused civilian casualties; correct?

14 A. I did receive such information as well, information.

15 Q. All right. Now, you received that information a number of ways,

16 and you've talked about some of those, so let's see if I can get you to

17 confirm that. You received that information through your staff; correct?

18 A. Yes. Yes. Naturally through the staff, because that is the

19 organ that works on all questions related to combat readiness, including

20 this kind of information, what can be observed, perceived.

21 Q. And you also received that through Major Indjic; correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And you received that information verbally. For example, in

24 meetings, conversations; correct?

25 A. Well, I think I've already stated that. At meetings I had with

Page 37789

1 representatives of UNPROFOR, military observers, these questions were

2 raised as well, so this is nothing new. I've already said that.

3 Q. And that information came to your corps and you in writing and in

4 telephone calls, among other things; correct?

5 A. Well, I've already answered those questions as well if you

6 remember, madam. Telephone? No, I did not receive such information by

7 telephone. I don't speak English. They probably sent it down there to

8 Indjic's office. As for written protests, we had some of those here, and

9 we discussed them during the examination-in-chief.

10 Q. You received that information as well through the media; correct?

11 A. Well, if you remember, we discussed a document here that had to

12 do with this incident on the 4th of February, 1992. On the basis of

13 media reports we found out about this, so we did find out. I said that I

14 personally could not and did not have enough time to follow the media,

15 and I couldn't have. I couldn't have because there was no electricity,

16 and there were no other resources for doing that.

17 Q. Now -- but you said, General, at transcript page 37397:

18 "If we learned of an incident -- if we learned an incident did

19 occur in various ways, whether through the media or whether because of a

20 protest note or because we were informed through the Main Staff ..."

21 So that seems to say that, as I just put to you, you did receive

22 information not only through the media. You received it in writing, and,

23 actually, you also added there you received information about shelling

24 and sniping from the Main Staff as well, from the top down; is that

25 right?

Page 37790

1 A. When we speak that way using that kind of vocabulary, then it's a

2 bit difficult to answer such questions. Now why is that the case? As

3 for sniping and shelling, that means criminal activity, not legal

4 military activity, and in Sarajevo and in that area there was a war that

5 was going on for two years while I was commander, and we discussed that.

6 We said there were civilian areas and there were military areas, that

7 there were military targets. There are no civilian targets, because one

8 is not allowed to engage civilian targets. So -- I do apologise. Sorry.

9 Sorry, about that. I just needed to catch my breath.

10 So when you say "sniping," I'll tell you, even in my judgement

11 says that I was not accused of or convicted for sniping. It is

12 footnote 711 of paragraph 254. However, I would like to underline once

13 again that shelling that is referred to, mostly shelling as criminal

14 activity, it primarily refers to mortar activity, so it's a mortar that

15 fires -- so there's a bit of a lack of understanding there.

16 So now when you ask me that way, you know, it is hard for me to

17 say whether it is correct or not. You see, I don't know if I've been

18 clear enough. I can give you an answer. I've come here to tell the

19 truth, and there's no problem. Let us work on this together, and let us

20 reach the truth this way.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 7 -- or, rather, line 8, it

24 is not reflected that the General said a mortar does not fire a shell but

25 a mortar shell. [In English] So it's a mortar that fires. Mines, not

Page 37791

1 grenades.

2 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue. Thank you.

3 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

4 Q. And we're going to come back to your own reference to the trial

5 judgement in your case, but rather than have my question disappear in

6 some formalistic discussion, I want to go back to what you said when I

7 first started to speak with you about protests. And my question to you

8 was whether you could confirm that during your tour as commander of the

9 SRK you were informed that shelling and sniping by your forces into

10 Bosnian-held Sarajevo caused civilian casualties, and you said yes, you

11 could confirm that you received that information.

12 So are you now qualifying the answer that you just gave? Did you

13 receive information or didn't you, General?

14 A. Well, we are repeating ourselves several times with regard to the

15 same question. I've given quite a few answers during the

16 examination-in-chief and now with regard to these problems.

17 Now, whether I received this information. During the

18 examination-in-chief, documents of the corps command were displayed, and

19 these documents show that we did receive such information. So there's no

20 dilemma there whether we did receive this or not. However, you have to

21 understand this other thing here, and I would kindly ask the

22 Trial Chamber to understand me on this as well.

23 I want to say that when we looked at individual incidents, say,

24 involving snipers, those that President Karadzic has been accused of, we

25 have seen that we have -- that I had not received any protest for any one

Page 37792

1 of these incidents. There's no trace of that for that day for that

2 incident specifically, say, sniping activity. That's what you call it --

3 or, rather, that's what the Prosecution calls it and the Court accepted

4 that. So whenever -- we have already explained what snipers are.

5 There's a bit of confusion there. Not everything is sniping. That is

6 why there's this ambiguity and then it's easy to manipulate that kind of

7 thing. I think that we should be more decided on various matters, also

8 including shelling including mortar shelling, mortar fire. These five

9 incidents that are in my indictment and Mr. Karadzic's indictment, we

10 said that -- now, when did I receive such information and where was I and

11 what were the conditions involved and what I did. There's no dilemma

12 there. That has already been discussed --

13 Q. General --

14 A. -- and I have already presented --

15 Q. General, whether or not you personally received reports that

16 these incidents had occurred is actually irrelevant, isn't it? You were

17 the commander; correct?

18 A. I was the commander, but such reports were being sent. We've

19 already said that with regard to each and every incident -- or, rather,

20 problem, this was recorded in the daily reports for the Main Staff. We

21 would not have concealed something that happened. We did write

22 something. We didn't write something else. That's impossible. Why

23 would we do that? How would we do that? We wrote what we knew, and what

24 we didn't -- oh, all right.

25 Q. General, you gave evidence during your testimony in chief saying

Page 37793

1 that as commander, you were -- and I'll be able to find the cite in a

2 moment, you were six levels up the command chain, and you would not

3 expect to receive a report of infantry fire being opened against an

4 individual. Do you remember that?

5 A. Madam Prosecutor, I think that you quite properly interpreted

6 what I said. I agree with that. I said that I was some sixth level of

7 command and control, and I did not receive all information. I could not

8 have known of all incidents, whether they had happened or not happened.

9 All of that is correct. There's no dilemma there. We did say that the

10 front of the corps changed. However, if the average was 250 kilometres,

11 well, just think of that. 250 kilometres. Does the commander know each

12 and every detail? No, and there's no way he can. That is why such

13 information was received by other levels of command too. But I'm

14 speaking about specific incidents, and that's why I came here in a way to

15 explain that part, those that President Karadzic has been accused of.

16 And I was accused of that, too, and I was convicted, and you asked me.

17 Now, how, in which way, and so on, I wouldn't want to go into

18 that now.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am afraid that it's going to

22 remain that way, but on page 15, from lines 22 to 24, the General said

23 that that's not reflected in the transcript, that the Prosecution

24 accepted that every infantry fire is sniping, and he is indicating that

25 now. And now from the repeated question of Madam Edgerton, we see that

Page 37794

1 her understanding was that this is infantry fire.

2 JUDGE KWON: I think it has been reflected in the sentence, I

3 quote: "Not everything is sniping." But thank you anyway.

4 Let's continue, Ms. Edgerton.

5 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

6 Q. Maybe we can go back to the very original question I asked, and

7 it's about the information you received. Can you confirm that you

8 received information from the Main Staff that shelling and sniping by

9 your forces was causing casualties in Bosnian-held Sarajevo? Can you

10 confirm that, General?

11 A. Did I personally receive this from the Main Staff, such

12 information? I don't remember any such information, but had such

13 information been sent along the line of Indjic and his people and the

14 Main Staff and that they exchanged information and that then that was

15 conveyed to me, that I accept was possible. But right now when you ask

16 me what this is exactly about, I could not remember. Well, that's how it

17 is.

18 Q. And your corps also received information about civilian

19 casualties in Bosnian-held Sarajevo caused by shelling and sniping of SRK

20 forces from line crossers as well. Isn't that the case?

21 A. Well, I don't quite understand this thing about crossing lines.

22 I don't quite understand what you meant.

23 Q. All right.

24 A. This last bit, I don't quite understand that.

25 Q. At transcript page 37196, you said 15 to 20 persons a day were

Page 37795

1 coming from Bosnian-controlled parts of Sarajevo to SRK-controlled

2 territory. Okay? So can you confirm that your corps also received

3 information about civilian casualties from those people?

4 A. Well, it didn't happen every day that 15 people crossed the line

5 entering the territory of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. I don't remember.

6 Perhaps the figure is a bit too big. Perhaps it happened only a few

7 times, only in 1993, as far as I can remember. There were other

8 situations when a smaller number of people crossed over. Now, whether we

9 received such reports from them, we did receive reports especially

10 regarding the casualties among the Serb civilians in Sarajevo, in the

11 area of the 1st Corps of the BH Army. They were in different camps

12 there --

13 Q. All right.

14 A. -- and now whether -- well, you just want me to say whether we

15 had committed some crime. I don't know what it is that you want.

16 Q. From line crossers did you receive -- did your corps receive

17 information that civilian casualties were being caused in Bosnian-held

18 Sarajevo by shelling and sniping from SRK forces?

19 A. I do not remember such information. I said what the information

20 I received was, the information that got to me. I did not question these

21 persons who crossed the lines, and there is a service that deals with

22 that. These are the security and intelligence people, and then they then

23 report to me. They're the ones who interview them and that's how they

24 receive information. I received information primarily about what I

25 already spoke of. Now, whether there was information on other losses

Page 37796

1 when infantry fire was opened and mortar fire and other artillery, I

2 cannot remember right now. But I said during the examination-in-chief

3 that when military targets were engaged, we counted on the possibility of

4 collateral loss of civilian lives. So it is possible that when engaging

5 a military target there could have been civilian casualties, but I do not

6 remember that it is these persons who crossed the lines that provided

7 such information to me. I don't remember.

8 Q. Thank you. Your indulgence for a moment.

9 Now, you said -- you said to me that -- and in your testimony in

10 chief that you were responsive to each and every one of the protests that

11 you received so long as they were in writing, in a particular format, and

12 contained specific information. And you told me at transcript page 37650

13 that in Additional Protocol 1 it's defined what a protest is and what it

14 needs to contain.

15 So what I'd like to know is who specifically did you tell in

16 UNPROFOR about this format that you needed to have?

17 A. I said -- I mean, all of those who informed me and then when I

18 received protests I would respond, and later on when I had conversations.

19 I said what would be good, and I underlined that several times. I said

20 what this kind of protest should contain and that it should come after a

21 warning, if you will, in terms of what had happened in a particular area.

22 We have to understand -- I mean, we have to go into the situation

23 of urban warfare involving, say, half a million people. Although there

24 are civilians, but they are exposed to this war activity. So on the one

25 hand we have 10.000, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in relation to Sarajevo

Page 37797

1 itself, and the 1st Corps of the Army of BH inside, we've already said

2 they had even up to 45.000 according to some estimates.

3 Now, when such a force is engaged in warfare, when there is

4 activity every day, manoeuvres, and so on, now, all the things that

5 happen and what I should receive in order to be able to take specific

6 measures in my unit, in my corps so that I could say, all right, now I

7 can on the basis of that take measures, say, in the 2nd Brigade or the

8 1st Brigade or the Igman Brigade, or any brigade. I've already explained

9 what the problems are when we get this protest in principle.

10 As for these specific protests, we saw what my answers were.

11 There's no secret there. We discussed this during the

12 examination-in-chief, and we saw what my response was. There's no secret

13 there. However, would I like to underline once again in this situation

14 when something happened -- now, if we are to interpret this as sniping

15 activity or sniping incidents, as you say, I say that this is an incident

16 due to infantry fire or shelling and then I say due to mortar fire and,

17 all right, other artillery fire. Now what are all the things that I

18 should be receiving in order to be sure that I'm taking the right kind of

19 measures and see what I can focus on, because now to examine three or

20 four brigades, you know, that's a process. You cannot go into all of

21 that. Although I wanted to make the brigade aware of each and every

22 protest I received in writing or verbally. I sent all of that down to

23 the command so that they could be checked. I've already said that during

24 the examination-in-chief too. That would be it.

25 Q. Do you remember the question I asked you, General?

Page 37798

1 A. Well, put it again if I haven't answered.

2 Q. My question was: Who specifically did you tell in UNPROFOR about

3 this format that you needed to have your information in? Who

4 specifically? Can you answer that?

5 A. All of those who talked to me, I told all of them what was

6 necessary in order for me to work more efficiently in that area, because

7 let's look at it this way: It's not that simple. Protest, a shell was

8 fired somewhere, and now you do whatever. I've already told you about

9 some incidents that occurred, that we were never allowed to go there with

10 our forces, except in this one particular case, with our own

11 representatives to go to the actual scene so that we could see where the

12 azimuth was and the line of descent and so on, to check whether this was

13 true or not. So we had to trust them. We had to believe all of them.

14 Q. General --

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 21, in line 15, the General

18 said: "That's a process. That is impossible. It is impossible to

19 examine that," and that was not recorded.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

21 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

22 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

23 Q. General, these people who you told this to, where in protocol 1

24 did you point them to? I want to know.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think the LiveNote doesn't work.

Page 37799

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, on the personal computer it seems to have

2 stopped, but in the public one it's continuing. Shall we continue?

3 So shall we continue, and in the meantime we can see whether it

4 can be fixed, otherwise we'll take a break. Let's continue for the

5 moment.

6 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

7 Q. General, could you tell us where in protocol 1 you pointed these

8 people to?

9 A. Madam Prosecutor, I'm not a lawyer. I'm a soldier. I have read,

10 I have studied those conventions, and protocols 1 and 2. As far as I can

11 remember, I didn't understand who protected us, under whose protections

12 should we have implemented everything that was required by conventions

13 that were issued in 1949? I pointed Article 90 to them, if you want to

14 be very specific. I believe -- and we're talking about protocol 1,

15 Article 9 [as interpreted], protocol 1.

16 A reference is made to commissions -- let me explain.

17 Q. General, what we're doing is we're talking about your reference

18 at transcript page 37650 to how in international regulations, and I'll

19 quote you:

20 "It is defined what a protest is and what it needs to contain.

21 It is defined in protocol 1 what a report should contain, if it is

22 supposed to contain a schematic for me to see, and based on that

23 schematic I would know from which the shell had come."

24 So I want to know where in protocol 1 you pointed them to for

25 that. Where does it say that in protocol 1?

Page 37800

1 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer -- before you --

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm trying to explain --

3 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, just a second.

4 Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I have two

6 points to make on the transcript. I didn't hear in Serbian that

7 General Galic talked about Article 9, but he will tell us.

8 And the second point is that I really have this feeling that he

9 was answering the question. He was asked where in the text. He doesn't

10 have a text, and he doesn't have a document in front of him, and I don't

11 think that this is a process which is acceptable in courtesy terms.

12 JUDGE KWON: I respectfully disagree, Mr. Piletta-Zanin. I am of

13 the opinion that Mr. Galic is following the question.

14 Yes, please continue, Mr. Galic. If you -- at any moment you do

15 not understand the question, please let us know, and ask Ms. Edgerton to

16 repeat her question at any time.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. President.

18 The question was about the conventions. There's no word "protest" either

19 in the convention or in protocol 1. Let's be very precise about that.

20 Let's say what a protest is and what its form is. However, I pointed

21 Article 90 to them. I don't know under which number, whether it was 5,

22 6, or 7. I don't know off my head where reference is made to the work of

23 commissions which are in charge of establishing a grave violations of the

24 convention provisions. I told them that if an incident happened, then it

25 was a violation of those convention. At the end of the day we were all

Page 37801

1 part of a learning process during that war, myself as well as UNPROFOR.

2 I had never been in a war before. I knew some of the theory. As for

3 what I needed to know, what measures I had to take, I could only see when

4 I encountered problems during the war.

5 Let us see what is that commission has to establish and how that

6 work of that commission is defined, how the commission is formed, and

7 what reports. You asked me. I'm answering.

8 MS. EDGERTON:

9 Q. But -- just a moment, General.

10 MS. EDGERTON: Mr. Piletta-Zanin is on his feet again.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I didn't see you. Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I'm sorry to be on my feet

13 again, and I'm listening to the Serbian, and I don't feel -- I don't

14 think that General Galic said a while ago that if an incident occurred,

15 then this was in violation of these conventions. This is not what

16 General Galic said. He didn't say that every time an incident occurred

17 that this was a violation of the convention. He said something else. I

18 don't wish to say it. I don't wish to repeat what he said, but he did

19 not say that, and that is what is on the transcript. If you asked me

20 what he has said, I will gladly tell you.

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Galic, do you confirm what Mr. Piletta-Zanin has

22 said?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have a big

24 problem, I am saying a lot. Whether I said that, whether I worded that

25 in that way or not, it's very difficult for me to say because I can't see

Page 37802

1 the transcript. I don't know how my words were translated. And now for

2 me to say whether that was indeed said in that way or not, it's a big

3 problem. Please appreciate that. I'm very honest. I'm honest to the

4 very end. So I don't think that it is any problem working with me.

5 THE ACCUSED: "Honest." I would translate it rather "sincere" or

6 "frank" than "honest." Because General Galic said "iskren" not "castan."

7 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure if there's much difference, but thank

8 you.

9 I'll leave it to you, Ms. Edgerton.

10 MS. EDGERTON: And if I may make a suggestion, Your Honour, with

11 respect to Mr. Piletta-Zanin's interventions on the transcript. All of

12 us in the courtroom, when we feel there is something that warrants

13 review, have at the end of the day to fill out a form which avoids us

14 interrupting the proceedings, and that form is then submitted to the

15 appropriate services. And I would think that in the spirit of

16 helpfulness, this is why Mr. Piletta-Zanin takes his feet, but it would

17 be equally helpful if he filled out the form like the rest of us do at

18 the end of the day.

19 Dr. Karadzic, defending himself, of course, we always accept his

20 interventions because they're well placed and it's difficult for him to

21 do the same, but I wonder if -- if these are issues that

22 Mr. Piletta-Zanin is going to continually take to his feet over, perhaps

23 it would be more efficient that he did this either at the end of the

24 session or on paper like the rest of us do.

25 JUDGE KWON: I appreciate his endeavour if it is related to

Page 37803

1 something that is important for all the parties and the Chamber, but

2 otherwise he must have taken your point.

3 Let us continue. Shall we leave it at that? Let's continue.

4 MS. EDGERTON: And because of these interventions I don't

5 actually have a way to go back in the transcript, Your Honour, to see

6 where we left off. If you can give me a moment, please. Because of the

7 interventions and the fact that the LiveNote doesn't work on personal

8 computers.

9 THE ACCUSED: If I may suggest to disconnect and reconnect, and

10 you'll get.

11 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton must appreciate your advice. Yes.

12 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. Thank you.

13 Q. And, General, as we continue, I want to say while I appreciate

14 you feel you have information that you want to give to the Chamber, the

15 more you could focus on answering my questions, the less time you'll have

16 to spend listening to me. So we'll continue.

17 General, you keep referring to these commissions and how

18 important you feel their work might be, but if you look at the UNMOs'

19 jobs, it was their job, among other things, that if they found an attack

20 against civilians was happening, it was their job to get it to stop,

21 wasn't it?

22 A. The tasks of UN representatives or UNMOs or other representatives

23 of the United Nations, commanders, all those who visited me, I knew more

24 or less what tasks they had, because when they visited me, they mostly

25 sought solutions to the problems that bothered them and less for those

Page 37804

1 that bothered me, i.e., the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. As for UNMOs, we

2 saw a schematic, if we all remember that schematic, about the deployment

3 of UNMOs in the area of responsibility of the 1st Corps of BiH Army --

4 Q. I'm really sorry, General --

5 A. I will answer. I will answer. I will answer. You will not

6 understand me if you don't allow me to answer completely. If we had four

7 observation points in that large area, I said eight, I thought that there

8 were more than there actually were, so I didn't know whether there were

9 four or eight, but I saw in the schematic that there were four. In such

10 a large city with 400.000 people living there in the Muslim part of

11 Sarajevo, i.e., in the part of Sarajevo under the control of the

12 BiH Army, there were four men, i.e., four observation posts. How could

13 they cover everything? How could they see anything between the high-rise

14 buildings, other facilities, and other obstacles --

15 Q. General, this has nothing to do with the question I asked you.

16 My question was: Among the jobs they had -- among the jobs they had, if

17 the UNMOs saw an attack against civilians was happening, it was their job

18 to get it to stop. Are you disputing that?

19 A. Madam, you're a lawyer, I'm a soldier, and we look at things

20 differently. I agree with you. Military observers were duty-bound to

21 say what was happening if they saw what was happening.

22 Q. So --

23 A. They needed to report what they saw.

24 Q. So is there any sense --

25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I'm not sure witness has answered

Page 37805

1 the question. Witness answered that it is their job to say what was

2 happening, but the question was whether it is the UNMOs' obligation to

3 stop what they are observing if civilians were being attacked.

4 What is your answer, Mr. Galic, about that?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it is correct, but I

6 was interrupted while I was answering the question. I wanted to be put

7 in a situation where I would be able to answer properly. In the

8 examination-in-chief, I answered along these lines: That at any time, at

9 any moment, whether an attack was legitimate or not, if we received

10 information that there were civilian casualties during such an attack,

11 that the attack would be called off immediately.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I'm reading your question again. You said "Get

13 it to stop."

14 Yes, please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

15 MS. EDGERTON:

16 Q. To get the shelling to stop -- to get shelling to stop, UNMOs had

17 to act urgently; correct?

18 A. In war, all situations are urgent, madam, and especially if there

19 are civilian casualties. I agree that this would be one of the most

20 urgent tasks that had to be seen to, and if such a report was received,

21 it was probably received by Indjic's office. It didn't reach me.

22 Indjic testified here. He testified in my case as well. You

23 have said he testified in this case as well, and he told you what

24 reactions were and how he followed up on the warnings and protests that

25 he received from UNMOs, i.e., UNPROFOR representatives.

Page 37806

1 Q. So given the urgency of the situation when there's an ongoing

2 shelling attack against civilians, General, what sense is there in asking

3 for written information and -- about the incident and a schematic for you

4 to work with? Because that would have made -- insisting on that would

5 have made it impossible for the UNMOs to do their jobs, wouldn't it?

6 A. You have been mixing apples and oranges here. If something is

7 urgent and if there is a telephone call asking for a resolution, we also

8 used telephone. Indjic used his telephone. If he can't deal with the

9 situation on his own, he calls either me or somebody in charge of the

10 situation that needed to be looked at, and then all the brigades in the

11 zone are called if the direction of fire is known, and they are warned to

12 abort any attacks, whether it is a fire that was being opened or an

13 infantry attack. So we didn't wait for schematics to arrive. However,

14 when you tried me here, you brought schematics without which you could

15 not try me. So if I were put in a position to try somebody or to be a

16 judge of somebody, I had to have schematics and drawings. How else would

17 I have been able to do my job properly?

18 Q. Actually, General, when you were given more details, what you

19 needed, you still didn't respond to UN protests, did you? When you got

20 the written letter, when you got the time, when you got the date, you

21 were still unresponsive. Isn't that actually the case?

22 A. What have I been telling you for five days here during the

23 examination-in-chief, for example? We saw the instances when I

24 responded, how I responded. Mr. Karadzic was examining me for five days,

25 and I answered his questions. So how can you now say that I did not

Page 37807

1 respond to such protests? I really don't seem to be able to understand

2 things here.

3 Q. Let's have a look at another document. It's P1061. It's a

4 protest letter to you from the Sector Sarajevo commander on the

5 21st of February, 1993, and it's about shelling attacks on UNPROFOR. And

6 it sets out the date. It indicates in the letter that you well knew

7 where the UN positions that were endangered and damaged were located. It

8 sets out the time, and it calls for an investigation calling the attacks

9 intolerable.

10 Even when you got these kind of details and this kind of specific

11 information, General, in fact you were singularly unresponsive, weren't

12 you?

13 A. Where will I find that? Where does it say that I didn't do

14 anything?

15 Q. Did you answer this protest then, General? Is that your

16 evidence?

17 A. I can't see the letters. Can the letter be zoomed in a little,

18 because I can't read.

19 It's really difficult to remember what anybody wrote 20 years

20 ago. I might remember some details, but not all of them.

21 I don't know now --

22 Q. In fact, General, over the course of your tour, did you ever

23 answer any protest with anything other than a denial?

24 A. I am going back to my previous answer. I don't know what to say.

25 Your question is repetitive. I can only repeat what I already said, what

Page 37808

1 I did based on oral and written protests. And now you're telling me that

2 I only denied protests. This is not correct. If I received protests,

3 and this is about a vehicle that was shot at, I don't know where that

4 happened. However, there were protests about shelling going on in the

5 vicinity of command posts of UNPROFOR, but before that, we warned them

6 that from that area Muslim forces had been opening fire on us. I can't

7 remember whether anybody responded or not to that mortar fire by

8 BiH Army. I don't know whether any of the UNPROFOR command posts were

9 affected by that. I can't remember. If we can find it somewhere, please

10 point it to me.

11 After that, I warned UNPROFOR. I protested myself. In the

12 examination-in-chief, we read documents where we warned the Muslim side

13 not to take positions, not to provoke our side from the vicinity of

14 command posts or the deployment of UNPROFOR forces. So they were warned

15 and they did not take measures. And if that was the case, who would be

16 to blame if fire continued to be opened from those areas, which was the

17 case. So I did take measures. I warned them to move their forces from

18 their area of deployment. I remember that the same thing happened when

19 they moved their observation post to Zuc. They had --

20 Q. General --

21 A. Yes?

22 Q. Can you answer my question? My question was: Did you ever

23 answer any protest with anything other than a denial? Did you ever

24 answer any protest admitting responsibility?

25 A. Look, my answer was not a denial. I first checked, and then

Page 37809

1 whatever reports I received from my subordinate units I referred those

2 reports further. I checked in the subordinated commands. I told you how

3 they reported to me, what answers I received. They would tell me that it

4 was their response to fire or that they didn't open fire. If they

5 responded to fire, it was a legitimate action. There was nothing to

6 investigate. I did not receive any more information.

7 JUDGE KWON: How about the second question. Was there any

8 incident in which you answered admitting the SRK's responsibility?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I could not admit anything

10 because I did not have enough information so as to be able to admit to

11 such an incident. I didn't have enough information. This is what I've

12 been repeating. How can I admit something that was just said to me?

13 Later on, when they provided me with more information or reports, I could

14 have perhaps admit things, but if there's just a reference to something,

15 when I checked those things with my units, I could only create my indicia

16 suspecting that something was wrong -- that something was wrong.

17 Let me tell you, there were situations when I myself says that

18 those reports that were received on excessive use of fire and firing

19 equipment, that those reports were rather correct, and sometimes fire was

20 excessive. Now, whether the fire is proportionate or not, it's a

21 different issue. It's up to the commander how to decide on the

22 proportionality of fire. It doesn't say anywhere. It depended on the

23 military goal that one needed to be achieved. If the goal was to

24 neutralise a target, I can't tell you what happened. Those who ordered

25 fire, they also assessed what their objective was. I don't remember that

Page 37810

1 I issued an order to a corps commander to open fire. It was in the hands

2 of lower ranked commands. However, if you will allow me, I will

3 continue. Perhaps things will become more clear to you.

4 Within the framework of those indicia, I felt that there were

5 actions that should have been more proportionate, and based on those

6 indicia, I removed -- or, rather, I did not remove because I didn't have

7 the right to do that, I proposed that a brigade commander, a battalion

8 commander be removed from their positions. The first commander, the

9 brigade commander lacked discipline and he used equipment and assets that

10 were excessive, and as for the second commander, I don't know whether I

11 was right. I'm still not sure that I was right when I thought that

12 she -- he should be removed from his position. That was my answer,

13 Mr. President.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes. Back to you, Ms. Edgerton.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.

16 MS. EDGERTON:

17 Q. Just to follow up on what you've just told to His Honour

18 Judge Kwon, can you tell us who the brigade commander -- actually, let me

19 read you back your answer. You said:

20 "I proposed that a brigade commander, a battalion commander, be

21 removed from their positions. The first commander, the brigade

22 commander, lacked discipline, and he used equipment and assets that were

23 excessive, and as for the second commander, I don't know whether I was

24 right."

25 Can you tell us who those two people are?

Page 37811

1 A. Well, I don't know if this is what the transcript says, but these

2 are not my words, but the essence is there, I would say, and that's the

3 most important thing. The essence is there. This means that I accepted

4 suggestions, but I did not have enough proof to take somebody to

5 court-martial or things like that, but there were indicia, and based on

6 those indicia the first commander was the commander of the Igman Brigade,

7 Dunjic, he lacked discipline. He was rather wilful. He used excessive

8 force according to my estimates and my indicia. I can't say whether that

9 was indeed true or not, because one would have to go to the area to see

10 what the effects were. I couldn't go to the Muslim side either with my

11 commission or my forces. I could not rely on UNPROFOR to allow me to do

12 that.

13 And the second commander was the battalion commander in Nedzarici

14 and his name was Grkovic. I understood him. When we explained the

15 positions in Nedzarici, when we explained his position, there were four

16 brigades there and during that time or before that he saw what had

17 happened in Pofalici when Pofalici fell. He did not have a reserve

18 position, a reserve homeland. He did not have anything reserved. He had

19 to defend and protect Nedzarici. So any movement by such large forces

20 that he expected would happen demanded that he engaged as many people as

21 possible in order to thwart those attacks, and that's why he always asked

22 from the brigade commanders and his neighbours and he also sought

23 approval from the corps command to perhaps engage artillery and heavy

24 artillery assets, possibly in a more unproportionate way.

25 Q. You mean Radivoje Grkovic?

Page 37812

1 A. Yes, yes.

2 Q. So did you remove him or not? Because it's not clear from your

3 answer.

4 A. Well, it's clear, but I said that I proposed that. I had no

5 right to remove anyone. That was not my authority. I could only make

6 the proposal for someone to be removed from office, and then the organs

7 of the corps command would propose it further, and then it would be

8 approved at the level of the Main Staff via the ministry which is in

9 charge of appointing officers up to the rank of colonel. And they were

10 the ones who were able to remove him from office and to decide whether he

11 would remain in a similar or other position, what measures would be

12 taken, disciplinary or others.

13 Q. Thank you, that's clear now.

14 MS. EDGERTON: I see it's 10.33, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but your answer is that you proposed to remove

16 him.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, that was my -- I had

18 no authority to remove him. As the commander of corps, I could not

19 remove a brigade commander. The brigade commanders were appointed by the

20 Ministry of Defence, and the generals were appointed by the Superior

21 Command -- or, rather, the president. So I could not order something

22 that I did not have the authority to appoint such a person. I could only

23 propose certain measures with an explanation or a statement of reasons

24 that he be removed, appointed to a different position, or that

25 disciplinary measures be taken against him. That was my authority. I

Page 37813

1 couldn't remove him and say, Well, from this day on you're no longer a

2 commander. I just did not have such authority.

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General. To whom and how did you make

4 that proposal?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those proposals were submitted to

6 the Main Staff, the Main Staff. All our communications, proposals,

7 opinions, were sent via the Main Staff, and then they would regulate the

8 relations with the Ministry of Defence whether such an officer would

9 remain in position or would be removed, who would replace him, because up

10 there in the Igman Brigade, a number of commanders were changed not for

11 this reason but for some other reasons.

12 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient.

13 MS. EDGERTON: Just one more question.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

15 MS. EDGERTON:

16 Q. With respect to Mr. Grkovic, is your evidence that you submitted

17 a recommendation to the Main Staff for measures to be taken against him?

18 A. To be more precise here, and to give a more simple answer, he was

19 a battalion commander. His immediate superior was the commander of the

20 brigade, Radojcic, it was at the time. It was his duty to submit such a

21 proposal or recommendation. He would submit such a proposal through the

22 corps command. That would then be sent to the Main Staff, and the Main

23 Staff and the Ministry of Defence would regulate between themselves the

24 appointments of officers.

25 Q. Did that happen, yes or no?

Page 37814

1 A. As far as I know, it did. He was removed from office, from that

2 position. He was from Montenegro, and simply I believe that he left for

3 Montenegro. Considering the situation he was in, I would say that I was

4 quite tolerant towards him.

5 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll take a break for half an hour and

7 resume at six past 11.00.

8 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

9 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.

10 JUDGE KWON: It might be too quick given the stage, but can I ask

11 you how much do you expect your cross to last in light of the fact that

12 we are sitting only for three days this week?

13 MS. EDGERTON: I am confident I'll be able to give Your Honours

14 an accurate estimate at the end of today.

15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.

16 MS. EDGERTON:

17 Q. General, I'd like to come back to something you said in answering

18 one of my questions this morning. At the transcript at page 32, you

19 mentioned receiving protests of shelling going on in the vicinity of the

20 UN command post, and you said then also that you warned the UN that

21 Muslims had been opening fire from that area and asked who was to be

22 blamed if fire was opened from those areas, and then you went on to talk

23 about proportionality. And I recall during your examination-in-chief you

24 said, actually, at transcript page 37571, that:

25 "Neither the equipment nor the command posts or the positions of

Page 37815

1 the UN were ever targeted by us."

2 That seems to contrast with your testimony today, doesn't it?

3 A. Well, Madam Prosecutor, that is your view, but I think that it's

4 not contrary at all. My forces never targeted the disposition, let me

5 call it that way, or the command posts of the United Nations as far as I

6 know. We have said today that there were examples like this one when

7 some areas of the airport were targeted, but later on it was established

8 that some other side did it, the 1st Corps of the BH Army. And as for

9 the command posts, they opened fire at mortars -- or, rather, the

10 disposition of firing corps -- firing forces of the 1st Corps of the

11 BH Army rather than the observation posts of UNPROFOR or the observers.

12 And I said after that whether there could have been some consequences for

13 the command post of the military observers or the command post of

14 UNPROFOR. I don't remember that there was anything special. I know that

15 in conversation with Razek, General Razek he promised that he would lodge

16 a protest with the Muslims for such fire, but that was repeated again

17 from those sectors where the disposition of the command post of UNPROFOR

18 were. This is why I said so.

19 We did not target UNPROFOR command posts. That was not the

20 target of any attack or fire. It was not the target.

21 Q. Do you remember, General, Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler who testified

22 in the trial against you in 2002? An UNMO from New Zealand.

23 A. No. I don't remember all the military observers. He was not a

24 leader of the military observers.

25 Q. All right.

Page 37816

1 A. I don't remember the contents of his testimony, so if you could

2 please refresh my memory.

3 Q. Well, I'll actually show you a document. It's 65 ter number

4 14217. It's a letter to you, and it's dated 13 February 1993 from

5 Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler. It was Exhibit P798 from your trial, and this

6 is, as you see from the very first paragraph, the second of two letters

7 he wrote to you in response to what he says is the repeated deliberate

8 shelling by your forces of his OP, of his observation post. And he also

9 notes that he verbally protested to your Chief of Staff at the time. And

10 despite a letter of complaint to you on the 30th of January, and that's

11 at the bottom of paragraph 1, and the visit where Lieutenant-Colonel

12 Cutler was reassured that your corps knew the locations of all

13 observation posts, his post Papa 5 was shelled again on the

14 13th of February. And in your trial at transcript page 8926, he spoke of

15 the shelling on the 13th, saying it was 60 rounds of 122-millimetre

16 artillery which landed near the observation posts some 2 to 3 metres away

17 from the building.

18 So it seems as though your assertion that you -- your forces

19 never targeted UN dispositions or command posts is incorrect, doesn't it,

20 General?

21 A. You always try to assert that what I say is incorrect. You could

22 not take into account other circumstances, what I said and what the

23 context was, what the conditions were. Whether it's true or not, I will

24 explain it to you now.

25 I don't know where exactly this OP was located, Papa 5. If we

Page 37817

1 had four, then Papa 5 was on the Muslim side. Whether it was in the

2 sector of -- I cannot find it immediately, in which sector it was

3 located, the particular observation post. If you told me that, I could

4 perhaps give you a more detailed answer to your question, because I

5 certainly guarantee that my forces never targeted observation posts or

6 command posts of the military observers, but what did happen sometimes

7 was that they would change their positions. They would be here one day

8 and then on the next day perhaps we did not have sufficient information

9 that they had changed their positions, and the Muslims, that is to say,

10 the 1st Corps of the BH Army, fired from there. Then we would respond

11 target that area and then it would turn out that it was close to an

12 observation point. So you can see from this that it was not directly

13 targeted even if it was too close. But 3 metres is 3 metres. It is too

14 close but still.

15 And I don't know what duty this gentleman, Mr. Cutler was

16 discharging. Was he a military observer or was he the chief of the

17 military observers on the Muslim side, or what was he? What was his

18 duty?

19 Q. If you can just scroll down to the bottom of the page, you can

20 see that he was the senior military observer.

21 Now --

22 A. But he -- he was rather a military observer but on the Muslim

23 side. That's -- if such an incident occurred, it's only possible that

24 they change their position and that we did not know about that. As I

25 said, that is possible, but I wouldn't know.

Page 37818

1 I have told you about the situation in Zuc. That was a situation

2 I do remember. When they were assigned -- I wanted to tell you about

3 that, but then you interrupted me, if you remember. They had changed the

4 location of their observation post and --

5 Q. I interrupted you --

6 A. -- and they located it next to the cannons and -- well, once

7 again you're interrupting me.

8 Q. -- because I didn't ask you anything about Zuc. Because you

9 weren't answering my question. So --

10 A. But you haven't told me where this observation post was. Where

11 is Papa 5, in which sector? I don't remember Papa, Lima 11, 12, 15, and

12 all these designations. After 20 years I'm to remember where each

13 position was. I can't remember that.

14 Q. Why would that make a difference, General?

15 A. Well, I think that it would greatly change things because I would

16 know how to answer you. Right now I don't know how to answer you. You

17 want me to tell you what I know. I'm telling you what I know, but I

18 cannot tell you about things that I don't know.

19 Q. So you're denying that this, in fact, took place; is that right?

20 A. No, no. You didn't understand me correctly, madam. I'm telling

21 you that I -- I say what I know. I would not like to make any

22 speculations here, because you agree with me and I see that you requested

23 that no speculations should be made. Whether it was so or not, and if I

24 have the arguments with which to explain that. I don't have sufficient

25 arguments based on which I could explain this document. It's not my

Page 37819

1 document. It's a document from one Cutler. I have no idea who or what

2 he was. You say he was at my trial but you know how many of these people

3 were in my trial, all these UNPROFOR members and everyone else. And I'm

4 supposed to remember whether he said something or not in 2002 when my

5 trial was still ongoing. I can't do that.

6 Q. Now, in answering one of my questions you insisted that the --

7 this OP wasn't directly targeted but, in fact, perhaps we could look at

8 another document, 65 ter number 14208. It's another letter of protest to

9 you from Cutler, dated 14 February 1993.

10 Now, the very first paragraph, the last line says Papa 5 was

11 intentionally shelled actually four times, the 30th of January, the

12 13th of February in the morning, the 13th of February at noon, and on the

13 14th of February, wounding, as you see at the top of the second

14 paragraph, an UNMO. And Cutler asserts on the basis of the events that

15 transpired that the shooting came from positions under control of your

16 corps and was intentional. It was direct targeting, General.

17 So again this seems to -- the observations of Lieutenant-Colonel

18 Cutler directly contradict your assertion about targeting UNPROFOR, don't

19 they?

20 A. That is your assertion. You have some paper here that I'm

21 looking at now addressed to me, as far as I can see, up on top. It's

22 interesting that all of this is written by one and the same person,

23 Cutler, and not in some other location. So this can also be somewhat

24 indicative. But I'm sorry if a military observer was hit regardless of

25 the side from which the shell came, whether from the side of the

Page 37820

1 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps or from the side of the 1st Corps of the BH Army.

2 I cannot answer anything to this question of his, because I don't

3 remember that this was present like this in my area. This was the month

4 of February 1993. All of these events have to do with that month. That

5 means that some combat was ongoing there. Something was happening in the

6 sector where this Papa 5 observation point was located.

7 Q. Well, in fact, in your trial, in response to a concern that there

8 might have been outgoing fire nearby, Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler

9 specifically testified at transcript pages 8925 and 8926 that he

10 investigated this assertion and found no evidence to confirm it, General.

11 So it appears, again contrary to what you say, that there was no outgoing

12 fire in the area, doesn't it?

13 A. Madam Prosecutor, as I said, I did not testify in my trial. I

14 requested that, but it was not allowed. I have come to testify in this

15 trial and in this case in order to try to represent the truth more or

16 less about what was happening in Sarajevo and how, and you have been

17 asserting throughout that I am trying to conceal something or that I'm

18 not telling the truth, which in practical terms I don't like because

19 that's not true.

20 If I don't know what some paper contains 20 years later, it's not

21 a matter of me not telling the truth, but I simply don't remember. That

22 is why I always ask to be told what is the general context of a situation

23 so that I can try to refresh my memory, because you will allow that a lot

24 of time has passed and many things did happen in two years. To remember

25 now what was going on in a specific location on a specific day, well, I'm

Page 37821

1 telling you anything I can during my testimony, and after all, I'm just a

2 witness here. So I will answer to all the questions when I'm able to and

3 when I remember. What I don't know, I don't know, or I don't remember or

4 I didn't see.

5 I know that there were some problems with this Papa, but whether

6 things developed exactly as stated here, I don't know. I don't remember.

7 It's possible. But my order was that it was not allowed to target or

8 fire against UN personnel commands, observation posts, or anything, and I

9 was quite resolute. I requested to have co-operation with them and not

10 to kill them, and I'm really sorry to read here that this man from the

11 observation point was wounded. Whether the shell had come from our side

12 or from which side, this is something I couldn't tell you.

13 Q. Now, you've just said that you know that there were some problems

14 with this Papa, although you said a few minutes before that you didn't

15 know the location at which it was, and I would like to know what the

16 problems were that you remember.

17 A. Generally speaking, I remember that this Papa and the position of

18 this observation post was not good because it was not visible enough from

19 the position of our forces. That's what I do remember.

20 Another thing. I remember that they were too close to the

21 disposition of the Muslim forces.

22 And thirdly, I remember that after that they may have changed

23 their position. So this is more or less what I do remember. But for me

24 to remember all of this in detail, and how can I claim whether it's true

25 or not? All right. This is a report that was drawn up, but we have no

Page 37822

1 investigation here. We cannot establish whether it was the forces of the

2 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps or some other forces that were shelling, and

3 without any work of commissions and all of that to claim or assert that

4 the shells had come from the side of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, all

5 right, it's information that such an incident happened and that we should

6 prevent them, but to be able to take disciplinary measures or to

7 prosecute someone before such an incident is investigated, that was

8 something that I couldn't do.

9 Q. Now, you said here -- you've said just now that you couldn't

10 establish whether it was the forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps or

11 some other forces that were shelling without any work of commissions. In

12 fact, General, your Chief of Staff was specifically confronted,

13 specifically protested, with the shelling of this observation post. He

14 specifically told Cutler, and that's in 65 ter 14217, the first document

15 that we saw, that you knew where the observation posts were. So why do

16 you need a commission in the face of a protest like you've just seen from

17 Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler?

18 A. Madam Prosecutor, I don't understand you. Do you understand me?

19 If there was a protest, I don't remember whether I received it or

20 not. Where I was, I have no idea. But if there was a protest that was

21 lodged, and if the Chief of Staff knew where this Papa 5 was, where, but

22 it doesn't necessarily mean that it was visible.

23 Another thing, how can we accept that it is such on the face of

24 it just to believe it? Well, a shell fell there and it was fired by the

25 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. This is why a report would be necessary,

Page 37823

1 whether the report of a commission or somebody else, an on-site

2 investigation should be conducted, and the azimuth and the direction

3 would be established and it could be said, well, it came from such and

4 such a position on the basis of the azimuth and so on. I cannot now --

5 this is why say I cannot answer such questions, whether it was a shell or

6 something else that was fired from the positions of the Sarajevo-Romanija

7 Corps or from the positions of the 1st Corps of the BH Army, because

8 there are all kinds of military observers. Some of them liked Serbs,

9 others didn't. Some were good, others were not. Some were reliable,

10 others were not. Some wanted to gain popularity for themselves in

11 various ways. I don't know. It was a war going on. And to trust

12 something, to believe something, to believe the military observers, well,

13 I believed them as much as I could.

14 Q. If you needed a report of a commission, if you needed an on-site

15 investigation, if you needed the azimuth, if you needed the direction,

16 why didn't you or any member of your staff tell that to

17 Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler, General?

18 A. I asked that and I already told you about that. With regard to

19 all these incidents, this is one of the incidents, too, but in terms of

20 the United Nations, I cautioned you about that when the commission went

21 to the airport and investigated matters, although they said it was the

22 Serb side that had fired the shells, it turned out that it was the Muslim

23 side that had fired them. That is why it is important to have a site

24 investigation. Any crime, I mean even today, you have to go to the

25 scene, and you have to reach certain parameters in order to convict a

Page 37824

1 person or suggest that somebody else be convicted with regard to that

2 kind of problem, let alone in a war. That is why it is necessary to have

3 that part of the documents that we are discussing.

4 Q. General, with respect, you didn't answer my question. Do you

5 want me to repeat it to you?

6 A. I thought that I did answer.

7 Q. If you needed -- my question was: If you needed a commission

8 report or an on-site investigation or the azimuth or the direction of

9 fire, why didn't you or anybody in your staff tell that to

10 Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler?

11 A. Madam Prosecutor, perhaps the transcript did not reflect what I

12 had said. If necessary, I'll repeat it yet again. I said that I asked

13 for that with regard to each and every incident that I was told about,

14 protests, whatever, to submit this kind of information. So with regard

15 to this incident, that should have been asked for. Now, whether it had

16 been asked for or had not, I cannot say right now, but this was well

17 known.

18 As a matter of fact, all these commissions work under the

19 supervision and control of UNPROFOR. So UNPROFOR and the military

20 observers, they lead these mixed commissions. Just like in the mixed

21 commission the leader is, I don't know, from the UNPROFOR command for BH.

22 For Sector Sarajevo, the leader of the commission is such and such a

23 person from Sector Sarajevo. It's not the representative of the

24 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps or the representative of the 1st Corps of the

25 BH Army that is the leader of the commission, so they should have asked

Page 37825

1 for it themselves. And I said during the examination-in-chief if we

2 hadn't done something properly, in accordance with conventions and so on

3 and so forth, they should have taught us. They should have taught us how

4 we should do things and what we should do. As for this commission, this

5 commission had to --

6 Q. General, I'll try this one more time and then we'll move on, but

7 nobody answered Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler. That's the evidence we have

8 got in front of us. If he needed to give you something more for you to

9 be able to do something, why didn't you tell him? Instead, you just

10 didn't answer. Nobody in your staff answered.

11 A. Well, I cannot say. You said yourself that it was the Chief of

12 Staff who talked to them so that means I wasn't there, and I don't really

13 know this entire process, what happened. Now for me to claim whether

14 this or that thing was given -- I mean, I'm just giving you the general

15 principles and orders that I had issued and that everyone was supposed to

16 abide by.

17 Now, whether it was said or not said, I cannot say, but probably

18 this Cutler, if he came that many times bringing these protests, he

19 himself, and it is not his duty to bring protests to the corps command

20 because he is the observer for the Muslim side primarily, not for the

21 Serb side, if that's it. So if he's a senior observer, then it's only in

22 the area of where it is the area of one corps or the other corps, but

23 then also there is the chief observer who was supposed to co-operate with

24 both sides, if that's the way it is. Perhaps he was the chief observer

25 then. Really I cannot say, because they changed then. Was it Valentin

Page 37826

1 then or not? Whether he got in instead of Valentin I --

2 Q. Thank you, General.

3 MS. EDGERTON: Could I have these two documents, please, 65 ter

4 14217 and 14208 as Prosecution exhibits.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

6 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

7 JUDGE KWON: They will be admitted.

8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits P6298 and Exhibit P6299 respectively.

9 JUDGE KWON: 6298 and 99.

10 MS. EDGERTON:

11 Q. I want to talk about some of the incidents that Dr. Karadzic

12 asked you about during your examination-in-chief, but not for a great

13 deal of time, and we will start by talking about some of the sniping

14 incidents.

15 Now, with respect to what we call sniping incident F6, that's an

16 incident that took place on the 6th of January, 1994, in the context of a

17 discussion about this incident where a woman was shot while riding a

18 bicycle across the Nikola Demonja Street, the bridge there in Dobrinja.

19 You said you "wanted to celebrate holidays peacefully, not only Sarajevo

20 but everywhere else. We wanted peace for Muslims as well as for

21 ourselves," and that's at transcript page 37521.

22 And you also referred to a document Dr. Karadzic showed you,

23 D3452. And we could have a look at that so the General could refresh his

24 memory. It's your daily combat report to the Main Staff of the same

25 date.

Page 37827

1 And looking at this document, you told Dr. Karadzic that you

2 didn't see reference to any activities across that bridge, and that's at

3 37522. And after having a quick look at that document, I'd like to turn

4 to another one, P -- just tell me when you've had a look at it, General,

5 and we can move on.

6 Are we all right to move on, General?

7 A. I'm not that much of a genius. Thank you very much, but, yes,

8 then we can move on to the next one.

9 MS. EDGERTON: If we could have a look at P2293. That's --

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask to zoom in

11 because I don't really see any of this. So regardless of whether I have

12 the document in front of me or not in this form, it doesn't matter. Now,

13 this is better. Thank you.

14 JUDGE KWON: Now are we moving to the next document?

15 MS. EDGERTON: If the General's -- if the General's okay with

16 that.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

18 MS. EDGERTON:

19 Q. P2293 --

20 A. Yes, yes. It's fine.

21 Q. -- is an UNMO Zagreb weekly summary for the period of

22 31 December 1993 to 6 January 1994 which discusses the scale of shelling

23 activity during this holiday time, and unfortunately it's only in

24 English, General, so I'll read it to you.

25 If we could go to e-court page 3 of the English.

Page 37828

1 Under heading B, which is Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then sub-1,

2 Sarajevo, and then sub a and b, it reports Sarajevo as being unstable

3 throughout the reporting period, and at b says there was BSA, Bosnian

4 Serb Army, shelling of the northern and western areas of the city, along

5 with the city centre all week long. Most frequent Bosnian Serb Army

6 targets were Stup with coordinates, Zuc with coordinates, Alipasino Most

7 with coordinates, Smiljevici and Rajlovac, also with coordinates. It

8 then says the level of Bosnian Serb Army shelling rose from 123 outgoing

9 rounds at the beginning of the week to 1.613 outgoing on the 4th of

10 January, 1.344 outgoing on the 5th of January, and 815 impacts on the 6th

11 of January, 1994.

12 So regardless, General, of your express desire in your evidence

13 in chief to celebrate the holidays peacefully, it doesn't seem that

14 that's the case at all, and what your soldiers were doing at the time is

15 that they were engaged in heavy shelling, as well as the sniping of

16 civilians as occurred in this incident F6. Isn't that the case?

17 A. Well, that's not the case. Now, why is that not the case? All

18 of this shelling is outside Dobrinja. You see, it has nothing to do with

19 Dobrinja, Zuc, et cetera. It's far away from Dobrinja and all the areas

20 where there was fighting and so on that they reported on. All right, now

21 whether it's that way and how they counted it, whose, what, but these

22 areas are not related to Dobrinja where this incident where we're

23 speaking about happened, this sniping incident as you call it, or one

24 related to infantry fire in the area of Dobrinja. If I remember directly

25 what it was that you asked me about.

Page 37829

1 So I would not -- that is why I would say that that is not linked

2 to that area, but I do agree that if there were such provocations and if

3 one had to respond and if one could not peacefully celebrate any holiday,

4 that was possible, it wouldn't have been the first time. After all, this

5 characteristic in relation to provocations, I mean of the BH Army, that

6 was present throughout the war.

7 I spoke about the names of some operations, what we called them,

8 operation step-by-step to intervention, that is to say, to engage as many

9 forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps as possible and to portray that as

10 some kind of terror rather than targeting military targets. That is why

11 linking all of this to what happened in Dobrinja, sorry, I don't really

12 see any link. If you see one, do tell me. Perhaps I didn't listen

13 carefully enough, but I did listen carefully and I didn't find anything.

14 So that claim, that is correct, that there was intensified artillery fire

15 there and that can be seen from these reports now. Whether it was that

16 way or not, I mean I have to believe it. I --

17 Q. General --

18 A. -- repeat once again, they have no reason to lie.

19 Q. -- to be fair, I'm going to read you subparagraph c of this

20 report. It says that Bosnian shelling --

21 A. All right.

22 Q. -- was mainly confined to areas of Lukavica, Grbavica, and the

23 Bosnian Serb Army side of the confrontation line in the Vogosca area. So

24 none of the areas referred to in the first paragraph. And says the level

25 of Bosnian shelling fluctuated between 10 and 50 rounds throughout the

Page 37830

1 week.

2 A. I agree. I did take a look at this paragraph C. You know where

3 Grbavica is. It's down there. Hrasno, Hrasno Brdo, Mojmilo, separates

4 it from Dobrinja, so this really has nothing to do with Dobrinja, this

5 Grbavica.

6 Now let us move on. Vogosca, you know where Vogosca is. That is

7 on the completely opposite side of the front in relation to Dobrinja. So

8 that's it. All right. If that's what happened. But again we cannot

9 link this to Dobrinja, what happened, I mean, when this incident

10 occurred, please, if that is what matters.

11 Q. So, General, how does small levels of outgoing Bosnian shelling

12 in Lukavica, Grbavica, and the Serbian side of the confrontation lines in

13 Vogosca justify response to completely unrelated areas, Stup, Zuc,

14 Alipasino Most, Smiljevici and Rajlovac, and the level of 1.613 rounds

15 and almost the same amount, 1.344, as this document says, on the 4th and

16 5th of January?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I kindly ask that we be given

18 an explanation on the basis of what it says that this is unrelated,

19 unrelated locations? Where is it written that they did not fire at Serb

20 positions from there?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was supposed to be my question

22 too.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I'll leave it to you Ms. Edgerton.

24 MS. EDGERTON:

25 Q. I can change to word to "other areas." Should I rephrase the

Page 37831

1 question for you, General?

2 A. Whatever you prefer. I can answer, no problem. It's better to

3 rephrase it so that I understand better, but it's not a problem. Just

4 what Mr. Karadzic asked right now, that's what I wanted to ask. We

5 cannot see whether any fire had come from Zuc. We know that the

6 1st Corps of the BH Army is in all of these areas where this activity

7 took place. There are no civilian areas there. I mean, now we would

8 have to look specifically to see whether there is anything civilian

9 there. Excuse me.

10 Q. General, so maybe I'll ask the question a different way. Was it

11 your forces' practice to respond in the face of Bosnian attack on other

12 areas of Sarajevo?

13 A. If we recall the examination-in-chief, I said where if I was

14 directed that it was directed to sources of enemy fire, not that there

15 was any kind of revenge taking place in any area. As for the answer I

16 gave to the president, there were situations when there was a

17 disproportionate response and I think that to a considerable extent this

18 is a reply to what you are saying in relation to some problems.

19 Q. I'll leave this for the moment, but we're going to come back to

20 this, General, because I want to talk about another sniping incident, and

21 that's the one on 25 May 1994. We call it F7, and it relates to the

22 targeting of a bus in Dobrinja. And in discussion about that incident,

23 you said at transcript page 37522 to 37523:

24 "When I remember that buses were running, people could stroll,

25 that they could work in their gardens, that they could go shopping. What

Page 37832

1 else could we do? What else could we make possible in that area? If

2 public transport was working in the area of Dobrinja, which was under

3 constant fire, as it were, and if people were wounded, the question is

4 who wounded them and whether we could open fire on that bus from our

5 side."

6 Now, when you referred to Dobrinja being under constant fire, you

7 meant constant fire from your forces. Isn't that correct?

8 A. Constant fire because -- well, we had parts of Dobrinja that we

9 held under constant fire of the BH Army and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

10 So as a matter of fact, even more so. I mean, it's not that I measured

11 this. It is unrealistic to say. But if we recall the number of shells

12 that were fired from both sides, now what is being counted as I don't

13 know which grenade, which shells, but you will see that many shells were

14 fired to the area held by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. That would be the

15 answer.

16 Q. General, this incident is an incident of targeting a bus in

17 Bosnian-held territory in Dobrinja. So I can only assume when you were

18 discussing this incident and in your answer to Dr. Karadzic you were

19 referring to Bosnian-held territory in Dobrinja. I'll remind you what

20 you said:

21 "If public transport was working in the area of Dobrinja which

22 was under constant fire, as it were, and if people were wounded, the

23 question is who wounded them and whether we could open fire on that bus

24 from our side."

25 When you referred to the area of Dobrinja which was under

Page 37833

1 constant fire in your answer to Dr. Karadzic, you were referring to

2 Bosnian-held Dobrinja, weren't you?

3 A. Correct, correct, because everything I said beforehand is

4 correct. If we look at all of Sarajevo, and if we look at all the

5 incidents that occurred and all the people who were wounded, I am saying

6 that all of this was made possible, for markets to work, for shops to

7 work. I don't want to go into further interpretations, but I'd like to

8 go back to this incident. That is correct too. You know where Dobrinja,

9 and you know how far away this is from the front line, this bus. And you

10 know that this is an area -- well, sort of between high-rise buildings,

11 and where could this fire come from, the fire at this bus? All of this

12 remained unclear.

13 As for this incident during the war, I claim that we had not

14 received a single protest in writing or verbally with regard to any one

15 of these individual sniping incidents that are mentioned in

16 Mr. Karadzic's indictment. That is why I'm saying -- that is why I'm

17 saying everything I know about this bus, all of that dates back to my

18 trial. I did know about it beforehand. I know that there were buses

19 running, and I know that some kind of agreement was sought. It can go,

20 it cannot go, but the position was to enable public transportation. Now,

21 where civilians were going, why they were taking buses, where --

22 Q. General. General, can we go back to my question --

23 A. I mean if there is a war going on.

24 Q. So I asked you to confirm that you were referring to Bosnian-held

25 Dobrinja, and you said, "Correct, correct."

Page 37834

1 Now, you meant to say, then -- let me just rephrase that. So

2 according to the answer that you've just given, Bosnian-held Dobrinja was

3 under constant fire and constant fire by your forces. Isn't that the

4 case?

5 A. These were constant conflicts. So if there are conflicts, fire

6 is opened. There was no peace there. Let's put it that way. So if

7 there was a cessation in firing, then it was the Muslims who stopped

8 that. And we saw evidence of that during the examination-in-chief here,

9 if you remember.

10 Q. General, when you gave that answer, when you said, "I remember

11 that buses were running, that people could stroll, that they could work

12 in their gardens, they could go shopping," you were describing the period

13 of cease-fire, weren't you? Because this is May 1994. Correct?

14 A. I've told you that there were some ten different cease-fires.

15 May 1994, I think there was a cease-fire. I can't say for sure now. But

16 regardless of whether there was a cease-fire or not, it was forbidden to

17 target means of public transportation. Let us be clear on that.

18 Although there is different evidence here --

19 Q. General --

20 A. Yes?

21 Q. -- in February 1994, a cease-fire agreement was concluded between

22 the warring parties. You were, as you said in your evidence in chief,

23 present with Dr. Karadzic during the course of these negotiations. So

24 are you now saying that that cease-fire was no longer in force by the

25 25th of May, 1994?

Page 37835

1 A. That cease-fire -- you know what? A cease-fire lasts for as long

2 the parties keep it going. If it is not limited by time. If one side

3 violates the cease-fire - that is what is written in conventions too -

4 the other side no longer has the obligation to honour that cease-fire,

5 although we kept saying that we honour the cease-fire. If there is a

6 time limit, then that has to be observed, say, if it was a month. This

7 cease-fire was certainly there on the 18th of February, 1994, and these

8 other activities that were carried out within that framework including

9 the cessation in combat activities.

10 Now, after that, whether there was a halt in May or June, going

11 on for a month, I cannot tell you exactly because I cannot remember all

12 of these different orders that had to do with cease-fires agreements and

13 so on. But I think that then, in June, there was a cease-fire for about

14 a month. I may be wrong on that.

15 Q. Oh, we'll definitely come back to this then, General, but for now

16 let's move on to, so we don't get off track from these sniping incidents,

17 the one we call F10 and it took place on the 22nd of July, 1994. And in

18 regard to this incident, a 13-year-old boy was shot in the abdomen while

19 he was window shopping with his mother in Cengic Vila. And you

20 suggested, at least in general, that there may have been Bosnian Army

21 forces deployed in the area of Cengic Vila. You -- and that was at

22 transcript page 37538. You said:

23 "The area in question is Cengic Vila and we can see, if we look

24 at the disposition which forces were deployed there, but there's some

25 information available that there was some unit or troops that were

Page 37836

1 deployed or were moving in that particular area."

2 And that's, by the way, General, that's even though you said on

3 that same page whether there was any firing of that -- "whether there was

4 any firing, what sort of fire or activities, that is something that I

5 couldn't claim at this point in time and this situation."

6 But I want to come back to this observation or suggestion that

7 there may have been Bosnian Army forces deployed in the area of Cengic

8 Vila.

9 General, Brigadier Blagoje Kovacevic, who was, among other

10 things, battalion commander in the -- in your 1st Sarajevo Mechanised

11 Brigade, testified here last year, and he was asked whether there were

12 any no-fire zones in Sarajevo, areas not to be targeted, and he said,

13 although it wasn't the only one, there was -- Cengic Vila was a no-fire

14 zone. It never came under fire. Only from Cengic Vila fire was never

15 opened against us. There was no front line in Cengic Vila. It was

16 mostly inhabited by civilians. There were no institutions, no military,

17 and there was no need to open fire on Cengic Vila.

18 So it seems like, General, your suggestion is actually

19 speculative because your contradicted by one of your own commanders.

20 Isn't that the case?

21 A. Each commander knew what they knew. Every command level had its

22 information. I don't have to know everything that a battalion commander

23 knew. I was not in a position to know. However, Cengic Vila is in the

24 centre of Sarajevo. It's the very centre of Sarajevo, in practical

25 terms. We insisted on this part, being a museum part, like Bascarsija,

Page 37837

1 for example, it's a museum area, and that it shouldn't be targeted. And

2 I suppose that claim of his originates from there. I don't know what he

3 testified. I didn't hear it. I don't know what he told you. However,

4 this may be my speculation. This is all subsequent knowledge. I'm

5 talking with hindsight. I did not have that information during the war.

6 I didn't know that a lad had been hit. I'm sorry about that young boy.

7 Of course, I'm sorry. It was a 13-year-old child. I didn't know at the

8 time that he was wounded, and I repeat, I'm sorry. I feel sorry for all

9 those who were innocent and who suffered during the war, especially in

10 Sarajevo.

11 Based on my trial, I can tell you that a witness, I don't know

12 which witness, said that an army passed through there, that was said

13 during my trial. This is why I thought that there were troops in that

14 area. I don't know whether they passed through there and whether that

15 boy was with them window shopping. I don't know. But if you look at the

16 deployment of command posts, you will see that there is -- there was a

17 command post somewhere in the vicinity. How does one shell Cengic Vila?

18 The question is where it was shelled from, because it was a problem,

19 really.

20 Q. Are you saying -- so you're now saying there was a command post

21 in Cengic Vila. Did you know that at the time?

22 A. At that time I did not know that. I didn't know. Maybe my

23 commanders did, but I personally didn't know that.

24 Q. Thank you. I'll leave that for now to stay with the theme of

25 sniping.

Page 37838

1 General, in your testimony to Dr. Karadzic, you insisted several

2 times that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had no sniper units - and that was

3 at transcript pages 37191 to 92, 37465, and 37472 - but that's actually

4 not correct, is it, General? The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had sniper

5 units within the Sarajevo -- the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade;

6 correct?

7 A. Not correct. If you know better what the situation was in the

8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, then fine, you can testify. I'll do something

9 else. But I'm telling you, in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, at the time

10 when I was commander, there were no sniper units. There were snipers,

11 though, and I repeat what I said during the examination-in-chief. We

12 didn't have sniper units. We had snipers. A smaller number of snipers.

13 I told you how they were deployed and used. And now since you're talking

14 about snipers and sniper units, about sniper activity, and you imply that

15 that was the entire infantry weaponry, you can also say, totally outside

16 of the context, that all infantry units are sniper units. I already told

17 you what sniping activity is --

18 Q. General --

19 A. -- and if this is what you based your knowledge on and if say

20 that all those were sniper units, well, then it's up to you. It's a

21 totally different story.

22 Q. You keep coming back to that, and I'd like you to listen to my

23 questions instead and answer my questions. We're talking about sniper

24 units, and you've said categorically that at the time that you were

25 commander there were no sniper units. But, General, one of your company

Page 37839

1 commanders, Dragan Maletic, who was in the 2nd Battalion of the

2 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade said in his written evidence to this

3 Court that there was a sniper squad in the 2nd Battalion command directly

4 subordinate to the commander. And that's at D2519, page 5, paragraph 31

5 in B/C/S; page 9 in English.

6 So, General, you're contradicted in your assertion by one of your

7 own company commanders. Isn't that the case?

8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness kindly

9 be asked to speak slower. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I intervene on the transcript?

11 Madam Edgerton said "sniper squad," and General Galic received the

12 interpretation a "sniper company." That may lead to confusion. [In

13 English] Company. It hadn't been said "company" but "squad."

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Now he must have understood.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I did not understand

16 these statements and assertions. To arrive at conclusions based on

17 partial information, if anybody had such units, they should tell us when

18 they were set up, who set them up, under whose command they were. They

19 were not under my command. There were sniping assets. Sniper fire was

20 opened. That's no secret at all. Whether there were units, especially

21 if you say that there were sniper companies, there were no such things.

22 I'm sure of that. I apologise. It is possible those were all reserve

23 officers. I don't know what their position was in the 1st Sarajevo

24 Brigade, but I don't know whether they understood properly what they put

25 on paper, that person, for example, and that's the question that I'm

Page 37840

1 putting to myself. I adhere to my assertion that in the

2 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps we did not have sniper units, as far as I know.

3 JUDGE KWON: By "unit," what do you mean, General? My question

4 is whether you exclude the possibility that there existed a sniper squad

5 in a battalion or company or whatever.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I will gladly answer

7 your question and believe that we will arrive at the right answer and the

8 right understanding.

9 Snipers usually work in pairs. There's always two people opening

10 sniper fire together. That was the rule, that was part of the tactic for

11 using such assets.

12 I don't know if there were people who made up a unit or a squad

13 of some ten people or so. Maybe they were given a task as a group. I

14 don't know about that. It is possible that things like that happen. If

15 there was a special task, a special mission, if there was an order to be

16 carried out, as I've told you, I was on the sixth level of command and I

17 was not in a position to know how the organisation was adapted to the

18 situation at hand, how they use their assets that they had. In order to

19 be closer to your interpretation, I am saying that things like that are

20 possible but I don't know.

21 And what is a unit? When you say "a unit," it's a group of some

22 10 people. A platoon has 30 people. A company has a hundred, battalion

23 has 300 to 500 people. These are units and their strengths.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: A company has

Page 37841

1 30 people.

2 MS. EDGERTON:

3 Q. So when Mr. Maletic gave this evidence, General, your assertion

4 is he didn't know what he was talking about; correct?

5 A. This may be too strong, but I just provided an answer to that.

6 Perhaps, perhaps I am here and I am learning new things. If my

7 subordinates say that they had things like that and I say that they

8 didn't, then I suppose I did not have enough insight into the whole

9 situation. I don't know whether they were set up as a temporary unit.

10 They were not a permanent unit. A permanent unit by establishment in the

11 corps, for example, in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, without any

12 exaggerations, there shouldn't be a sniper unit in such an establishment

13 order.

14 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment.

15 Q. So when Milan Kovacevic, who was deputy commander of the

16 2nd Battalion of the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade, who also served in

17 Grbavica and who gave a statement to the Office of the Prosecutor,

18 stated, and that's at 65 ter number 22117, page 20, when he stated

19 specifically that there were 12 snipers in the 2nd Battalion 's sniper

20 detachment who came to daily battalion meetings, who sometimes got

21 ammunition from the battalion and sometimes from the brigade, your

22 evidence is that the existence of this unit is something that you as

23 commander didn't know about; is that correct?

24 A. Well, you see, those sniper units, i.e., snipers, have to have

25 special ammunition. That's the difference between sniping and opening

Page 37842

1 infantry fire. Those are not bursts of fire but individual shots. They

2 came from the entire brigade. I believe in the battalion there was a

3 dozen such snipers, ten, and it is possible that personally the commander

4 at a certain level in the battalion gave them the task. It is known that

5 even a battalion commander who is in charge of some 10- to 20.000 people

6 issued the tasks to a person with a machine-gun. So it's not surprising

7 that he got a task and conveyed it to somebody else.

8 Kovacevic was through a lot, from Rajlovac to Sarajevo. I don't

9 know what his position was. I don't know. He was probably the commander

10 of the 1st Battalion up there. That was his duty. And he probably

11 didn't say anything wrong. He said that some ten people were gathered

12 with snipers and we were given tasks, and then the battalion commander,

13 the brigade commander, says that all the snipers had to be gathered and

14 used. It's a normal activity during combat operations. For example, you

15 can also gather armoured forces, transporters, APCs, in order to carry

16 out tasks although they do not belong to a certain unit but they will be

17 operational in their zone of operation. They are so-called tactical

18 groups. In this sector it was also possible to gather important assets

19 that could be used or to perhaps counter the sniping activity of the

20 1st Corps of the BH Army from Marin Dvor, for example.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript. On line 2 he said that

23 it was normal, and before that he said that it was allowed and normal.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

25 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

Page 37843

1 Q. And now, General, just -- still on the same subject, in your

2 testimony, in your answers to Dr. Karadzic at transcript pages 37466 and

3 37471, you listed buildings and locations where you said snipers were

4 deployed on the Bosnian side.

5 Now, you also said, at 37466, your snipers were deployed in the

6 high-rises in Grbavica. You mean, I take it, they were deployed in the

7 white skyscrapers on the former Leninova Street when you refer to the

8 high-rises; is that correct?

9 A. Your assumption is good. As for the correct and exact places

10 where those snipers were deployed, to be honest, I really don't know. I

11 never toured their positions. And if you put it to me they were there, I

12 don't know. Those were individuals. I did not get around examining

13 their positions, but they changed places. For example, one night they

14 are in one place and the following day they're in a different place.

15 Whether they were on higher floors of the skyscrapers, yes, they were,

16 because they could observe the sniping units of the BH Army that they had

17 and it's a notorious fact. Everybody knows that.

18 Q. So you know where the Bosnian snipers were located but you're not

19 sure where your sniper firing positions were located. Is that what

20 you're telling us?

21 A. I refuse [as interpreted] to say anything to that. This is not

22 what I meant. I know the approximate locations where they were and from

23 which fire was opened on both sides, but to be precise about the

24 buildings or the floors, I don't know. Madam, I was a corps commander.

25 I was not a squad or a company commander, so it is only normal that I

Page 37844

1 didn't know.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] We have the same problem with

4 the transcript. General Galic never refused to say something like that.

5 He simply said he never expressed that. So he did not deny this. And as

6 you asked me, Mr. President, I'm not intervening. I only intervene when

7 I feel that there is an urgent need to do it. I've refrained from doing

8 that until now, but I'm doing it now. Thank you.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

10 MS. EDGERTON:

11 Q. And you can also confirm, I take that, that your forces had

12 firing positions in the buildings at Metalka 1 and 2; correct?

13 A. That's in Grbavica; right?

14 Q. Metalka 1 and 2 are both in Grbavica. That's correct.

15 A. I know that they opened fire from that sector, our snipers did,

16 because on the other side, fire was opened from the 1st Corps of the

17 BH Army. There were somewhat stronger forces there in order to repel

18 those attacks. I don't know whether they were snipers or whether they

19 had machine-guns. I don't know what they had. In any case, they were at

20 the ready to respond to the fire opened by the 1st Corps and repel their

21 attacks. Those are two very high skyscrapers. As I already told you, I

22 did not live in Sarajevo, so I have problems with the street names, and I

23 apologise, and it was such a long time ago that I can't retain all those

24 things in my head. I've not succeeded in retaining all that in my head.

25 Q. Okay. We'll just then leave the question of those details and go

Page 37845

1 on to another area, still talking about sniping. You said at transcript

2 page 37465 that the main task of sharpshooters -- and it relates to how

3 you've just answered a question now, the main task of sharpshooters or

4 sniping activity was to fight and counter enemy sniper activities. So

5 could we understand -- should we understand your evidence as saying that

6 sniping by your forces was military on military?

7 A. Do you also imply sharpshooters in military terms or the way we

8 explained sniping activities? What do you imply in your question?

9 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I can clarify that for the General

10 but it might take a little while, and I just see the time that we're at.

11 I'm in Your Honours' hands. I can --

12 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient, we'll take a break. We'll take

13 a break for 45 minutes and resume at 10 past 1.00.

14 --- Recess taken at 12.26 p.m.

15 --- On resuming at 1.15 p.m.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. The Court may have noted

18 that a couple of requests for the presence of counsel were filed in the

19 last couple of hours. I simply wanted to note that the Prosecution has

20 no objection.

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, is the counsel for Mr. Borovcanin,

22 name of the counsel is Cimeric or Cmeric?

23 MR. ROBINSON: There's no I, so it's CM.

24 JUDGE KWON: Cmeric, yes. So the request for the presence of

25 counsel in court during the testimony for Mr. Martic and Borovcanin,

Page 37846

1 i.e., the presence of attorney Mr. Bourgon and Ms. Cmeric, are hereby

2 granted.

3 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

4 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

5 Q. General, we left off with my question to you as to whether we

6 should understand your evidence as saying sniping by your forces was

7 military on military, and perhaps it might be clearer, first of all, if I

8 rephrase it to ask you whether sniping by your forces was exclusively

9 military on military. Does that help you?

10 A. Well, Madam Prosecutor, as far as I know, as far as I am aware,

11 judging by the tasks which I issued for sniper fire, and any other fire,

12 not just sniper, to be directed at military targets, not just against

13 troops but also military facilities and so on. Let me not talk more

14 about what can be considered a military target. That was the order that

15 we received from superior commands, and that was the order that I gave.

16 So that would be my answer to your question if that is sufficient.

17 Q. Now, General, actually in this case, not referring to your trial

18 but this trial, we've received evidence that the larger portion, the

19 preponderance of victims of sniping in Sarajevo were civilians, and

20 that's at T13313, and we've also heard from a demographic expert on the

21 large number of civilians killed and wounded as a result of sniping by

22 forces in your territory.

23 During your time as SRK commander, the demographic evidence is

24 that 900 -- pardon me, 253 civilians were killed by sniping in

25 Bosnian-held territory inside the front lines in Sarajevo, and 1.296 were

Page 37847

1 wounded by sniping, and that's from P4998, page 6 in both languages.

2 So, General, it seems like your last statement is incompatible

3 with the figures that I've just read out, isn't it?

4 A. Well, I wouldn't say that it is in any way contradictory. What I

5 said and the figures which you mentioned now, they were mentioned during

6 my trial as well, 253, if that's the number, but these are the figures

7 from Ms. Ewa Tabeau, the Prosecution. No one verified these losses. No

8 one did. And it also says there that the losses are not divided into

9 direct shots and whether the fire was legitimate or not. These were --

10 these are the overall losses which were established in various ways. So

11 I wouldn't go into that.

12 In two years, if the losses were such among the civilians, I do

13 say that it's much, if the figures are correct. It is a lot, for sure.

14 We have seen here, because we did monitor the losses on the Serbian side,

15 during the direct examination we could see how many civilians were killed

16 by their fire per day. Whether these were all instances of sniper fire,

17 that is again one and the same subject, or whether it's infantry fire,

18 that's always a problem. And as a professional, as an expert, I can tell

19 you that it's difficult to distinguish whether it was sniper fire or

20 ordinary rifle or some other fire. Special expertise is necessary in

21 order to prove that this was sniping activity. If there was any conflict

22 along the confrontation line and infantry fire was opened, she just put

23 it all under sniping activities. So that would be my last answer. And

24 such loss of civilians was unnecessary.

25 Now, whether the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and its forces were to

Page 37848

1 blame, equally other forces were to blame, whether they took the

2 necessary measures that should be taken into account, and both sides

3 should be faced with the problems they created during the war rather than

4 blame just one side. I can see that we are the only ones who stand trial

5 for Sarajevo and sniping. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. No one is

6 accused for the losses among the Serbs in Sarajevo. That is not normal,

7 that everything is fine over there.

8 Q. So, General, you've actually not explained, as far as I can see,

9 how the figures are not in any way contradictory, but I think what I'd

10 like to do is deal with an issue that you've raised a few times now and

11 it's about the -- a distinction you keep insisting on between sniper fire

12 and ordinary rifle fire, infantry fire. And, General, when you first

13 came in here to testify today, you referred to footnote 711 in

14 paragraph 254 of your appeals judgement, and in that footnote --

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. In that footnote, the Appellate Chamber makes it clear, General,

17 that the case doesn't require a definition of sniping or proof of

18 specific types of weapons, because you, General, were actually charged

19 with murder and other inhumane acts.

20 So, General, when one of your soldiers shoots a civilian with a

21 gun, it doesn't actually matter whether you call it sniping, does it?

22 A. Well, no, it's not as you present it, the footnote 711, and I

23 would ask for the footnote to be read out here. It's not a long one.

24 Because it explains, first of all, what sniping activity or sniper fire

25 is. It says that it's direct firing from infantry weapons, if I'm not

Page 37849

1 correct [as interpreted]. That's what the footnote says. And then the

2 conclusion is that I'm neither accused nor sentenced. If I'm not

3 accused, then I'm not sentenced. I shouldn't be sentenced for sniping

4 but for murder and inhumane acts.

5 If you are to interpret that further, you would see that I am not

6 accused and sentenced for that and so on and so forth. Let me not

7 interpret the judgement any longer. So we should say clearly what the

8 footnote says.

9 MS. EDGERTON: I'll do that for the General, Your Honour.

10 Q. The footnote reads, and I apologise for not uploading it:

11 "The Trial Chamber defined 'sniping' as the 'direct targeting of

12 individuals at a distance using any type of small calibre weapon.'"

13 And that's in the trial judgement at paragraph 184.

14 A. No, it doesn't say so. No, no. No. Paragraph 254, footnote 711

15 says using any infantry weapons. That is the translation I received. If

16 the translation is poor, then I apologise, but I remember quite well

17 what's written there. And I can bring here the Serbian translation here

18 tomorrow if needed, or send it to you, as you wish.

19 Q. Perhaps we can look into that overnight and get back to you on

20 that tomorrow, General, rather than spending time on it today.

21 So -- but we still didn't -- you still didn't answer my question,

22 and my question was it doesn't actually matter, General, whether -- when

23 one of your soldiers shoots a civilian with a gun, it doesn't matter

24 whether or not you call it sniping, does it?

25 A. Well, it is important if I am accused of sniping activity, and

Page 37850

1 now when we discuss it then it's not important. We have to distinguish

2 between sniping and not sniping. What's a sniper and what's not. It is

3 important. I'm not sure when the figures were presented. The 253 I

4 think relates to the overall losses of both soldiers and civilians who

5 were shot by snipers. But if you say as you do, I can't remember

6 everything now and ...

7 Q. Let's go back a little bit. So you're disputing the accuracy of

8 the demographic figures I've read out to you; is that correct?

9 A. We disputed that during my trial too.

10 Q. Now, with respect to shooting civilians with a gun, General, it's

11 the same activity which is taking place, isn't it, whether you're using

12 specialised rifles with special ammunition or if it's single shots from

13 ordinary infantry weapons or bursts of fire, it's the same activity,

14 shooting? Isn't that the case?

15 A. But what is the purpose of that activity? What's the point or

16 the thrust of your question? I don't know. I didn't understand you. I

17 cannot answer you with a proper answer because I haven't sufficiently

18 understood your question. Shooting is shooting, but whether it's

19 shooting or firing from a cannon or a pistol or from a rifle, shooting is

20 shooting if we're talking about shooting, or firing activity to put that

21 in military terms and be more precise.

22 Q. So the discussion we're having or that you're raising is just a

23 semantic one, isn't it, General? The word you use in the context of

24 Sarajevo in the context of your evidence doesn't matter. It's just about

25 shooting, isn't it?

Page 37851

1 A. No, it's not so. In our language, shooting means shooting which

2 is aimless. You don't have to target anyone. You can shoot into the

3 air, no matter where. That's shooting. And when you aim, then you take

4 aim and then you fire. That's shooting. Or in military terms, it's

5 firing activity. Anyway you want to term it. And shooting is a bit

6 one -- as a term it's imprecise. You can shoot at anything anywhere.

7 Q. General --

8 A. At weddings.

9 Q. I find that you're answers are formalistic and you're still not

10 answering my question, so I'll try one more way --

11 JUDGE KWON: I think, Ms. Edgerton, you could be clearer.

12 MS. EDGERTON: Of course.

13 JUDGE KWON: I take it Ms. Edgerton means targeting civilians.

14 So whether it's by sniper unit or whether it's by ordinary gun by

15 ordinary soldier, it doesn't make any difference. That's the point of

16 Ms. Edgerton.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I -- may I help with the

18 interpretation? As His Excellency Mr. Kwon said should not be

19 interpreted as "shooting" but as "targeting," aiming at civilians,

20 targeting civilians. So -- "gadjanje" [phoen] is the word. Aiming at

21 civilians, targeting civilians, rather than just shooting civilians.

22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Now the General must have understood.

23 Can you answer the question?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand it all immediately.

25 It's not a matter of my understanding, Mr. President, but I want to be

Page 37852

1 able to understand in order to properly interpret so that I can answer so

2 there would be no dilemma about my answer, what did I answer, and so that

3 it couldn't be said to me: What you said is not true. I want to tell

4 you what is true and what I know. If I don't know something, I'll tell

5 you so. And here she's asking me, Did you shoot at civilians? Did you

6 target civilians? And I'm saying no, we did not target civilians. There

7 was no ordinary that was issued to target civilians. No, madam and

8 Mr. President. Such an order did not exist. To aim at civilians or to

9 target civilians, there was just an order that it's prohibited to target

10 civilians or aim at civilians and civilian facilities. Such orders do

11 exist. And that I ever issued an order or that someone else ordered that

12 civilians be targeted, I'm not aware of such an order. If it exists, let

13 us look at it and see which fool issued it.

14 MS. EDGERTON:

15 Q. I want, General --

16 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.

17 Q. Before I leave this area, General, I'd like to go back to your

18 answer regarding the demographics figures. Now, you said that the

19 demographics figures were not, and I'll find your exact words -- you said

20 that the demographics figures were not contradictory to your assertion

21 that you didn't target civilians, and that's the demographics figures

22 showing 253 civilians killed by sniping and 1.296 wounded. And you

23 haven't explained how they're not -- they don't contradict one another.

24 Can you do that?

25 A. Well, I've been explaining that all along, but I can repeat some

Page 37853

1 details again and say why they do not contradict.

2 If we taken the entire period, two years of the war, 23 months --

3 is that correct? 23 months. These were the losses established by

4 Ms. Ewa Tabeau for this entire period, 23 months. So what would be the

5 civilian losses per day if we are to divide the figures? If we use the

6 other analogy how many losses there were on the Serbian side, then if by

7 analogy we also use the fact that there was fighting ongoing all the

8 time, that there were civilians in Dobrinja, for example, where there

9 were the most incidents, where we have six incidents of which

10 President Karadzic stands accused, of all the listed 15, I think that

11 there are 6 there, or Alipasino Polje. We had such a situation, on one

12 floor we have soldiers, on another are civilians, and on the third floor

13 they're mixed, and then when combat occurs there's an exchange of fire,

14 then it's possible that some civilians may perish too. And if we have a

15 front that extends along 65 kilometres, during so many days of combat we

16 will see that it's much, any civilian loss is unnecessary and it is much,

17 but it does happen. Well, that would be my answer.

18 Q. Ah. So your answer is that civilians killed and wounded by

19 sniping were collateral damage. Is that how we should understand it,

20 General?

21 A. Whether they were all collateral damage, each particular loss

22 should be analysed now, and we should assess whether it was so or not, or

23 whether there was some deliberate targeting. That possibility should not

24 be excluded. There were all kinds of people at the front. All kinds of

25 things happened at the front, Madam Prosecutor. You know, there were

Page 37854

1 people there who, for example, had three of their children killed, and

2 then to control all of them, whether they would take some initiative and

3 do something or not, it's difficult. What I'm saying is that it's normal

4 to expect under such a situation that there would be such collateral

5 damage too. If it's such a long period and so much fighting within

6 Sarajevo on a daily basis in various locations on various fronts, various

7 losses of both soldiers and civilians, then it's possible that some loss

8 of civilians occurs.

9 Q. To move away from sniping, Dr. Karadzic discussed with you also

10 some shelling incidents, and one of them was the incident of the football

11 game in Dobrinja on the 1st of June, 1993, and you discussed this with

12 Dr. Karadzic at transcript page 37367 to 37368. And you talked, in

13 discussing that incident, you said that there was a cease-fire in that

14 period, that close to the place where the incident took place there was

15 an atomic shelter that was supposed to be used by civilians but it was

16 used to shelter soldiers and materiel from recoilless guns, and the

17 incident happened perhaps 150 metres in depth from the confrontation

18 line. So I just want to go over that a little bit now, General, with

19 you.

20 You remember giving that evidence. Now, based on what you've

21 said, there was no fire coming at your forces from the atomic shelter.

22 It was a storage unit; right?

23 That's -- I think that's probably something you could answer with

24 a yes or a no, General. There was no firing coming at your forces from

25 the atomic shelter; correct?

Page 37855

1 A. No, not from the shelter, but next to the shelter, yes. But on

2 that day, whether there was fire, whether there were troops or cannons

3 inside on that particular day, I was telling you just my general remarks

4 about that and what I know. If you know something more, please tell me

5 and do ask me. I will answer any question you ask me, because you should

6 take into account what the depth was. I think it was 110 metres, or it

7 could have been 150 metres as you said or as I said, I don't know, but

8 that's it. At 150 metres from the confrontation line, that was where the

9 disposition of the enemy forces was. On one side and on the other as

10 well. There's no dilemma about that. Whether the atomic shelter was

11 closer or not close to the incident itself and so on and so forth, I

12 wouldn't expand that any longer, but I would rather wait for your

13 question.

14 Q. Well, on that day was there fire coming from next to the atomic

15 shelter, yes or no?

16 A. Oh, madam, if I remembered each specific day, then I would be a

17 genius, but I don't know. It's an important date, but I didn't know at

18 all what happened there then. I only received information about that

19 later on.

20 Q. All right, then. Now, you talked about, as I indicated and

21 you've just spoken about, the position of the confrontation line. You,

22 General, as career officer and an experienced commander, you wouldn't

23 think of placing a mortar on or even near a confrontation line, would

24 you?

25 A. Under normal circumstances I would not, but under such

Page 37856

1 circumstances, there were all kinds of dispositions. Not everything was

2 in accordance with the norms and rules. There were many things that were

3 different from the rules or different from what I would have done. You

4 should know that the army was constituted on both sides from the

5 Territorial Defence, and depending on what everyone had, they would then

6 deploy themselves accordingly.

7 Q. Well, let's talk about what you would do. You wouldn't fire a

8 mortar at a target 150 metres away because that would put your own

9 soldiers at risk, wouldn't it?

10 A. Madam Prosecutor, that is an excellent question. You are

11 thinking along the same lines as me, and I'm glad that this is so.

12 In such a situation it was realistic to expect that that was too

13 close, because the safety zone for 120 mortars, if my memory's correct,

14 was it 120 or 82 millimetres? Because the safety zone is different. The

15 calibres are what the safety zone depends on. But for such calibres, the

16 infantry ones up to 120 millimetres, it has to be at least 200 metres,

17 200 metres from the location which is targeted. At least. Or 400 metres

18 for bigger calibres around 120 millimetres or more. That is why I agree

19 with you that it wouldn't be normal to fire from a mortar on that line,

20 but if fire was from smaller calibres, then it's possible. The risks

21 were high if they fired from my side. You know that those weapons

22 necessitate corrections also for every instance of firing and so on and

23 so forth.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I intervene about the

25 transcript. In line 24, 5, line 78 [as interpreted], the General could

Page 37857

1 explain to us for which calibres is the safety zone 200 metres and for

2 which calibres is it 400 metres because this has been missed.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. That is the safety zone

4 or security zone. Please interpret it properly. The safety zone.

5 Because it is conditioned by the positions for a charge which are

6 200 metres from the locations that are targeted by these weapons. The

7 minimum is 200 metres, and for bigger calibres from 120 millimetres

8 upwards, as in this case, the safety zone is around 400 metres, around

9 400 metres. That was why I agreed with Madam Prosecutor when she noted

10 and stated her expression that that was too close if it was fired from my

11 side, that is to say, the side of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

12 MS. EDGERTON:

13 Q. So you wouldn't do that. You wouldn't fire a mortar from

14 150 metres away because of the danger to your own forces; correct?

15 A. Yeah, yeah, I understand what you're asking, but the

16 interpretation is not very good, so my understanding was that you asked

17 something different. In that situation, it is not permissible to fire a

18 120-millimetre mortar at a 150-metre distance where my forces are because

19 then I would expose my own forces to that mortar fire.

20 There's another thing. Also, if we have an obstacle, if we have

21 a high-rise building in between, then it is possible to target the area

22 that is shielded by the high-rise because the fragments will not get to

23 our positions. That's possible too but that is very risky.

24 Q. And, General, you certainly wouldn't -- you talked about your own

25 side. You certainly wouldn't fire at your own side at a distance of

Page 37858

1 150 metres as part of a conspiracy, because people would know that you

2 fired from that close. Isn't that the case?

3 A. Now, I understood what it was you were asking me, because all of

4 that is a bit illogical from the point of view of military terminology

5 and military knowledge, you know. All of this firing that we talked

6 about now. You're asking me whether I would use my mortar that is

7 150 metres away from the front line; right? Whether I would fire from my

8 mortar. If this is where the line of my forces is, whether from here I

9 would fire 150 metres here? Is that what you're asking me?

10 Q. I want to know if you agree that you would not fire at your own

11 side 150 metres away as part of a conspiracy because people would know

12 that you were doing it, that you were firing from that close.

13 A. Now I understand why you're asking me that, because the logic I

14 used was of tactical technical possibilities and the use of forces and

15 resources, but you're asking me about a completely different topic that I

16 really didn't focus on, whether Muslims had targeted themselves. That is

17 how the question was interpreted and that is how I'm interpreting it. So

18 now this mortar that was Muslim here, whether it fired at its own forces

19 and so on. Now, applying that logic of yours that you used to interpret

20 this --

21 Q. Just before you get started --

22 JUDGE KWON: Let him -- let him finish.

23 MS. EDGERTON: Oh --

24 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Galic.

25 MS. EDGERTON: Sorry. I just didn't want [sic] to avoid a

Page 37859

1 misunderstanding.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So if I understood it properly now,

3 what the point of your question is, all you -- although you didn't say

4 that that is it, but now I understand that that is it. Now that you're

5 asking me about that.

6 Certainly it is risky. At any rate, from both sides, but if one

7 runs such a great risk, then that variant is possible, with some

8 difficulty, but it is possible. But with such calibres, it isn't really

9 very convenient.

10 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence.

11 Q. My question was whether you would do it.

12 A. Madam Prosecutor, I would never order anyone to fire at civilians

13 regardless of whether they're my side, the other side. I'd never do

14 that.

15 Q. Okay. Now let's go back to my question. My question was: Would

16 you agree that you wouldn't fire at your own side from a distance of only

17 150 metres away as part of a conspiracy because people would know you

18 fired from that close. People would know it. Do you agree?

19 A. You're putting a hypothetical question to me, and it can be

20 answered in a variety of ways. One must bear in mind that there were

21 mobile mortars in the 1st Corps of the BH Army, so it would stop, fire,

22 and move on momentarily. However, it would have to be a large angle of

23 the mortar, I mean to fire at such close range, you see, because

24 45 degrees is the biggest range, and then it varies afterwards. So it's

25 the so-called upper group of angles and lower group of angles. I would

Page 37860

1 never do that. I repeat, and if necessary I'll repeat it ten more times,

2 I would never target my own civilians and, on the other hand, from this

3 close range, whether anybody knows whether people are involved in combat,

4 a game, a provocation, I mean I can only speculate.

5 Q. Under ordinary circumstances, you can hear a mortar being fired

6 150 metres away, can't you?

7 A. It's been a long time, you know. I mean -- well, yes, you can

8 hear it. That calibre, yes, you can hear it. Any other mortar calibre

9 would be heard at a 150-metre distance. It could be heard. Even

10 60 millimetre -- yes, at 150 metres it could be heard, that's for sure.

11 Q. So everybody would know if you had fired it from that close;

12 right?

13 A. Well, whether they would know or not know, it would be heard. So

14 those who hear know, and those who do not hear do not know. But we've

15 already said that what I said is important, that at that distance the

16 firing of a shell can be heard. So not when it falls on the target.

17 Because you asked me about the firing, didn't you? That's how I

18 understood it. This firing can be heard at 150 metres regardless of the

19 mortar calibre. That's for sure. Now, whether high-rise buildings may

20 affect this, to a certain degree, but not prevent anyone from hearing it.

21 However, also there's the problem of what is shooting from where and so

22 on and then you cannot distinguish at all what it is that is firing. For

23 instance, if you do not hear a shell being fired, then it is very

24 dangerous because it is certainly flying at you rather than flying above

25 your head or nearby. So much for the fortunes of war.

Page 37861

1 Q. But it was a cease-fire that day on the 1st of June, 1993. You

2 even said it in your testimony. At transcript page 37367.

3 A. Madam Prosecutor, I'm not changing my testimony because certainly

4 there was a cease-fire then. Now, whether from the side the BH Army

5 there was some firing and whether there was a response to that firing and

6 to what degree and so on, these are questions that would have to be

7 looked into once again as regards that day, but certainly there was a

8 cease-fire and that's what I said and if that is what was written in this

9 daily report, it must have been a daily combat report, my daily combat

10 report, I'm sure that's what you're talking about.

11 Q. So if something had been fired 150 metres away at a time of

12 cease-fire, everybody would have heard it. If a mortar had been fired

13 150 metres away during a time of cease-fire, everybody would have heard

14 it, wouldn't they have, General?

15 JUDGE MORRISON: The question has to be, I think, slightly

16 modified. Everyone who was in the vicinity would have heard it provided

17 they had been of relatively normal hearing and within a reasonable

18 distance. I mean, it can be heard at 150 metres according to the

19 General's evidence. That doesn't mean to say it can be heard at 300 or

20 400 or 500 metres, so there's going to be a relatively limited group of

21 people that will be able to hear it.

22 General, that must be the case.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Judge, sir, I'm the one who's

24 supposed to answer so I will say that you fully comprehended what should

25 be answered to this question and I'm so pleased that it is so. So

Page 37862

1 whoever was within this zone of 150 metres heard that or who was not

2 busy. However, if there were other firings, Judge, then you cannot

3 really distinguish from where a shell had been fired and whether it had

4 been fired because there are other sounds that are louder than the firing

5 of that mortar. You have to understand the war and then observation is

6 quite different. It's not simple. It's not that that is the only thing

7 that is happening. We know some of the things that were happening. So

8 as I said, this is your approach to the problem. I as corps commander

9 know some of the truth around Sarajevo, but I do not know everything.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I would

12 like to thank Judge Morrison for his intervention, because I was going to

13 stand up to say exactly the same. I would like a bit more fairness in

14 the way questions are asked, because if you quote passages of Mr. Galic's

15 testimony, you probably noticed that several people said that in

16 Sector Sarajevo we couldn't hear and distinguish between the noises

17 because of other surrounding noises. And trying to trap General Galic

18 with such questions when you know that military observers already

19 established that it was very difficult to establish this specific point

20 is not fair and this is the reason why I've stood up.

21 JUDGE KWON: As to the fairness of the question and conduct of

22 trial, you may leave it to the Chamber, rest assured.

23 Let's continue, Ms. Edgerton.

24 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

25 Q. I just want to ask you, General, now about the market-place

Page 37863

1 incident in February 1994. Could you tell us who told you that there

2 were 10 commissions that were unable to establish where the shell came

3 from? Because that's the evidence you gave at transcript page 37444.

4 A. No one told me about that. I read it in the newspapers, and I

5 know that several UNPROFOR commissions worked and here at my trial it was

6 stated that at least four or five commissions were operating. Now,

7 later, whether there were Muslim ones or, rather, of the 1st Corps of the

8 BH Army or whether it was just these commissions that dealt with it, I

9 did not receive any reports about that with regard to the

10 5th of February, 1994.

11 Q. And to go back to your evidence at transcript page 37445, you

12 said from the reports you read in respect of this incident, after

13 returning to the corps command you learned that a commission or somebody

14 was established to inspect the units. So, General, what reports did you

15 read after returning to corps command? And who wrote them?

16 A. Well, I don't know whether I had put it that way, that these were

17 reports or statements, or whether I put it some other way, but they made

18 me aware of what was happening then, and then I really did find out what

19 was happening in that area, because it was something that most had become

20 aware of that, myself included. I said that General Gvero was at the

21 airport and he asked for a joint commission to be set up and to explore

22 that. I just heard this, I was not there.

23 Q. Who did you hear it from, General?

24 A. Well, I think it was actually Gvero that I heard it from.

25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the end of the

Page 37864

1 answer.

2 MS. EDGERTON:

3 Q. And who was on the commission?

4 A. You did not understand me. This commission that was supposed to

5 be established was just a commission that was supposed to be established.

6 However, earlier on it had been defined that a joint military commission

7 should be established in such situations. Now, whether this would be at

8 the level of the Main Staff and the staff of the command of the BH Army,

9 the UNPROFOR command that would be headed by the UNPROFOR command for

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or whether perhaps a lower-ranking joint military

11 commission should be established that would be at the level of the

12 UNPROFOR Sarajevo Sector, then the 1st Corps of the BH Army and the

13 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. So they refused. Actually, the representative

14 of UNPROFOR then, as far as I've heard, the representative of UNPROFOR

15 and the representative of the BH Army refused. They said that this kind

16 of joint commission could not be established that would include Serbs

17 because they could not guarantee -- I haven't finished my thought yet.

18 They could not guarantee the safety of the work of this kind of

19 commission. Thank you.

20 Q. So when you said in your testimony that you learned that a

21 commission or somebody was established to inspect the units, that's

22 incorrect. Is that so?

23 A. No, no, no. That's a completely different matter. This needs to

24 be looked at separately.

25 If we recall the daily report of the 4th, that we discussed here

Page 37865

1 during the examination-in-chief of the 4th of February, 1994, in this

2 daily report it says that they found out from the media, et cetera,

3 et cetera, that some commission or whatever, they went to subordinate

4 units, they checked this and they established that fire had not been

5 opened, et cetera, et cetera. So then there was some other commission

6 there that toured the area because we had not had information yet, either

7 from UNPROFOR or from anyone else, from where it was assumed that it was

8 possible to fire at the Markale Market, because you have to understand

9 that the Markale Market is in the centre and that it's 3 or 4 kilometres

10 away from the external positions -- or, rather, the positions the

11 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. And now just to hit with one single shell that

12 area, that is almost impossible.

13 Q. General?

14 A. And also --

15 Q. Who was on the commission?

16 A. I don't know. They toured this -- I think there were some

17 representatives. We had a commission that had been established, Colonel

18 Kosovac headed it, headed that commission, and it would be established

19 for every incident. Now, whether he went then or whether some other

20 commission had been established, I cannot say, but they said that they

21 could not establish what had happened. Actually, I said and I was made

22 aware of this detail that they were reviewing the mortars and you could

23 also see the cap on the mortar barrel because there was snow at the time

24 and this was supposed to protect it from the snow, so it could not have

25 been fired if it was snowing. That's something I already said before the

Page 37866

1 Court.

2 Q. But who told you that?

3 A. At the corps command. That's what they told me when I came.

4 There was this general alert, frankly speaking. The representatives of

5 UNPROFOR were there, representatives of the Supreme Command and the

6 Presidency and so on. So everybody was already working on this case and

7 officers were already being made aware of what had happened and what had

8 not happened and so on, and then later on we know that there were

9 commissions of the United Nations that were working or, rather, of

10 UNPROFOR --

11 Q. I want to know, General --

12 A. -- not --

13 Q. -- one single person or the single person who told you about

14 seeing the cap on the mortar barrel because there was snow at the time.

15 Who told you that?

16 A. At the command. I cannot remember exactly who told me that in

17 that situation because there were a lot of problems then that had to be

18 resolved regarding that particular incident, because immediately after

19 that, different discussions negotiations followed and so on. Now whether

20 somebody told me at the corps command, I cannot tell you who it was that

21 told me. I'm just telling you who the person was who was supposed to

22 head these commissions and that was Colonel Kosovac. That is what I can

23 tell you. As for the rest, to remember who told me that then, I don't

24 know.

25 Q. Okay. So you -- you don't know who went to look at mortars. You

Page 37867

1 don't know who told you about the snow on the mortar. Do you know the

2 date that these people -- no. If I can actually just have a moment.

3 Okay. So, General, you don't know who went to review the

4 mortars; correct?

5 A. Well, some commission reviewed them. I don't know who was on the

6 commission, who led it, who commanded it, I don't know. I cannot

7 remember.

8 Q. You don't know who told you what they'd seen, because you've just

9 given that evidence; correct?

10 A. Well, I've told you already. I've been repeating the same thing

11 for a hundred times.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I told you I know the person who was supposed to be working

14 there. I was not at the command post then but I came later to the

15 command post. And now, this person who had been appointed, I mean, I

16 don't know what the Chief of Staff had ordered then. I did not go into

17 each and every detail so that I can tell you about it now, 20 years

18 later. I don't know. But I am telling you that some commission went

19 there and that is what the daily report says of the 4th and also the 5th,

20 that they went to check.

21 Now, who was on that commission, what they worked on, what they

22 did, where that report is, who was on that commission, I don't know. I

23 cannot remember. I knew it then, but I don't know now.

24 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment.

25 [Prosecution counsel confer]

Page 37868

1 MS. EDGERTON:

2 Q. Thank you, General. Now, we're going to go into one area, one

3 last large area for today, that you spent some time on in your testimony

4 in chief, and it's about the question of water for Sarajevo.

5 Dr. Karadzic, in your direct examination, asked you about the

6 water supply from Bistrica and Tilava and other mountain sources such as

7 Moscanica, and whether you ever prevented that kind of water supply from

8 such sources that did not require electricity, and your response, which

9 is at transcript page 37609, was that as far as you know, there was never

10 a manipulation in terms of water supply. There was never any abuse of

11 water supply in order to have someone sanctioned or punished by doing so.

12 It's impossible to stop the flow of water.

13 But, General, in fact, it was possible to stop the flow of water,

14 wasn't it, or at least to ensure it doesn't reach Bosnian-held Sarajevo,

15 because before and during your tour as commander that's exactly what

16 happened. Isn't that the case?

17 A. I don't know what you're asking me, to what extent. You have

18 better information than I do as far as water goes. In principle, I said

19 that is true, that water had not been abused as such, because from

20 Moscanica, Tilava, whatever, I don't know what was done. If that water

21 had been stopped anywhere then -- well, that's mountain water so there

22 would have to be a dam there that would break. I don't know what would

23 have happened to us and the entire 1st Corps of the BH Army and Sarajevo.

24 However, as far as I know, this water had not been abused for any kind of

25 shortage because it takes this natural course from the source that was

Page 37869

1 then in the zone of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and it was supposed to go

2 into the area of the 1st Corps of the BH Army. That is what I know. I

3 know that this water was supplied regularly and that we in Lukavica from

4 time to time did not have water although it passed by us. So we can

5 interpret all of this differently, what happened.

6 I don't know that water supply was obstructed in any way. If you

7 have some information, tell us.

8 Q. So -- well, your answer to Dr. Karadzic was that as far as you

9 know, there was never a manipulation in terms of water supply, and now

10 you're saying you actually don't know. Is that the case?

11 A. As far as I know, that's what I said. As far as I know, that's

12 what I said then, that there was no manipulation of water during the war.

13 I repeat again, as far as I know. That's what I said a moment ago too.

14 I know quite a bit but I don't know everything. Now, whether somebody

15 manipulated it, I think that that is virtually impossible. Well, perhaps

16 you can prove to me that it was possible.

17 Q. Well, I have a document here I'd like you to have a look at it,

18 actually. It's 65 ter number 24495, and it's a report on war operations

19 and their consequences for the work of the Sarajevo water supply and

20 sewage disposal systems from April 1992 to October 1995. And I just want

21 to take you to a period even before your service as Sarajevo-Romanija

22 Corps commander.

23 MS. EDGERTON: It's English page 28 and B/C/S page 20. And in

24 the B/C/S it's the --

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be advised of the origin

Page 37870

1 of the document and the time or the date when it was issued?

2 MS. EDGERTON: If we can go back to the first page of the

3 document, and then over to the introduction, which is on page 5 in

4 English, the introduction explains that this is a compilation of

5 contemporaneous reports on the operation of the water supply and sewage

6 disposal system from 1992 right through until 1995. If Dr. Karadzic

7 would like information about the date that it was issued, I would have to

8 check into that and get back to Dr. Karadzic tomorrow. And if

9 Dr. Karadzic objects to using this document now, we can deal with it

10 tomorrow as well.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance. On

12 page 99, in the contents it reads, "signatures by the members of the

13 working group," but that page, together with 20 others, is missing. If

14 we look at page 3 of the contents and one page -- or, rather, one bullet

15 point but last points to the fact that members of the working group

16 signed the document. However, there are a total of 20 pages missing in

17 the document.

18 MS. EDGERTON: I think we have a pretty large translation problem

19 which I'll deal with by the time we come back tomorrow. And thank you to

20 Dr. Karadzic for pointing that out.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

22 MS. EDGERTON:

23 Q. Still on the same subject, though, and in relation to

24 Exhibit D3479, and we can have a look at that, it's a Sarajevo-Romanija

25 Corps daily combat report dated 26 November 1992.

Page 37871

1 A. Can the report please be zoomed in.

2 Q. Thank you. You had a look at this document and said that --

3 pointed out that it reported the Blazuj transformer station was hit by a

4 120-millimetre mortar shell which had been fired by the Army of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that 4 tonnes of transformer oil leaked, and then

6 you seem to suggest that when the transformer was hit by a shell, it

7 stopped it from functioning and supplying electricity to the city of

8 Sarajevo. But, General, I'd like you to have a look at this document

9 again, and the relevant paragraph is paragraph 1. It's the fourth

10 paragraph down from the top.

11 The document actually doesn't say that the transformer stopped

12 working, does it? That was your own conclusion; right?

13 A. Madam, if 4 tonnes of oil leak from the transformer, it can be

14 ignited, but it cannot work, as far as I understand electronics. If you

15 think it can -- I don't think it can.

16 MS. EDGERTON: Apologies to everyone. The question related to

17 this -- was drawn from the document where we had a translation issue.

18 I'll just simply move on.

19 Q. I'm sorry if I've confused you, General.

20 And finally, General, if we could have a look at D3481, and

21 that's your daily combat report dated 19 June 1993, and it says at

22 point 1, paragraph 1:

23 "The enemy attacked elements of our combat disposition and fired

24 two 82-millimetre shells and rifle grenades on the cargo gate and the

25 power line near Pretis and the power line was damaged and Pretis couldn't

Page 37872

1 work due to the power outage."

2 Now, General, you said about this that this power line runs

3 parallel to the front line and enters Vogosca and then continues toward

4 the centre of Sarajevo, and -- but you didn't have a map to be able to

5 say where those power lines ran. And you were sure that they go to the

6 city centre because one line ran from Hadzici and another from Vogosca

7 and one part from Pale down to the old city.

8 Now, again, this document actually doesn't specify whether this

9 was a power line connecting Pretis to the electricity supply or to the

10 main power line at that feeds the part of central Sarajevo, does it? It

11 doesn't say anything about that.

12 A. Madam Prosecutor, this would be a question for an expert. An

13 expert would look at things differently. I'm a soldier. I know about

14 this as much as I had to know about this. I remember when -- where

15 transformer lines went, and if the transformer is damaged in the

16 direction of Vogosca or Pretis, I'm sure that Pretis couldn't work

17 because there was no electricity supply. And when I spoke about various

18 directions, I told you that I remembered that line followed the River

19 Bosna in the direction of Vogosca and from there it forked off towards

20 Hotonj or perhaps it went directly through to the -- to the other part,

21 but I don't know exactly. It went in the direction of the centre because

22 there was not just one single direction of electricity supply for

23 Sarajevo. There were several directions, several sources, the network

24 was the same but one direction was from Visegrad and another one was from

25 Jablanica and Konjica across Mount Igman, and I don't know other thermal

Page 37873

1 power plants supplied Sarajevo. I'm not an expert. Please do not ask me

2 too much about electricity supply because the answers you're going to get

3 from me will leave a lot to be desired.

4 Q. I was just asking, General, because you had answered Dr. Karadzic

5 about that. So now, based on what you've said now, I'm curious. Based

6 on your answer, then, it looks like you actually have no idea whether the

7 power outage at Pretis had anything to do with the electrical situation

8 in Sarajevo, do you?

9 A. I can only assume. When a network is supplied, it is supplied

10 from several directions. How much influence did the Vogosca direction

11 have on Sarajevo? We can only assume. Maybe the power pressure was

12 reduced or limited for a period of time. You have to understand that we

13 are talking about a network. We are not talking about just one line, and

14 that line was interrupted. And as soon as a contact is established in

15 the network, that means that the network is supplied from various

16 sources. This is the way I see things. Maybe I'm not right. I'm not an

17 expert. If you think differently, please tell me so.

18 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I could begin a new area, but it

19 would I'm sure take longer than the time we have -- ah, no. Sorry,

20 Your Honours. I'm off my stride again. I thought we were -- I didn't

21 realise we had some time to conclude this afternoon. Apologies.

22 JUDGE KWON: No, not at all. After such a long break, today has

23 been a long day for everybody.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was long, yes. Too long for my

25 spine, Mr. President.

Page 37874

1 JUDGE KWON: Do you need a break, General?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm a general. I'll survive.

3 Thank you very much.

4 MS. EDGERTON:

5 Q. General, in fact, the supply of not only electricity, water, but

6 also gas to the city was manipulated, and it was in part controlled

7 through your forces. That's the case, isn't it?

8 A. There was no manipulation, as far as I know. If you know

9 something, please tell me. I can explain whether any manipulation was

10 possible. I said on examination-in-chief that Mr. Krajisnik and

11 Mr. Muratovic were involved in that, and they also discussed the postal

12 matter. That was another problem. That problem was never discussed,

13 actually, and all postal or mail networks leading to the

14 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were interrupted and all that remained was within

15 the sector of the 2nd Corps of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mr. Magnusson, who

16 attended the first round of talks, if you remember, and later on I heard

17 a statement of his, said that the Serbian side was co-operative in that

18 respect and that we always allowed the flow of the bare necessities for

19 the population as much as we could. Again there was war. There was

20 damage to the mains. A shell fell and mains got -- were shattered, so

21 the water could not flow through the pipe. It flew outside of the pipe.

22 That's the way you have to see things. Or if, for example, if a shell

23 fell on the transformer line, the electricity supply was interrupted

24 along that line.

25 Gas could not be stopped because it -- that would result in an

Page 37875

1 explosion. I don't know what kind of fool would have interrupted the

2 supply of gas. I don't know where you would have to go, to what source

3 to interrupt the supply of gas.

4 There were huge amounts of gas being used by both sides. Even

5 trenches were heated by gas through the war.

6 Q. General, the supply of these things was manipulated at times of

7 political expediency, and I'm going to show you a document. It's P4802,

8 and it's a record made by the Croatian authorities of an intercepted

9 conversation between Dr. Karadzic and a Colonel from the VRS Main Staff

10 which is written here as Milic --

11 A. [Overlapping speakers] I apologise. I can't see the text. I has

12 to be blown up. I need to be able to read it to be able to comment upon

13 it. Now it's okay. Thank you.

14 Q. Now, this is dated 10 August 1993, and, General, that is the eve

15 of the cease-fire that -- the military cease-fire for Bosnia-Herzegovina

16 that was signed by the warring factions. And in this conversation, which

17 takes place at 7.05, just under halfway down the page, Dr. Karadzic

18 orders that Sarajevo is to be given electricity, water, and gas, and says

19 that Serbs are the winners, whereas Alija is a loser who has no chance to

20 threaten them unless the Serbs make a mistake.

21 So, General, this conversation has Dr. Karadzic ordering a member

22 of your Main Staff with the restoration of the electricity, water, and

23 gas to the city of Sarajevo at a time when it was politically expedient,

24 doesn't it?

25 A. Madam Prosecutor, I am not aware of any such thing. I've not

Page 37876

1 seen this document before. However, if this order was issued, it was

2 impossible to carry out. If the gas was interrupted in the direction of

3 the Muslim side, the same would happen to my side. If I stop the

4 electricity, I stop it for myself, for my side as well. And the same

5 applied to water.

6 I really don't know how this could be drafted. Obviously I am

7 not aware of all the technicalities regarding electricity, water, and the

8 mail. I suppose that the president was like that as well. If these are

9 his words, I don't want to interpret them, but I don't believe that he

10 issued an order to that effect. This may be manipulation. I wouldn't be

11 able to comment. I can only share my observations like I've already had

12 on so many occasions, and I've told you what the position of the

13 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was. I don't know if anybody wanted to

14 manipulate, whether there were manipulations unbeknownst to me, whether

15 people wanted things to be different. I don't know. In any case,

16 whatever was going on, it was unbeknownst to me.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance? I would

18 like to say that the General may have been misled by the fact that it was

19 his Main Staff, but it was not his Main Staff. It was not one of his

20 subordinates that I had spoken to. It was somebody else.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I would like to say

22 something about that if I may. It says here that from the Main Staff of

23 the Army of Republika Srpska, which means that it is very clear that this

24 is not my staff. Whether the order arrived at my staff or not, I don't

25 know. I cannot comment upon this because I have not seen it. I don't

Page 37877

1 know what kind of order that is.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may. On line 21,

3 Madam Edgerton said "your Main Staff" so that may have misled the witness

4 into believing that that was the staff of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

5 MS. EDGERTON:

6 Q. So it's your position, General, that political reasons and

7 political expedience had no effect on the supply of utilities to

8 Sarajevo. Is that the case?

9 A. Well, according to the laws of electronics and physics, this is

10 not easy to implement. In order to apply political manipulations on such

11 a situation. You can see what the front line was like. Where the water

12 and electricity went, if you punish one side you punish the other side as

13 well. I don't know is it the case that President Karadzic punished the

14 Serbs with depriving them of electricity and water? In my view he would

15 never have done that. I know him as much. I don't know why he would

16 have punished his own people with robbing them of electricity and water.

17 This is not within my purview. It was not up to me to know that. And I

18 don't know how my interpretation would help you. I shared with you all I

19 know. I don't know anything else, Madam Prosecutor. If there is

20 anything else that you think I might know, I will gladly answer your

21 questions.

22 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have a look please at 65 ter number

23 25000. And it's a letter from the city Assembly of the Serbian city of

24 Sarajevo, dated 27 September, 1994, and it's addressed to Dr. Karadzic

25 and Mr. Krajisnik, the president of the National Assembly, and the

Page 37878

1 president -- the prime minister of the Republika Srpska.

2 Now, if we can go over to point 9, which is on English pages 4

3 and 5 and B/C/S page 4, it says:

4 "In the most recent using of Sarajevo for the purpose of raising

5 and lowering tensions in the whole of former Bosnia and Herzegovina (the

6 cutting off of" - if you can go to the next page in English -

7 "electricity, water and gas), about 40.000 households in Serbian Sarajevo

8 have suffered considerable financial damage."

9 And further, it says that:

10 "The Assembly believes that such activities should be carried out

11 with prior consulting and informing of the political organs of the

12 municipalities and the city ..."

13 Now, General, you just said that you didn't see, you didn't know,

14 why Dr. Karadzic might have punished his own people by depriving them of

15 electricity and water, and this document, General, confirms that that's

16 exactly what happened, isn't it? This document sets out clearly that

17 Dr. Karadzic's own people were deprived of utilities at the same time

18 that people in Bosnian-held Sarajevo were deprived. Isn't that the case?

19 A. Could you please show me who signed that document?

20 Q. Dr. Professor Vojislav Maksimovic, president of the Assembly of

21 Serb Sarajevo signed the document, General.

22 A. Well, I did not have such information. I didn't know that

23 anybody would manipulate with that. I thought that if we didn't have

24 electricity or water there were problems elsewhere. I never thought that

25 somebody would have ordered the utilities to be cut off. I can't tell

Page 37879

1 you anything else. I really did not have information to the effect that

2 somebody was manipulating the situation. Nobody ever issued me an order

3 to cut off electricity or water. That would have been -- well, this is

4 precisely a confirmation of what I have just told you. If you cut off

5 utilities for one people, you do it for the other, the others as well,

6 and it's a huge punishment. This is all I can say. If this is the way

7 to manipulate the situation, then this manipulation is bad, because both

8 sides suffered, both the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the BiH Army, and --

9 and the people who suffered the most were civilians, on both sides. I

10 really can't believe that manipulation of that sort was carried out.

11 This may have happened due to this mire [phoen] or because of

12 some interruptions towards the source, but for somebody to issue an order

13 to that effect, to manipulate with utilities, I can only you that I've

14 never heard that from anybody. You are the first one who is saying that

15 those were manipulations. I thought that if there was to electricity or

16 water for a certain time, there was a problem somewhere. A commission

17 would come to see where the problem lies, and the situation would be

18 resolved after that. And it was a different issue as to how long the

19 whole situation would last, and it would also depend on the dynamics of

20 combat activities.

21 Did I say enough about this document? Is there anything else you

22 would like to ask me about this document? I don't see what else I could

23 add to what I've already said.

24 Q. No, thank you.

25 MS. EDGERTON: Could I have this document as a Prosecution