1 Thursday, 21st October, 1999

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.

7 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario

8 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.

10 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

11 WITNESS: PHILIP JENNINGS [Resumed]

12 Q. And good morning, Major Jennings.

13 A. Good morning.

14 Q. I've been through my notes. I think that we

15 can finish up your cross-examination in 10 or

16 15 minutes. Let's start by just cleaning up a few

17 loose ends that were left over from yesterday.

18 MR. SAYERS: We have previously distributed,

19 Your Honour, to counsel for the Prosecution and our

20 co-defendants, a few short exhibits that we intend to

21 use today. The first one is the -- I'm sorry, actually

22 the registrar has the packets.

23 Q. The first document I would like you to

24 review, Major, is milinfosum number 98. That is dated

25 the 6th of February, 1993, previously marked as

1 Exhibit D49/1.

2 A. Thank you.

3 Q. Two points regarding this milinfosum, sir.

4 The first is, it's true that actually both the ABiH and

5 the HVO forces were digging entrenchments, fortified

6 positions, defensive positions; isn't that true?

7 A. Yes, that is the case. It wasn't just the

8 HVO.

9 Q. And second, there is no mention in this

10 milinfosum of the meeting that you had with Mr. Kordic

11 on that day, I believe.

12 A. No, as you've established in other cases,

13 there isn't a record, although I do have my own notes

14 recording the record.

15 Q. Right.

16 A. And there are other documents which record

17 such meetings or events which took place, specifically

18 the 1 Cheshire war diary.

19 Q. I'm sure that's the case. We have not had

20 the opportunity to review that.

21 The next document I would like you to review,

22 sir, is milinfosum 99, from the next day, February the

23 7th, 1993.

24 MR. SAYERS: This does need an exhibit

25 number.

1 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

2 D111/1.

3 MR. SAYERS:

4 Q. Two very brief points with respect to this

5 document. The first page and a half, essentially,

6 chronicles a list of complaints related to the BritBat

7 representatives by the commander of the 3rd Corps in

8 Zenica, and the comment on page 2 essentially concludes

9 with the observation that these sorts of accusations

10 are being made by both sides. That was consistent with

11 your experience; correct?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. And there is no reference in this milinfosum

14 to your meeting on February the 7th, 1993, with

15 Mr. Kordic?

16 A. There isn't. I have this from yesterday. We

17 actually established this point yesterday.

18 Q. All right.

19 A. So I have now two copies of this --

20 Q. Very well. The next document I would like to

21 review with you is milinfosum number 103, which has

22 previously been marked as D109/1, 11th of February,

23 1993.

24 A. Thank you.

25 Q. Just take a look on the first page of this

1 document. There is a reference to your meeting. The

2 OC of C Company visited the HVO HQ in Busovaca and

3 spoke to the HDZ representative, Dario Kordic. It

4 relates the details of your conversation. It relates

5 accurately the details of the conversation that you had

6 with Mr. Kordic, I take it, sir?

7 A. This is an instance where, because I was able

8 to get back in time and actually speak, I can recall,

9 to Sergeant Connelly, he had time to actually get it in

10 the milinfosum. As I explained yesterday, this wasn't

11 always the case. It depended on when the information

12 came in.

13 And I see that it does actually, within the

14 milinfo, refer to the HDZ representative, Dario Kordic,

15 when we had the discussion yesterday about the

16 HZ-HD [sic].

17 Q. I think we can move on. I would just like to

18 show you the milinfosum for February 12th of 1993,

19 milinfosum number 104.

20 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

21 D112/1.

22 MR. SAYERS:

23 Q. Just one point with this, Major, and that is

24 that there is no reference in this milinfosum to the

25 mine-clearing or mine incident that you related in your

1 testimony in chief; would you agree with that?

2 A. There is no reference to it.

3 Q. Yes. The next document is the next

4 milinfosum, for the following day, February the 13th,

5 1993, milinfosum number 105.

6 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

7 D113/1.

8 JUDGE MAY: Is it suggested, because there is

9 no mention in the milinfosum, that these incidents

10 didn't occur?

11 MR. SAYERS: I don't believe that that's

12 suggested at all, Your Honour. The only point that I'm

13 making is that these conversations were not deemed

14 sufficiently important to be included in the

15 milinfosums. That's all. I'm not in any way, and I

16 hope the Court doesn't suggest in any way -- or doesn't

17 perceive in any way that I am suggesting that we are

18 attacking the major's veracity. We are not.

19 JUDGE MAY: I thought that wasn't the case,

20 but I just wanted to be sure. Yes.

21 MR. SAYERS:

22 Q. Now, milinfosum number 105, major, once

23 again, doesn't contain any reference to the

24 mine-clearing incident, does it?

25 A. Which mine-clearing incident are you

1 referring to?

2 Q. The incident that you referred to where you

3 saw a substantial quantity of explosives --

4 A. Indeed. So -- so it doesn't contain

5 reference to the fact that I discovered a quantity of

6 mines under a bridge. There was no clearance.

7 Q. Very -- I stand duly corrected.

8 There is a reference to shelling in the

9 Busovaca area. You can see that on the bottom of the

10 first page, where it is suggested that Bosnian

11 artillery or Bosnian army fire was falling onto HVO

12 positions. Did you ever see any of that when you were

13 present in the area?

14 A. In terms of this specific reported instance,

15 I cannot recall that I would have seen shelling on that

16 day. However, during the period, really, from the

17 start of the conflict up to the day -- that is the 25th

18 of January, when we established a U.N. control point on

19 the bridge at Kacuni, thereafter there was shelling all

20 the time. You would be driving along roads in the

21 course of your duties, and you would hear an explosion,

22 you would record it, and you would report it as such.

23 So this may have taken place whilst I was

24 driving around. It may not have. The fact that it's

25 in the milinfo, as I stated yesterday, I don't discount

1 the validity of it. I would just say that the comment

2 does underline, possibly, Bosnian army fire. I'm sure

3 that they did.

4 Q. Major, I'm not suggesting one thing or

5 another. You were performing your duties under

6 difficult circumstances, and isn't it true that

7 shelling from both sides was actually a regular

8 occurrence?

9 A. I can't rule out the fact that the army BiH

10 may have had artillery fire which they used. What I've

11 always stated is I didn't see any myself in my personal

12 experience.

13 Q. The next document brings us to where we

14 finished up yesterday, your conversation on the 23rd of

15 February, 1993, and I would just like the usher to show

16 you milinfosum 116, dated the 23rd of February, 1993.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Document D114/1.

18 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.

19 Q. Three points with respect to this milinfosum,

20 Major. The first is, as you can see under the Busovaca

21 section, there is no reference to the conversation that

22 you had with Mr. Kordic on that day?

23 A. There is no reference to the conversation I

24 had with Mr. Kordic on that day.

25 Q. With respect to the Vitez section, there's a

1 description of the incident that you described

2 yesterday, during which a Dutch Bat captain, Captain

3 Linsen's Mercedes was apparently hijacked by two

4 individuals while travelling in the Vitez area?

5 The third point that I would like -- you have

6 to say "Yes".

7 A. I beg your pardon. Yes, an incident which I

8 recall clearly. We were all briefed on it.

9 Q. The third point I would like to make is on

10 page 2, right before the Gornji Vakuf entry, where it

11 says the CO of the 1st Cheshires and the Vitez-Travnik

12 LO visited the HVO Vitez to request the return of the

13 vehicle and its contents. Were you aware that Colonel

14 Stewart and, I take it, Captain Forgrave had --

15 A. Captain Martyn Forgrave.

16 Q. Yes. They had visited the headquarters of

17 the HVO military forces in Vitez to bring this incident

18 to the attention --

19 A. I believe I would have been aware of that,

20 and as I said yesterday, the commanding officer had

21 made it clear to us all it was a very high priority. I

22 wouldn't be surprised that a dozen or so officers in

23 various capacities were doing what they could to try

24 and retrieve it, myself included.

25 Q. Very well. And finally with respect to the

1 meeting that you had on the 27th of February, this is

2 actually recorded, I think, in milinfosum number 120,

3 dated February 28th, 1993, and I would just like the

4 usher to show you that.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Document D115/1.

6 MR. SAYERS:

7 Q. The particular provision appears, Your Honour

8 and Major, on page 2 under the Busovaca entry.

9 A. Can I just read it?

10 Q. Absolutely.

11 A. That is a factual statement.

12 Q. Thank you. You previously described that the

13 chief of police in Vitez actually was the gentleman who

14 arranged for the retrieval of this Mercedes?

15 A. I was told that it was Mr. Pasko by Dario

16 Kordic.

17 Q. And Mr. Pasko told you that he had, in fact,

18 arranged that, I take it, when you saw him.

19 A. The meeting with Mr. Pasko was very brief.

20 As I think I've already outlined yesterday, I basically

21 bumped into a stand-off position between two opposing

22 factions, shall we say loosely, HVO, and, well, that's

23 really all that concerned me at the time, that they

24 were opposing factions. Mr. Pasko, shall we say, was

25 rather busy at the time.

1 Q. Yes, Major. I think that's a very

2 understated way of putting it.

3 The last question I have for you is this one,

4 Major: Do I understand that the first time that you

5 met Major Kordic was February 3rd was after the

6 fighting generally had ended and after the negotiated

7 ceasefire agreement was already in place?

8 A. I don't believe that the fighting had ended.

9 I don't believe, actually, during the period in

10 question right up to the last meeting I had with

11 Mr. Kordic, that the fighting ever ended. In fact,

12 there was several ceasefire agreements that were made

13 over the period. I couldn't date them, specify them,

14 other than on recollection there were many, and they

15 were broken by both sides. So, no, it wasn't when the

16 fighting had ended.

17 MR. SAYERS: Very well. Thank you very much

18 indeed, Major. I appreciate your testimony. That

19 concludes my questioning, unless the Court has any

20 questions for me.

21 JUDGE MAY: Do I take it from your

22 examination, Mr. Sayers, that there's no dispute about

23 the conversations which this witness had with

24 Mr. Kordic? Mr. Kordic said on one occasion he would

25 hold up the prisoner exchange until various points were

1 sorted out?

2 MR. SAYERS: That point, Your Honour, is

3 actually disputed.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. On another occasion, he

5 said that, on the question of aid, that they were

6 discussing blocking the road with civilians. Is that

7 disputed?

8 MR. SAYERS: I believe that point is

9 disputed. But we do not dispute the fact that the

10 Major had the conversations which he has described with

11 Mr. Kordic, or at least that various conversations

12 occurred at the time that he describes.

13 JUDGE MAY: Or that the car had been returned

14 thanks to Mr. Pasko?

15 MR. SAYERS: That point is not disputed, Your

16 Honour.

17 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

18 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

19 Q. It may be that you'll need to refer to your

20 notes for the questions I have to ask, and these were,

21 of course, extracted from a pocketbook which contains

22 other notes as well, I think.

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. I have a number of topics to deal with, but

25 all quite shortly.

1 First, I think, can I deal with Donja Polje.

2 In respect to that, some statistics from a census were

3 put to you. I would be grateful for sight, if it's

4 possible, of the census statistics that the Defence

5 were speaking from.

6 While that's being considered, can you check

7 or tell us whether you had any entries in any of your

8 pocketbook, other than the ones you've already shown

9 us, that relate to Donja Polje, that is, that relate to

10 what you saw at Donja Polje, not the occasion when

11 there was a reference by Kordic, Mr. Kordic, to Donja

12 Polje?

13 A. No. I can say this: I did check my

14 notebooks, I had two, and I believe there are no other

15 references which are relevant to what's happened in the

16 last couple of days, and certainly there's no specific

17 reference to the incident which I did witness, the

18 incident being the observation of one or two HVO

19 soldiers entering a building, which identified to be

20 Muslim in architecture, and then leaving. I believe,

21 from my memory, that it was Donjavic Polje or the area

22 of Donjavic Polje. There were, actually, buildings all

23 the way down from Donjavic Polje to the bridge itself.

24 There was no specific demarcation line. There must

25 have been, obviously, on a map which showed a village

1 boundary, for example.

2 Q. Precisely. Could you take this map and lay

3 it on the ELMO? And we'll look at the bit that shows

4 Donja Polje. The area that you're speaking of, I think

5 you may have to reposition it a bit, that would

6 probably be sufficient, if it can be sharpened on the

7 bottom right-hand corner, so much the better, but that

8 may not be possible. Thank you. That's perfect.

9 That shows the point that you've made,

10 because we can actually see what appear to be house

11 markings along the side of the road, can we not?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. There are, therefore, marked housing all the

14 way between Donja Polje and Kacuni; is that correct?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. You say that you saw this incident, first of

17 all, with the emerging HVO soldiers and the house that

18 then went up in flames. Can you be at all precise

19 about whereabouts that was on that road?

20 A. I cannot be exactly precise, relating to this

21 map, where I actually saw this incident taking place.

22 When I gave evidence and a witness statement was taken,

23 I focused in on this place, Donjavic Polje as a centre

24 of mass, but the destruction of buildings that I saw

25 occurred all the way along this road, as certainly

1 from, if you look at the map now here, the centre of

2 mass of Donjavic Polje going southeastwards all the way

3 to the U.N. checkpoint shown at Kacuni. It would have

4 been in one of these houses along that road.

5 Q. Indeed, the houses that were then seen by you

6 to have been damaged, were they also lying between

7 Donja Polje and Kacuni?

8 A. They were, but I must say that in relation to

9 my previous statement, I did say Donjavic Polje as

10 well, because I believed that such houses as I've

11 described being destroyed were in there as well, so it

12 is actually both.

13 MR. NICE: I don't know if the quoted census

14 is available for my consideration. Thank you very

15 much. If the usher could produce it so I can see it.

16 MR. SAYERS: It is, Your Honour, and I have a

17 copy here.

18 JUDGE MAY: If the usher would just hand it

19 to the Prosecution, please.

20 MR. SAYERS: The entry for Donja Polje is

21 actually referred to as "Polje" in this census on

22 page 2, for the Prosecution's assistance.

23 MR. NICE: Thank you. We'll just have a look

24 at that, please. Perhaps that can be demonstrated.

25 Q. First of all, look at the first sheet to

1 understand how the columns are to be construed, and it

2 totals, then, Muslims, Serbs, Croats, Yugoslavs and

3 then others. If we turn to the second sheet, which is

4 the bear statistic that was read out from you, it comes

5 not from Donja Polje but from Polje, and that statistic

6 would suggest no Muslims for Polje, 5 Serbs, 709

7 Croats, 8 Yugoslavs, and 7 others. Are you aware, one

8 way or another, of how the registration of "others" was

9 typically -- what that typically represented at the

10 time of the censuses?

11 A. I'm not aware of that, no.

12 Q. In any case, seven were others.

13 If we then turn back to the first page to

14 Kacuni, which you can see just halfway down, there the

15 Muslims are 963, 9 Serbs, 207 Croats, 3 Yugoslavs, 11

16 others. Do you see that?

17 A. I do, yes.

18 Q. It would appear from that that Kacuni is a

19 majority Muslim area, a place called Polje showing no

20 Muslims but some others, and you're not able to

21 identify for which part of this road and area Polje

22 relates?

23 A. No, I'm not.

24 JUDGE MAY: Has this document got an exhibit

25 number?

1 MR. NICE: No. It had better have one, I

2 think, now. I don't know how it -- what happens.

3 JUDGE MAY: I think it had better be a

4 Defence exhibit, since it's --

5 MR. SAYERS: I think it had better be, Your

6 Honour. Thank you.

7 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

8 D116/1.

9 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Nice,

10 could you tell us with greater precision what it is

11 exactly you wish to tell the Chamber through your

12 intervention? Apparently there were no Muslims in

13 Polje, according to the census. In Kacuni, you tell us

14 that there was an important majority of Muslims. We

15 are agreed on that. And then what else? Are you

16 making any inferences from these figures? Is that what

17 you are trying to tell us?

18 MR. NICE: No, the point was this: The

19 cross-examination on this part of the witness's

20 testimony seemed to be aimed at throwing some doubt on

21 whether what was happening was as described by the

22 witness; namely, first, an attack by the HVO on a

23 Muslim house, and second, the destruction of Muslim

24 houses. Because it was suggested, effectively, that

25 what was being described didn't fit with the census

1 statistics, which would have revealed no Muslim

2 occupation, and therefore no Muslims and no Muslim

3 houses, in the area concerned.

4 As we now see, the cross-examination

5 proceeded on an incomplete and, unfortunately, a

6 misleading picture, first because we don't quite know

7 what Polje is. Second, because Polje, in any event,

8 does contain some unattributed others, but most

9 significantly, because the witness's evidence -- as has

10 always been clear from his witness statement, and as is

11 clear in the summary -- relates to an event that

12 happened between Polje, or Donja Polje, and Kacuni.

13 And the statistical material makes it quite clear that

14 it is probable in the extreme that that road contains

15 Muslim property and that his account therefore --

16 which, as I understand it, was in some way being

17 challenged -- is likely to be right.

18 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) I should

19 like to ask the major, the witness: These houses that

20 he saw burning, under precisely what circumstances was

21 it in Donja Polje, and on what road?

22 A. Your Honour, it was on the side of the main

23 road, the only main road between Kacuni and, as is

24 shown on the map, Donjavic Polje, as I'm pointing to

25 now, this particular road. If I understand your

1 question correctly, Your Honour, as I said, I can't say

2 exactly which of the houses it was. I do believe that

3 it was in the area in between.

4 And the circumstances were, in the course of

5 patrolling up and down that road, I did not take my

6 Warrior off it, as a standard procedure, because of the

7 threat of land mines, and we all stayed to the main

8 roads. I therefore observed this from the turret of my

9 Warrior, this specific incident to which I relate. And

10 the rules of engagement at the time did not allow us to

11 intervene in such instances; nor, given the state of

12 ongoing fighting, sporadic as it was, would I have left

13 my Warrior to do so.

14 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) That

15 clarifies things a little bit regarding this incident.

16 Thank you.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could I ask, Mr. Nice, might

18 there be a village between Polje and Kacuni which is

19 not reflected here and which could be the area in which

20 the major saw the houses burning?

21 MR. NICE:

22 Q. Major, I don't know if you are able to help

23 with the completeness of the map?

24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please,

25 Mr. Nice.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. Major, I don't know if you are able to help

3 with the completeness of the map -- [Wrong channel of

4 translation] -- village, His Honour said, between

5 Polje and Kacuni. It may be that His Honour had in

6 mind between Donja Polje --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

8 MR. NICE:

9 Q. -- and Kacuni, shown on this map, reflected

10 in the census figures.

11 A. I don't think I can help you there. And going

12 by memory, there was clearly a signpost which showed

13 you were entering the village of Kacuni. I can recall

14 this. It was on the side of the road. It was actually

15 just north of the bridge where we had the U.N.

16 checkpoint.

17 I think I can recall a sign for, as I

18 describe it from the map, Donjavic Polje. I cannot

19 recall a sign on the road of a village or hamlet, or

20 anything with an identifiable name, in between the

21 two.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

23 MR. NICE: Just to complete the answer to His

24 Honour Judge Bennouna's question, the Chamber will

25 recall, I think from Professor Donia's evidence, that

1 Muslims regularly enough registered themselves either

2 as Yugoslavs or as others -- as, indeed, may have done

3 other ethnic groupings.

4 Q. The second topic, the holding-up of the

5 exchange of prisoners. Just remind us, is this

6 recorded in terms in your pocketbook?

7 A. Yes, it is. It is detailed in the list of

8 notes which I took at the meeting that I had with Dario

9 Kordic on the 3rd of February, 1993, and it comes after

10 the list of complaints which I took down.

11 Q. Can you just lay it on the ELMO again, so

12 that the Chamber can see it.

13 What you wrote, in terms, was, Major?

14 A. I wrote after the list of complaints, "No

15 exchange of prisoners" -- I put the word "until 48

16 hours," for 48 hours, and I then put the date, the 5th

17 of the 2nd, '93, next to it. That was 48 hours hence

18 from the meeting that I was attending at the time.

19 These are the actual notes that I took as

20 Dario Kordic was speaking, and a page or two later, as

21 I've submitted, I then wrote them up, as it were, in

22 longhand.

23 Q. Would you just take us to that passage again

24 as well.

25 A. As you can see, at the top, it says, "Summary

1 of points for meeting with Dario Kordic on Wednesday,

2 the 3rd of February." A summary of the complaints, the

3 sticking points, and then, in fact, in paragraph 4

4 relates to the roadblock, and then paragraph 5,

5 specifically, "Exchange of prisoners is delayed for

6 48 hours, until sometime on the 5th of February."

7 Q. Your attention has been drawn in

8 cross-examination to the specific terms of the

9 ceasefire agreement, but in your discussions with

10 Mr. Kordic, who raised the question of linking an

11 exchange of prisoners to resolution of these

12 complaints?

13 A. It was Mr. Kordic who said, in

14 effect, "Therefore, as a result of this, the exchange

15 of prisoners will be delayed for 48 hours." I did not

16 bring the subject up.

17 Q. Did you have an understanding at that time

18 that prisoners were being exchanged or were about to be

19 exchanged?

20 A. Yes, I do recall from memory that efforts

21 were ongoing to organise an exchange of prisoners, an

22 exchange of civilians, an exchange of hostages. There

23 were various levels of exchange of people who, shall we

24 say, were generally being detained, for whatever

25 reason. I was not actively involved in this because it

1 was being dealt with by those who had signed a

2 ceasefire document on the 30th of January. But in the

3 course of daily briefings and in terms of my

4 discussions with other people at the school in milinfo

5 in the operations room, I was aware that there were

6 efforts to try and exchange some people as soon as

7 possible.

8 I also believe, because this was a very big

9 task, that the efforts were concentrating on trying to

10 get just some exchanged as a demonstration of goodwill,

11 so that this would have been a gradual process.

12 However, I can't say that I knew that prisoners or

13 hostages were going to be exchanged at a specific time

14 at that period.

15 Q. In fact, as you told us in chief, was there a

16 delay in the exchange of prisoners following on this

17 meeting?

18 A. There was certainly a delay. Whether it

19 actually lasted the full 48 hours or not, I don't

20 know. As I put in my notebook, there was no specific

21 time given; that's why I put "until sometime on the 5th

22 of February." But I do know that there was a delay.

23 This from talking to people when I got back to the

24 school and over the next day.

25 Q. A number -- next topic, briefly, a number of

1 milinfosums have been put to you. Some of them you'd

2 read previously, some of them you had never read?

3 A. Some of them I had never read. Two

4 examples: I'd never read the milinfosum of the 9th of

5 January that was put to me. I'd left my previous job

6 some 12 hours previously -- I had no leave. I went

7 straight to Bosnia -- I was on a plane to Zagreb when

8 this milinfosum was written. In others, as I've

9 explained, I was often out on the ground for two to

10 three days, actually out on the ground doing nothing

11 other than operations and then sleeping and didn't, in

12 fact, return to the school sometimes. And there are

13 gaps in my notebook where I did not attend the 5.00

14 conferences because of this.

15 Q. Various statistics have been spoken of and

16 events have been spoken of that are covered in those

17 milinfosums. I'm not going to take you to any of them

18 in detail, save to draw to your attention that the

19 statistic of the 19th of February drew also attention

20 to the fact that of the Muslim soldiers identified,

21 less than 10 per cent were thought to be armed. Do you

22 remember that?

23 A. I don't believe I have a copy of the --

24 Q. D62/1.

25 A. I've got quite a lot of milinfosums here,

1 but --

2 Q. The Chamber can see it.

3 A. I'm sorry, which date was it again?

4 Q. Yes, it's coming. The 19th of February.

5 A. The 19th?

6 Q. Yes, the 19th.

7 A. I have one the 20th of February.

8 Q. The 19th of February.

9 A. I'm sorry, the one I've been given is the

10 20th of February.

11 Q. I think it's D62/1.

12 MR. NICE: I have mine and for convenience

13 can put mine on the ELMO if necessary. It's been

14 highlighted but perhaps we'll have a look at it.

15 Q. This deals with Jajce, the liaison officers

16 commented that the majority of the soldiers were

17 unarmed. There is no evidence of any heavier

18 equipment. The fact that the majority of these

19 soldiers were unarmed agrees with B Company's reports

20 that less than 10 per cent of the soldiers in Jajce

21 Brigade were armed.

22 Does that accord with your recollection, or

23 did you not know anything of this?

24 A. I have to say it would accord equally with

25 any recollection that I may have had at the time in all

1 the milinfosums that were handed to me by the Defence

2 yesterday.

3 Q. Thank you, that's all I ask on that or any

4 other document in detail. The statistics that have

5 been drawn to your attention, all, of course, focusing

6 on the Muslims as opposed to the Croats, does that

7 affect at all the overall picture you gave of the

8 comparative state of arms of the parties yesterday?

9 A. No, it does not because the statements which

10 I made yesterday are taken from witness statements I've

11 made, are based on my own recollection as a field

12 commander, and I stress, that is where the majority of

13 my time was spent. It was not spent in analysing

14 documents, giving comparative strengths. It was spent

15 on the road, trying to unblock checkpoints, to get

16 sides to talk to each other.

17 Q. Thank you. Second-to-last topic, I think.

18 The engineers who asked you not to tell Kordic, how

19 many times did you see them? Once, or more than once?

20 A. The engineers in question, over a period from

21 early February, possibly the 5th or 6th of February, I

22 would say I saw them maybe a dozen times over a

23 two-week period. Usually in the vicinity of the

24 checkpoint. It was a U.N. controlled point, similar to

25 the one at Kacuni that was established where the

1 roadblock had been removed. It was a similar principle

2 to establish U.N. control of passage as an arbiter

3 between the two sides.

4 Q. The reference to Kordic and not to tell him,

5 once or on any more than one occasion?

6 A. It was only on the occasion which I related

7 in my testimony. And it was unsolicited.

8 Q. And their demeanour -- last question on this

9 topic -- at the time they said that?

10 A. They were clearly, in my opinion, they were

11 clearly very concerned that he might know of what they

12 were going to say.

13 Q. Last topic -- no, last topic apart from two

14 tiny details. The two HOS individuals you met in Dario

15 Kordic's bunker, you've had one document shown to you

16 from April '93?

17 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, I'm not going to

18 go through the exercise of showing a number of

19 documents which show totally different conclusions;

20 that wouldn't be helpful because the witness won't have

21 seen them.

22 Q. Just tell us, please, they were introduced to

23 you on what basis, as what sort of person?

24 A. My recollection, as I stated at the time, was

25 that they were introduced to me as the commander and

1 deputy commander of the HOS in Zenica, and I'm

2 obviously going by my memory here.

3 Q. Was there any suggestion that, far from being

4 HVO, that they were BiH representatives?

5 A. There was no other reference to the

6 individuals. In fact, it was, I believe, a courtesy to

7 explain who was in the room, because we immediately got

8 down to specific business that we were relating

9 probably of minor detail. They didn't speak whilst I

10 was in the room, and I was only in there for a few

11 minutes, relating to points with regard to the equal

12 distribution or perceived equal distribution of aid.

13 This was the topic at the time.

14 Q. Did you see those same men on a subsequent

15 occasion?

16 A. Yes. I believe I saw both individuals at the

17 meeting which was called by Mr. de la Mota at the UNHCR

18 depot in Zenica, which was set for 4.00 p.m. the

19 following day or, sorry, 4.00 p.m. that afternoon.

20 Q. Therefore, on either occasion were these

21 people introduced as BiH representatives?

22 A. I do not recall that.

23 Q. If there had been BiH representatives in

24 Dario Kordic's bunker, would that have been a matter to

25 note and recall?

1 A. I would have certainly taken note if that had

2 become clear to me. [Technical difficulties with

3 realtime transcription]

4 MR. NICE: The transcript has got a technical

5 problem.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice. It's up and

7 running.

8 MR. NICE: Thank you.

9 Q. At the second meeting, if people there had

10 been introduced as representing in any sense the BiH,

11 would that have been noted?

12 A. I would have noted that. However, I was very

13 much an observer at this meeting. At the initiative of

14 Mr. de la Mota, the issue was very much out of my

15 hands. All I had done was to bring it actually to

16 Mr. de la Mota's attention. After Dario Kordic had

17 made the complaint about the unequal distribution of

18 aid, I spoke to nobody.

19 Q. You've described the bunker as effectively an

20 operations room, with maps and so on?

21 A. When I first went in and on subsequent

22 occasions, except for the 27th of February, when it did

23 look like, I would say, an office --

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. -- from my experience and also from visiting

1 other headquarters, it looked to me like an operations

2 room from where operations were planned and conducted

3 and orders given out to the ground. That's the

4 impression which I gained.

5 Q. Did you have any other experience -- any

6 experience, to your knowledge, of seeing Mr. Kordic

7 allow BiH people into this room?

8 A. No.

9 Q. I think it was suggested -- two tiny

10 details. It was suggested to you that the Vance-Owen

11 Plan was signed on all three sides at one stage in your

12 questioning. Do you know, one way or another, whether

13 it ever was? Just "Yes" or "No" will do.

14 A. No.

15 Q. It was put to you that the receipt document

16 for the Mercedes, Exhibit 502, was signed by Mr. Kordic

17 in his role as vice-president of HZ-HB. Would you look

18 at the document? Are you aware that he also signed as

19 "Pukovnik", which is translated as "Colonel"?

20 A. I'm now aware of that.

21 Q. You were asked then, and my last question

22 just this, about your career, and the point was made --

23 I'm not sure why -- you've been a major since 1990.

24 There's very few people in the public gallery. Is it

25 right that there may be further gazettings in your

1 career in the near future, just "Yes" or "No"? If you

2 think it's tempting providence, I will not even press

3 the question for an answer.

4 A. [No audible response]

5 MR. NICE: Right. That's concludes all I

6 wish to ask the witness, in order not to tempt

7 providence.

8 JUDGE MAY: Very well. I think we have the

9 point.

10 Major, thank you very much for coming to the

11 Tribunal to give your evidence. That concludes it.

12 You are free to go.

13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 [The witness withdrew]

15 MR. NICE: The next witness can come in.

16 He's Mr. Weckesser. He's a German national. He, I

17 think, speaks perfectly good English, at a sufficient

18 level to make the need for an interpreter from German

19 into English probably unnecessary. But I think we have

20 an interpreter here, should one be required.

21 The Chamber may recall that as a result of

22 timetable changes of the Chamber and personal

23 difficulties of one of the witnesses we originally

24 intended for this week, there had to be a reordering of

25 witnesses, and Mr. Weckesser was brought up as a person

1 who was available and cooperative enough to come. To

2 some degree, his evidence is out of order, but I don't

3 think it's going to take very long to give, in any

4 event.

5 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, unfortunately I'm

6 not in a position to be able to relate to the Court

7 which items can be led and which can't, because we've

8 just received the proposed outline. But one thing I

9 can tell the Court is that apparently this witness's

10 testimony does not concern our co-defendant, and

11 therefore our co-defendant has informed us that there

12 will be no questions from Mr. Cerkez, and I will be

13 conducting the cross-examination. Thank you.

14 MR. NICE: As, I think, time is likely to be

15 taken by reorganising the room to accommodate the

16 interpreter, if I'm right, it may be sufficient simply

17 for the interpreter to be kept in reserve, and it may

18 not be necessary to go through --

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, let's see how we get

20 on without the interpreter.

21 MR. NICE: The Chamber may find it helpful,

22 if it still finds the coloured map useful -- I'm going

23 to refer to it -- to turn to the Vares sector north and

24 east of the general area of interest.

25 [The witness entered court]

1 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness take the

2 declaration.

3 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

4 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

5 truth.

6 WITNESS: ROLF WECKESSER

7 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a seat,

8 Mr. Weckesser.

9 MR. NICE: My copy of the map that I've

10 referred to is highlighted in two colours as to certain

11 locations but is otherwise unmarked. I imagine it

12 would probably be quite helpful to simply lay that on

13 the ELMO.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

15 MR. NICE: If the usher could assist.

16 Examined by Mr. Nice:

17 Q. Your full name, please, sir?

18 A. My name is Rolf Weckesser.

19 Q. Did you spend some 36 years in the German Air

20 Force, leaving with the rank of colonel, and then being

21 deployed, in May 1993, as part of the ECMM mission?

22 A. That is correct, sir.

23 Q. Between October and December, were you a team

24 leader based in Travnik, with an area that included

25 Vares in the east and Maglaj in the northwest, and thus

1 also included Zepce, Kakanj, Breza, and Zavidovici?

2 A. That is correct, sir.

3 Q. On arrival to this mission, were you briefed

4 by Sir Martin Garrod as to who was or were the leading

5 figures in the territory?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Namely, for both politics and military

8 purposes, who were the leaders?

9 A. That is correct, sir.

10 Q. What names were given to you?

11 A. The names were, beside the other vital

12 persons, were Mr. Kordic and Mr. Blaskic as the

13 responsible personnel on the HVO side.

14 Q. I think you have before you some records to

15 which you are able to refer for dates and so on. When

16 were those records made in relation to the dated

17 entries that you may find yourself referring to?

18 MR. SAYERS: If I may, Your Honour, could we

19 be informed of what the witness is referring to? We

20 don't know.

21 JUDGE MAY: What were the nature of the

22 notes? Perhaps we can find that out.

23 MR. NICE: Yes.

24 A. Is that a question to me?

25 MR. NICE:

1 Q. It's a question to you, yes.

2 A. I'm sorry, I misunderstood that. I have

3 some -- taken during my stay in Central Bosnia, done

4 personal notes, I have done daily records which went

5 into a record of the RC Zenica as a daily record and

6 was published up to the staff in Zagreb. These are

7 basically the -- because I do have.

8 MR. SAYERS: Just as a matter of principle,

9 Mr. President, I must vigorously object to witnesses

10 called by the Prosecution testifying using notes that

11 have not been previously provided to the Defence. I

12 think we've raised this issue several times before, and

13 I think the time has come where we just have to

14 register the objection.

15 JUDGE MAY: You registered the objection.

16 Your right is to have the notes when the witness refers

17 to them. If they can be provided before, that's a

18 matter of convenience and obviously it's more

19 satisfactory, but the witness is entitled to refer to

20 the notes while giving evidence and then you are

21 entitled to have a look at them. That's when your

22 entitlement occurs, not before. Yes.

23 MR. NICE:

24 Q. Mr. Weckesser, I think you also have -- maybe

25 there will be objection to this, but you also have on

1 the desk, I don't know whether you're looking at it,

2 the summary that's been made of your evidence; is that

3 correct?

4 A. That is correct, sir.

5 JUDGE MAY: Any objection to that?

6 MR. SAYERS: No, Your Honour.

7 MR. NICE:

8 Q. Vares is where we're going to focus our

9 attention.

10 Looking at the map and using the pointer that

11 you can see to your right-hand side and which you can

12 use to point to things on the map, can you just paint

13 the historical position, in a couple of sentences, of

14 Vares; who occupied it and so on?

15 A. Maybe "occupation" is the wrong word. Out of

16 my memory, Vares was a pocket, an HVO pocket, isolated,

17 boundering [sic] in the north to the 2nd BiH Corps and

18 to the south to the 3rd BiH Corps and to the east to

19 the BSA. The area was militarily governed by the

20 Bobovac Brigade. The headquarters was located, I

21 think, about three kilometres due north of Vares on the

22 way -- on the road to Tuzla.

23 Q. At the time with which we are concerned,

24 which is October 1993, was there something described as

25 an exile government of Vares?

1 A. Yes, that is true that there was an exile

2 government which was located in the south, close to --

3 in the south of Vares, close to the town of Breza.

4 Q. These people, or if it was more than one

5 person, had they formerly lived in Vares itself?

6 A. That's what I don't know. I can't remember.

7 I only know that the lady, Mrs. Mervana -- and she has

8 a complicated name I can't really pronounce -- she

9 indicated that she has been the elected president of

10 Vares, and she was indicating, in all talks we had,

11 that she will go back to Vares as the president of the

12 town.

13 Q. At this same time, was pressure on the HVO in

14 Vares constant or was it getting stronger?

15 A. I arrived in the area I'd say the 5th of

16 October, I remember, and from the early beginning of my

17 working period there the pressure on the HVO was

18 rising. We had records, we had movements, we had

19 reports that the 2nd Corps from the north was moving

20 south, the 3rd Corps was moving northeast from Kakanj

21 area, and in all meetings I had with HVO authorities in

22 the town and in the Bobovac Brigade up to the date of

23 about the 23rd, there was a rising tense atmosphere.

24 At that time, it was really culminating in the transfer

25 or in the cooperation and coordination of a convoy

1 called Joy 2 from Split up to Tuzla. This convoy was

2 hampered several times by the conflicting parties on

3 its way to Tuzla, and the latest it was hampered by the

4 denial of -- initial denial of Vares authorities and to

5 get the Convoy Joy 2 through, mainly because the valley

6 north of Vares -- this must have been the 18th/19th of

7 October -- was blocked by hundreds of Croatian refugees

8 who were coming -- who were supposed to come out of the

9 northwest of Central Bosnia and were intended to be

10 brought to the south, to the Herzegovina area. I had

11 serious, very difficult discussions with the security

12 officer in Vares, Mr. Zvonko Duznejevic, and finally he

13 gave up persistence and he let the Convoy Joy 2 pass.

14 After in the night action, the HVO had taken away the

15 Croats out of the road.

16 Q. Before we turn to the detail of what happened

17 at Stupni Do, can you tell us how the rising pressure

18 on the HVO in Vares was finally resolved? Did they

19 eventually give up Vares?

20 A. It's an assumption on my side. I mean that I

21 think the HVO in Vares was, from the beginning, let's

22 say the date 20th of October, preparing their retreat.

23 I think it has become obvious to them that they would

24 not be strong enough, by men and by armament, to stand

25 a possible offensive from the Bosnian from the north

1 and from the south, and obviously the BSA had not given

2 the assistance which had been possibly wanted by the

3 HVO. I think this was part of the nervousity [sic] at

4 that time in that area, that the retreat was imminent,

5 and I think all the responsible people in that area

6 knew about that.

7 JUDGE MAY: The BSA, I take it, is a

8 reference to the Bosnian Serbs. Is that right?

9 A. That is correct, yes, the Bosnian Serb army

10 located due east of this area.

11 If I may add this, there were rumours at that

12 time, when talking to HVO officials -- I cannot refer

13 exactly who really stated, but it was stated several

14 times -- that when we questioned the situation of the

15 HVO, that they tried to convince us that they would

16 have tanks available. And when asked where, they

17 pointed to the Serb side.

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. When did the retreat eventually happen?

20 A. The retreat, I think it started about the

21 30th of October, when there was some shooting around

22 the Bobovac Brigade, and the 31st, when I met the new

23 commander, Kresimir Bozic, at his headquarters, when he

24 was begging me to remember is the date of his

25 command -- taking his command. And at that time --

1 Q. I'm going to cut you off there, because

2 having painted the overall picture of the tension and

3 the retreat, we'll now go through the matters on which

4 you can help us in chronological order.

5 Did the woman with the unpronounceable name

6 who was the president of the exile government provide

7 intelligence about an alleged attack on the village of

8 Stupni Do, and if so, when did she do that?

9 A. Yes. This was in the night from the 23rd to

10 the 24th of October, at about 23.00, at the

11 headquarters of the ECMM at Zenica. We got a telephone

12 call from this location close to Breza, I think between

13 Breza and Dabravine, asking for help -- for immediate

14 help for a possible fight or massacre in Stupni Do.

15 At that night, because we were not allowed

16 and supposed to go out and drive at night, I could not

17 do anything, so I had to wait for the next day, for the

18 24th.

19 Q. On the 24th, did you attempt to get to Stupni

20 Do, what could you see, and tell us why, if it was the

21 case, you couldn't enter the village?

22 A. Early in the morning of the 24th, we intended

23 to go to Stupni Do following these cries for help from

24 the exile government. The situation in Vares was

25 tense. The control posts were tense. We ended up in

1 the access road towards Stupni Do, which is in the

2 south of Vares.

3 Q. If the video booth could focus in on the map

4 exactly where the pointer is. Thank you very much.

5 This map is a map, Colonel, with which you're

6 only recently familiar. You've only seen it, I think,

7 this morning.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Does it, nevertheless, appear to show the

10 roads or the road into Stupni Do accurately?

11 A. I think it shows correctly the road at least

12 I know, which is where the pointer is put on now

13 [indicates], which is due south of Vares. I think that

14 was the road which was blocked and which was supposed

15 to be our access road towards Stupni Do, which is at

16 the dam. I think the railway is crossing there, and

17 there's a tunnel over the road, and at that tunnel HVO

18 forces were blocking the road with some trenches, with

19 some mines, and with dozens of soldiers, not allowing

20 us to get in.

21 Then, standing there discussing about

22 entrance, we saw three pickup-type cars and, I think,

23 one Jeep coming out of that tunnel carrying soldiers,

24 shouting, yelling, showing their arms. They stopped

25 for a while. I really don't know why. And so my

1 interpreter had a chance to talk to them, and he

2 relayed later on to me, he said, "Yes --"

3 MR. SAYERS: Objection to this, Your Honour,

4 unless the witness actually heard the soldiers speaking

5 to the interpreter.

6 A. May I answer?

7 MR. NICE:

8 Q. First of all, I think before the witness may

9 contribute, if he may, it's clear that this is simply

10 communication via an interpreter, who would be required

11 in any event. The evidence is as good as it can ever

12 be, in terms of proximity, unless you call the

13 interpreter himself.

14 JUDGE MAY: Well, perhaps the witness could

15 indicate whether he heard the soldiers talking to the

16 interpreter, or saw it, and how soon afterwards he

17 himself received the information.

18 A. Yes, I'm willing to do. I was standing about

19 four metres apart from that grouping. I saw the

20 interpreter talking to these soldiers, and he

21 immediately relayed this wording to me. And the

22 wording were --

23 JUDGE MAY: Just before you do this, there

24 has been an objection, Mr. Nice.

25 [Trial Chamber deliberates]

1 JUDGE MAY: We will admit this evidence. It

2 could scarcely be more contemporaneous, in our view,

3 and therefore has that degree of reliability about it.

4 What weight is to be given to it, of course, finally,

5 will be a matter for us.

6 Yes, Mr. Weckesser, if you would like to tell

7 us what was said.

8 A. Thank you, Your Honours. The soldiers said,

9 "We did not like to do this job, but we had to do it,

10 and we do not like our leaders," which gave us at that

11 time an assumption or a hint that something has

12 happened which was extraordinary.

13 MR. NICE:

14 Q. Before I move on in the chronology of events,

15 what sort of village was Stupni Do and for what was it

16 noted? And in giving that answer, can you, by

17 reference to the map, maybe, point out how near it was

18 to front lines of the various opposing parties?

19 A. As I said, I came in only at the 5th of

20 October in this area. The area was first, before,

21 handled by another monitor, called Hap Stutt, and he

22 told me, when taking over this area, he said Stupni Do

23 is a very nice valley, with charming people. He also

24 told me at that time, giving me a hint that this is

25 possibly a village where some smuggling is done; that

1 at least is a rumour, or was a rumour at that time,

2 reasoning basically on the fact that Stupni Do was

3 really in a kind of central point between the three

4 warring parties. To the east, immediately -- close to

5 the east to Stupni Do was a bordering to the BSA, to

6 the Serb territory. To the north, it was included,

7 actually -- almost included into the HVO pocket, and to

8 the southwest they had good access to the BiH forces.

9 So it was an ideal point, as it looks to me,

10 for transferring weapons, goods, whatever is possible,

11 among the warring parties. And exchanging goods and

12 arms and whatever among the warring parties was not an

13 extraordinary happening in this kind of war. I

14 experienced this at other locations during my two-year

15 stay in ex-Yugoslavia.

16 Q. Mr. Weckesser, I must explain that I wait

17 sometimes for the interpreters to catch up.

18 A. I understand, sir.

19 Q. Did you then decide to seek access by getting

20 permission from the local relevant brigade?

21 A. Yes, sir. Since --

22 Q. Tell us about that.

23 A. Since the access was denied by the soldiers

24 at this blockade in the south of Vares, I proceeded

25 that day to the Bobovac Brigade, and there I met the

1 commander, Emil Harah, who refused to grant access to

2 Stupni Do, pretending to me that there was heavy

3 fighting going on and it would be much too dangerous

4 for me and my team to go there, and there would be a

5 lot of mining around that village. So he promised me

6 that it might be possible, on the next day, to get

7 access to Stupni Do.

8 Q. While you were at the brigade headquarters,

9 did you see some other soldiers?

10 A. Yes. There were dozens of soldiers. Some

11 were inside, in the restaurant close to the area where

12 we had the meeting or the get-together with the

13 commander.

14 Q. Again I'm going to interrupt you, because

15 there's a small collection of exhibits. I think

16 they've been provided already. They can be

17 distributed, in readiness for production, in bundles.

18 The first one is a photograph. It may be the

19 photograph should just go on the ELMO.

20 A. May I use the photograph as reference?

21 Q. Yes. If you put it on the ELMO, then the

22 public can see it. That's the advantage.

23 Tell us about what we're looking at, and then

24 tell us about the soldiers that you saw.

25 A. That is the burned-out Bobovac -- former

1 Bobovac headquarter brigade building [indicates].

2 Between this pole and this wall over there [indicates]

3 was the gate, a primitive gate, control gate, to get

4 access to the Bobovac Brigade. There you were normally

5 standing for a long time until somebody really tried to

6 pick up, and I think they discussed whether they would

7 receive you or not. It happened also that we had been

8 sent away by saying nobody is in and nobody could talk

9 to us.

10 In this area [indicates] left of the

11 headquarters, at that time I saw, I think in this area,

12 there have been two different type of soldiers. One

13 type of soldier looking from experience to be normal

14 HVO soldiers, and there had been another grouping which

15 looked to me different. When we were standing here

16 [indicates] and waiting for access to get to the

17 commander, they were looking from behind the

18 headquarter towards us, going a few steps forwards and

19 then backward, it appeared to me and it appeared to us

20 that they were somewhat kind of hiding. One person

21 here [indicates] in front of us, actually leading us

22 then to the commander, he looked a little bit like that

23 other type of soldiers we saw wearing a bandanna. He

24 also had gloves on his hands, exposing the fingers,

25 leaving the fingers in the open, carrying the

1 trigger -- with the hand constantly on the trigger as

2 if we would consist of a danger to them, which was no

3 danger, out of question. That was about the situation

4 we found when we tried to meet the commander.

5 Q. On that same day, having failed to get

6 permission from the HVO commander, did you go and speak

7 to the BiH commander, Nehru Ganic?

8 A. Yes. On our way back, I think it was in the

9 afternoon, 15.00, around, together with Colonel

10 Hendriksen from the NordBat Battalion, we met the OG

11 commander, BiH commander, Ganic.

12 Q. It may just add some colour to your evidence

13 if we put the map back on the ELMO and just point out

14 where the Bobovac Brigade headquarters were and where

15 it was that you went to see the BiH commander.

16 A. [indicates]. So the command post, a

17 relatively primitive command post, in a house, was on

18 the road towards Vares at Dabravine, that was the

19 command post for the OG, and there we met the -- took

20 us with Colonel Hendriksen, the commander. He bitterly

21 accused us at that time of doing nothing. He pretended

22 that a massacre had taken place in Stupni Do. He

23 complained bitterly that NordBat had not and was not

24 intervening in the HVO attack, and he stated at that

25 meeting that out of 220 Muslim inhabitants, former

1 inhabitants of Stupni Do, only 21 had escaped.

2 Q. Were you given intelligence about vehicles

3 seen to have been leaving Stupni Do, and if so, where

4 did the intelligence come from?

5 A. The intelligence -- we got some information

6 came from NordBat. We always kept very, very close

7 contact to NordBat, because they were on scene, and we

8 could only come, actually, for hours out of Zenica, if

9 we had been visiting other areas. So NordBat told us

10 that they had observed several HVO trucks coming out in

11 the night, out of this Stupni Do area and out of the

12 Stupni Do road, in the night from the 23rd to the 24th

13 of October. And I assumed that they had been taking

14 away the looted material, I could not assume anything

15 else, which was taken out of this village.

16 Q. Did you, that same day, learn that Sir Martin

17 Garrod was intending to hold a meeting with Dario

18 Kordic in his capacity as vice-president of HZ-HB?

19 A. That's correct, sir.

20 Q. The reason for the meeting being what?

21 A. Primarily on the coordination of the giving

22 back of the two helicopters which had been kept back on

23 a medevac -- on a coordinated medevac mission at

24 Medjugorje. This was the prime aim of this meeting, in

25 order to help out in this kind of conflict.

1 In this conflict, I used the chance to ask

2 Mr. Garrod for a favour, and I had asked him in that

3 night, since I was seriously now concerned about the

4 fate of Stupni Do, to ask Mr. Kordic what was going on

5 in Stupni Do.

6 Q. So at this stage, at the time you made the

7 request for the interview to take place, you were still

8 working on rumour and complaint, no one from the ECMM

9 having gone into Stupni Do?

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. To your knowledge at that time, had NordBat

12 gone into Stupni Do, or not?

13 A. No, they had not at that time.

14 Q. Apart from the HVO soldiers blocking entry of

15 the road, were you aware of anyone else having access

16 to Stupni Do?

17 A. No, I was not aware.

18 JUDGE MAY: Is this a convenient movement?

19 MR. NICE: Yes, it is.

20 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now.

21 I'm getting the French coming through my

22 channel, but we'll adjourn for half an hour. No doubt

23 that can be put right.

24 --- Recess taken at 11.00

25 --- On resuming at 11.30 a.m.

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. We're at paragraph 14. Did you hear back --

4 just yes or no to this -- from either Sir Martin Garrod

5 or someone else as to the results of the interview that

6 he had with Dario Kordic?

7 A. Would you repeat, please, the last portion of

8 your question?

9 Q. Yes. Did you hear the results of the

10 interview that were had with Dario Kordic? Just yes or

11 no.

12 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

13 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the position is that

14 Martin Garrod will be being called quite soon. The

15 matter is recorded, in any event, in an ECMM report

16 which I might as conveniently produce through this

17 witness, and then the Chamber will know at least what

18 the narrative is going to be.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

20 MR. NICE: So can I produce the next exhibit,

21 please, 1263,1, which you will find the first document

22 underneath the photograph.

23 Q. This is the daily report for the 25th of

24 October, but it deals with the matters you've been

25 telling us about. And on the political situation, it

1 deals with HRC visiting Dario Kordic in Busovaca in

2 connection with the helicopters that you've already

3 spoken of. There are other entries, which I'm not

4 going to go into, and then at the bottom of the page,

5 it says that he was questioned about Stupni Do, and it

6 sets out on the following pages what it was said that

7 he had given by way of comment or explanation.

8 Were you aware of that explanation being

9 given at the time?

10 A. I was aware, yes.

11 Q. And included, as we can see -- well, let me

12 come back to that.

13 Were you satisfied with the explanation, or

14 did you decide to continue your efforts to get into

15 Stupni Do?

16 A. Actually we were not satisfied, because the

17 circumstances, the rumours, the information so far

18 gotten by the BiH, the demands, we were not satisfied.

19 We were still trying to get a clear -- a clear picture

20 on the situation. But we trusted in that promise of

21 Mr. Kordic that he will -- that he look into it, and we

22 hoped, but we were not certain, that it would not look

23 that bad as it finally looked.

24 Q. On the 25th, did you try again, through the

25 Bobovac Brigade commander, Emil Harah, in company with

1 William Stutt?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Then did you find out that there had been a

4 change of personnel?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Tell us about that.

7 A. It was surprising, especially to Mr. Stutt,

8 who knew Mr. Rajic personally. For me, it was the

9 first get-together with Mr. Rajic, and when Mr. Stutt

10 with his team joined my team in the afternoon and we

11 went to the Bobovac Brigade, we were surprised to find

12 two commanders, not only Kresimir Bosic but also

13 Mr. Rajic, who introduced himself, was his name, and

14 took place on the meeting table, and -- should I refer

15 to the meeting itself?

16 Q. Yes, go on and tell us -- but tell us first,

17 where was Rajic known to be a commander from?

18 A. I was -- this was part of my initial

19 briefing. I still have some personal notes of that,

20 given at the 5th of October by Mr. Beaumont, that

21 Mr. Rajic was an HVO commander in Kiseljak.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 A. So it was surprising that he was now in

24 Bobovac.

25 Q. Tell us about the meeting.

1 A. The meeting focused from the beginning on the

2 access possibility to Stupni Do, and it was surprising

3 from the beginning that the expected commander in

4 charge, Mr. Bosic, did not control the meeting. He

5 almost did not take part in the conversation. The

6 talking was almost purely done by Mr. Rajic, in a

7 friendly, almost charming way, but denying any --

8 denial of any access to Stupni Do at that time.

9 Q. On what grounds was access denied?

10 A. I can't remember.

11 Q. The following day, I think you had to go to

12 Zepce?

13 A. That is correct, sir.

14 Q. Some distance away. And in a sense not the

15 topic you're here to help us with, but in a few

16 sentences, because it may be relevant for our

17 considerations, in Zepce, what evidence did you find of

18 co-operation between Croats and Serbs at that time?

19 A. Zepce was -- the Zepce authorities pretended

20 and they played towards us that they were besieged not

21 only by the -- or surrounded not only by BiH in the

22 east and in the south, but also in the north,

23 northwest, from the Serbs. I normally -- despite the

24 fact that based on the Brioni agreement, we were

25 promised to have freedom of movement, the freedom of

1 movement for these teams, especially in the particular

2 areas, was quite often limited and not given.

3 So whenever I went to Zepce for the meetings,

4 in order to prepare or to open a humanitarian corridor

5 aiming towards the starving city, Zavidovici, which was

6 isolated at that time and really surrounded, I was very

7 well escorted from the beginning and had, actually,

8 this exception of the meetings with Mr. Lozancic and

9 Ivo Jozinovic, no possibility to move.

10 But on that occasion I used a break to escape

11 from the escort, and I said to my team immediately,

12 "Get to the car. We'll do a little tour around the

13 town." And it was surprising, after a few house

14 blocks, to get into a warehouse of the HVO, where we

15 pretended to try to buy some chocolate, where we saw

16 ECTF food in the original packages, the original

17 pallets, stored, even under the normal plastic cover

18 they were sealed with.

19 Q. "ECTF" meaning ... ?

20 A. I can't remember, actually, what the

21 abbreviation means. It still is just in my mind, ECTF.

22 I think it was the abbreviation for the -- for the aid

23 which was provided to Bosnia at that time from the EC.

24 This was one, and then we continued our

25 drive, in that break period. And after one turn in the

1 north of Zepce, we ran into a Serbian platoon, tank

2 platoon, fully active, with the flags up, racing out,

3 yelling, charming, smiling to us, racing up to the

4 north, towards the area of Maglaj or Zepce or basically

5 BSA-held territory. This was a clear indication that

6 they had excellent relations at that time, and the HVO

7 with the BSA, this was also admitted personally by

8 Mr. Niko Jozinovic to me by indicating that all the

9 wounded people, the wounded HVO soldiers, are being

10 brought to Banja Luka to be cared for, and that he has

11 to pay a lot of money for that.

12 Another indication how they tried to fake

13 their kind of non co-operation with BSA at that time

14 was that I pretended, with a meeting with Mr. Lozancic,

15 who was the president at that time of Zepce, to need a

16 break, and I asked him twice. I think every time --

17 no, not twice. Every time I asked him, when I was in

18 Zepce and meeting him, to have a walk through his town

19 to look to the damages done by the Bosnian and Serbs.

20 And we had a walk, and during the walk, he

21 always showed me -- the windows were missing. He was

22 asking for alternatives for the windows, the window was

23 coming soon. And whenever we approached a certain

24 corner, he always stopped me by saying, "This is now

25 getting very dangerous. Here the Serbs are shooting

1 into our town. We should not progress." We always

2 returned at the same spot. This was in contrary,

3 actually, to the observations I had made in regard to

4 the tank platoon.

5 And an additional one: On almost every

6 occasion we went into the Zepce pocket, we saw Serbian

7 staff cars standing in front of the staff building.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 Paragraph 20. On the 27th of October, did

10 you succeed eventually then in gaining access to Stupni

11 Do, with the assistance of NordBat and despite

12 resistance?

13 A. That's correct, sir.

14 Q. As a matter of interest, how was the

15 resistance overborne, overcome?

16 A. The location of the resistance was the same

17 as described before, on the south of Vares at this

18 entrance gate to the road up to Stupni Do. The tunnel

19 itself -- or right after the tunnel, the road was

20 blocked with concertina and with three tank mines, the

21 middle tank mine with an antenna on it, and on the

22 right side, on the left side, a normal -- without

23 antenna, a normal tank mine.

24 We had a discussion -- it was one carrier

25 with us from the NordBat Battalion, we were one Jeep --

1 and they refused in a very clear way, saying, "No way,

2 you cannot get up there." And very bravely, one

3 NordBat soldier, he pushed one HVO soldier to the

4 chest. He was almost falling back. He took himself

5 the mine in the middle, put it aside, shifted the other

6 two mines to the side of the road, gave a sign to the

7 carrier. The carrier went through the concertina, and

8 we right away, after this carrier, followed up to the

9 road to Stupni Do.

10 I do not observe it -- later on I realised --

11 that I think a TV team, or at least a team of unknown

12 media, was also chasing behind us into Stupni Do.

13 Q. So was this, so far as you could judge, the

14 first entry into Stupni Do after the massacre that

15 you're now going -- or the massacre, the remnants of

16 which you were able to see?

17 A. It was not the first one. It was the first

18 one for ECMM, for an ECMM team. We had learned that in

19 the evening before, the NordBat had gained already

20 access to the Stupni Do area.

21 Q. I think in the village you found complete

22 destruction, some houses still smouldering. You found

23 some 20 bodies, most of them burned beyond recognition,

24 the size of the skull of some of them showing that they

25 were children?

1 A. That is correct, sir. I might add that also

2 in the meanwhile an UKLO team, a United Kingdom liaison

3 team, was coming up; a special force, obviously a small

4 grouping -- they just had one car and three persons --

5 and there was killed people. And together with them,

6 we were investigating the remains, especially from the

7 bodies of the children, having some kind of children's

8 skulls in our hand. It seemed to me at that time, not

9 being an expert of forensic experience, that these

10 human bodies had been burned together with animals,

11 because at the same location we also found sheep heads,

12 burned sheep heads.

13 Q. Did you search for signs of fighting, that is

14 to say, warfare-type fighting?

15 A. Yes. This was of prime interest also for my

16 colleague and me, to look for indications of the

17 suspected heavy fighting. I could not detect, in these

18 hours we spent up in Stupni Do, any sign of heavy

19 fighting. I could not see bullet signs in the walls,

20 in the remaining walls. I could not find any

21 fortification, military-oriented fortification. And we

22 were looking on the ground for small-arm shells, and we

23 only found about five small-arm shells right at the

24 vicinity of a house in the middle of the former Stupni

25 Do, where we in the cellar found, I think, three women,

1 three women which had been killed or had been dead.

2 Q. Thank you. Then we move to the 31st of

3 October when, I think, you met the man Bozic again --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- who you had last seen playing a

6 subordinate role in the discussion with Rajic?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. His behaviour, and what did he say?

9 A. Maybe I have to jump back just a little bit,

10 sir. I might add on that on that day when ECMM,

11 together with a NordBat carrier, went up to Stupni Do

12 on the 24th, also later on the chief of staff, I think,

13 of the Vitez BritBat unit was coming in, a gentleman,

14 Ramsey, and in an improvised TV or media conference,

15 which was aiming to, I think, one media team and

16 actually almost transmitting into the blind, he was

17 publicly blaming Mr. Kresimir Bozic for this massacre

18 and telling that this will be pursued.

19 When I met Mr. Bozic on the 31st, he was

20 considerably nervous and referring especially to this

21 presentation of the General Ramsey, and he was

22 indicating to me -- "indicating" is not the proper

23 word -- he was begging to remember and to put down in

24 records that he took command of the Bobovac Brigade on

25 the 24th and not before.

1 Q. Can you turn, please, now to the next paper

2 exhibit which follows in the stack, which should

3 probably just be placed on the ELMO. You can lay it

4 over the map. That's not a problem, I think. It's

5 Z1276.

6 A. What are we looking for now?

7 Q. Yes, the next paper exhibit. It's the ECMM

8 daily report for the 31st of October.

9 A. 31st of --

10 Q. 31st of October. You can see a couple of

11 entries that relate to Stupni Do. In the middle of the

12 first page, there's a reference to a meeting with Prlic

13 and Slobodan Bozic, respectively president and deputy

14 minister, and in that meeting it's recorded, so far as

15 Stupni Do is concerned, that General Petkovic had

16 removed all local commanders and an investigation was

17 under way. Did you learn of that at the time,

18 Mr. Weckesser?

19 A. No. I can't remember, actually.

20 Q. Then at the foot of the page, it deals with

21 the meeting of Bozic, and in these terms says he was

22 visibly nervous and explained that he was promoted and

23 took over his new post on the 24th of October. The

24 following comment is made:

25 "This is believed to be a piece of serious

1 scene setting, since the Stupni Do massacre took place

2 on the 23rd of October. Bozic explained the military

3 situation to the north. He said that 2 Corps BiH

4 captured the village of Dubrastica yesterday and, in

5 the process, killed seven children.

6 "Comment: NordBat",

7 and then to the next page:

8 "informed that the village was captured

9 without apparent civilian casualties. It was a poor

10 military action."

11 And then I think I needn't read any more.

12 Did you provide this or some of this

13 information?

14 A. Yes, exactly. That's my wording.

15 Q. Thank you. Is there anything further that

16 you want to comment on that entry and the meeting of

17 Bozic or not?

18 A. I think it's well said and well stated in

19 that record, so ...

20 Q. As explanation for Stupni Do, did you in any

21 event examine a village called Kopljari, and if so,

22 could you explain why, quite briefly?

23 A. Yes. Since Kopljari was mentioned,

24 especially when Stupni Do has happened, in Vares,

25 because I had met the priest on one occasion, the

1 senior priest, I asked him, I said, "These have been

2 inhabitants almost of your town. Could you not help to

3 prevent such a happening?" He just told me that, "We

4 did what they did to Kopljari." Immediately, after

5 rumours have been spread about a suspected massacre of

6 Kopljari, NordBat had investigated the scene, and they

7 had at any time, I remember, not found any sign of

8 massacre. They found the body of one man who maybe, I

9 just remember, had been dying from normal reasons.

10 A few days after this event in Stupni Do, I

11 visited with my team also Kopljari, which is a -- or

12 has been a little village surrounded by mountains on

13 three sides and on one side open to the valley. The

14 village itself was completely destroyed, burned. Some

15 houses were flattened. We could not find any sign of a

16 massacre. We did not realise any special smell which

17 we experienced in Stupni Do, so at that time I

18 concluded that it was most unlikely that a massacre --

19 a scene of massacre of the type in Stupni Do had taken

20 place in Kopljari. But it's true the Kopljari event

21 was, in the discussion with officials, quite often used

22 as the reasoning for the Stupni Do revenge.

23 JUDGE MAY: Where is that on the plan,

24 Mr. Nice?

25 MR. NICE: Sorry, yes.

1 Q. Can you find Kopljari on the map for us,

2 Mr. Weckesser? I'm sorry not to have done that. My

3 mistake.

4 A. It's just due west of Vares. I hope it's

5 visible here. Where the pointer is directed now

6 [indicates], Kopljari.

7 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

8 MR. NICE:

9 Q. Mr. Weckesser, did you form a view as to

10 whether what had happened at Stupni Do was planned or

11 spontaneous?

12 A. It's a very difficult question, sir. Based

13 on my experience, two years' experience in the former

14 Yugoslavia from '93 to '95, serving in different areas

15 and serving actually in the territories of all warring

16 parties, I always had the experience that all parties,

17 all conflicting parties, followed the same doctrine.

18 The doctrine was, in all decisions, to go up the chain

19 of command first and to check if they should say "Yes"

20 or "No", do it or not do it, and this despite the fact

21 that sometimes you offered an advantageous position or

22 possibility and it was always initially put back,

23 referring to further coordination.

24 So I assume that the Stupni Do event cannot

25 have been a spontaneous event. I think it had been

1 directed, especially if you look to the reaction

2 afterwards.

3 Q. The next exhibit, which is the ECMM report

4 for the 7th to the 13th of November, please.

5 You're blocking the light at the front of the

6 ELMO.

7 In the weekly report for the 7th to the 13th

8 of November, is there the report of ECMM attending a

9 meeting in Kiseljak? Were you present at that meeting

10 yourself or is it a question of relying on the report

11 from others?

12 A. I was not present at this meeting. This

13 meeting was --

14 MR. SAYERS: Two objections, Mr. President.

15 First, this appears to be an extract of a document and

16 not a complete document. I'm sure the complete

17 document can be made available. But, secondly,

18 apparently this is a report from someone. May we know

19 who it is that supposedly witnessed this conference?

20 Thank you.

21 A. If I may comment?

22 MR. NICE: It may be the witness may be able

23 to help us.

24 A. Yes. I think, if I remember correctly, the

25 head of the ECMM, Mr. Stutt, attended that meeting on

1 that day. It was a big issue, and we discussed it

2 several times in the evening meeting, because it might

3 have also put our safety into question, this kind of

4 action. Therefore, it was a matter of urgency for us.

5 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment, Mr. Weckesser.

6 Would it be better to deal with this when Mr. Stutt

7 comes to give evidence?

8 MR. NICE: We can deal with it with

9 Mr. Stutt. It's just a matter of whether the Chamber

10 would find it more helpful to have the whole scene set

11 now. Certainly he can do it when he comes.

12 JUDGE MAY: Well, it may be better if he

13 deals with it.

14 MR. NICE: Very well.

15 Q. Did you later hear, and this is the next

16 exhibit from this witness, Z1293,1, which is the daily

17 report for the 9th of November -- if you would like to

18 look at that, please -- did you later hear of Rajic

19 being dismissed, apparently?

20 A. That is correct, sir, yes. It was a major

21 issue for us, and therefore we -- all team leaders had

22 got this information.

23 Q. Despite being dismissed, were there reports

24 of sightings of him later elsewhere?

25 A. My colleagues were interested, sir, to --

1 were interested in the fate of Mr. Rajic afterwards,

2 and they were instructed to look for Mr. Rajic in

3 Kiseljak. At one time it was reported that he was seen

4 in the G-3 area of the headquarter in Kiseljak, but he

5 was trying to avoid contact with the ECMM team member,

6 which was unusual because normally he was open for any

7 discussion and any contact.

8 Q. The last exhibit is 1296,1, a newspaper

9 article which at the moment is attached to or has

10 attached to it not a translation by this Tribunal's

11 translators but an ECMM translation.

12 A. Sir, I don't have it at hand here.

13 Q. It should be the last document.

14 A. It's not in this package.

15 Q. I'm not going to go through it in detail, but

16 if we just look at the --

17 A. Oh, it is. I'm sorry, I'm sorry.

18 Q. If we look at the newspaper article itself

19 with the photograph --

20 A. That is -- that's being myself on the right

21 corner of that picture.

22 Q. Yes. If we turn to the English translation

23 provided by the ECMM, we can see that the date is the

24 10th of November. There is an eyewitness account given

25 by a survivor. Your Honour, I don't again propose to

1 read this at this stage. The material is available

2 there, showing what was being broadcast or revealed at

3 that time. But for your purposes in this trial, we

4 will, of course, call a live witness to deal with the

5 massacre itself.

6 JUDGE MAY: What is the newspaper?

7 MR. NICE: What is it?

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Which newspaper is it?

9 MR. NICE:

10 Q. Can you help us?

11 A. I think it's News Week. I don't know what

12 kind it is, whether it's News Week from the United

13 States, I doubt.

14 Q. But you have -- I think you have the

15 original. The earlier one or --

16 A. No, I only have this one. Maybe it's only an

17 extract of the News Week, but I was so much isolated

18 from press material at that time, I was grateful to

19 have some kind of statement from the press on that, so

20 I kept it.

21 JUDGE MAY: There is a photograph of you,

22 Mr. Weckesser. What is happening in that photograph?

23 Can you remember the incident?

24 A. Oh, yes, yes. In detail, yes.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

1 A. That's one of the victims in Stupni Do, in

2 the northern part of the village, which is uphill to

3 the north, one body we found behind that gate in the

4 background, about 50, 60 metres uphill, and this one

5 was lower here. It was interesting for me that he

6 seemed -- he seemed -- I have to be very careful -- he

7 seemed to have been tortured, because his fingers were

8 showing blisters, heavy blisters, and it was

9 interesting -- I might be forgiven for using the word

10 "interesting" -- that he was killed not by cutting the

11 throat but seeming just to stab through the throat.

12 An additional thing was our observation as

13 amateurs in this area, that it seemed to be a fake

14 position because he was covered by coal-burned wood,

15 but the clothing beneath was not burned. So this was

16 actually, in our opinion at that time, not the position

17 where he was stabbed or murdered.

18 The soldiers you see, these are the

19 accompanying soldiers of NordBat.

20 MR. NICE: That's all I propose to ask this

21 witness. Thank you very much.

22 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice,

23 could the witness tell us if that person was

24 identified, the person that he just mentioned? Was he

25 identified?

1 A. Not to my knowledge, but since we had a

2 funeral of some victims in Breza and the victims which

3 were, at least from the body to a reasonable extent

4 intact, were brought to Breza, I think the remaining

5 inhabitants of Breza, part of them then being at Breza,

6 must have identified this man. I'm pretty sure.

7 We had visited or we had seen the bodies once

8 more, or the bodies available, at Breza, but I can't

9 remember to have seen these men in the primitive morgue

10 we went to.

11 MR. NICE: I don't know that we'll be able to

12 help further with identification in other evidence. I

13 suspect not.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Sayers.

15 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

16 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:

17 Q. Good afternoon, Colonel Weckesser. My name

18 is Steve Sayers. Together with my colleague,

19 Mr. Naumovski, we represent Dario Kordic.

20 I would suspect that I have maybe an hour and

21 a half of questions for you, at the maximum.

22 Please forgive me if the delivery is somewhat

23 halting, but we have to, as Mr. Nice says, we have to

24 keep in mind the interpreters, because everything that

25 we say is being interpreted for our clients.

1 A brief matter of general background. I

2 believe, sir, that you spent 37 years in the Luftwaffe.

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. And you left the Luftwaffe in March of 1993;

5 correct?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Two months later, sir, you joined the ECMM;

8 correct?

9 A. I think almost one month earlier. One month

10 earlier. I must correct this, yes. I was coming in, I

11 think, in mid-April already.

12 Q. At the beginning of September of 1993, you

13 became a team leader for Team V-4 in Central Bosnia; is

14 that correct?

15 A. I think it was at the beginning of October.

16 Q. All right.

17 A. I had -- that was a mistake in my initial

18 statement.

19 Q. You said in your statement that it was at the

20 beginning of September, but actually what you mean is

21 that it's the beginning of October. I think you said

22 October 4th of 1993.

23 A. Yes. I was coming in on the 5th, the 5th of

24 October.

25 Q. Just so we're both clear, Colonel, the

1 statement to which I referred and to which you referred

2 is a statement that was given to the investigators for

3 the Prosecution on May the 7th and 8th of 1996;

4 correct?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. I believe, sir, that your tour lasted from

7 September to December 1993 as a member of Team V-4; is

8 that correct?

9 A. Yes, with some breaks for leave, but this was

10 the overall period.

11 Q. Would you just answer a general question?

12 What was the military purpose, if any, of the ECMM?

13 What was it monitoring?

14 A. Yes. ECMM had no military purpose at all.

15 The monitoring of military actions and ongoings had the

16 only purpose in order to avoid further conflicts, in

17 order to get the parties to a position to stop warring,

18 in order to get the possibility to get in with

19 humanitarian aid or with humanitarian help. There was,

20 at least from my side, not any aspect for military

21 intelligence or something, which was always suspected

22 from the conflicting party, especially when they knew

23 and we introduced ourselves in the open, and when they

24 knew that we had been formerly officers of the air

25 force or army. Actually, the military were driving the

1 conflict, so it was natural and I think it's

2 understandable that we concentrated especially in the

3 areas where military conflicts were active, on the

4 movements and on the coordination with military

5 people. In other areas where we had a calm period, not

6 warring period, we concentrated on the political

7 representatives and on economic and political matters.

8 Q. Would it be fair to say that all of the

9 monitors employed by the European Community Monitoring

10 Mission were, in fact, ex-officers?

11 A. I cannot speak for other nations. For the

12 German side, when I was there, we started with 23

13 monitors. I think they were all -- they all had a

14 former military background, that is correct, but I

15 cannot speak for the other nations. I think most of

16 them had a military background, yes.

17 Q. Now, you gave some testimony regarding a

18 briefing that you had received from Sir Martin Garrod

19 at the beginning of your tour in early October of

20 1993. You were actually briefed that the political

21 leader of the Croats in Central Bosnia was a man named

22 Dario Kordic; correct?

23 A. That is correct, yes.

24 Q. And you were briefed that the military

25 leader, the HVO military leader in Central Bosnia, was

1 Colonel Tihomir Blaskic?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. You also have stated during your testimony,

4 sir, that the position of Mr. Kordic, as you understood

5 it, was the vice-president of the HZ-HB? Paragraph 13

6 of your proofing statement that you have before you.

7 A. That's correct, sir. I knew him as the

8 deputy of Mr. Boban, yes.

9 Q. You never actually met Dario Kordic at all,

10 did you?

11 A. No, we have not met. At least I cannot

12 remember.

13 Q. And the same is true of Colonel Blaskic?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now, let me just ask you, sir, were you aware

16 that by October of 1993, the HZ-HB had actually ceased

17 to exist?

18 A. What do you mean this HZ -- could you repeat

19 that? What did --

20 Q. Yes. You said, in paragraph 13, that you

21 were informed that Mr. Kordic was the vice-president of

22 the HZ-HB?

23 A. Oh, you mean the Republic of Herceg-Bosna or

24 what?

25 Q. What did you mean by the term "HZ-HB"?

1 A. What are you referring now, if I may ask?

2 Q. Paragraph 13 of the statement that you have

3 before you, you have -- represented by the Prosecution

4 to testify about.

5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, what is it that

6 you're putting to the witness? Let's get to the

7 point?

8 A. We'll get it straightened --

9 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Weckesser, yes. Let's hear

10 again the question, please.

11 MR. SAYERS:

12 Q. Were you aware that by October of 1993, the

13 HZ-HB, the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, had

14 actually ceased to exist?

15 A. I must think about it. Give me a second.

16 To answer your question, sir, straight, I

17 would say I was not aware, but I knew at that time that

18 it was a constant discussion about the credibility that

19 that organisation would exist or not exist. I remember

20 we had a discussion -- always discussions, "Is it still

21 existing, is it still a matter or not," and it was not

22 clear at that time to us.

23 Q. Colonel, we have been regularly reminded, and

24 appropriately so, by the Trial Chamber that witness

25 testimony is not a memory contest, but let me just see

1 if I can jog your memory on two matters.

2 Were you aware that towards the end of August

3 of 1993, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan had actually been

4 approved and signed by the three combatting parties,

5 the Serbs, the Muslim side, and the Croat side?

6 A. I cannot say today if I was aware at that

7 time.

8 Q. Were you aware that following the

9 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan proposals, the Croatian Republic

10 of Herceg-Bosna had actually been established as one of

11 three constituent republics making up

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that it was established on

13 August the 28th, 1993?

14 A. Yes, sir, I was aware.

15 Q. Would it be fair to say that you yourself

16 have absolutely no idea what Mr. Kordic's official

17 position in this new republic, if any, was?

18 A. Just to come back once more to your first

19 question, in the same time period, I was working in an

20 area in the middle, between the two scenes we have

21 described, Bukanovici, which is a Croatian town, an

22 isolated Croatian town north of Kakanj, which was in

23 complete distress. And it was exactly the same time

24 period. And there, from the priest, I learned that

25 they had been ordered by -- they told me by

1 Mr. Boban -- to go to the south, to the southern part

2 of Herzegovina. They went, and after that, they could

3 not find any housing and any food, and they went back.

4 In the meanwhile, their village was robbed, and they

5 were almost starving to death.

6 Q. Colonel, I don't mean any disrespect, but let

7 me stop you, because the question was: Would it be

8 fair to say that you, yourself, have absolutely no idea

9 what Mr. Kordic's official position in this new

10 republic, if any, was? That would be fair to say,

11 wouldn't it?

12 A. No, it would not be fair. I only knew that

13 he was the vice-president.

14 Q. The vice-president of what, though?

15 A. Of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16 Q. That was your understanding, was it?

17 A. That was my understanding.

18 Q. Who told you that?

19 A. I can't remember.

20 Q. Can you tell us who the chief of the general

21 staff of the Croat armed forces in Mostar was, sir?

22 A. No, I can't.

23 Q. Do you know to whom the commander of the

24 Bobovac Brigade, Emil Harah, that you've previously

25 testified, to whom that commander reported?

1 A. To my understanding, he was responsive to the

2 second group, in Kiseljak.

3 Q. But who was his commanding officer, sir?

4 A. For his operational zone, it was Colonel

5 Blaskic. I don't know who was the commanding officer

6 of the group. I can't remember.

7 Q. Would it be fair to say, Colonel Weckesser,

8 that the ECMM knew Stupni Do as a notorious centre of

9 black-market activities before October the 23rd, 1993?

10 A. This would be too strong. It was laid down

11 in the reports that there was a suspicion that it would

12 be a smuggling centre, yes.

13 Q. That suspicion had been the number of several

14 written reports from the European Community Monitoring

15 Mission, had it not?

16 A. I know only from one.

17 Q. I wonder if I could show you a document that

18 I'd like to have marked as the next exhibit, please.

19 It is a copy of a daily summary of the coordination

20 centre in Travnik of the ECMM, dated November the 2nd,

21 1993.

22 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

23 D117/1.

24 MR. SAYERS:

25 Q. First things first, Colonel Weckesser: Have

1 you seen a copy of this report before?

2 A. I can't remember, sir, if I have seen this

3 document.

4 Q. I just have a few questions in connection

5 with it. First, in the "Comment" section, it states

6 that the ECMM has previously reported on black-market

7 activities around Stupni Do. Do you recall whether you

8 had access to those prior written reports, or that

9 prior written report, sir?

10 A. I don't think so. Maybe I was coming in too

11 late into this mission for that kind of history.

12 Q. Did you ever speak to the gentleman

13 identified as Okreh Mahmutovic -- I believe his actual

14 name is Ekrem Mahmutovic -- who was a member of the

15 BiH OG in Dabravine?

16 A. I might have talked to him, but I can't

17 remember. I cannot identify and cannot match the name

18 with the kind of meeting. We have met so many people

19 and so many officials, so -- no, impossible.

20 Q. The term "BiH OG" in Dabravine means "BiH

21 Operational Group," does it not?

22 A. I think so. I have not put down this

23 report. This had been done by Mr. Stutt.

24 Q. One final question in connection with this

25 exhibit, Colonel, and that appears on the second page,

1 under paragraph 7, "Assessment." The assessment is

2 made by, it looks like, Mr. Stutt, that the BiH appear

3 very much in control, and this is as of November the

4 2nd, 1993. That was how you found the situation on the

5 ground as well, was it not?

6 A. You are referring to para 7, "Assessment"?

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. I can barely read it. It's a military and

9 humanitarian --

10 Q. The final sentence in the first paragraph

11 says, "At the moment, the BiH appear very much in

12 control."

13 A. Yes, I understand that, but it is not my

14 opinion.

15 Q. You found that as of November the 2nd, 1993,

16 which is the date of this report --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- you disagree with that?

19 A. For that day, I have to disagree, because I

20 have not been in Vares or in this area at that day. I

21 was at that day in Zepce.

22 Q. Very well, sir.

23 A. So you must ask the head of the CC who was at

24 that day in this area, Mr. Stutt.

25 Q. I wonder, sir, if I could just draw your

1 attention to one of the exhibits that the Prosecution

2 introduced, Exhibit Z1281, regional centre of Zenica

3 daily report for the 2nd of November, 1993.

4 A. Just give me a chance here.

5 Q. Yes, sir.

6 A. Can I ask for the provision of this copy?

7 Because I don't have it here on the paper.

8 JUDGE MAY: Which is it? 1281?

9 MR. SAYERS: This is Z1281, Your Honour.

10 Apparently it needs to be shown to you. It's been

11 previously exhibited.

12 A. Not among these papers.

13 Thank you.

14 Q. The portion that I would like to draw to your

15 attention appears on the fourth page of this document,

16 where the observation is made that "Hadzihasanovic told

17 HOM that Vares was known as an area for smugglers,

18 and 'gangs and groups of smugglers had been sent there

19 to keep up tension. If the situation is tense, they

20 can do what they want to do.'"

21 The reference to "Hadzihasanovic" is to the

22 commander of the ABiH 3rd Corps, General Enver

23 Hadzihasanovic; correct?

24 A. Mm-hmm.

25 Q. And "HOM" is the head of mission; correct?

1 A. Yes. Yeah. Yeah.

2 Q. At that time, I believe -- correct me if I'm

3 wrong -- that was Sir Martin Garrod?

4 A. I'm not sure.

5 Q. Well --

6 A. I'm not sure.

7 Q. Very well.

8 A. I'm not sure if that is meant, the head of

9 the mission. That would lead normally to the higher

10 level, to the -- to the diplomatic representative of

11 the mission, who was normally stationed at that time in

12 Zagreb. So the -- Mr. Garrod was the head of the CC,

13 the head of the RC, head RC, so "HOM" must be the

14 ambassador himself.

15 Q. I think we can agree, Colonel, that whoever

16 the head of the mission was, nonetheless, that person

17 was told what General Hadzihasanovic said, as reflected

18 in this official ECMM report; correct?

19 A. It looks like, but as I said, this is not my

20 report, it's not my day, and I cannot speak for ECMM.

21 So ...

22 Q. Let's cover one more -- one separate subject,

23 Colonel Weckesser: fighting in the Vares area before

24 October the 23rd, 1993.

25 A. Mm-hmm.

1 Q. Did you have any conversations with the field

2 commander of NordBat, Major Hakan Birger?

3 A. Yes, several conversations, yes.

4 Q. Did Major Birger tell you that the village of

5 Kopljari had actually been attacked, at 5.30 a.m. on

6 October the 21st, 1993, by Muslim forces?

7 A. I cannot confirm the date; I can only confirm

8 the information. Yes, I had been informed that they

9 were informed that Kopljari had been attacked by the

10 BiH.

11 Q. Major Birger actually told you that this

12 village had been attacked by Muslims of the 3rd Corps

13 from the areas of Dragovici and Bijakovici; correct?

14 A. Maybe. I cannot remember the detail.

15 Q. He also related to you that every day for the

16 preceding week, shooting had -- exchanges of gunfire

17 had occurred between troops from the 3rd Corps and also

18 troops from the HVO; correct?

19 A. I cannot remember to this statement, sir.

20 Q. Did Major Birger tell you that he had gone to

21 Kopljari on October the 22nd, 1993, because there were

22 a lot of civilians who had been forced to leave their

23 houses, and their houses were being looted by troops

24 from the 3rd Corps?

25 A. I cannot remember the date when this was,

1 that this information was given to me, but I am aware

2 of this information, yes.

3 Q. Major Birger reported to you that he had

4 actually spoken to the commander of the Muslim forces

5 engaging in that assault and had instructed them to

6 cease and desist; correct?

7 A. I cannot remember, sir.

8 Q. All right.

9 JUDGE MAY: Are you going to move from

10 Kopljari, Mr. Sayers? Because there's something I want

11 to ask about it.

12 MR. SAYERS: Yes.

13 JUDGE MAY: Just from the point of view of

14 this case, this isn't the first time that we've had

15 these sort of allegations being put about. Is it

16 suggested that what happened in Stupni Do was in some

17 way justified because of what happened previously in

18 Kopljari? If not, what is the relevance?

19 MR. SAYERS: The answer to that,

20 Mr. President, is absolutely not. We are not

21 contending, and I don't think we ever have contended

22 that because a massacre occurred at Stupni Do -- and

23 there is no question that a massacre did occur at

24 Stupni Do -- that somehow that is justified because of

25 prior massacres. It is not justified, but I think this

1 is important contextually for the Court to realise that

2 these events were going on on both sides. They can't

3 be viewed in isolation.

4 But I do want to emphasise that there is no

5 way that the Defence is ever going to take the

6 position -- at least Mr. Kordic's Defence is never

7 going to take the position in this case that because

8 the same kinds of things were being perpetrated upon

9 Croats, any massacre is justified.

10 JUDGE MAY: So the position is that it's

11 accepted that there was a massacre at Stupni Do, or

12 that perhaps, put more neutrally, that a large number

13 of people were killed, but it's said that there had

14 previously been an incident at another village; is that

15 the way that you put it?

16 MR. SAYERS: I would put it, if I may,

17 Mr. President, even more neutrally than that: There is

18 no question that a large number of civilians were

19 killed. I believe it may have been in the region of

20 20, and I don't have the precise numbers to hand. But

21 I think as we will see, from my questions and from the

22 documents that I hope to go over with Colonel

23 Weckesser, this occurred in the context of a military

24 assault, and I think the evidence is absolutely clear

25 that the civilian casualties were not necessary in that

1 assault, but they nonetheless occurred. There is no

2 question, however, that Stupni Do was defended, and I

3 believe that that fact is even reflected in the report

4 of the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated

5 February the 10th of 1994, as we will see.

6 JUDGE MAY: Well, let's move on, then.

7 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. As we lead up, Colonel Weckesser, to the

9 events at Stupni Do, wouldn't you agree that as a man

10 with over 37 years of military experience, that if

11 military authorities in a village or a town receive an

12 explicit advance warning that there is about to be a

13 military attack, then it is incumbent upon those

14 military authorities to ensure that all civilians are

15 evacuated?

16 A. In normal military conditions, circumstances,

17 I would agree, sir. But my question would be, in that

18 case, where should the inhabitants of Stupni Do have

19 gone to? Where should they have gone? They had been

20 isolated. They were being controlled -- actually the

21 entrances were controlled by HVO. The Muslims could

22 not go to the Serb side, definitely not. What was

23 left? They could also not go -- evade to the south, it

24 was also blocked, because the HVO control line was in

25 the valley somewhere between Dabravine and Vares. So

1 that valley was -- I cannot say well defended, but it

2 was at least blocked by several checkpoints on the BiH

3 side and by several checkpoints on the HVO side.

4 So the question for me, if I were to have

5 been the president of that little village, I would not

6 have had a possibility to recommend to my citizens

7 where to go to.

8 Q. Thank you for those views, Colonel, but did

9 you know that in fact the president of the Muslim war

10 presidency in exile in the village of Dabravine, as you

11 have testified -- Mervana Hadzimurtezic I believe is

12 her name -- had actually issued an order to the

13 civilians in Stupni Do the night before or two days

14 before the attack occurred to evacuate the village, and

15 that that order was ignored?

16 JUDGE MAY: Well, if you're going to put that

17 to the witness as a fact, you'll have to call some

18 evidence. You are suggesting that that did happen?

19 MR. SAYERS: Yes.

20 JUDGE MAY: If you've got some evidence to

21 support it, put it to the witness; otherwise we'll have

22 to wait and see.

23 MR. SAYERS: We'll do precisely that,

24 Mr. President. I wonder if we could have Exhibit D31/1

25 shown to the witness, please.

1 A. Thank you.

2 Q. Colonel, this is a statement that is already

3 in evidence from Ekrem Mahmutovic. I would like to

4 turn you to page 10, please --

5 JUDGE MAY: That's not evidence. That's

6 simply something which some other witness has put in a

7 statement. Now, you can use that if you want to use it

8 in some sort of a comment, something which you've put

9 in evidence, and you're now trying to use it to

10 cross-examine this witness. It's not evidence, and I'm

11 not going to allow you to put it to him. It's simply

12 something that somebody else has said in a statement.

13 Colonel, there is no need to comment on

14 that. If you would like to put it down, do.

15 Yes, let's go on to another point.

16 MR. SAYERS: I take it, Your Honour, you are

17 precluding me from asking the witness whether or not he

18 is aware that these instructions were given?

19 JUDGE MAY: Colonel, did you know anything

20 about any such instructions? Did you hear anything

21 about it?

22 A. I was not made aware about that evacuation

23 order, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

25 MR. SAYERS:

1 Q. One other point, Colonel: Were you aware

2 that on Friday, the 22nd of October, 1993, residents of

3 Stupni Do were actually warned by a Croat from Vares to

4 leave the village, as something terrible was about to

5 happen?

6 A. I know about that warning. You refer to that

7 single Croatian family living in Stupni Do and then

8 leaving one day before? Is that the --

9 Q. Just so that we are on the same topic, let me

10 show you a document that I would like to have marked as

11 an exhibit, which is a letter from the President of the

12 Security Council to Secretary-General -- I'm sorry,

13 it's a report of the Secretary-General, S1994/154,

14 dated February the 10th, 1994.

15 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

16 D118/1.

17 MR. SAYERS:

18 Q. I'd like to draw your attention specifically

19 to paragraph 5, sir, the first sentence.

20 A. Five?

21 Q. And the remainder of the paragraph.

22 This paragraph states that the day before the

23 hostilities in Stupni Do, a warning had been issued by

24 a Croat to the residents of Stupni Do that they should

25 leave, and most residents of Stupni Do did not take the

1 warning seriously. Were you aware of that?

2 A. Not at that time, not at 22nd. Afterwards,

3 yes, I heard about this Croatian family leaving town

4 and warning -- giving this warning. Yes, that's true,

5 sir.

6 Q. Were you aware that there were 36 local

7 soldiers mobilised to guard the village during the --

8 A. No, I was not aware, no.

9 Q. All right. Let me just ask you a few other

10 questions in this regard. Were you aware that the war

11 presidency in exile in Dabravine had actually created

12 an evacuation plan for all civilians in the villages of

13 the municipality of Vares?

14 A. No, I was not aware of, and I was not told by

15 her.

16 Q. By Mrs. --

17 A. By the president. Never.

18 Q. You were not aware that, in fact, a radio

19 signal had been sent to the local forces in Stupni Do

20 instructing them to evacuate the village, that that

21 coded message was received, that a meeting was held in

22 the village, and the decision was made not to evacuate

23 the village?

24 A. I'm not aware about this, and it was also not

25 part of any discussion with any authority in the

1 following days.

2 Q. All right. Thank you.

3 Now, turning to the conversation that you

4 apparently witnessed between the NordBat interpreter

5 and the soldiers that you testified about on October

6 the 24th, 1993, two points. First, those soldiers

7 appeared to be drunk, to you, did they not?

8 A. Their behaviour was not normal soldier-like.

9 They were shouting, threatening, threatening with their

10 arms, very unusual behaviour, you know, and I had the

11 feeling they were drunk, yeah.

12 Q. And, in fact, three years ago, you told the

13 investigators for the Prosecution that "It seemed to me

14 that they were also drunk." And you don't disagree

15 with that today, do you?

16 A. I don't disagree, no.

17 Q. All right, sir. Second, you mentioned that

18 these HVO soldiers claimed that they did not like their

19 leaders because of what they had been ordered to do.

20 Did they mention which leaders they did not like?

21 A. They did not mention it, no, sir. It was

22 spoken, I remember, in the plural: their leaders.

23 Q. Turning to a separate subject, your visit to

24 Zepce, I believe it was on October the 26th --

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. -- you say that you spoke to a gentleman by

2 the name of Lozancic, who you identified as the head of

3 the municipal government in Zepce?

4 A. Mm-hmm.

5 Q. Did you ever speak to the president of the

6 House of Representatives of the HR-HB, Perica Jukic?

7 A. I can't remember, sir.

8 Q. All right. Now, on the subject of the level

9 of advance planning that you testified about, at the

10 HVO level, prior to the hostilities in Stupni Do,

11 wouldn't you agree that the decision to mount the

12 Stupni Do operation was actually taken at a fairly low

13 level, not at a high level?

14 A. I would disagree on your assessment, because

15 on a low level, I think, to bring in a commander from

16 another enclave at that time, from Kiseljak to that

17 scene, is very unusual and not understandable for me.

18 Because there was a commander, there was a brigade,

19 they were pretending to be strong; so it seemed to be

20 unusual if a -- not another unit but at least another

21 commander shows up and is at least being the speaker in

22 some decisive moments.

23 Q. Let me just show you one more document, which

24 is the end-of-tour report prepared by the head of the

25 regional centre of Zenica at the European Community

1 Monitoring Mission.

2 A. Mm-hmm.

3 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

4 D119/1.

5 MR. SAYERS:

6 Q. Just one observation, and it concerns

7 paragraph 5 on the first page, sir.

8 A. Umm-hmm.

9 Q. Here it is stated by the head of the regional

10 centre of the European Community Monitoring Mission in

11 Zenica that: "It is likely that the decision to mount

12 the operation was taken at fairly low level, and it is

13 possible that the massacre was triggered by the refusal

14 of the Muslims in Stupni Do, so the story goes, to pay

15 more to the local HVO from their profits from smuggling

16 operations in the area."

17 A. Sir, as I said, I disagree. That is another

18 assessment of many assessments or assumptions which

19 were taken at that time for that kind of an operation.

20 As I said, since -- what I experienced, the conflicting

21 parties were normally very careful to do such a thing,

22 you know, and therefore I don't think that it was just

23 a spontaneous event.

24 If you look to the prewarnings you just

25 mentioned, to the ever [sic] Croatian efforts, I think

1 it was aiming to that event, actually. Things were

2 driving like that and it was not just a thing which

3 happened out of the -- out of the sky. This is almost

4 impossible, if you refer just -- if I may refer just to

5 the statements you have made in preparation, exile,

6 warnings, family, HVO moving out, so it was obvious.

7 And even a commander change at that very moment is very

8 strange. It speaks for unusual circumstances.

9 So I cannot agree on that assessment which is

10 taken here, and I cannot agree or share your opinion on

11 that assessment, so ...

12 Q. Well, you will appreciate that that's not my

13 opinion, sir. That's the opinion of the head of the

14 regional centre in Zenica.

15 A. Sorry, yes.

16 Q. But let me turn to another subject.

17 In your efforts to obtain access to the site

18 of this reported massacre, you first attempted to

19 contact and you did contact Emil Harah, who was at that

20 time the head of the Bobovac Brigade, and that was on

21 October the 26th, was it not?

22 A. No, it cannot have been, because on the 26th

23 I was in Zepce.

24 Q. Was it on the 27th?

25 A. It was on the -- I'm thinking. It was on the

1 24th.

2 Q. On the 24th, very well. But the point is

3 that this gentleman, Emil Harah, was still in command

4 of the Bobovac Brigade on that day, was he not?

5 A. I don't know. This was a very strange

6 situation, especially if you look to the happenings on

7 the next days. Maybe he was in command.

8 Yes, you might be right, because I met him as

9 a very cool, very direct officer, running a tight ship

10 on his brigade. I think he was a commander, yes.

11 Q. And he instructed you that access to the

12 village would be barred because it was too dangerous,

13 in that fighting was still actively going on there;

14 correct?

15 A. Actually, not barred, but it would be too

16 dangerous for us to go in. He was caring for our

17 safety, so -- pretending, excuse me, pretending to care

18 for our safety.

19 Q. All right. Following the events at Stupni

20 Do, were you aware that General Petkovic, General

21 Milivoj Petkovic, had actually issued an order to the

22 commander of the HVO in Vares to remove three

23 politicians or three governmental individuals from

24 their office?

25 A. We realised -- the first portion of your

1 question, I was not aware at that time that

2 General Petkovic had issued this order, but I was

3 aware, because it was obvious that they had exchanged

4 the authorities in Vares.

5 MR. SAYERS: I wonder if the registrar could

6 show you Exhibit Z1258, please. Two questions.

7 Q. First, were you aware that General Petkovic

8 had actually authorised the removal of Anto Pejcinovic,

9 Zvonko Duznovic, and Ivica Gavran from their present

10 functions on October the 23rd, 1993, the day that the

11 Stupni Do massacre occurred?

12 A. I was not aware at that time.

13 Q. And were you aware that General Petkovic had

14 ordered an investigation into the responsibility of the

15 situation in the Croatian and Muslim villages?

16 A. That I was aware afterwards, so --

17 Q. And there is no doubt that an investigation

18 occurred on the part of the HVO after this massacre, is

19 there?

20 A. I cannot assess that. I don't know.

21 Q. Now, before you went to Zepce, I believe that

22 you went to see the commander of the Bobovac Brigade

23 again, this date being October the 25th, and you found

24 out that on this day or by this day, Commander Emil

25 Harah had now been replaced by the new commander,

1 Kresimir Bozic?

2 A. That is correct, sir.

3 Q. Indeed, at a press conference that was held

4 two days later, the allegation was made by the BritBat

5 commander that Kresimir Bozic was actually responsible

6 for the massacre; correct?

7 A. That is correct, sir.

8 Q. Let me turn now to the conversation that you

9 had with Sir Martin Garrod, where you asked Sir Martin

10 to speak to Mr. Kordic about the events at Stupni Do.

11 You knew that Sir Martin was going to be

12 speaking to Mr. Kordic on another subject, didn't you?

13 A. Yes, that's correct, because a medevac issue

14 was a big issue at that time.

15 Q. And you knew that Sir Martin had a meeting

16 scheduled with Mr. Kordic for October the 25th;

17 correct?

18 A. That is correct, yes.

19 Q. Then Sir Martin reported to you that he had

20 done exactly as you suggested, that he had spoken to

21 Mr. Kordic about suspicions of an HVO massacre at

22 Stupni Do; isn't that true?

23 A. That is correct, sir.

24 Q. Then he told you that after he had made his

25 enquiry of Mr. Kordic, Mr. Kordic had immediately

1 telephoned General Petkovic, who was at the time in

2 Kiseljak, and asked him what was going on in Stupni Do;

3 isn't that correct?

4 A. That is correct, and gave us some

5 satisfaction, yes, sir.

6 Q. Then it was related by Sir Martin to you what

7 Mr. Kordic had been told by General Petkovic; correct?

8 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.

9 Q. Was it related to you also that Mr. Kordic

10 condemned any atrocities that might have taken place or

11 been committed by either side?

12 A. I remember that statement in some reports.

13 Yes, it was mentioned in the reports -- but at that

14 very moment, I can't remember -- in conjunction with

15 the happenings of Stupni Do.

16 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, if that might be

17 a good time. I'm about to move on to another subject,

18 and I would anticipate at the most maybe 15 more

19 minutes of questions for Colonel Weckesser.

20 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now until half past

21 2.00.

22 Colonel, would you be back, please, at half

23 past 2.00 to conclude your evidence?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE MAY: Could you please remember, during

1 the adjournment, not to speak to anybody about your

2 evidence? And that does include members of the

3 Prosecution.

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

5 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.59 p.m.

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1 --- On resuming at 2.33 p.m.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.

3 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

4 Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Weckesser.

5 A. Good afternoon, sir.

6 Q. Turning your attention to the events of

7 November 2nd and 3rd, 1993, you would agree, would you

8 not, that the 7th Muslim Brigade led the ABiH forces

9 into the city of Vares and captured the city?

10 A. That is correct, sir.

11 Q. And that immediately preceding that, there

12 were approximately 7.000 or so refugees who had fled

13 from the city, all Croat; they fled over one of the

14 surrounding hills to the neighbouring village of

15 Dastansko, to the east?

16 A. That's what I heard. I have not seen it.

17 Yes, sir.

18 Q. Would you not agree that there was a huge

19 amount of looting and vandalism and damage perpetrated

20 by the 7th Muslim Brigade in the city of Vares?

21 A. I agree on this. I have observed this, yes.

22 Q. One point on this, sir, I think the final

23 point that I want to make on this particular subject:

24 Would you not agree that the capture of Vares was of

25 extremely important strategic significance to the ABiH

1 because it allowed them to link up the 2nd, 3rd, 4th,

2 and 6th Corps, and also because it meant that forces

3 could travel from Tuzla to Gornji Vakuf without having

4 to move, for the first time, through any Croat

5 enclaves?

6 A. Your analysis is fully correct. Yes, I

7 agree, sir.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 Turning to the subject of Ivica Rajic, did

10 you know that he has actually been indicted in this

11 Tribunal for the events at Stupni Do?

12 A. I think I read it in the newspapers a few

13 years ago.

14 Q. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Weckesser, that

15 you have really no personal knowledge of any of the

16 circumstances surrounding the dismissal of Ivica Rajic

17 from his command?

18 A. With the exception of the -- with the

19 exceptions of the informations which were relayed by

20 other team members to me in RC Zenica, yes, sir.

21 Q. You are of the opinion, I believe, that

22 Mr. Rajic's dismissal could only have been initiated by

23 Colonel Blaskic; is that correct?

24 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

25 Q. I wonder if I could ask you to look at a

1 document that we've previously provided to the

2 registrar, 11th of November, 1993, a monitor team daily

3 report prepared by team V-3?

4 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

5 D119/1.

6 MR. SAYERS: If I might point this out,

7 there's one document that's already been marked as

8 119/1; this should probably be 120/1.

9 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

10 D120/1.

11 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.

12 Q. Turning your attention, Mr. Weckesser, to

13 paragraph 1(b), the military situation, and there's a

14 reference to a rumour relating to the replacement of

15 Rajic at the instance of General Petkovic upon orders

16 from the president of the Croatian Republic of

17 Herceg-Bosna, Mate Boban. Were you made privy to any

18 of the information about which this monitor team daily

19 report concerns, or addresses?

20 A. I cannot guess on statements which have been

21 done by another team, especially when they refer to

22 rumour in the streets, just addressing normal people.

23 I can only say, because this was the initial of your

24 question, that I could not imagine, you know, that this

25 has not been done without influence of the commander,

1 Blaskic, because he was running a tight ship. This was

2 known to me and was felt from me when I had contact in

3 Zepce; everything was really tough, coordinated, in

4 preparing of the tripartite meetings.

5 So as I have stated, I think, before, I think

6 the initialisation, or at least with the participation

7 of Colonel Blaskic, I could not imagine that this has

8 happened.

9 Q. Thank you indeed.

10 Going to one of the last subjects, the

11 investigation concerning the events at Stupni Do

12 performed by the United Nations and by the HVO, do you

13 know anything about that?

14 A. Yes. Later still, when we had a funeral at

15 Breza, which took place on the 30th of October, I heard

16 that United Nations experts were doing a search and

17 investigations. But at that time, and even afterwards,

18 I had no information about the outcome of that, sir.

19 Q. Did you have any personal knowledge about

20 meetings between the G1 legal department of the

21 headquarters of UNPROFOR, Bosnia-Herzegovina command,

22 Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Koet, K-o-e-t, and between

23 Colonel Vinko Lucic, from the HVO headquarters in

24 Mostar, accompanied by Mr. Bandic, a military lawyer?

25 Did you ever --

1 A. Not at all. Not at all, sir.

2 Q. Very well.

3 I'd just like, as my final set of questions,

4 to come back to what your understanding of the position

5 of Mr. Kordic was, and I would like you to see, if I

6 may, three exhibits: Z1276, 1293,1, and 1263,1.

7 Mr. Weckesser, if I could first address your

8 attention to Z1276, was it your understanding that Mate

9 Boban was, in fact, the president of the Croatian

10 Republic of Herceg-Bosna?

11 A. That's correct, sir.

12 Q. Did you understand that Vladislav Pogarcic

13 was the head of human rights and humanitarian issues

14 for that entity?

15 A. No, not at all, sir.

16 Q. Did you know that Dr. Jadranko Prlic was the

17 president of the government of the Croatian Republic of

18 Herceg-Bosna?

19 A. No, sir.

20 Q. And did you know that Slobodan Bozic was the

21 Deputy Minister of Defence for the republic?

22 A. No, sir.

23 Q. Do you know who the Minister of Defence was?

24 A. No, sir.

25 Q. All right. Turning to the next document,

1 Mr. Weckesser, Mr. Kordic is identified in this

2 document, Z1293,1, as the vice-president of the HVO

3 government. No one ever informed you that he was the

4 vice-president of the HVO government, did they?

5 A. No, that is correct.

6 Q. Finally, document number Z1263,1: The HRC

7 visited Mr. Dario Kordic, who is now the vice-president

8 of the CRHB, the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Do

9 you know whether or not he was the vice-president of

10 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna?

11 A. It was my opinion at that time that he was

12 the vice-president of that republic.

13 Q. My last question concerns the photograph that

14 you showed the Trial Chamber, the Swiss-chalet-type

15 building with some smoke coming --

16 A. I believe the Bobovac Brigade, yeah.

17 Q. I think it's Z1283,1.

18 A. Correct, yes.

19 Q. Is this a picture of what was formerly the

20 Bobovac Brigade headquarters?

21 A. As far as I have the knowledge, yes.

22 Q. And this is in the city or to the north of

23 the city of Vares, I believe?

24 A. Exactly, sir.

25 Q. It was known as the Eagle's Nest, wasn't it?

1 A. I can't remember that, sir.

2 MR. SAYERS: I have no further questions,

3 Your Honour.

4 Q. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Weckesser,

5 unless the Trial Chamber has any for me.

6 A. Thank you.

7 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

8 Q. Just two things, really. You have been asked

9 questions about warnings that were given to the

10 occupants of Stupni Do before the massacre. Apart from

11 what may be contained in other reports, what, if any,

12 knowledge did you gather of warnings given to the

13 occupants of Stupni Do?

14 A. Sir, the warnings -- if I would have had

15 warnings more specifically directed to the situation of

16 Stupni Do, I would definitely have differently cared

17 for that village. Therefore, these warnings did not

18 reach us in that way.

19 We had rumours that there was uncertainty,

20 that it was tense, what we considered it, and it was

21 very difficult to coordinate anything in these days

22 with the local security officer, Zvonko. Actually, the

23 tension we had in that town, we referred it more to the

24 moving of the BiH in the north and more to the travel

25 of the Joy 2 which had to pass this area.

1 Q. I'm going to cut you off there, because I'm

2 only interested to know about what, if any, material

3 you were able to gather yourself after the event about

4 warnings that may have been given to the occupants of

5 Stupni Do. You will recall that in the newspaper

6 article that you produced, there's a reference there,

7 at the beginning of it, to a warning being given to the

8 Croat occupant of the village so that the Croat

9 occupant could move out. But apart from that, did you

10 gather any other form of material about warnings?

11 A. Not that I could remember.

12 Q. The second point, the dismissal of Rajic.

13 You said that would require the initiation or

14 participation of Blaskic. Is that on the grounds that

15 Blaskic is his superior in the military chain of

16 command?

17 A. That is correct, sir, and what I learned so

18 far, they stick to the chain of command in a

19 disciplined way.

20 MR. NICE: Thank you. I have nothing else.

21 JUDGE MAY: Colonel, thank you for coming to

22 the Tribunal to give your evidence. It's now

23 concluded, and you are released.

24 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your

25 Honours.

1 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to go.

2 [The witness withdrew]

3 MR. NICE: That concludes the evidence that's

4 available this week, but I can -- when the witness has

5 withdrawn, I may be able to satisfy the Chamber's

6 desire for marked maps of front lines. But because the

7 material may, at this stage, be acting as an

8 aide-memoire or some other kind of guide until put in

9 evidence, it may be this is something that can be dealt

10 with in a Status Conference or at least in private

11 session in case the documents don't ever become

12 evidence. But I'm in the Chamber's hands on that.

13 JUDGE MAY: Well, do you want to deal with

14 the matter in private session or do you think --

15 MR. NICE: No, I don't. I'm quite happy to

16 deal with it in public session.

17 JUDGE MAY: I think it's better dealt with in

18 public, if possible.

19 MR. NICE: I've asked for Mr. Lopez-Terres to

20 come down, because he's been dealing with the

21 preparation of these plans more than I have, and if

22 you've got any questions, he'll be able to explain them

23 to you more.

24 While we're waiting for him, can I at least

25 distribute the material that's been provided? I'm

1 sorry I haven't been able to show it to the Defence,

2 but I've literally only just had it made available to

3 me.

4 MR. SAYERS: On a completely unrelated point,

5 Your Honour, I actually used the address "Mr." to Mr.

6 Weckesser at his request. I actually didn't address

7 him as "Colonel" at his request, so I didn't want there

8 to be any suggestion that there was any disrespect

9 intended to him.

10 MR. NICE: I don't know how they should be

11 marked. Perhaps they can be given exhibit numbers. We

12 probably should give them numbers of some kind.

13 The first map, perhaps I could simply hold it

14 up and you'll see what's coming, because they are

15 slightly unwieldy things to deal with in court. But,

16 of course, the Chamber may be working on its papers

17 elsewhere or its staff maybe. The first map is headed

18 "Pre-April '93, Main Brigade Dispositions" and is, in

19 a sense, self-evident. It has black for HVO units,

20 ABiH units in green, and red for the VRS front line,

21 which you can see pretty well running round the

22 northwest, northeast, and southeast of the plan, even

23 at this distance. The various brigades are marked in

24 their various locations with a key at the bottom. So

25 it's, I hope, a self-explanatory map which may provide

1 a useful aide-memoire, assuming it's shown to be

2 accurate, for where brigades were before April 1993.

3 The second map is more immediately and

4 pictorially perhaps helpful. July '93, front lines and

5 main brigade dispositions. But you'll see also that it

6 shows the lines marking out the areas held by the

7 Croats both in and around Vitez and Busovaca, and then

8 in Kiseljak and also over in Vares. So as well as

9 having the units marked again, this shows the way the

10 territory was being defended or having to be defended.

11 Now, the next three documents that you have,

12 which have yet to be distributed, I think, recognise

13 the focus of part of the case on Vitez, and it's for

14 these that I might require some assistance from

15 Mr. Lopez-Terres, he having been dealing with them.

16 They focus entirely on Vitez, and they show the front

17 lines -- does the Court have them yet, because they are

18 manageable. If Ms. Ver Haag can perhaps approach your

19 associate.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes, certainly.

21 MR. NICE: That can be distributed. There

22 are three documents.

23 The first one, as the key shows, in time is

24 17th of April, 1993. The source of the information are

25 Blaskic orders at different times on the 17th of April,

1 '93, and the key is perhaps pretty well self-evident;

2 green for the ABiH front line, and the other lines, as

3 I -- well, I'll have to check and just make sure that

4 I've not misinformed when Mr. Lopez-Terres comes down.

5 So that's the position in April.

6 The next document, dated May or in relation

7 to the HVO front line in May, shows the ABiH front line

8 in green -- Mr. Lopez-Terres is not available

9 apparently -- and the HVO defence sectors in blue, and

10 you can see that they are numbered. This is based on a

11 document called the Vitez Defence Office Report.

12 The third document is from July onwards and

13 again, local to Vitez, speaks of the HVO or talks of or

14 shows the HVO front line, and again self-explanatory, I

15 trust.

16 Now, that is some of the material we've been

17 able to put together.

18 It occurred to me as at least possible that

19 the Chamber would, at some stage, want to be able to

20 consider the detail shown on the small maps in relation

21 to the material on the large maps, so that you have

22 both the micro and the macro picture. Superimposing

23 one on the other permanently looks difficult and is

24 unappealing, so what I'm having done -- I thought they

25 were ready immediately but they are not or perhaps they

1 are not -- I'm having acetate sheets prepared showing

2 the detail on the small maps, but just simply on the

3 acetate sheets, and some simple point of reference so

4 that one can correctly position it over Vitez, and then

5 it will be possible, if this is helpful, to have the

6 micro picture superimposed temporarily on the macro

7 picture. Alternatively, the Chamber may be happy to

8 use it in the form of these documents.

9 So those other acetate sheets will be

10 available later. It may be that they are best left to

11 be called for if and when thought to be helpful by the

12 Chamber, depending on how the Chamber uses the material

13 at all.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes, that seems sensible, to

15 leave them for the moment. We have these various

16 documents. We're going to get the July larger map.

17 When the Registry are ready, we ought perhaps to give

18 these some numbers.

19 MR. NICE: Yes, recognising that at the

20 moment, they don't stand as produced exhibits. They

21 are subject, as the Chamber will remember, to the

22 Defence putting in, if they want to, a similar map

23 differently marked or whatever the position may be.

24 Maybe we can achieve a level of agreement and they can

25 go in as agreed documents. I don't know. We'll see.

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I see a difficulty about

2 bringing these backwards and forwards into the court.

3 MR. NICE: Yes. Well, it may be, because the

4 large maps are -- I don't know whether they are easy

5 enough to see from that distance, but they are -- they

6 are not. They are the sort of size, I suppose, which

7 would probably be visible if placed halfway between the

8 Bench and the witness.

9 JUDGE MAY: If we could get hold of the easel

10 and the blackboard and put them up somewhere, but in

11 such a way that we don't cut off half the court.

12 MR. NICE: That's the problem with, of

13 course, the easels placed at the back of the court in

14 the conventional way, it obscures the view of the

15 public.

16 JUDGE MAY: Not only that, I can tell you

17 it's difficult to see if not impossible to see from

18 here, unless you can get the camera on it, and then it

19 doesn't always work.

20 MR. NICE: It might be possible, I suppose,

21 if the easel -- then there's the problem with

22 microphones, isn't there? I was going to say it might

23 be possible for the witness to move to another place.

24 It might be possible, for example, for a witness

25 dealing with a map to occupy one of these front desks

1 that are otherwise redundant in the way we use the

2 courtroom. But still, time will show.

3 I'm afraid, though, that apart from dealing

4 with the maps to that extent, I've run out of evidence

5 today.

6 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps it would be sensible to

7 give these some numbers. Maybe Prosecution numbers,

8 whatever the next ones are.

9 MR. NICE: The problem with that, Your

10 Honour, is that the computer system is temporarily not

11 responding, and Ms. Ver Haag can't gain access to the

12 document that identifies what number we've reached.

13 JUDGE MAY: Let's not worry about it now. We

14 can deal with it in due course.

15 There are one or two housekeeping matters,

16 unless anybody wants to raise anything on the maps, to

17 do with dates.

18 There was a question you may remember of

19 whether the Court would sit on the afternoon of Monday,

20 the 8th of November, if a court were available. The

21 answer is that no court is available, and so we shall

22 not sit that afternoon.

23 We have discussed matters arising from the

24 Prosecution's telling us about their current state of

25 thinking, and we've come to this conclusion, that there

1 ought to be a Status Conference in the not-too-distant

2 future. We have in mind Friday, the 26th of November,

3 which will give the Prosecution a month. We shall then

4 have sat, by my calculation, something like 70 days in

5 all, so we ought to be well into the Prosecution case,

6 nearing the end of it.

7 The purpose of the Status Conference will be,

8 first of all, to take stock of where we've reached.

9 Secondly, for the Prosecution to produce a document

10 dealing with the number of witnesses who are to be

11 called, who they are. By that time we will expect

12 decisions to have been made, of course.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Nice.

14 Microphone for the counsel.

15 MR. NICE: I'm sure that won't be a problem,

16 Your Honour. The exercise I spoke of is already well

17 advanced.

18 JUDGE MAY: And, of course, we would want to

19 know what the witnesses are going to deal with, the

20 topics. It may be that that's already been covered in

21 other summaries, but we would like at least a reference

22 to that so we may know what they're dealing with, and,

23 of course, an estimate of length. We would also want

24 an estimate of the length of time for the Prosecution

25 case, bearing in mind, as I say, that by then, if

1 everything goes to plan, there will have been some 70

2 days or so spent, in all, on the Prosecution case, and

3 in the Trial Chamber's view, it should be drawing

4 towards a close.

5 MR. NICE: Very helpful. Yes, very helpful.

6 As a matter of information, I can simply tell

7 the Court, I think it may be interested to know this,

8 that we are, of course, and have been for a

9 considerable time, keeping our eye firmly on the

10 affidavit possibility, notwithstanding the difficulties

11 that arise from there being no recognisable and formal

12 affidavit procedure in the former Yugoslavia. So

13 that's a matter that's under active investigation.

14 We're also keeping in mind the transcript

15 issue, which arises independently of, but particularly

16 when we come to deal with the crime base in the

17 villages. I was wondering whether by now we could have

18 identified, either by order or by agreement,

19 transcripts that we could read in, or deal with in

20 whatever way the Chamber decided, whenever we otherwise

21 have a gap.

22 I have to say in our own -- not defence, I

23 think to our own credit, in fact -- there have been

24 very few gaps when we have run out of evidence. This

25 is about the second, I think. It's very difficult, as

1 you can imagine, to keep witnesses here, particularly

2 at the end of sitting periods. So we haven't had many

3 gaps, but it might be useful to have identified

4 transcripts, and then, if we do ever have short gaps,

5 to use the gaps for dealing with those matters.

6 But I think there is outstanding some

7 uncertainty as to how the Chamber wants transcripts

8 formally put into evidence. We never resolved it on an

9 earlier occasion, and I think that different

10 expressions of understanding are given from the Bench.

11 They could be read in, in an entirely public and formal

12 way, by my standing here or one of my colleagues

13 standing here and reading them -- and one would hope

14 that it wouldn't be all of the transcript, but part of

15 it -- or it might be that the Chamber would be minded

16 to take them away and read them.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE MAY: Well, we have in mind simple

19 production being sufficient.

20 MR. NICE: That's extremely helpful and will

21 save a great deal of time.

22 JUDGE MAY: But obviously, again, that's a

23 matter -- we should as soon as possible identify which

24 of the transcripts you have in mind to deal with in

25 that way.

1 MR. NICE: Yes.

2 JUDGE MAY: Because there may be argument

3 about them which we ought to deal with.

4 MR. NICE: Indeed so, yes. I think, by the

5 start of the sittings of the week after next, we will

6 be able to identify several witnesses who've given

7 evidence whose evidence we would like to be read in by

8 way of transcript. We will serve notice of those on

9 our learned friends. If there is any objection, we

10 must find a time convenient to discuss them and argue

11 them.

12 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Nice, I

13 wanted to intervene regarding testimony. The point was

14 just made by the president. I should simply like to

15 make it quite clear that we expect from you a document

16 so that we can make the best of the Status Conference

17 envisaged for the end of November. That is why we

18 would like to have from you a document prior to the

19 Status Conference, so that it can be prepared under the

20 best possible conditions.

21 MR. NICE: I don't see any problem with that,

22 although I would forecast that we will refer you, in

23 whatever document we produce, to the overview of

24 witnesses which remains a summary, or an analysis by

25 summary, of the available material that is, I hope, as

1 useful to the Chamber as it is to us. And by reference

2 to it, or by use of it, it's easy to refer to matters

3 by topic as well as by individual witnesses.

4 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) No, I don't

5 think you understood quite well what we have in mind.

6 You will have had 70 days of testimony. You certainly

7 intend to call other witnesses. In this document, you

8 should tell us, in relation to what we have already

9 heard, what is the purpose pursued, why it is you need

10 such-and-such a witness to talk about such and such a

11 topic, to complement a certain section of the testimony

12 or to fill in the gaps, as you said, in the testimony

13 heard so far. That is what we would like to have,

14 because we have our own ideas, of course, about this,

15 because we are studying the testimony as we hear it.

16 We would like to have a document from you justifying

17 future testimony.

18 You have the statements and the form in which

19 they will be produced. If one of the witnesses that

20 you envisage will not come, for any reason whatsoever,

21 you can always ask the Court to -- or the Chamber to

22 have him replaced by someone else, justifying the

23 reasons for that substitution. That is what we expect

24 from you, because we will be at the end of November,

25 and we wish a document that will take stock of the

1 situation. And we, too, are engaging in a similar

2 exercise so that the Status Conference should be as

3 fruitful as possible regarding the rest of these

4 proceedings.

5 MR. NICE: It seems as though what you would

6 like to have from me is exactly what I have been

7 planning to provide you for some time. I don't think

8 you will be disappointed.

9 JUDGE MAY: It may be sensible, if there are

10 outstanding matters of law which we should determine --

11 and I've got in mind that there is an issue as to the

12 statement of witnesses who are dead --

13 MR. NICE: Yes.

14 JUDGE MAY: -- and the status of those

15 statements, it may be that there are other matters

16 which we ought to deal with fairly soon. Again, when

17 you're planning your calling of witnesses, you might

18 like to identify some time for legal argument.

19 MR. NICE: Indeed, sir, I think I said on the

20 earlier occasion this week, the argument about

21 witnesses who are dead or who are unwilling is really a

22 composite argument which breaks into two parts, but it

23 is nevertheless a composite argument, because the

24 underlying principles applicable to one resolution are

25 probably applicable to the other, and therefore it is

1 better for me to know what, if any, unwilling witnesses

2 there are and what categories they fall into, and at

3 that stage to address the argument about both topics

4 comprehensively.

5 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Provided the matter

6 is in mind.

7 MR. NICE: It certainly is.

8 JUDGE MAY: The other dates which I can

9 mention are these: that the last day listed is the

10 10th of December, which is a Friday. We shall not be

11 sitting that morning, so that means that the last day

12 for sitting will, in fact, be the 9th of December.

13 As I think I may have said before, we shall

14 start sittings in the New Year on Monday, the 10th of

15 January. I think that's the date. I haven't got the

16 calendar with me. But my recollection is --

17 MR. NICE: That's our --

18 JUDGE MAY: It's Monday the 10th.

19 MR. NICE: Yes.

20 JUDGE MAY: We have produced a calendar,

21 which should be with the senior legal officer, for the

22 first four months of this year, indicating what days

23 are available for this trial. And the answer is that

24 apart from two weeks or so, we will have the period

25 between the New Year and Easter available for this

1 trial.

2 That, of course, is subject to change. First

3 of all, change necessary because of this case, and then

4 change necessary due to other cases. We shall want,

5 certainly by the 26th of November, to have a good idea

6 as to when the Prosecution are going to close so we can

7 start planning accordingly.

8 MR. NICE: Yes, I don't think you're going to

9 be disappointed in the forecast that we'll be able to

10 make.

11 JUDGE MAY: Very well. As I say, I will ask

12 the senior legal officer to have copies of the calendar

13 available, and perhaps he can make sure they are handed

14 out to the parties.

15 MR. NICE: Can I make two points about the

16 timetable: First, whenever there's a day that's about

17 to be cancelled, it may be that we do get it at the

18 very earliest moment, but the complexities of getting

19 any single witness here, let alone a week's worth of

20 witnesses, are enormous. Ms. Bauer, who happens to be

21 in court, has to deal with this as one of her many

22 tasks, and she informs me that no witness involves

23 less, in simply arrangements, less than a couple of

24 hours, and frequently it's much more than that. So the

25 earliest possible notification of any day that may be

1 cancelled is helpful to us, even if it's a contingent

2 possibility that doesn't come off.

3 The second thing is, where there is a period

4 marked out as a week clear, we obviously make our --

5 and I'm sure that the Defence does as well -- we make

6 our own domestic arrangements and private arrangements,

7 including vacations, with those weeks in mind, and any

8 sudden introduction of court sittings can be difficult,

9 and to some degree disagreeable, if it means people

10 cancelling their holidays.

11 JUDGE MAY: It applies, too, to the Bench.

12 MR. NICE: I understand.

13 JUDGE MAY: No, I think that on the whole,

14 those weeks will not be interfered with. You can take

15 that as being so. We have in mind, of course, the

16 necessity of trying to fix dates and making

17 arrangements for alterations known just as soon as

18 possible. It's inconvenient to everybody if they're

19 made at the last minute. The problem here is the

20 knock-on effect from other cases.

21 Anything anybody else would like to raise?

22 MR. KOVACIC: (Interpretation) Your Honours,

23 may I take just two minutes? There is one thing, and

24 in all honesty, I really do not know how we should go

25 on in this matter, but I thought it would be wise for

1 me to inform the Court about some facts.

2 We had a Witness C here; I believe we

3 cross-examined him on the 20th of April, and we asked

4 him if he had a wartime diary to which he was

5 referring. He testified here that he had turned over

6 this war diary to the archives of the BH army as the

7 property of the army, to which we responded -- that is,

8 Mr. Cerkez's defence sent a letter to the government of

9 the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina asking them to

10 make that diary available to us.

11 There was no answer. Then we urged an

12 answer, and then eventually they did reply. I have the

13 copies of all this correspondence, in Croatian and in

14 English, for all the parties. We were replied that

15 such a document was nonextant. What confuses me is, of

16 course, we realise that we could use subpoena, but we

17 understand that a practical problem might arise. It

18 might take a very long time, and we hardly believe that

19 the outcome would be favourable.

20 However, I should nevertheless like to have

21 it recorded somewhere that what the witness said was

22 one thing and what the government said was another

23 matter. At least we know now that that diary is gone,

24 does not exist.

25 So all these documents, all this

1 correspondence has been translated, and we should

2 simply like it put on record.

3 JUDGE MAY: It's now on record formally. If

4 you wish the Trial Chamber to have the correspondence,

5 then perhaps you should file it in the normal way, as a

6 notification of the correspondence, and then it will be

7 on the record.

8 MR. KOVACIC: (Interpretation) Thank you very

9 much. Thank you very much for this advice. Thank you,

10 Mr. President.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now until the 1st

13 of November.

14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

15 3.20 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday,

16 the 1st day of November, 1999,

17 at 9.30 a.m.

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