1 Monday, 28
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the
6 Prosecutor versus Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
7 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the
9 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
10 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 Microphone for the witness.
14 WITNESS: WILLIAM STUTT
15 Examined by Mr. Nice:
16 Q. It's Colonel Stutt, I think?
17 A. Yes, it is.
18 Q. Colonel Stutt, we speak the same language,
19 and there is a problem there for -- with ensuring that
20 we go slowly enough for the interpreters. There will
21 be a pause between your answers and my next question,
22 while I ensure they have caught up.
23 Are you a career Canadian soldier with some
24 33 or more years experience? Your career is set out in
25 the first two paragraphs of the summary that's been
1 provided to the Court and the Defence; that summary
2 showing, amongst other things, that you joined the ECMM
3 monitors in August '93, joining team 4, having
4 responsibility for Zepce, Zavidovici, Breza and Vares,
5 becoming its team leader at the end of September.
6 Thereafter, taking over from Philip Watkins as the head
7 of CC Travnik on the 17th of October, and from Sir
8 Martin Garrod as the head of the RC Zenica in May '94,
9 eventually leaving for Belgium in August, '94?
10 A. Yes, that's correct.
11 Q. Your first visit to Zepce, was that on the
12 4th of September of '93, following a reported incident
13 of a mine, and did you make that visit in the presence
14 of Christine Amnanpour from CNN to consider HVO
15 allegations of considerable damage and deprivation in
17 A. Yes, that's correct.
18 Q. What did you find?
19 A. We found that Zepce wasn't exactly what we
20 had been led to expect, in terms of the fact that there
21 was in fact power, enough to eat, gasoline was
22 available and other consumables, to a much greater
23 degree than we had been led to believe. And, of
24 course, this caused us to conclude that Zepce was
25 getting sustenance from somewhere else, probably from
1 the BSA.
2 Q. Thereafter, was access to the -- for the ECMM
3 to Zepce controlled by Colonel Blaskic from his
4 headquarters in Vitez?
5 A. Yes, it was.
6 Q. Turning to Vares. On the 1st of October, did
7 you meet Zvonko Duznovic, the police chief for Vares?
8 A. Yes, I did.
9 Q. Did he tell you something about apparent HVO
10 and BSA intentions in relation to a village close to
12 A. Yes, he did.
13 Q. We've put the little map with which the
14 Chamber is familiar on the ELMO. Point out the village
15 concerned and its location, please, to Stupni Do and
16 Vares, and say what you were told.
17 A. No, I can't find Zepce on this map, but I
18 know where it is, because Stupni Do is here and that
19 village is south and slightly east.
20 Q. Could you use the pointer just to show the
21 Judges. There we are. Stupni Do is highlighted in
22 green, and the other village --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Nice, your microphone,
24 please. Interpreters cannot hear you.
25 A. [indicates].
1 Q. Sorry. The other village, of which you were
2 told, is called what?
3 A. Stupni Do.
4 Q. The other village?
5 A. Zizci.
6 Q. Let's go back. Just leave the map where it
7 was, please. I think on the 1st of October you saw
8 Zvonko Duznovic, and did he say something about --
9 about something that was going to happen to another
11 A. Zvonko said that there had been a report that
12 there would be an attack on the village of Zizci.
13 Q. Who did he say that attack was going to be
15 A. He said it was going to be an attack by both
16 the HVO and the BSA.
17 Q. It's all my fault for mishearing what word
18 you are using. It's Zizci. And if we look at the map
19 again, leaving it exactly on its present place on the
20 ELMO, Zizci is a couple of kilometres south-east of
21 Stupni Do. Now, in due course we know what happened at
22 Stupni Do. Did you at some stage wonder whether there
23 was any connection between Zizci and Stupni Do or not?
24 A. I did, because there were a number of
25 villages in that area, and by reputation it was claimed
1 that a great deal of black market racketeering was
2 going on. So it's possible there could have been a
3 similarity in the activities in those two villages.
4 Q. Moving on to the 9th of October. Did you
5 learn, Colonel Stutt, of the attitude of a man called
6 Ivica Rajic to the proposed repair of the
7 Kiseljak-Visoko road, which was then in a state of
9 A. Yes. At that time he wasn't supportive of
10 fixing that particular road, and the assumption then
11 would be so they could use the road that went through
12 Bilalovac and Busovaca.
13 Q. Briefly, could you see any logic in the HVO
14 wanting to enforce the using of the Bilalovac-Busovaca
15 road in preference to the Kiseljak-Visoko road or not?
16 A. Yes. If you can't use the Kiseljak-Visoko
17 road, you have an opportunity to repair a secondary
18 route you may need at other times for other reasons.
19 Q. In the event, did Blaskic intervene or make a
20 decision about repair of the road?
21 A. Yes. Eventually, the road was fixed.
22 MR. NICE: There's a small-ish collection of
23 documentary exhibits in chronological order. If they
24 haven't been distributed already, may they be
25 distributed, please, to the Bench and to the Defence?
1 The witness already has a collection in the same order
2 in front of him.
3 Perhaps if we can proceed in the way that has
4 sometimes been helpful, if the witness can look at his
5 own documents on the desk and the usher can simply lay
6 the appropriate documents on the ELMO as we come to
8 Q. Colonel Stutt, did you, on the 17th of
9 October, succeed Philip Watkins in Travnik?
10 A. Yes, I did.
11 Q. On that day, did you meet Dario Kordic,
12 Exhibit 1249 --
13 A. Yes, I did.
14 Q. -- being your report, as we can see from the
15 second sheet of that meeting?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. The first entry on the first page sets out
18 the title that you associated with him. How did the
19 title that you have there for him come about?
20 A. That's the position that he held as described
21 to me, and it was at the time the way we were
23 Q. He made the following points, A to -- well,
24 it's AA, B and C, actually -- that the Owen-Stoltenberg
25 Plan offered the most hope for peace, that Muslim
1 leaders were not in a hurry to obtain a lasting peace
2 because they believed that time was on their side,
3 particularly compared to Serbia affected by sanctions,
4 and he expressed the view or made the point that the
5 Muslims would suffer for one more winter. He made the
6 point that the military objective of the BiH in the
7 Vitez pocket was not for victory but to inflict
8 casualties and seize ground, little by little, and then
9 made the point that HVO commanders and politicians had
10 been directed to assist in any way possible the Convoy
11 of Joy based on a supposition that future convoy would
12 be dedicated to the Croats in the Lasva Valley. That's
13 your note.
14 Incidentally, the exclamation mark beside
15 that is, I think, not your annotation and has been put
16 on at some more later time. Is that correct?
17 A. Yes, that's correct.
18 Q. Can you remember where you met him on that
20 A. Yes. It was the first time I had met
21 Mr. Kordic, and I met him at what we referred to as the
22 dacha in Busovaca.
23 Q. Was that the lodge some kilometres up a
24 country lane or road?
25 A. Yes, it is.
1 Q. Can you remember now how he was dressed, or
2 surrounded, or anything like that?
3 A. I can't remember on that day if Mr. Kordic
4 was wearing civilian clothes or a uniform, but he was
5 with a number of aides, and it was the first time that
6 I had met Mr. Kordic.
7 Q. The 20th of October, Exhibit 1254.1 comes
8 next, you received a report that the Kiseljak-Visoko
9 road had been repaired. You also learned of six
10 soldiers apparently captured -- six BiH soldiers
11 apparently captured by the HVO in Vares close to a
12 checkpoint, this being a matter of concern. And as we
13 see on the document, 1254.1, your report for the 20th
14 of October, two thirds of the way down the first sheet
15 you report this:
16 "The village of Stupni Do is an isolated,
17 undefended, but completely surrounded Muslim village
18 which has been remarkably spared from the ravages of
19 war. It has been existing as a nearly untroubled
20 Muslim suburb of HVO Vares. This is either a case of
21 Stupni Do troops breaking some unwritten rule or it's
22 another indicator of military tension in the Vares area
23 of responsibility."
24 How did this arrest of six soldiers fit with
25 the previous level of cooperation between Muslims and
1 Croats in Vares?
2 A. It surprised me, because I had visited Stupni
3 Do a week or so previously and it was very, very
4 loosely protected by, at that point, by my count, six
5 uniformed BiH soldiers with very little in the way of
6 weaponry, and it was a very, very casual place. The
7 first report said that they had been arrested during
8 one of the regular shopping visits, and that they often
9 shopped in Vares, and this was most unusual.
10 Q. Paragraph 9 of the summary. The 23rd of
11 October of '93, did you receive a report from Oscar
12 Meijboom that their team of monitors had been held up
13 at a BiH checkpoint because of fighting going on in
14 Stupni Do and Vares?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. On the 24th of October, did you get first
17 reports of an alleged massacre in Stupni Do, coming
18 from the Vares government in exile, and did you send
19 monitors, including Weckesser, who reported smoke from
20 the village to which access was blocked by HVO
21 checkpoints, they also reporting that there had been
22 three military HVO vehicles leaving Stupni Do?
23 A. Yes, that's correct.
24 Q. What was your interim conclusion as to what
25 the vehicles from Stupni Do might have been carrying?
1 A. Stupni Do had been described as a location
2 where there was a great deal of black market
3 racketeering. The first assumption is that the
4 vehicles might well have been carrying contraband
6 Q. Was that ever confirmed on reports one way or
8 A. It was never confirmed one way or another.
9 Q. And indeed was there ever any discovery of
10 which you were aware in Stupni Do of supplies of
11 tobacco or alcohol or whatever else was on the black
13 A. None of which I'm aware.
14 Q. The next document, 1259, paragraph 11. The
15 second page of that document, paragraph 7, you said
16 that under the assessment of Vares, that its
17 complexities were well noted. It had been calm, with
18 Stupni Do untouched.
19 You went on to record or report a rift
20 between HVO Vares and the displaced HVO from Kakanj,
21 and you expressed the view that the Vares chief of
22 security, Zvonko Duznovic, had influence beyond his
23 position and had been identified on both sides as a
24 cause of problems in the area?
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. At this time was Emil Harah granting or
2 denying access?
3 A. Granting access.
4 Q. Sorry, he was granting access?
5 A. I'm sorry, are we talking about Stupni Do
7 Q. Yes, Stupni Do.
8 A. No, he was not granting access. He said it
9 was unsafe.
10 Q. And the BiH commander in the area, Nehru
11 Ganic, what was his attitude?
12 A. He was very, very concerned, first of all,
13 for the safety of the people in Stupni Do, and later
14 for the Muslim population in Vares itself.
15 Q. And at that time the route for humanitarian
16 aid to Tuzla, was that through Vares, and was that the
17 only route?
18 A. It might not have been the only route, but it
19 was the only main route.
20 Q. So what pressure was there to keep that route
22 A. We thought there would be great pressure to
23 maintain the status quo that existed, which is one of
24 the reasons we believed Vares had, up till that point,
25 been a very quiet place.
1 Q. And I think if we look at the first page of
2 the same exhibit, 1259, towards the bottom of the first
3 page we see Ganic is spoken of, and he complains of the
4 inability to protect the Muslims, and set a 1500 hours
5 deadline to gain access, saying that, absent that,
6 there would be retaliation. He also said that only 21
7 of 220 Muslims had escaped from Stupni Do. Correct?
8 A. That's correct, yes.
9 Q. We move to the 25th of October and the next
10 Exhibit 1263. On the 25th, did you learn of a denial
11 of access to Stupni Do?
12 A. Yes, I did.
13 Q. You learned of a meeting between Sir Martin
14 Garrod and Kordic, and were you aware of an allegation
15 from a witness to the effect that the HVO were acting
16 in self-defence, although you were able to form a view
17 on that general topic?
18 A. Yes, I was. As a result of my visit to
19 Stupni Do, before the tragic events that happened in
20 Stupni Do, I mentioned previously a very, very loosely
21 garrisoned, well-fed community. But most importantly,
22 there was no sign inside Stupni Do of fortification or
23 any of the signs of a military build-up, or any sign of
24 artillery or any type of weapon above and beyond the
25 personal weapon.
1 Q. Looking at 1263, on the first page under the
2 heading "political." The second paragraph sets out the
3 claim that the HVO was acting in self-defence, and your
4 reaction to that?
5 A. I had a great deal of difficulty believing
6 that HVO Vares was under any threat from anything I had
7 seen in the village of Stupni Do.
8 Q. And the foot of the page we have the
9 paragraph that begins with the reference to denial to
10 Stupni Do, but the last four lines of it set out how
11 the local Red Cross were able to inform you of the
12 incarceration of Muslim males in the elementary
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. And then over the page at the top, you were
16 by now being informed, that's the 25th of October, the
17 top two lines, of Kresimir Bozic having apparently
18 replaced Emil Harah?
19 A. Yes, that's correct.
20 Q. Were you ever able to verify whether these
21 were genuine replacements, one person by another, or of
22 when they occurred?
23 A. I couldn't say exactly when they occurred,
24 but Emil Harah had been replaced prior to the final
25 evacuation of the Bobovac Brigade.
1 Q. But as to any changes before the attack on
2 Stupni Do, were you ever able to verify one way or
3 another whether such changes in personnel relieving
4 them of responsibility had, in fact, occurred before
5 that date?
6 A. No, I could not confirm that.
7 Q. Paragraph 13 of the summary, the 26th of
8 October. Were you briefed by NordBat following their
9 interviews of Muslims who had escaped from Stupni Do?
10 A. Yes, I was.
11 Q. And the general allegation coming from those
12 Muslims was that the place had been attacked, burned,
13 men had been shot and women raped?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. What had happened to the survivors?
16 A. Imprisoned in Vares.
17 Q. The next document is 1266.1, your report for
18 the 26th of October. Did you learn, as recorded there,
19 of Muslim men being incarcerated before the attack on
20 Stupni Do; they being held in elementary schools?
21 A. Yes, that's correct.
22 Q. And if we look at the second page of this
23 exhibit, and at the top of it, we see a general account
24 of the allegations made via NordBat at that time. Is
25 that correct?
1 A. Yes, that's correct.
2 Q. Generally, was there any information coming
3 to you about members of the HVO in the Vares area who
4 may have helped Muslims?
5 A. Yes. Several sources reported that in some
6 cases HVO soldiers in Vares had protected some of the
7 Muslims who were their friends. Equally, it was
8 pointed out that somebody in Vares, who knew where the
9 Muslims lived, had to identify those locations.
10 Q. Next exhibit, 1261. This is a document
11 signed by Petkovic, dated the 24th of October,
12 apparently being a ceasefire. Comment, please.
13 A. This document was understood by us at the
14 time to be very much of an after-the-fact event.
15 Q. Connected to, in any way, the events that
16 were unfolding in Stupni Do?
17 A. Certainly, and more than likely as a result
19 Q. Any substance in this being a real and new
21 A. We certainly didn't think it was anything
22 new. We thought it was a reaction to the obvious
24 Q. Were you concerned, one way or another, about
25 whether at this stage there was any reprimand or
1 dismissal for those involved in Stupni Do?
2 A. Certainly, we expected something.
3 Q. Was it known or believed who was in charge of
4 the events that led to the massacre of Stupni Do?
5 A. The name Rajic appeared from all of our
7 Q. And was any step taken -- sorry, I mustn't go
8 too fast.
9 Any step taken by this stage to discipline or
10 dismiss that man?
11 A. His name didn't appear on the document of
12 those who were to be relieved as a result of Stupni Do.
13 Q. Paragraph 16. The 27th of October had
14 NordBat and the ECMM gaining access to Stupni Do?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. We turn, paragraph 17, to Exhibit 1293.2.
17 The first page, second paragraph, has your meeting
18 Dario Kordic, described as vice-president of the HVO
19 government, and Valenta, vice-president of the HDZ.
20 Asked about the future of Croats in Middle Bosnia,
21 Kordic said that Boban's heart was in Central Bosnia
22 and that he would cut his heart out before surrendering
23 it, and that the HVO would fight to the last man to
24 defend the three HVO pockets of the Lasva Valley,
25 Kiseljak, Kresevo and Zepce.
1 The next comment:
2 "HVO in Vares had been accustomed to a
3 lifestyle of smuggling and must not be compared to the
4 HVO elsewhere."
5 Whose comment was that, yours or Kordic's?
6 A. That was Mr. Kordic's.
7 Q. You went on to say that immediate BiH
8 intentions were to capture Zepce to split the pocket
9 between Novi Travnik and Busovaca, to take Kiseljak,
10 and finally to return and deal with Vitez?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. And he said they were organised, equipped and
14 Now, that was, I think, the first part of a
15 two-part meeting. Is that right?
16 A. Yes, it is.
17 I met privately with Mr. Kordic and his staff
18 prior to the much larger meeting which was attended by
19 a representative of BH command and a senior
20 representative of UNHCR. The purpose of this meeting
21 was to deal with a threat that had been made publicly
22 by Mr. Rajic to a UNHCR protection officer.
23 As a result of that, UNHCR suspended their
24 operations in Kiseljak. Something had to be done to
25 return the status quo. So the second part at the much
1 larger meeting, Mr. Kordic announced that Mr. Rajic was
2 being replaced.
3 Q. And do we see that meeting noted at the foot
4 of the first page, where you say he met with a
5 delegation from the UNHCR and UNPROFOR; Rajic is dealt
6 with with a great deal of reasonableness all around,
7 and then Kordic noted that good and honest men
8 occasionally give in to stress; the issue would be
9 dealt with tomorrow, and so on?
10 Now, the conclusion that you drew from that
11 about the line of authority for Rajic was what?
12 A. It was very clear, in order to fire someone,
13 that person has to work for you. Mr. Kordic was seen
14 to be Mr. Rajic's superior.
15 Q. Was there anything in that meeting said by
16 him or by anyone else to suggest that anybody else had
17 the relevant authority?
18 A. Nothing.
19 MR. NICE: The next exhibit is a very short
20 part of a long video. The video number is 1280. The
21 transcript, which I don't know that the witness has, is
22 1280.1. I hope I've had it queued at the right place,
23 but it doesn't matter if I haven't. I'll explain the
25 The video starts with a televised press
1 conference of Kordic, Kostroman and the interviewer,
2 but at page 8 of the transcript -- I beg your pardon --
3 page 7 of the transcript, we see, three quarters of the
4 way down the page, the interviewer speaking of an
5 opportunity to talk to the first man of Central Bosnia,
6 and I understand that to be a telephone interview. And
7 if we turn over now to page 8, halfway down, we come,
8 right in the middle of the page, to the one short
9 passage that I want this witness to deal with, for in
10 the interview, the interviewer and Kordic are dealing
11 with the meeting on the 9th of November with which
12 we've just been dealing.
13 I haven't had a chance this morning to check
14 that it's queued at the right place. I know how very
15 difficult it is to queue things from tapes. Can we try
16 it, and if not, we'll just live with the written
17 transcript? So if they could just play it and see if
18 we're at the right place.
19 [Videotape played]
20 MR. NICE: I'm going to stop that. Thank you
21 very much. If necessary, we can return to find it on
22 the monitor after the break. But for the time being,
23 the video having been provided, we'll proceed on the
25 If the witness has that at page 8, we see
1 that in a recorded interview, an interviewer has said
2 to Mr. Kordic:
3 "You were the first to promptly suspend the
4 decision of Ivica Rajic, the commander from Kiseljak,
5 who banned the work of the UNHCR. What is the
7 The first question, Colonel, do you
8 understand that to be a reference to the meeting with
9 which you've just dealt?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. The reply goes as follows:
12 "In any case, on the day this decision was
13 issued, the most responsible leaders of Croatian
14 Central Bosnia immediately organised a meeting with the
15 highest officials of the UNHCR and UNPROFOR based in
16 Kiseljak. That meeting was organised in Busovaca, and
17 I think that it ended in complete success to the mutual
18 satisfaction of both sides."
19 And then it goes on.
20 Your comment, please, on his then response to
21 a question about that meeting.
22 A. Yes. What follows in the transcript is not
23 what the focal point of the meeting was about. The
24 meeting really was a one-agenda meeting to deal with
25 the difficulty of Mr. Rajic having threatened the UNHCR
1 protection officer, and the announcement that the
2 decision had been taken to replace Mr. Rajic was the
3 really single agenda issue of that meeting.
4 Q. Does Mr. Kordic ever respond directly to the
5 question by the interviewer that he was the first
6 promptly to suspend the decision of Ivica Rajic?
7 A. Not that I've seen.
8 Q. The next exhibit, 1311. On the 18th of
9 November, your report, I think. We see on the first
10 page that you met Blaskic, and comments are there set
11 out about Kordic's position. From where did they come;
12 from Blaskic?
13 A. Yes, they did.
14 Q. Namely, that he was Mate Boban's
15 vice-president for Middle Bosnia, although for
16 procedural reasons, it may take some time before his
17 appointment could be confirmed, it was said. Is that
19 A. Yes, Colonel Blaskic told me that.
20 Q. The block of text ends, "All sources
21 questioned have said the same thing, Valenta is
22 finished, but Kordic remains the major HVO influence in
23 Middle Bosnia."
24 How did that fit or otherwise with your own
25 view on his role?
1 A. That confirmed what a number of other sources
2 told me, and that was my view at the time.
3 Q. I think at the top of the second page we see
4 the record of your meeting with Pero Skopljak, who said
5 he did not think HVO enclaves would hold out -- HVO
6 enclaves would hold out without external intervention.
7 Is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. But he also made it clear that the HVO
10 ambition was to link Kiseljak, Busovaca, Vitez, Gornji
11 Vakuf, Prozor?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. And thus to Herzegovina.
14 Next exhibit is 1315. So far as Rajic is
15 concerned, what was his position? Did he remain in
16 some position of authority?
17 A. He was replaced in his actual position, but
18 he remained on, we were told, by all concerned as an
19 adviser. And, in any event, remained the major player
20 in the Kiseljak area.
21 Q. So that if we look at the -- you ought
22 really, I suppose, to go to the second exhibit first,
23 1297, which is the 11th of November. You see on the
24 second page under paragraph 7 the first expressed
25 seeming belief, "It seems that Rajic has been replaced
1 because of his attitude towards UNHCR. This can cause
2 another internal problem in Kiseljak, since Rajic has a
3 sort of private army."
4 But the other exhibit, 1315, dated the 22nd
5 of November, records, at the foot of the first page,
6 that he remains on location as an adviser. The
7 evidence you've just given us.
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Was he also recorded as having these
10 paramilitary groups called the Apostoli, Maturice?
11 A. Yes, he was.
12 Q. The reputation of those units and their
13 function being to what effect?
14 A. Acting as a private army, group of bandits.
15 Q. What sort of things did -- were they alleged
16 to have done?
17 A. By repute, control of the black market.
18 Q. What was your overall conclusion about the
19 alleged removal of Rajic; was it genuine or not?
20 A. The issue of some kind of a public order had
21 to happen in order that the problem with UNHCR could be
22 seen to be dealt with. But most people understood that
23 Mr. Rajic was important enough that as long as he was
24 still in the area, he would be still in control of much
25 of what took place in Kiseljak.
1 Q. As we've heard already, following the Stupni
2 Do attack, the BiH took over the Vares pocket at the
3 beginning of November, '93, the Bobovac Brigade
4 abandoning and burning their headquarters when they
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. Exhibit 1331. On the 15th of December of
8 1993, did you meet Blaskic, at the foot of the first
9 page recorded, to ask him about the status of Kordic?
10 A. Yes, I did.
11 Q. Did he say that he had met Kordic earlier in
12 the afternoon, and neither of you were left in any
13 doubt about Kordic's importance in Middle Bosnia?
14 A. Yes, that's correct.
15 Q. You record, four lines up from the bottom of
16 the page, "Blaskic added that Kordic had been many
17 places and done many things, and that his position of
18 influence was assured."
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. You went on to say that the assembly on the
21 23rd of December would make Kordic's official position
22 clearer. And over the page, at a meeting you then had
23 with Maric, he said that Kordic was an official
24 delegate to the government of Central Bosnia, but had
25 refused to accept the position of minister in order to
1 better serve the inhabitants of Central Bosnia.
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. Next exhibit, 1376. On the 16th of February,
4 did you meet Dario Kordic?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. Top of the page in this report. Did you
7 discuss the newly inaugurated parliament in Sarajevo,
8 to which Kordic's response was what?
9 A. That it was a non-legitimate body, it
10 wouldn't stand the test of time, and would become
12 Q. Can you just turn over, please, to the second
13 page, subparagraph -- not subparagraph, "V1 discussed
14 with Dario Kordic." Now, is that the same meeting or a
15 different meeting? You haven't been pointed to it
16 earlier. Don't guess. Any recollection or not at the
18 A. I can't recall if the team was with me that
19 day. My guess would be that they weren't, because I
20 normally saw Mr. Kordic by myself.
21 Q. All right. Well, I'll move onto the next
22 exhibit. Paragraph 23 on the summary. Did you meet
23 again with Kordic in Busovaca on the 21st of March, by
24 which time Boban had resigned. And we can see your
25 comments underlined indeed at the first page of Exhibit
1 1404, where you say that his real position had been
2 uncertain, but that he had lately been emphasising his
3 position as a HVO Colonel. You expressed your view
4 about his being the most influential Croat in Middle
5 Bosnia, although under some challenge from the
6 president of Zepce. And you said, "It's apparent that
7 Kordic is calling all the HVO shots."
8 The last sentence, perhaps you would just
9 like to read it. Read it out to us and explain its
10 derivation, the sentence beginning with "initiatives
11 for peace and goodwill."
12 A. "While goodwill and peace initiatives were
13 going on elsewhere. Kordic remained more hardlined and
15 Q. Can you explain how you formed all of that,
16 that view?
17 A. I formed that opinion over a long period of
18 time, not at any one specific meeting, based on my
19 realisation that Mr. Kordic's relationship with the BiH
20 would be very much unrelenting, unbending and
22 Q. By this stage, what initiatives, peace and
23 goodwill, were there available to be built on?
24 A. Well, we were looking at the start-up of the
25 Washington Agreement, and places where there had been
1 absolutely no progress at all in the past were suddenly
2 starting to loosen up. For instance, routes between
3 Zepce and Zavidovici. There was a great deal of
4 interest in getting humanitarian through routes, that
5 humanitarian aid hadn't been able to get through
6 before. And, frankly, we were surprised at the
7 potential rapid progress of the peace process.
8 Q. How, if at all, did Kordic embrace the
9 possibility of speedy resolution?
10 A. Mr. Kordic's attitude was, consistently and
11 throughout, that we had to take one thing at a time,
12 that there were bad memories on all sides, and that
13 progress, because of this, must be very slow. In fact,
14 events caused things to move more quickly than that.
15 Q. Yes. Did you attend a meeting with -- at the
16 Hotel Vitez on the 4th of April with Kordic?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. I think that's Exhibit 1410. Have you got
19 that before you? I think it's at the second page, if
20 you look over to the second sheet. Tell us what Kordic
21 said then about the Federation parliament and so on.
22 A. As the Federation parliament moved forward,
23 and it relates to the meeting that Mr. Kordic had with
24 President Tudjman, following his meeting with President
25 Tudjman he became much more flexible about progress
1 between the two communities.
2 Q. What did you infer or interpret from what he
3 told you about the meeting with Tudjman --
4 A. It was my --
5 Q. -- and its reality?
6 A. It was my opinion he had been read the riot
7 act and publicly be seen to do those things that he had
8 been ordered to do, but we didn't expect progress any
9 faster than Mr. Kordic could control it.
10 Q. You've been speaking about the Easter
11 meeting. I think, in fact, you've been speaking from
12 memory and probably haven't got the document before
13 you. It doesn't matter. If you have, you may not have
14 had it open, but don't worry about that. You've
15 provided what I wanted.
16 On the 20th of May -- this is Exhibit 1423,
17 the second-to-last exhibit -- did you meet again Kordic
18 in Busovaca when he was dressed how?
19 A. He was dressed in uniform and explained that
20 he had been promoted to the rank of brigadier in the
21 reserves. However, this rank and position would be
22 largely ceremonial, since his main focus would be to
23 remain on political events.
24 Q. We see here, on the first page of Exhibit
25 1423, in the first paragraph, he setting out his recent
1 visit to President Tudjman, along with the mayors of
2 Central Bosnia, and maintained that he was pleased with
3 the solution reached at the Vienna talks about
4 self-governed Croat municipalities?
5 A. That is correct, and if I was out of sequence
6 here, I believe it was at that meeting that I formed
7 the opinion that Mr. Kordic's public image was changing
8 a little as a result of his meeting with Mr. Tudjman
9 and that he had, no doubt, been read some form of riot
11 Q. Going back to the Easter meeting, perhaps we
12 should just make sure you've got 1410 in front of you,
13 and it may not be in your stack because you haven't
14 brought a stack with you. It's the second sheet of --
15 the second page of 1410, top of the page, the Easter
16 meeting. In response to a question, Dario Kordic
17 says: "As the Bosnian Federation Parliament grows, the
18 CRHB will devolve out of existence." Is this the
19 discussion you had with him?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. He went on to say it wouldn't happen
22 immediately because it would be quite a while before
23 the question of canton boundaries was sorted out, and
24 he predicted the autumn before the Serbs would take it
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. And then 1429.1, the last exhibit, deals with
3 the week of the 12th to the 18th of June. We see on
4 the third page that President Tudjman had visited the
5 Croats of Central Bosnia. I think you met Mr. Kordic
6 shortly after that.
7 A. Yes. In fact, that was the meeting where
8 Mr. Kordic explained to me that he had been promoted to
9 the rank of brigadier in the reserve.
10 Q. And did he say that he would be working
11 mainly with the party of the HDZ in the cantons?
12 A. Yes, he did.
13 Q. Just, I think, one or two other questions.
14 You've already explained how you formed your
15 view about Kordic, but what was your approach to him in
16 order to have the benefit of relaxed conversations with
17 him; how did you treat him?
18 A. I always treated Mr. Kordic amicably. He
19 treated me the same way. I met infrequently with him
20 in Busovaca throughout the period of the year that I
21 spent in Middle Bosnia. I was told when I first got
22 there that Mr. Kordic was, in fact, the single most
23 important Croat person in Middle Bosnia, and during the
24 course of the year that I spent there, that opinion was
25 reinforced and was certainly the truth, from my point
1 of view.
2 Q. Did you visit him in a group or
3 individually? Did you go on your own or did you go
4 with others?
5 A. There were occasions, after I took over the
6 CC and then the RC, where I took a team with me, but
7 there were several occasions when I met with Mr. Kordic
8 in my capacity as either HCC Travnik or HRC Zenica with
9 just my interpreter.
10 Q. Did you call announced or unannounced?
11 A. I may have visited Mr. Kordic unannounced.
12 Usually, I made an appointment through the Hotel Vitez.
13 Q. We see, right at the beginning of your
14 narrative, though we didn't touch on it, about the
15 length of his first discussion or lecture to you. Do
16 you remember that?
17 A. Yes, I do, very well.
18 Q. Tell us about that, and tell us, if you can,
19 not just about your assessment of him as a figure of
20 authority but what he was like as a man.
21 A. I can't claim to know Mr. Kordic personally,
22 but he certainly maintained the same image throughout
23 the year that I did know him as a very, very intense
24 political and ambitious person, very unrelenting, and I
25 can't remember any instance where there was an advance
1 of the peace process as a result of an initiative
2 sponsored by Mr. Kordic.
3 Q. So, for example, at that first meeting, how
4 long did he talk for uninterrupted?
5 A. If my memory serves, the meeting went on for
6 about two hours. Mr. Kordic gave me his version of the
7 recent history of Middle Bosnia. Considering that it
8 had to go through an interpreter, I believe it took
9 about two hours.
10 MR. NICE: Thank you very much. You'll be
11 asked some further questions.
12 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:
13 Q. Good morning, Colonel Stutt. My name is
14 Stephen Sayers. I'm one of the attorneys representing
15 Mr. Kordic, and I'll be asking you a few questions.
16 Just as the Prosecution told you, we speak
17 the same language, so I would appreciate it if you
18 could just have a short break between my question and
19 the answer so that the interpreters can catch up.
20 Please forgive me as I bounce around a little
21 bit, but we did not receive the offer of proof until
22 just a few minutes before court started, so I'll try to
23 make it a well-organised presentation, starting out
24 with a few general topics and then going on
25 chronologically, much as the Prosecution did.
1 If I ask you any questions that are not
2 clear, just tell me. That's my fault and not yours,
3 and it's important to get a clear record here.
4 Now, sir, you yourself do not speak Croatian,
5 I take it.
6 A. No, I don't.
7 Q. And would it be fair to say that as a career
8 military man, you knew virtually nothing about Balkan
9 politics, or the politics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the
10 history of the country before your arrival in Zagreb
11 towards the end of August of 1993?
12 A. "Nothing" might be too harsh a term, but I
13 certainly did not arrive in the Balkans as an expert.
14 Q. You were sent, I believe, by your Department
15 of National Defence to the former Yugoslavia in August
16 of 1993. Correct?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. And upon your arrival in Zagreb, you received
19 what you have referred to in one of your statements to
20 the Prosecution in 1996 as the usual briefing; correct?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. And that lasted just a couple of days, I take
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. How much of that briefing was actually
1 devoted to Bosnia-Herzegovina as opposed to the rest of
2 the countries that made up the former Yugoslavia, sir?
3 A. Probably the bulk of the briefings dealt with
4 Middle Bosnia, since it was the hot spot at the time.
5 But they certainly weren't in any particularly great
7 Q. Had you studied up on Yugoslav politics or
8 the politics and history of Bosnia-Herzegovina
9 yourself, quite apart from the briefing that you
11 A. I had read two or three books prior to
13 Q. Do you recall what those were?
14 A. "Serbs and Croats" was one, and "Another
15 Short History of Bosnia."
16 Q. All right. Would it be fair to say that you
17 were essentially, to coin a phrase, thrown in at the
18 deep end in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after you had your
19 briefing and were sent to the regional centre at
21 A. As often we are, yes.
22 Q. Just to go through your duties with the
23 European Community Monitoring Commission, Colonel. I
24 understand that you started out initially as a monitor
25 on team V4, with responsibility, as the Prosecution
1 said, for Zepce, Zavidovci and Breza?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The senior team member, at that time, was
4 Stavros Kinigopoulos, correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And then after a three to four weeks on the
7 job, you then became the team leader in late September?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. I believe, sir, that you often worked alone,
10 due to the lack of resources and personnel available to
11 the ECMM; is that right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Then on October the 17th, you took over as
14 the head of the coordination centre in Travnik from
15 your predecessor Philip Watkins?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. You had become the head of the coordination
18 centre after only about six or seven weeks in the
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. All right. And I believe, sir, that you
22 stayed in that position until after the signature of
23 the Washington Agreement and the conclusion of the
24 hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Taking over as the head of the regional
2 centre on May the 15th, 1994 from your predecessor Sir
3 Martin Garrod?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. At the time that you became the head of the
6 coordination centre, Travnik was actually under the
7 control of Muslim armed forces and had been since the
8 June offences earlier in the year that you assumed your
9 duties; is that correct?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. You were aware that the HVO had suffered
12 significant military defeats in Travnik, Kakanj,
13 Fojnica, Bugogno, resulting in tens of thousands of
14 Croat refugees to other Croat enclaves. Would that be
15 fair to say, Colonel?
16 A. I am certainly aware of the general situation
17 that was reflected on the ground when I got there.
18 Q. And after the June offences and the July
19 offensive by the ABiH, you found the military situation
20 confronting you, at least insofar as the Croats were
21 concerned, was that they had been squeezed into four
22 geographically isolated pockets: First, the
23 Vitez-Busovaca pocket; second, the Kiseljak pocket,
24 under the -- for all of Ivica Rajic, as you've said;
25 third, the Zepce pocket; and finally the Vares pocket.
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. And then the Vares pocket, of course, fell in
4 the first week of November, resulting in, once again, a
5 very significant wave of refugees, civilians out of
6 Vares, Croat civilians; is that correct?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. All right. Now, just a few questions about
9 your perception of the chain of command in the Croat
10 military forces, Colonel. There is no question that
11 the headquarters of the HVO general staff was located
12 in Mostar; correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And I believe at the time that you were the
15 head of the coordination centre in Travnik, and at all
16 times until the end of the war the commander in chief
17 of the HVO armed forces was General Ante Roso; is that
19 A. I can't remember which date he ceased being
20 the commander, but yes.
21 Q. The only point that I am making is that
22 essentially throughout your duties as head of the
23 coordination centre, up until the signature of the
24 Washington Agreement, it was General Roso who was the
25 commander in chief of the HVO armed forces; all of
1 them, right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. All right. And I believe, sir, that his
4 chief of staff was Brigadier or by then General Milivoj
5 Petkovic; is that right?
6 A. As I recall, yes.
7 Q. Did you ever have the opportunity to meet
8 either General or Roso or General Petkovic?
9 A. I don't believe so.
10 Q. All right. Now, by the time that you arrived
11 in the Vitez-Busovaca area, the Croatian Republic of
12 Herceg-Bosna had been founded; is that right?
13 A. Allegedly, yes.
14 Q. All right. And were you aware that the
15 president of that republic was Mate Boban?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And as president, he was the supreme
18 commander of the armed forces; is that right? Or don't
19 you know?
20 A. I'm not sure if Mate Boban was a supreme
21 commander of the armed forces or not, to be honest with
23 Q. Just stepping down from the general staff
24 level, sir. It's true, is it not, that the military
25 organisation of the HVO armed forces was into various
1 operative zones?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Each operative zone being commanded by a
4 professional military man, a commander;
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And the Central Bosnia operative zone, or it
8 may have been the third operative zone by the time that
9 you were there, was commanded by Colonel Tihomir
10 Blaskic; correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Just one question with respect to General
13 Roso, or two questions. Were you aware that he had
14 spent over 20 years in the French Foreign Legion?
15 A. I had heard that he had served in the French
16 Foreign Legion, as had others.
17 Q. And were you aware, sir, that he was not
18 simply the commander in chief of the HVO armed forces,
19 but that he actually sat on the nine person
20 presidential council that was appointed on the 10th of
21 December, 1993, that he also discharged governmental
22 functions as well as purely military functions?
23 A. I never dealt with anything that concerned
24 his governmental duties.
25 Q. All right. Now, with respect to Colonel
1 Blaskic, you said in your statement, on page 3, the
2 1996 statement, that there was no question that he was
3 the military operational zone commander of Central
4 Bosnia. And that remains your view today; right?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. And I believe, sir, that you met with then
7 General Blaskic after he had been promoted, after the
8 signature of the Washington Agreement; is that right?
9 A. I did.
10 Q. And all of the forces in the Vitez-Busovaca
11 pocket certainly were under the command of Colonel
12 Blaskic during the time that you were head of the
13 coordination centre in Travnik; is that fair to say?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. All right. So that's the troops, special
16 forces, military police, artillery resources, as far as
17 you know; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. All right. And, at least organisationally, I
20 think, it's true that the Kiseljak and Vares and Zepce
21 pockets fell under his command; correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Proceeding down from the operative zone
24 level, it's right, isn't it, or didn't you deal at this
25 level, but I think it's right that the operative zones
1 were actually organised into various municipality based
2 brigades, which reported up the chain of command to the
3 operative zone headquarters?
4 A. I'm not sure that the organisation, as I knew
5 it, would ever fit in to a clean staff college line and
6 staff presentation. But I can't argue with what you
7 are saying.
8 Q. Did you ever meet the commander of the
9 brigade that was based in Busovaca, the Nikola
10 Subic-Zrinjski Brigade? I think his name was commander
11 Dusko Grubesic.
12 A. I believe I met him, but it would have been
13 one of the team leaders that dealt with him on a
14 regular basis. I had no personal, regular contact.
15 Q. All right. Colonel, we've already had the
16 privilege of hearing from Sir Martin Garrod, and he
17 prepared an end of tour report on April the 18th,
18 1994. It's already in evidence. Did you ever read
19 that report from him?
20 A. I can't recall if I read Sir Martin's.
21 Q. On page 4 of his report he says that all of
22 the Muslim generals that he ever met were unanimously,
23 as he puts it, hardliners. Is that your view too?
24 A. I guess that means -- I guess a definition by
25 what you mean by hardline. In my experience, some were
1 definitely more hardline than others.
2 Q. All right. Did you ever have the opportunity
3 to meet either General Alagic or General
5 A. I met General Hadzihasanovic. I knew I dealt
6 with General Alagic on a regular basis. And the 3
7 Corps replacement General Mehmed Alagic.
8 Q. All right. And I take it that your
9 predecessor, Sir Martin Garrod, also dealt with General
10 Alagic and General Hadzihasanovic, as far as you know,
11 on a fairly regular basis?
12 A. Certainly.
13 Q. Very well. Just winding up the general
14 questions, Colonel Stutt. Did you ever hear of a Croat
15 political body called the Croatian community of
16 Herceg-Bosna, so-called HZ HB?
17 A. I may have read about it in a description or
18 a report, but it's nothing that came up on my screen as
19 something I had to pay attention to, doing what I was
21 Q. Very well, sir. And I take it from your
22 answer that you never studied governance structure, and
23 that you never gained an understanding of who may have
24 been politically prominent within that organisation?
25 A. I worked very hard to know who was
1 politically prominent.
2 Q. All right.
3 A. But the organisation you are describing to me
4 isn't familiar. The community.
5 Q. All right, sir. Just on one other question.
6 Did you know that Dr. Jadranka Prlic was the president
7 of the civilian arm, at least of the HVO, from August
8 the 14th, 1992, until the ministries of the Croatian
9 Republic of Herceg-Bosna took over the governmental
10 functions of the HZ HB and the HVO on September the
11 30th of 1993?
12 A. No, I did not.
13 Q. All right. Have you ever met Dr. Prlic?
14 A. Not that I recall, but certainly not that I
16 Q. Did you ever know that he was, in fact, the
17 president of the HVO?
18 A. Yes, I would have known that.
19 Q. And did you have a contemporary understanding
20 that there were three vice-presidents of the HVO: One,
21 Mr. Ivankovic; one, Mr. Valenta; and the other
22 Mr. Zubak. And you were aware of that?
23 A. Yes, we certainly knew that, but it wasn't
24 always possible to match descriptions to personalities
25 and power.
1 Q. Very well. And did you ever have the
2 opportunity to meet the head of the defence department,
3 Bruno Stojic?
4 A. No.
5 Q. All right. You made some reference during
6 your direct testimony to the Stoltenberg Owen Plan that
7 was approved and endorsed, I believe, by the
8 International Community on the 6th of August 1993.
9 It's true, sir, that the Croat contingent was the first
10 to sign this plan, just as they had been the first to
11 sign the Vance-Owen Plan; is that right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And the Stoltenberg Owen Plan actually
14 envisaged a sort of loose federation, if you like, of
15 three constituent republics of the three constituent
16 peoples, Muslims, Croats and Serbs; is that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And were you aware that the Croatian Republic
19 of Herceg-Bosna, on paper, was founded on the 28th of
20 August, 1993, about three weeks after the endorsement
21 and approval of this plan by the International
23 A. I don't recall the date.
24 Q. All right. The founding documents, sir, and
25 they are already in evidence, were actually signed by
1 the chairman of the House of Representatives, a man by
2 the name of Perica Jukic from Zepce. Did you ever have
3 the opportunity to meet Mr. Jukic?
4 A. If he was in Zepce, I certainly did. But he
5 was not one of the main influences in Zepce, I can
6 assure you.
7 Q. Zepce, if we could use a vernacular turn of
8 phrase, was Ivo Lozancic territory, wasn't it?
9 A. Got it.
10 Q. He was, in fact, the most prominent figure in
11 Zepce and rigidly controlled the operations of affairs
12 there, did he not?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Were you aware, sir, that the Croatian
15 Republic of Herceg-Bosna did not have any office of
17 A. That's difficult to answer, because various
18 reports said that there were vice-presidents, and it
19 was very hard to confirm.
20 Q. Yes, sir. I wonder if I could just ask the
21 usher to put this document that's previously been
22 marked as Exhibit D143/1 onto the ELMO. This might jog
23 your memory a little, Colonel. But if it doesn't, just
24 tell me and we'll remove it. This is a report dated
25 the 15th of December by the regional centre in Zenica.
1 It's a daily report. And under paragraph 1(a), the
2 head of the coordination centre in Mostar apparently
3 met with a gentleman by the name of Slobodan
4 Lovrenovic, who was the press adviser to Mate Boban.
5 And he was explaining the functions of the recently
6 announced presidential council, and explained that the
7 republic, without vice-presidents, found itself in need
8 of an alternative mechanism to support the presidential
9 office in Boban's absence. Do you see that?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Does that jog your memory, sir?
12 A. It jogs my memory, inasmuch as a report I
13 read recently, where they referred to the possible
14 necessity to bring a vice-president out of Middle
15 Bosnia, but if they did that, it would have to be
16 someone who was a quote/unquote "war hero", and that to
17 do so would send the wrong message.
18 Q. And you can see, from the information that's
19 contained shortly after the passage I just read to you
20 from this paragraph, that Mr. Kordic didn't hold
21 presidential office anymore but was simply an ordinary
22 member of the house of representatives; correct?
23 A. That's what it says.
24 Q. Right. And, in fact, Zoran Maric, the
25 president of the HVO in Busovaca, actually confirmed
1 that to you in a meeting that you had with him; isn't
2 that right?
3 A. If I put it in the report, he told me that.
4 But I guess I have to emphasise that what Mr. Kordic's
5 actual position is -- was for a great deal or period of
6 time, we worked very hard to determine, and the only
7 answer we could get is that we would find out
8 eventually, but regardless of what the position stated
9 was, that Mr. Kordic was, in fact, the man in Middle
11 Q. Yes, Colonel, I understand that that's your
12 conclusion. But it would be fair to say that there was
13 a lot of confusion surrounding Mr. Kordic's position in
14 the really early days of this new republic that was
15 founded on the 28th of August of '93; would that be
16 fair to say?
17 A. It would be fair to say there was some
18 confusion as to what the nomenclature of his position
19 was, but there was no doubt about who you spoke to in
20 Middle Bosnia.
21 Q. All right. Let me address your attention to
22 Mr. Valenta, one of the people to whom you spoke. Did
23 you ever have the opportunity to meet him?
24 A. Several times.
25 Q. All right. He was described to you as, I
1 believe, the vice-president of the Croat Republic of
2 Herceg-Bosna. This is the description that's contained
3 on a September the 22nd, 1993, daily report which has
4 already been introduced into evidence as Exhibit
5 Z1211.1, vice-president of the Croat Republic of
6 Herceg-Bosna. Did you ever understand that, in fact,
7 Mr. Valenta was never the vice-president of the
8 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna?
9 A. No, I never understood that he wasn't a
10 vice-president, but I knew that he wasn't the person I
11 would go and speak to if I had something important to
13 Q. Did you ever have the opportunity to read
14 Mr. Valenta's book?
15 A. No.
16 Q. All right. Just a few questions, sir, on
18 I believe the first visit that you made to
19 Zepce was on September 4th, 1993. Correct?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. And to get there from Vitez or Busovaca, you
22 had to drive through territory that was controlled
23 completely by ABiH forces; is that right?
24 A. Yes, through Zenica.
25 Q. Yes, the Zenica municipality, that's right.
1 And it would be fair to describe Zepce as a Bosnian
2 Croat enclave that was totally surrounded by Muslim
3 forces; isn't that right?
4 A. There was a BSA back door to Zepce.
5 Q. So it was surrounded by Muslims partially,
6 and then the remainder of the circumference, if you
7 like, of Zepce was cut off by Bosnian Serb forces;
9 A. It was not unusual to find a BSA detachment
10 in one end of Zepce.
11 Q. All right. Now, you talked about the
12 Kiseljak road problems in early October of 1993, and at
13 this point I'm going to try to pick up the pace a
14 little bit and proceed on chronologically, just as the
15 Prosecution did.
16 JUDGE MAY: It may be a convenient time,
17 then, to adjourn.
18 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Mr. President.
19 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now for half an
21 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 11.30 a.m.
23 MR. NICE: Your Honour, just before
24 Mr. Sayers starts, I'm concerned about the timetable
25 for today and the week, given the shortened period of
1 time available to the Prosecution.
2 Mr. Sayers tells me he'll go into the
3 afternoon and take half an hour of the afternoon with
4 this witness. I don't know if the Chamber is going to
5 be able to -- I note that I was one hour and two
6 minutes, I think, in chief. The number of topics
7 covered is comparatively restrictive. I don't know if
8 the Chamber is going to be able to sit late this
10 JUDGE MAY: Until 5.00.
11 MR. NICE: I certainly hope we can get the
12 other witness in and either out or nearly out today.
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Mr. Sayers, I don't
16 understand what can justify, really, that you go
17 until -- in cross-examination until this afternoon with
18 this witness. Really, I can't understand that,
19 because, yes, there are of course elements, but the
20 majority of them are not very new, and I cannot
21 understand why we have to take more time than the
22 testimony in chief in this case.
23 MR. SAYERS: Two answers, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Yes.
25 MR. SAYERS: First, I'll try not to go in the
1 afternoon, obviously. I'll try to move as quickly as I
3 Second, it was extremely difficult to predict
4 the nature of the direct examination today, because the
5 witness covers a lot of territory. He's given very,
6 very extensive statements, and there are a very
7 significant quantity of documents that we had to go
9 But I've made quicker progress than I
10 thought, and I hope that I will be through by the
11 lunch. But if I'm not, it won't be more than 10 or 15
12 minutes, or half an hour at the most.
13 JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with it in the next
14 hour and a half. That will give you two hours, twice
15 as long as the Prosecution.
16 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour.
17 Q. Well, Colonel, you've heard we're under the
18 gun here, so let's try to move forward smartly.
19 Your first connection with Ivica Rajic was in
20 early October of 1993, when apparently he was reluctant
21 to allow UNPROFOR to improve a road between Kiseljak
22 and Visoko, is that correct, or to repair it?
23 A. Correct. But my contact with him was not
24 direct; it was indirect.
25 Q. And it's true, is it not, that
1 Colonel Blaskic --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the second witness's
3 microphone be switched on, please?
4 THE WITNESS: Am I on now?
5 THE INTERPRETER: The left-hand one.
6 JUDGE MAY: Help the witness, please.
7 JUDGE MAY: Apparently, one of the
8 microphones is not working. Let's not waste any more
9 time, if we can. Can you speak, please, into it,
11 A. Sir, is this good?
12 JUDGE MAY: That sounds fine. Thank you.
13 MR. SAYERS:
14 Q. It's true that Colonel Blaskic had to order
15 Ivica Rajic to repair that road; isn't that right?
16 A. As far as I understand it, yes.
17 Q. Now, your -- as I understand it, sir, you
18 talked about seven meetings with Mr. Kordic, seven that
19 you had through your time in Central Bosnia. The first
20 was on October the 17th; is that right?
21 A. If that's the date of my report, then that's
22 the date.
23 Q. All right. And the next time that you met
24 him was in November, and there's a report on that, as
25 we've seen. Well, let's take it one step at a time.
1 Mr. Kordic was essentially making political
2 points to you regarding your conversation with him on
3 October the 17th, 1993; wasn't he?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You say that Mr. Kordic was described as the
6 vice-president of the HVO government. It's fair to say
7 that you, yourself, did not have an understanding of
8 the various nuances of differentiation between the HVO
9 and the HR HB when you first met with him in October;
10 is that fair to say?
11 A. That's fair to say, and I'm not sure I
12 understood all the nuances when I left.
13 Q. I take your point, Colonel. You did not have
14 a clear and precise picture in your own mind of how
15 Mr. Kordic fitted into the political tapestry of the
16 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna; would that be fair
17 to say?
18 A. That would be fair to say, although I
19 certainly understood how he fit into the power grid.
20 Q. Let me gloss over some of the points that I
21 was going to go over with you. Let's talk about the
22 events just before Stupni Do and the events surrounding
23 Stupni Do, sir, since you gave a lot of testimony on
25 It's true, is it not, that Vares was a
1 geographically isolated pocket cut off from the other
2 Croat enclaves, the Vitez-Busovaca pocket and the
3 Kiseljak pocket being, I guess, the closest?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. The civilian government of Vares consisted of
6 Anto Pejcinovic, who was the president of the HVO
7 government there, I believe?
8 A. As I recall.
9 Q. Zvonko Dusnovic was the chief of military
10 police there; correct?
11 A. He was military or military and civilian. I
12 can't remember. But although you can find a list of
13 who the important people are, it became very obvious
14 that Zvonko Dusnovic was the person you spoke to and he
15 influenced a degree of authority over the Bobovac
17 Q. And the third person in authority was the
18 chief of civilian police, Ivica Gavran?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Yes, you met him. You did meet him, I take
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, the Muslims had established their own
24 parallel civilian government, or war presidency as they
25 called it, located in Dabravine to the south of Vares?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. And the president was Mervana Hadjimurtezic.
3 A. I've always wondered how you pronounce that,
4 but yes.
5 Q. It would be fair to say that immediately
6 before the Stupni Do incident, there was a series of
7 escalating incidents which caused great tension in that
8 area. Wouldn't you agree?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. All right. After the successful Muslim
11 offensives in Travnik, Bugogno, Fojnica and Kakanj,
12 tens of thousands refugees had left those locales, and
13 the refugees from Kakanj, about 15.000 of them,
14 actually relocated to Vares. Is that consistent with
15 your recollection?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. All right. The six soldiers that you
18 identified who were arrested on October the 20th, sir,
19 these soldiers were reported to you to be in uniform
20 and carrying weapons; correct?
21 A. I can't recall whether or not they were
22 carrying weapons, but they were in uniform and in
24 Q. All right.
25 A. If I so noted they were carrying weapons,
1 then that would be accurate.
2 Q. Have you had the opportunity to review your
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Your statements. All right. And you just
6 said, on page 5 of your statement, I don't think that
7 it's contested, that these gentlemen were supposedly
8 carrying weapons at the time that they were
10 A. So be it.
11 Q. And they were supposed to be soldiers
12 associated with the operative group Istok or the OG
13 East. Is that your recollection, sir, the ABiH east
15 A. In general, yes.
16 Q. All right. Now, sir, were you aware that the
17 village of Kopljari had been attacked by ABiH forces on
18 October 22, 1993, and that the entire civilian
19 population had been displaced and all of the houses in
20 that village burned to the ground?
21 A. Yes, I was. We were trying to find a
22 rationale for Stupni Do. That was given as one of the
23 theories at the time.
24 Q. All right. In fact, in the ECMM daily
25 summary of October the 24th, I believe it was noted,
1 and perhaps by you, sir, it's a report that you
2 authored. If we could just have this introduced into
3 evidence. Thank you.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Document will be marked
6 MR. SAYERS:
7 Q. Just to draw your attention to the bottom of
8 the page, sir. A United Kingdom liaison officer team,
9 V4, learned that the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had
10 attacked and captured the Croat village of Kopljari,
11 and you made the observation that the HVO action in
12 Stupni Do could be in retaliation for that. Is that
14 A. That was a possibility.
15 Q. You had the opportunity, I believe, Colonel
16 Stutt, to converse with the ABiH commander in
17 Dabravine, a man by the name of Ekrem Mahmutovic?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And he told you, I believe, that instructions
20 had been sent by radio to the population of Stupni Do
21 to evacuate that village on the night of October the
22 22nd. Do you recall that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And there is no question that Stupni Do was
25 obviously in radio contact with ABiH headquarters in
1 Dabravine at that time, right?
2 A. No. I'm not sure if Stupni Do was in radio
3 contact with anybody.
4 Q. But nonetheless, Mr. Mahmutovic, the ABiH
5 commander, told you that radio contact had been
6 established with Stupni Do the night before the attack,
7 and that instructions to evacuate the civilian
8 populations had been issued by the war presidency?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Very well. It was Commander Mahmutovic who
11 actually told you that Stupni Do was a local black
12 market gateway to BSA controlled territory; right?
13 A. I don't believe he was the first person to
14 tell me that.
15 Q. Right. In fact, a number of sources --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- reported to you that Stupni Do was a
18 lucrative centre for black market and smuggling in that
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. In fact, I believe that there are a number of
22 reports authored by the ECMM on precisely this point;
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. All right. In fact, you reported, I believe,
1 in your November the 2nd statement that has already
2 been marked as Exhibit D117/1. I wonder if I might
3 just put this on the ELMO so that you could have it
4 before you, Colonel.
5 This is an accurate copy of your report on
6 the 2nd of November, sir, is it?
7 A. It certainly appears that way, yes.
8 Q. All right. And Commander Mahmutovic told you
9 that in early October, the local HVO had demanded a
10 substantially higher cut of the black market profits
11 from the operations going on in Stupni Do, that this
12 had been turned down by the Stupni Do authorities, and
13 that the people had been killed in Stupni Do as a
14 result of their part in the black market; is that
16 A. That was one of the theories put forward at
17 the time, yes.
18 Q. Were you aware that there were approximately
19 50 members of the ABiH or Territorial Defence located
20 in Stupni Do and that they had a variety of weapons
21 available to them, including automatic and
22 semi-automatic weapons and a 60-millimetre mortar?
23 A. I think in my report I counted six, so if you
24 see six people on duty, anywhere 30 and slightly above
25 would be accurate. If you say they had automatic and
1 semi-automatic weapons, that certainly makes sense. I
2 did not see a 60-millimetre mortar, but a 60-millimetre
3 mortar is very small and easily concealed.
4 Q. Yes, sir. And I take it that when you
5 visited Stupni Do, you did not ask the local soldiers
6 to give you an inventory of all of their weapons.
7 A. Certainly not.
8 Q. Right. Now, there's one more reference in an
9 exhibit that's in evidence, Exhibit Z1281. I'll just
10 read you a portion --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel please
12 slow down?
13 MR. SAYERS: Yes.
14 Q. It says that:
15 "Hadzihasanovic told the HOM, the head of
16 mission, that Vares was known as an area for smugglers,
17 and gangs and groups of smugglers had been sent there
18 to keep up tension. If the situation is tense, they
19 can do what they want to do."
20 Do you ever recall reading comments such as
21 that or hearing of comments such as that from General
23 A. No. That's to say I don't recall. That's
24 not to say there was not a statement to that effect.
25 Q. I understand, Colonel. Thank you for
1 pointing that out. Now, let's discuss Emil Harah for
2 just a minute.
3 Prior to the fighting in Stupni Do on October
4 the 23rd, 1993, there's no question that he was the
5 commander of the Bobovac Brigade in Vares; isn't that
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. And it was Emil Harah who actually denied
9 access to your V3 and V4 monitor teams the day after
10 the killings in Stupni Do on October the 24th, 1993;
11 isn't that right?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. So it's clear that Mr. Harah was still in
14 command of the Bobovac Brigade one day after the
15 killings; right?
16 A. I am not clear precisely when Mr. Harah
17 ceased his command. This became an issue later.
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. Questioned by a number of sources.
20 Q. Yes. The only point I'm making, though, is
21 access to Stupni Do to your V3 and V4 monitor teams was
22 denied by Commander Harah on the 24th of October, and
23 that's clear, isn't it?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. All right. Now, with respect to the orders
1 about which you were asked that were issued by
2 General Petkovic, you were shown one which was a
3 ceasefire order dated October the 24th, 1993, and that
4 was actually sent to the commander of the Bobovac
5 Brigade, wasn't it?
6 A. I had seen a copy, yes.
7 Q. And that's true, it was the Bobovac Brigade
8 commander to whom that was addressed; correct?
9 A. To whom it was addressed, yes.
10 Q. All right. Not to any other commander in any
11 other region, but specifically to that commander of
12 that brigade in Vares; correct?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. The second order, sir, you weren't shown.
15 Let me just ask the usher to put this on the ELMO for
16 you, and I think you have seen it before. It's Exhibit
17 Z1258, an order dated October the 23rd, 1993, issued by
18 General Petkovic. You have, I take it, Colonel, seen
19 this order before.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And there's no question that this order is
22 issued to the commander of the armed forces in Vares,
23 and it's a direction by the chief of staff of the HVO
24 to remove three civilians from office; Anto Pejcinovic,
25 Zvonko Duznovic and Ivica Gavran; correct?
1 A. That's correct, but you earlier described
2 Zvonko as being the head --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. The
4 microphone is off.
5 THE WITNESS: Okay now?
6 MR. SAYERS: Press the oblong green button,
7 Colonel. There you go.
8 THE WITNESS: Okay?
9 JUDGE BENNOUNA: No.
10 THE WITNESS: Okay?
11 MR. SAYERS:
12 Q. You're quite right. But the other two
13 gentlemen, Anto Pejcinovic and Ivica Gavran, were
14 members of the civilian government; right?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. And Zvonko Duznovic, as far as you
17 understood, was the chief of military police in Vares?
18 A. I thought he had a dual role.
19 Q. But whatever that role was, Colonel, he was
20 basically fired or removed from any position of
21 authority --
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. -- on the authority of the commander in chief
24 of the HVO on the 23rd of October; right?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. Yes, sir. Sometime after October the 24th of
2 1993, it's clear, is it not, that Kresimir Bozic
3 replaced Emil Harah as the commander of the Bobovac
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Now, sir, were you aware that UNPROFOR did an
7 extensive investigation into the events at Stupni Do on
8 October the 23rd, 1993, and that that investigation was
9 conducted during the months following the killings of
10 civilians in that -- and combatants in that village?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Were you aware that the HVO actually
13 attempted to do their own investigation as well by
14 sending a colonel from Mostar, along with a military
15 investigator, to the UNPROFOR headquarters at
16 Kiseljak? I believe the person consulted was the head
17 of the G1 legal section there, Lieutenant General
18 J.W. Koet, K-O-E-T, and the individuals sent from
19 Mostar were Colonel Vinko Lucic and Mr. Ivica Bandic.
20 Were you aware of that?
21 A. I recall seeing a reference that an HVO
22 investigator had made contact with UNPROFOR. No other
23 detail beyond that, that I recall.
24 Q. All right. There are two such reports. Let
25 me show you one and ask you if you've seen it before,
1 and if you have, I would like it to be introduced into
2 evidence. If you have not seen it, then obviously
3 we'll move on.
4 If we put it on the ELMO, as you can see,
5 Colonel, this is a document dated November 30th, 1993.
6 It's entitled the first report meeting in connection
7 with the Stupni Do incident, and it relates to a
8 meeting that occurred on the 22nd of November of 1993,
9 as you can see from paragraph 1, with Colonel V. Lucic,
10 an investigator from the HVO headquarters in Mostar,
11 Mr. I. Bandic. Have you ever seen this before?
12 A. No, not that I recall.
13 Q. Very well. Let's move on, then.
14 You were aware that the NordBat had conducted
15 interviews with about 193 persons from Stupni Do and
16 that those interviews were transcribed and many of them
17 were taped or videotaped; is that correct, sir?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Were you aware that the Secretary-General of
20 the United Nations had issued a report on February the
21 10th of 1994, relating to the findings of the United
22 Nations in connection with what had happened at Stupni
24 A. I'm aware of the report. I haven't read it.
25 Q. All right. Turning to the next subject, sir,
1 October the 25th, 1993. You said that you learned of a
2 conversation between Sir Martin Garrod and Mr. Kordic
3 in connection with the Stupni Do incident. It's right,
4 isn't it, that when the subject was raised, Mr. Kordic
5 contacted General Petkovic and asked what had
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. All right. And that's unsurprising for a
9 political figure to contact the military chief of
10 staff, if you like, to find out what had happened in a
11 military operation; it didn't particularly surprise you
12 to find out that he had done so? Is that right?
13 A. That didn't surprise me in the least.
14 Q. All right. In connection with the
15 conclusions drawn by the European Community Monitor
16 Mission about Stupni Do, Colonel, it's true, is it not,
17 that interviews with the evacuees from that village
18 told representatives of your organisation that the
19 attack had been launched by soldiers, not from the
20 Vares area, but rather from the area of Kakanj and
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And indeed the two units I think that you
24 identified, one known as the Apostoli, one known as the
25 Maturice. The Apostoli actually came or were composed
1 of people who had fled from Travnik during the June
2 offensive of the ABiH; is that accurate to say, so far
3 as you know?
4 A. I've heard. I'm not sure how accurate it is.
5 Q. And the Maturice were composed of people who
6 had fled from Kakanj during the June offensive as well;
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And I believe you said in your 1997 statement
10 that all sources agreed that the killings in Stupni Do
11 were carried out by extremist troops from Kiseljak;
13 A. It may not have been exclusively, but every
14 report we had said that.
15 Q. Yes. Now, in the end-of-tour report that
16 your predecessor prepared, and I wonder if I could just
17 put this on the ELMO. It's already been marked as an
18 exhibit. Thank you very much. The only part that I
19 would like to discuss with you, sir, appears on the
20 first page, paragraph 5. Sir Martin Garrod concluded
21 that: "It is likely that the decision to mount the
22 operation," and he is talking about the Stupni Do
23 operation, "was taken at fairly low level."
24 You would agree with that, wouldn't you?
25 A. Sorry.
1 Q. No problem.
2 A. I am thinking about that. In my own mind,
3 I'm not sure whether it was taken at a low level or
4 not. I certainly won't interfere with anything that
5 Sir Martin has said in the past.
6 Q. You just have a complete lack of information
7 on that subject; correct?
8 A. No, not a complete lack of information. I'm
9 just not certain, in my own mind, at what level the
10 order to attack at Stupni Do was taken at.
11 Q. Very well. Now, you actually went to Vares
12 shortly after the town was captured by ABiH forces; is
13 that right?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. In your 1996 statement you said that, by the
16 end of October of 1993, Vares had become a military and
17 humanitarian powder keg. I guess you still stand by
18 that observation today, sir?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. It's true that total chaos reigned
21 immediately before the fall of Vares, isn't it?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. Civilian authority had basically broken down,
24 and the military authorities were organising an
25 imminent retreat and were, I think to use your words on
1 page 10 of your 1996 statement, nervous to the point of
3 A. They were. I saw it.
4 Q. And you actually saw the Bobovac Brigade
5 headquarters gutted by fire and empty, on the 4th of
6 November when you visited with Sir Martin; is that
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. You also saw the 7th Muslim Brigade members
10 who had led the vanguard into the town, basically
11 destroying property and looting; isn't that right?
12 A. I saw some of the Bobavac Brigade driving
13 through the streets in pick-up trucks, firing into the
14 air. The looting took place over a longer period of
16 Q. Immediately following the fall of Vares,
17 10.000 refugees headed variously for Kiseljak and over
18 the hills to Dastansko; is that right?
19 A. Right.
20 Q. Now, let's talk very briefly, sir, about the
21 threat made to the UNHCR representative by Ivica
22 Rajic. The person to whom a threat was made, I
23 believe, was Mark DeGiulio; is that right? Or can you
25 A. I can't recall the name. I wasn't at the
1 meeting, but it was reported accurately, including the
2 name, by the victor 3 team.
3 Q. Yes. Now, you've stated in your 1996
4 statement that it was reported to you that Ivica Rajic
5 was not in command of the HVO in Kiseljak, and you knew
6 this by the 11th of November, 1993, and had been
7 replaced by General Petkovic. Is that right?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. And indeed, the Croatian press had reported
10 that Ivica Rajic was relieved of his duties on the
11 order of the office of the president of the Croatian
12 Republic of Herceg-Bosna, Mate Boban; correct?
13 A. That's correct. But we've got to remember
14 who issued the first order announcing his replacement.
15 Q. Well, who did?
16 A. In my memory, Mr. Kordic announced that at
17 the meeting in Busovaca.
18 Q. Well, sir, Mr. Kordic told you that the issue
19 was going to be dealt with the next day; didn't he?
20 Isn't that what your report says?
21 A. It says the issue will be dealt with the next
22 day, in that the replacement would take place the next
23 day. But if you talk to any of the people who were
24 there, the representative from BiH command, the
25 representative from UNHCR who came in from Geneva, we
1 all left that meeting with a very clear understanding
2 that Mr. Rajic had been replaced, the decision had been
3 taken, and everyone could back away from the perceived
5 Q. Right. But you don't know who actually
6 issued the order replacing him, do you?
7 A. I only know the order I heard.
8 Q. Right. But you never saw a written order,
9 did you?
10 A. Not that day, no.
11 Q. And you, frankly, don't know whether this
12 figure was removed by General Petkovic, as you said in
13 your statement, or by someone else; do you?
14 A. I know exactly who announced that Mr. Rajic
15 was replaced, and at that moment the tension concerning
16 the incident solved.
17 Q. Right. But you did say in your statement
18 that he was replaced by General Petkovic, and you don't
19 know any information to the contrary?
20 A. I don't know any information to the contrary
21 concerning General Petkovic.
22 Q. You did say in your statement that the
23 Croatian press had announced that this Mr. Rajic had
24 been relieved of his duties on order of the office of
25 the president of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna,
1 Mate Boban, and you don't know any information to the
2 contrary of that, do you?
3 A. No.
4 Q. And I do believe, sir, that you never
5 actually asked Mr. Kordic whether he had actually --
6 whether he actually had the power to remove people,
7 such as Rajic, after this November the 9th meeting, did
9 A. I did not ask Mr. Kordic personally, but it
10 was clearly understood by all of the people who
11 attended that meeting that it had happened.
12 Q. All right. You, frankly, do not know whether
13 Mr. Kordic has any or had any power to intervene in the
14 military justice system that was in place in the HVO,
15 governed as it was by rules of military discipline, and
16 you don't know whether he -- well, let's just have an
17 answer to that question first.
18 A. It was certainly perceived by all concerned
19 as an intervention, but whether the order started
20 higher, I don't know.
21 Q. Well, I think that's perfectly fair,
22 Colonel. But the fact of the matter is that you would
23 agree that in military court martial proceedings
24 generally, or military disciplinary proceedings
25 generally, there really is no place for a civilian
1 intervention, is there? Once the Prosecution is
2 started, it runs its way through the military justice
3 system without intervention on the part of civilians?
4 A. I wouldn't compare conventional military
5 court martial or any other proceedings with anything I
6 saw during my year in Bosnia.
7 Q. I understand. But what I said is true? For
8 example, in your military disciplinary system, there is
9 no place for civilian intervention, is there, once the
10 investigative wheels have been set in motion,
12 A. I don't see the comparison, but ...
13 Q. But what I said is true, nonetheless, isn't
15 A. In my case, yes.
16 Q. And you don't know in the -- within the HVO
17 military system whether there was any place for
18 civilian intervention once the military wheels of
19 justice had been set in motion, do you?
20 A. I'm not sure if it started with the military
21 wheels of justice or the civilian wheels of justice. I
22 maintain that the lines of command and communication
23 were often blurred. I don't think it lends itself to a
24 crystal clear comparison.
25 Q. But it would be fair to say, sir, that you
1 yourself never had a discussion with Mr. Kordic about
2 whether he had any power to intervene in the military
3 justice system?
4 A. No, I didn't.
5 Q. And you never had any discussion with him,
6 whether he had any power to issue orders, for example,
7 to military forces, as opposed to orders coming from
8 Colonel Blaskic or higher, General Petkovic, or General
9 Roso; is that right?
10 A. I never questioned him about that, but I
11 certainly understood where he fell in the power
13 Q. You discussed meetings that you had on
14 November the 18th, 1993, with Colonel Blaskic and Pero
15 Skopljak. Now, who was Pero Skopljak and where did he
16 fit into the power structure, as you understood it?
17 A. Pero Skopljak, if I recall, and if I am wrong
18 I'll stand corrected, was vice-president of the HDZ in
19 Vitez. Now, if I'm wrong, I'll bow gracefully. He was
20 a minor political figure in Vitez, and he's one of the
21 people that you went and talked to when you were going
22 to go out and talk to everyone. He was certainly not
23 seen by me or my colleagues as one of the powerful
24 figures in Vitez.
25 Q. All right. Now, you were speaking to Colonel
1 Blaskic. Would it be fair to say that Colonel Blaskic
2 was not a politically sophisticated person; he was a
3 military man and did not follow the political process
4 particularly carefully?
5 A. I can't say that he didn't follow the
6 political process carefully, but you are right in the
7 first part of what you said, that he certainly
8 emphasised the military dimension of his career.
9 Q. I wonder if I could ask the usher to put this
10 document on the ELMO. It's been previously marked as
11 Exhibit D143/1, dated December the 15th, 1993. And the
12 part to which I would like to draw your attention,
13 Colonel, actually appears on the bottom of the page.
14 If the usher could just move it up. Yes. There is a
15 discussion of the HCC, whom I believe is you, meeting
16 with Colonel Blaskic, the HVO commander of Vitez, and
17 inquiring into the status of Mr. Kordic in the Croatian
18 Republic of Herceg-Bosna. With Colonel Blaskic
19 explaining to you that, "I was not a politician and had
20 not followed the political process, but they had met
21 with Mr. Kordic earlier in the afternoon and that they
22 were both in no doubt as to Mr. Kordic's importance in
23 Middle Bosnia."
24 Is that right?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. Would it be fair to say that the military
2 liaison officers with whom you dealt, and from whom you
3 got information about Mr. Kordic's unclear status
4 within the political structure, were not themselves
5 particularly sophisticated politically, they were just
6 regular soldiers?
7 A. No, I don't think that's quite accurate.
8 When we were trying to determine exactly what
9 Mr. Kordic's actual position was, we dealt with a much
10 wider range of people than military liaison officers.
11 Of course, Colonel Blaskic is one of the first people
12 we would ask, but we got the same answer, literally,
13 from everyone.
14 Q. Well, you said that you had developed an
15 amicable relationship with Mr. Kordic over the year
16 that you knew him?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And you felt, I think, fairly free to drop in
19 on him whenever you wished, or to arrange an
20 appointment to see him whenever you wished; right?
21 A. Mr. Kordic always made himself available if
22 he was --
23 Q. Right. When you were having these questions
24 in your mind around November -- October, November of
25 1993 about the precise status of Mr. Kordic, did you
1 ever just sit him down and say, "Look, what exactly is
2 your position, sir?"
3 A. One of the first things we wanted to do was
4 see Mr. Kordic and ask him, and if my memory serves,
5 Mr. Kordic was not there or available at that time,
6 because you're quite right, that would have been one of
7 the first things we would have done.
8 Q. All right. But would it be fair to say, and
9 I don't want to dwell on this point, but you never
10 actually sat down with him and said, "We're in doubt,
11 Mr. Kordic, as to what your precise position is. What
12 is it?"
13 A. I can't recall asking him that question,
15 Q. Let's move on, Colonel, and we are, I think,
16 making progress that will allow us to finish perhaps by
18 It's true, is it not, that the HVO was on the
19 defensive throughout the time that you were the HCC in
20 Travnik and that, in fact, the ABiH launched a number
21 of offensives just before Christmas in 1993, being one
22 of them, and then just after the new year, on January
23 the 9th of 1994, another offensive aimed at trying to
24 cut the main supply route just south of Santici; is
25 that right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And indeed this was despite a ceasefire
3 agreement that had been reached -- the second attack
4 was despite a ceasefire agreement that had been reached
5 between General Rasim Delic, who had replaced General
6 Zefer Halilovic, and General Rosso on behalf of the
7 ABiH and HVO; is that right?
8 A. That ceasefire did not hold.
9 Q. You referred to a discussion that you had
10 with Zoran Maric, the president of the HVO in Busovaca,
11 sometime in December of 1993. He actually told you
12 that Mr. Kordic's position was just one of -- one
13 delegate in the House of Representatives of the
14 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Does that ring a
16 A. I recall reading my report on that.
17 Q. Yes. And he was just therefore, at least at
18 that time, December of 1993, one of 70 or so
19 legislators in that body, in the House of
20 Representatives; is that consistent with your
21 recollection, sir?
22 A. If that's how the report went in, that's
23 fine, but it wouldn't have attracted a particularly
24 great deal of attention.
25 Q. Were you aware that on the 17th of February
1 of 1994, just after, I believe, your -- just before
2 your third meeting or fourth meeting with Mr. Kordic,
3 he had been appointed as one of the two vice-presidents
4 of the House of Representatives, the legislation of the
5 HR HB?
6 A. I recall that, yes.
7 Q. And the president of the House of
8 Representatives was a man by the name of Ivan Bender?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. All right. Let me just show you one
11 document, sir, that you were not asked about, and I
12 believe that this document was drafted by you on the --
13 or is dated the 13th of July, 1994, and it basically
14 summarises your relationship with Mr. Kordic.
15 We'll put it on the ELMO, sir. It's a
16 one-pager, and I have several questions in connection
17 with it.
18 Just so that we're all clear, this is a
19 special report that you drafted on or about the 13th of
20 July, 1994, and it concerns your dealings with
21 Mr. Kordic over the preceding year; is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. All right. If you take a look in about the
24 middle of the page, there's a reference to the fact
25 that it was announced that Mr. Kordic had been
1 appointed as assistant to the chief of staff of the
2 HVO. Do you see that?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you know what functions, if any, he had in
5 that position as assistant to the chief of staff of the
7 A. No, I don't. If I recall, this is after I
8 met Mr. Kordic in Mostar, at which time he would have
9 explained his new duties to me. But I don't know what
10 specific duties he would have had as assistant to the
11 chief of staff.
12 Q. Very well. If you could just keep that
13 report ready to hand, I have some concluding questions
14 on that. But let me just continue through here.
15 JUDGE MAY: What's the number? Tell me the
16 number, please.
17 MR. SAYERS: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: The number is D193/1.
19 MR. SAYERS:
20 Q. In the meeting that you described, Colonel,
21 with Mr. Kordic on the 16th of February, a topic of
22 discussion arose about the newly-inaugurated and
23 short-lived parliament of Croats in Sarajevo which
24 Mr. Kordic expressed to you he did not regard as a
25 legitimate institution and, in his opinion, it wouldn't
1 stand the test of time. Do you recall that?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. The institution, in fact, sir, did not stand
4 the test of time, did it?
5 A. No, it didn't.
6 Q. Mr. --
7 A. It kept us busy, trying to find out what it
9 Q. Yes. Proceeding on, sir, by this time,
10 February the 16th, 1993, it's right, isn't it, that you
11 understood that Mr. Boban had actually resigned as
12 president of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna and
13 that he had done so at a meeting held in Livno on the
14 8th of February of that year?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And did you know that the Presidential
17 Council essentially took over the functions that were
18 discharged by President Boban, with Dr. Prlic, amongst
19 others, being on the Presidential Council?
20 A. I'm not aware of the precise details of who
21 took over what responsibilities exactly when Mr. Boban
23 Q. All right. Suffice it to say, though, sir,
24 that you do not have any information to the effect that
25 Mr. Kordic was ever a member of the Presidential
1 Council; is that fair to say?
2 A. Or contrary.
3 Q. But you just don't know?
4 A. Exactly.
5 Q. Mr. Boban, however, was felt by his
6 colleagues to have resigned for honourable reasons; is
7 that right?
8 A. I heard more than one opinion as to that, and
9 I certainly don't know which of the opinions was
11 Q. All right. In the report, I believe, that
12 was drafted by the regional centre in Zenica for the
13 week of February the 13th through the 19th, 1994, the
14 comment was made that Ivo Lozancic in Zepce bears
15 watching because he was on the Presidential Council of
16 the HR HB. Were you aware that the commander of Zepce
17 was actually on the Presidential Council or were you
18 not aware of that?
19 A. I wrote that, but it wasn't because
20 Mr. Lozancic was on the Presidential Council that I
21 made the comment I did. I made that comment for other
23 Q. Right. There was some doubt as to who was in
24 the political ascendancy at that point, so to speak,
25 Mr. Kordic on the one hand and Mr. Lozancic on the
1 other; is that right?
2 A. Some of the comments that Mr. Lozancic made
3 to me led me to believe that he wasn't Mr. Kordic's
4 biggest fan.
5 Q. I'm sure that's the case. And you weren't
6 exactly Mr. Lozancic's biggest fan, were you, Colonel?
7 A. No.
8 Q. No. In fact, you regarded him as a little
9 better than a hoodlum; isn't that right?
10 A. He had some of those qualities.
11 Q. Now, turning to the meeting that you had with
12 Colonel Blaskic, then General Blaskic, on April 4th of
13 1994, sir, he had described to you tremendous
14 difficulties that he had in trying to exercise command
15 over forces in the Kiseljak area; is that fair to say?
16 A. If we're thinking of the same report, the
17 discussion I had with Colonel Blaskic, during that
18 discussion he said he had difficulty exercising command
19 and control because he had to use different techniques
20 in each of the different areas. He didn't say it was
21 impossible. He just said each area had to be treated
23 Q. Yes. And, in fact, he told you that he
24 himself had issued instructions to the chief of civil
25 police in Busovaca to find out who may have been
1 responsible for the destruction of the mosque in that
2 small town in September of 1993; is that right?
3 A. I recall the incident, not the date.
4 Q. Right. But you recall that it was
5 Colonel Blaskic who had issued instructions to the
6 chief of civil police in Busovaca to initiate that
7 investigation, sir?
8 A. I don't recall that instantly, but it
9 certainly sounds logical, and I'm not going to question
10 it if you have it in one of my reports. It doesn't
11 leap to memory, but it sounds reasonable.
12 Q. Let me see if I can jog your memory. In the
13 statement you gave to the prosecutors over the course
14 of about a week in July of 1996, June and July, on
15 page 17 you said that Colonel Blaskic introduced the
16 chief of civil police and said his instructions were to
17 find out the persons responsible for the destruction of
18 the mosque in Busovaca and frame charges; is that
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Very well. Now, in all the time that you
22 knew Colonel Blaskic and met with him, he never
23 contended at any time that he was in any way somehow
24 subordinated to Mr. Kordic and had to take military
25 orders from Mr. Kordic, did he, sir?
1 A. No, he didn't, but on a couple of occasions
2 he reminded me, as is in one of the reports, that
3 everybody understands what Mr. Kordic's position in
4 Middle Bosnia is, which is a neither/nor answer, in my
6 Q. But the point is he never insisted to you
7 that Mr. Kordic had any kind of individual unilateral
8 authority to issue orders to the military outside of
9 the normal chain of command, did he?
10 A. He never said that, but he never said he
11 didn't either.
12 Q. And when you met Brigadier General Blaskic at
13 that point, he was the second in command to
14 General Petkovic in Mostar; correct?
15 A. Podgorica.
16 Q. Podgorica, yes, I'm sorry. Wherever it was,
17 but the point I'm making is that he was the second in
18 command to the commander in chief of the entire HVO;
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. And his replacement as commanding officer of
22 all of the HVO forces in Central Bosnia was now General
23 Filip Filipovic, was it not?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Indeed, sir, you had some discussions with
1 Brigadier General Blaskic concerning the extremist
2 gangs in Kiseljak, and I believe that Brigadier
3 General Blaskic instructed you that the identity of the
4 wrongdoers and perpetrators of criminal acts was known
5 and that they would be dealt with in due course;
7 A. I recall that.
8 Q. And in fact, sir, you yourself noticed, over
9 the course of your duties as head of the coordination
10 centre in Travnik, that there was, over the course of
11 October of 1997 to the signature of the Washington
12 Agreement, a gradual increase in the efficiency of the
13 Croat police and that there was a reduction in the
14 amount of crime that was actually going on in your
15 area; is that right?
16 A. After the Washington Agreement and the
17 cessation of hostilities, things became easier to do
18 everywhere. However, in despite of that, there were
19 still continuous reports of gang activity, particularly
20 in Kiseljak and Mostar.
21 Q. All right. But the point that I'm making is
22 that Brigadier General Blaskic at that point told you
23 that the identity of the wrongdoers was known and
24 that --
25 A. I recall him telling me this.
1 Q. Now, turning to a meeting that you described
2 in your direct examination on May the 20th, 1994, with
3 Mr. Kordic, you said that you were surprised at this
4 meeting by the reasonable and moderate attitudes and
5 statements that he made about the agreed cantons in the
6 new Federation government and that you ascribed this to
7 having been read the riot act by President Tudjman, the
8 president of Croatia; right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did you know that Mr. Kordic was one of about
11 100 or so people who were part of the delegation from
12 Central Bosnia visiting Zagreb and President Tudjman
13 between February 1994 and May of 1994?
14 A. I wasn't able to count them. I don't know.
15 Q. Do you know how many people actually were
16 part of that delegation --
17 A. No, I don't.
18 Q. Very well. You are not suggesting that this
19 was an individual mission, if you like, by Mr. Kordic
20 to President Tudjman in Zagreb, and that there was a
21 one-on-one meeting at which he was specifically
22 individually read the riot act, as you put it? You
23 just don't know, do you?
24 A. I don't know if there was a one on one. But
25 I accurately reported a change in attitude.
1 Q. Absolutely. But the change in attitude was
2 not just on the part of Mr. Kordic, it was on the part
3 of the other HVO politicians in the area as well,
4 wasn't it? And you did notice that change in attitude?
5 A. The change in attitude in some of the other
6 places happened a little bit sooner.
7 Q. You referred to a conversation that you had
8 with Mr. Kordic some time in the middle of 1994, when
9 he confided to you that he had been appointed to the
10 rank of brigadier in the reserves of the HVO; is that
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. And he told you that this was a largely
14 ceremonial function, and in fact you actually recorded
15 that in your July the 13, 1994 report, didn't you?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. His future was with the HDZ, and he planned
18 to be involved in Cantonall politics from that time
19 forward, right?
20 A. That's what he told me.
21 Q. Did you know that he had actually been a
22 vice-president of the HDZ, BiH political party from
23 November the 14th, 1992, continuously, until he
24 actually became the president of that party in July of
1 A. No, I certainly didn't know that, because it
2 was a long -- a wide period of time where no one could
3 tell us precisely what his official position was.
4 Q. Two final subjects. HV troops. It's true
5 that one of the reasons the ECMM presence was
6 established first in Central Bosnia was to monitor the
7 alleged presence of HV troops there; isn't that right?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. And you yourself never saw any HV troops
10 during the entire year that you spent in Central
11 Bosnia, right?
12 A. I didn't, but I got reports from some of the
13 teams who did.
14 Q. But you are not personally aware of any HV
15 armed forces from the Republic of Croatia ever being
16 involved in combat in any of the pockets of Croats in
17 Central Bosnia? By that I mean the ones that I've just
18 identified, Vitez, Busovaca --
19 A. No, not in the pockets, but their presence
20 was recorded.
21 Q. Thank you. Now, just to finish up my
22 cross-examination. I would just like to ask you a few
23 concluding questions on your July the 13th, 1994
24 report, Colonel. You made the observation that
25 Mr. Kordic was the only senior Croat politician who
1 looked beyond the immediate conflict with the Muslims
2 to the future; is that right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. To more distant political and military
5 objectives, I think as you put it? In fact, he told
6 you that one of his responsibilities was to look ten
7 years into the future, to try to envisage what life
8 would be like in Central Bosnia ten years in the
9 future; correct?
10 A. That's what Mr. Kordic told me.
11 Q. And, indeed, you made the observation that in
12 your discussions with him he appeared frequently not to
13 be aware of many of the nitty-gritty joint commission
14 issues of the moment; is that right?
15 A. He was always aware of the wide policy
16 issues, but he was not aware of 12-figured grid
18 Q. I mean, he was a big picture political figure
19 and he didn't concentrate on the nitty-gritty of
20 operational matters, either in a detailed --
21 A. Not to the best of my knowledge, no.
22 Q. Now, you made the observation in your report
23 that Mr. Kordic had a reputation as being an extremist,
24 but you say that that was not precisely correct. And
25 you are still of that view; correct?
1 A. Well, I guess what do we mean by extremist?
2 From the time I first met Mr. Kordic throughout, he was
3 always hard and unrelenting and probably the last
4 person to exercise a flexible option on a peace
5 process. When I said he wasn't an extremist, he always
6 spoke very eloquently, and wasn't given to completely
7 irrelevant statements that you would attribute to an
8 extremist of a different sort. He is certainly an
9 extreme man, but he argued his case very carefully.
10 Q. Right. I mean, he never made racially
11 derogatory remarks about Muslims to you in your
12 presence, did he?
13 A. I don't recall Mr. Kordic ever making a
14 racial slur against the Muslims, but he certainly
15 didn't have much time for the BiH or the people in it.
16 Q. Right. But you would have to agree, sir,
17 that having been a leading political figure during the
18 preceding year, there had been a lot of --
19 A. Mr. Kordic did not make racial slurs in my
21 Q. Right. And finally you said that Mr. Kordic
22 was distrustful of Muslims. But that's not an
23 unreasonable position to adopt, in your view, given the
24 fact that there had been a civil war going on for about
25 a year; isn't that right?
1 A. That was right up until we had the cessation
2 of the hostilities and the Washington Agreement, and
3 after that, frankly, most of us were amazed by how much
4 trust got pulled out of the hat in a sincere effort to
5 make things work.
6 Q. Right. And you said that in your report that
7 Mr. Kordic was distrustful of Muslims, but it is wrong
8 to grant him as an extremist, which has a perpetrator
9 of radical acts connotation. And that's still your
10 view today, right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Just one final question in this regard.
13 There is no question that after the Stupni Do incident,
14 Mr. Kordic was one of the first persons to condemn any
15 kind of atrocities anywhere, regardless by whom they
16 were perpetrated; isn't that right?
17 A. Everybody condemned it, and it was a contest
18 to see who could be first.
19 Q. Right. But Mr. Kordic also condemned it?
20 A. As one of the many.
21 Q. Right. Colonel, thank you very much indeed.
22 That concludes my questions.
23 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honours, thank you. We
24 will not have cross of this gentleman.
25 MR. NICE: A few other questions, Colonel,
2 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
3 Q. You were asked about whether the forces were
4 under Blaskic's control. In your judgement, where, if
5 at all, did Blaskic and his decision-making fit into a
6 political structure?
7 A. I don't think any of us were absolutely
8 certain who was entitled to give orders and who wasn't
9 entitled to give orders. The chain of command did not
10 match a staff college line and staff diagram.
11 Q. If it had matched a staff college plan, where
12 does the politician fit in, in relation to military
14 A. Fall in. In most countries politicians
15 establish the policy and the military carries it out.
16 Q. You were asked about Sir Martin Garrod's
17 end-of-tour report. It wasn't shown to you in detail,
18 but there was a suggestion about the Muslim commanders
19 being hardline. What Sir Martin actually said was, in
20 relation to Hadzihasanovic and Pasalic, commander of
21 the 4th BiH Corps handing over to Bukdakovic [phoen],
22 he said this: That Hadzihasanovic's promotion was of
23 interest, as he had been hardline, as indeed had Alagic
24 in his determination to achieve a united Bosnia.
25 In the same report Sir Martin said this, at
1 page 4: Of the Croat side, he said that they were not,
2 certainly in the first part of the period in question,
3 interested in a united Bosnia and wanted their own
4 state within it.
5 So that's the way in which the term
6 "hardline" is used --
7 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, I'm afraid I must
8 object. What I had in mind was paragraph 26 of Exhibit
9 119-1, which says: All the BiH generals with whom I
10 came into contact on a regular basis were unanimously
11 hardline, determined to fight on either for a united
12 Bosnia or for their territorial demands.
13 MR. NICE:
14 Q. Again, the use of the united Bosnia. Do you
15 agree or disagree with that?
16 A. I'm sorry, you are going to have to ask me
17 again what I am agreeing to here.
18 Q. He's twice referred to their hardline
19 approach in relation to having a united Bosnia, not a
20 segregated Bosnia. And once he refers to there being
21 possibly hardline in relation to their own territorial
22 aims. Do you agree with him in relation to their being
23 "hardline" in relation to their wanting a united
25 A. I agree that they were hardline to continue
1 their existence. I'm not sure how long -- how hardline
2 they were personally about a united Bosnia.
3 Q. The other half of that summary that I read
4 out was the reference to the desire of the Croats, at
5 least initially, to have their own state within
6 Bosnia. Do you agree with that?
7 A. Absolutely.
8 Q. One of the documents, I think it's 1258, but
9 we needn't look at it again, was the three removals
10 from office allegedly taking effect on the 23rd of
11 October. Do you remember that document?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Any reason to accept the dating of those
14 removals as genuine; any external evidence coming to
15 you to show that that was correct?
16 A. No.
17 Q. You were asked about Kordic contacting
18 Petkovic in relation to what happened at Stupni Do.
19 Does his contacting a high-level military person fit or
20 otherwise with your general view about his position in
21 Central Bosnia and his power there?
22 A. It's completely in concert with my personal
23 opinion as to his power in Middle Bosnia.
24 Q. One matter of detail. You were asked about
25 looting by the 7th Muslim Brigade and you gave an
1 answer that dealt with shooting in the air by the
2 Bobovac Brigade.
3 A. I'm sorry, no. Shooting in the air by the
4 7th Muslim Brigade. The looting took place over about
5 a two-week period.
6 Q. In which case I think the transcript may have
7 misgot it, or you may have misplaced a word. So what
8 you were speaking of was shooting in the air by the 7th
9 Muslim Brigade?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. Thank you. At the meeting with Kordic about
12 Rajic, was there any suggestion by him, or anyone else,
13 that he had to refer the decision about Rajic
15 A. No.
16 Q. You were asked several questions about who
17 actually removed Rajic. Once the decision had been
18 made to remove the man, do you know, one way or
19 another, whether he would have had to be technically
20 removed by a military or a civilian person?
21 A. No, I don't know, but the order given on that
22 day was seen and understood by all of the attendees at
23 the meeting to be the executive.
24 Q. Was there ever any need to ask Kordic what
25 his powers were? If not, why not?
1 A. Possibly because -- although we were
2 certainly very interested in finding out what his
3 specific position on paper was, those of us who dealt
4 with Mr. Kordic on a regular basis had no doubt how
5 important he was. Sometimes it's embarrassing to ask
6 somebody what he is.
7 Q. It's been suggested to you today that he was
8 a big picture political figure, but I don't think any
9 particular role has been suggested, just a big picture
10 political figure. From the cross-examination you've
11 had today, does the picture of Mr. Kordic become any
12 clearer to you, or are you left in the same position as
13 you were in 1993 and 4?
14 A. I've certainly learned some blackened detail
15 I didn't know before, but other than that I stand by
16 the reporting I did a number of years ago.
17 Q. Does your opinion on his power and authority
19 A. Exactly as it was.
20 Q. You were asked whether you had an amicable
21 relationship with him, and you answered affirmatively
22 to that. But just explore that a little bit more.
23 Amicable might suggest friendship, or it might suggest
24 a relationship characterised by aspects of humanity and
25 so on. Just tell us --
1 A. I don't think Mr. Kordic and I ever delved
2 much into the way of humanitarian issues on a personal
3 level. We didn't discuss much on a personal level.
4 Amicable is exactly what the meaning of the word is, I
5 think. We were always polite to each other. I think
6 we treated each other with respect, and there was never
7 any tension between the two of us personally.
8 Q. Any affection ever developed?
9 A. I don't think so. No, I think is the honest
10 answer there.
11 Q. Was there any reason or event that occurred
12 to lead you to believe that there was an independent
13 HVO court martial system?
14 A. No.
15 Q. You've been shown the document D193.1. It's
16 unfortunate that it wasn't shown to you by us. It
17 slipped through the net of retrieved documents, so you
18 haven't had a chance to review it. You've still got it
19 in front of you, and just remind yourself --
20 A. I have it and I remember it.
21 Q. We've been taken through various parts of
22 it. In the middle it says, and somebody's underlined
23 it, maybe the original underlinings, that the HVO would
24 only ever fight with the BiH when it was in the Croat's
25 interest to do so, and would never assist with purely
1 Muslim military interests. And then you turn to the
2 change in attitude from Zagreb.
3 You then say that he -- you asked him about
4 this, and he smiled and said there was a different mood
5 now, and went on to deal with becoming a brigadier.
6 Anything else on that that you can remember,
7 or does it speak for itself?
8 A. I think it's clear. I'm happy to answer any
9 questions about it.
10 Q. And finally just two other questions of
11 Stupni Do.
12 You've told us about -- in detail, you've
13 told us the numbers and the equipment that they had by
14 way of defence when you visited them. How clear or
15 otherwise was your impression then, is your impression
16 now, of what was the nature of the defence, if any,
17 going on at Stupni Do?
18 A. There was no apparent defence system
19 internally within Stupni Do. It bore none of the signs
20 of stress that you would see in other areas, nor did it
21 have any of the signature of caches of ammunition or
22 large-calibre weapons, which usually leave a trail.
23 Q. I think you were asked a question about
24 Mr. Kordic's power to issue military orders. What view
25 were you able to form about his power to either issue
1 military orders or to influence them?
2 A. I always saw and understood Mr. Kordic to be
3 the senior Croat in Middle Bosnia, regardless of
4 whether he was wearing a uniform or not, and personally
5 I doubt if anything substantial was ever decided
6 without his having a major input into that decision.
7 Q. You were asked about the level of decision
8 making at Stupni Do, and you declined to be drawn on
9 whether it was a low-level or middle-level or
10 high-level decision. Does that remain your position?
11 A. That remains my position. It's very easy at
12 the time to put a comment in a report, and that wasn't
13 my comment either, and in my own mind, and I certainly
14 thought about it often enough, I don't know whether it
15 was a low- or high-level decision to do what happened
16 in Stupni Do. I always wondered.
17 Q. And we saw -- sorry. We saw that the comment
18 about it being a low-level decision wasn't premised by
19 but I think was followed by a reference to the black
20 market explanation. The black market explanation was
21 one of several, I think.
22 A. Yes, two or three I can think of.
23 Q. So when you said it's easy to put a comment
24 in a report, forget the instant comment about Stupni
25 Do, but when you're trying to build a picture of an
1 event, you obviously look at the then existing other
2 material. In this case, I think Sir Martin was
3 obviously looking at the evidence about the black
5 A. No doubt.
6 MR. NICE: Yes. That's all. Thank you very
8 JUDGE MAY: Colonel, thank you very much for
9 coming to the International Tribunal to give your
10 evidence. Your evidence is now concluded. You are
11 free to go.
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
13 MR. NICE: Mr. Scott is taking the next
14 witness. He was told, because of what we understood,
15 that it was going to be after lunch. I believe the
16 exhibits may not be in a final position. Would it
17 inconvenience the Chamber to take an early lunch or
18 would you like me to summon him down and get him
19 started, come what may?
20 JUDGE MAY: Early lunch.
21 [The witness withdrew]
22 MR. NICE: And one administrative matter
23 while the witness is withdrawing.
24 The Chamber will recall a short discussion
25 last week about affidavits, about the fact that the
1 statements to which the affidavits related had been
2 served a long time before, about the fact that there is
3 a seven-day rule built into the procedure which may be
4 abbreviated, and about the fact that in respect of two
5 of the statements, there had been some amendments made
6 before the judge in Bosnia.
7 On Friday afternoon, we served -- or maybe
8 Friday evening, we served the Defence with draft
9 translations of the amendments made by the two
10 witnesses. I see Mr. Sayers shaking his head. I've
11 seen the letter this morning which sent it out, so it
12 may have been a slip-up.
13 MR. SAYERS: Just so the position is clear,
14 Mr. President, we were delivered the Croatian versions
15 of the so-called affidavits at the close of business
16 last Friday.
17 MR. NICE: Yes, of course they were. What
18 I'm concerned with is the amendments, if any, and they
19 were served, I think, last Friday by letter, so that
20 although they don't have the nuts and bolts of the
21 formalities of the affidavit in translation, they have
22 got all the material information in translation as of
23 last Friday, and of course the affidavits themselves
24 are served in a language that the accused themselves,
25 and in each case lawyers on one side and on both sides,
1 understand. So I'm going to be asking in due course
2 for an abbreviation of the time period so we can
3 resolve the affidavit issue, and I would ask that there
4 be an abbreviated so that we can deal with it on
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
7 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, the only authority,
8 as I understand it, for affidavits under 94 ter --
9 JUDGE MAY: Now, what is the prejudice to you
10 if we do abbreviate the time.
11 MR. SAYERS: There's no prejudice,
12 Mr. President. That's not the point that I was going
13 to make. The point is that Rule 94 ter specifically
14 provides that affidavits on specific facts can only
15 corroborate the testimony --
16 JUDGE MAY: That's a different point. The
17 point that's made at the moment is to ask for an
18 abbreviated time, which we're minded to give, and we'll
19 hear the matter on Wednesday. And then, of course, you
20 can make your point.
21 MR. SAYERS: Yes, thank you.
22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn now.
23 2.15, please.
24 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.45 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 2.22 p.m.
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let the witness take the
4 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
5 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
7 WITNESS: REMI LANDRY
8 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.
9 Examined by Mr. Scott:
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Scott.
11 MR. SCOTT:
12 Q. If it please the Court, Colonel, your full
13 name is Lieutenant-Colonel Remi Landry in the Canadian
14 Army; is that correct?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. You graduated from the Royal Military College
17 in Montreal, Canada, and received a Master's Degree in
18 Political Science from the University of Montreal in
19 1997; is that correct?
20 A. It is correct.
21 Q. You have been a professional, and still are,
22 if that's correct, a professional infantry officer, a
23 parachutist, or paratrooper, and a chief instructor at
24 the Canadian Infantry Training School; is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. You are currently employed at the
2 International Peace Academy in New York; is that right?
3 A. It is.
4 Q. And, in the course of your professional
5 military career you have received Canada's Order of
6 Military Merit?
7 A. That's true.
8 Q. Is it correct, sir, that at about the end of
9 February, 1993, you became a member of something called
10 the European Community Monitoring Mission or ECMM?
11 A. It is true.
12 Q. You spent your tour with ECMM in Central
13 Bosnia primarily at the regional centre called RC
14 Zenica; is that right?
15 A. It is right.
16 Q. During your time you were also involved in
17 the Busovaca Joint Commission. You thereafter held a
18 number of positions in ECMM for the remainder of your
19 tour, including chief of operations and deputy chief of
20 mission; is that correct?
21 A. It is correct. All that took place within
22 the RC Zenica.
23 Q. And your tour in Bosnia continued until about
24 late August of 1993?
25 A. It is correct.
1 Q. Can you describe, please, to the Court,
2 Colonel, in ECMM's view, of what you saw in the first
3 half of 1993 of anything such as a strategy or plan on
4 behalf of the Bosnian Croats in connection with
5 territory or municipalities or Cantons in Bosnia?
6 MR. SAYERS: Let me just interpose a
7 preliminary objection, Your Honour. In the offer of
8 proof here that we received at 2.00 today, it looks
9 like the witness is going to propose to express a lot
10 of political opinions here, as opposed to military
11 opinions, to which we would not object. We do object
12 to all of the political subjective opinions that
13 apparently the witness is going to be asked to utter,
14 as beyond the scope of his competence.
15 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Scott, if you could stay
16 within the witness's expertise on the matter.
17 MR. SCOTT: We will, Your Honour, although we
18 would consider that expertise, Your Honour, be
19 consistent with other senior officials of ECMM, who had
20 both and expressed opinions on both military and
21 political matters, as came up during the course of
22 their professional duties.
23 Q. Let me ask you, sir, in the first half of
24 1993, did you see any plan or strategy on behalf of the
25 Bosnian Croat leadership to implement some
1 interpretation or view of the Vance Owen Peace Plan,
2 and if so, can you describe that briefly to the Court?
3 A. I would say that after a month upon my
4 arrival, it became obvious that the HVO were having a
5 double standard practice on the ground. I mean by
6 that, that whatever troop was in Central Bosnia or
7 south of Central Bosnia, they appeared to fully
8 cooperate with the Bosniak Muslim forces, while the
9 same troops wearing the same uniform to the north of
10 Central Bosnia, and here I refer to Tuzla, were more or
11 less living in harmony and cooperating fully with the
12 Muslim Bosnian.
13 And then it became apparent that through
14 other contact with UNPROFOR, other contact within
15 Zagreb, that there was some kind of tacit understanding
16 that was being talked within all those organisation;
17 that they heard that probably there was a kind of plan,
18 master plan between Croatia and between Serbia that, in
19 fact, they were going to split Bosnia in two parts, and
20 Central Bosnia and the southern part of Bosnia was
21 eventually to go to Croatia. And the northern part of
22 Bosnia was to go to the Serbs.
23 Q. What was your understanding of how that plan,
24 as you've just described it, related to the Vance-Owen
25 Plan as put forth by the International Community?
1 MR. SAYERS: Once again, Your Honour, this is
2 precisely the point of my objection.
3 JUDGE MAY: He's not giving a political
4 opinion. He was on the ground at the time.
5 Now, Colonel, I'm sure you can deal with this
6 fairly briefly. What was your understanding of the
8 A. As soon as the plan was announced to have
9 been signed between the Bosniak Muslim and the Bosniak
10 Croat at the end of March, it became very, very, very
11 apparent that the HVO in Central Bosnia and in the
12 southern part of Bosnia wanted to implement the plan as
13 quickly as possible. But again it was our perception,
14 and when I say "our", I mean the staff of the ECMM
15 mainly in Zenica, that the plan was to be -- or at
16 least the Vance-Owen Plan was to be implemented
17 according to the perceptions of the HVO, which, for
18 example, called for encouraging Muslim inhabitants
19 basically in Central Bosnia to quit, to leave the
20 village that they were living in, and eventually
21 accommodate Croats that were, for example, living in
22 Zenica and offering them to return to Central Bosnia or
23 at least the parts which would belong to the provinces
24 that would be under the control of the Bosnian Croats.
25 MR. SCOTT:
1 Q. All right. Is it accurate to say, Colonel,
2 that in the first part of 1993, it was ECMM's
3 assessment that the HVO at that time was in a
4 strategically-stronger position in relation to or in
5 comparison to the Bosnian Muslims?
6 A. Yes, it was our assessment, and it could be
7 easily seen on the ground. It's no surprise for us to
8 realise that the Bosnian Muslims were fighting
9 basically on two fronts and instead of sharing the same
10 aim or the same goals with the Croats in Central Bosnia
11 while they were facing a force which was not
12 cooperating at all, which was attempting by all means
13 to delay or to keep adding -- how should I say -- to
14 keep adding elements to an already-agreed ceasefire,
15 and that's what we could see throughout the first
16 months that I was there, February and March. And as we
17 were closing up to the mid-April, we could even see a
18 further deterioration of the overall situation.
19 As you must recall, the Busovaca Joint
20 Commission was there to implement the ceasefire
21 agreement that had already been signed earlier on that
22 year throughout Central Bosnia, and the commission was
23 eventually to see that both sides were cooperating to
24 implement the ceasefire. And one side, on numerous
25 occasions and repeatedly, were attempting to delay the
1 implementation of this ceasefire, knowing very well
2 that the Muslims were in a very difficult situation and
3 would eventually accept the addition of those new -- of
4 those added elements to the ceasefire.
5 Q. Let's be clear about this, Colonel. When you
6 say "one side would engage in a series of delays,"
7 which side are you talking about?
8 A. Talking about the HVO, the Bosniak Croat
10 Q. And also just to be clear, when you said a
11 few moments ago that the Muslims were fighting on two
12 sides or on two fronts, which fronts were you talking
14 A. Well, I was talking the front that the
15 Serbs -- I mean the Bosniaks were fighting the Serbs to
16 the north and slightly to the north-west of Central
17 Bosnia, and as this was taking place, they were
18 fighting through the south part of Central Bosnia,
19 Jablanica and all that. They were under a lot of
20 fighting in the Fojnica area, and this was taking place
21 basically against the HVO forces, and this was taking
22 place while they were attempting to implement this
23 ceasefire agreement in the Lasva Valley.
24 Q. What did you see about the approach that the
25 Bosnian Croats took to the plan that was different or
1 in contrast to the plan as you understood it to be
2 properly implemented or intended by the International
3 Community? I want you to be very specific in terms of
4 any specific differences you saw between what you
5 understood and what ECMM understood the plan for the
6 provinces or cantons to be and what you saw the Bosnian
7 Croats doing at that time?
8 A. As I basically said earlier, as soon as the
9 plan was agreed by HVO and then eventually by the
10 Bosniak Muslims, the interpretation of exactly how this
11 plan should be implemented seems to be slightly
12 different from the point of view of the actual
13 Vance-Owen Plan.
14 I must say here, Your Honours, that RC
15 Zenica, as soon as the plan was accepted, received a
16 task to facilitate the implementation of this plan, and
17 that's why most of the monitors became very
18 knowledgeable about this plan.
19 The plan agreed that, yes, three provinces
20 were to become Croat, three provinces were to become
21 basically majority of Bosniak Muslim, three Serbs, and
22 one was -- Sarajevo was to be some kind of the three
23 ethnic provinces.
24 But in each of those provinces, the
25 leadership of the provinces was supposed to be headed
1 by the minority that had -- the majority -- had the
2 majority within those provinces, but it was very clear
3 to us that this was supposed to be done with the
4 tolerance of the other minorities and that sometimes
5 the Vance-Owen Plan did say that some of the governing
6 or some of the representative positions had to be sure
7 with the majority and with the minority.
8 And in addition to that, all parties that did
9 sign this agreement were to allow free traffic so that,
10 in fact, basically the central provinces, which were
11 Muslim, were to have access to a line of communication
12 to be able to resupply and all that, and all we could
13 see during the month of April was that it seems that
14 the Croats -- the HVO had a different interpretation of
15 this agreement.
16 Q. Let me ask you to -- and especially for the
17 benefit of the interpreters, if you could speak just a
18 bit more slowly, Colonel.
19 Also, let me hand you or ask the usher,
20 please, to hand you two exhibits to begin with, or
21 actually one is a -- the first is 394.1, and then
22 there's also a bundle, if you will, of exhibits
23 starting with 571.3. If those could be distributed,
25 It might be helpful, usher, if we could
1 please put a copy of 394.1 on the ELMO.
2 Now, starting with 394.1 -- excuse me a
3 moment. We can step back in time for a moment.
4 Looking at this document, do you recognise the format
5 and content of this document to be the type of ECMM
6 report that you, from February to August of 1993,
7 became very familiar with, and in fact, I'm sure,
8 authored a number of reports such as this; is that
10 A. It is correct.
11 Q. For the record, this is a report dated the
12 25th of January, 1993, titled "Fightings between
13 Muslims and Croats in Central Bosnia," a special
14 report. If I can direct your attention down to the end
15 of what is paragraph numbered 2, where it says:
16 "What is at stake there is not a local
17 problem (the two local commanders did not look very
18 much like enemies) but certainly a political purpose
19 close to ethnic cleansing."
20 And item 3:
21 "The dangers for the whole area are obvious,
22 for the outcome of the Geneva talks, for the fate of
23 the populations, as well as for the possible
24 interference of Islamist forces encouraged by the
25 victimisation of the Muslim community."
1 When you got on the ground in Central Bosnia
2 in February, did ECMM understand, and did you come to
3 understand that the concept of the different groups or
4 ethnic factions, having different claims on territory,
5 or competing with each other for territory was already
6 an issue?
7 A. Yes. It takes -- it took maybe a week or so,
8 and then I was being able to benefit from the expertise
9 of my colleague. And eventually, since I was directly
10 involved with the Busovaca Joint Commission, then I
11 came to have quite a thorough understanding of what was
12 going on, and what was a real issue.
13 Q. Directing your attention to the first sub
14 item under paragraph 3. Even as of January of 1993, is
15 it fair to say, Colonel, that the future of the Muslim
16 or BiH troops in the Croat-held provinces was one of
17 the issues or concerns?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Let me then ask you to go to Exhibit 571.3,
20 which, Mr. President, is the first document in a bundle
21 of documents. And these particular documents, we have
22 compiled a set in the order in which they will be
23 presented to the witness for, hopefully, ease of
25 I think there will be no dispute, Your
1 Honour, that this exhibit, or part of it at least, is
2 part of the Vance-Owen Plan, as signed by some of the
3 parties toward the end of March of 1993.
4 Colonel, I would like it direct your
5 attention to page number 5 of annex 4. Or if one is to
6 use the handwritten numbers that have been placed in
7 the upper right corner, it would be page 7 out of 22.
8 I am going to direct your attention to the first
9 numbered paragraph 1 on the bottom of that page. If
10 you could just look at that and give the Court a moment
11 to look at --
12 A. Did you say paragraph 1?
13 Q. Paragraph numbered 1 on the bottom of that
14 page, under the heading "Interim Provincial
15 Governments." Having this document in front of us,
16 Colonel, is it fair to say that this reflects or
17 indicates what you were testifying about a few minutes
18 ago, that the concept of the Vance-Owen Plan and the
19 cantons or provinces were that there -- where there
20 would be a majority population, there would still be a
21 proportional representative system of government?
22 A. Yes, that's exactly what I was referring to.
23 Q. And at the bottom of that page, it
24 indicates: "On the basis of the composition of the
25 population of the province based on the results of the
1 1991 census."
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Did you take it from that, then -- well, not
4 really just you personally, but ECMM have the
5 understanding that the fact that a particular province
6 might be referred to as a "Croat" province, did not
7 mean that it would be -- that the powers to be
8 or the --
9 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Scott, I don't think we need
10 go into all of this. We've had evidence about it, and
11 it will be a matter of interpretation for us. We've
12 been over this -- just one moment. Time is limited
13 this week. We are under much pressure. And I see
14 there are at least another six witnesses to be done in
15 the next two days. So I must ask you to complete your
16 examination-in-chief in the next hour, in order to
17 allow the Defence to cross-examine, and in order to get
18 on with our business.
19 MR. SCOTT: I appreciate that, Your Honour.
20 We'll do everything we possibly can.
21 Q. Let me just finish by simply pointing that
22 paragraph out. And I don't think these particular
23 paragraphs, Your Honour, have ever been specifically
24 put before the Court. If I can just point out one
25 other paragraph and then move on.
1 I would direct the Court and with the
2 witness, only to the extent the Court may have a
3 question, to page -- let me again use the pages on the
4 top right corner, 9 of 22. The section indicated
5 "Withdrawal of Forces." And just by way of pointing
6 out to the Court, Your Honour, if the Court will allow
7 me one question.
8 On the bottom of that page, Colonel, the
9 second -- excuse me, the third full sentence of that
10 paragraph provides, does it not, "Both Bosnian army and
11 HVO forces shall be deployed in provinces 5, 8, 9 and
12 10, under arrangements agreed between them."
13 Was that correct?
14 A. Yes, it is.
15 Q. And again the concept was not that the HVO
16 would be the only military force in a "Croat" province;
17 is that correct?
18 A. It is our understanding. Yes, it is my
19 understanding, and was the understanding of ECMM at
20 that time.
21 Q. If the Court will just give me one moment,
22 I'll try to edit down as I go here. If I could
23 summarise a couple of the points or questions together,
24 if the Court will allow me.
25 Colonel, can you tell the Court whether it
1 was -- it appeared to you, and to ECMM, that the
2 Bosnian Croats, in carrying out, or their view of the
3 Vance-Owen Plan, did you see or observe that they
4 seemed to be going on two tracks or two levels at the
5 same time? Can you describe that to the Court,
6 briefly, please.
7 A. Okay. When you refer to two levels, I gather
8 that you must refer to the fact that since we were
9 working on the ground with the local commander, it
10 seems that those local commanders were to -- eventually
11 to agree to the ceasefire, were eventually able to show
12 signs of compliance to the plan and to the ceasefire,
13 and eventually to this acceptance of the Vance-Owen
14 Plan. And at the same time, it seems at the very
15 higher level, the political level of the HVO, it seemed
16 that they were never satisfied with what was taking
17 place on the ground, and seems that they were trying to
18 get something more from the Bosniak. They were never
19 satisfied with the plan as it was. They wanted to --
20 my gathering is that they wanted to have the full
21 control of those Croat provinces and have the full
22 control of the forces that were within those
24 And at the same times we were attempting to
25 get to them to agree to have a joint headquarters,
1 where again we felt that this was -- this was the --
2 what the Vance-Owen Plan, by having a kind of
3 cohabitation of both forces in either Croat majority or
4 Muslim majority provinces. And yet, even though we saw
5 evidence that later on in April and early May that this
6 joint headquarters was put together, it was never given
7 the resources, the strength and the authority to do
8 what it was supposed to do.
9 Q. If the Court will allow me to combine about
10 four or five questions together.
11 Did you see, Colonel, that on the one hand
12 there was a level at which the HVO would present itself
13 to the International Community as conciliatory and
14 anxious to accomplish a true peace agreement in Bosnia,
15 but did you see a different set of events or acts on
16 the ground?
17 A. To be very brief, and to repeat what I said,
18 yes. In fact, that if my memory is correct, they were
19 the first ones to sign the Vance-Owen Plan. And yet,
20 at the same time, this attitude was not really put
21 forward and we could not really feel that that's
22 exactly what was their intention. Their intention
23 seems to be to try to get the kind of international
24 support and eventually head up doing something else on
25 the ground, which was not really within the spirit of
1 the Vance-Owen Plan.
2 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I am going to point
3 the Court to two exhibits and simply note them now, to
4 move on, in the interests of the Court's guidance and
5 time. If I could direct the Court to Exhibit 595 in
6 the bundle and 595.1.
7 Let me just represent to the Court, Exhibit
8 595, the record and the evidence would show, Your
9 Honours, is a proposed joint statement by Mate Boban,
10 purporting to be an implementation of at least certain
11 parts of the Vance-Owen Plan. I would simply point the
12 Court, for the present purposes, to paragraph 4,
13 indicating a supposed deadline by the 15th of April,
15 I would also then, in Exhibit 595, Your
16 Honour, point the Court to a document tendered to
17 another Trial Chamber previously, a communication from
18 President Alija Izetbegovic from Bosnia, dated the 22nd
19 of July, 1997, in which President Izetbegovic indicated
20 that he, in fact, never signed the joint statement with
21 Mate Boban. That is Exhibit 595.
22 Q. Did you come to realise during this time, and
23 by "this time", I'm now at the end of March and into
24 April of 1993, after the Vance-Owen Plan was signed,
25 that -- did it come to your attention that the Bosnian
1 Croat side was increasingly frustrated or concerned, if
2 you will, with what they saw as lack of cooperation
3 with the implementation of the plan, of the Vance-Owen
5 A. I think that it was well sure again within my
6 colleagues that even though things seem to be going
7 ahead at the local level, that there was a lot of
8 frustration, a lot of tension in the air. And it seems
9 that other incidents were popping up in Central Bosnia,
10 in the Lasva Valley, that were indicative of something
12 I was, for example, very optimistic that we
13 were going to be able to accomplish the filling up of
14 the trench in a certain area of Central Bosnia, and yet
15 at the same time we had all those indications that
16 other incidents involving ethnic hate involving
17 violence that were popping up in different locations
18 were indicative that something wrong was going on. But
19 we could not exactly put our finger on it.
20 Q. Let me direct your attention, please, to
21 Exhibit Z639.1.
22 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, may I just inquire
23 whether these documents have previously been provided
24 to us pursuant to the timetabling order? I must say
25 this particular document does not look familiar,
1 although, of course, it is possible that it has been
3 MR. SCOTT: I don't think this particular
4 document has, Your Honour, because Mr. Landry produced
5 it to us yesterday. Or it was our understanding
6 that --
7 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's see what the
8 document is. I'm not sure. Is it in this bundle,
9 Mr. Scott?
10 MR. SCOTT: No, I guess it isn't, Your
11 Honour. That's what I -- it is? I'm not sure, Your
12 Honour. I thought it was, but it may have been -- I'm
14 If the usher can -- it's 639.1, Your Honour.
15 I don't know what's happened. Mine are in order. I
16 don't know where they are now.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, I have it. What is the
18 point on here that you want the witness to deal with?
19 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, the point -- first
20 of all, I would ask the witness to identify the
21 document as being an ECMM document, and this particular
22 one concerning the Canadian contingent, similar, Your
23 Honour, excuse me, to reports -- the type of reports up
24 the ECMM chain of command, as the Court has seen
25 before, this one dated the 11th of April, five days,
1 for instance, before Ahmici. And I direct the Court's
2 attention to page 5 of 9, the top of that page, which I
3 think is directly relevant to the line of testimony
4 we've been pursuing for the last few minutes.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
6 MR. SAYERS: Just as a matter of principle,
7 Your Honour, and in two seconds, the Court's
8 timetabling order of the 21st of January, 2000,
9 required all exhibits to be delivered to us by the 28th
10 of January, and here, as in previous cases, we see yet
11 more exhibits popping up. And so I object on the
12 grounds of untimely delivery.
13 [Trial Chamber deliberates]
14 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Scott, you know, no doubt the
15 witness, of course, trying to assist, brought this
16 document with him, and it may be you've admitted it for
17 the same reason. But there has to be a limit to the
18 number of documents that we have. I myself am
19 currently reviewing your outstanding exhibits, which
20 are hundreds of exhibits long. For that reason, we're
21 not going to admit another one. The point is one that
22 has been covered elsewhere.
23 MR. SCOTT: Let me just -- I think it's been
24 the Prosecutor's understanding, Your Honour --
25 JUDGE MAY: No, it is not a matter for
1 argument, Mr. Scott. We've ruled.
2 MR. SCOTT: Very well.
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's move on.
4 MR. SCOTT: Yes.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 MR. SCOTT: All right. If we could then
7 authenticate then, before moving on, several exhibits.
8 Q. If I can ask the usher to hand you Exhibit
9 852.4, 890.1, and 972.
10 If you can just look at those, the only
11 questions for the present purposes, Colonel, are
12 looking at these documents, are these all documents
13 that you obtained or received in the course of your
14 tour of duty with ECMM in Central Bosnia?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And, for instance, on 852.4 and 890.1, it
17 indicates, in fact, that these particular documents
18 were faxed between two different components of ECMM; is
19 that correct?
20 A. Yes, it is.
21 Q. And on Exhibit 972 -- just for point of
22 reference, Your Honour, I'm looking a little below the
23 middle of the page for Province number 10, indicating
24 Mr. Kordic to be a member of the provincial government
25 of Province number 10.
1 Colonel, did you receive this particular
2 document in the course of, again, your duties with
3 ECMM, and why was it that ECMM would be interested in
4 this particular information?
5 A. As I've mentioned to you, we -- earlier, we
6 were given the task by ECMM headquarters to facilitate
7 the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan, so naturally
8 all this information was crucial to help us out to
9 eventually facilitate the process to create those
11 Q. And concerning Province number 10, among
12 those being nominated for positions in that provincial
13 government included Mr. Valenta, Mr. Skopljak, and
14 again Mr. Kordic; is that correct?
15 A. It is.
16 Q. Moving forward, then, beyond the other
17 exhibits in the outline for present purposes, did
18 you -- can you describe to the Court what role, if any,
19 from a policy perspective, did ethnic division play, if
20 it did, in the HVO programme that you saw being carried
22 A. Well, most of the work that we were doing
23 within the Busovaca Joint Commission was basically to,
24 as I was saying earlier, to implement a ceasefire, but
25 most of the work that we had to deal with, basically
1 complaint and protests that minority ethnics were
2 suffering from the majority ethnics which were around.
3 And I must say that starting basically in April, a lot
4 of those minority ethnics appear to be Muslim, were
5 Muslim living basically in Central Bosnia.
6 And I can recall, for example, the work that
7 they did in Skradno, which is a small village or very
8 close to Busovaca, where we had to go there on a
9 regular basis because people were eventually confined
10 to stay within the village and were -- all type of
11 pressures were being exercised on them to force them to
12 quit. True --
13 Q. When you say "quit", what do you mean?
14 A. To leave the premises of the small village so
15 that, in fact, they could vacate their house and
16 eventually the house be given to somebody else that was
17 of Croat ethnicity.
18 Q. In your observation on the ground, Colonel,
19 did you see that -- by and large, did you experience
20 that the ethnic division was something that was
21 experienced, if you will, at the grassroots level, or
22 from the bottom up, or was it a policy from the top
24 A. I would tend to believe again that it was a
25 policy from the top down, because there is numerous
1 incidents, and if the Court wants to know more about
2 that, I can provide examples where it appears to us
3 that there was, in fact, much more harmony between the
4 ethnics than appears to be when looked from the
5 outside, and it seems that when we were gaining this
6 type of -- when we were able to achieve
7 reconciliation -- local reconciliation, not too long
8 after again there was incidents that were awakening
9 again, revenge, and it was very difficult for us to be
10 successful because we just felt that the higher
11 authorities in charge, be it either the military or the
12 political authority, okay, were not supporting what, in
13 fact, we had been asked to help them out to implement.
14 MR. SCOTT: Just a couple of specific
15 stories, Your Honour, by the witness, but we'll pass
16 through those -- over those in the outline.
17 Q. You mentioned Skradno a few moments ago,
18 Colonel. Did you -- is that one of the places where
19 you saw efforts by the HVO, by various tactics, to move
20 the Muslims out of that community?
21 A. Exactly. You must realise that as the
22 commission was sitting in the morning, what we used to
23 do is that in the afternoon we were investigating the
24 protests that were being presented to us, and Skradno
25 happened to be one of the first protests that I was
1 personally involved with. And I kept involved for at
2 least two months by paying visits on a regular basis to
3 the people -- inhabitants of Skradno.
4 Q. What I want you to do now, just very briefly
5 Colonel, just go very specifically to a particular
6 practice where the Muslims may have been lined up and
7 shot at in some fashion. If you'd just describe that
8 very briefly to the Court.
9 A. The first incident, what's very close to my
10 memory, is as I was -- as I entered this village, there
11 was a woman that came running at me, crying, asking
12 protection. And then I found out later on, through our
13 interpreter, that she and the rest of her family had
14 been put into the motion of every night, as the
15 darkness was falling on the village, people dressed up
16 in black were knocking at her door, and then were more
17 or less lining up all the inhabitants. Her husband was
18 not there. And then they were lining up all the
19 inhabitants of that house on the outside wall and then
20 were just going through the motion of an execution
21 party, by firing their weapon. Naturally, I was able
22 to see all the holes above the heads of the people that
23 were still there on our own.
24 And again the idea was to force them to leave
25 the village. And as they were about to do it, well,
1 they had to sign a paper saying that they were leaving
2 the village on their true will.
3 Q. It's probably clear, but when you say they
4 were lined up and shot at, intentionally they were shot
5 over -- the shots were fired over their head?
6 A. Yes, exactly, over their heads.
7 Q. And then they were told that they could leave
8 the village if they signed a paper saying they were