131114ED

Page 43466

1 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

2 Mr. Kupresanin, as you have noted, your evidence-in-chief in this

3 case has been admitted in writing, that is through your written

4 statement, instead of your oral testimony. Now you will be

5 cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor. Do

6 you understand that?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

9 MR. TIEGER: Just before I commence, Mr. President, just one

10 housekeeping matter, perhaps of several that arise from the Court's

11 observations about the exhibits and the statement. So, for example,

12 paragraph 11 is a commentary on a document that we haven't seen, that

13 nobody knows anything about because it's not the document referenced in

14 the paragraph. Barring anything else, I presume that paragraph would

15 then have to come out and that may be true for other sections of the

16 statement in which documents -- well, I think -- certainly wouldn't be

17 the case as far as I can tell for documents that are insufficiently

18 commented on. That's a different matter.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will bear that in mind in reading the

21 document.

22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

23 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

24 Q. Mr. Kupresanin, I understand that although this is the first time

25 you've testified before this Tribunal, that in fact you were interviewed

Page 43467

1 by representatives of the Tribunal, specifically representatives of the

2 Prosecutor's office, on the 16th of July 2001; correct?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. And am I correct that it's your position that at that time, you

5 attempted to be as honest and truthful with the -- in giving your answers

6 as you could be?

7 A. I tried to tell the truth. Things that I was sure were true,

8 I tried to tell them as I knew them.

9 Q. Let me turn to your statement before the Court today, the

10 statement that you gave to the Karadzic team. Many of the paragraphs in

11 that statement deal with the two successive regional bodies in the

12 Krajina, the ZOBK and then the ARK, the Autonomous Region of Krajina.

13 Now, the purpose of the region, that is the region of Krajina, was to

14 eliminate a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct? That is to destroy what

15 was sometimes referred to as Alija's state; correct?

16 A. We turned out at the elections of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

17 automatically we recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina. We chose to live in a

18 democracy and for those three peoples.

19 Q. Excuse me, let me -- let me lay out some quick ground rules for

20 you. I'd like you to tend to the question I ask, and I'd like you to

21 only answer the question I asked rather than expound in a manner that you

22 see fit. So in this case, I'm focusing on the task or purpose of the

23 Autonomous Region of Krajina.

24 A. Please repeat.

25 Q. It's correct that the purpose of the region, that is the region

Page 43468

1 of Krajina, was to destroy what was sometimes referred to as Alija's

2 state?

3 A. That's not true. The purpose was the economic assertion,

4 self-assertion of Krajina.

5 Q. Well, you say that's not true today, but, in fact, that's

6 precisely what you told the members of the Bosnian Serb Assembly at the

7 20th session held on the 14th and 15th of September, 1992. And we have

8 that in evidence. That's D456. And what you said at English pages 70

9 and B/C/S page 76 is the following:

10 "Last year, we built up the region and made it strong with the

11 clear purpose and goal, the task of the region of Krajina was to destroy

12 Alija's state."

13 That's what you were saying in 1992, at the time, correct,

14 Mr. Kupresanin?

15 A. I don't remember that. But the region, as time went on, acquired

16 political elements when there were turmoil in the assembly of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina and when the declaration of the Muslim and Croat sides

18 was proclaimed, which practically excluded the Serbian people from the

19 assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that context those words could have

20 been said.

21 Q. In fact, Mr. Kupresanin, ensuring that a unitary Bosnia and

22 Herzegovina ceased to exist was considered a holy mission, wasn't it?

23 A. Well, I think that Bosnia and Herzegovina should have never been

24 a unitary state, not that it should have been centralised to such an

25 extent that we Serbs were excluded from that state. The ordinary people

Page 43469

1 would never accept such conduct on the part of the assembly of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3 Q. And, therefore, Mr. Kupresanin, it was your position that

4 ensuring that Bosnia and Herzegovina ceased to exist was a holy mission,

5 wasn't it?

6 A. No. That's not it. I probably said that Bosnia-Herzegovina

7 could not exist as a unitary state or a state of Muslims and Croats.

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina must be a state of three constituent peoples. We were

9 equal and we were persistent about that.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't like to intervene but the

13 follow-up questions of Mr. Tieger are conditioned by the omissions in the

14 transcript. In lines 5 and 6, said that the Serbian people were being

15 excluded as or eliminated as a constituent people, excluded from the

16 republic. Not just as a people.

17 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Do you confirm having said that,

18 Mr. Kupresanin?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember now. I don't

20 remember.

21 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then could you please ask what he

23 said now, not what he said back then?

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it does not harm the context. We can

25 continue.

Page 43470

1 MR. TIEGER: 65 ter 32152, please. And if we could go to English

2 page 13 and B/C/S page 9 to see who is speaking first.

3 Q. This is an excerpt from the extended session held on the

4 14th of February, 1992, Mr. Kupresanin, a very large plenary, and this is

5 a recording of your comments beginning at page 13 in the English, page 9

6 of the B/C/S, and concluding at page 15 of the English and page 11 of the

7 B/C/S, where you say:

8 "I personally propose that you suggest to the president of the

9 party and to all our Serbian deputies to make sure that the Serbian

10 police are included in the Serbian constitution. The moment we establish

11 the Serbian police, Bosnia and Herzegovina will cease to exist, and that

12 is our holy mission."

13 JUDGE KWON: Are we on correct page?

14 MR. TIEGER: We are still on the first page. I asked to go to

15 page 15 which is the end. I didn't realise we hadn't made that

16 transition. Page 15 of the English, page 13 of the B/C/S -- or page 11

17 of the B/C/S, excuse me.

18 Q. So that was your position on the 14th of February, 1992,

19 Mr. Kupresanin, that ensuring that Bosnia and Herzegovina ceased to exist

20 was a holy mission; right?

21 A. The holy mission was that the Serbian people had to be equal in

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. There should be no outvoting of the Serbian people.

23 The Serbian people had to be a constituent people with all the elements

24 and rights which any other people in Europe has in any other democratic

25 country. Because the Serbian people was having less and less of that in

Page 43471

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, then we began to form our political positions. One

2 of them was to constitute the assembly of Republika Srpska, and then the

3 government, the constitution, and everything else followed.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kupresanin. Please try to answer the question.

5 You answered it and then you started to tell us what followed. I'm

6 asking you not to make dissertations, just to focus on the question. In

7 fact, Mr. Kupresanin, you stated, to applause at that session, that the

8 goal was to finally live in one country and not have Serb territories

9 divided. And that's found on the previous page of both documents, both

10 the English and B/C/S documents.

11 A. Can you please repeat the question? Because I haven't

12 understood. What did I say?

13 Q. Yeah, you said at 1992 that the holy mission was destroying

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the goal was for the Serbian people to finally

15 live in one country; right?

16 A. Well, any conscious people or an individual within a people has a

17 tendency for the people to live in one country. Germany caused two world

18 wars, and in spite of 100 million victims, in 1998, the Germans were

19 allowed -- or rather in 1989, the Germans were allowed to live in one

20 country. And in both world wars we were on the side of the allies. We

21 are the only people in Europe who is forbidden to live in one state. So

22 what is bad about that? I'm thinking to this day, and I tend and wish

23 for my people to live in one Serbian country, and that is my democratic

24 right. Any tendency of an individual to such a goal is the holy mission

25 of any individual, and this is something I'm not going to deny. I still

Page 43472

1 want the Serbian people to have one single Serbian state in the Balkans,

2 and I think that we deserve this because we participated on the side

3 of --

4 Q. Thank you, sir [Microphone not activated]

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

6 MR. TIEGER: I tender the document, Mr. President.

7 JUDGE KWON: We will receive these pages.

8 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, in this case could we receive the

9 whole document? He speaks again at the end, and I think it's better to

10 have the whole document in for context.

11 JUDGE KWON: We will admit these pages and, if necessary, deal

12 with those pages.

13 MR. TIEGER:

14 Q. Mr. Kupresanin --

15 JUDGE KWON: Shall we give the number.

16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P6509.

17 MR. TIEGER:

18 Q. And, Mr. Kupresanin, you were aware that the Bosnian Serb

19 leadership, the republic level and particularly Mr. Karadzic, backed and

20 were behind regionalisation; correct?

21 A. In case of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, Radovan Karadzic was

22 not to be found even in traces. Whatever happened about the region had

23 to do with the MPs who were from the region and municipal deputies. I'm

24 not aware of Radovan Karadzic having participated in any way. I know

25 that the constitutive session was held in Celinac. There were several

Page 43473

1 people who were candidates. It never occurred to me that I might be the

2 president. Because after a heart attack I had come from a hospital, and

3 --

4 Q. We will get to all that information in a second. In fact,

5 Mr. Kupresanin, Mr. Karadzic bragged to you about his role in

6 regionalisation, didn't he, in telephone conversations with you both

7 before and after the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Krajina?

8 A. I don't remember such bragging. I don't think it happened. I

9 don't remember that at all. Before Krajina, we never discussed this

10 issue. After its establishment, I doubt that we did. I can't remember.

11 Q. Did you read the documents which are associated with your

12 statement; for example, D1084 cited in paragraph 30, or D424 cited in

13 paragraph 29? Or were those just appended to the statement by someone

14 else?

15 A. I didn't read them. I don't read them here now. I don't know

16 whether I read them or not. You asked me a specific question and I gave

17 you a specific answer. Now, I don't know whether you expect something

18 further from me.

19 Q. Well, let's take a look at those two documents which are

20 specifically referenced in your statement. First of all, D1084, which is

21 an intercept, intercepted telephone conversation, between you and

22 Dr. Karadzic on the 23rd of July, 1991. The transcript says D. It's

23 P1084. Now, just to refresh your memory about that, there is a

24 discussion about the possible -- somebody raising the possibility of a

25 referendum about Krajina to which Dr. Karadzic responds, Are they fucking

Page 43474

1 nuts? And you say, So, what do you suggest for us to do? And the

2 conversation continues. Dr. Karadzic tells you why that wouldn't be a

3 good idea, including the fact that it would be a mistake for negotiations

4 because they have even prepared complete documentation to show

5 John Major?

6 JUDGE KWON: Are we on correct page?

7 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. That would be page 3 of P1084, in the

8 English, Mr. President.

9 JUDGE KWON: And B/C/S.

10 MR. TIGER: And B/C/S.

11 Q. They prepared documentation with all the evidence that the Serbs

12 are creating the Greater Serbia. And now you are playing right into

13 their hands as if they are paying you. Fuck, man. And then he continues

14 at the bottom of that page, and then continues on to the next page, These

15 are some fools who show up making premature steps. That will happen,

16 Vojo, but they have to be - "they" meaning the Muslims - have to be

17 responsible for that. They have to make a mistake. They will definitely

18 make a mistake. We know that. And so you ask, Shall I call you

19 tomorrow?

20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters into B/C/S did not find the

21 relevant passage and could not quote the original words of the witness.

22 MR. TIEGER: Okay, it's on page --

23 JUDGE KWON: With that speed interpreters

24 cannot [overlapping speakers]...

25 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Mr. President. That's page 4 of the B/C/S.

Page 43475

1 They have to make a mistake. They will definitely make a mistake. We

2 know that. And then Dr. Karadzic continues in the middle of the page in

3 English and a little further on in B/C/S, What the fuck else am I

4 supposed to do? Who created that fucking regionalisation? Then he goes

5 on at the bottom of the page in English to talk about how he views the

6 appropriate way to be a certain winner by not keeping your plans on your

7 forehead and playing into other people's hands.

8 Q. Now, that's what he told you in July of 1991, Mr. Kupresanin.

9 Why don't we look at what he said to you in February of 1992, after the

10 formation of the Autonomous Region of Krajina and that's D424, also

11 explicitly referenced in your statement.

12 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, it seems like the witness ought to

13 be given a chance to answer some question, otherwise Mr. Tieger is just

14 making some kind of closing argument.

15 MR. TIEGER: Well, I am responding to the witness's -- I'm

16 presenting the witness with evidence in response to his assertion that he

17 never discussed regionalisation with the accused before --

18 JUDGE KWON: Let the witness read the document and then why don't

19 you ask a question.

20 Do you follow the intercept? Did you read the parts read out to

21 you?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm trying, but it doesn't really

23 seem to work.

24 THE ACCUSED: Should witness be given the hard copy?

25 JUDGE KWON: I don't see any difficulty with it.

Page 43476

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What am I supposed to read?

2 MR. TIEGER:

3 Q. I don't care what you read, Mr. Kupresanin. I recited to you

4 some of the pertinent portions of this document and certainly sufficient

5 portions to ask you the question: Isn't it true that it is -- let me put

6 it this way: It is incorrect, it is not true, that you did not discuss

7 regionalisation with Dr. Karadzic, as you just testified to?

8 A. I don't remember that Radovan Karadzic and I discussed the issue

9 of the regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at any given time. I just

10 know that all of Europe is divided into regions. It has 10.000 regions.

11 We wanted to be like Europe. We wanted to copy Europe. And all the time

12 we were saying Yugoslavia should join the Europe. Europe is being

13 regionalised. We wanted to copy that, so where is the sin there? If we

14 had regions it wouldn't mean that we wanted to topple Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15 They would strengthen it economically in the first place.

16 Q. Let's stick on the topic. I'm not asking for your justifications

17 of regionalisation. I'm asking you about this: So now that you say you

18 don't remember that you and Dr. Karadzic discussed regionalisation at any

19 given time, can you explain to me how it is that your statement

20 explicitly references this conversation and incorporates it?

21 JUDGE KWON: Let's do it in this way.

22 Mr. Kupresanin, do you have your statement with you now? Your

23 statement.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 23rd of July, 1991, how come that

25 it's the 23rd of July when Krajina was formed on the 24th of June? It's

Page 43477

1 possible that this conversation took place after the constitution of the

2 assembly of the autonomous region, because it was on the

3 24th of April, 1991, that we constituted the assembly of Krajina. So the

4 region came into being at certain point, and this conversation was

5 conducted after it came into being and not before that, as far as I can

6 notice.

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kupresanin, do you remember that telephone

8 conversation with Mr. Karadzic?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, no. I don't remember at

10 all.

11 JUDGE KWON: Do you have your statement with you now, witness

12 statement that Mr. Karadzic tendered? We will print out for you. We can

13 upload his statement. Paragraph 13.

14 THE ACCUSED: If I may, Excellency --

15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Do you see the paragraph 13 of your

16 statement? I will read out for you, "I have been shown document" --

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see it, I can see it, I can

18 see it, I can see it, and I'm reading it now. Please don't help me. I'm

19 going to do it by myself. I understand this perfectly.

20 JUDGE KWON: The telephone conversation referred to in this

21 paragraph 13, i.e. P1084, is what you have now with you now. Just a

22 minute ago you said to us you don't remember that telephone conversation.

23 So how can you comment on this telephone conversation while you do not

24 remember?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps the telephone conversation

Page 43478

1 did take place, but I cannot confirm that 100 per cent. I remember the

2 topic of this conversation. I know what it was about, and I know that

3 Mr. Karadzic, when it comes to this unification of the autonomous regions

4 of Krajina, Radovan Karadzic did not participate in this process in any

5 way whatsoever. It was the result of work of the MPs from the

6 Autonomous Regions of Krajina. Actually, he did not want to approve of

7 this activity of ours, saying that we simply had to apply in practice the

8 positions of the Main Board of the Serbian Democratic Party, and

9 sometimes we did something that was not in accordance with it, not all of

10 us, but as far as I can see from this document, the majority.

11 JUDGE KWON: Back to you, Mr. Tieger.

12 THE ACCUSED: May I give an explanation?

13 JUDGE KWON: No. You can deal with it in your re-examination.

14 THE ACCUSED: It concerns an inaccuracy of the question. It's a

15 big confusion.

16 MR. TIEGER: I'm not hearing any objection to the questions when

17 they are asked and the witness has answered, and to traverse back to the

18 colloquy seems to be counter-productive.

19 JUDGE KWON: Please discuss it or deal with it in your

20 re-examination, Mr. Karadzic. In the meantime, we'll continue.

21 MR. TIEGER:

22 Q. And when it came time for the Autonomous Region of Krajina to be

23 established in September of 1991, you mentioned that establishment in

24 paragraph 16 of your statement, it happened that despite initiatives to

25 do that earlier, those hadn't passed, and then all of a sudden it

Page 43479

1 happened that it was allowed to establish. It was allowed to establish

2 such a region, right, Mr. Kupresanin?

3 A. The constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed us to constitute

4 the region. Article 4 of the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed

5 for the regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on various bases, the

6 economic basis, the closeness of territories, and so on. The

7 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed us to do that. So there was

8 no legal vacuum in that respect. We were not doing anything wrong. We

9 were doing this in accordance with the constitution.

10 Q. Well, that wasn't quite the question. Let me try it this way,

11 Mr. Kupresanin. This Trial Chamber has received that on the 6th of

12 September, Dr. Karadzic said to Slobodan Milosevic that the next day he

13 was having a big plenary "with all my officials." And that's P2544. And

14 the next day, as we know from P2530, the Pale symposium of municipal,

15 regional and republic SDS organs was held, and that resulted in decisions

16 and conclusions about regional organisation. And at that meeting, as we

17 know from the words of a Main Board member or in the words of a

18 Main Board member, which is reflected in P2545, "We passed a decision

19 yesterday...," and this was a conversation this Main Board member was

20 having on September 8, so he's referring back to September 7:

21 "We passed a decision yesterday that Bosnia can remain officially

22 but we'll split it into Serbian Bosnia, Croat Bosnia and Muslim Bosnia."

23 So those were the steps taken by the republic level authorities

24 to advance regionalisation, correct, Mr. Kupresanin?

25 A. I don't remember that at all. I just know that the constitution

Page 43480

1 of Bosnia-Herzegovina allows for regionalisation, that it was no sin and

2 it was no conflict with the law or the constitution, that people were

3 allowed to join a region and establish it. And as for Radovan Karadzic,

4 Slobodan Milosevic, instructions, I don't remember that at all, or that

5 it happened, or that it was some kind of strategy, really, political or

6 otherwise. But according to the law, it was possible to establish

7 regions and why would we hold it against people if they wanted it and

8 could do it?

9 Q. And from your point of view, back in 2001, reflecting back on

10 what happened in 1991 and 1992, all of a sudden it happened that it was

11 allowed for the Krajina officials to establish the region; right? And

12 you said that in your interview, which is 65 ter 25608, at page 15 of the

13 English and page 20 of the B/C/S.

14 A. I don't have page 20 here. I don't see it. There is page 17 and

15 that's it.

16 MR. TIEGER: 65 ter 25608, page 15 of the English, page 20 of the

17 B/C/S, please.

18 Q. It's line 20 through 22 for your benefit, sir. And lines 36

19 through 37 in the English. That's what you explained some 12 years ago

20 when these events were fresh in your mind; right?

21 A. This is so vaguely written that I can't understand it. Nothing

22 is really said here. What was possible, what was not, what people were

23 allowed to, it was well known what people could do and what was allowed,

24 what we could do and what was allowed we did that. We did not threaten

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We did not violate the constitution. So I don't see

Page 43481

1 what was bad about this and this is very sloppily written.

2 Q. It may be sloppily written but it reflects your verbatim words at

3 the time, sir.

4 MR. TIEGER: I tender that portion, Mr. President.

5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Could you read out from line 20 to

6 22, your answer. Could you read out aloud?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "There were earlier initiatives to

8 organise a region in this area, but it was not upheld. And suddenly it

9 so happened that it was allowed to establish a region. Probably we need

10 the critical mass for such a project like that and probably --

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will admit this page.

12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6510, Your Honours.

13 MR. TIEGER:

14 Q. Mr. Kupresanin, you assert in your statement at paragraphs 29,

15 33, 34, that one of the issues that you claim reflected the

16 insubordination or independence of autonomous region of Krajina figures

17 was the push for unification with the Krajina, with the Croatian Krajina,

18 Knin Krajina, and you state that you were the one who prevented that.

19 And again that's found at paragraphs -- the latter assertion is found at

20 paragraphs 33 and 34.

21 A. No. I advocated the unification of the two Krajinas. I did.

22 And the other side, the Serbian Democratic Party and Radovan Karadzic,

23 didn't. We announced the declaration on the 28th of June, 1991, which

24 said the Republic of Serbian Krajina will join the remaining part of

25 Yugoslavia. So, for the Serbs, it was somewhat acceptable that the

Page 43482

1 Republic of Serbian Krajina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia

2 should be in one state, a smaller state, where Serbs and Muslims would

3 live together as the two dominant ethnic groups.

4 That was our political platform, our political will, and this

5 Grahovo declaration never really took off the ground. And what happened

6 happened. Serbs have been expelled from Croatia and it turns out that

7 that was better than --

8 Q. Okay. Let's focus on the questions at hand. So do you -- do

9 I understand then that you recant the statement that you endorsed no more

10 than a half hour ago, I think, at paragraphs 33 and 34 where you say

11 you -- I managed to prevent the separatist option. That's 33 and

12 paragraph 34 at the session. I managed to prevent the option of the

13 Krajina separatists from being accepted. Because in your statement you

14 take credit for preventing the option that you now say you advocated.

15 A. Well, I did not sign this decision. I didn't sign it because the

16 majority, mostly from the Serbian Democratic Party, were against it,

17 including President Karadzic himself, because they were saying the time

18 was not yet ripe for this. And time passed, we never did it, precisely

19 at the initiative of the President of Republika Srpska and the Main Board

20 of the Serbian Democratic Party. It was our great wish to unite with the

21 Serbs from the Republic of Serbian Krajina. They remained a minority.

22 They were victims of genocide in the Second World War and they ought to

23 have been protected at any cost. I don't think that Radovan Karadzic was

24 the crucial man who dismantled the project. I think that

25 Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia actually prevented the Republic of Serbian

Page 43483

1 Krajina from joining the rest of Yugoslavia, and that is a big sin that

2 the majority of the Serbian people committed towards the Serbs from the

3 Republic of Serbian Krajina, because that minority of the Serbian people

4 are the remains of the Serbian people whose throats had been cut in

5 Croatia. A million and 900.000 Serbs lived in Croatia before the

6 Second World War and the Second World War ended in Croatia with 700.000

7 Serbs left.

8 Q. Please, I -- I would ask you, it's not pleasant to have to

9 interrupt you, and I don't wish to do so, but I hope you can see that

10 you're straying quite far from the precise subject at hand. Now, what

11 you just said, and I'll -- that the -- the initiative didn't happen

12 because of the intervention of the President of Republika Srpska, because

13 of Dr. Karadzic's opposition, is precisely reflected in what happened at

14 the 8th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the

15 25th of February, 1992, where you spoke at the assembly and said that you

16 couldn't handle the situation. Just let me get your exact words, sir:

17 I can't bear the entire burden of that Krajina assembly on my shoulders.

18 And you urged that the president of the party and the president of the

19 assembly come to Banja Luka to make sure that nothing bad happens, and

20 you explained to the Members of Parliament, "I know...," and this is a

21 quote:

22 "I know that Karadzic, as the president of the SDS, is truly the

23 leading figure among the Serbian people and five of his sentences are

24 enough to change the entire course of the session."

25 So contrary to your statement where you take -- you take credit

Page 43484

1 for preventing the Krajina option from being realised. At the time you

2 said you couldn't do it, only Radovan Karadzic could do it, and in fact

3 he came to Banja Luka on the 29th of February and he prevented that from

4 happening. That's what happened; correct?

5 A. No. You've confused your topics and all these theses. It's not

6 the uniting of the two Krajinas. In Bosnian Krajina there was this

7 project by a number of intellectuals to create Republika Srpska. In the

8 area of Banja Luka, and Krajina and these 17 municipalities, a number of

9 intellectuals advocated that project and they were persistent in that.

10 I asked the President of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, to

11 come to Banja Luka so that we could do something about that. I myself

12 could not do anything about it. I couldn't prevent it, I couldn't

13 dispute it, and so on and so forth. So you confused these topics. It's

14 not that it's the integration of a state. This is within one region.

15 There was this idea to create a republic from Grahovo to Derventa. And

16 the Serb people would not be in an entity. There would not be a

17 territorial link. The Serb people should not be forgotten in the

18 Krajina.

19 Sir, I think that you have confused these topics, and you don't

20 seem to know of this other case -- you don't seem to be very

21 knowledgeable on this subject.

22 Q. Mr. Kupresanin, in paragraph 33, you say: I managed to prevent

23 this separatist option. And that refers to -- that refers to P938, which

24 is a discussion that took place on the 28th of February, 1992, and it's

25 about the declaration of the Republic of the Krajina; correct? And at

Page 43485

1 paragraph 34 you say that there was a session of the ARK assembly the

2 next day and you managed to prevent the option of the Krajina separatists

3 from being accepted. And that's all part of your thesis that

4 Dr. Karadzic wasn't involved in this whole effort; right?

5 So you're taking credit for preventing the declaration of the

6 Republic of Krajina. That's what you say in your statement.

7 Is that correct or not?

8 A. You said a moment ago, during the establishment of the

9 Autonomous Region of the Krajina that Radovan Karadzic took part in this

10 project. I said that Radovan Karadzic did not take part in this project

11 of the creation of the autonomous region in any way. Now we are moving

12 on to another problem, and that is the creation of a state within a

13 state, a state within a state. We already have Republika Srpska, and we

14 have an attempt within Republika Srpska to create yet another state which

15 is going to be called the Krajina within the territory of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So we have a state within a state. That is a

17 different situation. And of course I asked Radovan Karadzic for his

18 help. I asked him to help me so that we would prevent the creation of a

19 state within a state. That is that case. And it has nothing to do with

20 what you've been saying all along. And you don't seem to be

21 understanding what I have been saying and that is the truth. And

22 Radovan Karadzic came --

23 Q. You did not manage to prevent the separatist option. You didn't

24 prevent the option, as you say in both those paragraphs. It was

25 Dr. Karadzic, the man whose five sentences can change the course of an

Page 43488

1 respect those who are above me, all those who are under my command must

2 obey me.

3 And he went on to explain that's why he supported the central

4 Sarajevo leadership.

5 Now, that's in part also how you perceived and understood

6 Mr. Brdjanin, as a man who, among other things, tried to be as close as

7 possible to the leadership, to those above him; correct?

8 A. Well, you said that Brdjanin was president of the Crisis Staff.

9 I don't know on whose instructions the Crisis Staff was formed in the

10 Autonomous Region of Krajina. The Crisis Staff in the Autonomous Region

11 of the Krajina was not initiated by the assembly of the autonomous region

12 and --

13 Q. Okay. We may well get into that subject but I thought my

14 question was reasonably clear. It was about Mr. Brdjanin and not about

15 the establishment of the Crisis Staff of which he was the president.

16 A. I would like to ask you, if possible, to repeat that as

17 succinctly as you put it a moment ago.

18 Q. Well, let me try it a slightly different way. You understood

19 Mr. Brdjanin, based on your contacts with him, as somebody who tried to

20 be close to people -- the people above him, who wanted to push himself

21 forward in politics by doing so, who liked people in high positions, and

22 whose world was basically the people who were on the top; right?

23 A. Well, how should I know? He was devoted to this idea that the

24 Serb people should live in freedom. Now, to what extent he was a person

25 who liked power, I really don't know. When he and I worked in the

Page 43489

1 Krajina, he was my vice-president, although at the time he was also a

2 minister. We had little contact. What he stated is his view of the

3 world. That is what I can say.

4 Q. Well, in 2001, when these events were presumably fresher in your

5 memory, you also indicated that you didn't have extensive and regular

6 contact with him but you said that was because he was a guy whose world

7 was the people on the top. He was -- he liked and was into the people in

8 high positions. And that's your explanation for the limitations on your

9 contact with him; right? The fact that he was devoted to the people on

10 the top.

11 A. Well, I don't think so. These people were not the classical top,

12 as you would put it. We are not the same, all of us. We have different

13 affinities. I am basically interested in my people. It's not that

14 I strove to be someone in some position. I stood in the defence of my

15 homeland and I sought my own happiness in the happiness of my own people,

16 and I sought my own wealth in the wealth of my own people. Brdjanin

17 perhaps had ambitions that were greater than my own, in terms of power.

18 Q. Let me --

19 THE ACCUSED: Transcript, although witness repeated it but it

20 should be in the second line, about ambition.

21 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow, Mr. Karadzic.

22 MR. TIEGER: If I understand it, what the witness said that's

23 reflected in the last line is apparently something that he said a bit

24 earlier in the answer. Is that it? It's apparently contained in the

25 answer.

Page 43490

1 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

2 MR. TIEGER: All right.

3 Q. Let me ask you then to confirm what you said in 2001.

4 MR. TIEGER: First, if we could turn it's 65 ter 25608, and if we

5 could turn first to English page 15 and B/C/S page 20, lines 28 through

6 30.

7 Q. At the bottom of the page in English, and as I said, on page 20

8 in the B/C/S, you're explaining the difference between you and Brdjanin

9 painting yourself as someone who prefers to be independent and retain

10 self initiative in contrast to those:

11 "Who want, who are pushing themselves in politics. They want to

12 be bigger than they are. And in order to achieve that, you know, one has

13 to be a poltroon, you know, sort of stuck up too high or people in higher

14 levels."

15 A. Well, it's not that I think that -- I mean, it's not that I think

16 that Mr. Karadzic liked people who were sort of people who wanted to be

17 lizards, sycophants at all costs. I admired people for their work, their

18 ideas, their efforts. I took care of the people. That was my holy

19 mission.

20 Q. Okay at page --

21 A. And Brdjanin --

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Pardon me, could the witness please

23 be shown the top of the next page so that he would have full insight?

24 MR. TIEGER:

25 Q. You also said at page 28 of the English, lines 8 through 11, and

Page 43491

1 page 39 of the B/C/S - if we could turn to those - lines 14 through 18,

2 that Brdjanin:

3 "Liked people who were in high positions, and I wasn't like that.

4 We didn't communicate at all, not even on the phone."

5 So that's another --

6 A. I did not telephone or I did not communicate with who?

7 Q. This is what you're saying about Brdjanin in 2001; correct? This

8 is a taped interview, Mr. Kupresanin.

9 A. I did not understand you. Are you saying that I did not

10 communicate with Radovan Karadzic and the political leadership or that

11 did I not communicate with Brdjanin?

12 Q. I'm reading to you verbatim from the answers you gave to the

13 representatives of the Prosecutor on July 16th, 2001, about Mr. Brdjanin

14 and you said he liked people who were in high positions and you weren't

15 like that. That's correct? That's what you said at the time; right?

16 A. Well, it's correct that I did not communicate often. That is

17 correct, that I did not communicate often. Probably there was no need

18 to, although he was president of the Crisis Staff, because I have my own

19 position regarding the Crisis Staff.

20 Q. And finally, at page 68 of the English, line 41, and page 100 of

21 the B/C/S, line 33, again referring to Mr. Brdjanin, you said:

22 "He had his own world, his people were the top, on the top."

23 A. That was probably the rule for him. He had his own ideals, his

24 own idols. I had my own. I'm not trying to say that people who were top

25 leaders were not persons of authority for me, but I thought that I was

Page 43492

1 supposed to work hard, work honourably, work honestly in order to get a

2 position and to be held in their regard, that I should have certain

3 merits.

4 Q. Okay. Thank you.

5 MR. TIEGER: And I tender those excerpts, Mr. President.

6 JUDGE KWON: Just the basis to -- of tendering them? He

7 confirmed his statement.

8 MR. TIEGER: As we indicated, he confirmed portions of those and

9 portions were sort of edged around. I think with the clarity being

10 dramatically enhanced if we simply have exactly what he said in 2001, and

11 I mean those are classical documents for admission, I think they would be

12 helpful and render the record more clear.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.

14 MR. ROBINSON: This is primarily a matter for the Chamber. But

15 it implicates the very same issue that we had in the Kovac, if you feel

16 that the portion has been fully read then it's not necessary to admit it,

17 but if you feel there is something that's ambiguous about what was read

18 and what the answer was, then it can be assistance to the Chamber and it

19 can be admitted. That's my understanding.

20 MR. TIEGER: And one more point on that, Mr. President, if I may,

21 I --

22 JUDGE KWON: What's the general position as to the prior

23 consistent statement of the witness?

24 MR. ROBINSON: Well, a prior consistent statement is not

25 admissible unless it's to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, but

Page 43493

1 a prior inconsistent statement is admissible either by his oral -- orally

2 indicating that that's what he said or by the record of what he said

3 being read to him.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 Yes, Mr. Tieger.

6 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I'm sorry to intervene

7 too quickly.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

9 JUDGE KWON: I'll come back to you unless it is related to this

10 debate.

11 THE ACCUSED: I just only would like to point out that what

12 Mr. Robinson said was allocated to your Excellency.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

14 MR. TIEGER: Those things do get fixed. A couple of things,

15 Mr. President. Number one, the prior consistent statement rule is a rule

16 that arises out of a classical adversarial system for reasons related to

17 the hearsay rule, which have no application here. The question is the

18 relevance and utility of any statement, not whether or not if facially

19 offends the rule against hearsay and then thus requires a separate

20 exception for its admission. So citation to that particular rule arising

21 from the jurisdiction that Mr. Robinson and I both hail from, I think, is

22 not applicable here.

23 Number two, the -- I revert back to my earlier point, the -- I --

24 the Kovac decision presumably arises as an exception. We dealt with

25 those issues before. This -- in a very similar situation, repeatedly and

Page 43494

1 I can cite the Court to that. It's T42198. The same issue arose. The

2 point was made by the Prosecution counsel that it's better and clearer to

3 actually have the document in, and the Trial Chamber agreed, better to

4 have them in written evidence. And I would say that that is the case for

5 a couple of reasons, because we have -- there are many occasions in which

6 we present to witnesses for impeachment purposes and recite portions of

7 evidence which we don't consider to be admissible - Court knows that -

8 written statements which fall within 92 bis. So now we're -- rather than

9 admitting the document and therefore having it clear, we now will have

10 two categories of questions, one of which is to be used in lieu of the

11 underlying document, others of which are not admissible and are only

12 questions. And unless we make that clear during the time the question is

13 posed, which is not likely to happen and hasn't been happening, we

14 introduce a potential ambiguity into the record. Far clearer, it seems

15 to me, to simply make the decision at the time. Of course this is

16 admissible. It either clarifies, contextualises, or impeaches what the

17 witness says, is of valuable to the Court for that reason, and we have it

18 in evidence and can refer to it, rather than reading the context in which

19 the question is raised to decide it's not one of those questions for

20 which evidential value is or is not to be attributed, but is, instead,

21 one of those that refers to a document that wasn't admissible.

22 In the Kovac case, in this case, we are obviously dealing with

23 documents that are admissible, prior statements. I think the Kovac

24 ruling was based on the clarity of that particular record and perhaps the

25 number of examples. But as a general rule, this Court has already taken

Page 43495

1 the position that it's -- it's better and clearer to have them in written

2 evidence. And I continue to think that we'll have a clearer record and

3 one much easier to work with if we do that.

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, I'm not sure the Chamber necessarily

5 agrees with your observation that the prior consistent statement rule is

6 not applicable at all. There are two matters with respect to this

7 interview, part of this interview. First, whether this is a -- this part

8 is inconsistent with this witness's evidence; and number two, whether

9 the -- there is a need to admit this part separately. The Chamber will

10 put this under advisement, to make a more informed decision and we will

11 come back to this.

12 MR. TIEGER: Okay. I appreciate that, Mr. President. That's

13 fine. Let me simply say I tried to get into it in a -- what I consider

14 to be a fair way. I asked the witness the question first. We didn't get

15 the direct answer, instead moved away, so I said, Well, fine then, didn't

16 you say this, and we still didn't get quite the adoption that I think

17 would be -- that would completely reflect the statements that were made.

18 Okay. We'll move on.

19 Q. Let me ask you next, Mr. Kupresanin, about other aspects of

20 Mr. Brdjanin. Now, you considered that he was responsible for things for

21 which he should be prosecuted; right?

22 A. Concerning Mr. Brdjanin I can say that he didn't do anything in

23 practical terms that would harm other people and other nations.

24 Mr. Brdjanin was wont to say things occasionally, but his words are one

25 thing and his acts were something different. There were verbal excesses,

Page 43496

1 things he said that I didn't agree with, but in practical life I never

2 noticed that he harboured any hatred towards other ethnic communities.

3 He even had a lot of friends and socialised a lot with Muslims from

4 Celinac, from other places. I don't think -- I didn't see that he had

5 any antagonism or hatred towards other ethnic communities. And he -- in

6 his discussions in the assembly, I never heard him say anything ugly.

7 That's how I see Mr. Brdjanin, except that sometimes he would say

8 something that was over the top. I don't know if I was clear enough.

9 Q. I think you're sufficiently clear about the position you're

10 taking now here in this Court in 2013, so I want to look at what you said

11 in 2001. First of all, back -- still on 65 ter 25608, at page 68 of the

12 English, page 99 of the B/C/S, English page -- lines 1 through 8 on

13 page 68, and lines 26 through 30 of the B/C/S, you said, "What I put on

14 his soul" -- excuse me. First of all, you said you consider him

15 responsible for things for which "he should be prosecuted." See at the

16 top:

17 "And for those things he should be prosecuted. I think

18 Radoslav Brdjanin is responsible for certain things. What are those

19 things? And for things he should be prosecuted."

20 And then you went on to say:

21 "What I put on his soul are statements in -- to which the other

22 people of other nationalities -- nationalities had great problems and

23 probably those statements made them move partly."

24 So you said those two things; right?

25 The B/C/S goes on to the next page, lines 3 to 8.

Page 43497

1 A. I never said this. I never said this. I have the impression

2 that something is being foisted on me here.

3 Q. This is a transcript of a tape, Mr. Kupresanin. At page -- again

4 at page 68 of the English, again page 100 of the B/C/S, lines 21 through

5 22 of the B/C/S, you said:

6 "I think that his statements contributed to the great danger

7 that -- that Croats and Muslims were put into and probably one part of

8 them moved out because of those things."

9 You said that as well about Mr. Brdjanin in 2001.

10 A. I don't think I've said this. I said a moment ago what I said,

11 that he was wont to make verbal excesses, to say things that were over

12 the top. So maybe -- maybe there were some problems because of that.

13 I still stand behind my belief that whatever -- whoever did anything

14 against other peoples should be held responsible. If somebody incited

15 expulsions --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down.

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kupresanin, could you repeat your answer? And

18 speak very slowly, please.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't remember this.

20 I said what I've said, and what I've noticed about Brdjanin. It's

21 possible that I said this but I doubt it.

22 MR. TIEGER:

23 Q. You heard from Muslims -- excuse me, you heard from Serbs that

24 Brdjanin had said that only a thousand Muslims would remain in

25 Banja Luka, and that's found at page 43 of the English and page 64 of the

Page 43498

1 B/C/S. These are at lines 15 through 18 in the B/C/S. That's correct

2 also, isn't it?

3 A. No, no. I never heard Brdjanin say that just a thousand Muslims

4 would live in Banja Luka, only a thousand. A normal person would never

5 say that. I've never heard him say that.

6 Q. But that's what you said in 2001.

7 A. I never said that Brdjanin had said that only -- it's not true,

8 Mr. Prosecutor, that I said that he had said --

9 Q. Mr. -- Mr. Kupresanin, you said -- as I said before, you said in

10 2001 that Serbs told you that Brdjanin said that -- and that's what you

11 heard from Serbs, that only a thousand Muslims would remain in

12 Banja Luka.

13 A. Sir, it is such nonsense. I've never said that. It would never

14 occur to me. Nobody told me anything of the kind, nor did I hear

15 Brdjanin ever say that.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown that

17 precise line so that he can read for himself what he had stated at the

18 time?

19 JUDGE KWON: Or you could read out the entire context. I'm not

20 sure that we have a correct page on B/C/S. I will read out the portion.

21 Did you find it?

22 THE ACCUSED: I think so. I think we have --

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Under which number?

24 JUDGE KWON: "Have you heard him on TV saying that only a

25 thousand Muslims would stay in Banja Luka?

Page 43499

1 "I didn't hear that myself but I heard that he had said that."

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, that's all right. That's

3 all right. No, no. I heard, when Brdjanin addressed a number of

4 journalists from the BH television in response to their question how many

5 Muslims should come back, and he then mentioned a percentage. I don't

6 remember which percentage, but it sounded odd to me and it was an

7 unpleasant surprise.

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. You also heard from Muslims that they were afraid of him;

10 correct? And you said that in 2001 at page 64 of the Serbian, lines 6

11 through 8, and page 43 of the English, line 39.

12 A. I heard that Brdjanin said at some point that he mentioned

13 cabbage, saying that cabbage should not be pickled. That's what Muslims

14 told me about what he said on that subject, that they should not expect

15 to eat pickled cabbage, and that's what I heard from the Sarajevo

16 journalists, and this other thing regarding the pickling of cabbage.

17 I took this out of context - maybe he said something in greater detail -

18 and what people told me later, that it's no use pickling cabbage because

19 there would be no time to eat it.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript. Line 20, there is

21 something missing. The witness said: The Muslims told me that. I did

22 not hear it from Brdjanin.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not hear it.

24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic --

25 Mr. Tieger.

Page 43500

1 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

2 Q. And you also stated that Brdjanin was someone who wanted to

3 impose radical nationalist solutions for the benefit of one national

4 group against the rights of other national groups; is that correct? And

5 I can turn you to the passage that reflects that, if you like.

6 A. I would like to see it. I don't remember saying something like

7 that.

8 MR. TIEGER: Page 56, English, please, and page 82, B/C/S.

9 Q. You were asked, Would you say that the persons who were the

10 most -- whether Brdjanin was among persons who were the most radical in

11 Krajina at the time. You said, I don't know what the term radical means,

12 sometimes the term radical it's negative, sometimes it represents

13 fascism, et cetera, sometimes it's positive. Then it was explained --

14 then you asked, You elaborate. What do you mean by radical? And the --

15 your interlocutor stated, When I say radical, I mean radical nationalist,

16 someone who wants to impose solutions, radical nationalist solutions for

17 the benefit of one national group against the rights of other national

18 groups. And your answer was, I understood. Well, judging by his

19 appearances and/or his attitude, what he said, Brdjanin had all those

20 elements and more than that.

21 That was your position in 2001, correct, Mr. Kupresanin?

22 A. Well, all right. Brdjanin had a national bias. Whether he was

23 nationally aware, I don't know. I did not see any extremism or

24 chauvinism in his public appearances. It was more verbal on his part, a

25 populist rather than putting it into practice on the ground. He was more

Page 43501

1 into public appearances when he said such things in the assembly. He did

2 not speak like that. I don't believe he was in the -- on the board. I

3 know he socialised with Muslims. He had very close friends among

4 Muslims. His entire family and his wife, they even participated in

5 some --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat what they

7 participated in.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And I don't think he hated other

9 ethnicities. But if he thought that would give him a political

10 advantage, then on such occasions that's possible.

11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. I'd tender those excerpts, too,

12 Mr. President. And just to be clear, I'm certainly not urging that where

13 there is a clear-cut, straightforward and unequivocal adoption of a prior

14 statement, that that needs to be admitted in -- in -- in that sense, and

15 we've acknowledged that before. So if that's what Mr. Robinson meant by

16 previous prior consistent statement, I -- I don't want to argue that we

17 need to have those admitted. We have take that position clearly before.

18 But in these cases I think we continue to have ambiguity and the record

19 is rendered much clearer by the admission of these excerpts.

20 JUDGE KWON: What are those pages you refer to? What pages?

21 MR. TIEGER: Page -- at the English, page 68. Page 64 --

22 JUDGE KWON: I don't think 64 was shown to the witness at all.

23 Please continue.

24 MR. TIEGER: And page 56 of the English and 82 of the B/C/S.

25 JUDGE KWON: Sixty-eight, 56, and 64. I would like you to deal

Page 43502

1 with -- whenever you -- immediately after you dealt with the document,

2 I'd like to deal with their admission.

3 MR. TIEGER: Each -- each -- each separate is okay, even if it's

4 the same topic. We'll do, Mr. President. Okay.

5 JUDGE KWON: We will deal with it all together later on.

6 MR. TIEGER: Okay.

7 Q. Now, you -- you mentioned in your previous answer something about

8 thinking about gaining political advantage. And, in fact, you stated in

9 2001, that he probably served a purpose to someone in -- with these

10 extreme positions; correct? So we turn to page 43 of the English and

11 page 63 of the B/C/S. And in 63, lines 30 through 31, you said he was

12 forcing himself to be the leader of the Serbs in the Krajina region and

13 he probably served his purpose to someone as being an extreme person,

14 correct, that's what you said in 2001?

15 A. I see that I've said that and I probably did, but I'll be more

16 precise now. I believe Mr. Brdjanin was in communication with the army

17 on this subject. That's my opinion. And I believe that he did not

18 communicate on that subject at all with Mr. Karadzic. He adored officers

19 and generals. I was sometimes in conflict with them but his relationship

20 with them was ideal.

21 Q. Let me turn to something else you said, and that's at page 68 --

22 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, okay, I think that --

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I will -- I will add that page to consider.

24 MR. TIEGER: Okay.

25 Q. You also said the following, if you turn to transcript page 68 in

Page 43503

1 the English and 102 through -- 102 in the B/C/S, moving on to 103 as we

2 continue towards the bottom of the B/C/S at page 102.

3 So starting at line 40 you said, We didn't socialise. He had his

4 own world -- again, we are speaking about Mr. Brdjanin. He had his own

5 world. His people were the top, on the top. Let me just say something.

6 All his speeches and all those statements and actions could have been cut

7 off by somebody and somebody could have shortened his horns. I wonder

8 why people who were able to do that didn't do it, because such statements

9 and such accents -- actions of his only damaged or created damage for the

10 Serb people. So the president of the country could have done it, the

11 president of the assembly could have, parliament -- I'm sorry, the

12 parliament -- president of the parliament, president of the government,

13 or the prime minister. Why did they tolerate it? Maybe they agreed with

14 him, I don't know. That's what you said in 2001, correct,

15 Mr. Kupresanin?

16 A. What I know regarding Radovan [as interpreted] Brdjanin and the

17 president of Republika Srpska is this: I believe they were in constant

18 conflict over Brdjanin's behaviour. If Brdjanin thought that something

19 he had done was good, then the president would tell him in so many words

20 that it was idiotic, that he had shot himself in the foot with such

21 behaviour, and it very often happened that Radovan criticised him every

22 now and then saying, Why did you do this and why did you do that? He

23 simply sought explanations from some of his actions. That's what I know

24 from some people who were there. Now, what you are saying, perhaps

25 Radovan could have or Momo could have, I don't think he was close in any

Page 43504

1 way with either Momo or Radovan. Maybe he had some ambitions of becoming

2 a minister, but he often made serious slips, blunders, and Radovan could

3 not understand his actions, he just couldn't understand it.

4 Q. It's not what I'm saying, Mr. Kupresanin, it's what you said in

5 2001.

6 MR. TIEGER: I tender this excerpt as well, Mr. President.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it's noted.

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. Now, the statements Mr. Brdjanin made that you said in 2001

10 provoked fear among the Muslims and caused a portion of them to leave

11 were not the only statements by Krajina leaders reflecting issues about

12 the number of Muslims who remained in the ARK region. For example,

13 Mr. Kupresanin, you were also concerned about the number of Muslims in

14 the territory comprised or anticipated to comprise Republika Srpska;

15 right?

16 A. Well, I was concerned about Muslims and Croats because of the

17 situation they found themselves in. They found themselves in a very

18 difficult situation because they had the obligation to serve in our army

19 under the law and wage war against their own, and they tried in every

20 possible way to avoid that obligation, and in that I understood them.

21 Second, we didn't have factories during the war. In fact, we had

22 factories but they were not operating and people were very hard up.

23 I talked several times with the president of the republic, saying that

24 conditions should be created to enable them to make a living. Serbs

25 mainly came from villages into towns, but they still had their home farms

Page 43505

1 from which they could draw sustenance; whereas Muslims were mostly urban

2 population, and workplaces and factories were for them the only source of

3 livelihood.

4 Q. That's an adequate answer for this purpose. Your position that

5 the only expression or the only time you gave expression to concerns

6 about the number of Muslims in Republika Srpska was for their benefit is

7 contradicted by any number of things that you said in 1992 through 1995.

8 For example, at the third session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly,

9 D84, at English pages 26 through 27 and B/C/S 41 through 42, you told the

10 assembly members that in your view, our, that is Bosnian Serb living

11 space, and the territory in which they live was endangered, and that

12 danger has to be averted, and then you talked about shutting off the

13 250- to 300.000 Muslims in Cazin Krajina into a ring. That was one

14 expression of your concern about the number of Muslims who might be in

15 territories sought by or intended to comprise Republika Srpska, wasn't

16 it, Mr. Kupresanin?

17 A. I don't know that Muslims from the Cazin Krajina made up or were

18 comprised in Republika Srpska. They were a separate region. I don't

19 remember who their main boss was. And before the war, I had a lot of

20 communication with them about integration and co-operation. During the

21 war, we had great problems with the Cazin Krajina. We had to keep a lot

22 of personnel occupied to defend ourselves from them. But I was talking

23 about the autonomous region of Republika Srpska, not the Cazin Krajina.

24 At that time we were at war. Why would I be thinking about them? And of

25 course, we had to narrow down the front line during the war. We were in

Page 43506

1 jeopardy, physically, and in economically, and it was --

2 Q. Mr. Kupresanin, I asked you about something that you said before

3 the war, at the third session of the Bosnian assembly in 1991, when you

4 told the delegates that your view was this was a battle for -- this was a

5 threat to Serbian living space.

6 A. I probably meant they were a threat as a military power, as an

7 armed force.

8 Q. It was your position, Mr. Kupresanin, that Bosnian Serb forces

9 should conquer territories on which the Bosnian Serbs were a minority but

10 on which they were a minority because of the genocide committed in

11 World War II; right? And you said that in September of 1992.

12 A. What did I believe? I believed that we were the left-overs of

13 peoples who -- whose throats were cut during World War II and we would

14 not allow that genocide over the Serbian people to be repeated. What the

15 Jews in Germany had lived through is the same thing that we lived through

16 in Croatia, in Bosnia, and other parts of Yugoslavia.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness slow down and repeat this

18 sentence.

19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Could you repeat.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I repeat that I said that the

21 Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina after the world war,

22 were the remains of a people whose throats had been cut, and we had to

23 mobilise ourselves to the maximum to prevent further crimes against the

24 Serbian people. And through our activity in the party, we did prevent

25 it, at least temporarily. And raising the awareness among the people

Page 43507

1 for -- in my eyes was an obligation. I repeat to you: In Croatia before

2 the Second World War, there was a 1.900.000 Serbs. When the

3 Second World War was over, there were 700.000 Serbs in Croatia.

4 Communists came into power and they were not interested in that story.

5 Nobody investigated it. A list of a highly-ranking German officer's -- a

6 letter from -- high German officer said the Croats had cut the throats of

7 300.000 Serbs --

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. Mr. Kupresanin. Mr. Kupresanin, I'm not asking you for

10 dissertation on what happened in World War II, please. You --

11 MR. TIEGER: And by -- for the Court's benefit and for the

12 benefit of the parties, that was a reference -- the previous question was

13 a reference to D456, pages 24 through 25 in the English and B/C/S, 27

14 through 28.

15 JUDGE KWON: Just one comment, Mr. Tieger, about the exhibits.

16 In your cross, first part of your cross-examination, we admitted

17 65 ter 32152, some part of pages -- some pages into Exhibit P6509, but

18 I take it that exhibit is part of the associated exhibits which were

19 admitted in its entirety as Defence exhibits.

20 MR. TIEGER: I believe -- I understand the Court's question.

21 JUDGE KWON: We will vacate that number.

22 MR. TIEGER: I was going to say I -- I believe that that --

23 the -- the recording of that session it was comprised of a number of

24 different, separate recordings and P -- I can't remember the exact number

25 for the earlier referenced one may not comprise this particular excerpt

Page 43508

1 I've referred to. I can double check on that, of course, but I suspect

2 that's why I -- I just can't recall specifically. That's why it was

3 separately referenced.

4 JUDGE KWON: Is this the document about which Mr. Robinson rose

5 to state, to admit in its entirety?

6 MR. ROBINSON: I believe so, yes.

7 MR. TIEGER: I certainly have no objection if the -- in keeping

8 with our previous practice with regard to similar sessions, if we

9 aggregated the entirety of the transcripts referring to that particular

10 session and introduced them just as we have introduced whole sessions of

11 assembly sessions. That would seem consistent to me, so I couldn't

12 object to that.

13 JUDGE KWON: Given that this is only 20-page document, we will

14 admit it in its entirety. And, therefore, as such, we will vacate the

15 exhibit number of P6509.

16 Please continue.

17 MR. TIEGER: Okay.

18 Q. Mr. Kupresanin, you also stated in 1994 that you personally think

19 that Bosnia has always been a Serbian land and in that state there could

20 not be three masters; correct?

21 A. I always stated that Serbs, Orthodox Serbs, Muslim Serbs and

22 Croatian Serbs lived in Bosnia. That's the way I see it, and that's the

23 way it is. So if all of them are Serbs of various religious, according

24 to this logic Bosnia is also a Serbian land. The synonym for a people is

25 not the religion but the language that they speak. They all speak the

Page 43509

1 Serbian language. And that's not what I said 150 or 200 years ago,

2 Vuk Karadzic said it. The Muslim Serbs, the Catholic Serbs and the

3 Orthodox Serbs all speak the Serbian language and the Stokavian dialect.

4 The other dialects Kajkavian and Chakavian is the Slovenians who speak.

5 Some Serbs also lived --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness please repeat this.

7 MR. TIEGER: I think we have strayed away from the question. So

8 your explanation is: You said that and now you've explained that what

9 you meant was that the -- the Muslims are Muslim Serbs and so there can't

10 be three masters --

11 A. Yes, I know.

12 Q. -- that the Serbs must be the masters. Okay.

13 You also stated in January of 1993 --

14 A. I didn't say Serbs. They could be Muslims as Serbs, they are

15 Serbs for me, all other facts do not support that. Everything else is a

16 lie. Everything else is a communist division. There is no fact

17 testifying that the Muslims are not Serbs. A million facts testify to it

18 that Muslims are Serbs. Everything else is a lie, if we take facts as

19 facts. Ninety per cent of the Croats are Serbs, Serbs who were converted

20 to Catholicism, and those who were converted said: We are not Serbs, we

21 are Croats now. As Slavs it's logical that we were converted to

22 Christianity from the Byzantium and most of the Bosnian Muslims were

23 converted to Islam from the Turks. So the majority of the Serbs were

24 converted to Catholicism. They accepted it, especially during

25 Maria Theresa, the queen. And now we are discussing who is who in these

Page 43510

1 areas. The scientific elite in Europe knows who is who, and so does the

2 Serbian scientific elite that is not communist.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness please slow down. He's way too

4 fast.

5 MR. TIEGER:

6 Q. Mr. Kupresanin, you're purporting now that you don't make any

7 distinction between Muslims, Croats and Serbs for purposes of this

8 discussion because to you they are all the same. But in January of 1993,

9 after an immense amount of displacement, forcible displacement, killing

10 and ethnic cleansing took place, you said the following, you said at 24th

11 assembly session on the 8th of January, 1993:

12 "We say that the war was not necessary in Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina," referring to what some other people had said.

14 And you said:

15 "The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was necessary. Right now, if

16 we were to count the population right now, there would be over a million

17 Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnian-Herzegovina would be

18 predominantly a Serb republic."

19 And then to make the point completely clear, you said:

20 "Is war necessary in Serbia? It's a horrible thing to say that

21 the war would be necessary in Serbia. If Serbia does not go into the war

22 now, then in three to five years, the Albanians and Muslims will legally

23 overtake the power in Belgrade along with the Serb opposition. This war

24 was necessary for the Serb people."

25 So there you're making a clear distinction between Muslims and

Page 43511

1 Serbs and you're asserting that without this war, there be too many

2 Muslims who would soon be in a demographic position to legally overtake

3 power; correct? That was your position in 1993.

4 A. I know that I said at rallies always that the Muslims are the

5 Serbs. What I told the international representative, Stoltenberg, from

6 Norway only confirmed my opinion. I'm saying that Albanians -- all

7 Albanians are Albanians regardless of their religion because they speak

8 the Albanian language which means that you have Orthodox Albanians,

9 Catholic and Muslim Albanians. Likewise, there are Serbs of various

10 religious. Only that here, there is this confusion of positions

11 depending on what suits the international community.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness please slow down.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kupresanin, could you speak very slowly, please?

14 The interpreters have difficulty following you.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right. All right, thank you.

16 MR. TIEGER: All right.

17 Q. Let's move on to another portion of your statement,

18 Mr. Kupresanin. At several points in your statement, you attempt to

19 emphasise alleged ARK power and independence. At paragraph 40 you said

20 they were independent; at paragraph 42, you said -- that's vis-a-vis the

21 municipalities, by the way. And let me put that another way so that I --

22 I -- so we don't have any confusion.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please see the

24 statement or, rather, be given the statement in hard copy so that he

25 could follow and check what he has been asked?

Page 43512

1 MR. TIEGER:

2 Q. Okay, paragraph 40 you said the municipal Crisis Staffs were

3 independent from the Krajina Crisis Staff. At paragraph -- that's right

4 in the middle of that page. And at paragraph 42, you suggested that the

5 ARK Crisis Staff was more of a Banja Luka-specific Crisis Staff. So

6 that's what you say now about the powers of the ARK Crisis Staff

7 vis-a-vis the municipalities or the role of the Crisis Staff vis-a-vis

8 the municipalities. But back in 2001, you said that that was a big

9 mystery to you, and let me turn your attention to page 33 of the English

10 and page 46 of the B/C/S. This is --

11 A. Yes, yes. I can see it.

12 Q. Did Brdjanin give orders to presidents of municipalities about

13 what he wanted carried out? And you said, Well, you see, I -- I ask

14 myself that question. Certain things happened in Krajina. I'm

15 interested to what extent was the ARK Crisis Staff connected to the

16 peripheral -- question: Municipal Crisis Staffs. And your answer, Yes,

17 yes, that is a great mystery for me.

18 And yet now, a dozen years later, after meeting with the Karadzic

19 Defence, you suddenly claim that that mystery is no mystery at all and

20 you can state that there -- to the contrary, that -- that it had no role

21 with the municipal Crisis Staffs; right? You changed your position

22 completely, haven't you, sir?

23 A. Do you expect me to answer?

24 Q. I don't actually.

25 MR. TIEGER: And I tender that portion.

Page 43513

1 MR. ROBINSON: Objection.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to say something.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not aware of a single

5 institution in Republika Srpska which ordered that Crisis Staffs be

6 formed by regions. That Crisis Staff which was established in the region

7 was not established at the order of the government of Republika Srpska,

8 so I believed it to be unlawful. The government of Republika Srpska

9 ordered the establishment of Crisis Staffs by municipalities. Banja Luka

10 is a municipality, did not establish a Crisis Staff at the time, nor did

11 it have one.

12 The Crisis Staff of Krajina had no members from Krajina. All the

13 people in the Krajina Crisis Staff hailed from Banja Luka. So that for

14 me, the Krajina Crisis Staff was a -- rather a Crisis Staff of

15 Banja Luka. I also assert that in the communication between the

16 Crisis Staff of Krajina in Banja Luka and the municipality in

17 the Autonomous Region of Krajina, there practically was no communication,

18 as the Crisis Staff had no subordination either vertical or horizontal.

19 The Crisis Staff cannot punish, didn't have its account, and it all means

20 that the Crisis Staff is some sort of a body or institution of a

21 preventive character in a situation when people feel that there could be

22 some kind of danger from a natural disaster to war. The Crisis Staff has

23 the task to promote and establish a rule of law, if that is possible, in

24 the area where it is situated, so that I can note that each

25 municipality --

Page 43514

1 Q. Mr. Kupresanin, that's -- this is not -- okay, I need to

2 interrupt you. This is not a platform for you to make dissertations on

3 these subject.

4 JUDGE KWON: We will add this page to P6510.

5 MR. TIEGER:

6 Q. Well, although you said it was a big mystery to you in 2001, the

7 fact is that contemporaneous documents from the municipalities completely

8 contradict your assertion here now that there was no level of hierarchy

9 between the ARK Crisis Staff and the municipalities. For example -- and

10 let me ask you about Bosanski Novi. P2632. This Court has received

11 evidence that the Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff, in reporting on its work,

12 referred to implementing the ARK decision on disarmament, also referred

13 to the ARK decision on general public mobilisation, and stated:

14 "After familiarising themselves with such a decision of the ARK

15 government, the Crisis Staff initiated concrete actions and tasked organs

16 in charge with implementing the decision."

17 So do you claim you're unfamiliar with Novi's position on their

18 relationship to the ARK Crisis Staff?

19 A. I didn't know anything. I didn't know anything about these

20 relations and co-ordinations, nor could the Crisis Staff of the ARK

21 Krajina influence the way that the Crisis Staff in Bosanski Novi would

22 act. It did not have such force. It did not have such powers. There

23 was no possibility for the Crisis Staff to do something, nor could it do

24 anything according to the law and nobody was due to obey it. I'm not

25 aware of this kind of communication.

Page 43515

1 THE ACCUSED: If we ask witness to put off headphones or not to

2 be translated.

3 JUDGE KWON: Are you going to make some objection?

4 THE ACCUSED: I would like to make objections that can't wait for

5 the redirect. All things that are cited are selective and wrongly posed

6 questions that do not fit with the material that is cited. For example,

7 on page 53, line 33 --

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. Mr. Kupresanin --

10 THE ACCUSED: -- and 34 --

11 JUDGE KWON: No. I think we can continue. Yes. If could you

12 take off your headphone for the moment, please. Thank you.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But I don't hear anything then.

14 JUDGE KWON: That's -- yes.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a procedural issue so it's

16 better for you not to hear it.

17 [In English] On 33, line 33:

18 "I'm telling you that the Crisis Staffs in municipalities were

19 Gods, they were a state within a state, and they acted differently in

20 each municipality."

21 And on 26, page 26, line 50, 51, and 52:

22 "Well, I didn't say or I didn't mention something that is very

23 important in all of this, all the most important things of all this. The

24 Crisis Staffs in the municipalities were states and presidents of

25 municipalities and presidents of the Executive Councils were the leaders,

Page 43516

1 all communication between civilian and military authorities were through

2 these people."

3 So I think that there would be no witness who wouldn't be

4 confused by this kind of cross-examination.

5 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow your objections. Mr. Tieger this

6 time clearly showed -- cited some part of the prior record.

7 Where is it from, Mr. Tieger?

8 MR. TIEGER: P2632, Mr. President.

9 JUDGE KWON: Although it was not shown to the witness, I think it

10 was fair enough to cite that part and put to the witness about his

11 observation.

12 Let us continue, Mr. Tieger.

13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kupresanin -- thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: Excellencies, I object also that Mr. Tieger

16 testifies and is not interested in response from the witness.

17 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will monitor, but so far we can

18 continue. But I -- in the future, we would be more benefited if you

19 showed the document to the witness and then ask a comment on that. Shall

20 we continue.

21 MR. TIEGER: Let's call up 3497, please. P3497, English page 1,

22 B/C/S page 2. Public announcement of the Crisis Staff of the

23 municipality of Kljuc on the 8th of May, 1992, stating among other

24 things:

25 "All decisions shall be made and tasks performed in compliance

Page 43517

1 with the regulations and decisions of the organs of the

2 Autonomous Region of Krajina and the Serbian Republic of BiH."

3 Q. I take it you were unfamiliar with that position of the

4 Kljuc Crisis Staff as well?

5 And the portion I read out is in the second paragraph in B/C/S,

6 sir.

7 A. This Crisis Staff in Krajina, I think that they simply usurped

8 power. That's my opinion. There is a time for a Crisis Staff to exist,

9 and when the war breaks out, then the War Presidencies should take over

10 the authority, then the Ministry of the Defence, the Ministry of the

11 Interior, they should do their work. I'm not sure according to what

12 logic the Crisis Staff was doing that after the breakout of the war. It

13 should do its duties in peacetime, when there is a premonition that war

14 might be coming or if there is a natural disaster.

15 So, for me, this is pure usurpation. But probably this kind of

16 communication did exist, though I don't see any stamp here. The

17 Crisis Staff of the Kljuc municipality did not have a stamp. It doesn't

18 have a stamp, which means that no Crisis Staff had a stamp or a giro

19 account. It wasn't a legal entity, and it's decisions were not to be

20 taken into account. Someone who is in war and needs to communicate with

21 the municipalities is the ministry of arm -- of the army or the command

22 of the army. This is somebody who is infiltrating an empty space and

23 doing some business. And what I say in the end is that that means

24 usurping power.

25 Q. And according to you, irrespective of the communication between

Page 43518

1 the ARK Crisis Staff and the municipal Crisis Staffs, that there was

2 nevertheless a chain of command running from the municipalities clear up

3 to Dr. Karadzic, and that's what you said back in 2001; right?

4 A. Well, I don't know. I would exclude the Crisis Staff from any

5 real operation if the rule of law existed. There was no Crisis Staff at

6 the level of Republika Srpska, as far as I know. That was why a

7 Crisis Staff is unusual. It has no subordination or co-ordination from

8 top to bottom or from bottom to top either. So someone infiltrates

9 himself. During wartime, subordination and co-ordination are different.

10 Q. Let's set the Crisis Staff aside for the moment. Your position

11 in 2001 was that there was a chain of command conducted through the

12 presidents of the municipalities through to the president of the state.

13 That is Dr. Karadzic; right?

14 A. I don't know to what extent the president of the municipality is

15 in communication with the president of the country. There is some

16 different kind of communication during the war, when war is at issue. If

17 it's the president of the municipality, he probably tried to co-operate

18 with the political leadership of the republic which is logical, but

19 whether that was the rule, that depends on the situation.

20 Q. Well, this is what you said in 2001.

21 MR. TIEGER: If we could turn to page 27 of the English, lines 9

22 through 15, and page 38 of the Serbian, lines 1 through 7:

23 "They -- then the other kind of communication was then conducted

24 from the --

25 JUDGE KWON: Could you wait until we have the page?

Page 43519

1 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. I'm sorry. Did I fail to --

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Actually, here there was a

3 double command in existence. The civilian authorities were directed at

4 the President of Republika Srpska and the military authorities were

5 focused on the commander, General Mladic. There was no co-ordination and

6 subordination, but, rather, double authorities, just like a double stake

7 is not put into earth. So that Radovan Karadzic had control. He had the

8 state, but he did not have the power; and the army had the power but

9 didn't have the state. So the army used us purely for logistics, but we

10 didn't have much influence. And if crimes happened in certain areas,

11 then civilians were not killing civilians. It was some army or

12 paramilitary formations that were doing that. In Republika Srpska we had

13 military courts and military prosecutor's offices.

14 MR. TIEGER:

15 Q. Let's stick to the subject. So what you were confirming there

16 was your, quote: "They -- then the other kind of communication was then

17 conducted from the presidents of the municipalities, through the chain of

18 command, to the president of the state of the country. And then military

19 people, they have their own chain of command, which also ended, went to

20 the top, to the Supreme Commander, General Mladic."

21 That's what you said in 2001; right?

22 A. Yes. I said that it was double command. The hierarchy in a

23 state is well known. What if the American president ordered a ship of

24 the sixth US fleet to fire at a town, and if they refused to obey the

25 order, you know what would happen. In our country, such orders could not

Page 43520

1 be issued. There was very often obstruction --

2 Q. The question was a simple one. And in connection with -- before

3 we break -- with that, one more thing. When were you asked about

4 Brdjanin's authority and whether he could order the police or the

5 military to do certain tasks, you responded in the following way and

6 let's turn to page 43 of the --

7 JUDGE KWON: You're tendering page 27.

8 MR. TIEGER: Yes.

9 JUDGE KWON: That will be added to P6510.

10 MR. TIEGER: And page 43 of the English,

11 lines [overlapping speakers].

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something? May I say

13 what you said, just to confirm or to reject it? Mr. Brdjanin could not

14 order anything to anyone. He could only make suggestions but not to

15 order.

16 JUDGE KWON: A question will be asked after taking a look at the

17 document first.

18 MR. TIEGER: Page 43 --

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just -- may I just clarify? Who is

20 AC who formulates the question in lines 2 to 5 in the Serbian language?

21 JUDGE KWON: You can see at the bottom of the page usually. Let

22 us see whether we have it. Yes, you should have it.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, I have nothing. I don't have

24 any AC. Those are the initials.

25 JUDGE KWON: I see it under the AC.

Page 43521

1 MR. TIEGER: There are -- I -- if we could -- okay. There are

2 four people listed: Mr. Kupresanin, two people from the Office of the

3 Prosecutor, and an interpreter.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 MR. TIEGER:

6 Q. Back to what --

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not there in the English

8 version. In the English version there is only three, and I have the

9 English version in front of me.

10 MR. TIEGER: I think it's safe to say that this was conducted

11 through an interpreter. And the fact that it's contained in the Serbian

12 version should be adequate, and this is [overlapping speakers]

13 JUDGE KWON: On this English page there is no AC. That's why.

14 Shall we continue.

15 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.

16 Q. Again page 43 of the English and page 63 of the Serbian, lines 11

17 through 12 in the Serbian, and 11 through 16 in the English, you were

18 asked as -- and you just mentioned something about Brdjanin's authority

19 to order the police or the military to do certain tasks. Question was:

20 "What was the authority? Would he order? Could he order the

21 police or the military to do certain tasks?"

22 You said:

23 "He could have ordered naive policemen and naive army or

24 military. They were all listening to Radovan's orders."

25 And that's what you said in 2001 about who had the authority over

Page 43522

1 the military and police and who could order them to conduct tasks;

2 correct?

3 A. Even a layman would know that it was the Ministry of Police that

4 gave orders to the police and that the Ministry of Defence, through the

5 Supreme Commander and military commanders, issued orders. Brdjanin, the

6 Crisis Staff, could not issue any orders to anyone. So it's logical that

7 people should know that the Supreme Commander and the commander of that

8 army could issue orders and exclude the Crisis Staff from the sphere of

9 power, some power. I said naive. Yes, he could issue orders only to the

10 naive, the Crisis Staff -- many did not obey the Crisis Staff at all.

11 MR. TIEGER: Okay, I tender that excerpt, Mr. President.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will issue -- we will consider this

13 together with the other pages.

14 MR. TIEGER: And I see it's time for the break. And again I just

15 emphasise in circumstances where there is a straightforward adoption of

16 the prior statement, I have no problem with that, of course. And in the

17 sense in which that's a prior consistent statement, we are perfectly in

18 agreement with Mr. Robinson, but where there is equivocation I think

19 these -- the prior statement is -- should -- should be admitted.

20 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break for 45 minutes and resume at

21 1.20.

22 MR ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. If I could put something

23 on the record with respect to our associated exhibits at the request of

24 the Registrar. And that is that our document 70, 65 ter 17367 is, in

25 fact, subsumed in 65 ter 17356 and need not be admitted, and then the

Page 43523

1 intercept which is 30061 which had the wrong participants is not being

2 tendered and being withdrawn. Thank you.

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Just a second. We will come back to

4 this issue about the associated exhibits. We will resume at 1.20.

5 --- Recess taken at 12.36 p.m.

6 --- On resuming at 1.24 p.m.

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, during the break the Chamber has

8 reviewed all the pages shown to the witness, and the Chamber is of the

9 view that all those pages were not entirely consistent with the witness's

10 evidence and on that ground we will admit them all. Those pages will be

11 added to the Exhibit P6510.

12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

13 Q. Mr. Kupresanin, I wanted to turn next to paragraph 22 of your

14 statement. That deals with a -- the minutes of a session of the ARK

15 assembly in November 1991, and reflects your comments that you insisted

16 on the replacement of directors of companies and institutions and the

17 appointment of SDS staff in their stead but Dr. Karadzic was for harmony

18 and unity and insisted that the old staffs remain in their positions.

19 Now, first of all, as a general matter, it is correct to say that

20 in the ARK, a great many dismissals took place and that task was carried

21 out by the Executive Council of Krajina; correct?

22 A. Are you asking me to answer?

23 Q. Yes, sir.

24 A. The Serb Democratic Party won the elections in Banja Luka that

25 year, and it is to be expected -- and it's to be expected that people

Page 43524

1 from the Serbian Democratic Party would take key positions in companies,

2 especially state-owned companies, or, rather, public companies. That is

3 logical. That is to be expected. Why else did the SDS take part in the

4 elections? We took part in the elections because we thought that we were

5 better than those who were there beforehand, and I don't think there was

6 anything bad in that.

7 Q. Thanks. And I wasn't trying to make --

8 A. I have to finish. Do allow me to finish. It is correct that

9 Mr. Karadzic insisted that we do not dismiss the directors. He insisted

10 on that many times in order to create some kind of peace, harmony

11 et cetera and I said these are communist directors and they should go,

12 that's it.

13 Q. Please follow the question. The first question was not asking

14 you to make a value judgement either way about dismissals or to tell me

15 who instigated those dismissals. It was just to confirm the fact that it

16 was the case that in the Krajina, a great many dismissals ultimately took

17 place and that the Executive Council of Krajina carried out that task.

18 And do you confirm that?

19 A. Well, there was a replacement of communist cadres, in part to a

20 large degree. I'm not saying totally.

21 Q. Now, let me -- and more specifically, you -- with respect to the

22 ARK Crisis Staff and Mr. Brdjanin, Mr. Brdjanin pushed very hard to have

23 people who were not Serbs dismissed from important positions, in fact,

24 all positions at any higher level in companies, and that, in fact, many

25 -- there were great changes in response to that, and it was the Executive

Page 43525

1 Council of Krajina that carried out that task?

2 A. Well, I don't know that there was this purge, if you will, of

3 these other peoples in the Krajina. There were probably replacements

4 because the SDS won the election and then their people took key

5 positions. I keep repeating that. Like in Sarajevo, where the SDA won

6 and then the key positions were held by SDA people. So who prevented

7 Serbs from being members of the SDA? They would have then gotten key

8 positions in Sarajevo just like here. If the Muslims were in the SDS

9 then they -- had they joined it, then they could have been in the same

10 position because the statute of the SDS says that the SDS is the party of

11 the Serb people and other peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please

13 be asked to speak slower, thank you.

14 MR. TIEGER: Let's turn to 65 ter 25608 once again, English

15 page 58, and B/C/S 85.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kupresanin, you are advised to speak slow.

17 Please bear that in mind.

18 MR. TIEGER:

19 Q. And in July of 2001 you were asked, Brdjanin also pushed very

20 hard to have people who were not Serbs dismissed from important

21 positions, in fact all positions at any higher level in companies; is

22 that correct? And you said, There were great changes carried out at that

23 time. I can't say that there were not many great changes. The

24 Executive Council of Krajina carried out this task. You have signatures

25 of people who were dismissed. And then it was said, Yes. Brdjanin's

Page 43526

1 signature. And you said, Very well, everything is clear.

2 That's what you said in 2001, correct, Mr. Kupresanin?

3 A. Possibly.

4 MR. TIEGER: In that case I think it's best to tender the

5 excerpt, Mr. President.

6 JUDGE KWON: Very well. That will be added.

7 MR. TIEGER:

8 Q. Now I'd like to take a closer look at the document you cite in

9 paragraph 22, that's P551 -- 5551, let's call that up, please. That's an

10 extract from the minutes of the 9th session of the Assembly of the

11 Autonomous Region of Krajina which was held on the 6th of November, 1991.

12 Looking at item 1, it states that it was established that the presidents

13 of municipalities had failed to fully carry out the conclusions we

14 adopted together at the last session.

15 And it goes on to point out that in some places it was impossible

16 to implement those conclusions because they could only be carried out

17 within the party and notes that Brdjanin should inform Dr. Karadzic about

18 this level of implementation. Now, the agenda also refers to the

19 implementation -- at the beginning refers to the implementation of

20 conclusions adopted at the session held on the 26th of October 1991. So

21 those conclusions that had not been fully carried out that were just

22 discussed related back to the 26th of October, 1991.

23 Now, we know from that date that that was the day of the Sarajevo

24 SDS order. Let's look at 2548, please. All right. So this is the

25 document which reflects the order which was brought to light at the

Page 43527

1 meeting of the presidents of municipalities held on the

2 26th of October, 1991, in Banja Luka, and which was chaired by

3 Dr. Karadzic and at which the conclusion were fully accepted by the

4 Autonomous Region of Krajina. And if you look down the list, it

5 includes, in part, to take over power in public firms, post office,

6 account keeping institution, administration of justice, and especially in

7 mass communication media.

8 So, Mr. Kupresanin, in contrast to the suggestion you make in

9 paragraph 22 about the significance of the document P5551, at that time,

10 Dr. Karadzic, in fact, was urging, indeed ordering, the replacement of

11 the cadres deemed unacceptable to the SDS in particular position -- in

12 important positions in public firms and other important institutions;

13 correct?

14 A. Well, of course, the SDS should have its own people in public

15 companies. That is quite logical. If other people who are suspicious

16 stay on, they could create great problems. There were some Croats and

17 Muslims in key positions and then the transportation of weapons took

18 place all the time, to Croatia where there was a war between the Serbs

19 and Croats; that is to say, these were not trustworthy people. We were

20 very sensitive because we knew what was happening and we knew what would

21 happen. We expected problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is quite logical

22 for us to appoints our own people. What's so sinful about that? I think

23 it's a good thing that that was done, to put one's own cadres not those

24 of other parties.

25 Q. Let's look at another reflection of the emphasis on replacing

Page 43528

1 personnel in important positions in the Bosnian institutions and

2 especially in mass communication media, and if we could turn to

3 65 ter 32823, please, this is an intercepted telephone conversation

4 between Dr. Karadzic and Dr. Vukic around the same time, that is around

5 the fall of 1991. This is September 27th, 1991. And if we turn to the

6 second page of the document, please, in both languages, and it will

7 continue in the Serbian. Dr. Karadzic and Dr. Vukic are talking, and

8 Dr. Karadzic says, In whose hands is radio Banja Luka? And Vukic says,

9 I beg your pardon? Karadzic, In whose hands is radio Banja Luka? Vukic:

10 A Muslim is a director. Karadzic: What the fuck? Vukic: Shall

11 I replace him straight away, let him go to fucking hell? Karadzic: Come

12 on replace him immediately. Appoint a man of yours. These are war

13 times. Appoint -- if he is not listening to you, appoint a man of

14 yours -- not listening. If he is not listening to you and is sabotaging,

15 appoint a man of yours. Then he goes on to ask who the main editor is

16 and is pointed out that her ethnicity is Serbian and she is a woman.

17 Now, that's another reflection, is it not, Mr. Kupresanin, of the

18 effort by Dr. Karadzic, contrary to your suggestion in paragraph 22, to

19 ensure the replacement of personnel deemed inappropriate with personnel

20 acceptable to the SDS?

21 A. May I start answering? The director of radio Banja Luka that

22 belonged to the television of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the director was a

23 Muslim. The director was not a Muslim it was Rajko Vasic. I remember

24 that very well. There was this Svetlana who was the editor. But it is

25 true that there was a man who was a Muslim, and this television -- I

Page 43529

1 cannot remember his last name now, maybe I will remember. We replaced

2 Rajko Vasic. Not this man who was there, who was of the Muslim faith.

3 We did not have any problems with him. We did not attack him at all. It

4 was this Rajko Vasic, who was our problem, a Serb. We did not touch the

5 Muslim at all. And this Muslim testified here in The Hague, as far as I

6 can remember, in relation to what happened during the war and the

7 Krajina. So what's bad about that? It is bad that we replaced people

8 who were working in television? In Bosnia-Herzegovina, we had these

9 televisions that were all anti-Serbs, Yutel, TV Zagreb, and I personally

10 do not mind having people dismissed or replaced. I was replaced, too, on

11 television, proposal of the SDS, President Karadzic.

12 MR. TIEGER: I tender that and obviously be -- I shouldn't say

13 obviously, but I assume it would be MFI'd unless there is agreement to

14 the contrary by the Defence.

15 JUDGE KWON: We will mark it for identification.

16 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P6509, Your Honours.

17 MR. TIEGER:

18 Q. Let me turn your attention, Mr. Kupresanin, to the crimes that

19 took place in the Krajina and particularly during 1992. Now, there was

20 no mystery about that, was there? I mean, there were many, many crimes

21 which took place and you were aware of them at the time or shortly after

22 they happened; right?

23 A. Well, it's been a very long time, for me to find out about a

24 crime. I mean, the crime committed at Koricanske Stijene, first of all,

25 people started whispering about that and then that went on for months,

Page 43530

1 and then I finally found out the truth. So television was probably

2 concealing that. Sometimes these media companies who were supposed to

3 provide information for some reason provided misinformation. So as for

4 many crimes, I did not find out about them quickly and no one sent me

5 information like that. To be quite frank, I heard about Prijedor too

6 late.

7 Q. Well, Mr. Kupresanin, back in 2001, you explained that many bad

8 things happened in Krajina and you would find out about those things

9 about 15 or 20 days after something had happened. And, indeed, you'd

10 find out from regular people, from Muslims and Croats, and specifically

11 you found out about Omarska about 15 days afterwards, that is after it

12 was formed. That's all true, right, that's what you said in 2001?

13 A. No, no. I found out about Omarska when President Karadzic called

14 me and he asked me to ask people in Prijedor to disband that reception

15 centre. For me that was a reception centre, not a camp, and that's what

16 I did. That was the time when I found out about that. How many days had

17 elapsed, I don't know.

18 Q. Well, let's look at what you knew or claimed to know in 2001. If

19 we could turn back to 25608, to English page 22, and B/C/S page 31. And

20 at lines 32 or 31 you begin to say, As far as I know, many bad things

21 happened in Krajina but I never knew anything about it. I would find out

22 about it only 15 or 20 days after something happened. And I would find

23 out about those things from Muslims and Croats and regular people,

24 ordinary people.

25 And then toward the bottom of that -- toward the end of that

Page 43531

1 answer you say at lines 39 through 41 in the English, For example, there

2 is camp in Omarska, and 15 days I didn't know what -- for 15 days I

3 didn't know about it. I was informed about it by relatives of Muslims or

4 Croats. That's what you said in 2001, isn't it, Mr. Kupresanin?

5 A. For example, if something happened in the territory of Krajina,

6 well, specifically concerning Croats, let's say, Bishop Komarica would

7 immediately come to my office and ask me to participate in inquiring into

8 that. And every time he asked, I went to inquire on the spot. That's

9 one type of information. Or, for instance, Emir Pusatlic [phoen], a

10 dentist, when an incident happened, when there was a problem, he would

11 come to my office. It would be some serious Muslim connection. He would

12 let me know and see if we could intervene. So that was this non-Serb

13 connection. And the Serb connection would be a request from

14 Radovan Karadzic for me to go to Omarska and do that job. So that would

15 be it.

16 Q. All right.

17 MR. TIEGER: I tender this excerpt.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be added too.

19 MR. TIEGER:

20 Q. Now, you mentioned Bishop Komarica and other people. Let me --

21 let me ask you about a specific example of crimes that you found out

22 about. You found out about the mass killing in the village of Bresevo,

23 where the Bosnian Serb army entered the village and killed, according to

24 what you learned, 68 people in July; correct?

25 A. I heard about it from Bishop Komarica. I didn't hear it from a

Page 43532

1 different source. He asked me to go to the scene and find out how much

2 of it is true. So we went. There were two military men with us. They

3 drove us. And we entered Brisevo village. It's not Bresevo, it's

4 Brisevo. We came to a different village which had a little Catholic

5 church. And when we came, there were some women there. Komarica held a

6 mass service. These women were moaning and asking us to enable them, if

7 we possibly can, to leave that village. We tried to tell them

8 different -- suggested different options, but they wouldn't listen. Now,

9 how many people were killed, I don't know. I don't know your figure is

10 correct. In one variant is 88, another variant is 63, and there are

11 different figures.

12 I was very willing to help, together with Bishop Komarica, and

13 Mr. Karadzic never held it against me that I made these efforts and he

14 always encouraged me, on the contrary, and told me that I need to look

15 after other ethnic communities. Usually, the president of the SDS,

16 Krzic, came; president of the HDZ, Gabelic; Catholic priests; hodzas;

17 Muslim intellectuals, came to my office, came to speak to me as if there

18 were no war going on. And I tried to help them all, and I did all

19 I could with the encouragement and approval of President Karadzic.

20 Q. When you learned about this terrible crime in Brisevo? Did you

21 keep it to yourself or did you tell someone in the republic-level

22 authorities?

23 A. I found out from Mr. Komarica the first time. Now, whether

24 I informed anyone, we had two military persons who kept a record and of

25 course they were supposed to submit a report to the military authorities

Page 43533

1 because the perpetrator was the army. I know that I discussed this with

2 several people and I'm sure that I discussed it with a member of the

3 Presidency, Biljana Plavsic. I was much closer to her than to other

4 people. Ideologically we were close. The others looked to me a bit like

5 communists, left of centre, or leftist.

6 Q. You also told Mr. Karadzic and you also told --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The witness also

8 said whereas the two of us were monarchists.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not sure I said Krajisnik.

10 I discussed it in detail with Biljana Plavsic, as a member of the

11 Presidency, not Karadzic. That's the one thing that I'm sure about. I'm

12 not sure about the rest.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

14 JUDGE KWON: Line 6 should say "Krajisnik" instead of "Karadzic."

15 MR. TIEGER: I believe that's right. That's certainly -- yeah,

16 that's correct, Mr. President.

17 Q. Let's turn back to what you said in 2001 when these events were

18 fresher in your mind. And if we could turn to page 62 of 65 ter 25608,

19 and page 92 of the B/C/S. Question, this begins at page -- line 39 of

20 the English:

21 "Okay, Mr. Kupresanin, my question is: When people informed you

22 about the crimes that were committed on them, what was your response to

23 those crimes, the killings and the destruction of their property?"

24 You said:

25 "Well, what I heard there I told the others. It didn't stay with

Page 43534

1 me or --

2 "Q. Who did you inform, who did you inform?"

3 And you said:

4 "For example, Momo Krajisnik, maybe a certain number of

5 ministers, all deputies from here."

6 Then it continues on to the next page in English, and same page

7 in Serbian, and you discuss how quickly according to the victims this

8 occurred, which brigade may have been involved, and then later we see you

9 say, No, I informed -- you didn't inform General Talic but no, I informed

10 ministers, minister of the army. It was Nikolic, I don't know, or it was

11 Subotic.

12 And the question was:

13 "So you're saying whoever was the minister of defence at that

14 time, the RS minister for defence, you brought this information to his

15 knowledge?"

16 And the answer is, That was the schedule. That was how you do

17 things.

18 So, in fact, that's who you recalled were among the people to

19 whom you reported this crime after you learned about it?

20 A. Well, okay, I was informed and I probably informed some other

21 people. I don't remember. I don't think that was within my competence.

22 I think it was within the competence of military courts and military

23 prosecutor's offices that were in operation at the time in Republika

24 Srpska. I had only two military men around me and on all my travels and

25 contacts with other ethnic communities and priests and hodzas, those

Page 43535

1 militaries were present, for the most part, and it was logical for them

2 to inform their commands, Talic and the others. That was not my job.

3 But because the crime had happened, I told people. That I know

4 100 per cent that I had spoken to Biljana Plavsic. About the others, I'm

5 not sure. It's possible that I spoke to the minister of the army as

6 well.

7 Q. You also said - and that's found at page 63 of the English, again

8 same page in Serbian - many people, even if they heard that, they didn't

9 want to hear about it. That was your experience in attempting to report

10 these things, wasn't it, Mr. Kupresanin?

11 A. Well, there were many situations when specifically the government

12 was not willing to do its job and they were not interested. I had

13 problems, and when I informed them they don't want to get involved. They

14 don't want to share in it. We know exactly who was in charge. Who

15 perpetrated the murders. We know exactly who perpetrated the crime.

16 It's quite sure that within one hour all the perpetrators could have been

17 identified, and later prosecuted and held responsible. I was a deputy.

18 It was not my job. But it is human to react as much as I could within my

19 limitations.

20 Q. And despite those efforts, those people who were known were not

21 arrested and prosecuted at that time; right?

22 A. I know that it's not fair.

23 Q. And --

24 A. They didn't do their job.

25 Q. I wanted to turn next to paragraph 60, in which you assert that

Page 43536

1 there were no organised expulsions. So that's the position that you take

2 in your statement. But back in 2001, your position was a bit different.

3 Then, you were asked about ways of making the Muslims and Croats leave

4 the area, and you indicated that you knew the municipalities did that and

5 said it was on their own initiative but then went on to say, Well, maybe

6 that's not the case. Maybe there was someone who co-ordinated it. Does

7 that refresh your recollection about the occurrence of organised efforts

8 to expel Muslims and the fact that you were not prepared to say at that

9 time -- first of all, you thought the municipality -- you were -- you

10 knew that the municipalities did it and you considered that maybe there

11 was someone who co-ordinated it?

12 A. Well, I was a deputy in the assembly of Republika Srpska. There

13 was never any activity in that direction or was such a project of

14 expulsion ever advocated. I was a member of the board and never was

15 there any activity in that direction. But I have to be frank and honest,

16 municipalities in Republika Srpska were states unto themselves and there

17 was no co-ordination whatsoever. For instance I was in Krajina. I

18 didn't know what was going on in Prijedor. I -- I didn't know what was

19 going on in Brisevo. I didn't know what was going on in

20 Koricanske Stijene.

21 I cannot say I ever encountered an incident wherein people would

22 be expelled at gunpoint. I know that people left so as to avoid military

23 service and because of poverty and deprivation. Nobody prohibited it,

24 and there is a Geneva Convention on the freedom of movement and it allows

25 people to move out and go wherever they like. There was Sarajevo where

Page 43537

1 people could not leave. So all of them lived in a ghetto, just to prove

2 the democracy of Alija Izetbegovic, and we all know how they fared.

3 Q. Let's go back to paragraph 60. So if I understand you correctly

4 you are not in a position to assert -- that you cannot assert that it is

5 not true that there was an active and systematic repression and expulsion

6 of Muslims. You can only say at this point that you don't know

7 everything that was going on, that's the most you can say, you're willing

8 to say now. But, in fact, in 2001 you said you knew that the

9 municipalities were doing that.

10 A. Well, I can say about the municipalities where I physically moved

11 around, I am from the Banja Luka municipality and I know that nobody was

12 expelled there, from Laktasi either. I was in Prnjavor, in some Muslim

13 villages in 1995. And in that municipality, in those villages,

14 specifically Muslim villages, I worked as a teacher and I went there to

15 visit my Muslim friends. I found them, they had never moved anywhere,

16 and they told me, The Serb authorities are treating us quite well. So in

17 1995, in August, I was there. In August 1995, the Muslims were there.

18 And there were charges against --

19 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear against whom.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For the expulsions of Muslims from

21 Prijedor. In other municipalities, I was not physically present, and I

22 could not make anyone send me daily reports. So I maintain that the

23 political leadership was not doing that. It was not the political

24 position of the top leadership or the assembly. But it's possible that

25 some municipalities did it. And it's very viable. It can be checked.

Page 43538

1 It's not a problem.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 2, page 85, the interpreters

5 didn't hear properly. The witness said I was deputy to the Main Board of

6 the party, and at the beginning of page 85, the witness enumerated

7 municipalities, Srbac, where he comes from, Laktasi, Banja Luka, Prnjavor

8 and Gradiska. These are municipalities where he knows nobody was

9 expelled from. Maybe there are some more municipalities that he

10 mentioned, but these did not find their way into the transcript.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would have noticed the buses, the

12 people being expelled, the police. I didn't see that. I only saw buses

13 carrying prisoners from Manjaca. There was an organised convoy of buses

14 headed by police cars and I saw that they were escorting someone. And

15 I asked who and they told me prisoners from Manjaca. But in those

16 municipalities where I was able to move around and visit, nobody was

17 expelled.

18 MR. TIEGER:

19 Q. Let's just as a final -- focus on this topic, let's turn to

20 page 36 of your 2001 interview, in the English, and page 52 at the bottom

21 and 53 at the very top of the Serbian. And at the bottom of the page in

22 English, beginning at line 41, you're asked, Did the Crisis Staff, again

23 referring to the ARK Crisis Staff, discuss ways of making the Muslims and

24 Croats leave this area of the Krajina? Your answer, I don't think so. I

25 know that municipalities did that on their own initiative but maybe

Page 43539

1 it's -- maybe that's not the case. Maybe there was someone who

2 co-ordinated it. That's what you said in 2001; right, Mr. Kupresanin?

3 A. I said "maybe, maybe" everywhere. I told you roughly the truth

4 about the areas where I moved around. I told you that the top leadership

5 of Republika Srpska, the political leadership, never pursued that, never

6 pursued any activity wherein people would be physically expelled and we

7 would remain alone in these areas. As to what happened in

8 municipalities, I don't know what happened in some other municipalities

9 such as Novi. I know that Pasic had certain problems. I know that much.

10 I know they had problems. But who else? I don't know. I know about

11 Kotor Varos. There were problems. I participated in Kotor Varos on

12 another project.

13 MR. TIEGER: I tender that excerpt, Mr. President.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be added.

15 MR. TIEGER:

16 Q. You mentioned Kotor Varos. Very quickly, what you said when you

17 went there was -- you were told the presidents of the local communes that

18 the Serb army has tanks and guns, and that you don't have the right to

19 sacrifice your children. So let's try to find some solution; right?

20 A. Right. I received on a daily basis information from the ground,

21 from the municipality of Kotor Varos, where heinous crimes occurred.

22 People were impaled, they were murdered, some people were even roasted on

23 a spit, if you can imagine that. I don't know in whose minds this idea

24 was born, but this was done by the Muslims and the Serbs were killed in

25 various ways. And then Bishop Komarica came to see me, I told him

Page 43540

1 horrible things are happening in Kotor Varos, let's do something about

2 it, and he said, Vojo, I'm at your disposal. Then I contacted two

3 Catholic priests in Kotor Varos and one hodza.

4 Q. I'm not so much interested at the moment in the details of your

5 activities in Kotor Varos at that time. I wanted to focus on your

6 position regarding the relative military weaponry available and your

7 comment that it was the Serb army that had tanks and guns. So I wanted

8 to ask you if it was not the case that you were always adamant, from the

9 beginning of the war to the end, that the Serbs were vastly superior

10 militarily to the Muslims and, in particular, in 1992?

11 A. Well, it was true, we had weapons. It was true we were able to

12 commit crimes. Now, combatting the Muslim and Croat army was not a

13 crime. However, there were hundreds of children there who were innocent.

14 I made an appeal. I told them, You don't have the right to kill your

15 children. I am at your disposal. I offered this, this, this and this.

16 But it's true they were -- they had tanks, they had webers, they he had

17 howitzers, they were able to do the job, and a lot of Muslims and Serbs

18 eventually were killed in that operation. But the purpose was to save

19 lives, but primarily the children. So we -- we carried out that project,

20 Mr. Komarica and I. Sometimes policy is stronger than all the howitzers

21 in the world.

22 Q. I have limited amount of time left so I wanted to turn to

23 paragraph 46 of your statement, Mr. Kupresanin, where you state that the

24 local -- you discuss among other things Omarska and Keraterm and you

25 state that the authorities, local authorities in Prijedor, acted on their

Page 43541

1 own initiative there. Now, that's not consistent with what you said back

2 in 2001.

3 In 2001, you said, in fact, you were interested to know who

4 ordered the establishing of the camp in Omarska. If you turn to page 37

5 of the English of the 2001 interview and page 53 of the B/C/S, and then

6 in a related excerpt at page 62 -- page 42 of the English and page 62 of

7 the B/C/S, there you're referring to, at the beginning, your effort to

8 get Mevludin Sejmenovic out of Omarska, which you say you did on your own

9 initiative, but then you say: I want to say that Radovan Karadzic told

10 me personally that he had nothing to do with that, but my feeling is -

11 what I have is - that the order about the camp, about the camps to be

12 established, didn't come from Brdjanin but somewhere, someone on the top,

13 but I don't know who from.

14 So back in 2001, Mr. Kupresanin, it was your position that you

15 thought that the Omarska camp, that you didn't -- first of all, you said

16 you didn't -- you were interested to know who ordered it, and that you

17 thought the order had come from somewhere on the top but you didn't know.

18 So your statement in -- in paragraph 46 that it was a local initiative is

19 belied by what you said in 2001 when these events were fresher in your

20 memory; right?

21 A. I can say, at the time when you were interviewing me, I did not

22 have the real picture. Now, after all this time that has passed, I gave

23 it a lot of thought. What actually happened in Prijedor? Two or three

24 days before the conflict in Prijedor, people from Prijedor and people

25 from Omarska came. They asked the president of the Executive Board, that

Page 43542

1 is to say the prime minister of Krajina, to enable them and find a way --

2 Q. Mr. Kupresanin, just -- okay. First of all, just so we get a --

3 are you relating now what you knew at the time or what you've learned

4 since?

5 A. I'm telling you the real truth and please hear me out. So two or

6 three days before this clash in Prijedor, people came from Omarska and

7 from Prijedor. Omarska is a place in the Prijedor municipality. The

8 delegation from Omarska asked that the municipality be divided into two

9 municipalities, Prijedor and Omarska. Why? Because of the Ljubija mine.

10 Ljubija is a mine that yielded huge money. And people from Omarska were

11 thinking that Prijedor is stealing from them, so they came to see the

12 president of the Executive Board to talk to him about how to go about it,

13 and he invited me to assist, to attend the meeting. So they asked me,

14 too, What should we do to achieve this division? I didn't know the

15 answer. Nikola didn't know the answer.

16 So the conclusion is, two or three days before the conflict in

17 Prijedor, the political leadership didn't know it would happen. That's

18 my opinion. I believe the army knew but the political leadership of

19 Republika Srpska did not know. And, again, I maintain that sometimes

20 municipalities acted on their own. And in this case, the political

21 leadership of Prijedor did not organise any conflicts or any clashes, and

22 in the end it was the Muslims who attacked the municipality of Prijedor,

23 not the political leadership of the municipality.

24 I exclude the political leadership of the municipality and the

25 republic but the army knew. The municipality was attacked. Some

Page 43543

1 villages were attacked but it was all done by Muslim forces. They were

2 the first to attack. So many people got killed in Prijedor.

3 Q. You -- we have to finish up pretty quick. Do you know how many

4 Muslims and Croats were in Omarska or Keraterm by the time of the attack

5 on Prijedor town on the 31st of May, 1992? Do you know how many Muslims

6 and Croats had already been rounded up from their homes and placed in one

7 or either of these camps?

8 A. I don't know about Keraterm. I visited Omarska and I saw

9 hundreds of people. A huge number of people were there. All these

10 people were leaning against the fence or were sitting down on the

11 asphalt. That was what I saw. I stood by these people, I spoke a few

12 words with them, because I know that I got the task to have the camp

13 disbanded and I came to do that. How many people were there? There were

14 many, perhaps 1.000 or 800. I don't know. I think people kept arriving

15 even after that.

16 Q. Well, there were --

17 A. There were many people there. I don't know anything about

18 Keraterm.

19 Q. All right. Two more quick points about Omarska: First of all,

20 you say, and you repeated it here a few minutes ago, that Dr. Karadzic

21 called you and suggested you use your authority and ask the local

22 authorities to close down Omarska. In fact, in 2001 you explained that

23 Dr. Karadzic called you to visit the municipal authorities and tell them

24 to dismiss the camp that day, and that day meant immediately after it had

25 been discovered by the international community and been highly

Page 43544

1 publicised. That's correct, isn't it?

2 A. No, that's not correct at all. I didn't say immediately. I said

3 that President Karadzic said that it should be dismissed and that on the

4 second day, when it was disbanded and when I went to Manjaca I entered

5 the buildings and I gave to speech to these people. I told them that

6 they would come to no harm and that only those who were guilty would be

7 held to account. And I saw the facilities, and the facilities could not

8 be put in order and adjusted for the needs. At least a month was

9 necessary. These were huge buildings, so probably the camp had been

10 prepared for 20 days or a month in order to be functional so that it

11 could be used. That was my estimate. And no one ever said a single word

12 that it had to be on the following day.

13 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I didn't tender the previous excerpts

14 referred to which were pages 62 and 63 of the English and 92 and 93 of

15 the B/C/S.

16 JUDGE KWON: English page numbers again?

17 MR. TIEGER: Sixty-two and 63.

18 JUDGE KWON: And not this one? Oh.

19 MR. TIEGER: I haven't put that to -- I asked a general question.

20 I haven't -- with respect to the answer the witness just gave, there is

21 not a --

22 JUDGE KWON: Very well, they will be added as well.

23 MR. TIEGER:

24 Q. If we could turn quickly to page 37 in the English, page 54 in

25 the B/C/S, and the lines -- relevant lines are 27 through 29 in the

Page 43545

1 English, 8 through 10 in the B/C/S, where you relate to -- you see that

2 there, Mr. Kupresanin? The line begins, I asked -- I asked one day

3 Radovan Karadzic, and then it continues, And he asked me as a deputy to

4 visit the Municipal Assembly in Prijedor and to tell them to dismiss the

5 camp during that day. And you've also said that you and Dr. Karadzic got

6 into a big argument about the camp on the phone. You see that excerpt,

7 sir? B/C/S is 8 through -- look at line 8 through 10 toward the top of

8 the page. That's what you said in 2001, that Dr. Karadzic asked you --

9 A. All right. I know that Dr. Karadzic asked me to do this but he

10 did not impose any deadlines. He didn't say I had to do it immediately.

11 First of all, it's impossible to do it at once. He said see what the

12 situation is like there and, please, as this was a camp through which

13 inmates kept moving, ask the army to create the conditions so that people

14 could live normally in the camp. But I don't remember that he said

15 I should do it immediately. I came to Prijedor and found a great number

16 of journalists there from various international agencies, such as

17 Reuters, the BBC, and so on, and I believe that they were at the camp.

18 They visited it at that day, and also visited the president of the

19 municipality. There were so many journalists there. I found them in the

20 municipal building.

21 Q. All right.

22 MR. TIEGER: I tender that excerpt, Mr. President.

23 JUDGE KWON: I think we saw that page before as well. We will

24 add that page.

25 MR. TIEGER: Okay.

Page 43546

1 Q. And finally, Mr. Kupresanin, I simply want you to confirm that

2 while you were at Omarska, you spoke to Dr. Karadzic on the phone and

3 that was in the presence of Mr. Sejmenovic, who you took out of the camp.

4 A. What have I heard? What am I supposed to say? What do you

5 expect from me? I hear you real well.

6 Q. I notice in discussing what happened in Omarska your statement

7 doesn't mention anything about Mr. Sejmenovic, anything about a telephone

8 call to Dr. Karadzic in the presence of Mr. Sejmenovic, which was

9 something that [overlapping speakers] --

10 A. [Overlapping speakers]

11 Q. Dr. Karadzic told Mr. Sejmenovic didn't happen. In fact, it did

12 happen. You did speak to Dr. Karadzic on the phone from Omarska in the

13 general presence of Sejmenovic and then you took him out of the camp;

14 correct?

15 A. No. That's not correct. I did not call anyone on the phone from

16 Omarska. I came from Omarska, then I informed Radovan, and Sejmenovic

17 was in my office at the time. Mr. Sejmenovic. I ordered half a litre of

18 coffee as the Muslims drink a lot of coffee and I gave him two boxes of

19 cigarettes. And I told Radovan, Mr. President, what is going on there?

20 And he told me, Vojo, those fools and idiots, no one obeys me. It was to

21 that effect. And it turned out that he had some idea about that, so

22 perhaps I did not put this nicely, and perhaps he was even more rude when

23 he said -- he said, Those guys there, those idiots, that was -- he said,

24 which means my conclusion from the conversation with him was that Radovan

25 had nothing do with it. But my conclusion was also that the political

Page 43547

1 leadership of the Prijedor municipality also had nothing to do with it.

2 My final conclusion was that the army oversaw all this.

3 How would the political leadership of one municipality allow the

4 Muslims to enter and kill so many Serbs, if they had been preparing

5 anything, the Serbs were killed first and then all the other things

6 developed as they did.

7 Q. So there was no problem with the telephone lines and the man you

8 spoke to from your office, from -- was Dr. Karadzic; right?

9 A. Yes, that's correct. I informed him what I had done. And

10 throughout this time, Mevludin Sejmenovic sat next to me and he listened

11 to what I was talking about. Only that this Mevludin, whom I treated as

12 my own brother, was here at a trial in 1994 for the first time and he

13 said the absolute truth about everything that he had seen, and it was

14 absolute truth, and then he corrected his positions. He kept changing

15 them, probably because he was persuaded by the political party that he's

16 a member of, so that I am somewhat angry or rather quite angry at him

17 because he was not fair and he was not correct.

18 MR. TIEGER: Nothing further, Mr. President. Thank you.

19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. So the Muslim you talked about is

20 Mevludin Sejmenovic who testified in this case?

21 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President.

22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Sejmenovic, S-e-j-m-e-n-o-v-i-c.

23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic: