1 Friday, 26th November, 1999

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning Your Honours.

7 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario

8 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kovacic.

10 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 WITNESS: ALASTAIR DUNCAN [Resumed]

12 Cross-examined by Mr. Kovacic:

13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Brigadier

14 Duncan.

15 A. Good morning.

16 Q. You are a qualified military officer, so

17 could you please, very briefly, tell us what you

18 consider to be a model brigade by NATO standards in

19 terms of structure and strength; how large it is and

20 which unit it comprises? What is the standard?

21 A. There is no standard for a NATO brigade,

22 because NATO brigades are formed from the alliance, the

23 19 alliance countries that form NATO. The structure

24 and organisation of those brigades are a national

25 responsibility, but the selection of tasks for those

1 brigades will be the responsibility of the senior

2 commander, from whatever force is formed in NATO, be it

3 for standing defensive forces or an expeditionary

4 force, such as Kosovo.

5 Q. Thank you. [No further translation]

6 JUDGE MAY: We are not getting a

7 translation.

8 MR. KOVACIC:

9 Q. If you were to prepare it on the basis of any

10 criteria, what kind of numbers would it have? Did you

11 receive the transcript?

12 A. Yes, I got that. I mean, every military

13 command will always ask for more soldiers, and the

14 politicians will tell them they can't have that many.

15 We don't have a standard number of soldiers at all.

16 Q. Thank you. Tell me, please, when you arrived

17 in the Lasva Valley, you already encountered

18 established HVO brigades, so that the situation was

19 more or less clear even to your predecessors, but did

20 you also learn how large the HVO brigades were and how

21 they were structured, those that were deployed in the

22 Lasva Valley?

23 A. I have no idea of the size of the brigades.

24 I was aware there was a number of brigades which

25 defended the Lasva Valley. Those brigades were a mix

1 of territorial forces who were based in their own homes

2 and would do, I think, some 10 days on the front line

3 in their local area; that is the individuals would

4 serve for 10 days on the front line. The brigades had

5 a structure and a command structure and seemed to be

6 equipped with sufficient radios and telephones to

7 communicate. There were also manoeuvre forces which

8 were able to shuttle fairly swiftly from one part of

9 the Vitez pocket to the other. And then there was the

10 infrastructure of supporting mortar and artillery

11 units, as well as police and other essential elements

12 which put together a fighting force.

13 Q. Thank you. Those manoeuvre forces that you

14 mention, you had no reliable data, any kind of document

15 or any reliable information that they came under the

16 command of the brigades?

17 A. I had no reliable information to that extent,

18 and I understood they were formed on an ad hoc basis as

19 required. I would assume that they would have to come

20 under command of the brigade to which they were

21 deployed, otherwise the command and control

22 relationships would not have worked. In fact, you

23 cannot send reinforcements into an area and leave them

24 on a separate command structure. They would have to be

25 incorporated. And I think this must have happened

1 because of the successful defence of that Vitez

2 pocket.

3 Q. So that is an assumption. But Brigadier,

4 within the town of Vitez itself we had the headquarters

5 of the operative zone, the command of Colonel Blaskic

6 in the hotel, who was the commander of the entire

7 zone. In that same town we had the Vitez Brigade, for

8 instance. You heard, and we saw, looking through some

9 documents yesterday, that there were Jokers and others,

10 so the command of the operative zone would

11 hierarchically be the highest command level in Vitez.

12 Therefore, in this hypothetical model, can you be sure

13 that those special units were responsible to the

14 brigade or to the operative zone, or maybe in another

15 town it may have been organised differently? So we are

16 just going -- discussing a hypothesis.

17 A. It would be normal for special units to be

18 attached according to the task of the brigade. There

19 are a number of supporting units, I was aware, that

20 were in Vitez, of special and other natures. As far as

21 I was aware, they were commanded and attached as

22 required.

23 Q. I see. You will agree that soldiers, members

24 of brigades, had no barracks; they didn't even have a

25 proper base, except that they did have a command post?

1 A. Yes. That's true.

2 Q. So we can agree, I assume, that the brigade

3 soldiers, when they are not on duty, they sleep at

4 home, they go home?

5 A. Yes, that's what I was aware of.

6 Q. So, therefore, this is certainly not the

7 traditional military standard for a soldier to be on

8 the front for eight hours or 12 hours, and then go

9 home. This could hardly be called a generally

10 acceptable or standard solution?

11 A. It's a standard solution for, I believe,

12 Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, and seems to work

13 remarkably well there.

14 Q. So Bosnia had a highly modern solution, did

15 it?

16 A. I think to jump straight to that conclusion

17 is going a little far. All I am saying is there is no

18 great disadvantage in having territorially based forces

19 that spend some of their time at home and some on the

20 front line. To my certain knowledge, that is the way

21 the Norwegian army are equipped and would intend to

22 fight for a war of national defence, with a good

23 communication system and a good command and control

24 structure. It's a different way of doing business. I

25 am not saying it's either good or bad. It's just one

1 of the range of options for utilising military forces.

2 Q. And to wind up this section on brigades.

3 Just one more question. The kind of brigade you

4 encountered, for instance in Vitez, or perhaps if you

5 are more familiar with the brigade in Novi Travnik or

6 Busovaca, it doesn't matter, the kind of HVO brigade

7 that you encountered, and about which you knew most,

8 how much time would it need, according to your expert

9 opinion, for such a brigade to be fully organised, from

10 the moment commander receives the order to establish it

11 to the moment it has to be combat ready? According to

12 what you knew at the time and on the basis of your

13 peacetime experience.

14 A. My experience is that that -- it would not

15 take long at all for that brigade to be combat ready,

16 since it has all its weapons with it and can move

17 rapidly into its combat positions, which would be

18 fairly close to the homes. Because they know each

19 other and because they will have worked together, as

20 they had for some time, it could deploy extremely

21 quickly.

22 Q. I apologise. Perhaps my question wasn't

23 worded properly. If we still don't have a brigade, it

24 still doesn't exist, but somebody is given an order to

25 form a brigade, to establish it, not to activate it,

1 not to deploy it. You were talking about its

2 deployment. I am talking about the situation when it

3 still does not exist. It has to be organised, to find

4 the personnel, to equip it and all the other things

5 that need to be done. I don't know what it is, judging

6 by the situation you found there, but let us assume

7 that these were peacetime conditions. But roughly,

8 would you need three weeks, two months, five months?

9 A. I'm unqualified to speculate on the length of

10 time, I'm afraid, it would take that to do.

11 Q. Thank you. There is no doubt at all that at

12 the time you were aware, on the basis of your contacts

13 with the HVO, that the immediate superior of my client

14 Cerkez was Tihomir Blaskic, who was the commander of

15 the operative zone of Central Bosnia; isn't that so?

16 A. That is correct. Yes.

17 Q. Without producing any documents to speed

18 things up, you did submit table Z2563. Just one

19 question in connection with that diagram. In that

20 diagram, operative groups have been marked. There's

21 the Operative Zone, operative groups, and then

22 lower-level units, including brigades. You know what

23 I'm referring to, I hope, or shall I get the document?

24 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have the

25 document, 2653.

1 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. So at the medium level of command, we have

3 the operative groups. Do you have any knowledge as to

4 up to which point in time the HVO was organised in this

5 manner?

6 A. As far as I am aware, the date on the bottom

7 right-hand corner of that document, under, as it were,

8 subpara (6) of the notes, refers to a change in -- that

9 a surrender took place on the 14th of June. So I

10 assume that that document would have been compiled on

11 or after the 14th of June, 1993.

12 Q. With the exception of the operative group

13 numbered as 3, on these two others, the name of the

14 commander is not indicated; obviously you had no

15 contact with these institutions or with this level of

16 command.

17 A. That is correct. That's either because we

18 did not know the names, or the fact that that level of

19 command may well not have existed.

20 Q. We have mentioned the hierarchy between

21 Blaskic and Cerkez; there's no one between them. You

22 would have probably known if there had been someone in

23 between.

24 A. I think so, yes.

25 Q. Thank you.

1 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] We don't need

2 the document any more.

3 Q. Brigadier, you had no more precise knowledge

4 as to the way in which the individual units were

5 assigned areas of responsibility; the HVO or Blaskic,

6 for instance, never informed you which unit was

7 responsible for which area of responsibility? Is that

8 correct?

9 A. That is correct, but I would not expect -- I

10 did not know -- I was not particularly interested in

11 that level of command. I had my liaison officers who

12 were attached to each brigade, and they, I believe, had

13 a detailed knowledge of where those brigades were.

14 Q. In a part of your testimony, you told us that

15 you had even personally seen some troops of the

16 Croatian army in Tomislavgrad, Gornji Vakuf, mostly in

17 the area of Prozor. We can agree that that area is

18 much farther to the south from the Lasva Valley, and

19 that between the two, there is a considerable mountain

20 range, so that this is quite a separate area,

21 geographically?

22 A. Yes. Could I just confirm whether you said

23 "HVO troops" or "HV troops"?

24 Q. "HV." You mentioned this.

25 A. I can confirm I saw HV soldiers in the area

1 of Prozor: a truck, I think two soldiers, and a

2 150-odd-millimetre D-30 towed howitzer, I think. That

3 was the only time I personally saw HV soldiers in that

4 area.

5 Q. And that is south of the Lasva Valley, and

6 geographically separate, isn't it?

7 A. Yes, and I think it's certainly in range of

8 BiH troops deployed in the Gornji Vakuf area,

9 certainly, and probably further than that.

10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could I ask the

11 usher for his assistance to distribute this document.

12 Q. Brigadier, in your examination-in-chief

13 yesterday, there was mention made again of certain

14 criminal groups that were operating in the area of the

15 Lasva Valley, but you specifically mentioned that those

16 criminal groups were really a very good excuse for the

17 commanders to claim that there were elements outside

18 their control. Let me show you just three documents as

19 an example from which it is evident.

20 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could each

21 document, one document out of each set, be provided to

22 the witness, please.

23 JUDGE MAY: Have they been provided to the

24 interpreters?

25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I did not give

1 a copy to the interpreters, but I hope there are enough

2 copies.

3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic, before you go on, in

4 the morning, before you begin a cross-examination --

5 and this applies to all counsel -- when you know you're

6 going to refer to documents, then what you should do is

7 make sure that the interpreters have a copy beforehand,

8 because now the Registrar has got to go around

9 distributing them, and it's much more efficient if it's

10 done at the beginning.

11 MR. KOVACIC: I will, Your Honour,

12 certainly. But we will be very short, and --

13 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter. They must

14 have them, because they don't know what reference is

15 going to be made to them.

16 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, sir. I will,

17 certainly, next time.

18 Q. Brigadier, will you please take the document

19 dated the 24th of May. These are UNPROFOR reports from

20 the region towards the centre, are they?

21 A. Yes, that's from headquarters, UNPROFOR in

22 Kiseljak, to UNPROFOR Zagreb, and various other

23 battalions within the organisation.

24 Q. Very well. Will you please turn to page 4.

25 The page number is indicated in the left-hand corner.

1 In the middle of the page, under the heading

2 "Vitez/Busovaca," small 1, the second sentence, that

3 begins with the words, "The main problems"; will you

4 please read it yourself.

5 It is clear, isn't it, that those criminal

6 elements do exist, even in your own reports, so that

7 they are not a negligible problem? I assume that such

8 a statement would not figure in your report if these

9 were quite insignificant issues; is that correct?

10 A. That is correct. My concern with these

11 criminal elements, or so-called criminal elements,

12 should I say -- is that if they are living in the Vitez

13 pocket, in the Vitez area, they are clearly consuming

14 food, ammunition, petrol, water, manpower, and

15 communications that would be best put to effect under

16 the military command. If the military command wish to

17 use them effectively, I would have brought them under

18 control or used them for its own ends; but in a pocket

19 such as the Vitez pocket, I find it very unlikely that

20 people, as I say, consuming food, ammunition, petrol,

21 and the rest of it, would be left on their own just

22 doing criminal activity. It would be a complete waste

23 of military assets.

24 Q. Brigadier, both sides claim that there were

25 criminal elements, and your units also recognised the

1 existence of such criminal elements on both sides.

2 Isn't that correct?

3 A. Yes, but I'm saying that it's quite likely

4 that those criminal elements are being sponsored by

5 somebody.

6 Q. Thank you. Let us look at page 7 of this

7 document, please. The second paragraph from the top,

8 under number 4, speaks about disputes between Croat and

9 Muslim communities that are continuing and mentions

10 groups led by Mafia personalities. So this is

11 consistent with the statement we have just looked at at

12 the beginning. Would you agree that such references

13 would not be included in your reports if these were

14 peripheral problems?

15 A. No, they were -- I entirely agree, they are

16 not peripheral problems; they are mainstream problems

17 for both sides. What I am concerned about -- remain

18 concerned about, is that if both sides are trying to

19 win a war, then it is unlikely they would let large

20 amounts of soldiers or criminals operate with

21 activities such as these Mafia activities, which would

22 be degrading their war-fighting capabilities.

23 Q. Very well. Can we have a look at the second

24 document, please, dated the 31st of May.

25 JUDGE MAY: Let us give a number to the first

1 one.

2 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

3 D46/2.

4 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. On this document, let us look at page 3,

6 please. Here, in the second half of the page, the

7 paragraph under the heading "Turbe/Travnik" -- so,

8 according to your terminology, on the edge of the Vitez

9 area -- again, reference is made to a criminal gang who

10 ambushed a BH army vehicle, which appeared to have

11 raised tensions.

12 A. I'm sorry, could you just confirm, on the

13 front page of the document, who is purported to have

14 drafted it and to whom? I've only seen -- I can only

15 see the third page.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Brigadier, if you want to

17 look at the first page, do.

18 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.

19 JUDGE MAY: Or, indeed, at anything else.

20 A. This is an opinion written by the person who

21 drafted the report, based on an incident. Again, I say

22 it is quite likely that somebody ambushed a BiH

23 vehicle, but to what end. If it's a criminal killing

24 somebody from the Muslim side or a Muslim criminal

25 killing one of his own side, as it were, it is a little

1 vague as to what happened.

2 Q. Yes. Yes. We agree. But obviously there is

3 a criminal act. If somebody seizes a vehicle, that is

4 a criminal act, regardless of the consequences. I am

5 not saying that this is true; it may be, it may not,

6 but a criminal act has been perpetrated. We agree on

7 that, don't we?

8 A. Yes, I can agree that in this case it would

9 appear that a criminal act has been perpetrated.

10 Q. Finally, the third and last document.

11 Brigadier, it is your report on a meeting, on your

12 meeting with Blaskic dated the 17th of August 1993.

13 Have you seen it, reviewed it recently? Do you recall

14 this document?

15 A. I certainly recall the document. I haven't

16 reviewed it recently.

17 Q. If I may draw your attention to a paragraph

18 that fits within this topic. You agree that this is

19 your note about a meeting with Colonel Blaskic, so

20 please look at the second page and how it ends.

21 Looking at the second page, may I draw your attention

22 to point 6. You said here that Blaskic was irritated

23 by the theft of his liaison officer's car from outside

24 your base. Do you remember that conversation? Is it

25 possible to infer from this that Blaskic's liaison

1 officer had his car stolen in front of your base,

2 probably while he was visiting your base?

3 A. Yes, I can confirm the car belonged to Darko

4 Gelic. He was the liaison officer from Blaskic's

5 headquarters. The car was stolen from outside my

6 base. I think car theft is fairly rife in any

7 community.

8 Q. Yes, there is crime everywhere, and that is

9 precisely what I wish to establish. And under point 3

10 of the same document, on the first page therefore,

11 Blaskic complains to you because you had organised a

12 meeting between the chief of police in Zenica, Asim

13 Fazlic; Zarko Andric, known as Zuti; of whom Blaskic

14 said, and you repeated, that he was a Mafia Godfather?

15 A. This paragraph 3 records what Blaskic told

16 me. It starts by saying "in his perception," therefore

17 he did not know that this meeting had happened. I

18 finished that paragraph with the words, "This will be

19 investigated further, as at the moment it does not seem

20 to have much credence." This was an accusation that I

21 personally organised this meeting, which I denied.

22 Whether or not the meeting took place, I do not know.

23 But it was certainly not orchestrated or organised by

24 the British Battalion or any member of the British

25 Battalion.

1 Q. Brigadier, I apologise, but perhaps my

2 question wasn't clear. The description used for Zuti

3 as a Mafia Godfather, this term, was it used by Blaskic

4 or by you?

5 A. It was used by me.

6 Q. Well, you know that there was some kind of a

7 Mafia, someone called Zuti, some criminals in the area?

8 A. Yes, there were. There was an organisation

9 which was, I believe, led by the person we called

10 Zuti. And he's been referred to before, both in the

11 fact that he was running a criminal organisation, and

12 again I would refer to the fact whether that criminal

13 organisation was deliberately tolerated and used by the

14 command structures in that pocket.

15 And you'll also be aware that Zuti and his

16 organisation were pre-positioned where they could

17 potentially ambush the second Muslim convoy late on in

18 my tour. And that is where the road comes north from

19 Gornji Vakuf north to Novi Travnik.

20 Q. And since you are mentioning those places and

21 Zuti and in such detail, even though I had no intent in

22 going so far, Zuti was from Novi Bila, and you knew

23 that; and Nova Bila is in the Travnik municipality? Is

24 that correct?

25 A. Yes --

1 JUDGE MAY: Two questions there. Just ask

2 one at a time.

3 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I am just trying

4 to cut the time.

5 Q. [Interpretation] Are you aware that he was

6 from Nova Bila?

7 A. Yes, I understand that he was previously in a

8 police role, civil police role, in the Nova Bila area.

9 Q. Are you aware that, administratively, Nova

10 Bila belongs in the Travnik municipality?

11 A. No, I am not directly aware of that.

12 Q. And just one more question in relation to

13 this. In late September 1993 there were a number of

14 significant artillery attacks on the Lasva Valley by

15 the army of BiH, and that includes Vitez. Do you

16 remember if towards the very end of September the Vitez

17 health station, the one in the centre of the town was

18 hit by several shells, and that there were quite a

19 number of casualties and that two persons were killed.

20 Do you recall that event? Because it resounded quite

21 forcefully. It was the very end of September, the

22 health station in Vitez.

23 A. Whereabouts in Vitez?

24 Q. In the centre, the very heart of the town.

25 A. I cannot recall that exact shelling

1 incident. All I can say is that both sides in the

2 conflict shelled each other at irregular intervals. I

3 am sure that shells would have landed in that late

4 September and they will have also have caused

5 casualties. That wouldn't surprise me at all.

6 Q. Yes. We agree on that, but I was not asking

7 you if that shelling occurred, because of course there

8 are very many instances of that. But do you remember

9 that it was a health institution which was hit several

10 times, and that people who were killed or wounded came

11 from that health station, and that is why the reaction

12 was rather forceful to that?

13 A. That is entirely possible, that one of the

14 health stations was hit, yes.

15 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic, do you want the

16 documents which you have produced exhibited?

17 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, Your Honour, I would. I'm

18 sorry, I forgot to ask for the number.

19 JUDGE MAY: We'll get the numbers.

20 THE REGISTRAR: The previous document dated

21 31st of May will be numbered D47/2 and the last

22 document D48/2.

23 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

24 MR. KOVACIC: And I have just one question

25 more.

1 Q. [Interpretation] Brigadier, if I understood

2 well your testimony, but will you tell us, you never

3 met with Mr. Mario Cerkez, my client?

4 A. When I consulted my diary last night, I

5 discovered that we met very briefly in company with

6 Colonel Stewart on the 7th of May. It was a brief

7 meeting, and I don't believe we ever met again

8 face-to-face in my time in Bosnia. I don't believe we

9 spoke at that meeting, apart from, perhaps, saying good

10 morning or good afternoon, whatever time of day it

11 was. But apart from that, I never had direct

12 conversations with Mario Cerkez

13 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you

14 very much, Brigadier Duncan. Thank you. I have no

15 further questions.

16 Re-examined by Mr. Lopez-Terres:

17 Q. [Interpretation] I should like to ask the

18 witness to give us some further explanations after this

19 cross-examination.

20 Brigadier Duncan, I should like to show you a

21 document which you were already shown. It is a

22 document of the 24th of August 1993, milinfosum. It is

23 Z1179.

24 Will you please look at the pages 5 to 6, 5

25 and then 6. That is the penultimate page, one before

1 last. Can you see the end of that paragraph 16, which

2 talks about the order of battle and people? Do you

3 remember that document?

4 A. Yes, I do. I remember the request referred

5 to in the paragraph 16.

6 Q. We've already referred to that request which

7 came from Mate Boban, but this milinfosum says, because

8 after that there is a list of individuals, that is of

9 Bosnian Croats, follows this request. Then it says

10 that this request was indicative of the hierarchy of

11 politicians, of political personalities in Central

12 Bosnia?

13 A. Can we -- is this list attached?

14 Q. Yes, the list is attached. It is on the next

15 page. Could you just tell us who are the persons who

16 appear -- the persons who appear first on the list and

17 the person who appears under "c".

18 A. The person at the top of the list is Dario

19 Kordic. Under him is a man called Kostroman, who I

20 know accompanied and I saw accompanying Dario Kordic on

21 many occasions. And then beneath that at paragraph "c"

22 is Anto Valenta. But this continues listing other

23 politicians, two of whose name I recognise.

24 Q. Thank you. Thank you. At that time, this

25 list reflected the hierarchical order that you yourself

1 observed, and those were the prominent political

2 individuals amongst the Bosnian Croats; is that so?

3 A. Yes. And if my memory serves me right, I

4 believe this list was copied from the original Croat

5 document.

6 Q. I shall now like to show you another document

7 which was used by the Defence yesterday. It is

8 document D135/1.

9 Will you please look at paragraph 18 of the

10 document, and again the passage referring to orbat.

11 This document was shown to you so as to make a

12 distinction between the Joker units and Vitezovi

13 units. Do you remember that?

14 A. Yes, I do remember. I mean, it refers

15 specifically to the Jokers, the Vitezovi and the

16 Viteska Brigade.

17 Q. There is no reason to doubt the reliability

18 of information in that document, is there?

19 A. No. This is some part of the normal

20 compiling of orbats, which was an ongoing requirement

21 for the officers responsible for the milinfosums. And

22 the orbat we've already seen.

23 Q. Could you please read out to us the last

24 sentence in paragraph 18. It refers to the head of

25 Vitezovi.

1 A. Does the -- the leader of Vitezovi in Vitez,

2 Darko Kraljevic, is a personal friend of Mario Cerkez,

3 commander of the Viteska HVO Brigade.

4 Q. Thank you. And now something that concerns

5 the incidents related to the Convoy of Joy. Yesterday,

6 you were asked several times about that crowd of

7 hostile civilians -- that is, Croat women, enraged --

8 and we were told that there were not only civilians

9 there, but that the military was also actively involved

10 both in intercepting and in pillaging that convoy?

11 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.

12 Q. And there were two military, two soldiers,

13 from the area of Vitez, who were killed by your troops

14 in that case; they were not civilians?

15 A. Yes, that's correct. Yes.

16 Q. Did Dario Kordic tell you after that event

17 that he, himself, would ask for an investigation to be

18 conducted about the death of eight drivers of the

19 convoy?

20 A. Yes, he did. Yes, he did. He made a

21 personal assurance that, firstly, all vehicles would be

22 released; that those vehicles would have freedom of

23 passage; that UNPROFOR would have freedom of passage;

24 and that we had the assurance of the Croat people for

25 this. And then, finally, he said he would investigate

1 the eight drivers -- the murder of the eight drivers.

2 I believe that's also in my notebook, sir, which I

3 submitted, those facts.

4 Q. My question is, Dario Kordic said to you that

5 he himself would investigate it or order it, but he

6 didn't say that he asked or that he would ask the

7 military authorities to conduct that investigation?

8 A. No, he merely stated that he would

9 investigate the murders. There was no rider put on

10 that as to who would do the investigation.

11 Q. And the last point: Following your testimony

12 yesterday, Mario Cerkez's Defence counsel asked you

13 about the availability of the military to prepare for

14 the combat. Do you remember that question asked by the

15 Defence?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. As a professional military, as a brigadier,

18 as a general, does it seem plausible to you that a

19 brigade commander stays at home at the time when he is

20 told that an imminent attack of the enemy is about to

21 take place, is about to happen?

22 A. I would find it very strange that a brigade

23 commander would, firstly, be at home; I would expect

24 him to be out deployed with his soldiers. And

25 certainly, if an imminent attack was threatened, he

1 would be, as it were, round and about, making sure that

2 all was ready to repel such an attack.

3 Q. Would it be either possible that the brigade

4 commander stays at home when he receives orders that

5 they have to be ready for combat within the next

6 24 hours?

7 A. I mean, in my opinion, it would be very

8 unlikely that he would stay at home.

9 Q. And the last thing, which concerns that Mafia

10 and the Mafia's godfather, Mr. Zarko Andric: Did you

11 know that that person was promoted by Colonel Blaskic

12 on the 4th of July, 1993; that is, a few weeks before

13 that conversation that you had with him?

14 A. No, sir, I wasn't aware of that at all.

15 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I have no

16 further questions, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE MAY: Brigadier, that concludes your

18 evidence. Thank you for coming to the International

19 Tribunal to give it. I'm sorry that you've had to

20 return, but it's now finished, and you are released.

21 THE WITNESS: Sir, thank you very much.

22 [The witness withdrew]

23 JUDGE MAY: We'll go into private session.

24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

25 9.50 a.m., to be reconvened on Monday,

1 the 29th day of November, 1999, at

2 9.30 a.m.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25