{short description of image}

  1. 1 Wednesday, 21st July, 1999

    2 (Open session)

    3 (The accused entered court)

    4 (The witness entered court)

    5 --- Upon commencing at 2.34 p.m.

    6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your

    7 Honours. Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor

    8 versus Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez.

    9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Stein.

    10 WITNESS: ROBERT J. DONIA (Resumed)

    11 Cross-examined by Mr. Stein:

    12 MR. STEIN: Your Honour, first --

    13 MR. NICE: Before Mr. Stein starts, I

    14 understand from something that the Victims and

    15 Witnesses Unit has told us that the witness may have

    16 something that he wants to raise with the Tribunal. We

    17 had the message indirectly from the people who

    18 accompanied the witness here.

    19 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Doctor, is there something

    20 you want to raise?

    21 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I wonder if I

    22 might be permitted about five minutes to clarify

    23 responses that I gave to a line of questioning

    24 yesterday in regard to the one man, one vote matter.

    25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, by all means.

  2. 1 THE WITNESS: Thank you. If you will recall,

    2 yesterday, I was asked a series of questions by

    3 Mr. Stein dealing with a quotation from the book

    4 Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation by Laura Silber and

    5 Allan Little, specifically a quote which referred to

    6 one man, one vote in the relationships between

    7 President Izetbegovic and the HDZ.

    8 Mr. Stein also then, in response to an

    9 inquiry from you, stated that this was the big debate

    10 about the status of the Croatian community. I believe

    11 it was not the big debate or, in fact, any debate at

    12 all, and I did not have in front of me yesterday the

    13 context from the work of Silber and Little, which

    14 shows, I think quite clearly, the nature of this issue

    15 and the fact that it was very short-lived and

    16 inconsequential.

    17 I can use the ELMO, sir, if you wish, or I

    18 can just read, but it's about ten sentences from the

    19 book and a bit of explanation.

    20 JUDGE MAY: It may help if you put it on the

    21 ELMO, please.

    22 THE INTERPRETER: Could Dr. Donia read

    23 slowly, please?

    24 THE WITNESS: Yes, Ma'am. Beginning here on

    25 page 209 was the question that was stated to me

  3. 1 yesterday. "Like the Serbs, the Croats were infuriated

    2 when Izetbegovic announced in September that the SDA

    3 opposed the principle of national parity, and that the

    4 next government would be formed on the basis of

    5 one-man one-vote."

    6 I believe this statement to be completely

    7 accurate, but there's an important qualification that

    8 must be added, namely, the meaning of the word

    9 "government." In the structure at the time, the

    10 government was a specific institution. It was

    11 independent of the assembly and independent of the

    12 presidency. It was, in fact, a body called the

    13 government or vlada which was a group of -- there was a

    14 president of it and vice-presidents and the various

    15 ministers. So Izetbegovic's proposal did not pertain

    16 to voting in the assembly, did not pertain to

    17 membership on the presidency, which was already decided

    18 in the constitution, but only to the composition of the

    19 government. So this statement is, I believe, factually

    20 correct.

    21 However, the speculation that follows on the

    22 part of the authors assumes that it pertains to all

    23 governmental institutions, and it sets off this

    24 following speculative conclusion: "Izetbegovic was

    25 attempting to play the same game in Bosnia that

  4. 1 Milosevic had in mind for Yugoslavia." Now, that's

    2 only true to a very limited degree because what

    3 Milosevic had in mind for Yugoslavia was, in fact, a

    4 national voting for an assembly, which was one man, one

    5 vote. "Unless civil and individual rights were secured

    6 through institutions, majority vote would guarantee

    7 Serb domination throughout the country."

    8 Now, the institutions that the author is

    9 assuming here are all institutions, and I would point

    10 out at the time that civil and individual rights were

    11 already secured by a variety of institutions. In

    12 force, perhaps not, but secured.

    13 The authors then go on: "In Bosnia, the same

    14 principle would give the Muslims, the Republic's

    15 largest ethnic group with 44 per cent of the 4,35

    16 million population, the greatest authority." This was

    17 true already. There was no change in the situation

    18 from the last days of socialism to the time that this

    19 statement pertains to. Then a very speculative

    20 conclusion: "A key difference was that Milosevic was

    21 striving for changes which subverted the very

    22 principles on which Yugoslavia was founded, whereas

    23 Izetbegovic's proposals applied only to Bosnia."

    24 The final statement of this paragraph: "The

    25 Republic's constitution, however, made each of its

  5. 1 three groups constituent nations which meant that no

    2 major decision could be carried out without

    3 consensus." As a matter of fact, the first part of

    4 that sentence is absolutely correct. Each of the

    5 Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were recognised as

    6 constituent nations. The latter part of that sentence

    7 is not the case. It is not true that no major decision

    8 could be carried out without consensus.

    9 This is a very important issue because the

    10 constitution in effect at the time defined national

    11 communities but gave them no veto power over

    12 decision-making, either in the assembly nor in the

    13 presidency. In fact, there are numerous examples, both

    14 before the election of November 18th, 1990 and after

    15 the election, in which decisions were made by those two

    16 bodies with the complete opposition of one of the

    17 constituent nations. In other words, the status quo

    18 was that constituent nations could not obstruct a

    19 decision. There was no requirement for consensus.

    20 Now, the key part of this, however, is it's

    21 still true that the Croats and Serbs were infuriated

    22 with Izetbegovic in September. Unfortunately,

    23 yesterday, Mr. Stein didn't go on to point out the

    24 subsequent sentence at the top of page 210: "Despite

    25 the growing tensions, the three national parties,

  6. 1 meeting behind closed doors in Sarajevo, agreed to form

    2 a united front against their main opponents, the

    3 communists."

    4 This agreement, which I will represent to you

    5 took place in October 1990, prior to the elections,

    6 resolved the issue of one man, one vote for all three

    7 major parties. It was replaced with a notion that to

    8 include the government itself, that council of

    9 ministers and various ministry positions, would be

    10 generally guided by the census of 1990. I must

    11 represent this to you. I don't have with me the

    12 documentation to establish this, but I am confident you

    13 will have other opportunities to affirm this point.

    14 From the time of this agreement onward to

    15 today, this issue of one man, one vote, ceased to be a

    16 point of contention between the parties. I've just

    17 finished six weeks of going through the daily press in

    18 Sarajevo from November 1990 until April of 1992, this

    19 was in research for another matter, and I never saw a

    20 single reference to a debate about one man, one vote

    21 versus recognition of communities.

    22 There was, however, a very important

    23 overriding debate that seized the HDZ, and it was not

    24 the one man, one vote issue; it was the question of

    25 whether the HDZ would be a party representing all

  7. 1 Croats in Bosnia, that is, the national community, or

    2 whether it would become a territorial entity defined by

    3 the boundaries of Herceg-Bosna as spelled out in

    4 November 1991, ruled under what was essentially a

    5 constitutionally conditioned martial law as proclaimed

    6 on July 3, 1992, and under the fused leadership of the

    7 HVO, the HDZ, and the Community of Herceg-Bosna, all

    8 responsive to the instructions of President

    9 Izetbegovic.

    10 Now, that polarity between those people who

    11 wanted the HDZ to represent all Croats and those who

    12 favoured a territorial unit which excluded about

    13 250.000 Croats from representation, that controversy

    14 was ultimately decided because of the Zagreb regime's

    15 involvement in favour of the territorial option and

    16 leads us to the background of the events discussed in

    17 the indictment. I find no evidence of further

    18 discussion of one man, one vote, after this September

    19 reference that's in the book.

    20 I would also just like to point out that the

    21 quotations that were given to me yesterday from the

    22 book were highly selective, were taken out of context,

    23 and omitted some key things which this author, on the

    24 very same page, has said about topics that were part of

    25 my direct testimony.

  8. 1 At the bottom of page 208, you see the point

    2 made by the two authors, "National Dreams: The

    3 Emergence of Ethnic Parties and Leaders," did not

    4 reflect ancient hatreds, as was later claimed by some

    5 sectors of the frustrated international community while

    6 it struggled to comprehend the war." That was not

    7 something that was shown to you yesterday. Nor were

    8 the comments that the authors have to make about Dario

    9 Kordic shown to you yesterday.

    10 JUDGE MAY: Well, I think we're now going

    11 beyond what's necessary for the moment. No doubt, if

    12 we refer to the book, we can look at it in due course.

    13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

    14 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Stein.

    15 MR. STEIN: Thank you. Your Honour, just one

    16 or two brief administrative things. We have

    17 substituted for the illegible copies of D42 some new

    18 copies. I hope they work; if not, we'll try again.

    19 With an opportunity, Judge, I would like to

    20 address the issue of the tape that we addressed at the

    21 end of --

    22 JUDGE MAY: After the witness's evidence.

    23 MR. STEIN: Very good.

    24 Q. Sir, let me start by asking you this, and

    25 that is, did you have the Silber book with you when you

  9. 1 came to The Hague today?

    2 A. I never leave home without it.

    3 Q. Never leave home without it?

    4 A. I had it with me when I arrived.

    5 MR. STEIN: I'm listening by the way, Judge,

    6 to French, so when the French ends, I will begin, and I

    7 hope to avoid any speed warnings.

    8 Q. So it's kind of like an American Express

    9 card: You never leave home without it because it's

    10 important?

    11 A. It's important.

    12 Q. You don't consider yourself an advocate for

    13 one side of this case versus another, do you?

    14 A. I don't consider myself an advocate, no.

    15 Q. Let's take one brief look at what you said

    16 yesterday relative to some quotes from Mr. Izetbegovic

    17 that I gave you. I don't want to repeat them. It's

    18 the only thing of your testimony yesterday I want to go

    19 over. It was relative to the quotes in which he

    20 essentially said, "In our state, we will live how it

    21 suits us. No one can prescribe how we should live,"

    22 et cetera. You were asked when he said that and were

    23 you familiar with it, and your response was, quote, "I

    24 think it comes from the Islamic declaration written by

    25 Mr. Izetbegovic."

  10. 1 In fact, sir, I represent to you that that is

    2 from a 1994 speech given in May in Mecca, and this of

    3 course would be just after the Washington Accords.

    4 A. Could I request, sir, to see that document?

    5 You've given me many quotes in the last -- yesterday

    6 that you've represented as coming from various places,

    7 and I would really like to see the exact quote that

    8 you're operating from.

    9 Q. I have no problem with that. We'll show you

    10 the English.

    11 JUDGE MAY: Does it matter? What does it

    12 matter which was the date of the quotation?

    13 MR. STEIN:

    14 Q. The question then, sir, as per the Presiding

    15 Judge's query, is, this was in 1994; doesn't that give

    16 us a different insight, as of 1994, as to what the

    17 leader of the Bosnian Muslims was advocating as of that

    18 time period?

    19 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Stein,

    20 in order to clarify what has been said by the witness,

    21 I think that we should have precise indications as to

    22 the context of this speech that you said was given in

    23 May in Mecca.

    24 (In English) Given in what context, on what

    25 occasion? This is very important. Was it an official

  11. 1 speech or a personal interview? What was it, exactly?

    2 This is important, to know what we are talking about.

    3 Thank you.

    4 MR. STEIN: Judge, according to the text we

    5 have, this was a speech given by Mr. Izetbegovic,

    6 addressing pilgrims and Bosniak heroes, delivered in

    7 Mecca publicly in 1994, May.

    8 JUDGE MAY: And the witness would like to see

    9 where you get that information from.

    10 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Where was it published?

    11 MR. STEIN: This is our only copy, but

    12 certainly you may see it.

    13 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Where was it published?

    14 MR. STEIN: In 1975. I'm sorry; 1995, and it

    15 says --

    16 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Where? Where?

    17 MR. STEIN: In Zagreb.

    18 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Which paper was it?

    19 MR. STEIN: According to the title page, it

    20 was published by the Muslim Community in Zagreb.

    21 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see it.

    22 MR. STEIN:

    23 Q. And the quote has a Post-It on the beginning

    24 and is highlighted for you in yellow next.

    25 A. What you've showed me, sir, is not a speech;

  12. 1 it's an interview with a publication, Ljiljan, a

    2 Sarajevo newspaper, dated December 10th, 1994.

    3 Q. You're looking at the wrong Post-It, sir.

    4 MR. STEIN: While the witness is reviewing

    5 the document, we have for the Court four copies, if you

    6 would like, and we can put it into evidence. This is a

    7 copy not of the entire book but of the specific speech.

    8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Stein, I hope we're not going

    9 to go over all the evidence of yesterday again.

    10 MR. STEIN: I wasn't planning to, Judge.

    11 JUDGE MAY: No. Very well. You can put that

    12 in, then.

    13 MR. STEIN: I'm sorry, sir. Did you wish --

    14 JUDGE MAY: Put it in.

    15 MR. STEIN: All right. I think we're shy one

    16 copy for my adversaries, but we'll make sure that's

    17 remedied.

    18 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked D44/1.

    19 MR. STEIN:

    20 Q. Dr. Donja, are you ready to resume your

    21 examination?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. Now, can we turn our attentions from the

    24 document in front of you to an issue involving the 1990

    25 elections? You and I can agree that the 1990 elections

  13. 1 transformed the political landscape in Bosnia?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. And indeed, you've noted that the elections

    4 demonstrated the remarkable historical consistency with

    5 previous Bosnian multi-party elections from 1910 and

    6 1920?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. And each of the ethnic groups essentially

    9 voted for their ethnic party?

    10 A. In substantial percentages.

    11 Q. And your observation at that time was: "The

    12 politicians restored patterns of coalition politics in

    13 the Bosnian assembly in a futile effort to achieve a

    14 formula for Bosnia's political future that would

    15 satisfy all parties."

    16 A. I made no comment in writing on the elections

    17 in 1990 at the time, so I'm wondering where you're

    18 reading from.

    19 Q. Well, I'm reading from your book, at

    20 page 211, and specifically quoting from it, sir, the

    21 last --

    22 A. I'll agree that that's from my book, but it

    23 was not written in 1990, as you suggest in your

    24 question.

    25 Q. Sorry, your book was written in 1994 --

  14. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. -- observing the 1990 elections.

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Now, I wonder if you can explain this for

    5 us. The winner of the election on the SDA was

    6 Mr. Abdic; correct?

    7 A. The leading vote-getter for the presidency

    8 was Fikret Abdic.

    9 Q. Much more accurate than I posited; you're

    10 correct. Yet, as it turned out, Mr. Izetbegovic became

    11 the president of the presidency. How did that happen?

    12 A. I don't know.

    13 Q. I'm sorry?

    14 A. I don't know.

    15 Q. My last question on this area, sir, is you

    16 observe in your book, and I quote: "Many new leaders

    17 aroused fear and suspicion among the members of

    18 national minorities within their republics'

    19 boundaries." That's an observation you made in 1994

    20 relative to those 1990 elections?

    21 A. That's an observation relative to the

    22 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its

    23 various republics, yes.

    24 Q. All right. Now, very briefly, can we

    25 capsulise the different positions of the parties after

  15. 1 the November 1990 elections relative to the future of

    2 Bosnia? The Serbian position was either a

    3 confederation or succession (sic)? Can we agree to

    4 that?

    5 A. No.

    6 Q. Well, Mr. Malcolm, in his book, on page 223,

    7 is quoted as observing, quote, "By early 1991,

    8 Milosevic was saying publicly that if there were any

    9 attempt to replace the federal structure of Yugoslavia

    10 with some looser confederal arrangement, he would seek

    11 to annex whole areas of Bosnia and Croatia." Would you

    12 disagree with that?

    13 A. No, I agree with that. I would disagree with

    14 your statement, which was not the same as what you just

    15 read.

    16 Q. And what part of my statement did you

    17 disagree with, sir?

    18 A. Would you like to repeat it, please?

    19 Q. Well, no, I don't, actually. Let's go on to

    20 the -- if we can see what the Croatian position was and

    21 if we have an agreement on that.

    22 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Stein,

    23 you said -- I think that is where the witness disagrees

    24 with you -- you said that there were several

    25 positions.

  16. 1 (In English) You capsulised the different

    2 positions of the parties after the November 1990

    3 elections relative to the future of Bosnia, the Serbian

    4 position was either confederation or succession.

    5 (Interpretation) This is what you asked.

    6 What do you mean by "succession"?

    7 (In English) I don't understand. What is --

    8 succession to what?

    9 MR. STEIN:

    10 Q. Let's try to break that question down. It

    11 was a poorly phrased question on my part. Do you agree

    12 that the Serbian position was -- let's just take one --

    13 confederation?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. And what did you take that question to mean?

    16 A. I took it to mean that you didn't understand

    17 what Noel Malcolm wrote.

    18 Q. All right. What was the Serbian position in

    19 1991 relative to Bosnia?

    20 A. As he said in the passage that you read, the

    21 Serb position, meaning that of Milosevic and the SDS,

    22 was either a centralised Yugoslavia, not a

    23 confederational Yugoslavia, but a centralised

    24 Yugoslavia or a secession of Serbian communities and

    25 the establishment of a greater Serbia.

  17. 1 Q. Let's take the second part of that question.

    2 The Croatian position, sir, was for a federation, fair

    3 enough?

    4 A. The HDZ position really changed over the

    5 course of 1991.

    6 Q. November 1991?

    7 A. November 1991 is a good time to pick

    8 because --

    9 Q. I want the Croatian position.

    10 A. No, there is no single Croatian position, as

    11 I've told you previously.

    12 Q. Then your answer is not important to me,

    13 sir. Now, let's move ahead --

    14 MR. NICE: I'm concerned about the witness

    15 not being allowed to answer questions --

    16 JUDGE MAY: You can ask him in

    17 re-examination.

    18 MR. NICE: I'm also concerned about

    19 quotations being put without the witness having

    20 documents to look at.

    21 JUDGE MAY: Let's see how we get on. I'm

    22 anxious to finish this examination.

    23 Yes, Mr. Stein?

    24 MR. STEIN:

    25 Q. I want to turn our attention, sir, to the

  18. 1 response of the central government of BiH to the Serb

    2 aggression. You recognise, sir, do you not, that

    3 Mr. Izetbegovic declared in early October that Bosnia

    4 was neutral between Serbia and Croatia?

    5 A. Can you specify the year, please?

    6 Q. 1991.

    7 A. Yes, and I would say that was the position of

    8 the presidency, in the majority of the presidency of

    9 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    10 Q. Now, we're making great progress, sir, so I

    11 want to turn your attention to one other thing, and

    12 that is, in the war itself, you make an observation in

    13 your book relative to the actual fighting and fighters

    14 on the ground. You noted that there were exclusively

    15 Muslim brigades, and this is a paraphrase, formed in

    16 the early days of the war to fight within the Bosnian

    17 army; is that correct, sir?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Your research shows that there were, in fact,

    20 people from outside the region who came into Bosnia to

    21 fight this war.

    22 A. That is different from the statement that you

    23 just read from my book.

    24 Q. Let me get directly to the statement from

    25 your book, and this is at page 267: "Fighting against

  19. 1 Croatian units in Central Bosnia was done principally

    2 by Muslim brigades and Bosnian government forces and

    3 that region became almost exclusively Muslim." My

    4 question, sir, is where did these Muslim brigades come

    5 from?

    6 A. A couple of different sources. First, when

    7 the mobilisation began at the time of the initial

    8 prospect of hostilities, the mobilisation was done on a

    9 territorial basis. There were a great many

    10 multi-ethnic units of the Territorial Defence force.

    11 Many of the Territorial Defence forces in Herzegovina

    12 were Muslim and Croat, many in Sarajevo were Muslim,

    13 Croat, and Serb, and as time went on, there tended to

    14 be a greater ethnic singularity to these units on all

    15 sides, first, because members who were not of the

    16 ethnic group often departed and sometimes they were

    17 expelled.

    18 So the first source is that there was this, I

    19 think, general process of the creation of ethnically

    20 more pure units that in some cases resulted in purely

    21 Muslim or purely Croat units. The second was specific

    22 brigades or units that were raised from early 1992 by

    23 leaders typically of the Territorial Defence or MUP,

    24 the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

    25 Q. I want to specifically ask you whether these

  20. 1 individuals you're referring to included individuals

    2 who called themselves Mujahedin.

    3 A. Well, "Mujahedin" was a term that was

    4 frequently used by Croatian commentators as a

    5 pejorative term applying to the army of

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So at least through Croatian eyes,

    7 they were all Mujahedin.

    8 Q. I want to be very specific. Were there

    9 individuals fighting in the army of BiH who were from

    10 outside the region, that is to say, from Islamic

    11 countries?

    12 A. To my knowledge, there were a very few.

    13 Q. So that means there were some?

    14 A. There were some.

    15 Q. All right. Where did those people come from,

    16 from your research and study?

    17 A. I don't know.

    18 Q. You mentioned in your book and in your

    19 testimony in Blaskic that the Muslim irregulars and

    20 gangs terrorised civilians in government-controlled

    21 areas during the spring of 1992. First, do you still

    22 agree with that?

    23 A. Yes, I do.

    24 Q. Second, would you describe that?

    25 A. I think the statement speaks for itself.

  21. 1 Q. Again, the book that you have on your desk,

    2 page 331, describes some of these forces. I'd like you

    3 to take a look at it. Now, we might have different

    4 editions, so let's make sure we have the right one

    5 before I point you to it.

    6 A. I hope you bought this too.

    7 Q. We bought several copies. We'll come back to

    8 it. I just wanted to ask you this about the -- we're

    9 looking at this edition. I don't know that it's the

    10 same as yours. It's on page 331.

    11 A. I'm afraid it's not.

    12 Q. Let me quote from it precisely. The 7th

    13 Muslim Brigade is the topic of the discussion. "This

    14 was explicitly Muslim rather than Bosnian in its

    15 origin. Its officers were hostile to Westerners, wore

    16 Islamic insignia, long beards, and greeted each other

    17 with the Arabic 'Selam Aleikum,' peace be with you.

    18 Their families attended Islamic education classes, and

    19 their wives and daughters increasingly wore veils in

    20 public."

    21 My first question to you, sir, is were you

    22 aware that there was a 7th Brigade operating in the

    23 area?

    24 A. I am aware, yes.

    25 Q. Does the Silber book accurately describe

  22. 1 them, based on your research and writings?

    2 A. I would say generally, yes.

    3 Q. She goes on to note, next sentence, and then

    4 we'll put this book down: "For the first time, a

    5 strident xenophobic Muslim nationalism was being

    6 articulated in Bosnia. The politics of multi-ethnic

    7 tolerance, the officers of the 17th Muslim Brigade

    8 argued, had led to the destruction of the Muslim

    9 people. It was time for Muslims to take matters into

    10 their own hands, not as Bosnians but explicitly as

    11 Muslims."

    12 Agree or disagree with that observation of

    13 the Silber book?

    14 A. I can't agree in its totality, no.

    15 Q. Sorry, sir?

    16 A. I don't agree.

    17 Q. You do not?

    18 A. No.

    19 Q. I want to set the stage here to where we're

    20 going on this ultimatum discussion. In order to do so,

    21 though, I think it's fair to discuss the refugees that

    22 were certainly disturbing the demographic structure in

    23 Bosnia. So let's start with this: We can agree, can't

    24 we, that in April of 1992 forward into 1993, major

    25 Bosnian cities were flooded with refugees.

  23. 1 A. Yes. I would actually date -- the date is

    2 much earlier than that.

    3 Q. All right. What do you give us as the first

    4 date?

    5 A. We started seeing refugees coming into Bosnia

    6 in significant numbers in the summer of 1991, during

    7 the war in Croatia.

    8 Q. According to your book and your observations,

    9 and feel free to comment, less than three weeks after

    10 the EC recognised Bosnia's independence, the UNHCR

    11 estimated that 370.000 Bosnians had become refugees, by

    12 June 2nd, that number had reached 750.000, and by the

    13 fall of 1992, the Bosnian war had produced 2 million

    14 refugees, almost half of Bosnia's population, according

    15 to the 1991 census. Are those the numbers that you

    16 still, based on your current research, agree to?

    17 A. The numbers you are citing here are the total

    18 number of refugees created. They were not, by that

    19 time, anywhere near -- the majority of them were not in

    20 Bosnia.

    21 Q. But about 1 million of them remain in Bosnia

    22 still; correct, sir?

    23 A. That's right, yes.

    24 Q. And you opined in your book, and I'm sure

    25 you'd still agree, that the refugees in Bosnia

  24. 1 compounded the urgent needs of the civilians for food

    2 and basic supplies?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Let's go up to the spring of 1993. You've

    5 opined that there were, again, roughly a million

    6 refugees in Bosnia at that point in time?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. We may be saying the same thing, but I want

    9 to make sure we put this in context, the U.N.

    10 Commission on Human Rights reported, as of November 17,

    11 1993, in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, there

    12 were over 2,1 million people displaced from their

    13 homes, nearly 50 per cent of the population recorded in

    14 the census of 1991. Now, that's for the totality of

    15 Yugoslavia; yes or no?

    16 A. You cited that it's the United Nations High

    17 Commissioner for Refugees, not Human Rights, but I

    18 otherwise concur with your statement.

    19 Q. That work goes on to say that about 800.000

    20 of the 2,1 million were estimated to have sought refuge

    21 outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the rest were

    22 seeking refuge inside the country.

    23 A. It's, I think, fair to say that this was a

    24 process whereby typically when one became a refugee due

    25 to hostile action, one sought first refuge in a nearby

  25. 1 town or city and, in many cases, ultimately moved

    2 outside of either Bosnia or the former Yugoslavia.

    3 Q. And the million or 1,3 million, depending on

    4 the time and place, individuals in Bosnia who were

    5 refugees would sometimes move more than one time?

    6 A. Yes. They're still moving.

    7 Q. Of course. Now, with that in mind, with

    8 those numbers in mind, I'd ask you if your research can

    9 help us with this, relative to life from the ground up,

    10 if you will: During the war, the entire infrastructure

    11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina basically closed down; would you

    12 agree?

    13 A. No, not exactly. Actually, the

    14 infrastructure was seriously weakened before the war

    15 began and functioned at some minimal level, and its

    16 functioning during the war was highly dependent on the

    17 local circumstance. So there were places where I would

    18 say your statement is absolutely true --

    19 Q. All right.

    20 A. -- and other places where things functioned

    21 at the same inadequate level they had functioned at

    22 before the war began.

    23 Q. And certainly services such as water,

    24 electrical, natural gas, oil, and the supplies of those

    25 necessities were diminished during the war?

  26. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Municipal services, such as police, fire,

    3 ambulance, rescue, were all impacted by the lack of

    4 manpower and men being sent to the front?

    5 A. As a general rule, those emergency services

    6 frequently worked better than some of the other more

    7 routine municipal services.

    8 Q. All right.

    9 A. Nevertheless, your observation is an accurate

    10 one, I think.

    11 Q. Fair enough. The currency was devalued and

    12 the monetary system collapsed?

    13 A. That pretty much happened before the war

    14 began.

    15 Q. And remained the same during the war?

    16 A. Well, yes, the German mark became the

    17 currency well before the war began and remained the

    18 currency, at least in the areas controlled by the army

    19 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In some cases, in the

    20 Croatian-controlled areas, the Croatian kuna became the

    21 currency.

    22 Q. And state and federal services, such as

    23 health care, pensions, state programmes, disabilities,

    24 were delayed or impacted or diminished by the war as

    25 well?

  27. 1 A. The delay in pension payments preceded the

    2 war and continued to be in arrears throughout the war

    3 and continue, to this day, in almost all places to be

    4 substantially in arrears. So I don't know that the

    5 cause of that lateness or retardation can be judged to

    6 be the war.

    7 Q. The observation is correct, but the cause we

    8 separate on. All right. Schools were also affected by

    9 the war?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Shut down?

    12 A. Most schools continued to function during the

    13 war to a surprising degree.

    14 Q. All right. Their staffs were affected by

    15 people going to the front, obviously?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. Radio, TV, and newspapers were sporadic, at

    18 best?

    19 A. That's one area where the functioning

    20 continued, maybe even increased during wartime.

    21 Q. On all those medias?

    22 A. In various places, depending on

    23 accessibility, as the well-known story of Oslobodenje

    24 in Sarajevo never missing a day of publication, and

    25 radio broadcasts were continued in many areas, and

  28. 1 even, as I say, the stations in some instances

    2 increased.

    3 Q. How about in the rural areas, sir?

    4 A. Well, the media -- generally, the radio

    5 capabilities reached into the rural areas, in most

    6 cases, just fine. Newspapers were started in some

    7 small communities where none had existed before.

    8 Q. All right. As I understand it as well, the

    9 gaols were opened up, that is to say, the gaols were

    10 closed down and the prisoners let out because they

    11 couldn't maintain the facilities?

    12 A. That's a very broad generalisation, and I

    13 wouldn't accept it for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, no.

    14 Q. You certainly can accept that part of that

    15 statement is true. Gaols were opened in instances?

    16 A. I don't know what you're reading from, so

    17 I ...

    18 Q. Do you know of any instance, sir, in which a

    19 prison or gaol was basically shut down and the

    20 prisoners released?

    21 A. No.

    22 Q. You've heard of that?

    23 A. Yes. That was another consistent feature of,

    24 actually, life. There were periodic pardons that were

    25 executed by the presidency going back to the 1970s.

  29. 1 Q. All right. Sir, does your review also

    2 indicate that the courts within Bosnia-Herzegovina were

    3 closed or short-staffed?

    4 A. Yes, many, many, I would say, not all, but

    5 that was an area that functioning was extremely

    6 difficult.

    7 Q. Factories were shut down?

    8 A. "Shut down" is perhaps not the word. Many

    9 were already rendered idle by 1991 due to lack of

    10 supplies, the high cost of electricity, the

    11 difficulties getting adequate means for production, and

    12 many factories were bombed and destroyed during the

    13 war. So in general, the productive capability, from an

    14 industrial standpoint, with very few exceptions, shut

    15 down.

    16 Q. And food supplies were limited; civilians had

    17 little to eat?

    18 A. Again, with some exceptions, that was true

    19 for much of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    20 Q. We can agree, can we not, that by the spring

    21 of 1993, inter-ethnic tensions were at an extremely

    22 high level?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. These tensions and fears at times and in

    25 certain places were characterised by feelings such as

  30. 1 terror, fear, and paranoia?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. We can agree, can we not, that in your

    4 opinion, the armed forces of all three sides had

    5 committed atrocities by the spring of 1993?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. This fact, in and of itself, furthered and

    8 increased tensions and volatility within Central

    9 Bosnia?

    10 A. Throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    11 Q. Now, you claim that there was an ultimatum

    12 issued in April of 1993; correct?

    13 A. April 3rd, 1993.

    14 Q. As I understand it, the basis of your claim

    15 is newspaper accounts.

    16 A. The basis of my contention that this is an

    17 ultimatum is, first of all, the language of the alleged

    18 draft agreement between Mr. Boban and President

    19 Izetbegovic, the deadlines that are imposed within that

    20 agreement, the nature of the resolution that was passed

    21 by the HVO at its session on the 3rd of April, 1993,

    22 the response that the ultimatum evoked in various

    23 media, both within Croatia, the international media,

    24 and even Tanjug, the Serbian agency, and finally, the

    25 fact that the ultimatum was reiterated by the spokesman

  31. 1 for the HVO at a press conference on the 16th of April,

    2 1993.

    3 Q. And that spokesman would be who, in your

    4 opinion, sir?

    5 A. I'm sorry, Vaso Vegar, I believe, is the

    6 name. Vaso Vegar.

    7 Q. First name?

    8 A. I think it's V-O-S-O, if I have his name

    9 right.

    10 Q. We're going to go through some of those in

    11 great detail, but let me start off by saying I would

    12 like you to have a look at another little exhibit we've

    13 made up, which we'd like to put on the ELMO and which

    14 we'd like to give to the Court.

    15 JUDGE MAY: Which part of the evidence are

    16 you dealing with now?

    17 MR. STEIN: This is the ultimatum issue, sir.

    18 JUDGE MAY: The evidence in chief?

    19 MR. STEIN: The evidence in chief includes

    20 his expert report.

    21 JUDGE MAY: Whereabouts in the report is it?

    22 MR. STEIN: I believe it's towards the back,

    23 sir.

    24 JUDGE MAY: Well, if you're going to

    25 cross-examine on it, you must refer us to it.

  32. 1 MR. STEIN: I'm sorry.

    2 Q. That would be roughly at pages 41, 42, 43,

    3 and 44. Now, sir, I started to --

    4 JUDGE MAY: No, wait a moment. I'm going to

    5 find it first.

    6 MR. STEIN: All right.

    7 JUDGE MAY: Now, which part of the report do

    8 you want to cross-examine on, Mr. Stein?

    9 MR. STEIN: Well, I want to be very limited,

    10 sir, and that's going to be relative to page 43 in his

    11 conclusion that there was an ultimatum.

    12 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Would you deal with

    13 it as expeditiously as possible.

    14 MR. STEIN: All right.

    15 Q. Sir, are you done?

    16 A. Yes, mm-hmm.

    17 Q. Before April 15th, are you aware that there

    18 were a series of crimes against Croats in Central

    19 Bosnia?

    20 A. There were numerous conflicts, including

    21 civilian casualties, by both sides in Central Bosnia

    22 prior to April 3rd and prior to April 15th.

    23 Q. Let me show you a chart prepared by us and

    24 see if we can agree that this represents some of the

    25 crimes against Croats in Central Bosnia in April of

  33. 1 1993.

    2 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

    3 D45/1.

    4 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Before it's

    5 exhibited, we'll see whether the witness agrees with it

    6 or not. It may be, Mr. Stein, that you'll have to

    7 produce this by another route.

    8 MR. STEIN: That's fine, sir.

    9 JUDGE MAY: Just let the witness see it.

    10 Doctor, if you can agree with it, say so; but

    11 if you don't know or you feel you can't, also say so.

    12 THE WITNESS: I would feel I'm not qualified

    13 to judge the validity of this report.

    14 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Hand it back to

    15 Mr. Stein.

    16 MR. STEIN: Thank you, Judge. We'll do it by

    17 other means.

    18 Q. One of the witnesses in this case, sir,

    19 Mr. McLeod, testified on May 14th, at page 199 -- I'm

    20 sorry, at page 4 -- that the events in the middle of

    21 April leading up to the 16th, quote, "suggested there

    22 had been a long period of tension between the two

    23 ethnic groups in Central Bosnia. This appeared to have

    24 exploded on the morning of the 16th."

    25 That's consistent with your opinion of the

  34. 1 tension level in Central Bosnia as of April 1993;

    2 correct, sir?

    3 A. The first sentence, I think, that you read,

    4 would be consistent with my understanding of it.

    5 Q. All right.

    6 A. I would take -- I wouldn't care to express it

    7 that way for the second sentence.

    8 Q. All right. Were you aware, sir, that on

    9 April 15, 1993, an HVO brigadier commander named Totic

    10 was kidnapped in Zenica and some of his bodyguards were

    11 killed?

    12 A. No.

    13 Q. You were not aware of that at all?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. Do you know who Lieutenant-Colonel Robert

    16 Stewart is?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. He was the BritBat commander for Central

    19 Bosnia during this period of time?

    20 A. That's my understanding, yes.

    21 Q. Colonel Stewart has opined in this

    22 courthouse, quote: "It is clear to me that the

    23 kidnapping of Totic --"

    24 JUDGE MAY: Well, what's the point of this?

    25 The witness said that he is not aware of it, so there

  35. 1 is no point putting something else about the

    2 kidnapping. You can put it to another witness or you

    3 can call evidence about it, but if a witness says that

    4 he is not aware of it, there's no point belabouring

    5 it.

    6 MR. STEIN: It's not that I want to belabour

    7 that point, sir; it's a different point. I'll try it

    8 in another way.

    9 Q. Your opinion is that the events of mid-April

    10 were as a result of threats issued in the media;

    11 correct?

    12 A. My --

    13 Q. In essence.

    14 A. My statement, sir, is designed to address the

    15 political situation, and I have not opined on the

    16 tactical military unit operations either on the 16th of

    17 April or at any other time. I have simply noted that

    18 the HVO, which was in charge of the area at the time in

    19 kind of a martial-law capacity and was the head of the

    20 fused civil and military administration of the area,

    21 issued, in what appeared to be ambiguous terms, a

    22 specific ultimatum. It was interpreted as such at the

    23 time by a wide variety of observers in the region, both

    24 the local actors and outside observers. That's the

    25 essence of what I have put forward to you here.

  36. 1 Q. It's the local actors of which I would like

    2 to speak. You haven't spoken with any of the local

    3 actors on the ground, have you?

    4 A. No, sir. That is not something that I have

    5 addressed in this paper, nor would I claim to have

    6 spoken with them. It's beyond the scope of my direct

    7 testimony.

    8 Q. And your answer, sir, to my question a few

    9 seconds ago was that your report was designed to

    10 address the political situation, and you have not

    11 opined on the tactical military unit operations either

    12 on the 16th of April or any other time. So if I take

    13 your answer, you're talking about a theory, but you

    14 have never spoken with the individuals on the ground --

    15 JUDGE MAY: Well, he's answered that.

    16 MR. STEIN: All right.

    17 Q. By the way, sir, in your book, no mention is

    18 made of this ultimatum?

    19 A. That's correct.

    20 Q. Were you aware, also, sir, that the April

    21 1993 agreement did in fact result in a joint command?

    22 A. I cannot accept your characterisation of it

    23 as an agreement. It was never endorsed, signed by, or

    24 involved in any way the side of the ABH or the

    25 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The issue of a

  37. 1 joint command was in fact a very old one, going back to

    2 early 1992 --

    3 Q. Sir, let me just cut you off. You agree with

    4 part of my sentence but not all of it; is that right?

    5 A. I don't agree with any of it. As I heard you

    6 state, the agreement resulted in a joint command; I

    7 take exception to the use of the term "agreement."

    8 Q. And the term "joint command"?

    9 A. And the fact that it led to or established a

    10 joint command.

    11 MR. STEIN: If it please the Court, I would

    12 like to introduce, if I can, or maybe perhaps just read

    13 from -- would make it a lot faster -- a statement of

    14 Dzemo Merdan, who was the general of the HQ BiH army

    15 Sarajevo. He is quoted in his statement given to the

    16 Office of the Prosecution, quote: "On April 2nd, 1993,

    17 an agreement was signed between Mate Boban and Alija

    18 Izetbegovic that had a number of terms and conditions.

    19 The basis of this agreement was the work done by the

    20 joint commission, which I will refer to later. I was

    21 present at the negotiations that led to and followed

    22 that agreement. In the formal agreement, one of the

    23 terms was to the effect that units that had their

    24 origin from outside of the area in which they were

    25 present must leave within three days. This was

  38. 1 particularly because HV soldiers were in the area, as

    2 evidenced by the one killed on a road between Vitez and

    3 Busovaca. Regarding the fourth term of that agreement,

    4 wherein it was decided that a joint command be formed

    5 between the HVO and the BiH, the joint command was

    6 formed at the end of April or the beginning of May 1993

    7 with the HVO in Travnik, and it functioned for

    8 approximately 15 days, until the conflict in Travnik in

    9 May. The purpose of that term was to attempt to unite

    10 us against a common enemy, the Bosnian Serb army."

    11 Having read --

    12 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.

    13 Are you able to take this in, Dr. Donia?

    14 THE WITNESS: Yes, I've followed, yes.

    15 JUDGE MAY: You've got the gist of it? Very

    16 well.

    17 MR. STEIN:

    18 Q. At least according to the general, there was

    19 an agreement and there was a joint command?

    20 A. I believe the general's story is correct. I

    21 think he has the date wrong. I think he has it about

    22 three weeks too early, and the date was the 3rd of

    23 August, not 2nd, and the track that President

    24 Izetbegovic followed was from Zagreb, on the 27th of

    25 March, back to Sarajevo, where on the 3rd of April, he

  39. 1 presided over a meeting of the government of Bosnia and

    2 Herzegovina and met with the French ambassador. He was

    3 not in Mostar, which is the place at which the

    4 agreement was alleged to have been signed. He had no

    5 knowledge of this particular draft agreement. There

    6 were, however, subsequent talks, after the ceasefire

    7 that was arranged about -- in about the middle -- about

    8 the 22nd or 23rd of April, I believe, there was an

    9 effort by BritBat to bring about a ceasefire, and at

    10 that point, further discussions were held.

    11 So my best interpretation would be that he

    12 simply has the date wrong, and that makes his comments,

    13 if I'm correct about that, irrelevant to the ultimatum

    14 that we're discussing.

    15 Q. If you're correct?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. Is this conclusion that you have, relative to

    18 this alleged ultimatum, something on which reasonable

    19 historians can reasonably disagree?

    20 A. My sense of it is that the evidence is very

    21 convincing and that there will always be people who

    22 will disagree with me on it, but I wouldn't accept your

    23 formulation that reasonable historians can reasonably

    24 disagree. I think reasonable historians would agree

    25 with me.

  40. 1 Q. And some would not?

    2 A. Some historians would not.

    3 Q. All right.

    4 A. Some attorneys might not either.

    5 Q. I want to ask you, in conclusion, this:

    6 Colonel Stewart opines in his book that -- and I'll

    7 read it. Quote: "Bosnia is certainly complex beyond

    8 anyone's dreams. There are far more than three sides

    9 -- Serb, Croat and Muslim -- we hear about in the

    10 media. There are factions within groups and groups

    11 within factions, and without an established order,

    12 these different elements have created a situation as

    13 close to anarchy as I have witnessed." That's from

    14 Stewart's book. Have you read his book, sir?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. Is that a conclusion with which you agree?

    17 A. I think it is applicable for various times

    18 and many places in Bosnia. I would say that his

    19 general characterisation makes even more unusual the

    20 ultimatum of April 3rd, because it was one of the few

    21 times in the war when the clear prevailing civil and

    22 military administration preannounced an intent to

    23 launch a military operation.

    24 Q. By the way, were you aware that Colonel

    25 Stewart also has told us that the HVO was totally

  41. 1 unprepared for the events in the Lasva Valley on

    2 April 15th?

    3 A. No.

    4 MR. STEIN: Nothing further.

    5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic, or Mr. Mikulicic?

    6 Mr. Mikulicic, how long are you going to be?

    7 It's five minutes to the break. Would you prefer to

    8 take the break now?

    9 MR. MIKULICIC: Yes, Your Honour, it seems

    10 reasonable to take a break now, and then after that, I

    11 will need another half an hour.

    12 JUDGE MAY: Very well. A quarter of an

    13 hour.

    14 --- Recess taken at 3.55 p.m.

    15 --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.

    16 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Mikulicic?

    17 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation) Thank you,

    18 Your Honours.

    19 Cross-examined by Mr. Mikulicic:

    20 Q. Good day, Dr. Donia. My name is Goran

    21 Mikulicic. I am an attorney from Zagreb, and in this

    22 case with my colleague, Kovacic, I represent Mario

    23 Cerkez, the second accused. I would like to ask you a

    24 few questions, so I would ask you to respond to them

    25 according to your best knowledge.

  42. 1 Dr. Donia, before coming to the group of

    2 questions that I noted down, I would like to clarify

    3 two topics which, it seems to me, were not sufficiently

    4 explained in your testimony to date. The first topic

    5 that you mentioned recently, this afternoon, is when

    6 you said that the HVO, in the regions where it achieved

    7 its jurisdiction, introduced so-called martial law.

    8 Could you please explain what you meant when you said

    9 that?

    10 A. Yes. I believe I noted that it was a

    11 constitutionally provisioned martial law, and I'm

    12 referring to both the proclamation of July 3rd, 1992,

    13 which made the HVO the temporary supreme authority in

    14 the territory of Herceg-Bosna, and also the fusion of

    15 authority which took place, I believe, in November of

    16 1992 in which the head of the HDZ of

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Community of

    18 Herceg-Bosna, and the HVO were fused in a single

    19 person.

    20 I use the term "martial law" as qualified by

    21 the rather unusual provisions that were included in the

    22 Act of July 3rd. My use of the term may, in fact, be

    23 unacceptable from the point of view of a constitutional

    24 perspective, I don't know, but it seems to me to aptly

    25 describe the situation as it prevailed in

  43. 1 Herceg-Bosna.

    2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Dr. Donia, what were the

    3 features of that rule that have inspired you to

    4 describe it as martial law?

    5 A. Basically, judicial functioning, including

    6 courts, and various administrative functions were

    7 consolidated under the leadership of a military

    8 organisation.

    9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

    10 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation)

    11 Q. Dr. Donia, Judge Robinson, in a way,

    12 anticipated my next question, but I would be quite

    13 direct. Does that mean that, in your opinion, in those

    14 regions, all civil authority was suspended and

    15 substituted by military authority?

    16 A. In my interpretation, no, it was rather fused

    17 with military authority. I would note that in the

    18 objections of the members of the HDZ who opposed the

    19 formation of a stronger Herceg-Bosna, to them, and this

    20 was a proclamation issued on, I think, the 4th or 5th

    21 of July, 1993, the part that they objected to was not

    22 the existence of the HVO but that the HVO had now

    23 assumed administrative functions.

    24 Q. Do you know, Dr. Donia, that the term "HVO"

    25 also included both the civilian and the military

  44. 1 component?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Are you familiar, Dr. Donia, with the fact

    4 that the military component of the HVO, in July 1992,

    5 was recognised as a legitimate component of the armed

    6 forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Let's move to the second topic which I felt

    9 was not sufficiently clarified. This is the agreement

    10 that you cited between Alija Izetbegovic and Mate

    11 Boban, which was articulated by the spokesman Vaso

    12 Vegar. I would like to concentrate on point 2 of that

    13 agreement, so if you would permit me to read it as it's

    14 described here. That paragraph states: "All armed

    15 forces of the HVO and the police of the Croatian

    16 Community of Herceg-Bosna and the army of

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the police, the Ministry of

    18 Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which come from

    19 outside of the borders of the province, must be

    20 identified and leave those provinces within three

    21 days."

    22 Dr. Donia, could you please concentrate on

    23 the part that talks about the forces which come from

    24 outside of the province? What is your interpretation

    25 of this decree? Is this talking about all the forces

  45. 1 of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the police or

    2 only those which happened to be in that region of the

    3 8th, 9th, and 10th cantons but are not originally

    4 linked to those regions?

    5 A. Thank you. I, first of all, cannot share

    6 your characterisation of this as an agreement because

    7 it was never discussed or entered into by President

    8 Izetbegovic. In fact, even the press coverage, which

    9 was written by the HVO spokesman, I believe, refers to

    10 it as a draft agreement and notes that it was yet to be

    11 signed by President Izetbegovic.

    12 I'm not in a position to interpret what the

    13 specific language of that article means. It, I think

    14 in some sense, was clear that there was to be a

    15 division of forces, but what was meant by the drafters

    16 in expressing the term "porijeklom" from origins

    17 outside the province, I don't know what that refers

    18 to. I'm not qualified to interpret it.

    19 Q. Mr. Donja, your report which we received

    20 regarding this topic concluded that the text that we

    21 have just read would mean, and I quote, "that all

    22 Bosnian forces must leave Provinces 3, 8, and 10 where

    23 they were present in a significant number." I could

    24 only interpret this statement of yours the way it was

    25 stated, "all forces," but this does not come out from

  46. 1 this text, only those forces which are not originally

    2 from that region, and that is something different.

    3 Would you agree with me?

    4 A. I would, I guess, defer to what happened on

    5 the 16th of April, when actually at a press conference,

    6 Mr. Vegar clarified the terms of this ultimatum. At

    7 that press conference, he was asked whether the army of

    8 BiH and its units that were in Provinces 3, 8, and 10

    9 had to lay down their arms. That was a question posed

    10 to him at the conference. His response was, "No. The

    11 requirement is either that the units of the army of

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina withdraw or submit themselves to HVO

    13 command."

    14 Q. Dr. Donia, perhaps I'm insisting on this too

    15 much, but this is a very important fact, so I would

    16 like to ask for your understanding and also ask for the

    17 understanding of the Court. This is not in the form of

    18 an ultimatum, as you say, and that relates exclusively

    19 to the forces of the Bosnian army and the police, but

    20 also the Croatian army and the police in Bosnia and

    21 Herzegovina, which are not originally from the region

    22 of Provinces 3, 8, and 10 under the Vance-Owen Plan.

    23 A. I think that the language refers to the

    24 withdrawal of the respective forces, not from Provinces

    25 3, 8, and 10 but from the provinces in which they don't

  47. 1 belong, that is, the notion would be that the forces of

    2 the HVO would, if there were any in those provinces,

    3 withdraw from provinces that were awarded to

    4 Bosnia-Herzegovina under Vance-Owen. Likewise, any

    5 troops that were army of Bosnia-Herzegovina or police

    6 units of the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Provinces 3,

    7 8, and 10 would be compelled to withdraw from those

    8 provinces.

    9 Q. Dr. Donia, if we accept your characterisation

    10 of this topic as an ultimatum, then is it true that the

    11 ultimatum was stated equally in relation to the HVO and

    12 the BH army? Because both units from these entities

    13 were supposed to withdraw from the provinces that they

    14 did not originally come from.

    15 A. The specific impact of the ultimatum depends

    16 on what units were where. If there were a host of ABiH

    17 units in Provinces 3, 8, and 10 and no HVO units in

    18 provinces awarded to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would,

    19 indeed, be a unilateral ultimatum. If, on the other

    20 hand, there were forces of the HVO throughout the

    21 provinces of those awarded to the central government,

    22 it would not be a unilateral ultimatum and it would

    23 apply to all those forces. I don't know what specific

    24 units were deployed where at that time.

    25 Q. Thank you, Dr. Donia. We will move on to

  48. 1 other topics.

    2 Yesterday, at the beginning of your

    3 testimony, my colleague Stein asked you if you had

    4 ever, while working on your report, spoken with Dario

    5 Kordic, did you ever ask to speak to him, and was it

    6 true that his name, the name of Dario Kordic, was not

    7 mentioned in your book from 1994. My question is, does

    8 this also apply to Mr. Mario Cerkez?

    9 A. There are two questions you're asking, and

    10 one is have I ever interviewed or met with your client,

    11 and the answer is no, I have not. The second question

    12 is does his name appear in the book, and the answer

    13 also is no, it does not.

    14 Q. Thank you.

    15 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation) I would like

    16 the usher to put document Z1660 on the ELMO, 1660.

    17 This is a map of the region of the former Yugoslavia

    18 that we are discussing, so in order to make the

    19 testimony more plastic, I would like to put a few

    20 questions to Dr. Donia.

    21 Q. Dr. Donia, we see a map of the region of the

    22 former Yugoslavia which is interesting to us only in

    23 order to establish or determine the borders of the

    24 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in relation to the

    25 neighbouring republics, later states. Would you please

  49. 1 point on the ELMO with which republics, that later

    2 became states, does -- which states border on

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    4 A. Two states border Bosnia-Herzegovina. One is

    5 the Republic of Croatia and the other is the

    6 reconstituted Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in its

    7 embodiment representing both the Montenegrin republic,

    8 the Serbian republic, and the Vojvodina, which was

    9 annexed to it in 1990.

    10 Q. Dr. Donia, could you please just tell us

    11 briefly, which region did the main aggression against

    12 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina come from, and

    13 by that, I mean the aggression of the former Yugoslav

    14 People's Army and the paramilitary Serbian and

    15 Montenegrin units.

    16 A. Aggression came from both the Republic of

    17 Croatia and the units of the Yugoslav National Army and

    18 Serbian paramilitary units. I respect your question

    19 and will identify it. The aggression came from the

    20 Montenegrin irregulars and paramilitaries who entered

    21 Herzegovina, it came from forces crossing the border

    22 with Serbia, and it came from within

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, including units of the JNA,

    24 numerous Serbian paramilitary units, and, in some

    25 cases, reconstituted Territorial Defence forces.

  50. 1 Have I answered your question?

    2 Q. Of course. One explanation, when you

    3 mentioned that the aggression came partially from the

    4 territory of the Republic of Croatia, would you agree

    5 that by that, you mean parts of the Republic of Croatia

    6 which at that time were under the rule of Serbian

    7 paramilitary units and parts of the Yugoslav People's

    8 Army?

    9 A. That was indeed part of it, yes.

    10 Q. Would you agree with me, Dr. Donia, that the

    11 border towards the southeast, towards Serbia and

    12 Montenegro, and then on the other side, in relation to

    13 the Republic of Croatia, in parts which were occupied

    14 by the JNA, were practically closed to citizens of the

    15 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina? There was no

    16 border traffic across those borders; is that true?

    17 A. Could you identify the time period that

    18 you're thinking of?

    19 Q. I mean the period from 1992 up until the

    20 Dayton Accord.

    21 A. I would say, from the early summer of 1992,

    22 that that was a general statement one could make, yes.

    23 Probably also valid for some time after Dayton.

    24 Q. Nevertheless, Dr. Donia, the population of

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina received humanitarian aid, received

  51. 1 medicines, clothes; refugees were crossing the

    2 borders. Would you agree with me that this was border

    3 traffic that was exclusively conducted through the

    4 borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of

    5 Croatia?

    6 A. Largely. There was substantial air

    7 assistance. I would note that my own entry into Bosnia

    8 and Herzegovina during wartime was always through

    9 Zagreb, and that in fact a great deal of humanitarian

    10 aid passed through the Republic of Croatia on the way

    11 to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Very frequently a

    12 substantial percentage of it was removed by forces of

    13 the Croatian army or HVO on the way in, but indeed,

    14 your basic point, I would concur that the border

    15 crossings into Bosnia and Herzegovina were largely

    16 through the Republic of Croatia.

    17 A. Mr. Donia, would you agree with me that the

    18 Republic of Croatia, the next day after the declaration

    19 of the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    20 recognised that state, and that it was the first state

    21 out of all the world's states which sent an ambassador

    22 to occupied Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and

    23 Herzegovina? Is this true?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. After a certain period of time, in Zagreb,

  52. 1 the capital of the Republic of Croatia, an embassy of

    2 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established;

    3 is that true?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Is it true, Dr. Donia, that throughout this

    6 whole period that we are talking about, from the moment

    7 when the embassies were established, the Croatian

    8 embassy in Sarajevo and the Bosnia and Herzegovinian

    9 one in Zagreb, that these embassies were continually

    10 active?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Are you familiar, Dr. Donia, with the fact

    13 that at the Bosnian and Herzegovinian embassy in Zagreb

    14 in 1993, there was a military-economic representative

    15 office, as well as a logistical section of the

    16 headquarters of the armed forces of Bosnia and

    17 Herzegovina, as well as a sector of that headquarters

    18 in Split?

    19 A. I was not aware of the Split office, but I

    20 was aware of the offices in Zagreb.

    21 Q. Permit me, Dr. Donia, to show you a document

    22 which I would like to introduce into evidence. I would

    23 like you to comment on it if you feel that this is

    24 necessary.

    25 MR. MIKULICIC: Would the usher please ...

  53. 1 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

    2 D32/2.


    4 Q. Would you please be kind enough, Dr. Donia,

    5 to look at this document.

    6 A. Yes, sir.

    7 Q. Would you agree if I say that this body

    8 operated on the 15th of July, 1993, in the embassy of

    9 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb?

    10 A. I'm really not qualified to, I guess,

    11 validate this document. I have no reason to doubt it

    12 and would find it in agreement with the general

    13 approach of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at

    14 the time, but I really can't validate the document as

    15 such.

    16 Q. Of course. Dr. Donia, a moment ago, in

    17 answering questions by my colleague Mr. Stein, you

    18 touched on the question of refugees and their fate and

    19 their numbers as a consequence of the war in

    20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I should just like briefly to

    21 touch upon this topic.

    22 Would you agree with me, Dr. Donia -- and I

    23 have some figures here of the office for refugees and

    24 displaced persons of the government of the Republic of

    25 Croatia -- if I say that at the end of 1992, there were

  54. 1 about 285.000 refugees from the Republic of

    2 Bosnia-Herzegovina that had found refuge in the

    3 Republic of Croatia?

    4 A. I believe that number is right. It accords

    5 with my understanding of the refugee reception by

    6 Croatia.

    7 Q. Dr. Donia, do you know or did you come across

    8 in your research any data which would indicate that the

    9 government of the Republic of Croatia expelled refugees

    10 coming from Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    11 A. I know of no such incident, no.

    12 Q. In the course of your research, Mr. Donia,

    13 did you find any evidence of the Republic of Croatia

    14 during that time -- that is, end of 1992, 1993, and

    15 1994 -- in any way confiscating the property of legal

    16 persons from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the

    17 territory of the Republic of Croatia?

    18 A. I really can't answer that question. I have

    19 not made any point of investigating that question and

    20 couldn't really give you an answer.

    21 Q. Very well. Do you know, Dr. Donia, that the

    22 Republic of Croatia, in its hospitals, provided medical

    23 treatment to a large number of people coming from the

    24 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina? And I particularly

    25 have in mind the Bosnian Muslims.

  55. 1 A. Again, I'm not really familiar -- I would

    2 assume that there was medical care provided in refugee

    3 camps and in various facilities where refugees were

    4 housed and cared for by the UNHCR and other agencies,

    5 and that some of that came from the Republic of

    6 Croatia. But I must -- I'm reaching beyond my

    7 knowledge here to make that assumption.

    8 Q. I understand that, Dr. Donia, but I hope you

    9 didn't misunderstand my question. I was not thinking

    10 of the refugee camps; I rather had in mind hospitals

    11 and regular medical facilities. In specific terms, do

    12 you know that the clinical hospital in Split, in the

    13 course of 1992 and 1993, hospitalised almost 4.000

    14 persons of Muslim ethnicity from the territory of

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    16 A. I did not know that number, no.

    17 Q. Very well. Dr. Donia, could you agree with

    18 me if I say that in 1992, 1993, and 1994, there were

    19 frequent meetings between statesmen or representatives

    20 of the state authorities of the Republics of Croatia

    21 and Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. How would you describe those meetings,

    24 roughly? Were they frequent, or were they rare,

    25 infrequent?

  56. 1 A. Well, I really don't -- I think it varied

    2 from time to time, and in -- certainly in 1992, there

    3 were very regular, frequent contacts. I think they

    4 became somewhat less regular in the course of the

    5 spring and summer of 1993, but I think the contacts and

    6 meetings took place at many different levels, and it's

    7 difficult to characterise the frequency without looking

    8 at specific ministries or heads of state.

    9 Q. I see. Dr. Donia, are you aware that the

    10 Croatian parliament adopted a declaration with regard

    11 to the conflicts that occurred in Central Bosnia

    12 between the Croatian and Muslim sides, asking

    13 explicitly that those conflicts be halted?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. Do you know, Dr. Donia, that the president of

    16 Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, in April 1993 issued an appeal

    17 requesting that the conflicts in Central Bosnia be

    18 stopped between the Muslims and the Croats?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Dr. Donia, I should like to ask you to

    21 examine a document relating to this appeal of President

    22 Tudjman's and which I should like to tender into

    23 evidence.

    24 MR. MIKULICIC: Could I ask the usher for his

    25 assistance to show this document to the witness.

  57. 1 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

    2 D33/2.


    4 Q. Would you please focus on the last paragraph,

    5 which I should like you to examine more closely.

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Could you very briefly comment on those

    8 events and the meeting held in Zagreb on the 24th of

    9 April, 1993, under the auspices of Lord Owen?

    10 A. I actually referred to it a few minutes ago

    11 in response to some of Mr. Stein's questions. In the

    12 wake of the violence on April 16th and that subsequent

    13 week, the international community actively promoted a

    14 ceasefire on the ground in Central Bosnia and rushed to

    15 move forward the arrangements of the Vance-Owen Plan.

    16 It will be remembered that Boban had signed this

    17 agreement already in January, and Izetbegovic had

    18 signed it already in March, with certain

    19 qualifications. So this document reflects the efforts

    20 to push the process forward by the international

    21 community.

    22 Q. Thank you. That document, among other

    23 things, refers to meetings between the two states,

    24 doesn't it? Between the presidents of the two states;

    25 I'm sorry.

  58. 1 A. Well, it specifies -- the English language

    2 version I have says, "I welcome readiness expressed by

    3 the Croat and Muslim leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    4 Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegovic." It doesn't state

    5 between states, unless I'm directing my attention to a

    6 different section of it.

    7 Q. I think there must be a misunderstanding. My

    8 question was whether there was a meeting in Zagreb,

    9 attended by President Alija Izetbegovic, President

    10 Tudjman, and Lord Owen, which is referred to in this

    11 document.

    12 A. I'm sorry, I don't see a reference to a

    13 meeting with the three of them.

    14 Q. Dr. Donia, this appeal was made by

    15 Mr. Tudjman on the 22nd of April, 1993, and in the last

    16 sentence it says that it welcomes the readiness of the

    17 Croatian leaders and the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    18 Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegovic, to meet with Lord

    19 Owen, and that meeting was attended by Lord Owen; is

    20 that correct?

    21 A. Well, I don't know if the meeting -- I assume

    22 the meeting took place, but I see no indication in this

    23 document that President Tudjman had attended a prior

    24 one.

    25 Q. Very well. Dr. Donia, let us leave this

  59. 1 matter aside, and let us turn to another area now which

    2 will also be the last area of my cross-examination.

    3 You have studied the history of the Balkans,

    4 and especially that of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you

    5 tell us, on the basis of those studies into distant

    6 history, how many wars were waged in that area, I do

    7 not mean the exact number, but how would you describe

    8 those wars?

    9 A. I would certainly begin by noting that the

    10 two greatest wars of the 20th century on the territory

    11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina were major, bloody, large-scale

    12 confrontations, it took many, many casualties, those

    13 being World War II and the war of the 1990s -- wars of

    14 the 1990s. World War I, there was relatively little

    15 fighting on the territory of Bosnia.

    16 Prior to that, I would -- it's a very valid

    17 question, and I'm not sure how I would characterise it

    18 without thinking about it some more, but there were

    19 sporadic armed conflicts and occasional wars over some

    20 centuries, and they were of different types. There

    21 were territorial wars around the borders, some of which

    22 were no more than skirmishes, some of which were major

    23 battles.

    24 I would probably, just thinking back on the

    25 19th century, consider the Austro-Hungarian invasion of

  60. 1 1878 to be perhaps the most substantial military action

    2 perhaps of that century.

    3 Q. Dr. Donia, bearing in mind the wars between

    4 two states that occurred through history in this area,

    5 in your studies, did you ever come across an example

    6 of, during such war operations between two states,

    7 diplomatic relations between those two same states

    8 continuing uninterrupted? Have you ever come across a

    9 situation of that kind in your research?

    10 A. I think it was typical of the earlier period

    11 anyway, for diplomatic relations to be maintained even

    12 as warfare went on.

    13 Q. While states were at war, did ever one state

    14 service the other state with weapons, medicines, food,

    15 and other forms of aid, allowing it to pass through its

    16 territory? Have you ever come across such an example?

    17 A. I think that probably it was a very typical

    18 situation in earlier times for exactly that situation

    19 to prevail.

    20 Q. Dr. Donia, in your opinion, as a historian

    21 and a researcher of this issue, what is the reason, the

    22 cause of the conflict, of the war in Central Bosnia?

    23 A. I think that it was --

    24 Q. I'm sorry for interrupting. What I have in

    25 mind is the conflict between the Croats and the

  61. 1 Muslims, to make it quite clear.

    2 A. I would say, in a word, Karadjordjevo. It

    3 was the determination of the Croatian community, as it

    4 became transformed under the leadership of the Zagreb

    5 regime, to carve out a territory which would be

    6 dominated by the HVO and exclusively Croatian in

    7 character.

    8 Q. That is your position, isn't it, Dr. Donia?

    9 A. That would be my answer to your question,

    10 which was what was the primary cause of the conflict.

    11 Q. Dr. Donia, do you know somebody called

    12 Muhamed Sacirbey?

    13 A. I do not know him personally but I know who

    14 he is.

    15 Q. Could you tell Their Honours the position

    16 this person had in 1993?

    17 A. In October 1993, I believe he became foreign

    18 minister and was foreign minister until sometime around

    19 Dayton, and prior to that, I'm not certain what his

    20 function was, prior to October 1993. He was, for some

    21 time, the ambassador to the United Nations prior to

    22 becoming foreign minister.

    23 Q. So Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey was the standing

    24 representative of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

    25 the United Nations; is that correct?

  62. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Dr. Donia, is my conclusion correct, that the

    3 main function of an ambassador to the United Nations is

    4 to articulate the positions and policies of the state

    5 he represents in the International Community, that is,

    6 in the United Nations, to formulate the official

    7 positions of the state he represents? Would you agree

    8 with me in that?

    9 A. That would be one of his functions, yes.

    10 Q. I should now like to ask you to look at a

    11 document, with the help of the usher, written by

    12 Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey, standing representative to the

    13 United Nations, dated the 21st of April, 1993.

    14 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation) Your Honours,

    15 the original version of this document is a bad one, so

    16 the Defence has copied it to facilitate reading, and

    17 I'm tendering both.

    18 THE REGISTRAR: Document D34/2.

    19 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation)

    20 Q. Dr. Donia, will you please look at the second

    21 page? It is far more legible than the first. Would

    22 you please read this document, upon which I have a

    23 question for you or, rather, I will be asking you to

    24 comment.

    25 A. Yes, sir.

  63. 1 Q. To fix this document in time, it is five days

    2 following the tragedy in Ahmici.

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Dr. Donia, is it true that Mr. Muhamed

    5 Sacirbey, and you agreed with me that his function is

    6 to articulate the official positions of the Republic of

    7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that he describes the conflict in

    8 Bosnia, and I'm drawing your attention to the fourth

    9 paragraph, as a conflict between local leaders which

    10 would never have occurred had it not been for the

    11 inadequate humanitarian aid given to the population of

    12 Central Bosnia?

    13 A. I noted that one of his functions is to

    14 represent the official position of his government, and

    15 I note your reading of the paragraph.

    16 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation) Dr. Donia,

    17 thank you for answering my questions. The Defence has

    18 no further questions.

    19 MR. NICE: I have several matters in

    20 re-examination.

    21 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

    22 Q. Just dealing with that last document first,

    23 do you have any other comment to make on that passage

    24 in the statement of the United Nations, its validity or

    25 otherwise?

  64. 1 A. I would simply note its correspondence with

    2 the broad and longstanding objective of the government

    3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina to lift the arms embargo, which

    4 is the principal purpose of this document. It is not

    5 designed to characterise the conflict but rather to

    6 seek assistance in the relief from the arms embargo of

    7 September 1991.

    8 Q. Going back to the earlier questions you were

    9 asked yesterday, first, dealing with questions

    10 directed, I think, to the integrity and so on of your

    11 report and other writings, when you started work on

    12 this region, did you have any personal historical

    13 sympathy to one side or the other?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. Any connection to any part of the region?

    16 A. As I've indicated in the personal statement,

    17 my entire family is American of Dutch extraction, and

    18 so I have no relationship, familial or origin, in any

    19 way connected to any part of Southeast Europe.

    20 Q. You were asked about your involvement under

    21 the National Peace Foundation. Is that a body that is

    22 partial in any way?

    23 A. I don't know anything about the National

    24 Peace Foundation, except that it facilitated my visit

    25 in the summer of 1994.

  65. 1 Q. You've been asked a number of questions about

    2 critics of your works. For convenience, there are

    3 collections of documents.

    4 MR. NICE: If they are distributed in this

    5 way, as bundles, by the usher, first to the Court and

    6 to the witness, as they come, and then -- yes, exactly

    7 like that, to the Judges, to the witness, the Court,

    8 and the defendants. The documents have separate

    9 exhibit numbers. If you can give a bundle to the

    10 witness, please. Thank you. One bundle remains for

    11 the Court and one for each of the defendants.

    12 I've highlighted passages here for speed of

    13 finding and because they are the passages to which I'm

    14 taking the witness.

    15 Q. First, the criticism by Kisslinger, not

    16 Kissinger, of September 12, 1994, does it deal with

    17 your book, A Tradition Betrayed, and highlighted in

    18 yellow in the first paragraph, you're described as "an

    19 expert on Islam under Hapsburg rule"?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. In the bottom paragraph, "The unique Bosnian

    22 mix is, of course, well-known as a modern urban

    23 phenomenon ... but it is this book's particular

    24 accomplishment to trace it to the very advent of

    25 Bosnian Christianity and extend it to outlying towns

  66. 1 and villages."

    2 Over the page, please, highlighted in red is

    3 the passage read to you by Mr. Stein. Its context was

    4 this. The first phrase or sentence even not read was:

    5 "Donia and Fine's view of Bosnian culture is

    6 on the whole compelling, but its presentation is

    7 troubling ..."

    8 The last paragraph reads as follows: "Still,

    9 like Vulliamy, Donia and Fine deepen our understanding

    10 of what has been lost in Bosnia, and underscore the

    11 distance between knowledge and political wisdom. Their

    12 efforts are valuable because the war in Bosnia has been

    13 fought to expunge its past while determining its fate.

    14 As a work that documents a legacy, Bosnia and

    15 Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed is an answer,

    16 however disproportionate, to the burning of the

    17 national archives in Sarajevo, the razing of hundreds

    18 of mosques and churches, the destruction of the Mostar,

    19 Bridge. What conquerors can blast from stone, they can

    20 never bottle the genie of historical memory."

    21 That was part, in any event, of the comments

    22 of Kisslinger on your work.

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. There is a French translation for that. But

    25 if we can turn swiftly to the next document, they've

  67. 1 all been numbered, which should be 1677.3, this is a

    2 criticism by Legvold, and there was the one phrase put

    3 to you, "written with something of a skilled

    4 high-school text"?

    5 A. I thought that actually was pretty much the

    6 objective that we had in mind in writing it.

    7 Q. Shall we now look at the rest of the

    8 criticism? Because I'll tell you how that was

    9 characterised to you in a question. He suggested that

    10 this was not a very favourable criticism when that

    11 single line was put to you. Other passages read:

    12 "With the calm authority of their craft, they firmly

    13 crush the silliness of popular conception. Not only,

    14 they make plain, has Bosnia existed as a separate,

    15 identifiable entity over all these years with borders

    16 more intact than either Croatia or Serbia, but in terms

    17 of present century, it's never known ethnic conflict.

    18 This history, they insist, has through the centuries

    19 been one of tolerated diversity and practical

    20 compromise."

    21 The next paragraph before the single quoted

    22 phrase:

    23 "This book is only 270 pages of small-paged

    24 text, simply written, with something of the character

    25 of a skilled high-school text. That is appropriate.

  68. 1 Given what the warring parties in the region are doing

    2 to their history, for others to be saving and

    3 preserving it for future generations is a modestly

    4 noble act."

    5 If we then turn to the next criticism by

    6 Fouad Ajami, three pages, dated August 7, 1995, is

    7 another comment on your book. The third sheet is a

    8 summary criticism of your work by -- do you know Ajami?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Who is he?

    11 A. He's at the Johns Hopkins Advanced School for

    12 International Studies, frequently a commentator as well

    13 for various television networks and, in my view, an

    14 outstanding scholar and analyst of, particularly, Islam

    15 and Middle Eastern countries.

    16 Q. In the third sheet, the highlighted sentence

    17 reads: "In one of the best scholarly accounts and

    18 histories of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and

    19 Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, historians Robert

    20 Donia and John Fine ..." and then goes off to summarise

    21 the book.

    22 Next sheet, please, 1677.5, a criticism by

    23 Abbas Milani. Known to you?

    24 A. No.

    25 Q. And the publication?

  69. 1 A. It was the San Francisco Chronicle.

    2 Q. And Highlighted: "Bosnia and Hercegovina: A

    3 Tradition Betrayed brings a sober voice of academic

    4 scholarship into the discussion. Seeking to identify

    5 the traditions that have characterised Bosnian society

    6 through its history, Balkan historians John Fine and

    7 Robert Donia explore the historical roots of Bosnian

    8 society from the arrival of Slavic tribes in the sixth

    9 and seventh centuries to the breakup of socialist

    10 Yugoslavia."

    11 Over the page, highlighted: "The authors try

    12 to steer a fair and dispassionate course." They praise

    13 your prose and they conclude at the end: "Erudite and

    14 impartial, 'Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition

    15 Betrayed' greatly illuminates the rich contours of

    16 Bosnian history and the genealogy of its current tragic

    17 predicament."

    18 I think the next and perhaps last is a

    19 document numbered 1677.6, again by Fouad Ajami dealing

    20 with a number of books. I think on the third sheet,

    21 there's one sentence highlighted in red but the balance

    22 in yellow, where he's dealing with: "This history is

    23 an invention, spun out of vanity and a need for

    24 consolation." He goes on: "For fate meandered in the

    25 Balkans. And its meanderings can now be more clearly

  70. 1 understood, and measured against some of the region's

    2 deadly myths, thanks to the appearance of outstanding

    3 works of research by the impassioned British journalist

    4 Noel Malcolm, the exacting American historians Robert

    5 Donja and John Fine ..." and he then goes on to deal

    6 with others, and he's praise-worthy of your work, three

    7 sheets or two sheets further on, in a passage

    8 highlighted, again, in yellow. The last document I'll

    9 deal with in a minute.

    10 Are those the criticisms that were being made

    11 of your work?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. And the people who made them, apart from one

    14 of whom you were unaware, peers, superiors, how would

    15 you categorise them?

    16 A. In many cases, peers; in some cases, people

    17 who have been longer than I have in the business of

    18 studying the region.

    19 Q. While we have the exhibits with us, and it's

    20 a small point that can be dealt with very swiftly, you

    21 were asked about the representation in countries other

    22 than the region of the party of the Bosnian Muslims.

    23 Are you aware of the representation in other countries

    24 around the world at that same time of the HDZ?

    25 A. Yes. This was actually something that all

  71. 1 three parties engaged in at that time.

    2 Q. So that if you just look at the last exhibit

    3 that was at the bottom of the pile of documents, tell

    4 us what the document is, if you can?

    5 A. Glaska Hrvatska Demokratska (phoen). It's

    6 "Merry Christmas and Happy 1990."

    7 Q. What is the document itself?

    8 A. It's the journal of the HDZ.

    9 Q. If we turn over and just look at the

    10 highlighted pages, we see references to, first, North

    11 America, I think. Following some pages with pictures,

    12 we see Australia, Sweden, and reports from associated

    13 groups elsewhere in the world?

    14 A. Yes, Australia, yes.

    15 Q. You were asked about President Tudjman, his

    16 revision of a text because of its having caused ethnic

    17 offence. Are you aware of any other examples of

    18 President Tudjman causing ethnic offence? Are you

    19 aware of a television programme where he spoke of his

    20 wife?

    21 A. No.

    22 Q. Very well. And any other examples of his

    23 causing offence?

    24 A. No.

    25 Q. Thank you. The term "Bosniak," you've

  72. 1 defined its present use. Did it, in fact, have an

    2 earlier use, however slight?

    3 A. It had many earlier uses, and there are many

    4 instances of earlier usage. The Bosniak historians

    5 have made a point of identifying these instances. As I

    6 look at them, the same problem occurred historically

    7 that occurs today, which is that at times, the term

    8 "Bosniak" applies to clearly the Bosnian Muslims, and

    9 at times, it's ambiguous whether it applies to the

    10 Muslims or to the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    11 But there are historical precedents in which people

    12 call them Bosniaks and others call them Bosniaks as

    13 well, and those are situations in which the people

    14 concerned are Bosnian Muslims.

    15 Q. You were asked about a number of meetings of

    16 leaders, including, of course, Karadjordjevo. Is there

    17 a meeting at Grac and is there a meeting at Tikvis that

    18 you can help us with?

    19 A. The follow-up to the meeting in

    20 Karadjordjevo, in which the two heads of state

    21 conferred regarding the division of Bosnia, was

    22 followed on May 6th, 1992 by a meeting between Mate

    23 Boban and Radovan Karadzic in Grac which produced an

    24 agreement. It was a publicly released agreement that

    25 referenced the 1939 banovina line and agreed to work

  73. 1 together further regarding a dual party cooperation.

    2 This was subsequently followed by, really,

    3 several other meetings in which, in June, President

    4 Tudjman met with first the Herzegovinian Croats on June

    5 13th and then June 20th with the Bosnian Croats, and

    6 further, the implementation, albeit a delayed

    7 implementation, of this politics of division.

    8 Q. Tikvis? No? Very well.

    9 You were asked many questions about efforts

    10 to create a Muslim state. Are you aware, yourself, of

    11 any efforts, in particular of any documents reflecting

    12 efforts to Catholicise areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina with

    13 which we are concerned?

    14 A. To Catholicise areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    15 No.

    16 Q. By which I mean moves to encourage the

    17 erection of religious symbols of the Catholic faith,

    18 and so on?

    19 A. Well, I interpreted your question to mean

    20 Catholic proselytisation or -- establish a more

    21 Catholic state, and I would say that there were some

    22 efforts to support the formation and strengthen

    23 Herceg-Bosna by certain clergy, and there was a great

    24 deal of support for the establishment of Catholic

    25 churches, support for the clergy, and so on, as a part

  74. 1 of the broad effort, to, say, strengthen Croatian

    2 culture and religion.

    3 Actually, the majority of the leaders of the

    4 Franciscan order of Srebrna Bosna and the Catholic

    5 hierarchy, which to this day is in Sarajevo, was quite

    6 bitter about the formation of a purely territorial

    7 unit, and on at least some occasions strongly denounced

    8 such a solution, which left, in their view, these

    9 hundreds of thousands of Croat Catholics out of the

    10 community which had been proclaimed.

    11 Q. When asked about the involvement of outsiders

    12 on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, were there

    13 outsiders involved in the HV or the HVO?

    14 A. Yes, at many different times. I think it's

    15 worth recalling that on May 15th, 1992, the Security

    16 Council passed a resolution which called for the

    17 withdrawal of foreign troops from the Republic of

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, including those of the Republic of

    19 Serbia and the Republic of Croatia, and so clearly at

    20 that time, in the view of the United Nations Security

    21 Council, there were outsiders -- namely Croatian forces

    22 and Serbian forces -- in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    23 There were also various -- the same

    24 resolution called for all paramilitaries to be brought

    25 under the command, the central command, of the army of

  75. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or I think it's -- the language is

    2 it's under the command of the armed forces of

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    4 Q. When you were asked about Mujahedin, was it

    5 the case that there were individuals, whether

    6 mercenaries or otherwise, involved in the HVO?

    7 A. Yes, there were mercenaries -- there were

    8 volunteers from Croatian communities around the world.

    9 There were mercenaries from a number of different

    10 countries, European countries and countries of the

    11 former Soviet bloc, that were involved.

    12 Q. You were stopped from giving your position on

    13 the Croatian position in November 1991 because you

    14 didn't agree with either of the two alternatives put to

    15 you. What do you say that position was?

    16 A. Well, the Croatian position at that time was

    17 in transition, and there was no single Croatian

    18 position but rather the first emergence of two

    19 different ones. The position of the elected leader of

    20 the HDZ in the elections of 1990, Stjepan Kljujic, was

    21 that the Croatian nation should support a unified

    22 Bosnia and Herzegovina and realise its national

    23 aspirations within the framework of that republic.

    24 The situation at the time was at the very end

    25 of the war in Croatia, and consequently that support

  76. 1 was frequently conditional on the understanding that

    2 Bosnia and Herzegovina would eventually break away

    3 from, rather than remain part of, Yugoslavia. Thus, at

    4 this time, the second viewpoint emerged, which was that

    5 there should be a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    6 either outright or in the form of the canton formula

    7 that the international community promoted. I've noted

    8 in my paper the two very different responses to the

    9 formation of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna by

    10 Mate Boban, who saw it as a realisation of a

    11 territorial aspiration from the 1939 banovina boundary,

    12 and that of Mr. Kljujic, who saw this as a

    13 reluctantly-taken step that would not be implemented at

    14 this time.

    15 So subsequently, of course, with the

    16 expulsion and purging of the party at the direction of

    17 the Zagreb regime, Mr. Kljujic resigned as president

    18 and was subsequently replaced, and the party then

    19 adopted at that time the position that the Croatian

    20 Community of Herceg-Bosna, with its territorial

    21 designation, was the realisation of Croatian

    22 aspirations in Bosnia.

    23 Q. Thank you. Colonel Stewart's book, which

    24 you've read, do you have any observations to make on

    25 his commentary generally or on his observations of

  77. 1 historical matters, he being an officer who was there

    2 for six months, I believe?

    3 A. Yes, I think he has a -- his reportage on

    4 contemporary events is certainly worthy of note and

    5 important. His understanding of history or his

    6 relation -- his imparting of history I think is

    7 somewhat superficial, if you will, and I don't think he

    8 was intending to be a purveyor of serious history in

    9 that book.

    10 Q. The creation of mutual embassies by Croatia

    11 and by Bosnia-Herzegovina; any significance?

    12 A. Well, yes, I think that's a very important

    13 part of this two-track policy that the Zagreb regime

    14 maintained toward Bosnia at this time, and numerous

    15 observers have commented on this prolific production of

    16 statements, guarantees, appeals, by President Tudjman

    17 and various members of the Zagreb regime, recognising

    18 borders, recognising the legitimacy of

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the same time the support,

    20 which was also really overt, of the separatist

    21 territorial aspirations of Croats in Bosnia. This

    22 really came to a head, I think, in the July 3rd, 1992,

    23 proclamation which was read in the world press as a

    24 stab in the back to Bosnia. The government -- or the

    25 official Russian agency, Itar Tass, simply stated that

  78. 1 the Zagreb government is now pursuing the same policy

    2 as the Belgrade government.

    3 So this policy of supporting the separatist

    4 territorial ambitions of the Bosnian Croats coincided

    5 in time and at all times ran parallel to this other

    6 track, which was a plethora of pronouncements,

    7 recognition, exchange of ambassadors, and at all times

    8 things that were viewed as required by the

    9 international community in terms of the posture towards

    10 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    11 Q. In your judgement, were those other actions on

    12 the second track truly sincere or not?

    13 A. Well, I think they were both real tracks, but

    14 it seems to me it's hard to view the expressions of

    15 support for the territorial integrity of

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina as sincere when Croatian forces were

    17 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a separatist agenda was

    18 being promoted. So I would not view them as sincere,

    19 no.

    20 Q. You've referred to two meetings of June the

    21 13th and June 20th; do you recall?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. Which year? Just for clarification; there

    24 may be a problem on the record.

    25 A. Yes, those meetings occurred in 1991.

  79. 1 Q. Very well. You started this afternoon by

    2 correcting certain matters that had been put to you in

    3 a selective way from the Silber & Little book. You

    4 also drew to the Court's attention that Kordic was

    5 referred to in that book, at least in the later edition

    6 of it. Is there anything you want to add to about

    7 that, and to what does it go?

    8 JUDGE MAY: Well, the examination was stopped

    9 at that point. If we're to have quotations of that

    10 sort from the book, then we need the authors.

    11 MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases.

    12 JUDGE MAY: Have you got very much more?

    13 We're past our time.

    14 MR. NICE: No, if you can give me just a

    15 couple of minutes, I can certainly conclude.

    16 Q. As a matter of a quick point of history,

    17 kuna, the currency you referred to, where was that

    18 derived as a name, and was it controversial or

    19 otherwise?

    20 A. The kuna is a small animal, the skins of

    21 which were used, supposedly, at the time of the

    22 medieval Croatian kingdom.

    23 Q. Had the name been used earlier as a currency?

    24 A. It was also a reference to currency used in

    25 World War II by the Ustasha independent state of

  80. 1 Croatia. Its adoption, I think in 1993, was very

    2 controversial and was viewed as a nationalist symbolic

    3 assertion by the Croatian government.

    4 Q. You were asked questions about the media, and

    5 the newspapers in particular. The newspapers, did they

    6 survive the war?

    7 A. Which ones?

    8 Q. Well, local newspapers.

    9 A. Most of them did not.

    10 Q. Those that did, what was their content, in

    11 your judgement, as to its genuine political commentary

    12 or otherwise?

    13 A. Oh, well, there were all sorts of

    14 publications, and the classic example, perhaps, is

    15 Oslobodjenje, the Sarajevo paper, which indeed came out

    16 I think every day except one when the printing ink

    17 froze. But there were many local publications, some of

    18 which had very tendentious agendas and others of which

    19 were pretty good.

    20 Q. Yes, I think probably I'm going to leave that

    21 there, and the only other thing I have is a correction

    22 which I think I want to -- yes, one last question: The

    23 17th (sic) Muslim Brigade, there was something that --

    24 you were, I think, unhappy with the way the question

    25 was put to you about that. Is there anything you want

  81. 1 to add? If you can't remember, it doesn't --

    2 A. 7th Muslim brigade?

    3 Q. Yes.

    4 A. No, I have nothing further.

    5 Q. It's too complicated to ask you all to go

    6 back to the relevant passage, but can I here note that

    7 at page 18 of today's transcript, line 5, Mr. Stein, in

    8 reading an extract from your book, Dr. Donia, on

    9 page 267, read it incorrectly, and it probably should

    10 be corrected for fear of otherwise being accidentally

    11 misleading. It was suggested, I think, that --

    12 it was read in this way, or something to this

    13 effect: "Fighting against Croatian units in Central

    14 Bosnia was done principally by Muslim brigades," and

    15 then I think it says, "became exclusively Muslim."

    16 What your book said was, "And the Bosnian government

    17 forces in that region became almost exclusively

    18 Muslim."

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. It wasn't referring to the area becoming

    21 exclusively Muslim or anything like that?

    22 A. Right.

    23 MR. NICE: There is a small correction to

    24 Merdan's statement, but I don't think it's

    25 significant. That's all I have to ask.

  82. 1 JUDGE MAY: Doctor, that concludes your

    2 evidence. Thank you for coming to the International

    3 Tribunal to give it. You are now released.

    4 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

    5 (The witness withdrew)

    6 JUDGE MAY: You've got the next witness to

    7 call tomorrow?

    8 MR. NICE: Certainly, yes.

    9 JUDGE MAY: That will take an hour or so; is

    10 that right?

    11 MR. NICE: In chief, I would have thought I

    12 will be between three-quarters of an hour and an hour,

    13 but I hope not more. It could be less.

    14 JUDGE MAY: The film has been seen now by one

    15 member of the bench and will be seen by the other

    16 tomorrow before the sitting, although I gather

    17 Mr. Stein has a point.

    18 MR. STEIN: Thank you, Judge. We would

    19 object -- Your Honour's seen the film, so you know

    20 thoroughly, we find, frankly, its relevance

    21 attenuated. It is not part of the expert's report, nor

    22 does he say that he has relied on it. I'm not sure why

    23 it's being incorporated through his testimony at all.

    24 It is of an unnamed Muslim family and an unstated

    25 date. We have no access to the author of the film,

  83. 1 although I gather her name is Tone Bringa. She is not

    2 on the witness list; she is the narrator. We have no

    3 access, either, to Debbie Christie, the producer or

    4 director, and I'm not sure how I would even begin to

    5 approach it.

    6 Now, I will concede, frankly, that it is, in

    7 my view, not particularly relevant except to prejudice

    8 the Court, and of course you are professional judges,

    9 and I'm not going to think for one minute that it will

    10 prejudice your judgement. But when you see the whole

    11 thing, as Your Honour has, it's a sad tale.

    12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kovacic.

    13 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I would just like

    14 to add only one sentence. We think that having that

    15 reader as part of Dr. Allcock's testimony is not

    16 appropriate. It is not because the discovery was not

    17 done appropriately, since we all voted yesterday, and

    18 indeed, only twelve hours before. I don't oppose, as a

    19 principle matter, a possibility for the Prosecution to

    20 enter that film in any other way or any other method

    21 throughout his case, but not connected to Dr. Allcock's

    22 testimony, since he never mentioned that movie.

    23 MR. NICE: Can I just deal with the

    24 position?

    25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

  84. 1 MR. NICE: When Dr. Allcock arrived some days

    2 ago, he volunteered that film as a piece of effective

    3 field research that he would like to refer to in

    4 support of his conclusions. It was not known to him

    5 that the film happened to have been seen in another

    6 case by the author of the film a week before, and it

    7 was just a coincidence. He regards it as a piece of

    8 research upon which he would rely, much like any other

    9 piece of research.

    10 The position is now clear that his

    11 cross-examination will not be concluded, I think,

    12 tomorrow, and he will have to come back. And it can't

    13 be next week; it will have to be at some later date,

    14 probably I think now in September, but it may be an

    15 earlier date. It's possible. It certainly can't be

    16 next week; I think he is examining some doctoral

    17 candidates or something to that effect. Therefore the

    18 film will not prejudice the defendants because they

    19 will always be in a position to deal with it by

    20 cross-examination at a later day.

    21 As to calling the author of that film, she is

    22 not on the witness list, and indeed, I wasn't aware of

    23 her potential to assist us until, by the independent

    24 route, I had heard of her appearing in the other case a

    25 week ago. I gather there had been problems, in any

  85. 1 event, with her attendance as a witness, and she was

    2 called by the Court, not by one of the parties, in the

    3 other case.

    4 Of course, if it's appropriate for her to be

    5 called and to ask questions, we can do that. Equally,

    6 it may be cross-examination in the other court would be

    7 relied upon, if that would assist. But the document

    8 itself is a piece of original research and is something

    9 that the witness may very well refer to in any event.

    10 (Trial Chamber deliberates)

    11 JUDGE MAY: We'll decide about this

    12 tomorrow. Meanwhile, we will have all looked at the

    13 film by tomorrow, and we'll let you know.

    14 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

    15 JUDGE MAY: Half past 2.00.

    16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    17 5.50 p.m., to be reconvened on

    18 Thursday, the 22nd day of July,

    19 1999, at 2.30 p.m.