1 Monday, 16 February 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus

7 Momcilo Krajisnik.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

9 Good morning to everyone. The Chamber regrets that it was not

10 able to deliver the decision on postponement of Mr. Deronjic's

11 examination, but hopes to deliver that this morning. Since my LiveNote is

12 not yet awake, I'll try to ... My computer as a whole doesn't want to

13 start up. But let's get started.

14 Mr. Usher, could you please escort Mr. Deronjic to the courtroom.

15 Yes, Mr. Stewart.

16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, before Mr. Deronjic comes into Court.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

18 MR. STEWART: May I straight away deal with this matter, Your

19 Honour. Your Honour, the Defence does ask for a break, a relatively short

20 break, between the completion of Mr. Deronjic's evidence in chief and

21 cross-examination. Without elaborating, Your Honour knows very well the

22 general pressures that everybody, but certainly the Defence team, have

23 been under in relation to the early stages of this trial. But so far as

24 Mr. Deronjic is concerned -- and Your Honour, I make it plain straight

25 away what I'm asking for. I'm not asking for some enormously long break.

1 We're actually going to propose two possibilities. One is that on the

2 footing that we rather think from discussions with Mr. Harmon that it

3 looks as if Mr. Deronjic's evidence in chief will come to an end sometime

4 late today. That seemed to be the rough estimate. Of course, that's

5 entirely in Mr. Harmon's and the Tribunal's hands, but unless the position

6 has changed, that seemed to be broadly the position.

7 On the footing that that's what's pretty much going to happen, we

8 would ask, as, if you like, alternative one, that the Tribunal should not

9 sit tomorrow, that we should resume on Wednesday. That would give us that

10 36-hour or so opportunity to -- well, to further work on Mr. Deronjic.

11 The alternative, and we only suggest this as an alternative in case it

12 were to work better for everybody, is that we understand that Mr. Treanor

13 could be available, or that was the position last week anyway, that

14 Mr. Treanor could be available to give his evidence in chief at relatively

15 short notice. It would be possible to deal with him and then come back to

16 Mr. Deronjic in this two-week period. Because it's understood that on no

17 footing are we going to be cross-examining Mr. Treanor anyway before the

18 break and until after Easter. So we just suggest that as an alternative.

19 The first possibility, that we -- the advantage of the second

20 alternative, Your Honour, is that that may have the effect of losing no

21 court time at all this week. Though the practical effect may very well be

22 the same anyway, because in this 18-day period it looks as if, despite

23 some of Your Honour's expressed concerns about timing, it looks as if in

24 fact we're making pretty good progress and we will finish off the chunk of

25 evidence that everybody had in mind within this 18-day period, and we

1 might end up with a little bit of time to spare at the end which won't, in

2 a sense, be bad news. That will have been that we will have completed the

3 programme of evidence that was contemplated within that 18-day period.

4 But, Your Honour, in an absolute nutshell, without laying bare all the

5 difficulties and the pressures on the Defence team, if I can just give one

6 or two simple illustrations.

7 Mr. Deronjic gave -- was cross-examined for four days in the

8 Blagojevic case between the 19th and the 22nd, I think it was, of January,

9 which was about ten days before the trial started. So we have four days

10 of his cross-examination, which comes upon us in transcript form. And of

11 course there's a delay before the -- am I going too fast? I'm not sure,

12 Your Honour.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, you are.

14 MR. STEWART: I'll slow down a little bit.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Not for me, but perhaps for the interpreters and the

16 court reporter.

17 MR. STEWART: Apparently I'm not. I am -- the light is shining on

18 the --

19 THE INTERPRETER: You are going too fast.

20 MR. STEWART: I'll slow down a little bit, Your Honour, then.

21 So we have those four days of transcript cross-examination, which

22 became officially available, I think actually after this trial started.

23 We also have important new areas of evidence of Mr. Deronjic. I don't

24 exaggerate by suggesting that tremendously voluminous in content but they

25 are very important in substance, the additional areas which are

1 highlighted in the amended witness summary. I don't wish to exaggerate

2 that, but they are important areas. And from a practical point of view, I

3 know that Your Honours will understand that although all sorts of

4 advantages in sitting in the morning last week, sitting in the morning

5 does create great difficulties in finding time with Mr. Krajisnik, because

6 the earliest we're able to get to the Detention Unit for practical

7 purposes is 3.00. We then have an hour and three quarters with a client

8 who has, after all, been in court all day for five hours, leaving aside

9 the fact that the legal team are only human, but we're deemed to be

10 superhuman in that area, but the client can't be deemed to be that in the

11 same way. So that there is tremendous pressure in achieving sufficient

12 time and effective communication with the client in connection with these

13 important aspects.

14 The same would apply today in the -- when the court sits in the

15 afternoon it is a little easier because we can get a couple of hours first

16 thing in the morning. But Your Honour is, I think, very familiar with

17 those pressures, and we have reviewed the position this morning. We

18 decided to soldier on over the weekend and see where we were, but we have

19 all compared notes, the Defence team this morning on this matter, and

20 though reluctant to take this step and genuinely, Your Honour, because we

21 have -- I think you can see that we have tried very hard to keep up with

22 the programme and we have not sought any respite over the last couple of

23 weeks. We have cracked on through these witnesses and we have dealt with

24 the programme. But we are really very stretched here, Your Honour, and in

25 fairness to Mr. Krajisnik and in order to be able to collate the very

1 voluminous material -- there are hundreds and hundreds of pages of

2 interviews of Mr. Deronjic. I don't suggest we haven't had those for

3 quite a long time but that's not entirely the point. We do have to put

4 them together with all the other material in the light of Mr. Deronjic's

5 examination-in-chief.

6 Your Honour, I could go -- I could go on and on about the

7 practical difficulties, but I believe that Your Honour is well aware of

8 the -- has a good feel of the overall practical situation. That one day

9 and we suggest it probably won't be lost in any serious sense because

10 we -- it looks as if we will complete the programme of evidence that we

11 had in mind during this 18-day period anyway. But for the Court not to

12 sit for those four or five hours tomorrow will give us a clear run through

13 from early this afternoon until Wednesday afternoon, and that will be

14 invaluable in terms of simply reviewing the position, collating the

15 material, achieving some proper time with our own client in advance of

16 beginning Mr. Deronjic's cross-examination. With the added point, without

17 being able, perhaps, to make it as a big promise, but Your Honours will

18 also know that a little bit of extra preparation time can actually hone

19 down and refine the cross-examination a bit so that time gets saved

20 anyway, that a little bit less preparation time sometimes adds a bit of

21 time to cross-examination. Whereas if it can be a little bit more

22 efficiently honed then you save time ultimately anyway.

23 So Your Honour, that is our application, that the Court does not

24 sit tomorrow. This is -- if the programme of Mr. Deronjic's

25 examination-in-chief changes radically, that would be a different matter,

1 but I don't -- I don't understand that there's any significant departure

2 from where we understood we were on Friday, which is that Mr. Deronjic's

3 examination-in-chief is likely to take all or most of today but not very

4 different from all or most of today.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And you say might even be a good investment.

6 Mr. Harmon, if we would not sit tomorrow -- well, things do not

7 change considerably for the Prosecution. If you would start the

8 examination-in-chief of Mr. Treanor that, of course, would at least change

9 the order of presentation of your evidence and the cross-examination of

10 Mr. Deronjic. The Chamber would like -- not necessarily right away, but

11 would like to hear the position from the Prosecution.

12 MR. HARMON: Yes. Good morning, Your Honours, counsel. Our

13 position is this: Mr. Deronjic was identified as a witness on the 22nd of

14 October of this year. On the 12th of December -- of last year? On the

15 12th of December, he was identified in order of when he would be called.

16 Production of statements to the Defence was completed a considerable

17 period ago. In respect of calling Mr Treanor at this point in time, that

18 would not be possible because we are in the process of organising and

19 preparing his exhibits. He has voluminous exhibits and it's not possible

20 for us to start with Mr Treanor. In respect of adjourning a day, I submit

21 that's -- we have -- we're neutral on that, Your Honour, and I would leave

22 that to the Trial Chamber to decide the best manner in which to proceed in

23 this case. But in respect of the second suggestion by counsel, we are

24 opposed to it. We simply couldn't be ready.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would it be possible for the parties to inform

1 the Chamber a bit more in detail, that is, I would say a scheme on what

2 days we'll hear what evidence if we would not sit for one day, so that we

3 are quite clear that we would fulfil the programme we had in mind for the

4 first 18 days. I'll ask the -- so that the Chamber can be confident that

5 a delay of one day would not really disturb our time scheduling. I'll ask

6 the registrar also to provide the Chamber with the full statistics on what

7 happened over the last few days and we'll consider it, but we'd like very

8 much the parties to sit together and say: Okay. If we have one day for

9 break, we expect the cross-examination to take so much time. Because

10 we're not informed yet about that, and the programme then would be

11 so-and-so. So that we get a time -- a kind of a time path for the two

12 weeks to come.

13 MR. STEWART: I'll just comment. Two comments, Your Honour. One

14 is of course I accept unreservedly if the Prosecution say -- it's rather

15 what we're saying in relation to Mr. Deronjic. If the Prosecution say

16 they can't be ready for Mr. Treanor at this stage we accept that

17 completely. We express surprise because last week when Your Honour asked

18 the Prosecution specifically whether Mr. Treanor could be ready for the

19 following day the answer was yes, he could. So if he could be ready the

20 following day last week, that information at the time must have been

21 overconfident. So it seems to have been superseded.

22 Our second comment is only that part of the programme that Your

23 Honour has asked for, and we endorse with respect that request entirely,

24 concerns the position of Mr. Hasanovic, whose travel arrangements were in

25 doubt. So the earlier that the Prosecution are able -- it's pretty early

1 in the United States at the moment, but the earlier the Prosecution are

2 able to explore the position -- current position of Mr. Hasanovic, the

3 better we shall be able to refine the projected timetable for the next ten

4 days.

5 MR. HARMON: We continue to monitor the travel situation of

6 Mr. Hasanovic, and as soon as I have information I will make Your Honours

7 aware of it and I will advise counsel of it as well.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, so we'll consider your request,

9 Mr. Stewart, and I add to that that the time when it was indicated that

10 Mr. Deronjic would testify and the time that the statements were given of

11 course does not solve the problem of his cross-examination. The case is

12 still to be studied by the Defence. And to that extent, I would agree

13 that if you can go through cross-examination of -- in the other cases,

14 then of course this could, although not necessarily does save time.

15 Then having dealt with this, Mr. Usher, could you please escort

16 Mr. Deronjic into the courtroom. I'd like to add to that that the Chamber

17 appreciates that both parties are, in our view, at least, trying to do

18 their utmost to work as efficiently as possible, but it is as in sport, we

19 always can do better.

20 [The witness entered court]

21 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Deronjic.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

23 JUDGE ORIE: I think that Mr. Deronjic said "dobro jutro."

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Good morning, Your Excellency.

25 Good morning to all.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Mr. Deronjic, please be seated. May I

2 remind you that you're still bound by the solemn declaration that you've

3 given at the beginning of your testimony, and may I also remind you to my

4 words that I spoke at the beginning of your testimony about your

5 obligation to testify in accordance with the truth and that no reason

6 whatsoever could justify any deviation, small or large, from that truth.

7 Mr. Harmon.

8 WITNESS: MIROSLAV DERONJIC [Resumed]

9 [Witness answered through interpreter]

10 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honours.

11 Examined by Mr. Harmon: [Continued]

12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Deronjic.

13 A. Good morning, Mr. Harmon.

14 MR. HARMON: If Mr. Deronjic could be provided with the two

15 notebooks that he had before him, as well as Prosecutor's Exhibit 51,

16 please.

17 Q. Mr. Deronjic, when we concluded the examination on Friday, we were

18 discussing an evaluation report by General Kukanjac, whose zone of

19 responsibility was the 2nd Military District. This report is dated the

20 3rd of -- March the 20th of 1992. And I was directing your attention to

21 certain elements in that report that are found under the heading

22 number 5: "Volunteer units in the zone of the 2nd Military District."

23 And I would direct your attention to that page. Can you find it in the

24 report in front of you, Mr. Deronjic?

25 A. Yes, Mr. Harmon, I've found it.

1 Q. We were talking about the arming of the Bosnian Serbs by the JNA,

2 and I'd like to direct your attention to subpart (F), 5(F), and invite

3 your comments on that. This is the part that reads: "JNA distributed

4 51.900 pieces of armament (75 per cent) and SDS 17.298 pieces." I invite

5 your comments on that, Mr. Deronjic.

6 A. In my previous statements, I said that Serbs from the beginning of

7 1991, from the spring of 1991, began to arm themselves and that they used

8 several sources for these weapons, amongst them the JNA also was involved

9 in this arming. From this report, you can see that the JNA here gave a

10 figure. The number of pieces that were distributed to Serbs in Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina, or in this army zone. And this is 50.500 pieces, and you can

12 clearly see that the SDS participated in this, or some people from the SDS

13 were also involved in this arming, which I discussed before. And the

14 number of weapons distributed by the SDS up to that moment amounted to

15 17.296 pieces. So this is my interpretation of this.

16 Q. Just to correct the record, it says on line 3, 50.500 pieces. How

17 many pieces did the JNA distribute?

18 A. It says here: "Distributed 51.900 pieces."

19 Q. All right. Now, this report, Mr. Deronjic, deals with the 2nd

20 Military District. I direct your attention to subpart 5(E), which

21 references the 4th Military District, another military district of the

22 JNA. And could you read that portion? And I'm particularly interested in

23 the part of that -- subpart (E) that is in parenthesis, that reads: "That

24 was formed earlier by the 4th Corps."

25 A. Yes. I've read that paragraph.

1 Q. Do you have any comments in respect of that paragraph,

2 Mr. Deronjic, particularly in respect of whether -- the observation in

3 this paragraph that indicates that the volunteer units were formed by the

4 4th Corps of the JNA?

5 A. Yes. I can interpret this in the light of events which were

6 taking place in 1991 and 1992. The fact that the military went through

7 various transformations are well known, that it adapted its composition to

8 the circumstances in the field. I know that already in January 1991,

9 there was a series of transformations of the Yugoslav People's Army, in

10 the sense of changing the military districts and the jurisdictions of the

11 military units in certain districts, and all of this was conditioned by

12 these broader political developments. Also a well-known fact is that the

13 members of the other two ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not

14 respond to the summonses by the JNA, and this forming and manning of the

15 JNA, the replenishment, was conducted on the basis of volunteers or those

16 who did respond to the call-up. However, I don't have any particular

17 information about this, and I wasn't involved in this. But anyway, it was

18 basically done through the volunteers who reported to these units. That's

19 what I am understanding from this paragraph.

20 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, I'd like to direct your attention to the

21 portion of the report, the caption above which is "some experiences." It

22 may be on the same page. It follows letter G. And I'd like to direct

23 your attention to what is in the English translation, the second

24 paragraph. It reads: "Certain leaders in SDS on all levels are using

25 different channels to demand the weapons from JNA and Serbia, and in that

1 way, they fight for the predominance, that is, creating the

2 dissatisfaction in people and dividing them." Can you provide some

3 comments in respect of that?

4 A. Yes, Mr. Harmon. It is true that during 1991, certain

5 individuals -- actually, a large number of them, including myself -- were

6 involved in the arming of Serbs. This particular paragraph concerns the

7 fact that people were exerting pressure on the JNA to arm Serbs, and

8 to the extent I had an opportunity to see from various documents, I know

9 that they were actually in the field, on the ground, and that the weapons

10 were reaching the Serbian population.

11 Q. Now, this report that is before you, General Kukanjac's report,

12 Mr. Deronjic, when was the first time you saw this report?

13 A. I saw this report for the first time five or six days ago, when

14 you showed it to me, Mr. Harmon.

15 Q. And prior to that, you had given the Office of the Prosecutor

16 extensive information in respect of the arming of the Serbs; isn't that

17 true?

18 A. Yes, that is true.

19 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, based on your knowledge of the events, your

20 personal role in arming efforts of the Serbs, can you tell me,

21 Mr. Deronjic: Why was it that the Serbs were being armed?

22 A. Excuse me. Could you please repeat your question? I pressed a

23 button to lower the volume and I just didn't hear you for a second.

24 Q. Can you hear me now, Mr. Deronjic?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Is the volume all right?

2 A. Just a second, please.

3 Q. I'm going to test. So is it all right, Mr. Deronjic?

4 A. I think it will be okay now.

5 Q. My question is, Mr. Deronjic: Based on your personal involvement in the

6 arming of the Bosnian Serbs and your contacts with other people in respect of

7 that same issue, why was it that the Bosnian Serbs were arming themselves?

8 A. Yes. I understand your question. I have to say that, as far as the stage

9 in which I was involved with arming is concerned, Yugoslavia was exposed to

10 a lot of danger. We were aware of a number of affairs involving the arming of

11 other people, especially in Croatia. At that time, the affair involving

12 Mr. Spegelj in the arming of the Croats in Croatia was already a matter of

13 public knowledge. This was also broadcast by the electronic media at the

14 time. To what extent this information was accurate, I don't know. All I

15 know about it was from the knowledge I had from the media. But I have to

16 draw your attention to the fact that people still remembered very tragic

17 events from the Second World War. Of course, I'm not trying to say that

18 only Serbs were the victims during that war. Everybody was a victim, and

19 this is a matter of historical record. But I have to say that everybody

20 was afraid of a potential conflict, including members of other ethnic

21 communities, and so far as I know, others were arming themselves as well, and

22 I am quite confident about that

23 It is true that the Serbs were arming themselves because they were

24 fearful of the possibility that during the breakup of Yugoslavia, during

25 the crisis in Yugoslavia, certain things which had happened in the past

1 could happen again. And I am convinced that this fear was the reason for

2 the people to arm themselves, and they were of course under a lot of

3 pressure to do that. And this is -- this, I think, would be the reason

4 for their arming. I may have not interpreted the best way I could, but

5 this crisis in Yugoslavia contributed to a large extent to this atmosphere

6 of fear in Yugoslavia. And then again, there was the pressure on the

7 people, because they did not fully trust the Yugoslav People's Army, and

8 because of its multi-ethnic character, and because of its nature,

9 generally speaking, it was an ideological army, after all, they did not

10 know how the military would behave in this breakup. Those would be the

11 reasons that I was able to identify during that period of time.

12 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, you were involved in the arming efforts in

13 April, as I recall your testimony, in April and the early part of 1991.

14 From the report that is before you, Mr. Deronjic, the army efforts

15 continued. This report is dated the 20th of March, 1992. Do you have a

16 view as to why the army efforts continued and with the intensity that they

17 did, after April of 1991?

18 A. I do have a view on that. As I have already indicated, the crisis

19 in Yugoslavia, in particular, the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, had

20 entered its final dramatic stage in the autumn of 1991 and the beginning

21 of 1992. This was the period when Republika Srpska was being established,

22 and it was a public thing. Its institutions were being founded at that

23 time. I have already spoken about the fact that the JNA at that time

24 already favoured Serbs and supported their plans, and this arming of the

25 Serbs can be directly linked to that, to the formation of

1 Republika Srpska. And, well, it is my assumption that there was a lot of

2 military activity going on with regard to that.

3 Q. All right. Mr. Deronjic, thank you very much. I've concluded

4 with Prosecutor's Exhibit 51. I'd like to turn to another exhibit,

5 Mr. Deronjic, and that is -- the next in order --

6 MR. HARMON: And if I could have a number for that exhibit.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number P52.

8 MR. HARMON: And before this exhibit is shown to -- you can take

9 it up and just hold on to it for just a minute.

10 Q. Mr. Deronjic, on Friday, I believe, you indicated in your

11 testimony that a man by the name of Rajko Dukic, you believed, was an

12 important figure in the financing of the SDS, and you heard it as a

13 rumour -- this was a rumour. I'd like to put before you this exhibit.

14 Have you ever seen this exhibit before, Mr. Deronjic?

15 A. No, I have not seen this document before.

16 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, Mr. Dukic, in your previous testimony, you

17 mentioned that he was, I believe, the owner of the bauxite mine, an

18 important commercial concern in Bosnia, and he was also a member of the

19 Executive Board of the SDS and one of its founders. Is that correct?

20 A. Yes, that is correct. But let me correct the interpreters. It is

21 not Mr. Djukic, but Mr. Dukic.

22 Q. I think that's a result of my poor pronunciation. I apologise,

23 Mr. Deronjic.

24 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interrupt you, Mr. Harmon. I see that

25 attachment to P52 are in a language which is not an official language of

1 the Tribunal. Does that cause the Defence any problem? I see it's in

2 German.

3 MR. HARMON: This is a document, for the record, Your Honour, I

4 provided to the Defence on Friday evening.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm informed about that. But it's perhaps

6 mainly on that basis that having been informed that it has been disclosed

7 only lately. I know some German, so if --

8 MR. STEWART: Well, so does the Defence team, actually, Your

9 Honour, so that just slightly softens the blow.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.

11 MR. HARMON:

12 Q. Mr. Deronjic, I direct your attention -- first of all, this

13 document is dated the 15th of December, 1992, and it is addressed to

14 President Karadzic, and a copy of which is sent to Mr. Krajisnik, the

15 Assembly president. And I direct your attention, Mr. Deronjic, to the

16 first two paragraphs of this document. And Mr. Deronjic, is this

17 consistent with the rumour that you had heard that Mr. Dukic was one of

18 the financiers of the party?

19 A. Yes, Mr. Harmon. We can see clearly from this that payments were

20 being made, such as this last one, a hundred thousand German marks. The

21 report concerns this particular payment. And in item 2, we can see that a

22 report was attached, report regarding the overall assistance provided to

23 the SDS, I assume for the period between May and November, and the amount is

24 approximately 3.050.000 German marks. So what I heard as rumours is

25 actually confirmed in this document.

1 Q. Now I'll turn to -- Mr. Deronjic, if I could have -- actually, let

2 me have Prosecutor's Exhibit 35 put back on the monitor, if I could.

3 And Mr. Deronjic, while Prosecutor's Exhibit 35 is coming up on

4 the monitor: In very late March or early April, did the Serbs in Eastern

5 Bosnia start to seize power in municipalities that were adjacent to the

6 Bratunac municipality?

7 A. Yes, Mr. Harmon. If my memory serves me right, I think they began

8 around the 1st of April. They started with Bijeljina, I think.

9 Q.

10 MR. HARMON: And Bijeljina, Your Honours, is the upper right-hand

11 corner municipality in Prosecutor's Exhibit 35.

12 Q. And did they -- did those seizures of power continue,

13 Mr. Deronjic, in municipalities that were near you following Bijeljina?

14 A. Yes, Mr. Harmon. After Bijeljina, and I think that the events in

15 Bijeljina are very well known, the conflict extended to Zvornik. Similar

16 units took part in this. I am referring first and foremost to Arkan's

17 units, I mean Zeljko Raznatovic, Arkan's units, including a number of

18 volunteer units that took part in the takeover of power by Serbs.

19 However, the situation was somewhat more complicated there, and I can

20 explain if you want me to.

21 These conflicts then went on in the region of Podrinje.

22 Q. And which municipalities, Mr. Deronjic? And I'm particularly

23 interested in the municipalities where the seizure of power occurred

24 before it occurred in Bratunac.

25 A. I shall try to enumerate the municipalities I'm aware of:

1 Bijeljina, Zvornik, Srebrenica, Visegrad. These are Podrinje

2 municipalities. As far as I know from the media, the conflicts also

3 concerned Banja Luka and a number of other municipalities which I cannot

4 remember at this point.

5 MR. HARMON: And, Your Honours, the Visegrad municipality is found

6 at the bottom right-hand side of the map that is before you, and the

7 Srebrenica municipality is directly above it. So in a line, the

8 municipalities that have been identified by Mr. Deronjic start at the top:

9 Bijeljina, come down to Zvornik, pass by Bratunac, and then you come on

10 the right-hand side to Srebrenica and to Visegrad.

11 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, were you able to discern a pattern, a rough

12 pattern, in respect of the forces that were used in the takeover and

13 seizure of power in these particular municipalities?

14 A. Yes, Mr. Harmon. There was a pattern of behaviour, of conduct of

15 the participants in those events, which is almost identical for all these

16 municipalities.

17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, the -- we suggest that it should be

18 made clear, following his answer a few minutes ago, when he said he would

19 try to enumerate the municipalities he was aware of, and he referred to

20 Bijeljina, Zvornik, Srebrenica, and Visegrad as the Podrinje

21 municipalities. And then he said: "As far as I know from the media, the

22 conflicts also concerned Banja Luka and a number of other municipalities."

23 There seems to be at least a distinct possibility, if not a

24 probability, that what Mr. Deronjic knows in relation to any

25 municipalities outside his own municipality of Bratunac is simply gleaned

1 from the media. That should be clarified first, because if that is the

2 source of his information, then it's inappropriate that this line of

3 questioning should continue with this witness.

4 MR. HARMON: I'll be glad to clarify that, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

6 MR. HARMON:

7 Q. Mr. Deronjic, were you in contact with people from the Bijeljina

8 municipality, from the Zvornik municipality, from the Srebrenica

9 municipality, and from the Visegrad municipality, and did they relate to

10 you the way in which power was taken over, the forces that were used in

11 the takeover of power in those particular municipalities?

12 MR. STEWART: Yes. Your Honour, that's an outrageously leading

13 question.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but it follows the answer already given in

15 line -- page 11, line 17, so I would not deny Mr. Harmon.

16 MR. STEWART: Line 17, Your Honour. Line 17 is part of my --

17 JUDGE ORIE: Page 11.

18 MR. STEWART: Page 11, line 17.

19 JUDGE ORIE: He enumerated the municipalities. He seems to have a

20 different base of knowledge than the others.

21 MR. STEWART: Well, seems to have. Your Honour, we haven't

22 established that yet. That was precisely the purpose of my intervention.

23 And although that might be the position, that's what's important to

24 establish, and it is important, we suggest, to establish these things

25 without complicated, composite leading questions.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

2 Mr. Deronjic, you testified that you were aware of Bijeljina,

3 Zvornik, Srebrenica, Visegrad, when answering a question on the takeover

4 of the power. Could you tell us how you became aware of that.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With respect to certain

6 municipalities, I was able to learn directly what happened, for instance,

7 the municipality of Srebrenica, I was personally present in the area when

8 the volunteers arrived. Likewise for the Bratunac municipality, I

9 directly participated in it. As for the municipality of Zvornik, I never

10 went there when these events were taking place. However, some of the

11 people did, members of the crisis staff, for instance, and they conveyed

12 to me the information as to what was going on in Zvornik. I even reached

13 a decision once to ban people from going to Zvornik for that reason.

14 I have never been to Bijeljina personally. I know about these events in

15 Bijeljina indirectly, and I know about it from a later period ,because

16 I knew a number of people who had a significant role in the area.

17 JUDGE ORIE: When you said that some people of the crisis staff

18 went there, do you mean the Bratunac Crisis Staff?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I was referring

20 to the Crisis Staff of the Serbian people in Bratunac.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, please proceed.

22 MR. HARMON:

23 Q. Mr. Deronjic, based on those contacts and the information you

24 received, were you able to discern a pattern in respect of the forces that

25 were used in the takeover of those municipalities?

1 A. Yes, Mr. Harmon. I was about to tell you about that. It was a

2 complex process indeed, and quite dramatic at the moment. Perhaps I was

3 not able during those first days to assess the situation and to analyse it

4 properly. However, during the war and through the contacts with people, I

5 discussed the events of April 1992 quite often, and I have a clear picture

6 as to what was going on in the area of Podrinje at the time. When I

7 say, "a clear picture," I don't think I -- I'm not trying to say that I

8 have an entire picture of the events, but I do have certain knowledge.

9 The arrival of those units which are referred to as volunteers,

10 including Arkan's units, in an area where there is no conflict, at least

11 not an open conflict, it is obvious that they arrive with a certain

12 objective on their mind. During those first days, a large number of

13 people, a large number of Muslims, were killed. As for the participation

14 of the JNA during that period, they did not try to prevent these

15 conflicts. I was personally able to see the participation of the JNA in

16 Bratunac, and I also had information that in Zvornik, for instance, the

17 JNA had sided with the Serbs.

18 Let me also say that the commander who arrived in Bratunac, which

19 is what I learned subsequently, Mr. Reljic, had a role in the events in

20 Bijeljina as well. I'm not sure as to what exactly he had done there, but

21 I know that the JNA units had sided with the Serbs.

22 As for the arrival of the volunteers, the aim was to provoke the

23 conflict. Their acts were intended to intimidate the population, to

24 create an atmosphere of terror, and, to a certain extent, this behaviour

25 concerned also Serbs, or rather, non-loyal Serbs, so to speak, which all

1 resulted in the change of the ethnic structure of the area. A large

2 number of Muslims eventually left. And once again, a large number of

3 people were killed during that period. So this would have been the

4 pattern that I was able to observe and that I already discussed.

5 Q. Mr. Deronjic, I'd like to now focus your attention on the arrival

6 of volunteers in your municipality, and I'd like to take you back to the

7 14th or 15th of April, 1992. Can you tell the Trial Chamber about the

8 facts and circumstances relating to the arrival of volunteers in the

9 Bratunac municipality.

10 A. Yes, I can. On the 17th of April, volunteers arrived in the

11 municipality of Bratunac. They came in the morning hours --

12 Q. Before we get to the actual arrival, I'd like to take you back a

13 few days earlier, to a situation when you actually travelled to a

14 particular location and observed volunteers for the first time. Can you

15 tell the Trial Chamber the circumstances of those events.

16 A. My apologies. I understood your question to refer to Bratunac

17 exclusively. Your Honours, I saw the volunteers for the first time

18 sometime around the 14th of April, 1992, in Bajina Basta. Bajina Basta is

19 an adjacent municipality to the municipality of Srebrenica, and partly to

20 the municipality of Bratunac as well. It was upon the invitation of

21 Mr. Goran Zekic, whom we have already mentioned, I went with a friend of

22 mine to Bajina Basta early that morning, because I had been asked to come

23 to the Territorial Defence of the Bajina Basta municipality.

24 I found the building easily, because Bajina Basta is a rather

25 small town. I entered the yard of that building and was then taken to the

1 office where Mr. Zekic was. He was there together with the chief of staff

2 of the Bajina Basta Territorial Defence, Mr. Bijelic [phoen], and a

3 gentleman by the name of Miodrag Jokic, who was the vice-president of the

4 Srebrenica chapter of SDS. I saw a large number of volunteers in the yard

5 of that building, people in uniform, who appeared to be preparing

6 themselves for some military activity.

7 I asked Mr. Zekic what this was all about and he told me that they

8 were members of a unit that had arrived in Srebrenica with a certain

9 mission to carry out in Srebrenica, and they were completing their arrival

10 in Skelani. These volunteers were already armed and in uniform in the

11 yard of the Territorial Defence building, and they were waiting to head

12 off to Skelani, which is a town in the municipality of Srebrenica.

13 Shortly after that, this particular unit started to march through

14 the centre of Bajina Basta in the direction of Skelani, which is situated

15 some two kilometres away from Bajina Basta, right across the Drina River.

16 I was at the back of this column of volunteers, because Zekic had asked me

17 whether I wanted to join them so that we could continue with the meeting

18 in Skelani.

19 I crossed the bridge, still in this column, which was moving

20 freely through Bajina Basta. Even the police helped regulate the traffic

21 in the town at that moment. We arrived. We crossed the bridge and we

22 went to the other side. They were armed, but nobody caused any problems.

23 The police allowed them to cross over to Skelani. I stayed there for a

24 while. Goran Zekic went to the police building and the newly established

25 town hall. I don't know what they had in terms of offices. They came

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1 back in about ten minutes. I was still on the parking lot of this

2 building. I was wearing civilian clothes. I had a civilian vehicle. And

3 he asked -- he told me that they were going to Srebrenica and he asked me

4 whether I wanted to join them. I said I was not ready. I wanted to go

5 back to Bratunac. And once again, I asked him what this was all about,

6 and he said that we would see each other shortly in the upcoming days and

7 that he would tell me about them, but briefly, he just told me that they

8 were just members of a unit that had arrived in Srebrenica.

9 I returned to Bratunac, and Mr. Zekic went with that unit in the

10 direction of Srebrenica. These were my first experiences and my first

11 encounter with the volunteers. And what I was able to see that day, based

12 on that, I formed some conclusions that that pattern that I talked about

13 was spreading in the neighbouring municipalities and that this was not an

14 accident, either in Bijeljina or Zvornik. These were not just local

15 incidents, but all of that had a broader significance.

16 When I came back to Bratunac, I expected that Bratunac would soon

17 also be caught up in the same problems and that some unit would also

18 appear there.

19 On the 17th of April, a unit did happen to come --

20 Q. Mr. Deronjic, we'll get to there in just a minute. But let me ask

21 you, Mr. Deronjic: When you were in Bajina Basta and you were there with

22 Mr. Zekic and Miodrag Jokic, did Mr. Zekic say who was responsible for

23 bringing the volunteers to Bajina Basta?

24 A. He did, but what he said does not have to be true. I even think

25 that it wasn't true. When I asked him who brought those volunteers, he

1 said it was Miodrag Jokic who did that. He had some connections in

2 Serbia, and he had brought these people. I think that that is not true.

3 And Goran Zekic sometimes likes to make some jokes in that way. He even

4 was laughing when he said that. I think that there were contacts between

5 him and somebody who sent that unit. It's possible that what he said was

6 also true, but I did not check on that later.

7 Q. And Mr. Deronjic, you described -- you said, and I made a note of

8 it, even the police helped regulate traffic in the movement of the

9 paramilitaries through Serbia into Bosnia. Can you, just very quickly,

10 describe what it was that the police did to assist the volunteers in their

11 movements.

12 A. Yes. I would just like to ask: I once had in the translation

13 that the army helped, and the second time it was that the police helped.

14 I apologise. I talked about solely the assistance of the police.

15 Q. Yes. Again, I'm asking you only in respect of the police in

16 Serbia. What actions did they take to assist the movements of the

17 volunteers?

18 A. Yes. The police regulated traffic. There was a special traffic

19 regime at the time which was evident. When we left the TO building,

20 headquarters, which is in the centre of town, all the streets that we went

21 through were blocked for traffic. There was a police car at the head of

22 the column. I'm not sure whether there was also one at the rear of the

23 column. You could clearly see the weapons in the hands of those people in

24 the vehicles. Most of them also had their weapons sticking out through

25 the windows. The traffic regime was such that I could see that the

1 traffic lights were all coordinated in the same way. There was just the

2 blinking yellow light, indicating that the passage was free, with some

3 caution.

4 There was a number of people who were observing what was happening

5 from the sidewalk, and this was quite incredible in those circumstances.

6 It was the first time I had seen anything like it, and it looked quite

7 unusual. I thought that if this was going to be done, it should be done

8 in some kind of secret manner. But the way it was happening, it was

9 actually happening in broad daylight, and the police was informed about

10 the movements of those people.

11 There's also the border police on the bridge, and I did not notice

12 that they were stopping or checking anyone, on either side of the bridge.

13 So that's what I meant when I said that the police took part in this.

14 Q. Approximately how many volunteers went across into Bosnia when you

15 were present?

16 A. I don't have a clear idea. I think that there were perhaps some

17 ten vehicles. And if you take into account that there were perhaps three

18 or four people in each vehicle, then we're talking perhaps about 30 or 40

19 people who crossed into Skelani at the time.

20 Q. Did these volunteers wear any identifying insignia or patches on

21 their uniforms?

22 A. I didn't notice any at the time. Perhaps I just wasn't paying

23 attention, but I didn't notice any insignia at that time.

24 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, I want to go -- that was to another day, and

25 another topic, and we'll return to the issue of the volunteers shortly.

1 MR. HARMON: But if I could have the next exhibit in order. The

2 next two exhibits in order shown to Mr. Deronjic. If I could get the

3 numbers for those exhibits, please. And the first in order should be the

4 exhibit, the English translation of which bears the ERN number L0001243.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number P53 and Exhibit number P54, where

6 the English translation bears the ERN number L0039963.

7 MR. HARMON:

8 Q. Mr. Deronjic, if you would direct your attention first of all

9 to P53. This is a document that is dated the 16th of April, 1992. It is

10 from the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of National

11 Defence. It has a reference number of 1/92. And could you examine that

12 document.

13 A. Yes. I've read it.

14 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic --

15 A. Just one second. I just wanted to read the --

16 Q. Please.

17 A. -- explanation.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Would it be possible to zoom out even more the

19 document? Because my eyes seem to get older.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I've read it.

21 MR. HARMON:

22 Q. All right. Mr. Deronjic. I'm going to direct your attention to

23 the first part of this exhibit. As you can see in the first page of this

24 exhibit, this exhibit was apparently distributed to all Serbian

25 municipalities. Did you receive a similar document in the Bratunac

1 municipality?

2 A. Yes. I remember one document - I'm not sure if it's identical to

3 this one - but I think that this was a decision on the immediate danger of

4 war, and I think here also that is what is being declared, the immediate

5 danger of war. And there's also the order on general public mobilisation.

6 I had the opportunity to see that order in April. I don't know if it's

7 identical to this one, but it's of a similar nature, that document which I

8 received.

9 Q. In this document, Mr. Deronjic, it indicates that at a session of

10 15 April 1992, the Presidency adopted a decision. And if we could turn

11 now to what that decision was, which is found on page 2. This decision,

12 Mr. Deronjic, indicates that, (1), the state of an imminent threat of war

13 is hereby declared; (2), general public mobilisation of the TO in the

14 entire territory of SR BiH is hereby ordered. All military conscripts are

15 duty-bound to make themselves available to the municipal TO staffs in the

16 territory of SBiH, it says. And this document, as we can see from the

17 first page, was dated the 16th of April, 1992. Mr. Deronjic, did you, as

18 a result of receiving a document similar to this, take action in the

19 crisis staff?

20 A. Yes, Mr. Harmon.

21 Q. Now if I could turn to P54, the next exhibit, Mr. Deronjic, and

22 ask you to inspect that.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Stewart.

24 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I just make a comment about the

25 previous exhibit. That was, as I believe Your Honours found, that was a

1 very difficult exhibit to handle on the screen, because it was impossible

2 to read when the whole document came up, and by zooming in, then you lose

3 the rest of the document. We didn't have a hard copy, and in this

4 particular case, this exhibit was not on the CD of exhibits. So that when

5 we were preparing and trying to do a hard copy printout in advance of the

6 this morning's hearing, we were simply not able to do it. So if this is

7 the position with an exhibit, which is clearly going to be unmanageable on

8 the screen, we would particularly request, especially when it's just a

9 couple of pages, that hard copy could then be produced. Because it's

10 very, very difficult to follow it on the screen in that way.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon.

12 MR. HARMON: I am informed that this is on the list. If you refer

13 to the December 2nd -- or the February 12th, 04/18/20 list, it is

14 identified as 15.007, establishment of Territorial Defence.

15 JUDGE ORIE: It is on the list, but I think that Mr. --

16 MR. STEWART: I didn't say it wasn't on the list. That's not the

17 point.

18 JUDGE ORIE: You said it was not on the CD. Apart from that -- it

19 certainly -- could we just get the same picture again. I would also like

20 to read the upper part, at least of the second page, so that we -- if you

21 could please zoom that out, because I jumped from the first page. So

22 the ...

23 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I'd like to work in a manner that is

24 most useful and efficient for the Trial Chamber. On these large exhibits,

25 if the Court wishes to have hard copies of these exhibits, I'm more than

1 happy to provide Your Honours with hard copy. I'm adjusting to the modern

2 technology and I find it somewhat limiting myself. If the Court instructs

3 me to, I would be more than happy to provide Your Honours with hard copy.

4 JUDGE ORIE: No I think the following is -- the main issue is that

5 we should be able to follow the evidence, also documentary evidence, and

6 if we jump from page 1 to page 2 at the bottom, then the context might be

7 lost. And how we solve it, either by you take some more time in Court to

8 show us the other parts as well, or whether we receive hard copies, I

9 leave it -- as long as it is guaranteed that we see what we would like to

10 see. Let me just read the upper part.

11 Yes. I think, as a matter of fact, we saw this part already

12 previously. But not knowing exactly what it was. Yes. If it's not on

13 the CD, then -- if the document is not on the CD, of course I can't check

14 that, then at least hard copies should be provided to the Defence in

15 advance. Could we continue? Because you said you'd only like to make an

16 observation, not any objection.

17 MR. STEWART: It was a tiny built of objection implicit in it.

18 It's more a request for the future rather than worrying about water under

19 the bridge.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's how I understood it. We have now seen

21 the upper part of the second page. I take it that we can then continue.

22 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.

23 MR. HARMON: Yes, thank you.

24 Q. Mr. Deronjic, let's move on. I asked you whether or not your --

25 the crisis staff in Bratunac then acted upon such a decision, and you can

1 answer that question yes or no.

2 A. Yes.

3 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, I'm going to show the first page of the

4 English translation of the two-page document, and then I will turn to the

5 second page when Your Honours have finished reading the first page. I'm

6 more than happy to --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But for us it's really unreadable as it appears

8 now, so it has to be split up in two parts. Because this doesn't help

9 that much. If you provide it to us in portions of half pages, then

10 there's at least some chance --

11 MR. HARMON: Is that more useful, Your Honour?

12 JUDGE ORIE: Hardly. Make -- it's really -- it's -- yes. No.

13 Sight loses with age perhaps. All of three have some problems in reading

14 it on the screen. But if you could show us then the second part of the

15 page, or at least the next part. And now if you want to move to the next

16 page. We've read this. But if you want to put questions ...

17 MR. HARMON: Let me go to just the short document, Your Honours.

18 JUDGE ORIE: It's already too much for our eyes. Could you please

19 split it up in two parts. Yes. Next. Yes. Please proceed.

20 MR. HARMON:

21 Q. Mr. Deronjic, is P54 the -- from the minutes of the crisis staff?

22 Strike that. Is P54 on order that complies with the previous order that

23 was shown to you?

24 A. I have to give you a conditional answer. I think that it is.

25 There is a discrepancy in the dates, because it says here at a meeting

1 held on the 15th of April, 1992, thinking of the Bratunac municipality

2 crisis staff meeting. But it was reported on the 16th while the previous

3 decision is dated the 16th, if I remember well. I must say that due to an

4 absence of a consistent way of communicating with the republican

5 leadership, we adapted our activities to what we could learn from the

6 media, and I'm stating that the TO of Republika Srpska was formed on the

7 15th of April, 1992. And I think that there were reports about this on

8 the 15th of April. And we decided, and this is mentioned here, based on

9 the decision of the Presidency of the Republic of the Serbian People of

10 Bosnia and Herzegovina on general mobilisation. So we adopted our

11 decision in Bratunac based on that decision.

12 This minor problem about the dates I think can be clarified in

13 this way.

14 Q. On the original B/C/S version there's a signature at the bottom.

15 Whose signature is that?

16 A. That is my signature, Mr. Harmon.

17 Q. Mr. Deronjic, let me return briefly to -- actually, let me stay

18 with this document. What did you do after you issued this particular

19 order? Were people mobilised?

20 A. No, they were not mobilised, in the classic sense, that the army

21 units were being formed. No. This was more a declaration in adherence to

22 the decision of the republican organ. At that time, Muslims were present

23 in the governing bodies in Bratunac. We were sharing power with them at

24 the time. And immediately prior to these events, we held a Joint Assembly

25 session. It was impossible to organise people, to mobilise them, and

1 place them in barracks, military barracks, because there were no such

2 facilities available. It was more a proclamation stating that if the need

3 arose, people were duty-bound to report for mobilisation.

4 Q. All right. Mr. Deronjic, I'd like to show you the next exhibit,

5 which is an aerial image.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number P55.

7 MR. HARMON: Could the witness be handed a copy of P55.

8 Q. Mr. Deronjic, you have not seen this exhibit before, but it

9 indicates with areas certain locations that will become relevant to your

10 testimony in respect of other events in Bratunac. Can you just make a

11 moment to look at that and confirm that the orientations and the locations

12 marked are correct.

13 A. Yes. The roads and the buildings are correctly marked. I assume

14 that this Old School means old school, Stara Skola, in translation.

15 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, this is an appropriate time to break. I

16 think I'm about to go into a different topic, and I think this is when

17 we -- approximately when we have our break.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Harmon, the Defence indicated how long you

19 would still need for your examination-in-chief.

20 MR. HARMON: Well, I hope to -- well, I haven't been progressing

21 as rapidly as I'd like, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

23 MR. HARMON: There have been many non-testimonial moments in this

24 courtroom where there have been objections raised. So I would say, Your

25 Honour, I will finish probably late in the day or tomorrow morning.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And you indicated the total time of the

2 testimony of Mr. Deronjic for --

3 MR. HARMON: Ten hours.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Ten hours, as far as I remember. Yes. Yes. I'm

5 doing some timekeeping. Yes. But I must say that non-testimonial issues,

6 if you present something on the screen which we really can't read, that is

7 really not -- I would say then it's entirely up to you that we lost that

8 time.

9 We'll adjourn until 10 minutes to 11.00.

10 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

11 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, please proceed.

13 MR. STEWART: Your Honour.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Stewart.

15 MR. STEWART: One moment, please, Your Honour. At the beginning

16 of the break -- just to update Your Honours, at the beginning of the

17 break, I handed to Mr. Harmon a draft proposed timetable following Your

18 Honour's indication earlier this morning. May I just add this, Your

19 Honour: That if -- consistently with the proposal we put to the Tribunal

20 this morning, if we are in the position where Mr. Deronjic's evidence in

21 chief is not finished today, we would ask that that is finished off on

22 Wednesday morning rather than -- well, Mr. Harmon said tomorrow morning.

23 He didn't really mean that because he would be on his own, because the

24 rest of us wouldn't be here tomorrow morning But tomorrow. Because the

25 trouble is that if we come back for an hour in the middle of the day, a

1 great deal of the advantage is lost because Mr. Krajisnik has to be

2 brought from the Detention Unit to the Tribunal and back again, and we all

3 have to have that interruption in the middle of the day, so...

4 JUDGE ORIE: And you would then accept it is advanced that you had

5 not heard yet the last -- the very last part of his examination-in-chief.

6 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. We could cope with that. We

7 don't suggest that that's a practical difficulty. Of course we accept

8 would that, yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: From Mr. Harmon's body language, I do understand that

10 that would not be a major problem.

11 MR. HARMON: That's correct.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed, Mr. Deronjic, and Mr. Harmon,

13 please proceed.

14 MR. HARMON: It's my understanding, Your Honours, that the screens

15 in front of you have been brightened and you can see much better and I --

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Quite surprisingly by pushing the off button,

17 that's what helps us.

18 MR. HARMON: All right.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Let's see how it works.

20 MR. HARMON: We'll see how it works and I hope it works better in

21 terms of documents. May I proceed, Your Honour?

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes, please.

23 MR. HARMON:

24 Q. Mr. Deronjic, now I'd like to turn your attention to the 17th of

25 April, 1992, in the morning, and I would like you to tell the Judges what

1 happened that particular morning.

2 A. Briefly, Mr. Harmon and Your Honours: That morning, armed people

3 appeared at the Fontana Hotel. As far as I could tell at that time, it

4 was a group consisting of about 30 people. I was at home, and a message

5 reached me to come to the Fontana Hotel as soon as possible, to attend a

6 meeting, because soldiers had arrived. So I went there, and as I was

7 getting into the hotel, I noticed that Goran Zekic was present at the

8 meeting, as well as Mr. Miodrag Jokic, whom I mentioned earlier on, who

9 was the vice-president of the Srebrenica SDS, and Velibor Sorak, a man

10 from Srebrenica as well, who was also present at the meeting. Apart from

11 them, I remember seeing three men in uniform present there as well. On

12 the opposite side of the table, there were representatives of the Muslims

13 from Srebrenica. As far as I can recall, Ljubisav Simic, the

14 then-president of the Serbian Municipal Assembly, was also present. At

15 that moment, he was actually leaving the meeting.

16 When I arrived, I noticed that the hotel had been blocked by these

17 people in uniform, and I realised that those were the same -- or rather,

18 the similar individuals as the ones that I had seen in Bajina Basta a few

19 days earlier. So I entered the hotel. I inquired as to what the meeting

20 was about, and Mr. Zekic told me that the meeting was with the

21 representatives of the Srebrenica Muslims. He told me who they were.

22 One of the volunteers, who obviously was there on behalf of the

23 commander of the unit, said that they had given an ultimatum of the

24 Bratunac Muslim representatives that they should abandon power, that this

25 concerned the police station and that the deadline was 12.00 on that day,

1 that is, that they had to leave all institutions by that time. They

2 wanted me and Ljubisav Simic to give them a list of extremists, as they

3 called them. Mr. Simic got very angry. He said he wished to take no part

4 in that. He left the meeting. He said he did not have any list.

5 I believe I already quoted his words in my interview.

6 I stayed at the meeting briefly and was informed that the Muslim

7 leadership wanted to see me, that they were at the public security station

8 in Bratunac and they wanted to see me there. It was one of the waiters

9 who brought me the message that had arrived by telephone.

10 So I went to the police station, the public security station in

11 Bratunac, where I found the president of the municipality, Mr. Dubicic,

12 the president of the Bratunac municipal board of the SDA, Mr. Dzevad

13 Gusic; the chief of police, whose last name was Hodzic. I cannot remember

14 his first name; and two other individuals, secondary school teacher who

15 was a member of the municipal SDA, Numo Pleho was his name. They wanted

16 to know who the people at the Fontana Hotel were, and I told them that I

17 did not know who they were, that that was the first time that I'd seen

18 them. They asked if I could guarantee their security. I said that I

19 couldn't because I didn't know who those people were.

20 This is just the gist of our conversation. They wanted to know if

21 I could organise their departure from Bratunac. They wanted to know if

22 they could have a vehicle, because they wanted to go to Konjevic, which is

23 a Muslim village in the direction of Tuzla, because apparently there were

24 problems there, and they wanted to see what they can do to calm down the

25 situation. I said that there should be no problems about that, that they

1 should take the police car, and I mentioned potential problems in the

2 village of Kravica, which is a predominantly Serb village. Actually,

3 correction. They mentioned this village, and I said that there shouldn't

4 be any problems there because I had given them my consent to go there.

5 It was my assumption that they wanted to leave Bratunac, which

6 turned out to be true. So they took this vehicle and left in the

7 direction of Tuzla. From what I learnt subsequently, they left the

8 municipality on that day. The police station remained rather empty. I

9 noticed the fact that the majority of Muslim police officers had left the

10 station. I assumed that they had been informed by their chief. A few

11 individuals remained, including two or three Serb officers who were

12 sitting on the stairs of the building. By that time, it was already noon,

13 I think, and the unit which was at the Fontana Hotel had in the meantime

14 started walking toward the police station. They got to the entrance to

15 the police station. I stopped them there. I told them that there was no

16 use -- that they should not use weapons, that the leadership of the police

17 station had left, and that the station was, practically speaking, empty.

18 They entered the premises. They stayed there for half an hour.

19 Then they took the vehicles and left with Goran Zekic in the direction of

20 Srebrenica. They drove in a column. So I had no time to go back to the

21 Fontana Hotel. They had already left for Srebrenica. And this is how

22 that day ended. And this is just a brief description of what I think is

23 the most important -- the most important events of the day.

24 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, the men who were inside the Hotel Fontana and

25 the men who were outside of the Fontana, did you believe that those men

1 were the people who had been volunteers and who had accompanied Mr. Zekic

2 and Mr. Jokic to Skelani?

3 A. It was a conclusion that I was able to reach, yes, but I did not

4 recognise any of the people attending the Fontana meeting. I had not seen

5 them in Bajina Basta. But they did resemble those people, as far as their

6 uniforms and weapons are concerned. I'm not 100 per cent sure that they

7 were the same individuals, but I think that some of them were the same.

8 Q. You said weapons. Were they all armed, and can you describe what

9 type of arms they were carrying?

10 A. Yes, they were all armed, and so far as I could observe, they all

11 carried automatic infantry weapons, automatic rifles, that is.

12 Q. Now, when the -- when you went over and had a conversation with

13 the Bosnian Muslim leaders from the Bratunac municipality, and they asked

14 you who are those people, you said you didn't know. Why did you say you

15 didn't know?

16 A. I really didn't know who they were. I had never seen any of them

17 before. I could not even recognise them as individuals who had been in

18 Bajina Basta before that. Subsequently, I learned that one of them was

19 one of the leaders of the group that had been in Bajina Basta the previous

20 day. But again, I had never seen them in my life prior to that. I had

21 never had any contact with them. Goran Zekic didn't have enough time to

22 tell me who they were, because I had to go to the police station. The

23 only thing that I could perhaps assume was that they were the volunteers

24 who had come from Serbia, with the mission to expel Muslims from the

25 government in Bratunac. But I said that I didn't know who they were

1 because I didn't know them.

2 Q. And when, Mr. Deronjic, was it that the Bosnian Serbs took over

3 power in the Bratunac municipality?

4 A. Right after this event, all institutions in Bratunac were,

5 practically speaking, dissolved, because most of the employees had been

6 Muslims. I'm referring to the president of the municipality, the

7 president of the Executive Board, the police, and other judiciary and

8 administrative, both state and republican organs. Only Serbs remained.

9 And we seized power, de facto speaking, sometime in late April 1992. At

10 that time, we had already established the crisis staff of the Bratunac

11 municipality, the municipal crisis staff, which means that we

12 functioned -- we continued to function for a while as the crisis staff of

13 the Serbian people, which had been established in October the previous

14 year. And later that month, we established the Bratunac Municipal Crisis

15 Staff, because conditions had been met in the meantime. That is, the

16 relevant bodies had been established, the police and so on and so forth.

17 And by virtue of their functions, the chiefs of such organs became members

18 of the municipal crisis staff.

19 Q. Mr. Deronjic, these volunteers that had assisted in the takeover

20 of power in Bratunac on the 17th of April, did they return to Bratunac and

21 did they remain in Bratunac?

22 A. They did not remain in Bratunac. They went to Srebrenica, where

23 they stayed, and continued with their activities. A conflict was soon to

24 break out between Serbs and Muslims in Srebrenica. By that time, these

25 conflicts were already opened, and they involved murders as well. They

1 would come to Bratunac by night in police vehicles --

2 Q. Let me ask you this question, Mr. Deronjic: What can you tell the

3 Judges what these volunteers did in Bratunac after the takeover of power

4 on the 17th of April? How did they behave themselves?

5 A. I was about to tell you how it happened. They came to Bratunac

6 mostly by night. They created panic. They opened fire in the streets.

7 They drove their vehicles very fast, with sirens. They entered various

8 streets in the town by night and started plundering property. They seized

9 private property from individual Muslims. I'm referring to their cars

10 mostly, because people started complaining about that fact. They

11 killed -- I'm not sure about the date, but they killed during that period

12 of time several Muslim individuals in Bratunac. One family was murdered.

13 Two or three brothers, I think they were, were killed during that period.

14 And another two individuals in Zljevice, a suburb, the incident we learned

15 about later on. So they were creating panic around the town. They

16 arrested people, robbed them of their property, of their personal

17 belongings, and, yes, those were the most drastic examples of their

18 activity during that period.

19 Q. And were Bosnian Serbs who lived in Bratunac also terrorised by

20 these people?

21 A. Yes. There were many examples of that. I did not speak about it

22 at length, but there were many cases of harassment of Serbs, including

23 arrests, also of the members of the crisis staff during that period.

24 Q. Now, what happened to these particular -- this particular group of

25 volunteers?

1 A. Three days after the arrival in Bratunac, on the 20th of April,

2 1992, to be precise, the Muslims, that is, their armed forces - and this

3 is what I know from reports. I do not have any direct knowledge of that -

4 under the command of Naser Oric, laid an ambush in Potocari, and most of

5 the volunteers were killed in this ambush. Potocari is five kilometres

6 away from the centre of Bratunac, so territorially speaking, it's part of

7 the town.

8 Q. Now, had you seen these particular volunteers in their cars with

9 stolen goods, and could you describe -- if yes, could you describe to the

10 Court what you saw.

11 A. I had an opportunity of seeing them personally. These are very

12 small towns, after all. And I also had information from the people in my

13 close surroundings that they were engaged in plunder of some technical

14 goods in Srebrenica. At that time, this would have been more difficult to

15 carry out in Bratunac, but Srebrenica was plundered and the goods were

16 taken then to Bratunac and across the bridge linking the area with Serbia.

17 Q. Now, after the first group of volunteers was killed by the forces

18 of Naser Oric, what happened?

19 A. Two things happened, two things which would be of some

20 significance for the future development of events. A JNA unit arrived in

21 the area. I had never seen this unit before, nor did I have any knowledge

22 in that period as to the identity of that unit. But it was an armoured

23 unit, consisting of perhaps 20 troops and 5 to 6 armoured vehicles.

24 Captain Suljic was their leader. I think they arrived in Bratunac on the

25 21st or 22nd. I'm not a hundred per cent sure of those dates, but I know

1 that it was immediately after the murder of the volunteers in Potocari.

2 Q. Mr. Deronjic --

3 A. Captain Reljic.

4 Q. Before we get to the arrival of the JNA, just let me ask you: In

5 respect of the volunteers who had been killed, what happened to those

6 volunteers, the bodies of those volunteers? And did another group of

7 volunteers arrive?

8 A. I just wanted to link the two events. We made an effort to obtain

9 the bodies and to recover them to the territory of the Bratunac

10 municipality so that we could hand them over to their families. Attempts

11 were made to negotiate with the people from Potocari. The president,

12 Mr. Simic, played an important role in this, together with a number of

13 members of the police, including a Muslim man who assisted us a lot in

14 this. Mr. Reljic had arrived in the meantime, and I think he joined in

15 the negotiations with the other side, with the purpose of obtaining the

16 bodies. During that period -- again, I'm not sure about the date, but it

17 could have been either the 23rd or the 24th -- a group of -- a large group

18 of volunteers arrived in Serbia. It was my estimate that it consisted of

19 about a hundred armed men. And they sent an invitation for me to come to

20 Ljubovija to negotiate. And I went to Ljubovija and I can testify about

21 that if you want me to.

22 Q. Mr. Deronjic, in brief, were the bodies of the slain volunteers

23 returned to their people?

24 A. Yes. Several bodies - I don't remember the exact number. I don't

25 think we actually managed to find them all - were obtained. They were

1 handed over by Naser during those negotiations and they were brought to

2 Bratunac. Families were informed of that through the media, I guess. I

3 don't know.

4 Q. Mr. Deronjic -- [Previous translation continues]... Additional

5 details that the Defence or the Court wants to ask you some questions

6 about that element of your testimony they can. But let me then ask you,

7 Mr. Deronjic: Did another group of volunteers arrive in Bratunac?

8 A. Yes. I have already mentioned this very large group of volunteers

9 who had arrived in Ljubovija. I went there. I wanted to prevent their

10 entering the area. Together with me was Mr. Milutin Milosevic, the chief

11 from Bratunac. We didn't want them to get into Bratunac, and we informed

12 them of that. However, part of that large group entered the town of

13 Bratunac on their own initiative, later on, and they stayed until mid-May.

14 They insisted that they should all get in Bratunac, under the pretext of

15 wanting to obtain those bodies. But we knew that that was not their real

16 mission. We just talked to two or three of their representatives. But,

17 however, in the course of the following days, this smaller group of

18 volunteers managed to get into town, where they stayed until mid-May.

19 Q. Why didn't you want the volunteers in Bratunac after the 17th of

20 April?

21 A. It was possible for me at that time to see clearly for myself what

22 it is that they were engaged in and to what extent we could have any

23 influence over them. When we went to see them, me -- I and Mr. Reljic,

24 our attitude was that we should not let them in, because a hundred armed

25 people without any control constituted a danger, that is, a danger for us,

1 because we couldn't have any control over the events, and that is the

2 reason why we didn't want them in the town.

3 Q. How many volunteers in the smaller group would you estimate

4 arrived in Bratunac?

5 THE INTERPRETER: Correction of the interpreter. Not Mr. Reljic,

6 but Mr. Zekic.

7 A. I think about 20. Those were not permanent groups, you see, and

8 their number varied, which meant that they did not have very strict

9 control and command. Some of the troops would leave and when -- and go to

10 another area. But I know that there were about 20 of them at all times.

11 MR. HARMON:

12 Q. And did these -- this new group of volunteers that had arrived in

13 Bratunac, did they -- how did they conduct themselves in Bratunac?

14 A. Well, I must say that probably because of the presence of the

15 military, they were not so aggressive as the first group. However,

16 harassment of the Muslims, including the plunder, continued. But we tried

17 to manage as best as we could with the assistance of the police. However,

18 there were no murders during that period when this second group arrived;

19 at least, I don't remember any.

20 Q. What kind of people were these people who were in the volunteers?

21 A. I will be direct. There were mostly criminals. And in the later

22 period, I had the opportunity to check some things. The majority of those

23 people were criminals, even a large number of them were released from

24 prison with the intention that they should take part in these volunteer

25 units. Later I got to know some of them, and I believe that they were

1 mostly criminals, which was evident from their behaviour.

2 Q. Who was the leader of this volunteer -- small volunteer group?

3 A. The volunteer group was headed by a person nicknamed Peki. This

4 is how we knew him in the beginning. Later I found out that his name was

5 Predrag Cubrilo and that he was from a village in Vojvodina.

6 Q. Could you identify by name other members of the volunteer group?

7 A. It is difficult to do it by name, but I knew their nicknames. I

8 knew some of their -- I knew some of them by nicknames. I remembered the

9 name of one of them, if that was his real name. I recall the names of

10 some other people. There was Zoran Kosijer. I remember that name. Then

11 there was a girl, Dragica Mastikosa. She was killed later. Most had

12 nicknames such Makedonac, Niski, Tihi, nicknames like that. Rambo. These

13 are some of the nicknames that they had.

14 Q. Now, given the concerns that you and others in the Bratunac

15 municipality had in respect of these paramilitaries, did the crisis staff

16 take any action vis-a-vis these volunteer groups? And you can answer that

17 yes or no, Mr. Deronjic.

18 A. Yes, we did take some steps.

19 MR. HARMON: And if I could have the next two exhibits given an

20 identification -- given an exhibit number. The first will be the one that

21 is dated -- document dated May 1st, 1992 in the upper left-hand corner of

22 the first page.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number P56, and the following document,

24 Exhibit P57.

25 MR. HARMON: And Your Honours, over the recess I had copies of

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12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

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1 these made and distributed, I hope, to Your Honours.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's highly appreciated.

3 MR. HARMON: Thank you.

4 Q. Mr. Deronjic, while these are being distributed, if you could just

5 cast on eye on Exhibits P56 and P57, please.

6 A. Yes. I am familiar with these crisis staff decisions.

7 Q. Let me, Mr. Deronjic, direct your attention, first of all, to P56.

8 On the B/C/S version, at the bottom of that document, there appears to be

9 a signature. Can you identify that signature?

10 A. This is the signature of the crisis staff's secretary. Sometimes

11 we would agree that when a decision was typed out, and if I was not

12 present, then the secretary would sign it. Zoran Tesic was the crisis

13 staff's secretary and this is his signature.

14 Q. On P57 also whose signature appears on the bottom of that exhibit?

15 A. It's my signature.

16 Q. Mr. Deronjic, starting with P56, can you just enlighten us as to

17 that particular exhibit. What is it, and why was it promulgated?

18 A. Mr. Harmon, I will be as brief as possible. The decisions banning

19 the activities of all paramilitary formations in the territory of Bratunac

20 municipality was adopted on May 1st. The reason for this was the conduct

21 of the volunteers and the constant clashes between the police, which was

22 already formed as the Serbian police in Bratunac, and the chief of the

23 municipality -- actually, the chief of the station, Mr. Milosevic, who

24 conveyed this information to us and asked us to adopt a decision allowing

25 him to sanction the conduct of these volunteers. We adopted such a

1 decision, and as far as I know, I have that also, that decision, amongst

2 my documents, as well as some documents on the expulsion and arrest of the

3 most extremist of the volunteers from the group. That's the first

4 document.

5 The second document is also about what I'm just explaining. It's

6 a decision allowing the police legally to disarm those illegal groups

7 which appeared. And I can tell you that in that period, in other areas of

8 the municipality, it was noticed that some unknown people were crossing

9 over the Drina with weapons. So these decisions referred to all of these

10 people.

11 Q. Mr. Deronjic, you have mentioned, and I have stopped you from

12 proceeding at this point, on the arrival of a JNA unit into Bratunac. Can

13 you first of all tell us approximately when did a unit of the JNA arrive

14 in the Bratunac municipality.

15 A. I cannot give you the precise date, but I believe that this was

16 immediately following the killing of the volunteers in Potocari. I think

17 that that date was the 20th -- the 21st, the 22nd, or the 23rd of April,

18 1992.

19 Q. What kind of a unit was it?

20 A. It was a smaller unit of the JNA. It was an armoured unit with

21 five or six armoured vehicles.

22 Q. What was the number of men in that unit?

23 A. It comprised mostly the crews of the armoured vehicles and a

24 number of the police. They were wearing military police uniforms. The

25 total was about 20 people, according to my estimate.

1 Q. And when you say an armoured unit, what type of armoured vehicles

2 were they?

3 A. I think there were four personnel carriers. These are armoured

4 personnel carriers. And a tank. I know that there was a tank. Then

5 there was a smaller armoured vehicle, which I think is called a combat

6 armoured vehicle.

7 Q. Who was the commander of this particular unit?

8 A. Mr. Reljic. I cannot remember the name.

9 Q. What was his rank?

10 A. He was a captain.

11 Q. Do you know where this particular military unit came from?

12 A. They came from Sekovici, from a unit which was located in the

13 Sekovici municipality. It is the headquarters of an armoured, mechanised

14 brigade, whose commander was a Mr. Tacic. I don't remember his first

15 name.

16 Q. Now, upon the arrival of Captain Reljic in the JNA unit, what

17 actions did they take in the Bratunac municipality?

18 A. They first introduced military rule. Then they adopted a plan on

19 the disarming of Muslims, or extremists, this is what they called it, on

20 the territory of the Bratunac municipality. They were referring to Muslim

21 settlements. The plan was adopted at a meeting without the crisis staff.

22 It was held at a -- one company in Bratunac, at their building. And then

23 at a meeting of the crisis staff, they informed us about the plan, which

24 we verified, even though some disarming activities had already started

25 without the knowledge of the crisis staff. These were the first actions

1 undertaken by Mr. Reljic in Bratunac.

2 Q. Mr. Deronjic, when you say in your testimony they first introduced

3 military rule, how did they do that?

4 A. Mr. Reljic printed some posters, and he put them up all over

5 Bratunac, informing the people. I had the opportunity to read this

6 poster. Informing people that military rule was introduced, and he

7 proclaimed himself the commander of town. This is how he signed it:

8 Captain Reljic, so-and-so, and that he was responsible for the situation

9 in Bratunac.

10 Q. I take it, Mr. Deronjic, that after -- on the 17th, when the

11 leadership, the Bosnian Muslim leadership of Bratunac, left, many, many,

12 many Muslims in the settlements, the Muslim settlements, indeed remained

13 in the Bratunac municipality. Is that a fair assertion?

14 A. Yes, that is absolutely true. They were mostly leaving the

15 territory of the Bratunac municipality from town. This was before the

16 conflict started in Bijeljina, in Zvornik. While in the villages of

17 Bratunac, they still remained. They didn't leave the villages.

18 Q. Now, what was the characterisation by Captain Reljic and the

19 purpose of this disarming campaign?

20 A. I've already said that the disarming plan and the conduct of the

21 army in Bratunac was something that he discussed at a meeting without the

22 presence of the crisis staff, with people who were not members of the

23 crisis staff. After he took over control, from that point on he was

24 issuing commands to the TO for the mobilisation of soldiers, so that

25 Muslim villages would be disarmed. Already in late April, some disarming

1 activities were carried out in Muslim villages. At a subsequent meeting

2 of the crisis staff, he tabled this decision. We discussed it. There was

3 no particular need for it to be explained to us, because we saw what the

4 result was of previous actions. It was to collect weapons in Muslim

5 villages and to warehouse them at a depot of the police station in

6 Bratunac. That was the purpose of it.

7 Q. And Mr. Deronjic, did you participate in one of the actions to

8 disarm a Muslim village?

9 A. Yes. I joined a TO unit which was leaving that day, and I joined

10 them in the capacity of soldier, because I was mobilised in the action to

11 disarm the village of --

12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the name of the

13 village.

14 MR. HARMON:

15 Q. Could you repeat the name of the village? The interpreter didn't

16 hear the name of it.

17 A. Podcaus.

18 Q. Can you describe to the Judges the manner in which the disarming

19 of the village that you saw occurred. What was the modus operandi?

20 A. Early in the morning, before dawn, the TO units of Bratunac

21 received orders -- at that point they were comprising exclusively Serbs.

22 They received an order to occupy a village, to surround it, and not to

23 come too close to it but at a distance from it, upon the order of

24 Commander Reljic, all the soldiers were supposed to fire one bullet into

25 the air in order to let the Muslims in that village know that they were

1 surrounded. That was the only task that we had as soldiers.

2 After that, police would enter, the police and the army, with

3 armoured vehicles, would enter the village, and then via loudspeaker they

4 would call on the people to surrender their illegal and even legal

5 weapons. If they had a licence for hunting weapons, they were supposed to

6 bring them along. That was how the action proceeded. The villagers did

7 respond. I wasn't present in the village to see how many people actually

8 came out, but people did come out and hand over their weapons.

9 Q. Did the JNA make any assurances to the people who had surrendered

10 their weapons?

11 A. I don't know exactly. I think that Mr. Reljic said that he did

12 issue some receipts or certificates. I wasn't present in the village, but

13 I think that he did give some kind of written receipt for the arms that

14 were confiscated.

15 Q. Mr. Deronjic --

16 JUDGE ORIE: May I just intervene. I don't know whether I

17 understood your earlier answer correct. You said in the village when

18 people were ordered to hand over their weapons, whether legal or illegal,

19 would that be for all the villages or just for a certain part of the

20 villages?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This applied to all the villages.

22 But Your Honour, I would like to underscore that we are talking about

23 villages now that have a completely Muslim population.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Because I see it's about the -- your answer

25 starts to be about villages, where my question was, as I see in the

1 transcript, about villagers. But now you continued. You said in these

2 villages there would live exclusively Muslim population, do I understand

3 that correctly, not one Serb, not one Croat, not one other nationality?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Perhaps there was

5 the odd villager like that, but I don't know. Not in that village,

6 though.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.

8 MR. HARMON:

9 Q. Mr. Deronjic, I was going to ask you: What were the Muslim

10 villages that were disarmed? Can you identify those Muslim villages for

11 the Trial Chamber.

12 A. I remember that action. Then I remember Glogova, which was also

13 disarmed in that period, up until May. I remember a village called Lolici

14 or Hrnjici in Konjevic Polje. I'm not sure. I wasn't there. These are

15 the villages that I remember for sure.

16 Q. Was there a settlement known as Voljevica? I may have slaughtered

17 the pronunciation.

18 A. I know that settlement, but I cannot remember exactly whether

19 Voljevica was amongst them. At this moment, I don't remember. If I

20 remember later, I will tell you, but I'm not sure right now.

21 Q. Mr. Deronjic, now I'm going to -- Mr. Deronjic, how long did this

22 disarming campaign last? When did it end?

23 A. It ended in early May. I don't know the exact date.

24 Q. Let me turn your attention now to the village of Glogova and the

25 attack on that village that took place on the 9th of May?

1 MR. HARMON: And if I could have the assistance of the usher to

2 put the following exhibit on the stand. This, Your Honours, is an

3 exhibit. It's four pages. It is census figures from the 1991 census.

4 It's an unwieldy exhibit. It's multiple pages. And I think the easiest

5 way to display this, just for informal purposes to Your Honours, I've

6 taped two of the pages together. If we could put it on the ELMO, then I

7 can direct your attention to certain portions of it.

8 If that could be given an exhibit number as well.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number P58.

10 MR. HARMON: And if we could shift that over, Mr. Usher, and down.

11 Right there is fine.

12 And what I have done, just for Your Honours' benefit, is -- now

13 I've lost the contrasting colour here myself. Is that visible to Your

14 Honours? My screen has suddenly gone dim.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Well, visible is -- it is sufficiently visible.

16 MR. HARMON: Let me orient Your Honours, then, to this exhibit.

17 This exhibit, at the top, highlighted is 1991 census figures. Then you'll

18 see "Muslimani," Muslims, highlighted. So these are the figures, the

19 population figures of Muslims from the 1991 census. And at the far left

20 column are the villages or towns that I have highlighted. So taking

21 Bratunac and coming across, one can see the number of Muslims that are

22 identified in that column. The next column is the number of Serbs. If we

23 then go down to the village of Glogova, which will be the subject of this

24 testimony. Next you will see, Your Honours, according to the 1991 census

25 figures, there were 1.901 Muslims in that village. There was one Croat,

1 six Serbs, four Yugoslavs and one -- I think that is probably "other." We

2 are also going to be touching upon the settlement of Suha, and Mr. Usher,

3 if you could move that up, please. Mr. Usher, could you move up the

4 chart? A little higher, please.

5 And I have highlighted, Your Honours, the two settlements that

6 will be discussed in this upcoming testimony, this settlement of Suha, and

7 you can see in that particular column there are 600 and -- or 800. I

8 can't see. 849 Muslims and 127 Serbs. And if we go down to Voljevica,

9 the number of Muslims in that village, in that settlement, 1.375, with 2

10 Serbs.

11 So that's a reference point, Your Honours, to the population

12 figures. And if I could have the next exhibit given a number.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P59.

14 MR. HARMON: I'm going to have part of this enlarged, Your

15 Honours. This exhibit shows population by ethnic group, green being

16 Muslim, purple being Serb, and this is based on the 1991 figures. And I

17 can orient Your Honours to Bratunac. And above the large circle is the

18 village of Suha.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Could we perhaps zoom in a tiny little bit.

20 MR. HARMON: This will, Your Honours, show us the populations

21 based on the 1991 figures. I direct your attention to Bratunac, where the

22 arrow is located, and then to Suha. Let me start again. I will -- the

23 arrow is on Bratunac. Then the arrow is on the Muslim settlement of Suha.

24 To the left, upper left-hand corner, is the Muslim settlement of Glogova.

25 And we will be talking about the Muslim settlement of Voljevica.

1 Now, if I could have the next exhibit marked as well. We'll place

2 this on the ELMO.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number P60.

4 MR. HARMON: Actually, I don't need this on the ELMO.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

6 MR. HARMON: I don't need this on the ELMO. If a copy could be

7 given to the witness. This also is a map 1:100.000 scale that identifies

8 by location those relevant villages. Bratunac -- again, to assist Your

9 Honours, I will move the arrow on the screen. Bratunac is located where

10 the arrow presently is. And then I have moved the arrow up to the

11 settlement of Suha. And now the arrow is on the village of Glogova. And

12 finally, Your Honours, the arrow is now on the village of Voljevica.

13 Mr. Usher, actually, if you would kindly put this on the ELMO.

14 You can use my copy, Mr. Usher.

15 Q. Mr. Deronjic, while the usher is putting this map on the ELMO,

16 have you had a chance to familiarise yourself with the map?

17 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. Harmon, could I ask you one

18 question? It says it's a 1:100.000 scale. Can the Chamber be sure that

19 it's not enlarged or reduced in size? Because that immediately affects

20 the scale.

21 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I can provide the whole map if Your

22 Honours wish a copy of it.

23 JUDGE ORIE: No. I don't want to have the whole map. But very

24 often while taking out portions maps are enlarged or reduced, and then the

25 scale is not precise any more, as you'll understand.

1 MR. HARMON: Right. This is taken from a map of 1:100.000.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 MR. HARMON: This portion of the map has been enlarged because its

4 visibility is not particularly clear and so I had --

5 JUDGE ORIE: This part is not necessarily 1:100.000.

6 MR. HARMON: That's correct.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Could you then sooner or later provide the Chamber

8 with -- what's the scale of this.

9 MR. HARMON: Yes. If that was done, I will be glad to, Your

10 Honour.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

12 MR. HARMON:

13 Q. Mr. Deronjic, we're going to focus for a few minutes on the

14 village of Glogova, and what I'd like you to do is -- there should be a

15 pointer, Mr. Deronjic. The usher is handing you a pointer, and you'll see

16 on the ELMO, the machine to your left, there is a map.

17 MR. HARMON: And Mr. Usher, perhaps you can show him how the

18 pointer works on the ELMO.

19 Q. What I'd like you to do, Mr. Deronjic, is you can get out of your

20 chair, approach the map on the ELMO, and I'm going to ask you some

21 questions about the village of Glogova.

22 Mr. Deronjic, can you first of all tell the Judges: What was the

23 strategic importance of the village of Glogova? And you can use that

24 pointer to illustrate your testimony.

25 A. The village of Glogova is on the road between Bratunac and

1 Kravica. Kravica, let me just mention it to the Trial Chamber, is a

2 region comprising a number of Serbian villages, and it's right behind

3 Glogova, in the direction towards Konjevic Polje. There is a crossroads

4 there. One of the roads leads to Pale, another -- for Sarajevo, and the

5 other leads to Zvornik from those crossroads. Glogova is located

6 halfway -- about seven kilometres away from Bratunac, so it is halfway to

7 Kravica. And it's the only Serb region in the municipality of Bratunac

8 which is respectable. It encompasses a large territory and has a large

9 number of Serb inhabitants. It is exactly on the road at an elevation -

10 I'm talking about the village of Glogova now - it's a dominant village in

11 that region. It is on the -- on both sides of this key road towards the

12 rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's where the village of Glogova is.

13 Q. Now, based on the -- you can have a seat again, Mr. Deronjic.

14 Thank you for that explanation.

15 Mr. Deronjic, I'm just looking at the transcript of your

16 testimony. It says as follows: "Glogova is located halfway, about seven

17 kilometres away from Bratunac, so it is halfway to Kravica. And it's the

18 only Serb region in the municipality of Bratunac which is respectable." I

19 take it you're referring to Kravica being the only Serb region in the

20 municipality of Bratunac which is respectable; is that correct?

21 A. What I meant to say -- I was thinking of Kravica, but I know that

22 there are some kind of -- that this is maybe not quite clear. I was

23 thinking of Kravica, but it came out a little bit ambivalent.

24 Q. All right. So to summarise, Mr. Deronjic: Between Bratunac and

25 the Serb settlement of Kravica, Glogova, a predominantly Muslim village,

1 was in between; is that correct?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. Now, based on your conclusion that Glogova had a strategic

4 importance, did you come to a decision in your own mind as to what needed

5 to be done in respect of the village of Glogova?

6 A. Yes. Your Honours, I came to a decision that the village of

7 Glogova, that is, that the population of the village of Glogova should be

8 forcibly resettled from the area.

9 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, we're going to go into some details in respect

10 of that particular attack, but let me focus your attention to a meeting

11 that took place between you and Mr. Zekic, Goran Zekic, on the 4th or the

12 5th of May, in the Hotel Fontana. Do you recall that particular meeting?

13 A. Yes, I recall that meeting. I remember the details of my

14 conversation with Mr. Zekic.

15 Q. Can you tell the Judges how that meeting came about and what

16 occurred at that meeting.

17 A. It was an accidental encounter of myself with Mr. Zekic. Actually,

18 it was the first opportunity that we had to be alone after the events in

19 Bratunac and Skelani involving the volunteers. I wanted to know, and I

20 wanted to hear from Goran Zekic, what it was that he knew about the

21 arrival of volunteers in Bratunac, about their intentions and their plans,

22 about their commander, and other things that were of interest to me.

23 Because of the events in Srebrenica, I had not seen Goran Zekic

24 before that. I may have seen him in passing, but I did not have

25 opportunity to be with him alone. It was impossible for me to travel in

1 the area, because Potocari were under the Muslim control.

2 So during that encounter, I asked him the following: What was the

3 role of the volunteers? What was the role of the military in Bratunac and

4 Srebrenica? And what was actually happening in all these municipalities

5 in Podrinje, where the conflicts at the time were already open? I wanted

6 to know if he knew more about these events and what it was that he could

7 tell me about it.

8 He provided me with certain information, basically telling me that

9 it would be wise for me to stay away from the military, not to have any

10 influence over the military. He was aware of my conflict with the

11 military and the volunteers, and his advice basically was for me to stay

12 away from them. I wanted to know under whose orders they were acting, and

13 he said one sentence, which I remembered to this date, that this was all

14 pursuant to an agreement and that the arrival of the military in Bratunac

15 had been based on an agreement between the leadership of Serbia and the

16 leadership of Republika Srpska.

17 So this would be the gist of my conversation with Mr. Zekic at

18 Fontana on the 4th of May, 1992.

19 Q. Was this plan or agreement that was described by Mr. Zekic

20 something that Mr. Zekic could conceive on his own?

21 A. Absolutely not. This would have been impossible. It would have

22 been impossible for him to have any control whatsoever over the forces in

23 Serbia and the Territorial Defence and the police, who provided assistance

24 to the arrival of these volunteers. He did not have any jurisdiction

25 whatsoever in that area. This must have been -- this had to be agreed

1 upon on a much higher level. Likewise, the arrival of the military and

2 their activities, I don't think that that had anything to do with the

3 agreement of Zekic with these individuals but that this was agreed upon at

4 the military top and

5 those activities could not have been undertaken pursuant to Zekic's orders.

6 Q. And when Mr. Zekic said that an agreement between the leadership

7 of Serbia and the leadership of Republika Srpska, did you come to any

8 conclusions in respect of who he meant?

9 A. Well, I have to say that his opinion was only a confirmation of

10 what I thought. Such broad action, according to a certain set pattern,

11 this could not be an isolated phenomenon in the area. This must have

12 been -- had to be coordinated at a very high level. When he said this to

13 me, I know that he was referring to the highest organs of

14 Republika Srpska, which had already been established and was already

15 functioning as a real state, and the leadership of Serbia. So I presume

16 that he referred to the highest-positioned leaders in Serbia at that

17 moment.

18 Q. Who, Mr. Deronjic, were the highest-positioned leaders in the

19 Republika Srpska - can I finish my question, please - on the time you had

20 this conversation with Mr. Zekic?

21 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please, before answering this question,

22 Mr. Stewart.

23 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, Mr. Harmon has already adduced

24 some evidence about who the highest-positioned leaders in Republika Srpska

25 were, and there is plenty of evidence about that. It's clear what he's

1 trying to do here. He's trying to get this witness to make the links that

2 Mr. Harmon wants for his case. But the way he put it when he said in his

3 question: When Mr. Zekic said that an agreement between the leadership of

4 Serbia and the leadership of Republika Srpska, did you come to any

5 conclusions in respect of who he meant? Now, I refrained from objecting

6 there, but really the question ought consistently with the suggestions we

7 made yesterday to be phrased in terms of: Did you know who he meant?

8 Rather than conclusions. Because that strays once again into the area of

9 opinion. If this witness did not know who Mr. Zekic meant specifically,

10 then he should not be pushed into saying that.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Deronjic, your testimony was that you presumed

12 that Mr. Zekic was referring to the highest-positioned leaders in Serbia

13 at that moment, and you also testified that you knew that he was referring

14 to the highest organs of the Republika Srpska, which had already been

15 established. So you said you presumed the highest level in Serbia and

16 that you knew that he was referring to the highest levels of

17 Republika Srpska. Could you tell us what made you know and what in his

18 wordings made you presume. So I'd like to know, on the basis of what he

19 said to you, what caused you or for whatever other reason you would know

20 he was referring to.

21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, with respect, we're not absolutely

22 sure. We'll stand corrected if it appears on the transcript, but at the

23 moment we're not absolutely sure that he used the word "knew." He

24 certainly said he presumed.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but a few lines prior to that. His presumption

1 was in relation to the Republic of Serbia, according to the transcript,

2 and if you look six, seven, eight lines before, he said, "I knew that he

3 was referring to the highest authorities of --" but let me just check.

4 MR. STEWART: Yes. I only wanted to check. I'm not asserting

5 that that's wrong, Your Honour. Just it's an important area. We just

6 want to be sure.

7 JUDGE ORIE: You can return -- I'll read it for you and I'll give

8 you the lines.

9 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ORIE: You can return -- I'll read it to you and I'll give

11 you the lines. Let's just have a look. Page 55, line 5, starting at

12 line 4, he says, about the coordination: "When he said this to me, I know

13 that he was referring to the highest organs of the Republika Srpska, which

14 had already been established."

15 And then two lines later, he says: "So I presume that he referred

16 to the highest-positioned leaders in Serbia at that moment."

17 So as I just made a distinction between --

18 MR. STEWART: Sorry, Your Honour. We're stuck at the moment.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Page 55.

20 MR. STEWART: Page 55.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Your presumption, you find it in line 7. What he

22 knew was in line 5.

23 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I just don't know what's

24 happening here, because we're looking specifically at something which is

25 numbered page 55 and we're getting something completely different. I

1 don't know what the mechanical explanation of that is. We're just getting

2 something totally different.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You're not looking in another transcript or

4 something like that? No. No. I can -- no. It's always a matter of

5 analysing the problems. As you may have noticed in the beginning, my

6 laptop was not functioning at all, and therefore my paging will be

7 different because I started five minutes later than you did. So I

8 apologise for not saying that on my page 55.

9 MR. STEWART: I understand.

10 JUDGE ORIE: But if you search for the wording -- let me just then

11 make it relative and see how far it is from my present --

12 MR. STEWART: It's obviously --

13 JUDGE ORIE: I'm now in the middle of 57. So you should go

14 approximately back two pages from the running transcript, where it is now.

15 MR. STEWART: Yes. It's obviously inconvenient for Your Honour to

16 have unsynchronised numbering, but may I say it's equally inconvenient for

17 everybody else.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just read the part.

19 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you.

20 JUDGE ORIE: So we have no problem. I'll read the whole of the

21 answer: "Well, I have to say that his opinion was only a confirmation of

22 what I thought."

23 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, one moment. I wonder if we could have

24 the opportunity of simply finding the passage first. It's --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

1 MR. STEWART: Once -- it would be -- we suggest it will save time

2 if we do simply -- if we are able to find the passage, then we can move

3 very quickly.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

5 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour. Could I just ask for the

6 introductory phrase again to the passage.

7 JUDGE ORIE: It's page 61, line 1 according to --

8 MR. STEWART: On ours?

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At least on the registrar's.

10 MR. STEWART: Yes, that's very helpful. Thank you. 61, line 1.

11 61, I think. 61?

12 JUDGE ORIE: 61, yes.

13 MR. STEWART: Yes. "When he said this to me I knew that he was

14 referring to the highest organs of Republika Srpska, which had already

15 been established and was already functioning as a real state."

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

17 MR. STEWART: "And the leadership of Serbia. So I presume that he

18 referred to the highest-positioned leaders in Serbia at that moment."

19 JUDGE ORIE: So partly knowledge, at least claimed knowledge, and

20 partly presumption. I think your question was whether the witness said

21 that he knew or that he presumed, and I indicated to you, and that was the

22 basis of my question, I made a clear distinction between the two, that

23 part of his testimony was what he knew, as far as the reference is

24 concerned, and partly that he presumed.

25 MR. STEWART: He knew about the organs, which is slightly more

1 conceptual than individuals.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Let's not discuss it any further. Could you please

3 tell us, Mr. Deronjic, now that the matter has been clarified, what made

4 you to know that he was referring to the organs of the Republika Srpska,

5 and what made you presume that he was referring to the Serbian high-level

6 authorities?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, let me try to

8 explain this as best as I can. I myself was able to conclude during that

9 period that the activities of the volunteers and the military on the

10 ground were taking place according to a certain plan. I was able to see

11 personally what the behaviour was of the state organs in Serbia during the

12 process of the arming of the population, in particular, when the

13 volunteers arrived in the area. I was personally present when this

14 happened in Bajina Basta. The conduct of the local state organs --

15 JUDGE ORIE: Let me stop you. My first question: Is it on the

16 basis of his words that you knew what he was referring to or that you

17 presumed what he was referring to, or was it on the basis of knowledge

18 outside, obtained outside of that conversation?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He said -- I cannot quote his exact

20 words, but he said that there had been an agreement between the highest

21 organs of Republika Srpska and those in Serbia with respect to the

22 operations that were conducted in the area. So on the basis of that, I

23 was able to assume that he was referring to the highest organs. Obviously,

24 he was not referring to low-level organs. I was a low-level organ myself.

25 But I was also personally able to conclude that this was part of a plan

1 that had been agreed at the very highest level. Now, I do not have any

2 specific piece of information which would confirm this, apart from what I

3 could personally see on the 11th of May, when I reported what had happened

4 in Glogova to the highest organs in Republika Srpska. And you know that I

5 was not arrested, not even criticised, but was, quite the contrary,

6 applauded for what had happened and for what I had done in Glogova, which

7 confirmed to me that this was all part of a plan that had been mentioned

8 by Goran Zekic.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.

10 MR. HARMON:

11 Q. Mr. Deronjic, let's continue, then, with your testimony.

12 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, are we going to go until 11.25 [sic]?

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's what I had in mind. But if you would

14 find this a more suitable moment, then we'll stop just a bit early and

15 restart a bit earlier again.

16 MR. HARMON: Yes. I think this would be a suitable moment.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll have a 15 minutes' break until 25 minutes

18 to 1.00.

19 --- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.

20 --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, please -- oh, we are not -- the witness

22 is not in yet.

23 [The witness entered court]

24 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated, Mr. Deronjic.

25 Mr. Harmon, you may proceed.

1 MR. HARMON:

2 Q. Mr. Deronjic, did you come to any conclusions in respect of what

3 you had seen occurring in other municipalities, adjacent municipalities,

4 and what you saw occurring in the Bratunac municipality?

5 A. Yes. I came to the conclusion that this was organised and that,

6 like I said, the top organs participated in the organisation of those

7 activities in the field.

8 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, after you had a meeting with Mr. Zekic on the

9 5th -- 4th or 5th in the Hotel Fontana, did you have occasion to meet with

10 Captain Reljic of the JNA?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And what occurred in that meeting with Captain Reljic?

13 A. After talking with Mr. Zekic, I asked for the commander -- I

14 looked for the commander of this unit in Bratunac, Mr. Reljic, and I

15 wanted to talk to him about my thoughts about Glogova, which was in that

16 location, and the idea to forcibly remove the population from that village

17 and from Bratunac. I talked to Mr. Reljic about this. I told him that those

18 were my thoughts about the development of the war in our area, and I

19 suggested that the actions should be carried out within the following few

20 days. He was quite restrained and he said that he would consult about this

21 with his superiors and that we would reach an agreement on this. That was

22 the essence of my meeting with Mr. Reljic.

23 And I would just like to note that my relationship with him at

24 that point was slightly better than when he had just arrived at Bratunac.

25 Q. And when you say: "I suggested that the actions should be carried

1 out within the following few days," what actions were you referring to?

2 A. I think that I mentioned it already. I was thinking about the

3 forcible transfer of the population from the village of Glogova.

4 Q. Now, after you had this -- after you concluded your meeting with

5 Captain Reljic, did you have a meeting with a man named Predrag Spasojevic

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Who is Predrag Spasojevic?

8 A. Predrag Spasojevic is a member of the state security services in

9 Serbia. He appeared in Bratunac in late April. He showed me his ID, his

10 membership with those units, and he said that he would be monitoring the

11 events in Bratunac, that that would be his task there. That's what he

12 told me.

13 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interrupt for one second? I'm trying to

14 understand your testimony as good as I can; therefore, I have one

15 additional question in respect of one of your answers. You said that your

16 decision to start an action of forcible removal of the population of

17 Glogova, it was, that you explained to Mr. Reljic what the developments of

18 war in the area at that moment was. I understood this to be that these

19 developments of the war in the area made you consider that it would be

20 necessary or useful to forcibly transfer the population of Glogova. Is

21 that a correct understanding?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the intention was to

23 remove the population from Glogova. The remaining population in Bratunac

24 and the surrounding settlements. Amongst other reasons, also because of

25 the war and the events of the war in that region.

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1 JUDGE ORIE: Could you explain that to me? I mean, what had

2 happened in the war that made it necessary or useful to forcibly remove

3 the population?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. In that period,

5 there was armed fighting in the neighbouring municipalities. I'm

6 primarily thinking of Zvornik and Srebrenica, because I was able to follow

7 that directly, and also through people who were going to that area. They

8 conveyed this information to me. Bratunac is in between those two

9 municipalities. The events in Srebrenica of the 20th of April, when these

10 volunteers were killed, led to open conflict. There was fighting in

11 Srebrenica continually. There were also casualties in the town itself and

12 in the neighbouring villages. Serbs and Muslims were being killed.

13 Srebrenica is completely linked to the Bratunac municipality all along its

14 territory, and because of the number of Muslims in that municipality, we

15 were worried in Bratunac because of those numbers. And the moving out of

16 the population from Bratunac, from Srebrenica, from Zvornik, was also one

17 of the things we had to take into consideration. We were also able to see

18 some attacks on some Serbian villages in Srebrenica. These are the

19 villages of Gniona, Studenac, Bljeceva, which were torched, or parts of

20 them were torched, and some Serbs were killed. I think ten Serbs were

21 killed in those villages in that period. The war was getting more and

22 more intense around Bratunac, and in Bratunac itself, it was impossible to

23 completely control the situation, because there were people with weapons,

24 both in Muslim and Serb villages.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you give me any indication? Because I

1 do -- if I do understand you well, you say: Well, the war was developing.

2 There were some volunteers were killed, volunteers that, from what I

3 understood from your testimony, entered the area, killed people, robbed

4 people, but were then -- some of them were killed. Could you give me a

5 general impression of the development of war in terms of numbers of

6 casualties. I mean, if you would have to give an impression of how many

7 Serbs, approximately, were killed. Because you mentioned that some Serbs

8 were killed; I think you mentioned the number of ten in a certain village.

9 On a total, how many Muslims were killed? That's one question. And also,

10 how many Muslim villages were taken over, compared to Serbian villages

11 being attacked?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The number of casualties, up until

13 9th of May, is something that I don't know. I told you about these three

14 villages about which I have information. In the town of Srebrenica

15 itself, I know four or five local Serbs were killed in that period. And

16 as far as I can recall, the number of Muslims who were killed in

17 Srebrenica was about the same. We had some indirect information about

18 this. People talked about it. I described the killings of five people in

19 Bratunac, and this happened just when the volunteers entered the town. No

20 Muslim village was occupied by Serbian forces in Bratunac or Srebrenica.

21 This means that Goran Zekic, in Srebrenica, controlled the town and the

22 institutions in the town, but had not taken any of the villages around --

23 surrounding the town.

24 As far as Bratunac was concerned, the first action to occupy any

25 of the Muslim villages took place on the 9th of May, and these are the

1 events in Glogova. This is when we forcibly removed the population from

2 Glogova.

3 And I also said that three villages were attacked in that period

4 by Muslim forces. These are the villages of Gniona, on the 6th of May;

5 then Studenac. Some people were killed and some people were transferred.

6 The villages were torched. And in Bljeceva, a part of it was attacked,

7 inhabited by Serbs. It was a mixed-population village. Three people were

8 killed, two woman and one man. I know their names and I have information

9 about this.

10 JUDGE ORIE: You're talking about Serbian people or -- the three

11 and the two?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Three Serbs were killed in Bljeceva,

13 two women and one man, an elderly man. His last name Jovanovic.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Were any Muslims killed in that village that you said

15 was a mixed village?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know if there were any

17 Muslim casualties. It's possible, but I don't have information about

18 that, Your Honours.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Do I understand from your answer that on the basis of

20 a -- I would say a relatively low number of casualties in the surrounding

21 villages and municipalities, Srebrenica, you said five, five,

22 approximately, that you decided to forcibly remove the whole of the

23 population in Glogova? Is that ...

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that one of the motives to

25 move out the population was the development of the war around us. This is

1 what I wish to say. And I also stated this in the factual basis. That

2 the objective was to move out the population forcibly from Bratunac, from

3 the town of Bratunac, its environs, and also from Glogova, primarily from

4 Glogova, in order to implement complete control over the Bratunac

5 municipality, in terms of carrying out the governing activities and the

6 protection of that area. There were a lot of civilians in that region.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.

8 MR. HARMON:

9 Q. Mr. Deronjic, we were talking about Mr. Predrag Spasojevic, and

10 you said who he was. He was from Serbian state security. And my question

11 is: Mr. Deronjic, why did you meet with him?

12 A. In that period, I had the opportunity to meet him several times.

13 This is from the time he came to the Bratunac municipality and introduced

14 himself to me. I noticed that he was the one who was carrying out these

15 police tasks, that he often went to the police station in Bratunac and had

16 contacts with those people. I knew that he was a member of certain units

17 of the state security of Serbia. And I wanted to get some kind of signal

18 from him about whether my decision to forcibly empty the Glogova village

19 was a decision which will not run counter to the plans which his superiors

20 had. And by that I'm thinking of the state security bosses in Serbia.

21 These were the reasons why I spoke with him.

22 Q. And did you discuss your plan?

23 A. Yes. We discussed our plan. And I would just like to add that he

24 said that he believed and that he was sure that his bosses believed that

25 my plan was all right and that it would secure some kind of military

1 dominance in Bratunac, dominance by Serbs.

2 Q. What were your feelings after you left that conversation with

3 Mr. Spasojevic? Were you more confident in your conclusions?

4 A. Yes, of course. I wanted to know that my further actions were not

5 contrary to the plans of the Serbian side, including Serbia and

6 Republika Srpska.

7 Q. Thereafter, Mr. Deronjic, did you have another meeting with

8 Captain Reljic from the JNA?

9 A. Yes. At one point we received an invitation to come to a meeting.

10 I believe it was in the morning of the 7th that we were asked to come and

11 look at the village of Glogova from a vantage point. So we went to the

12 village of Magasici, where I was born.

13 Q. Who is "we"?

14 A. Mr. Reljic and myself. I don't remember anyone else having been

15 with us. So we went to Magasici, the village where I was born, located on

16 high ground in the vicinity of Glogova, which can be plainly seen from

17 Magasici. So we had a good look at it. He spent some time observing the

18 village in some detail, and we returned to Bratunac with the agreement

19 that the operation should take place within the several next days [as

20 interpreted].

21 Q. Who was charged with actually planning the operational details of

22 the attack?

23 A. I didn't task anyone specifically. The military side of the plan

24 was done by Mr. Reljic, by the JNA.

25 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, on the 8th of May, what happened to Goran

1 Zekic?

2 A. Goran Zekic was killed on the 8th of May, in an ambush which had

3 been laid by Muslims in Potocari. His body was brought to Bratunac in the

4 afternoon hours of that day.

5 Q. What effect did Goran Zekic's death have on the Serbian population

6 in Bratunac municipality?

7 A. Well, first of all, I think that it had consequences for the

8 Serbian population in Srebrenica. On that day, in the hour of that day

9 and during the evening hours, the entire population of -- Serbian

10 population of Srebrenica left the town. My two sisters lived there, and

11 they too left Srebrenica in the course of that night, together with their

12 families. The population fled in the direction of Bratunac and Serbia,

13 having completely abandoned the area.

14 As regards the town of Bratunac, when the body of Goran Zekic was

15 brought, a large number of people gathered - I cannot tell you the exact

16 number, but I know that many of them had gathered in front of the town

17 hall when the body of Goran Zekic was brought. I myself was present there

18 as well.

19 Q. When was the funeral for Goran Zekic planned?

20 A. For the 9th of May.

21 Q. Now, on the same day of his killing, in the evening of the 8th of

22 May, did the crisis staff convene?

23 A. Yes. That is correct. We met and held a session of the crisis

24 staff.

25 Q. Who attended that session of the crisis staff?

1 A. That session of the crisis staff, apart from the members of the

2 crisis staff, was attended -- I cannot remember the exact number of the

3 members, maybe five or six, was attended by Mr. Reljic, representing the

4 JNA unit, and Mr. Spasojevic, the man who was a member of the state

5 security units from Serbia. Of course, there was also the chief of police

6 and the Bratunac TO commander. The Territorial Defence of Bratunac had in

7 the meantime been established as a separate institution.

8 Q. Was there anybody from the Kravica Territorial Defence attending

9 that session?

10 A. Yes. The commander of a unit of the Territorial Defence of

11 Kravica, Jaso Nunic [phoen], who was soon to be killed, I think in the

12 month of May.

13 Q. What was the last name of the person you mentioned from Kravica?

14 A. Raso Milosevic.

15 Q. Mr. Deronjic, can you explain to the Judges what happened at that

16 particular meeting.

17 A. The meeting consisted of two parts. The first part was dedicated

18 to the analysis of the events in Srebrenica and the killing of Goran

19 Zekic, which of course came as a huge surprise, and it was indeed a tragic

20 event, and we dedicated a lot of time to that. He was a prominent leader

21 at the time. His family had been made aware of his killing, so his father

22 appeared at the meeting as well. We were trying to arrange for the

23 details of the funeral. We made plans for the following day. And during

24 the second half of the session, we discussed the military situation,

25 military activities, including the attack on Glogova. It was at that time

1 that we decided that the forcible transfer of the population of Glogova

2 should take place the next morning.

3 Q. During the course of that meeting, was there any discussion about

4 burning Muslim houses?

5 A. Yes. We discussed that as well. We debated whether it was

6 necessary to set the entire village or only a part of the village on fire.

7 The discussion ended -- of course, some of the people were absolutely

8 against it. I wish to point that out. And I suggested that some of the

9 buildings in the village of Glogova should be set on fire as a warning.

10 So it was my suggestion that part of the buildings should be set on fire

11 but that the rest should not be touched, that is, that not the entire

12 village was to be torched.

13 Q. At the conclusion of that meeting of the crisis staff, what

14 decision was taken in respect of the attack on Glogova?

15 A. It was decided that vehicles should get ready to come to the

16 village of Glogova, depending on the course of the operation, and I refer

17 to the lorries that were to transfer the entire population which we

18 thought we would find in the village of Glogova to the municipality of

19 Kladanj, the municipality which was under the control of the Muslims, and

20 it was the nearest municipality to which we could send these people. It

21 was also decided that, in case there should be no resistance, all

22 villagers should be evacuated. In case of any resistance and fighting,

23 which is something which we could not foresee, though the objective

24 remained the same, this objective would have to be achieved through

25 fighting. We couldn't, therefore, foresee whether there would be any

1 fighting in Glogova.

2 Q. Now, Glogova had been previously disarmed, according to your

3 testimony; isn't that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. At the crisis staff meeting, did Captain Reljic say that he

6 would -- he and his unit would participate in the operation against the

7 village of Glogova?

8 A. I wanted Mr. Reljic to provide us with a direct answer. Before

9 each operation, each decision on an operation, I asked him whether he

10 would take part with his JNA unit in the operation, and his answer was

11 affirmative. He said yes, he would participate in the operation.

12 Q. What other units participated in the operation against Glogova?

13 A. The Bratunac TO participated, together with the police, the

14 Bratunac police, to the extent we had police officers at the station at

15 that time. A number of volunteers, and also a certain number of residents

16 of Srebrenica, because after the fall of Srebrenica into the hand of the

17 Muslims, part of the unit moved to Bratunac, and they took part in the

18 operation on Glogova. So those would be the units that participated in

19 the attack.

20 Q. Mr. Deronjic, after the conclusion of this meeting, did you and

21 others go to the surrounding areas of Glogova and assume positions,

22 military positions, around the village?

23 A. Yes. You said you and other members of the crisis staff. No. I

24 went alone, together with the Territorial Defence unit, which, by the way,

25 was also my unit, according to my war assignment. So it was together with

1 them that I went to this tasking, the task being for this unit to

2 interpose between Glogova and the Bratunac municipality, and a number of

3 villages, Muslim villages, in the municipality of Srebrenica. I am

4 referring to Potocari in particular. So it was between 11.00 and

5 12.00 p.m. that we deployed on the high grounds between Glogova and the

6 remaining Muslim area of the Srebrenica municipality, and partly Bratunac

7 municipalities as well, because Bljeceva, Cizmici, and other Muslim

8 villages were behind our backs. Those villages also being part of the

9 Bratunac municipality.

10 Q. Let me take you back to the crisis staff meeting the night of

11 the 8th. And did you discuss any attacks on other Muslim settlements

12 following the attack on Glogova; and if so, which Muslim settlements were

13 targeted?

14 A. Yes. We adopted a decision, under certain reservations, that

15 should there be no fighting in Glogova, and if the operation ends without

16 casualties, that we would continue with the operation of the forcible

17 removal of the Muslim population in Bratunac, in particular, the Suha and

18 Voljevica suburbs. We also agreed that these people should not be

19 surrounded. There was no possibility to do that, but because of their

20 number, they should be called upon through loudspeakers that they were to

21 leave Bratunac and gather at specific locations in order to be evacuated

22 from the area.

23 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, let me take you back to the early morning hours

24 of the 9th of May. Can you tell the Judges when the attack started, and

25 can you describe the attack.

1 A. The attack started at 6.00 a.m., very early in the morning.

2 Perhaps not exactly at 6.00, but it was in the early morning hours. I was

3 on the high ground above the area, and I could observe the events. I

4 could see the road from Bratunac and the approach of our force from

5 Bratunac. As for the actual entry into the village, it preceded from the

6 north, so far as I could tell. The village had already been surrounded by

7 our TO units, and as far as I could see, the military was inside the

8 village, with their APCs and a tank. It was then that the burning of

9 certain buildings started, proceeding from the southern part of the

10 village. So that was the beginning of the events in Glogova.

11 Q. Now, were you monitoring the events in Glogova from your vantage

12 point?

13 A. Yes. I could observe the most part of the movements. I couldn't

14 see the military with my naked eye; however, I was able to see the opening

15 of fire and the torching of buildings. Very soon we could see thick smoke

16 coming from various directions.

17 Q. Did you receive any information during the course of the morning

18 about whether there was any resistance in the village?

19 A. Yes. I received such information. The commander of the unit

20 where I was, was Mr. Miloje Bozic, a reserve officer and one of the

21 commanders in the TO. He had a Motorola, a communications device. And at

22 one point I took it and wanted to hear the commanders of the detachment,

23 to see if everything was all right in the village, because we could still

24 hear the shooting going on in the village. But the information I received

25 was that there was no resistance and that the operation was proceeding as

1 planned, and that, for the time being, we had no casualties. That's what

2 was reported to me.

3 Q. Did you eventually leave your position and walk in the direction

4 of the village of Glogova yourself, along with other members of your unit?

5 A. I took a side road around the village of Glogova, walking in the

6 direction of the west, to the west side of the village. I didn't enter

7 the village, because this macadam dirt road goes around the village. We

8 left with a group of soldiers, because we had been informed that the

9 events had finished, that the population was being gathered in the centre

10 of the village, and that we no longer had any role to play, that these

11 people would be transported.

12 On the way to Bratunac, I therefore passed by the village of

13 Glogova. In the centre of the village I could see the presence of the

14 military, the APCs and the tank were in the centre of the village. I saw

15 the police and I saw the vehicles that were to take the population in the

16 direction of Kladanj. One of them was leaving. There may have been

17 others that I had not seen. I did not stay there. I proceeded directly

18 to Bratunac to attend the funeral of Mr. Zekic, because we had agreed --

19 Q. Mr. Deronjic, while you descended into the village, did you

20 personally authorise the burning of any Muslim homes; and if so, could you

21 describe that to the Judges, please.

22 A. Yes. On two occasions I approved of the burning of some of the

23 houses. When we got to the edge of the village, a number of troops

24 entered four or five houses that were in the vicinity to check if anyone

25 was in there, in order to ensure our safety, and they told us that the

1 houses were empty. They wanted to know whether they should burn those

2 houses, and I said yes.

3 On the way to Kravica, I came across a TO unit from the village of

4 Jezestica on an elevation there. I knew their commander and I ordered

5 that several houses in the area should be set on fire, which they did.

6 Q. Now, as a result of the action against the village of Glogova, the

7 military action, at the conclusion of that action, were there any Muslims

8 left in the village? A. No. Now, I have to say that part of the population

9 had hid during the night. I know this for sure, because they had been

10 informed of our action. So a large number of people managed to hide, and in

11 the following days they came back to Glogova and in

12 some later actions numerous Serbs were killed there , including

13 Rasa Milosevic, who was killed in an ambush which was organised after this

14 action. However, for the most part, the population was removed by us, and

15 from what I know today, I know that about ten vehicles, including buses

16 and lorries, left the area carrying the local population, including women

17 and children.

18 Q. Were a substantial number of the Muslim homes burned as a result

19 of that operation?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. Were 65 Muslim villagers killed as a result of that operation?

22 A. I agree with your view. I never checked the number, but I have no

23 reason to doubt it.

24 Q. What happened to the mosque in the village?

25 A. That day, in the afternoon, I think that the mosque was blown up

1 by explosives.

2 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, where did you go -- you started to tell us

3 where you went on the 9th of May. Where did you go?

4 A. I returned to Bratunac immediately after the order that our role

5 as a TO unit was finished in Glogova. I returned to the Fontana Hotel, to

6 the funeral wake of Goran Zekic. I've already said that his family was

7 already in Bratunac. Many people gathered. We said goodbye to Goran

8 Zekic in front of the Fontana Hotel. He was taken to Ljubovija, in

9 Serbia, where he was buried at the town cemetery, according to the wishes

10 of his family. I was in the column going to Ljubovija and I attended the

11 funeral services in church, and also I went to the graveyard where

12 Mr. Zekic was buried. I attended the ceremony there as well.

13 Q. Now, following the attack on Glogova, can you tell the Judges what

14 happened to the Muslim settlements of Suha and Voljevica.

15 A. In the morning, I noticed that the army and the police acted

16 according to our agreement reached at the crisis staff, to continue with

17 the evacuation of Suha and Voljevica from the town of Bratunac. I did not

18 notice but I'm not saying that this is absolutely so, but I did not notice

19 the TO taking part in this action. Mostly it was the police and the army

20 who were calling people to come to the bus station in Bratunac or to the

21 stadium. I don't know whether there was another location perhaps in

22 Voljevica - I wasn't there - for the people to come to those locations and

23 that they would be transported in the direction of Kladanj. This

24 operation lasted the whole day.

25 In the afternoon, I left Bratunac and went to Pale.

1 Q. Now, Mr. Deronjic, did the Muslim residents of Suha and Voljevica

2 have a choice in the matter?

3 A. I must say that I did not take part in that. However, some people

4 came to see me in the morning, having heard about this call for them to

5 forcibly leave Bratunac. I have some statements, and I saw some

6 statements also at the OTP. People came to me. I wasn't able to suggest

7 anything to them. I even told one of those people that I would rather

8 leave Bratunac myself also. I didn't notice anyone being arrested or

9 escorted out of Bratunac. But because there were so many things going on,

10 because of an atmosphere of fear and panic, a large number of people

11 responded to this summons, and they gathered at these various locations in

12 order to leave Bratunac.

13 Q. But, Mr. Deronjic, I just want to put this, what you characterise

14 as an evacuation, in the proper perspective. On the night of the 8th of

15 May, a decision was taken to attack Glogova, and if that was successful,

16 then the forcible transfer of people from Suha and Voljevica would take

17 place. My question really comes down to this: Did the Muslims in Suha

18 and Voljevica have a choice? Could they have said: No. I wish to remain

19 here. We want to stay in our community. We're happy here?

20 A. No. I think that that was not a realistic option, and they did

21 not have the opportunity of staying in Bratunac, and no one was there who

22 would be able to guarantee their safety if they stayed in Bratunac.

23 Q. Now, you said that those people from those communities were

24 supposed to assemble at a particular location or locations. Where were

25 they supposed to assemble?

1 A. Just a brief remark. In the translation, it was said from those

2 municipalities, but I think the translation should be from those

3 settlements.

4 Q. Yes. All right. What I said was from those communities, but

5 settlements is the same thing. Where was it specifically they were

6 supposed to assemble?

7 A. One of the locations was the stadium in Bratunac; another location

8 was on a plateau in front of the bus station.

9 Q. Now, did you learn, prior to going to Pale, that something was

10 happening to the men?

11 A. Yes. I received information that volunteers were at the stadium

12 and that they were robbing those people first, and then that they had

13 separated a group of men from the women and children. Mr. Rodoljub

14 Djukanovic, the president of the Executive Board, and myself went there to

15 see what was going on.

16 Q. What did you see?

17 A. When I came close to the stadium, I was greeted by a group of

18 these volunteers. They were waiting for me, and I could see on the right

19 side of the stadium, along the wall, men lined up against that wall. I

20 asked what this was all about, why these people were there, and I was told

21 that there was an order from the army to detain those people in order to

22 allegedly exchange them for captured Serbs in other parts of Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina. I objected to that, and so did Mr. Djukanovic, but we

24 provoked quite a strong reaction from those armed volunteers.

25 On the way back, Djukanovic and I stopped at the police station,

1 where we found the deputy chief, or the commander - I don't remember

2 exactly who - his name was Luka Bogdanovic. We told him what was going on

3 at the stadium, and we asked that he should try to do something together

4 with the police. He said that all of his men were out in the field and

5 that he would call the people to go to those places, and except for one or

6 two police officers, he didn't have any personnel at the station.

7 Shortly after that, I was called away to go to Pale. When I

8 returned to the -- then I returned to the municipal building and then went

9 to Pale.

10 Q. Why did you go to Pale?

11 A. I cannot tell the Court exactly. I said that I was summoned to

12 go, and I still think that I was summoned to Pale, but I cannot remember

13 whether the summons was conveyed through the police or through the SDS. I

14 went with the intention of attending a meeting. I think that's what I was

15 told. I set off for Pale in a police car, escorted by one police officer.

16 Q. And Pale was the capital of the Republika Srpska; correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, did you attend a particular meeting in Pale?

19 A. Yes, Mr. Harmon. I attended the meeting. I came to the meeting.

20 I concluded that the meeting was already in progress when I arrived.

21 Q. Can you describe for the Judges the physical layout of the room

22 where this meeting took place.

23 A. According to my best recollection, it was a large room, a

24 conference room in a building. I cannot remember what building it was any

25 more. The meeting was attended by about 50 people from various

1 municipalities. This is what I was able to conclude at that time.

2 Mr. Mladic, Ratko Mladic, Mr. Radovan Karadzic, and Mr. Ostojic were

3 there, perhaps some other people, but I didn't really pay attention. I am

4 sure about these three, though.

5 Q. Mr. Deronjic, you said 50 people attended this meeting. What

6 positions do you recall those people held?

7 A. I knew some of the people. I cannot say that I knew all of them.

8 I knew a few people there. They were mostly the presidents of municipal

9 boards. And at the time, definitely, presidents of crisis staffs. Brano

10 Grujic, for example, from Zvornik, was one of the people I knew. Some

11 people I knew personally.

12 Q. Who were the other people you knew personally?

13 A. I cannot remember exactly today. I don't want to make a mistake.

14 I did see Brano Grujic. I knew him. But I don't dare -- I knew some

15 other people, such as the presidents of the municipal boards. I think

16 that I saw people from Visegrad there. I think that I saw Mr. Stanic,

17 that is, Miro Stanic, from Srbinje. But I'm not 100 per cent sure. I

18 think they were present.

19 Q. Now, where were Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Ostojic, and Ratko Mladic seated

20 in relation to the other attendees at this meeting?

21 A. First let me say that at the entrance to this conference room, as

22 far as I can remember, there was a table to the right, at which they sat.

23 So they were facing this group. They were chairing the meeting.

24 Q. When you say Mr. Ostojic, is that Mr. Velibor Ostojic?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. And you've identified in your previous testimony his role in

2 the SDS.

3 Now, in respect of the locations of Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Ostojic, and

4 Ratko Mladic, were there any maps in the room?

5 A. Yes. On the wall behind them, there was a map. I think that it

6 was a map of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I didn't really pay much

7 attention whether perhaps it was a map of Yugoslavia. In any case, the

8 topic of the meeting was Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9 Q. And what was the -- from your observations, once you arrived at

10 that meeting, what did it appear to you was the purpose of that meeting?

11 A. I can just give you my impression, which was confirmed when I

12 addressed the meeting, when I submitted my report, the point of the

13 meeting was for the local people to submit reports, either the presidents

14 of the municipal boards or the presidents of the crisis staffs. These

15 were the key figures out in the field, and they were reporting about the

16 military situation in the field. I was at the meeting for a very brief

17 time. I requested to submit my report as soon as possible, not waiting

18 for my turn, because of the seriousness of the situation in Bratunac and

19 because I needed to return to Bratunac by the evening. It was well known

20 that the situation was very risky.

21 The driver accompanied me to the meeting. His name was Vidoje

22 Radojevic. He was a police officer and my driver. We sat next to each

23 other, and I was given the opportunity to submit my report out of order,

24 or perhaps I was submitting my report when my turn came.

25 Q. What report --

1 A. About the situation in the party.

2 Q. What specifically did you report to Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Ostojic, and

3 Ratko Mladic?

4 A. Briefly - and I didn't speak for long - I informed the leadership

5 at the meeting about the situation, the events in Glogova. I said that

6 the day before, the 9th of May, we carried out the forcible transfer of

7 the population from Glogova, that the village was torched, most of the

8 village was torched, and that all the inhabitants of the village who

9 happened to be there when we came were evacuated in the direction of

10 Kladanj. I also told them, as far as I can recall, that the operation was

11 continuing in Bratunac and that Muslims were being asked to leave the area

12 of the Bratunac town and the surrounding settlements by force.

13 Q. And, Mr. Deronjic, what was the response of the people in

14 attendance at that meeting to your report?

15 A. I said that in my prior testimony. After I finished my testimony,

16 or, actually, my report, I received a round of applause from the people

17 who were sitting in the conference room. I am not counting the people who

18 were presiding over the meeting, but the people who were sitting in the

19 conference room gave me a round of applause.

20 Q. Did any of the people who were presiding over the meeting make any

21 remarks after you concluded your report?

22 A. Mr. Mladic was the first to ask me to point out on the map where

23 the village of Glogova was. That was the first time I saw Mr. Mladic. He

24 was interested in the military units and who was commanding them in

25 Bratunac, so I told him what I knew. Then Mr. Ostojic added a sentence to

1 the effect that now that municipality, the municipality of Bratunac, can

2 be painted blue. That was the comment that he made at the time.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, looking at the clock --

4 MR. HARMON: I'm looking at it very carefully, Your Honour, and I

5 have one or two more questions and I will finish.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Because I've started already by having a short

7 break, a couple of minutes from the interpreters. But if one or two

8 minutes would do, please go ahead.

9 MR. HARMON:

10 Q. Were the maps that were behind Mr. Ostojic, Mr. Mladic, and

11 Mr. Karadzic coloured with various colours and what did those colours

12 designate?

13 A. Yes. The colours represented the ethnic composition in the field.

14 The green colour marked the municipalities or the settlements. I'm not

15 sure. I didn't really pay that one attention [as interpreted]. But you

16 could see that some areas of the map were coloured green, some were blue.

17 I don't know how the Croats were represented on the map. There weren't

18 too many of them in this region, so I didn't notice that.

19 Q. What population group was represented by green, and what

20 population group was represented by blue?

21 A. The green represented Muslims, and the blue represented the Serbs.

22 MR. HARMON: I have no further questions at this point. Thank

23 you. I will be brief in my remaining areas of examination with

24 Mr. Deronjic the next time he appears.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And what means "brief"?

1 MR. HARMON: Well, I think, Your Honour, I can finish in probably

2 30 minutes or less.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. First of all, may I ask Mr. Deronjic to be

4 escorted out of the courtroom. I know, Mr. Usher, it's not entirely in

5 your hands, but ...

6 Mr. Deronjic, we'll -- presumably on Wednesday, we'll continue.

7 That would be Wednesday afternoon. A final decision has not been taken by

8 the Chamber yet whether we continue tomorrow or Wednesday, but Wednesday

9 is more likely. And may I again instruct you not to speak with anyone,

10 nor parties, nor other detained parties, nor other persons not detained,

11 to speak about your testimony given and still to be given.

12 Then you may leave the courtroom.

13 [The witness stands down]

14 JUDGE ORIE: As I indicated already that it was more likely that

15 we would continue on Wednesday, given the fact, although a bit of a

16 surprising fact for the Chamber, that the Prosecution says that it's not

17 ready. And let me be quite clear that one day being ready and the other

18 day not being ready any more needs at least some explanation, the Chamber

19 has not received yet, and we don't -- can't spend time on it now, but in

20 general terms, this change of position by the Prosecution perhaps should

21 have been announced prior to telling this Chamber in Court.

22 But it seems to be a matter of fact. The Chamber does agree with

23 the Defence that it's not practical to ask Mr. Deronjic to come in

24 tomorrow for half an hour. That means that Mr. Krajisnik should also be

25 transported for this half an hour to the courtroom. That's not a very

1 practical way of proceeding.

2 Therefore, under the conditions that the parties agree later this

3 afternoon on what their time path would be, that if the Chamber could

4 expect such a common time path to be presented later this afternoon - it

5 should not be very elaborated, but just to state that they -- and I do

6 understand that the parties have discussed the matter already - that we

7 would then continue on Wednesday, in the afternoon, at a quarter

8 past 2.00, in Courtroom II -- III. Courtroom III. I correct myself.

9 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I just say, Your Honour, that we

10 gave what we -- is a fairly simple proposed timetable. Actually, we gave

11 that at the beginning of the first break.

12 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not going to take any more time from the

13 interpreters. I do understand that you gave something to the Prosecution.

14 We'll see this afternoon whether the Prosecution agrees. If so, it's

15 quite simple. If not, we'll let the parties know what our decision will

16 be. But if we receive something acceptable for the Chamber - and it would

17 be difficult to offer something not acceptable. I add that - then we'll

18 continue next Wednesday, quarter past 2.00.

19 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.51 p.m.,

22 sine die.

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