1 Wednesday, 2 March 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.10 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in the courtroom and also to

6 those just outside the courtroom assisting us.

7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus

9 Momcilo Krajisnik.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11 Are there any further reports on communications that may have

12 taken place yesterday, in the afternoon, between Mr. Stewart and Mr.

13 Tieger?

14 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. I've got -- may -- I've got two

15 or three small points to report. May I just report them all, Your Honour,

16 including that one.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

18 MR. STEWART: The first is that Mr. Tieger and I met yesterday

19 afternoon with Ms. Cmeric, actually. Ms. Cmeric and Mr. Tieger had had a

20 long and animated conversation before we met. Their state of play is that

21 Mr. Tieger is now very helpfully reducing what we agreed to writing.

22 We're hoping to have an exchange of e-mails and produce some sort of note

23 or memo or copy e-mail for the Trial Chamber which sets out what we've

24 agreed.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber would like to receive that as soon

1 as possible because, you'll understand, your ongoing discussions are

2 relevant for the Chamber's decision, so therefore we feel more or less

3 obligated to wait until we have that result.

4 MR. STEWART: But, Your Honour, we understand that. The very last

5 remark that Your Honour has made really has to go in that direction across

6 the court, because the ball is right now in Mr. Tieger's court. But we

7 have the point, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

9 MR. HANNIS: I want to report to the court. Just before I came

10 down, I saw Mr. Tieger and he has sent the e-mail, but I don't know that

11 Mr. Stewart has had a chance to see it yet.

12 MR. STEWART: Ms. Cmeric is probably reading it even as we speak,

13 Your Honour. We'll catch up with it. I had left before it arrived.

14 JUDGE ORIE: If Ms. Cmeric can continue to work as long as we

15 speak, you might have quite some time to work.

16 MR. STEWART: The second point to report is this, Your Honour: I

17 have to say that Mr. Krajisnik has just signed the agreement in relation

18 to data transmission, so as soon as that's got to the powers that be in

19 this particular instance --

20 JUDGE ORIE: I'm happy that the matter --

21 MR. STEWART: -- it shall be working.

22 JUDGE ORIE: I'm happy that the matter has been resolved. As you

23 may know, and as Mr. Krajisnik may also know, the Chamber has really tried

24 to promote the availability of laptop and a use of that laptop that

25 assists Mr. Krajisnik.

1 MR. STEWART: We're very grateful for that, Your Honour. In fact,

2 there was just all sorts of confusion about the agreement. It confused

3 Mr. Petrov, me, Mr. Krajisnik, everybody. We got it sorted out. We put

4 our brains together and eventually managed to work it out. It's done.

5 There's no problem with that.

6 A tiny point, Your Honour. Your Honour and I agreed yesterday

7 afternoon that this extra allocation for interpreters was a $1.000. It's

8 actually a thousand euro. Just to correct that.

9 JUDGE ORIE: I said dollars, because usually remuneration goes in

10 dollars in this Tribunal, but I'm glad to hear that it's therefore 30 per

11 cent more than I thought.

12 MR. STEWART: Though I still feel the internal pain of Your

13 Honours comment that people get paid in dollars, but that's another

14 matter. So it's that, Your Honour.

15 I just wanted to add to that, though, that if any such matters are

16 at any time to be regarded by the Trial Chamber's relevant to anything to

17 the adjournment application, then we would ask for an opportunity to deal

18 with it, because to take isolated aspects of the financial arrangements

19 without any regard to the whole can lead, with respect, to error and even

20 to unfairness. So I know Your Honour is no more enthusiastic than we are,

21 I believe, to explore that in these hearings, but as long as it's all left

22 on one side, Your Honour, the Defence is content. But isolated aspects on

23 their own really have to be disregarded, unless the whole matter is

24 explored.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. May I just explain why I knew about it?

1 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, of course.

2 JUDGE ORIE: I did not, and this Chamber would not, inquire into

3 backgrounds of your submissions without letting the parties know. At the

4 same time, when we were informed that this -- that Ms. Cmeric would leave

5 the team, it was of some concern to the Chamber how communication with Mr.

6 Krajisnik would take place, and whether any additional measures had been

7 taken, just in view of the language problem. And this was not in relation

8 to the adjournment, of course I know the departure of Ms. Cmeric plays a

9 role in it, in the adjournment matter, because it causes additional

10 problems. But it was not on the basis of your motion that we inquired

11 into it, but it was mainly to our concern for the practical implications

12 of the departure of Ms. Cmeric.

13 MR. STEWART: But, Your Honour, we understand that entirely, and

14 we don't have any problem that Your Honours have that single piece of

15 information, provided with the proviso that I've indicated. Your Honour

16 will actually appreciate that it buys 40 hours of interpreters' time,

17 which would get exhausted in eight days in court.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and you would have a full-time assistant in

19 court, that would not -- certainly would not help you out.

20 MR. STEWART: That's right, Your Honour. In fact, we did -- Ms.

21 Loukas and I discussed it, we took the view that Ms. Hanson, the witness,

22 giving her witness in English, where we felt there was relatively little

23 B/C/S that would imply that that was not a priority for that resource

24 given that we have B/C/S speaking witnesses coming up. So that is the

25 explanation of the slightly unfortunate position that we are bereft of

1 B/C/S facilities immediately.

2 The last point, Your Honour, and I expect Mr. Hannis has something

3 similar, although I did mention her yesterday, I should have introduced,

4 my apologies, Ms. Vine to the Trial Chamber. I should have introduced my

5 colleague, and I say my colleague because she is an English barrister, Ms.

6 Catriona Vine, who is with us for the moment, not unhappily for very much

7 longer. We'd like her to stay forever. She is here for the moment

8 assisting us out of the goodness of her heart, If I could put it that way,

9 Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ORIE: That's fine. What could this Chamber add if

11 Mr. Stewart says he'd like you to be on board forever. Welcome to this

12 courtroom. Mr. Hannis.

13 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I also have an introduction to make

14 before we start. Assisting me today in court is one of our trial

15 attorneys, Anna Richterova. She joins the team. She previously worked on

16 the Brdjanin case with Joanna Korner. As you know, Mr. Tim Resch and

17 Magda Karagiannakis were part of our trial team but they have both left

18 the Tribunal. However, we're hoping that Ms. Richterova can carry the

19 load of both of them.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you. Although Mr. Hannis didn't say he

21 wanted to keep you forever, Ms. Richterova, I take it, is as happy with

22 your presence as the Chamber is.

23 MR. HANNIS: She is getting paid, but she's also here out of the

24 goodness of her heart.

25 JUDGE ORIE: No comment. Are you ready to continue the

1 examination-in-chief?

2 MR. HANNIS: I am, your Honour. And while we're having the

3 witness in, I thought we could hand up binder number 3 because I only have

4 two or three documents left in binder number 2.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Ms. Usher, could you please escort Ms. Hanson

6 into the courtroom.

7 [The witness entered court]

8 WITNESS: DOROTHEA HANSON [Resumed]

9 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Ms. Hanson.

10 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE ORIE: May I remind you, before you further give your

12 testimony, that you're still bound by the solemn declaration you've given

13 at the beginning of your testimony yesterday.

14 THE WITNESS: Yes, I understand.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hannis, please proceed.

16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. My case manager just stepped

17 out to hand some copies of intercept translations to the booth, and when

18 she returns, I'd like to hand the presentation binder to Ms. Hanson.

19 When we left off yesterday, Your Honour, I think we were at tab 79

20 in the presentation binder, which is master tab number 68.

21 Examined by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]

22 Q. Ms. Hanson, we were still talking about the War Commission, and we

23 had just gone through a series of documents regarding the appointments of

24 commissioners. I believe this document has some reference to the

25 abolishment of Crisis Staffs and the creation of War Commissions. Could

1 you tell the Court about this one?

2 A. Yes. This document we had seen also yesterday in a slightly

3 different context. This is a letter from the secretary of the executive

4 committee of the SDS to the presidents of the Crisis Staffs of Serbian

5 Autonomous Regions. In the first paragraph, he is telling them that

6 Crisis Staffs have been abolished by the Presidency decision of 31 May,

7 and instead of "Crisis Staffs," he says in this text, "War Commissions."

8 As we know, the decisions specified War Presidencies. In the very next

9 paragraph, he says War Presidencies. He tells these people that they

10 should set up War Presidencies in the municipalities. I take this to be a

11 confusion of terms. We saw it yesterday in our own translation, because

12 it's -- as we saw the original decision says presidencies, not

13 commissions, but he himself makes this error.

14 As I indicate in my report, in many cases we see confusion of the

15 terms, and this even among people who should know what the decision

16 actually said.

17 So it's an indication of the implementation of the Presidency

18 decision on War Presidencies, indication that the -- these people who

19 were, until now, presidents of the governments of these autonomous regions

20 and presidents of their regional Crisis Staffs are now war commissioners.

21 It's now significant that this is from the SDS to these

22 governmental figures, and saying now, any questions or -- about the

23 implementation, contact the Presidency directly, showing the contacts

24 between the SDS and the Presidency, the overlap of party functions.

25 Q. And I don't recall if yesterday, when we first looked at this

1 document, did you tell us anything about the parties to whom this document

2 was sent?

3 A. I didn't then. As I said now, each of these people, Bozidar

4 Vucurevic, was president of the government of SAO Herzegovina. He was

5 also, I believe, a member of the Main Board of the SDS. Milan Kostanic,

6 we met in an earlier context -- no, it's the other Stanic. Excuse me.

7 This is head of the SDS in Vlasenica. And Milan Novakovic, also a member

8 of the Main Board and president of the SDS, but to my shame, I can't

9 remember right now which municipality.

10 Q. Now, let me take you to the next tab, tab number 80. You also

11 told us that there appeared to be some confusion about the transition from

12 Crisis Staffs to War Presidencies, and then before that there was even

13 time to even deal with that, it was decided to form war commissions. Did

14 you see that reflected in some of the documents in the local municipality

15 documents?

16 A. Absolutely, that's how I drew my conclusions, is observing the

17 confusion at the local level.

18 Q. Before you go on, let me describe what this next document is.

19 Presentation tab 80, master tab number 126.

20 A. When I say confusion, I mean simply that the evidence I have seen

21 indicates that people do not consider that there was a significant

22 difference between them, and that the terminology was not consistently

23 applied because they did not consider there to be a significant

24 difference.

25 This document is a speech, judging from internal evidence given,

1 or at least drafted, for the third anniversary of the founding of the

2 Serbian municipality of Rajlovac. As just a speech, one has to --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hannis, the document title says "Formal Speech

4 on the Occasion of Declaration of the Rajlovac Municipality," and not "a

5 third anniversary", and it bears as the date, 23rd February, 1992, which

6 might be -- that would suggest that it would have been for the third

7 anniversary that the Rajlovac Serbian municipality would have been

8 established in February 1989, which is at least a bit of a puzzle.

9 MR. HANNIS: We believe the February '92 date is the date of the

10 establishment, and there is internal information that leads us to believe

11 that this was an event that occurred in February of 1995, so it's a

12 retrospective.

13 Your Honour, for the information of the Court and Mr. Krajisnik,

14 the portion that we intend to highlight here, I think, is at page 3 of the

15 English.

16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we'd suggest it might be a good idea --

17 I'm sorry, I think Your Honour has the same point.

18 JUDGE ORIE: I'd like to have this clarified by the expert,

19 because at least the text which I have not read, of course, starts with,

20 "Today, on the 23rd of February, 1992," which does not seem to be in --

21 looking in retrospect to that date, but rather to address the -- so could

22 you please clarify that with the expert.

23 You have heard, Ms. Hanson, what the issue was, so if you would

24 come up with a spontaneous explanation for us.

25 THE WITNESS: I've dealt with this issue myself, Your Honour, in

1 trying to understand this document. If we could look at the original in

2 Sanction, on the first page - maybe it's not immediately available in

3 Sanction, the first page of that document - but you can see that it --

4 originally it said, "On this day in 1992," and that was crossed out and

5 said "23 February 1992."

6 JUDGE ORIE: And --

7 THE WITNESS: "We met ..."

8 JUDGE ORIE: And what does that mean, "today".

9 THE WITNESS: On this date, I would take it to mean, on this date

10 in 1992, we met.

11 JUDGE ORIE: "On this date", so "today" should be on the date of

12 the 23rd of February. On the word of the text, the word is "dan," which

13 is day, but --

14 Could we have it on our screen so that the interpreters can see it

15 as well?

16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I comment, because I can't help on

17 B/C/S but I can help on English. As far as the first line is concerned,

18 it seems, from what the witness is saying, is there would be a very tiny

19 solecism in the translation because "we have met" wouldn't be the English

20 in those circumstances, it would be "we met," and "we have met" adds to

21 the confusion, because it certainly suggests that it just happened, as

22 opposed to three years ago.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just ask perhaps the interpreters if they

24 could have page 1 of the computer evidence on their screen, I take it that

25 what is stricken out -- I don't have the --

1 MR. HANNIS: Perhaps, Your Honour, we could ask Ms. Hanson to read

2 the three words in B/C/S that are stricken out.

3 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that the two lines on the top which are

4 stricken are the reserves and respective guests. And then we have the

5 original text. Could you please read that, what is stricken out, the

6 three words.

7 THE WITNESS: Na donis ne don [phoen].

8 JUDGE ORIE: Would the interpreters tell us what that means?

9 THE INTERPRETER: It means "today".

10 JUDGE ORIE: It means today.

11 THE INTERPRETER: On this day or today.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So do I understand that it is possible to

13 understand this also on that day of -- on that day in 1992, not

14 necessarily that being the present day in which -- on which the words are

15 pronounced?

16 THE INTERPRETER: It means today, on this day, this particular

17 day. Now, what that day was, perhaps the 23rd of February, I don't know.

18 JUDGE ORIE: And then we see -- could you read what is

19 handwritten, Ms. Hanson?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 23rd of February.

21 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that the interpreters have it now on their

22 screen as well. That if you take out "today," could it mean on the 23rd

23 of February, 1992?

24 THE INTERPRETER: Yes.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So then the translation is not correct to the

1 extent that "today" has been stricken out. Yes. That's at least for the

2 time being a clarification on the first three words.

3 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honour, I would ask Ms. Hanson to clarify

4 that if some of the further internal content reflects that this was

5 clearly written after February 23rd, because there's a reference to April

6 21st, 1992.

7 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. It was internal -- it was other

8 internal evidence. The very next sentence begins -- after that, the first

9 sentence that was problematic says [B/C/S spoken], "that was the time"

10 when -- or at that time many thought it was impossible. It's clearly, in

11 hindsight -- they use the past tense referring to the day on which they

12 formed the municipality.

13 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we are a hundred per cent endorsed.

14 Your Honour was ahead of us. We were 100 per cent endorsing with respect,

15 Your Honour's suggestion that the witness should give the clarification.

16 But it seems that, overall, some improved translation of this document

17 would be valuable. It's quite clear, for example, that it refers to three

18 years of existence in an activity of the Serbian municipality of Rajlovac,

19 which is a little bit of a clue. But what we have is we've got "dear

20 sirs" appearing as if it's three draft letters, whereas, in fact, it

21 appears to be a speech, so that "dear sirs" would be we suppose something

22 like, well, say "ladies and gentlemen". Not sure how many ladies were

23 present. But it's been translated in a way which, overall, seems to be

24 adding to our confusion. So perhaps the whole document ought to be

25 revisited.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we could ask specific attention from the

2 Prosecution. Is there any further dispute about this being a document -

3 and I'm also looking to Mr. Krajisnik who, of course, can read the

4 original - this document of a speech which looks back for three years?

5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, may the interpreter add that --

6 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that appears to be so.

7 JUDGE ORIE: The interpreters want to speak.

8 THE INTERPRETER: -- having read the document a little bit, it

9 could be "on this day" in the sense, on the anniversary of this day.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you. It's clear. There's no dispute

11 anymore.

12 Let's proceed.

13 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, then, Your Honour. If I could direct you

14 to the excerpts we wanted to talk about.

15 Q. I think in the English, at the bottom of page 3 in the third line

16 of the second paragraph from the bottom and also at the top of page 4.

17 A. I wanted first to show that the top of page 4, because the issue

18 right now is the distinction -- whether -- how important was the

19 distinction between War Presidencies and War Commissions.

20 Q. And for Mr. Krajisnik, I believe that would be the top of page 6,

21 or 02269288 in the B/C/S.

22 A. Yes, that's correct. The line there at the top of the English

23 translation:

24 "The War Presidency, then the War Committee," and in the English

25 translation it should be "War Commission, has been the standard". And

1 then again, "War Presidency were selected and their tasks were mostly the

2 same."

3 Other evidence I've seen indicates a similar inclination to see

4 these bodies as much the same.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 MR. HANNIS: That was the point -- that was the immediate point we

7 wanted to make with that document, Your Honour, was to show the continuing

8 confusion about the distinction between War Commissions and War

9 Presidencies and Crisis Staffs.

10 Q. I wanted to move on now to another party report, Ms. Hanson, where

11 you talked about the connection between the party and the Crisis Staffs

12 with the military. And you, I think, have in the binders some examples of

13 the roles of the Crisis Staff vis-a-vis the military.

14 A. My report had followed -- there was another section in my report,

15 but if we're going to the military, we can see --

16 Q. Well, I guess I'm talking about, sort of, the nexus of the party

17 and the government and the military --

18 A. Yes, yes, because there's a different set of documents regarding

19 military. Yes.

20 The Crisis Staff, as we saw, was tasked to coordinate defence, so

21 it coordinated with the military, also with the government and with the

22 party. It was a coordinating body to make sure that -- make sure that all

23 these different forces and resources in the municipality were working

24 together and following the policies of the SDS. So the military was one

25 important factor, but as a more complicated factor, then some of the

1 others, I wanted first to just talk about in general how the Crisis Staff

2 was a coordinating body.

3 Q. Okay. And while we still have that Rajlovac document up, is there

4 an example --

5 A. Yes. The very next sentence after the one I just read, second

6 sentence on page 4 of the English translation, talking about the War

7 Presidency, War Commission, said:

8 "Each of these bodies concentrated to establish as close as

9 possible cooperation with the military command in order to strengthen

10 defence lines."

11 And on the previous page, page 3 in the translation --

12 Q. And in the B/C/S, I believe it's on page 02269287.

13 A. 85 -- 87, yes, yes. They describe in general how the Crisis Staff

14 operated. It says:

15 "In addition --"

16 I'm sorry, Your Honour, this is the second to last paragraph on

17 page 3 of the English translation.

18 "In addition to the legally selected assembly and their organs,

19 we have appointed a Crisis Staff that has been meeting in session on a

20 daily basis and has been resolving current problems. The Crisis Staff

21 participated in saving property, organising the Territorial Defence,

22 taking over military facilities, and everything that, according to the

23 Crisis Staff, was of interest to the Serbian people. Conclusions were

24 being brought and the actions were fast."

25 Your Honour, because I've used the original before, I had, for my

1 own purposes, my translation was slightly different in terms of forms of

2 verbs. No different in context. That's why I was stumbling.

3 This shows, however, how the Crisis Staff worked, meeting daily,

4 saving property, organising the TO, and taking care of everything that the

5 Crisis Staff judged was in the interests of the Serbian people. That was,

6 I thought, a good description of how Crisis Staffs worked.

7 Q. And to go back to, sort of, the initial premises regarding Crisis

8 Staffs, part of their purpose was, to do that kind of work in the

9 municipality during times of war or imminent threat of war when the

10 municipal Assembly could not meet.

11 A. Exactly. The basic premise, as we saw in the instructions from 26

12 April 1992, and the later decisions and instructions, when the municipal

13 Assembly could not meet, the Crisis Staff was to replace the municipal

14 Assembly as the municipal authority, the highest authority in the

15 municipality.

16 Q. And later on in your presentation, do you intend to give us some

17 specific examples?

18 A. Yes. I want to present the Court with three case studies of

19 municipalities to show how this was borne out in practice. I think

20 looking through a series of Crisis Staff documents is a useful way to see

21 how they operated.

22 Q. And a reflection of that role of the Crisis Staff, sort of,

23 replacing the municipal Assembly during these times, I think, is in the

24 next document at tab 81, master tab number 145?

25 A. Yes. This is the decision of the Crisis Staff of the Serbian

1 municipality of Bratunac. It's numbered 01-I-92. It's not dated. That's

2 why I give the number. But it shows what we'll see is typical for Crisis

3 Staffs; that in item 2, "the organs of the Assembly and the executive

4 committee of the municipality shall cease working and their competencies

5 should be temporarily taken over by the Crisis Staff." And Article 5:

6 "All decisions, orders, conclusions, and other documents in the area of

7 the municipality shall be brought by the Crisis Staff of the Serbian

8 municipality of Bratunac," indicating the authorities which the Crisis

9 Staffs claimed in the municipality on the basis of replacing the municipal

10 Assembly.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, that's the last tab in binder number 2.

13 I want to move to presentation binder number 3.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me try to get it. Mr. Hannis, perhaps you

15 could pay attention to the fact that presentation tab 80, the title is

16 different than what we find in footnote 46, because in footnote 46, the

17 third anniversary appears where it does not appear on the title in tab 80.

18 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. We'll have a look at that.

19 Now if we can hand presentation binder number 3 to Ms. Hanson, and

20 if Your Honours could turn to the first tab in that binder, which is

21 presentation tab 82, master tab number 136.

22 Q. This is another reflection of that role of the Crisis Staff in the

23 municipality?

24 A. Yes. On the first page, which would be --

25 Q. The bottom of the page, last paragraph?

1 A. Yes, I just didn't know if we -- on 02265800, and on the first

2 page of the English translation, the last paragraph. This is an

3 information from the executive board of Ilijas municipality, dated the

4 21st of December, 1992, and describes the course of the war in Ilijas.

5 "At the beginning of July, in accordance with the legal acts of

6 the Republika Srpska, the municipal Crisis Staff and the municipal wartime

7 Presidency stopped their operations and started to work the municipal

8 wartime commission executive board and municipal administrative organs.

9 The municipal wartime commission is the link," or a link, "between the

10 authority organs and the command of the Serbian army," again, showing the

11 continuity between Crisis Staff and War Presidency and War Commission, and

12 that the War Commission is a link between the municipal organs and the

13 army command.

14 Q. Anything else from that document?

15 A. I believe that's all I intended to say.

16 Q. Let me move on to presentation tab 83, Your Honours, master tab

17 number 141, from Sanski Most municipality.

18 A. This is conclusions of the Crisis Staff of Sanski Most, dated the

19 30th of May, 1992. If you note the makeup of the Crisis Staff, it is

20 consistent with the instructions issued and, moreover, with the intention

21 of the Crisis Staff as coordinating various political, military, and other

22 forces. We see that the commander of the 6th Krajina Brigade is a member,

23 number 10, Branko Basara; also number 6 and 7, the chief of the police

24 station and the commander of the TO; number 4, the president of the Club

25 of Deputies of the SDS in the municipal Assembly. And also of interest

1 here is the description for number 2, Vlado Vrkes, the deputy president of

2 the Crisis Staff, "in charge of political problems and the implementation

3 of the ideas of the Serbian democratic party leadership at the level of

4 the republic region and municipality." So we see this confluence of

5 party, military, and government in one body.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you one additional question. We suddenly

7 see here Nedeljko Radusa, which is a name not familiar to the Chamber.

8 Could you please look at the original to see if it's a proper reflection

9 of what the original says?

10 THE WITNESS: It should be.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

12 THE WITNESS: It is Radusa in the original.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Since this name has appeared before in this

14 courtroom, it's good to know that the translation is not correct.

15 Please proceed.

16 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour, I think that document has already

17 been presented to the Court in another exhibit, and we addressed that

18 issue of the error in the translation at that time as well. Thank you.

19 Q. Next, in your report you talk about how Crisis Staffs operated as

20 part of the overall Republika Srpska system, and how they not only viewed

21 themselves, but how they were viewed from the highest level as being an

22 integral part of that system.

23 In tab 84, I think you have an example of that. This is master

24 tab number 468, and this is from a national Assembly session in November

25 1994. Could you direct us to the quote that you wanted to highlight here?

1 A. Yes. It's on the bottom of page 347 in the translation, and page

2 02153546 in the original. We looked at this passage before because it was

3 a reference to the instruction A and instruction B. Karadzic reminds the

4 deputies, "you remember about instruction A and B."

5 He says: "We have Crisis Staffs and it was clear that they were

6 the authority. They could make mistakes but they were the authority. The

7 people were not left out the authority because there was a Crisis Staff."

8 So I repeated it here just to highlight the fact that the Bosnian

9 Serb leadership regarded the Crisis Staffs as their authority in the

10 municipality.

11 Q. Let's move to tab 85 in the present --

12 MR. STEWART: May I make an observation, please. I don't think

13 it's a problem, but it's just that when Mr. Hannis introduced his question

14 at page 18, line 22, I think it was, by saying "next you talk in your

15 report as to how the Crisis Staffs operated," et cetera, et cetera,

16 "viewed from the highest level as being an integral part of that system."

17 I appreciate that all Mr. Hannis is trying to do is just identify the

18 particular aspect of the witness' report which is being dealt with. We

19 would just ask that, if possible, and if not too inconvenient, that when

20 an introductory passage is included, that Mr. Hannis could give

21 specifically the paragraphs in the report. I see him nodding. It seems

22 that there's no particular problem about that.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

24 MR. HANNIS: That's a point well taken, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

1 MR. HANNIS: That particular point was from paragraph 41 of her

2 report.

3 I should indicate, Your Honour, we now have copies of her report

4 here, and we could have those handed around or marked as an exhibit at any

5 time that's convenient for the Registry.

6 Q. One more example regarding paragraph 41 of that point that you

7 just mentioned, I believe at tab 85, this is an intercepted telephone

8 conversation?

9 A. Yes, between General Ratko Mladic and Fikret Abdic on the 21st of

10 April, 1992. Just a very short passage that indicates, again, that the

11 leadership saw Crisis Staffs as part of the state system.

12 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honour, this is a long intercept but we're

13 only going to play a short segment. In the English hard copy, it's at

14 page 7. The third speaker from the bottom up is Ratko Mladic.

15 Q. Is that the one, Ms. Hanson?

16 A. Yes, that's the one.

17 MR. HANNIS: And in the B/C/S for Mr. Krajisnik, I think that

18 would be found on page 0322-0328, almost the middle of the page. And

19 we'll try and play that now. I think it is very short.

20 [Intercept played]

21 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

22 "Ratko MLADIC: Will you talk to them? Call the government of the

23 Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and resolve the matter with them.

24 Crisis Staffs and those associations are under their control."

25 A. As I said, Mladic says that at least he sees Crisis Staffs as

1 being under the control of the government.

2 MR. HANNIS:

3 Q. And this was a conversation from the 21st of May, 1992?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. In general, just to give us a little background of what that

6 conversation was about between Mr. Abdic and General Mladic?

7 A. I believe it was the withdrawal of the JNA forces, of what is

8 being left behind and what is being taken with them.

9 Q. Now I want to move to another topic regarding Crisis Staffs

10 receiving orders from the higher levels of the government. Tab 86 is

11 master tab number 165. And can you tell us what this is and what point

12 you wanted to make by including this?

13 A. Well, I wanted to say that evidence which shows the way the Crisis

14 Staffs were part of the state system is the fact that the leadership or

15 state organs issued orders to crisis staffs, both to Crisis Staffs as a

16 category in general and to individual Crisis Staffs.

17 This decision is a decision of the Presidency, signed by Karadzic

18 as president of the Presidency, dated the 2nd of June, 1992, the decision

19 on the return of those who left the territory of the Serbian Republic of

20 BiH -- I'm sorry, the return of those who left to the territory, I'm

21 sorry.

22 In both -- in Article 1, we see that people who left the Serb

23 Republic are instructed to return and report to the Crisis Staff; if they

24 can't go back to their place of residence, then the nearest Crisis Staff.

25 In Article 3, it says: "The municipal Crisis Staff shall decide

1 on the further engagement of those people who come back."

2 Article 4 says: "Those people who do not explain or justify their

3 inability to return to the Crisis Staff shall be denied the right of

4 citizenship." And that those people will lose their -- their property

5 will be used temporarily for the needs of the Serb republics, and the

6 Crisis Staffs shall take care of and use that property.

7 So the Presidency is clearly tasking municipal crisis staffs as a

8 governmental category, with important tasks of deciding how to use the

9 property of people who don't return, and deciding -- indeed, Article 4,

10 deciding their right to citizenship, of people who don't return.

11 Q. Let's turn to tab number 87 in the presentation binder, master tab

12 number 170.

13 A. This is an order from the prime minister of the Serbian Republic,

14 dated the 20th of May, 1992. I'm just looking at the -- although the

15 preamble says the session held on the 21st of May. But it, similarly, is

16 an order from the government tasking crisis staffs as a category. If you

17 look at number 3, it says:

18 "The order shall be sent to all municipal crisis staffs in the

19 Serbian Republic. Municipal crisis staffs are required to transmit this

20 order to the competent organs."

21 So crisis staffs are seen as, again, a category to which the

22 government gives taskings, and the transmission belt by which this order

23 is passed further down to the municipal organs.

24 Q. And a point of translation. I see the name in the English

25 translation is Branko Ceric.

1 A. Yes, but the prime minister was Branko Djeric.

2 Q. And how is it spelled in the original B/C/S?

3 A. Djeric.

4 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, if Defence counsel is willing to agree

5 that that should be Djeric, perhaps we can do that without having to have

6 a revised translation.

7 MR. STEWART: Yes. Well, we wondered "how is it spelled in the

8 original B/C/S" is going to come across on the transcript. But we do

9 agree with that, yes.

10 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

11 Any question, Your Honour, before I move on to the next one?

12 Q. Now, you indicated that, in addition to these orders to all crisis

13 staffs as a group, did you see examples of orders to specific crisis

14 staffs?

15 A. Yes, indeed, and I have --

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do have a -- Mr. Hannis, I do have a

17 question.

18 In the document which explains, as you said, the influence of the

19 central government authorities of the crisis staffs, the document in tab

20 86, we see that in a document dated the 2nd of June, we find an

21 instruction saying that "those who have temporarily left the territory of

22 the Serbian Republic are obliged to return to their places of residence as

23 soon as possible, until the 20th of May at the latest," which is a --

24 well, not easy to obey. Is there any interpretation or explanation of

25 that? I see that, apart from that it's published in the Official Gazette

1 of the 8th of June, that people -- you know, for criminal lawyers,

2 retroactivity is a sensitive issue.

3 Is there any explanation for that, Ms. Hanson?

4 THE WITNESS: I could offer one -- one possible explanation. I

5 have not seen -- I have not seen a document that would explain it fully.

6 But if you notice, the preamble says it's the acting presidents of the

7 republic, but it is signed for Karadzic as president of the Presidency.

8 And it may be that there was a decision earlier in May at the time that

9 they had acting presidents, and when this decision was published in the

10 Official Gazette, by then they had a Presidency and Karadzic was president

11 of the Presidency. It may be that there was an earlier decision - I have

12 not seen such a one - that was then published in the Gazette, without this

13 discrepancy being --

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and perhaps that would be a reference to an

15 earlier decision than imposing an obligation on this at this very moment.

16 THE WITNESS: I --

17 MR. HANNIS:

18 Q. And because some of these obligations here are continuing --

19 A. It was certainly an ongoing obligation. We will see that crisis

20 staffs did act according to this decision later.

21 Q. And what was the time period during which there were acting

22 presidents within the republic, approximately?

23 A. I can't answer that. I focussed on the municipal level and I

24 don't want to --

25 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I believe that was information that Mr.

1 Treanor talked about.

2 Q. Can we go to tab 87. No, I think we talked about that already.

3 A. Yes, 87.

4 Q. Then to tab 88, which is master tab 180 -- 127. Can you tell us

5 what this is?

6 A. Well, I connect that with tab 87. As you'll recall, 87 was the

7 order from the president -- prime minister regarding mobilisation, and

8 tasking Crisis Staffs to -- saying that they will get this order and act

9 upon it. And tab 88 are the conclusions of the Crisis Staff of Sanski

10 Most of the 21st of May, 1992, acting on a proclamation by the president

11 of the Presidency, Karadzic, regarding mobilisation of forces and

12 equipment. So it indicates that orders, such as mobilisation, were

13 received and implemented at the municipal level. It's a linkage.

14 Q. I have a question concerning tab 88. The Crisis Staff document

15 from Sanski Most indicates that they're ordering this mobilisation on the

16 basis of a proclamation from President Karadzic.

17 A. Yes. Whether they got the decision directly from Karadzic or this

18 -- as passed on by Djeric, because Djeric's order was, in turn, based on

19 the decision of the president of the general mobilisation of forces and

20 resources. It's not clear from this document how exactly the Crisis Staff

21 received the order. But we know from Djeric's, that Crisis Staffs were

22 sent that order from Djeric and we see it implemented.

23 Q. Now I want to get to some examples of orders to specific Crisis

24 Staffs. Tab 89 in the presentation binder, master tab 157. Please tell

25 us what that is.

1 A. This is a letter from secretary of the government of the Serb

2 Republic to the Crisis Staff of Ilijas, dated the 15th of May, 1992,

3 asking them to arrange passage of a group of prisoners who are travelling

4 from Pale to Visoko. So we see the government here coordinating between

5 Crisis Staffs on the question of prisoner transport, and addressing a

6 Crisis Staff individually.

7 Q. And tab number 90 in the presentation binder, which would be

8 master tab 158 in the exhibit.

9 A. This is a report on activities from the Crisis Staff of Novo

10 Sarajevo to the president of the Presidency. We'll look at it in a

11 slightly different context again soon. But here it's noticeable that it

12 is the Crisis Staff reporting to the president.

13 And in this context, thinking of orders, I wanted to look at a

14 later page --

15 Q. Item number 8?

16 A. Yes, item number 8, page 3 in the English translation, page

17 00855161 in the original, showing that they have received orders from the

18 Presidency and granted them all the authority one would expect. The

19 Crisis Staff -- this is the second sentence from the bottom.

20 "The Crisis Staff has considered your draft decision made at the

21 session on 5 June 1992 to form War Presidencies in Serbian municipalities,

22 and has reached the conclusion," to summarise, "that there's no need for

23 War Presidency here."

24 On the next page, as they describe why they don't need a War

25 Presidency, the middle of the next page, in the translation page 4:

1 "We request that you consider the matter and give us urgent

2 instructions and orders. It is our proposal that War Presidencies be

3 established in municipalities under full occupation where it is impossible

4 to operate in any other fashion."

5 In this context, I want to show that this document shows that the

6 Crisis Staff is receiving Presidency decisions, is reacting to them, and

7 is requesting further orders and instructions from the Presidency.

8 Q. Next in the presentation binder, tab 91.

9 MR. HANNIS: Pardon me.

10 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I apologise, but I should like to

11 go back a little bit to table 89, about the Ilijas Crisis Staff. I'm

12 sorry for going back a little.

13 In this document, in the last sentence, we read [In English] "...

14 Ilijas municipality."

15 I would like to ask the witness what this witness means, because

16 my understanding is that these documents were seized, were found on

17 site. The instruction was not in effect because the precaution was taken

18 to recommend to destroy this document. Is this something that you came

19 across in other documents or not, other documents with this type of

20 recommendation. The last sentence is that we ask permission to be -- for

21 this approval to be destroyed the moment the prisoners leave the territory

22 of Ilijas municipality.

23 THE WITNESS: I have not seen any other such instruction on the

24 document, but this document was found in the archives of the government,

25 so it is perhaps a copy of a document that was sent to Ilijas Crisis

1 Staff. It was not found in Ilijas, it was found in the government

2 archives, which might explain why it wasn't destroyed.

3 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] And this type of instruction was

4 not found in other documents, was it?

5 THE WITNESS: No, I have not seen anything with that phrasing.

6 No, sir.

7 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. Ms. Hanson, I think we were just about to talk about tab 91, which

10 is master tab 403.

11 A. Yes. These are the conclusions of the Sokolac Crisis Staff of the

12 20th of April, 1992. And here I bring your attention to number 4 on the

13 first page of both the original and translation.

14 "Competent organs should carry out the order issued by the

15 Ministry of Defence of the Serbian Republic." And then says -- goes on to

16 say that: "The president of the Crisis Staff and the commander of the TO

17 staff will meet with the Minister of Defence on the account of the issue

18 of keeping part of the equipment in the territory of Sokolac."

19 I don't know -- we can't tell from this specifically which order,

20 but nonetheless they've received an order from the Ministry of Defence,

21 are instructing the municipal organs to carry it out, and want to meet

22 with the minister to discuss it further. Again, of orders,

23 implementation, and contacts.

24 MR. HANNIS: I just wanted to raise one point in connection with

25 Judge Hanoteau's question before we talked about this. That order

1 regarding the movement of prisoners in Pale, Your Honours, Judge Orie and

2 Judge Canivell, will recall that we had a witness from Pale who testified

3 live and we presented some documents in connection with the movement of

4 prisoners from Pale at that time. And if it's of interest to the Judges,

5 that's a place that I would direct you to have some reference that may

6 have a link to that particular order.

7 Q. Now, I want to move on to paragraph 41 in your report where you

8 talk about Crisis Staffs operating as part of the Republica -- I'm sorry.

9 Before -- strike that. I'm talking about what we just talked about.

10 I want to talk about examples of Crisis Staffs, not necessarily

11 receiving orders from the centre but receiving support from the higher

12 level of the government. Did you find examples of that in your study?

13 A. Yes. I found several examples that indicate that the government

14 was materially supporting Crisis Staffs.

15 Q. Let me direct you to tab 92 in the presentation binder, master tab

16 number 173.

17 A. These are the minutes of the meeting of the government of the Serb

18 Republic of the 18th of May, 1992. If you look at -- under item 1 in the

19 minutes, the end of item 1, on page 2 in the translation, and that's

20 01245319 in the original, on the list -- numbered list, number 4, the

21 Ministry of Finance was put in charge of giving aid, that is, 30 temporary

22 loans, to Crisis Staffs, so the government is directing its Ministry of

23 Finance to provide loans to Crisis Staffs. Then under agenda item 2 on

24 the same page, bottom of the page:

25 "It was concluded that aid be given to the Novo Sarajevo and

1 Hadzici Crisis Staffs, and that the amount of aid be determined according

2 to the situation in these municipalities."

3 Q. And at tab 93 in the presentation binder, master tab 174.

4 A. It's the next session, the 21st of May, minutes of the government

5 session. Similarly, aid being discussed. Under agenda item 4 --

6 Q. Can you direct us to that?

7 A. I'm just trying to find it in the -- it's on page 3 in the

8 translation, fourth item in the list.

9 Q. And in the original?

10 A. In the original ...

11 Q. The bottom of --

12 A. I can't see the ERN because it's just a highlighted section.

13 01245323, the bottom of that page.

14 "Regarding the request of information for funds for the purchase

15 of uniforms and of Crisis Staff, Stari Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Centre

16 Sarajevo, Rajlovac, the finance minister to prepare a proposal."

17 So, again, finance minister being tasked to see about funding some

18 Crisis Staffs.

19 Q. Next, presentation tab 94, master tab number 357. What does that

20 show?

21 A. This is an overview of the budget of the Serbian municipality of

22 Ilijas, from the 11th of May to the 30th of June, 1992. And in the first

23 section on income, we see that the bulk of the income of the municipality,

24 13 million dinars out of 16.700.000 came from the Serbian Republic -- came

25 from the government of the Serbian Republic. On the 11th of May, order

1 number 18, 3 million; on the 22nd of May, order 60, 10 million.

2 To give the Court some idea of roughly the order of magnitude at a

3 time of inflation, 16 million, according to the official exchange rate, I

4 looked at the official exchange rate for the 1st of June, to give a rough

5 figure, it's the --

6 Q. 1st of June of --

7 A. Of 1992, yes. Sorry. It's about $50.000, roughly, U.S. dollars.

8 And the 13 million that they received from the government is about 40.000.

9 It's about 80 per cent of their budget, anyway, came from the government.

10 That's just to give you an idea of the order of magnitude.

11 Q. Let's move to presentation tab 95, master tab 176.

12 A. This is a request for issuing of arms and ammunition, signed by

13 the Minister of Economy. The exact addressee is not clear, but it's dated

14 the 24th of May, 1992. And the minister is instructing that the Crisis

15 Staff Grbavica, according to their request, be issued, as we see,

16 machine-guns, automatic rifles, ammunition, and so on.

17 Q. And quickly, tab 96, master tab 178.

18 A. A request from the prime minister to the Bauxite Company, to the

19 attention of Rajko Dukic, dated the 24th of May, 1992, asking the Bauxite

20 Company to supply fuel for the needs of the Pale municipal Crisis Staff.

21 So these show that the government gave monetary support but also arms and

22 fuel to individual Crisis Staffs.

23 Q. Thank you. Now I do want to move on to another section of your

24 report.

25 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask one question in between.

1 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE ORIE: I see that in tab 95, it's the Ministry of Economy

3 that provides the weaponry. I would expect some --

4 THE WITNESS: It could also be industry. The word -- perhaps the

5 interpreters can explain, but the word "[B/C/S spoken]" can mean both

6 industry or economy.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could the interpreters help us out? But then,

8 of course, you would have to read it. It says --

9 THE WITNESS: "Ministarstvo Ekonomije."

10 THE INTERPRETER: Ministry of the Economy.

11 JUDGE ORIE: But at least it's not the Ministry of Defence.

12 THE WITNESS: No, not at all.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

14 THE WITNESS: But it could also be "ekonomije" as industrial

15 production.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That would, under those circumstances, mean

17 that the ministry responsible for the production of weaponry would tell

18 where the weaponry should be ...

19 THE WITNESS: It's not know -- there is no addressee on this, so

20 we don't know to whom -- to whom the Crisis Staff -- to whom this letter

21 was addressed, who actually issued it to the Crisis Staff.

22 JUDGE ORIE: And Mr. Vitkovic was -- do you know that name?

23 THE WITNESS: No, I don't.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, okay.

25 Please proceed.

1 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. Now, I wanted to move to paragraph 42 in your report where you

3 talk about examples of the Crisis Staffs acknowledging the higher

4 authorities on whose behalf they were acting or on whose orders they were

5 following.

6 Tab 97 in the presentation binder, master tab number 185.

7 A. Yes. This is the bulletin of the War Presidency of Kotor Varos,

8 dated the 24th of July. It was simply a way in which the War Presidency

9 described its work and informed the municipality.

10 Under the section "Resettling the Population," page 6 in the

11 translation, page 00416475 in the original, describing the moving out of

12 Muslims and Croats, the third paragraph from the top of page 3:

13 "The War Presidency and other relevant organs, showing full

14 responsibility for these unfortunate people and acting in accordance with

15 the existing laws and regulations of the Serbian Republic of BH, the

16 region, and the municipality, has begun resettling the population in an

17 organised fashion."

18 I chose that passage because it shows that the Crisis Staff, or

19 War Presidency in this case, took its actions, felt it was acting in

20 accordance with the laws and regulations of the republic. We'll see this

21 again in the case studies. In all kinds of decisions, large and small,

22 they cite the law -- they cite laws and regulations and they see

23 themselves as acting in accordance with them.

24 Q. Another example of this is in presentation tab 98, master tab --

25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Mr. Prosecutor.

1 Regarding this bulletin of the War Presidency, could you give us some

2 clarification regarding the actual bulletins. Did they exist for all the

3 War Presidencies? Did they exist for the Crisis Staffs? To whom they

4 were addressed and how regularly they were addressed? Thank you, madam.

5 THE WITNESS: I have not seen in every municipality such a

6 bulletin. As we saw yesterday, we do have some municipal gazettes from

7 municipalities, but this one is different, it's not an official gazette,

8 it's of an informational newsletter. And I have only seen anything quite

9 like this from Kotor Varos. I can't say that it didn't happen elsewhere,

10 but this kind of informational newsletter as opposed to an official

11 gazette, I've seen only here. I think we have about eight issues of it.

12 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, for the Court's direction, I know from

13 Sanski Most we did have a document called the "Informator", I think was

14 the translation which was of a similar nature being more in the form of a

15 narrative description. We also have a report on the work of the War

16 Presidency in Brcko, which is more in the nature of a summary.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one additional question in relation to

18 page 6 of tab 97.

19 You showed that they acted in accordance with the existing laws

20 and regulations of the Serbian Republic. What I'm interested in is

21 whether I do understand the wording of this paragraph, on what was done in

22 accordance with these laws and regulations.

23 It starts by saying that many Muslims and Croats were feeling that

24 they and their families were not safe, seeking a way out, and then later

25 on it's explained that they had begun resettling the population in an

1 organised fashion. Of course, resettling could mean a lot of things; to

2 put them back in the place where they come from, but also to -- do I

3 understand from what follows is that this activity is in accordance with

4 the wishes expressed by these population groups and to the transportation

5 and appropriate protection has been provided for such people as far as the

6 first border area, that finally the activity was to escort them out of the

7 territory? I'm also reading the next three lines: "Three convoys of such

8 people have been safely escorted away to date."

9 Does this mean that the activity, in accordance with the law, was

10 to escort Muslims and Croats out of the territory, apparently at least

11 that's what the document says, in accordance with their wishes as well and

12 because they did not feel comfortable there? Is that a correct

13 understanding?

14 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was about to point, Your Honour, to the

15 sentence on the convoys, but you saw it yourself. So yes, this document

16 says that -- it's describing the process of organising convoys of Muslims

17 and Croats and taking them out of the municipality to the first border

18 area. This document says it was in accordance with their wishes.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

20 Please proceed.

21 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. I believe we were going to look at -- I believe we were ready to

23 look at presentation tab 98, master tab 187.

24 A. This is a proposal of the War Presidency of the Bosanska Krupa to

25 the command of the 1st Podgrmac Brigade, dated the 25th of May, 1992. And

1 the War Presidency proposes that the army prepare to cleanse the left bank

2 of the River Una, including the right back of the Una, in the action; to

3 -- and in the course of preparing and cleansing the left bank of the Una,

4 to destroy and pull as many residential and other buildings as possible,

5 including demolishing tunnels and setting fire to a forest.

6 And what I found significant under "reasons," item 1 for this

7 their reason for this proposal, is the political determination to have the

8 border of -- the original is a little confused here, "to have the border

9 of Serbian municipality autonomous region Banja Luka, Serbian Republic of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina and a Serbian state established along the River Una up

11 to Bosanska Otoka. The confusion of terminology, if you just read --

12 understand, the border -- everything borders here the municipality and the

13 ARK and the state, so since those are our borders, the war -- as decided,

14 Your Honours may recall that -- we'll get to it in the 12th May session of

15 the Assembly, that was -- the borders were established there.

16 So I see that -- I bring this here because the War Presidency is

17 acting on the political decision and asking the army to take action on the

18 basis of that political decision.

19 Q. And this is dated the 25th of May, about 13 days after the 12 May

20 session, where the strategic objectives announcing the Una River as one of

21 the borders were announced?

22 A. Yes, thank you. The Una River was specified as the border at the

23 12 May session.

24 Q. Now we have a few minutes left before the break. Let me move to

25 another topic that's related. In paragraph 43 of your report, you say, in

1 addition to acknowledging the central authority of the higher bodies, the

2 Crisis Staffs also reported to these higher organs?

3 A. Yes. Reporting is an important indication of the -- both the

4 communications between the municipal level and the republican level but

5 also of the hierarchy.

6 So the next tab, or should you say it?

7 Q. Yes. Tab number 99, master tab number 193.

8 A. It's the minutes of a session of the National Security Council and

9 the government of the Serbian Republic of the 20th of April, 1992. And if

10 you see number 9:

11 "The reports on the works of Crisis Staffs and municipal

12 governments were adopted."

13 Number 10: "Suggestions on the use of the -- of previous reports

14 by the Crisis Staffs were adopted."

15 So the National Security Council and government has received

16 reports on the work of Crisis Staffs as early as the 28th of April.

17 Q. Earlier -- I just want to make reference to tab number 45, which

18 we talked about yesterday, which was a telex from Bijeljina Crisis Staff.

19 Do you recall that one --

20 A. Yes, from Bijeljina Crisis Staff dated the 1st of April, to the

21 SDS Main Board.

22 Q. Is that one of the earliest examples?

23 A. Well, we had examples of reporting via the Assembly throughout

24 that period, but of -- that is -- Bijeljina, as we know, is one of the --

25 where the conflict broke out earliest, and it's a report on the day of the

1 takeover of Bijeljina, the main -- the Crisis Staff is reporting to the

2 Main Board of the SDS on that day.

3 Q. Let's move to tab number 100 in the presentation binder, master

4 tab number 158.

5 A. This is a document we saw earlier that I said I would be

6 discussing in a slightly different context. I don't mean to fill up my

7 binders, but I use one document for different purposes. And in this case,

8 it is clearly a report on activities of the Crisis Staff of Novo Sarajevo

9 to the Presidency, dated the 5th of June. And I noted here, on page 3 in

10 the translation, page 00845160, that one of the activities on which the

11 Crisis Staff reported to the Presidency is the treatment of Muslims and

12 Croats. It says:

13 "Our public attitude is very correct. Secretly, the police apply

14 the usual procedure to people who were engaged in military activities

15 against us."

16 Q. And to whom was this report directed?

17 A. The last page, page 5 in the translation, indicates that copies

18 were sent to Radovan Karadzic and to Ostojic. Velibor Ostojic was the

19 Minister of Information in the Serb Republic.

20 Q. And did you see some evidence that reflected that this report had,

21 indeed, been received at a higher level? Let me take you to tab 101,

22 master tab 191.

23 A. Yes. This report appears to have been received and discussed at

24 the government level. This document is the minutes of the government

25 session of the 7 of June, 1992. And we'll see on the agenda, agenda item

1 6, the report of the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff. If we look further in

2 the minutes -- I'm sorry, you'll see under the attendees, you'll see that

3 Velibor Ostojic was there, and just under the minutes, under 6, the

4 government acknowledged the report of the Crisis Staff -- the report of

5 the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff. So it appeared that that report was, in

6 indeed, received and acknowledged by the government.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, we're one or two minutes early but would

9 this be a good point to break?

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps I can ask a question to the witness

11 first. I do understand that we're going, to some extent, which you

12 mentioned in footnote 63 of your report. I don't know if you have your

13 report.

14 THE WITNESS: I don't have it.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Could we provide the witness with her report.

16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

17 JUDGE ORIE: If you look at paragraph 43, page 18, it says: "The

18 43, page 18, it says: "The Crisis Staff report to central state organs of

19 the Republika Srpska, including the Presidency, the Assembly, and various

20 ministries," and then reference is made to footnote 63. If I go through

21 footnote 63, I have difficulties to find confirmation that the Crisis

22 Staffs reported to the Assembly. Could you tell me where we find that in

23 footnote 63?

24 THE WITNESS: From Novo Sarajevo, it perhaps doesn't indicate

25 actually putting that the intention that the Crisis Staff was formed by

1 the Assembly of the Serbian People, that is, the Assembly should discuss

2 the Crisis Staff's work.

3 JUDGE ORIE: That's different. You're right that they reported,

4 not that it was their duty to report to the organ that had founded these

5 Crisis Staffs. But you're right, the Crisis Staffs reported to the

6 central state organs, and you give, then, one, two, three, four, five,

7 six, seven, eight examples of such reporting. And I have some difficulty

8 in finding reports to the Assembly.

9 THE WITNESS: What I showed with the Assembly sessions, which we

10 will also see more in the next few documents in my presentation, are

11 members of Crisis Staffs reporting to the Assembly on what happened in

12 their municipality. It was not the Crisis Staff as an organ but members

13 of Crisis Staffs informing the Assembly of what was going on in the

14 municipalities.

15 JUDGE ORIE: So you make a distinction between Crisis Staffs and

16 members of Crisis Staffs. Do you also make a distinction between the

17 Assembly and members of the Assembly? Because I see at least in footnote

18 63, and that was where I had some doubt, but of course I've not seen the

19 document, the last item is Zivinice SDS Crisis Staff sent an appeal to

20 Krajisnik. Of course, Mr. Krajisnik is --

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, and, in fact, in that document, it specifies to

22 Krajisnik -- to the president of the Assembly, it's sent to him as

23 president of the Assembly.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So he was addressed as --

25 THE WITNESS: As president of the Assembly.

1 JUDGE ORIE: As president of the Assembly. So it was not a report

2 to the Assembly directly but to the president of the Assembly.

3 THE WITNESS: The president of the Assembly.

4 JUDGE ORIE: So therefore, I do understand, that apart from this

5 example, I do not find any examples of reports to the Assembly in footnote

6 63; is that correct?.

7 THE WITNESS: Not reports as a written report. We'll see, as I

8 say, an Assembly discussion.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps not a footnote. We'll find other matters,

10 but not in 63.

11 THE WITNESS: No.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

13 Yes. We'll have a break until 11.00

14 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

15 --- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, you may proceed -- Mr. Hannis.

17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I indicated to Mr. Hannis, just very

18 briefly, I have two points to mention. I did say to Mr. Hannis -- they're

19 very brief. One is positive, one is not so positive.

20 The positive is that we're very close to agreement between Mr.

21 Tieger and myself. I looked at the e-mail exchange, and subject to one or

22 two observations, I'm fairly confident we'll sort that out in the next

23 break. If that's over-optimistic, which I don't think it will be, we'll

24 certainly do it very shortly after court and get something to Your

25 Honours. We're, in principle, agreed. It's just a question of putting it

1 in a suitable form for Your Honours, so it records one, two, three, four,

2 five, six where we are.

3 The second point is this: I've just been informed that I'm simply

4 unable to give or leave with Mr. Krajisnik --

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, let me stop you. I have been informed

6 about the problem you have. It's a practical matter which need not be

7 discussed in open court. It's about your ability to give the binders to

8 Mr. Krajisnik so that he can consult them in the Detention Unit.

9 MR. STEWART: Your Honours it has implications, it has

10 implications for the very issues -- I'm not revealing in court anything

11 improper.

12 JUDGE ORIE: No, no, no, it's just --

13 MR. STEWART: -- I don't know anything about security details.

14 JUDGE ORIE: I'm suggesting to you that we'll try to find a

15 solution during the next break, and I'm available to assist you in that

16 respect. But I already gave you some guidance that there is a relatively

17 strict set of rules in respect of various parties, including the Dutch

18 police force, who is responsible for the transportation from the -- this

19 building to the Detention Unit. There are other services included, such

20 as the OLAD and the Detention Unit. They have all their own

21 responsibilities. I do agree that we should find the most efficient way

22 of making it possible for Mr. Krajisnik to consult the documents, but I'd

23 rather not discuss it in court.

24 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I -- I am grateful for Your

25 Honour's offer of assistance in this. The only comment I would make, Your

1 Honour is this: It has inevitably -- it is a further drain on time and

2 money for the Defence team to deal with this problem, and I hope that is

3 understood. And in our submission, it is unfortunately a wasteful

4 expenditure of further money and time in dealing with solving this

5 particular difficulty. So if Your Honour can help us with that, it will

6 improve the use of resources to that extent.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's see what we can do.

8 Before I give you an opportunity to proceed, Mr. Hannis, Judge

9 Hanoteau would like to put a question to the witness, I take it in

10 relation to one of the previous documents, or the present one.

11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Once again, I'm asking you to go

12 back a little. I hope nobody will mind. Tab 98, please.

13 Madam Witness, I understand that you have drawn our attention to

14 the fact that these War Presidencies or War Committees had true authority,

15 according to my understanding, over the military commanders. I'm a bit

16 surprised to find in this document the word "proposal," which, to my

17 understanding, means a proposal, a suggestion. When you have hierarchial

18 reports, then one might think it would be an instruction, a command, an

19 order, to this commander of the 1st Brigade. Could you give me some

20 clarification of this point? Thank you, madam.

21 THE WITNESS: That's a very important question, the question of

22 the command authority of Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies. As we'll

23 see, I have a series of documents, quite an extensive part of my

24 presentation is devoted to that issue, because there is no one simple

25 answer. Some Crisis Staffs did order the military units in their

1 municipalities; others saw their function as more limited to coordination

2 and support. So we see a range of -- a range in the extent to which

3 Crisis Staffs could or did command. So we'll see -- there will be orders,

4 there will be recommendations, there will be -- simply providing the

5 troops and the logistical support.

6 In this case, the fact that it's a recommendation to a brigade

7 suggests that this War Presidency is not claiming command authority over

8 this brigade, if that helps.

9 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Quite. Thank you, madam.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Hannis.

11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 During the break, I spoke with one of the interpreters who

13 suggested that it might be helpful with them that, because I think --

14 because the witness and I speak so rapidly sometimes, if, when she were

15 reading from a document, if we can put the English up on the ELMO, we'll

16 have the B/C/S up in Sanction, and that will assist them in following

17 along.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So that everyone can choose his language by

19 pushing the buttons.

20 MR. HANNIS: Yes.

21 [Prosecution counsel confer]

22 MR. HANNIS:

23 Q. So I think, Ms. Hanson, if I can ask you, for example, in the next

24 one, which is an excerpt from an Assembly session, if you could put the

25 English, with the assistance of the usher, up on the ELMO and follow along

1 in that for the interpreters, that would help.

2 When --

3 JUDGE ORIE: For everyone in this courtroom, therefore, we would

4 get the B/C/S on the button of "Computer Evidence," and to that extent the

5 technicians are instructed to have the English text on the video selected

6 for appearing on the screens.

7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

8 Q. Now Ms. Hanson, I want to move -- one of the last questions we had

9 before the break had to do with reporting from the Crisis Staff to the

10 Assembly, and I think you indicated that you didn't have an example of --

11 a written report from a Crisis Staff directly to the Assembly, but you had

12 examples of Assembly members who were also members of their local Crisis

13 Staffs, giving oral reports.

14 A. Yes. We have a number selected in the next ...

15 Q. With that, let me go to tab 102 in the presentation binder, which

16 is master tab 465, from the May 12th, 1992 Assembly session. Could you

17 find the excerpt you want to talk about in connection with this tab and

18 put the English on the ELMO for us. And then if you could tell us who is

19 speaking.

20 A. I'm looking at -- this section down here. Yes, on page 16, the

21 speaker addressed here is Dr. Beli. Dr. Beli is Milenko Vujinovic,

22 president of the Brcko SDS, member of the Main Board from Brcko and on the

23 Brcko Crisis Staff. Here he is reporting on the situation in Brcko.

24 Four lines from the bottom, he says: "For a definitive clearing

25 of the area, it will be necessary to have many more forces."

1 As I'm sure Your Honours has seen until now, the word [B/C/S

2 spoken] is variously translated as cleaning, cleansing, clearing, but that

3 is the word used here, [B/C/S spoken].

4 Later on in his speech, on the next page, page 17, I found it

5 interesting, the middle of this paragraph, middle of the first paragraph,

6 he notes that there are only 20 per cent Serbs in Brcko, and he's implying

7 that it's been difficult to get them all mobilised. These Serbs are not

8 getting easily involved in the conquests. And he notes that also in

9 neighbouring municipalities, it's been difficult to mobilise men.

10 There are a number of other speakers at this session. The next --

11 can I see the B/C/S just to know which section was next? It was Trifko

12 Radic.

13 Q. I believe he speaks at the beginning -- bottom of page 18 and the

14 top of page 19?

15 A. Yes. Starting at the top of page 19, the top of the page, up

16 there, he describes -- Trifko Radic, excuse me, is a member of the Crisis

17 Staff from Ilijas municipality and a deputy from Ilijas. He says that in

18 Ilijas, they had been aware of the war, and they've been organising as

19 well as they could, saying that "we have gotten arms" -- he says he will

20 not speak of the arms, but he obviously is speaking of the arms.

21 I'm sorry, it's confusing to move between the highlighted B/C/S

22 and -- is it this one?

23 He says in the next paragraph that -- actually, could I have this

24 one. Sorry, just mastering the technology.

25 In the next paragraph, he says that communications had been broken

1 off, "so sometimes we don't know what to do. Should we --" this one -

2 "should we defend -- should we destroy all the Ustashas and enemies

3 around us or should we stop?" So he's asking the Assembly to set our

4 goals and tasks, see what is ours, occupy it.

5 And then next page -- I'm finding it difficult to work this way.

6 At the bottom of page 19, he says that: "The Assembly tells us

7 that our enemies must be given an exit route from Sarajevo" but he says

8 that "they can pass through Ilijas only dead."

9 And on the next page of the translation, page 20, in the top

10 paragraph he describes their preparations, stealing goods and provisions,

11 including oil, fuel. "We have cut off and mined the railway line and now

12 no one can get into Sarajevo. We have mined the motorway too."

13 So Radic is reporting to the Assembly on preparations.

14 Q. Let me ask you a question. The comment you read about -- the

15 quote was, I believe, "through Ilijas, they can pass only dead." What was

16 that referring to? What was that discussion?

17 A. The exit from Sarajevo, that he will not allow any Muslims to

18 leave Sarajevo through Ilijas municipality.

19 Q. And if I can take you to one point further up in the preceding

20 highlighted portion where you talked about the communication having been

21 cut off and what should -- "we don't know what to do." Do you see that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. At the bottom of the paragraph --

24 A. I was going to talk about that a little later. It's highlighted

25 but it's for another passage.

1 Q. We'll address that at a later point.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, was there another speaker that we heard from before in the

4 Assembly that you wanted to mention about here?

5 A. Yes. Miroslav Vjestica has a very extensive speech.

6 Q. Your Honours, it's at page 24 of the English translation.

7 A. Would it be possible to have a different copy on the ELMO or are

8 there not enough copies?

9 Q. Sure. We can give them mine if I can have it --

10 A. Well, you'll need yours. Because it's a very long speech, it's

11 hard to move around. This is Miroslav Vjestica, as we know, member of the

12 Crisis Staff of Bosanska Krupa, telling the Assembly what they have done.

13 In the middle of the -- I need to see both.

14 In the middle of the page, he says: "What have we done in the

15 Serbian municipality of Bosanska Krupa? I must tell you, to remind you

16 all, that only 24 per cent of the population are Serbs in the Serbian

17 municipality of Bosanska Krupa. There are 14.500 of us and there are

18 47.000 Muslims."

19 Later in that paragraph he says: "For a year and a half we have

20 been preparing for war in Krupa." He says: "How did it happen that

21 two-thirds of the town were taken in two days of operations? Thank god we

22 did get to our borders, because that is how we had envisaged them and

23 drawn them, and your peoples deputies know well that we said the right

24 bank of the Una River would be our border, and the right bank of the Una

25 River must be the border."

1 He also talks about the military preparations and operations. "We

2 have mined the right bank, we have mined the iron bridge, blown up the

3 wooden one, and now we are preparing for Bosanska Otoka. God willing, in

4 two to three days we shall mine the bridge in Bosanska Otoka."

5 He says further down in the same paragraph: "There are no more

6 Muslims in the Serbian municipality of Bosanska Krupa. All the enclaves

7 that were there, we have evacuated them so that there will be none there

8 for the duration of war operations. Will they have a place to return to?

9 I think it is unlikely, after our president told us the happy news that

10 the right bank of the Una is the border."

11 On the next page, he also tells the Assembly about some other

12 municipalities. On the third paragraph on page 25, he says that he's been

13 in Bosanski Novi yesterday. "Bosanski Novi is sealed off, an ultimatum

14 issued, and a deadline set for the Muslims to surrender their weapons."

15 And he says: "The same is going on in Sanski Most. I think that the

16 Muslims will soon be disarmed there too."

17 In this context, I would like -- I had also been struck by

18 Vjestica's comments at a later Assembly session on the 17th of December.

19 Q. I think -- I think we have that in the next tab, 103 in the

20 presentation binder, master tab 405.

21 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So as not to cause any delay, I

22 will stick to 102, and on page 19, the second paragraph, the tenth line I

23 think, it's a paragraph that you read, madam. "Should we destroy all the

24 Ustashas and enemies around us, or should we stop?" Do you see that?

25 That's why I asked, as the president said, "Let us set our goals and

1 tasks," what does the phrase "as the president said" imply as I haven't

2 read the whole text and I would like to know what this refers to as the

3 president said.

4 THE WITNESS: I'm just looking at the original to see what the

5 term for Presidency -- I'm sorry, I'm trying to look for the original.

6 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Please do.

7 THE WITNESS: Could I see 7727 on the screen? It must be easier.

8 Predsjednik, president, I just wanted to make sure that it wasn't perhaps

9 the word for the "presiding" of the Assembly. He was referring, I assume,

10 to an earlier speech by Karadzic at this Assembly session.

11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, madam.

12 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

13 Q. Now, I believe we were going to talk about an excerpt from the

14 December 17th, 1992 session, presentation tab 103, master tab 405.

15 A. Just in further reference to Vjestica, talking about the removal

16 of Muslims from Krupa, you note that he says at the top of page 72 - this

17 is in December 1992 - "Krupa is a newly formed municipality with 13.760

18 Serbs, and we prepared ourselves hard for one year before the war, when

19 there were 47.000 Muslims there. We did our job."

20 Q. Thank you. Let me move to the next tab, which is presentation tab

21 104, master tab 392, and this is an excerpt from the July 1992 session,

22 the 17th session.

23 A. I had inserted that tab from the December session simply to

24 reference Vjestica's remarks, but there were other remarks from the 12th

25 of May session that I was still going to refer to.

1 Q. I have another one at tab 105 --

2 A. Okay, sorry.

3 Q. -- from Mr. Radic?

4 A. Okay, sorry. So 104 is the -- if I could see on the screen which

5 one that is. From Prstojevic. It's on 02149561, page 65 of the

6 translation. This is from Nedeljko Prstojevic, who was president of the

7 Crisis Staffs of Ilidza. He says: "When the Serbs started the uprising

8 in Sarajevo, and when they seized control over certain territories, there

9 was no government, or at least it was not known where it was then.

10 Moreover, we even did not know if Mr. Karadzic was alive during the first

11 couple of days. When we learned that he was alive, and when he visited us

12 in Ilidza and encouraged us, the Serbs from Sarajevo retained control over

13 the territory and even extended their territory in some areas, driving the

14 Muslims out of the territories where they had actually been majority."

15 So president of the Crisis Staff is reporting that they had driven

16 Muslims out of territories where they had been a majority. Although he

17 does mention a breakdown in communications, he says that it was only for a

18 few days, and Karadzic then visited Ilidza.

19 Q. Let me return you to tab 105, master tab 465. Now back to the May

20 12th Assembly session.

21 A. It's slightly confusing. I am hopefully not troubling the Court.

22 This is a speech by Trifko Radic, starting on page 48. As I said, Trifko

23 Radic was -- we earlier saw him reporting on -- that they had stolen fuel,

24 he said, and he's explaining in response to a question about that. He

25 also describes the war operations. In the middle of the last paragraph,

1 he says:

2 "We are at war. We are surrounded. We are being attacked every

3 evening. We have no other solution but to shell and destroy towns. We

4 have destroyed one-third of Visoko. Maybe tonight another third will go."

5 So he's describing to the Assembly the destruction of towns.

6 Q. Next, I want to take you back to the July Assembly session, the

7 17th session, tab 106 in the presentation binder, master tab 392. And I

8 believe you wanted to refer to --

9 A. The speech by Rajko Dukic, beginning on page 70 in the

10 translation. It's a long speech so I'll be summarising. It might be hard

11 to follow on the ELMO. But he's complaining at first that there are too

12 many Muslims -- or the Muslims have too much authority in Bijeljina. This

13 is the bottom half of page 71. He's saying -- he says that there's been

14 some appointments of Muslims in Bijeljina.

15 "I ask you then why we expelled all Muslim judges from Vlasenica,

16 Bratunac, and Zvornik." In the context, he's thinking that was a good

17 thing, "but it's pointless if we're letting Muslims run Bijeljina."

18 On the next page, he goes on to talk about how much -- what will

19 be the position of Muslims in Bijeljina, and then he sees, Birac, Birac

20 being the area for which he was appointed coordinator. It is the

21 municipalities of Bratunac, Vlasenica, Sekovici, parts of Srebrenica,

22 Zvornik, that area. He says:

23 "In Birac, Birac has 1.200 Muslims. That is how many there were,

24 but I hope that has been at least halved, and 90.000 Serbs."

25 So he's telling the Assembly that he hopes 60.000 Muslims no

1 longer live in that area.

2 At the bottom of that page 71, he requests that the Assembly

3 issues an order that all Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies be closed

4 down. "Wherever civilian authorities can function, they must function as

5 tomorrow, and the military command must do its job." Just further

6 indication of the authority of the Assembly's regard.

7 He also says earlier in that speech, just noting that the

8 municipality of Milic is functioning well. So it's more reporting of how

9 the municipal authorities are doing and what they are doing in the

10 Assemblies.

11 Q. I had just one fine translation point for you. I believe in my

12 copy of the English page 70, where the beginning of that speech is, it

13 lists the speaker as Rajko Lukic.

14 A. I believe --

15 Q. Would you have a look at --

16 A. The name is added in hand, but it is a D, if you can put that on

17 the --

18 Q. The B/C/S page, 02149567?

19 A. Yes. That's up on the ELMO now. It is a Cyrillic D and not an L.

20 It was apparently an error.

21 Q. And from the content of the speech --

22 A. It's consistent with Rajko Dukic, who, as I said, was appointed

23 coordinator for SAO Birac, and he was chairman of the SDS executive board.

24 And as far as I know, there was no Rajko Lukic, assemblyman.

25 Q. Thank you. The next tab in our presentation binder is 107, master

1 binder number 2. I believe you indicated that this was simply for

2 identification purposes, related to Mr. Dukic?

3 A. I see the translation here also has both Lukic and Dukic, but that

4 was simply to identify his appointment to Birac, to explain his knowledge

5 of SAO Birac.

6 Q. Now, the next topic I wanted to deal with, you talked of the role

7 of Assembly deputies and transfer of their power to the municipalities.

8 A. Yes, to explain the importance of the Assembly as both the channel

9 upward for communicating the events on the municipalities to the

10 republican level, and downward as the communicators of the Assembly

11 authority to the municipal level. There's some discussion in the various

12 Assembly sessions on that topic.

13 Q. The next tab in order is 108. Is that the one you want to talk

14 about now?

15 A. If I could see what the highlight -- if I could see the -- let's

16 see --

17 Q. Presentation tab 108, master tab 392.

18 A. Oh, yes. Jovo Mijatovic. On page 58 of the translation, and page

19 02149554 in the original, in the middle of page 58, he says: "It is the

20 MPs," that is, the members of parliament, "who are to transfer the

21 authority of the Republic to the municipalities and from the

22 municipalities here," an indication of their view of the role of

23 assemblymen.

24 Q. Remind us again of who Jovo Mijatovic was?

25 A. He was an assemblyman from Zvornik.

1 Q. Tab 109 is also from an Assembly session on the 17th of December,

2 1992.

3 A. Okay. Once again, we have Milenko Vujinovic from Brcko,

4 indicating the authority of the Assembly. He says:

5 "Following the instructions of the Serb Assembly, a War Presidency

6 has been formed in Brcko, and it replaces the local Assembly. We cannot

7 invoke the Assembly. All the local representatives are in war. So

8 instead of a War Presidency, we formed a military council."

9 The original, I would note, is "Ratna Komisija," or War

10 Commission.

11 "We have followed your decision. You are forming a military

12 council now that will consist of the mayor. Can you listen? Tell me what

13 to do."

14 So he is appealing to the Assembly saying that they have followed

15 the instructions on forming a War Presidency and a War Commission, and

16 looking for further instructions.

17 Later on in this same session, I believe -- no --

18 Q. I'm sorry, I next had an excerpt from a different session, on the

19 24th of March, at tab 110 in the presentation binder.

20 A. I'm sorry, we don't --

21 Q. Master tab 389. Mr. Karadzic is speaking.

22 A. Yes. This one is a little out of order. I apologise for the

23 confusion. It was meant to go a little more smoothly. This is from an

24 earlier session. I do apologise for the confusion, it was meant to be of

25 more --

1 On the 24th of March, 1992, Karadzic says: "The deputies are

2 members of the supreme organ of authority, the Assembly. Now they must

3 literally stay with the presidents of municipalities."

4 Just emphasising there, we have seen this before, but to emphasise

5 that he's saying that the deputies are the members of the supreme organ,

6 and they go down and ensure that the policies are carried out by the

7 presidents of municipalities. So this was a ...

8 Q. Thank you. Now I'll get you back to the point I think you were

9 heading before. Tab 111 in the presentation binder, master tab 405, from

10 the December 17th session of the Assembly. And the speaker, again, is --

11 A. Yes, again, it's Milenko Vujinovic from Brcko.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hannis, may I just interfere. In relation to tab

13 110, of course, it's the testimony of this witness that it's Mr. Karadzic

14 speaking. But for the Chamber, it's rather difficult to go through the

15 whole of the transcript at the same time while studying, so if you can

16 include at least one page, giving a clue to who is the speaker at that

17 time for the future, that would be highly appreciated.

18 MR. HANNIS: We will do that, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

20 A. Yes. On page 70 and 71 of the translation, Dr. Vujinovic says:

21 "If I didn't follow the directives of this Assembly and the SDS,

22 then for seven months I have been working wrong."

23 I take that to mean, I have been following your directives, the

24 directives of the Assembly and the SDS, so tell me what to do. As we

25 know, he earlier said in the Assembly session, Tell me what to do.

1 Q. And Milenko Vujinovic from --

2 A. From Brcko, a member of the SDS main board and president of the

3 Brcko SDS.

4 Q. And he's also referred to sometimes as?

5 A. Dr. Beli.

6 Q. Next I want to move on to another topic which relates more

7 specifically to the accused in this case, Mr. Krajisnik, and his contact

8 with war commissioners or Crisis Staffs. Did you find some evidence in

9 regard to that issue in preparation of your report?

10 A. Yes. I found evidence of direct contact between Mr. Krajisnik and

11 Crisis Staffs and also War Commissions and war commissioners.

12 Q. Let's begin with presentation tab 112, master tab 195.

13 A. This is an announcement -- this is a document from Radio Ilijas,

14 dated the 29th of June, 1992. We have other such texts. They all appear

15 to be the text read by the broadcaster. It's a radio text. It notes

16 that, in the fourth paragraph of the translation:

17 "A delegation of the Presidency of the Serbian BH and the Main

18 Staff of the Serbian BH army came to Ilijas, headed by Momcilo Krajisnik,

19 president of the Assembly of the Serbian Republic."

20 In the next paragraph, it notes that Ratko Adzic and Momcilo

21 Krajisnik spoke, Krajisnik on behalf of republic organs, the Serbian

22 Bosnia or west Serb, as Krajisnik said. "Then after the ceremony, the

23 delegation visited the municipal Crisis Staff for a short period. There

24 they were informed about the situation on the field and those Serbian

25 units holding the --" and that the Serbian units held their positions.

1 So Mr. Krajisnik visited a Crisis Staff as a member of the

2 Presidency, and was briefed on the situation in the field, according to

3 this.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 MR. HANNIS: Next, Your Honours, I have a few intercepts we want

6 to try and play. Tab number 113, and we'll try to put the English on the

7 ELMO.

8 THE WITNESS: I don't need the English.

9 MR. HANNIS: This is master tab 406, reportedly a conversation

10 between Jovan Tintor and Momcilo Krajisnik. And we're bring this excerpt

11 about the middle of the page, in both the English and B/C/S translation --

12 transcripts.

13 [Intercept played]

14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

15 "Jovan Tintor: I'm calling from the headquarters. I hear you've

16 been informed. Rajko has told me about that part. They're getting ready

17 up there. Reportedly, they're on the move already.

18 Momcilo Krajisnik: Who's on the move?

19 Jovan Tintor: Well, the Muslims from Kobilja Glava.

20 Momcilo Krajisnik: Yeah?

21 Jovan Tintor: They're on their way towards Graoviste, towards us,

22 Zuc, and the situation is tense. I think a conflict will break out up

23 there.

24 Momcilo Krajisnik: Yeah?

25 Jovan Tintor: Please, it's my duty to inform you what's going on.

1 Are you finished with -- I can't think of anything else but to check on

2 some supplements to the military.

3 Momcilo Krajisnik: You're calling from our SDS?

4 Jovan Tintor: I'm calling from the Vogosca headquarters.

5 Momcilo Krajisnik: Vogosca.

6 Jovan Tintor. Yes.

7 Momcilo Krajisnik: Look, I've just spoken with Rajko.

8 Jovan Tintor: Yes.

9 Momcilo Krajisnik: I told him to inform this Momo Mandic for the

10 police, you know.

11 Jovan Tintor: Yes.

12 Momcilo Krajisnik: Best man, we need to try everything to calm

13 the situation down.

14 Jovan Tintor: Yes. Momo Mandic has been on the spot.

15 Momcilo Krajisnik: That's the most important thing. Finally, the

16 people do need to organise themselves, but in no circumstances should be

17 look for trouble. It is very important to keep peace, you know.

18 Jovan Tintor: Yes, but they are on the move, best man.

19 Momcilo Krajisnik: I don't think they are.

20 Jovan Tintor: Well, let's hope so. If they're not, then it's --

21 Momcilo Krajisnik: Look, could you check this somehow?

22 Jovan Tintor: Well, I have just received the information on the

23 movement.

24 Momcilo Krajisnik: Yeah, because there's panic. You check this.

25 All right. There may be something going on, but you need to check on this

1 panic.

2 Jovan Tintor: Yes.

3 Momcilo Krajisnik: Check it and let me know. I'll be here."

4 MR. HANNIS:

5 Q. Could you tell us who Jovan Tintor is?

6 A. He was the president of the Vogosca Crisis Staff. I'd also just

7 like to note that when Tintor says, "I'm calling from the Vogosca

8 headquarters." The word in the original is [B/C/S spoken], which means

9 "headquarters" but also "staff". So the head of the Vogosca Crisis Staff

10 is calling Momcilo Krajisnik, saying it's my duty to inform you.

11 Krajisnik is being informed of the situation on the ground, we'll be

12 talking to Momcilo Mandic about it. Momcilo Mandic was at this time, I

13 believe, deputy minister of the interior, and so it shows his contacts

14 with the head of the one Crisis Staff and his information -- his

15 involvement following events on the ground.

16 Q. Thank you. I'd like to next go to presentation tab 114, master

17 tab 407.

18 MR. HANNIS: And the excerpt we're playing in English begins on

19 page 2 of the English, Your Honours, and the third line on page 2 of the

20 B/C/S.

21 [Intercept played]

22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

23 "Momcilo Krajisnik: Are you all right? What is it? Tell me,

24 what's the situation like?

25 Momo Garic: Well, there are some little problems. Could you

1 receive me up there for a brief meeting?

2 Momcilo Krajisnik: Well, sure, no problem.

3 Momo Garic: You could, right?

4 Momcilo Krajisnik: Sure.

5 Momo Garic: Alright, I'll come there. I'll find some vehicle and

6 I'll come there.

7 Momcilo Krajisnik: Alright, Momo. What's the situation like up

8 there?

9 Momo Garic: Well, it's all right for the time being. We've had

10 some casualties and many wounded.

11 Momcilo Krajisnik: You did? Well, are our men withdrawing from

12 up there?

13 Momo Garic: No, no, but the cooperation here is not on a high

14 level. I don't know why.

15 Momcilo Krajisnik: Alright. Momo, come here, let's not discuss

16 this over the phone.

17 Momo Garic: Alright."

18 A. Momo Garic, as we saw from an earlier document, I think it's the

19 next tab, simply for ID purposes, was a member of the Novo Sarajevo Crisis

20 Staff. And once again, we have him calling Krajisnik to discuss problems

21 on the ground. Krajisnik saying sure, come up, have a meeting, clearly

22 available to Crisis Staff members, and interested in the situation on the

23 ground.

24 MR. HANNIS:

25 Q. Okay. I think --

1 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Please, in these two last cases,

2 the speakers addressed each other in what capacity? What was the capacity

3 of Mr. Krajisnik for them?

4 THE WITNESS: It's not explicated in the phone conversation in

5 what capacity they called, whether as president of the Assembly or a

6 leader of the SDS or -- it's not clear.

7 JUDGE ORIE: If you say it's not clear, may I draw your attention

8 to tab 113, where, not in the part read out by you but one of the first

9 lines, it reads: "Could I speak with the speaker?" Is that, you say,

10 there's no indication whatsoever?

11 THE WITNESS: Well, it is how Tintor refers to Krajisnik as the

12 speaker, meaning the speaker of the Assembly. But that he called him --

13 he also calls him "best man" later on. So why he called Krajisnik in that

14 -- he may refer to Krajisnik as the speaker because he was the speaker of

15 the Assembly, but why precisely he's -- in what capacity he's calling

16 Krajisnik, that is one possibility.

17 JUDGE ORIE: You mean that even calling him by one of his

18 functions, that that does not necessarily imply that you approach him --

19 THE WITNESS: Well, he's calling his office -- he's apparently

20 calling Krajisnik's office, so he's asking the secretary, "Can I talk to

21 the speaker?"

22 JUDGE ORIE: That could also mean, for a friendly talk, you could

23 also ask the secretary, if you want to speak to a friend, to ask the

24 secretary to be connected with the speaker.

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's possible.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. That's clear.

2 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

3 Q. I believe you indicated tab 115 was just a document we'd seen

4 before to show that Garic was a member of the Crisis Staff of Novo

5 Sarajevo?

6 A. Yes, that's why it's included.

7 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honours, tab 116 is an Assembly that

8 session we don't intend to use, so we're going to withdraw 116 and not use

9 it for the purposes of this presentation.

10 Q. I would like to skip, then, to tab 117 in the presentation binder,

11 which comes from the May 12th Assembly session. And again, I believe,

12 starting at page 18 in the English, we have Mr. Radic, Trifko Radic,

13 speaking again.

14 A. Yes. This was Radic's speech. That was what I wanted up there.

15 Where did it have it? It was a highlighted portion that I hadn't talked

16 about. The middle of page 19, the last sentences of the middle paragraph,

17 Radic says that "at the intervention of the president of the Assembly, we

18 released that Ustasha, that Ivo Stanic, whom I had taken prisoner. This

19 is what I regret having done most."

20 I note it here because it's indicating that Radic received a

21 direct intervention -- I'm sorry, received an intervention from the

22 president -- from Krajisnik as president of the Assembly, and released a

23 prisoner upon his intervention, even though Radic did not want to do it.

24 So another indication of contact from Krajisnik to the Crisis Staff.

25 Q. Do you have any further knowledge or information about who that

1 particular individual was or what was that about?

2 A. I didn't research that, no.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 MR. HANNIS: Next, Your Honours, I want to move to tab 118, which

5 are the minutes of the 15th session of the Presidency on the 6th of July.

6 A. We have seen this before, but just to remind, in context of this

7 discussion, that Krajisnik had been appointed as member of the Presidency

8 responsible for the work for -- responsible for commissioners. I also

9 found evidence of his involvement in the work of commissioners.

10 MR. HANNIS: And in connection with that, we'll have some more

11 intercepted conversations, Your Honour. Tab 119, master tab 408. The

12 excerpt we'll play begins on page 2 of the English, near the middle of the

13 page. And in the B/C/S, it's about six blocks up from the bottom of the

14 page.

15 Q. Do you have that, Ms. Hanson?

16 A. Yes. It's on the ...

17 [Intercept played]

18 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

19 "Momcilo Krajisnik: OK, tell me how things are going in Rajlovac.

20 You know ...

21 Mirko Krajisnik: Which things?

22 Momcilo Krajisnik: That man from the municipality? The one that

23 came recently, the commissioner?.

24 Mirko Krajisnik: Yes, yes. He is not there. He said that he

25 would be absent for two days. I don't know where he is, but apparently he

1 will be here at the meeting tomorrow.

2 Momcilo Krajisnik: Okay."

3 A. So you will see similar conversations, the next two, but it's

4 Krajisnik inquiring about a commissioner in a municipality.

5 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

6 Q. Next is tab 120, master tab number 410, another intercepted phone

7 conversation. And the English, Your Honour, begins on page 1, right after

8 the introductory remarks.

9 Could you tell us the date of this conversation and who the

10 speakers are before we begin?

11 A. It's the 22nd of June, 1992. Again, it's a conversation between

12 Momcilo Krajisnik and Mirko Krajisnik.

13 [Intercept played]

14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

15 "Momcilo Krajisnik: Hello. What are you up to?

16 Mirko Krajisnik: Many things. Listen, please. Can anyone ...

17 Since Radovanovic is not here ... I don't know where he is. In the end of

18 the day, he has the only copy of the document regarding the establishment

19 of the War Commission.

20 Momcilo Krajisnik: Yes.

21 Mirko Krajisnik: Is there anywhere a copy of that so that someone

22 can send it to us by fax? Hello?

23 Momcilo Krajisnik: Yes, I can hear you.

24 Mirko Krajisnik: Because the basic document for conduct of work

25 is essential to make it function.

1 Momcilo Krajisnik: So instruction should be sent to you for the

2 Commission, is that so?

3 Mirko Krajisnik: Can you do that?

4 Momcilo Krajisnik: I will.

5 Mirko Krajisnik: The decision by which ... are determined and

6 formed -- please, 467-376.

7 Momcilo Krajisnik: 376.

8 Mirko Krajisnik: Yes.

9 Momcilo Krajisnik: I will now ..."

10 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hanson, is there any -- do we know who started

11 this telephone conversation? Who called who?

12 THE WITNESS: I believe it's Mirko calling Momcilo.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

14 THE WITNESS: He's asking for the instructions -- he's looking for

15 a copy of the decision on the formation of War Commissions.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So the initiative was on Mirko's side --

17 THE WITNESS: Mirko, yes.

18 JUDGE ORIE: -- and the question also came from Mirko.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, can you send it, and Momcilo says that he will

20 send -- fax a copy of the instruction on the War Commission.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

22 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. Next, Your Honours, is presentation tab

23 421, master tab 409. The excerpt begins on page 5 of the English, near

24 the top. And at the top of page 3022-0986 in the B/C/S for Mr. Krajisnik.

25 It's reportedly a conversation on the 26th of June between Momcilo

1 Krajisnik and Mandic. This is a longer excerpt.

2 [Intercept played]

3 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

4 "Momcilo Mandic: No, no, no ... President, what are we going to

5 do, do send a commissioner to Kasindol, two - three men ... some Papazi,

6 they came to me from Dr. Avramovic from Kasindol, nobody ever called, they

7 scattered there doctor. They appoint their own people for directors.

8 Momcilo Krajisnik: And who is that one?

9 Momcilo Mandic: To Kasindol, the hospital.

10 Momcilo Krajisnik: Who are those people, where is that from ...

11 Momcilo Mandic: Local community of Kasindol, the Crisis Staff.

12 Momcilo Krajisnik: And is that the municipality, which one?

13 Momcilo Mandic: No, it's local community Ilidza, Ilidza is the

14 municipality, Kasindol is local community.

15 Momcilo Krajisnik: And why do they have the Commissioner, why

16 don't they go there?

17 Momcilo Mandic: No, it isn't, I don't know which ... these

18 doctors came to me, they appointed some ... Divljan Sonja, instead of this

19 director ...

20 Momcilo Krajisnik: And how could they do that?

21 Momcilo Mandic: The crisis staff of the local community Kasindol

22 appointed her.

23 Momcilo Krajisnik: Give me, please ...

24 Momcilo Mandic: And than ... Popovic Koviljka, the cashier, to

25 make an overview to see how the income is being distributed, and the

1 income again ...

2 Momcilo Krajisnik: I will now call Prstojevic to go there or to

3 send someone because he has the Crisis staff Ilidza, and that is Ilidza.

4 Momcilo Mandic: It's a disgrace, President.

5 Momcilo Krajisnik: I will see that they take care of that

6 immediately.

7 Momcilo Mandic: But they are in touch with Prstojevic.

8 Momcilo Krajisnik: See then, if he does not do anything, we'll

9 see to send someone else there.

10 Momcilo Mandic: They are in some kind of business with that

11 Prstojevic, they do black-marketing together ...

12 Momcilo Krajisnik: He cannot do anything on his own, he has the

13 Committee now, some wonderful people are there, you know? They are not

14 the old ones any more."

15 A. Again, I would note that although the English translation says

16 committee, the word in the original is provanista [phoen] which we have

17 been translating as commission.

18 MR. HANNIS:

19 Q. Any other comment on that one?

20 A. Well, clearly, Krajisnik is aware of who is in the War Commission

21 in Ilidza, and that he can tell Prstojevic what to do. He will contact

22 Prstojevic and tell him what to do, and there are good people in the

23 commission who will make sure that this matter is taken care of. So,

24 again, further evidence of Krajisnik's contacts with War Commissions.

25 Q. All right. Now I want to move to another Assembly session from

1 November of 1992, which there's a discussion about the war commissioners.

2 A. Yes. This is very important for understanding or shedding light

3 on how war commissioners worked and what --

4 Q. Let me identify where we're at. This is presentation tab 122,

5 master tab 411. And I believe you have several excerpts. Can you tell

6 us, first of all, who the first speaker is --

7 A. The first speaker is Momcilo Krajisnik.

8 Q. And tell the Judges where we're starting in the English.

9 A. This is on page 104, the -- well, it's all one large paragraph,

10 about one-third of the way down, the sentence starting "the

11 commissioners." There's been a discussion in the Assembly about War

12 Commissions and war commissioners, and Krajisnik is, in this speech,

13 responding to earlier comments, and then there will be other speeches by

14 other -- by some actual war commissioners following.

15 Q. May I inquire if Mr. Krajisnik is able to see the highlighted

16 portion in B/C/S on his screen? Otherwise we'll read out the location for

17 him.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik confirms by nodding that he has it on

19 his screen.

20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

21 Q. If you could proceed, Ms. Hanson.

22 A. All right.

23 "The commissioners are deputies whose duty are to go around the

24 country where the government is not functioning, collect information about

25 what is wrong, and try to help solving the problems and establishing the

1 government. Where there is the Assembly, where there is the executive

2 committee, it is not the parallel government nor executive government but

3 some decree in government. In my experience, this works very well. I was

4 informed about each one of our members who went there. Mirko Mijatovic,

5 Jovo Mijatovic, Cancar, Marko Simic, Branko Simic, and Vojo Maksimovic

6 have all performed that duty and solved a lot of problems."

7 He goes on lower in the same paragraph to say that:

8 "The purpose was to bring help in that way, and we had many

9 municipalities asking for people to come. And it was done very

10 efficiently. We did not cover everything, but that is a small deficiency.

11 Therefore, we should not talk badly about this service, because it is very

12 important to have our deputies go around talking to people. Whether he is

13 deputy or commissioner is of no importance, but it has a great effect when

14 a member of our Assembly comes among the people. Branko Simic has been on

15 the Ozren mountain, Vojo Maksimovic was in Herzegovina. The people mark

16 that as positive. Mirko Mijatovic was in Foca. And it is no parallel

17 political organ but help for these organs to govern. And if it is not

18 needed, we will easily abolish it."

19 On the next page in the English translation, I just noted, again,

20 Krajisnik's short speech, page 105 of the translation. He is responding

21 to earlier comments about some political problems in one municipality,

22 some conflict between some individuals. And it's notable here that he

23 says that these comments should be investigated. He asks Branko Simic to

24 schedule a meeting and investigate the information. I found that

25 indicative of his -- of Krajisnik's ability as speaker of the Assembly,

1 when he hears something that's troubling, to order an investigation. But

2 I didn't see such a reaction to some of the -- to any of the comments I've

3 given -- shown so far.

4 Then there's a long speech by Vojislav Maksimovic, starting at the

5 very bottom of page 105, but I'm looking at page 106. Vojislav Maksimovic

6 was president of the SDS Deputy's Club, and as we know, commissioner in

7 Herzegovina. He says -- again it's one long paragraph on page 106, but

8 the -- about the eighth line down, he says -- seventh line down: "I was

9 assigned in two regions in old and eastern Herzegovina." He says he had

10 the tasks assigned by the decision "or some special instructions we

11 received orally." He then goes on to describe how commissioners helped

12 form authorities in the regions where the authority was still not formed,

13 especially those regions "where we still did not have our Serbian

14 authority, but it was formed later." He explains how commissioners get

15 the work of executive bodies and municipal Assembly up and running and

16 functioning. He also says in the middle of page 106: "A commissioner is

17 also obligated to coordinate military and civilian authorities where their

18 cooperation is not good." In the next sentence, he notes the

19 psychological effect of having a commissioner that "some regions might not

20 feel forgotten, and that a member of the Presidency has come there and

21 helped with some practical issues."

22 At the bottom of this page, he notes that "commissioners have the

23 obligation to report what he observed to members of the Presidency." He

24 notes the importance of the visit of Mr. Koljevic to Herzegovina, "when

25 all the deputies, municipal presidents and commissioners met, which was of

1 great importance." The very last line in that -- on that page: "The very

2 territorial distance from the centre requests that we be present, that we

3 be the people who will convey the information to the area we are

4 responsible for." I'm now on the top of page 107. "Of course, sometimes

5 they need to convey certain decisions as well as some informations they

6 learn," so he's showing how the commissioners convey decisions from the

7 Presidency and information from the municipalities back to the Presidency.

8 At the end of that same paragraph, he says there are also many

9 practical issues where the commissioners are always requested to help

10 intervene, contact the government, and so on.

11 And in his -- the next paragraph, his last paragraph of his

12 speech, he says that "the War Presidency," in this case he's referring to

13 the republican War Presidency, "should be the one who would decide when

14 commissioners are needed and how many of them."

15 So Maksimovic, as a commissioners, describes very well the work he

16 did.

17 Q. Before you leave Mr. Maksimovic, I wanted to ask you a question.

18 He made reference to having received special instructions orally.

19 A. Yes. That -- I noted that as a significant indication that

20 there's not a documentary record for all the instructions that

21 commissioners -- he clearly was meeting with some members of the

22 Presidency and getting instructions orally.

23 Q. And there's no reference in the speech as to who that was?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Who was the member of the Presidency assigned the responsibility

1 for war commissioners?

2 A. Momcilo Krajisnik.

3 Q. Thank you. Could you go on to your final segment in this session.

4 A. Yes. On page 109, we have the speech by Mirko Mijatovic, a deputy

5 from Trebinje, who was assigned as commissioner for Foca. In his first

6 paragraph on page 109 he says he was a commissioner. "They were necessary

7 in some regions and they are still necessary." He notes the importance of

8 the appearance of Vojislav Maksimovic, who was the previous speaker, so he

9 confirms, as Maksimovic did, the importance of commissioners.

10 It is a long speech. On page 110, he is talking about what's been

11 accomplished, that Maksimovic did constitute a commission in Foca. "That

12 is the only organ of authority --" I'm sorry, in Trebinje. Maksimovic was

13 in Trebinje. But he, Mijatovic, was in Foca. Also did some work in Rudo

14 and Cajnice.

15 Most importantly, on the last page of his speech, page 111 in the

16 translation, a third line down, he says: "If they cancel the War

17 Commissions, I will send a report to the president who sent me." So

18 reporting -- it says that he will be reporting.

19 Q. Do you know which president he would have been referring to there?

20 A. He simply says "president," which tends to be the word for the

21 president of the republic.

22 Q. Thank you. And at that time, was there a single president of the

23 republic?

24 A. Yes. Well --

25 Q. In November of 1992.

1 A. I don't want to speak with any certainty about the republican

2 level. I focused --

3 Q. We'll ask the Judges to recall Mr. Treanor's testimony on that

4 point.

5 A. Thank you.

6 Q. Let me then go to another topic. We've finished talking about war

7 commissioners for a while.

8 In your report, at paragraph 45, you discuss the military role of

9 Crisis Staffs, and I think this will take us back to a question Judge

10 Hanoteau asked us earlier.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you want to give us a little introductory remark about that

13 before we look at the first document?

14 A. Yes. I may have made my comments already, but that it's a very --

15 of all the issues dealing with Crisis Staffs, of all the areas of

16 responsibility of the Crisis Staffs, the question of the military role has

17 the most variations. As I said, there's a range of responsibility and

18 authority -- responsibility for an authority over the military claimed by

19 Crisis Staffs for a number of reasons. Some have to do with simply who --

20 what were the military structures already in place. Was there a JNA unit?

21 Who was in command of that unit? And, also as we'll see, the personality

22 of the Crisis Staff or other people -- municipal leaders.

23 Another important factor is -- and perhaps the most important

24 factor of all, is the question of time, because, as we saw before, Crisis

25 Staffs themselves were bodies in transition, moving from secret party

1 organs to public municipal authorities, and the military structures in

2 question were also in transition at this time. So whenever we talk about

3 how much authority a particular Crisis Staff had or claimed to have over

4 military units, we have to think about what was the state of the military

5 structures at the time. Because when Crisis Staffs were first formed, as

6 we saw, in December 1992, there was, of course, the JNA. The Yugoslav

7 People's Army was present in Bosnia, stationed in various parts of the

8 country. There was also the republican Territorial Defence, which had its

9 own republican chain of command. With the withdrawal of the JNA, the VRS,

10 the army of the Bosnian Serb Republic, was established, but it took, of

11 course, some time for those structures to be up and running. And Crisis

12 Staffs basically filled a gap between a JNA that was withdrawing or

13 disintegrating or not following the orders of its own command structure

14 and the then VRS as it was being established.

15 So we have to remember that the military structures were in

16 transition. We have to look at the time period to understand this very

17 complicated issue.

18 What we do see everywhere, however -- the common factor is the

19 coordination of defence. Crisis Staffs had a role to communicate with the

20 military, to support them. Sometimes that role included giving, as we

21 saw, recommendations or even orders to certain units. But of all the

22 issues, as I said, this is the least amenable to one pattern. But there

23 is definitely a consistent trend. I think looking at the practical

24 examples will make it much clearer.

25 Q. Then with that, Your Honours, the next tab will be tab 123.

1 However, before we put that up, that's a copy of the instructions --

2 A. Yes, I simply -- I wanted to point out what the normative document

3 says about the role of Crisis Staffs - we looked at them only yesterday so

4 perhaps we need not spend much time - but that they always mention a

5 military role for the Crisis Staffs.

6 Q. And in the variant A and variant B document, generally, what was

7 the role of the Crisis Staffs?

8 A. Well, remember that one of the -- the primary purpose of the

9 instructions was to enhance the mobility and readiness for defence of the

10 interests of the Serbian people. We know that they were to include the

11 commander of the TO in the Crisis Staff; they were to mobilise the TO and

12 police reserves; they were also to subordinate those police to the

13 commands of the JNA. So there was definitely a military role, but the JNA

14 was seen as the body with whom to coordinate and, indeed, subordinate.

15 And that was -- remember, these were written in December 1992.

16 Q. December?

17 A. Of 1991, I'm sorry.

18 Q. Thank you. That was tab 123, master tab 22.

19 The next tab in the presentation binder is 124, master tab 76.

20 Again, this is a document we've seen before, I believe.

21 A. Yes. This is Djeric's instructions for the operation of Crisis

22 Staffs from 26 April 1992.

23 Q. And these specifically addressed some of the issues regarding the

24 relationship between Crisis Staffs and military units, no?

25 A. Yes. Once again, we see that -- excuse me. Under Article 4, it

1 notes that: "Command over the Territorial Defence and the police force is

2 exclusively the responsibility of the professional staff. It is,

3 therefore, necessary to prevent any interference as to the commanding of

4 the Territorial Defence or the use of the police force."

5 We see an acknowledgement that command of the forces is a matter

6 for professional staff, but recall, again, that the commander of the TO

7 and the police were members of the Crisis Staff, so they -- the Crisis

8 Staff was to make sure that no outside influence, is how I take this, is

9 to interfere in the professional staff commanding.

10 Under number 8, the Crisis Staff is to create normal life and work

11 conditions of the JNA, to ensure proper relations and generally to enable

12 the JNA to work.

13 Again, this was 26 April, 1992. The JNA was still the official

14 arm -- army of the -- of Yugoslavia. It was still present in Bosnia.

15 Q. Tab number 25 in the presentation binder, master tab 108.

16 A. Again, these are all documents we've seen before. Simply to

17 revisit the military question. These are Plavsic's instructions of the

18 24th of May, 1992.

19 Q. When it was proposed to create War Presidencies?

20 A. War Presidencies. But, again, the first task, under item 1, the

21 first task of these Presidencies is the organisation, coordination and

22 synchronisation of the activities for the defence of the Serbian people,

23 so clearly a role in organising military activities.

24 Q. And tab --

25 A. And furthermore -- I'm sorry, I don't have the -- okay, thank

1 you. Yes.

2 Furthermore, the commissioner, who, as we know, is to be appointed

3 to these War Presidencies -- to these Presidencies, was "to ensure the

4 constant coordination and implementation of the policies and measures

5 determined and issued by republic state organs and the Main Staff of this

6 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

7 By this date, the 24th of May, the VRS had been formally

8 established, although not yet up and running. But we see the transition

9 now. Instead of working with the JNA, they are to coordinate the

10 implementation of the policies of the Main Staff of the VRS.

11 Q. Let me move to presentation tab 126, and master tab 110. Again,

12 another document that we've seen before. Does this also speak to the

13 issue of Crisis Staffs and military units?

14 A. Yes. As we've seen before, it's very similar wording.

15 Q. And what is this document?

16 A. Sorry, this is the Presidency decision of 31 May 1992 on the

17 formation of War Presidencies in municipalities. And the wording for the

18 relevant sections is almost the same as Plavsic's instructions:

19 "Coordination of defence and implementation of the policies of the General

20 Staff," or -- yes, the Main Staff, I'm sorry, of the army of the Serbian

21 Republic.

22 Q. Then following close on that, tab 127, master tab 112, which is a

23 June 10th decision regarding War Commissions. What did that say about the

24 topic?

25 A. Under Article 4 -- I'm sorry, Article 3. Under Article 3: "War

1 Commissions shall cooperate with the authorities with a view to creating

2 conditions for the work of military organs and units engaged in defending

3 the Serbian people."

4 As I said before, the War Commissions -- the emphasis in this

5 decision is on getting to normality, getting all the regular state organs

6 up and running. So we see in this decision a slightly different emphasis,

7 that the War Commission is to create the conditions for the military

8 organs to work, just as it is also supposed to create the conditions for

9 the municipal Assembly and other municipal organs to work.

10 This was, of course, dated 10 June 1992, and it's an indication

11 that there is more military command structure being established, and

12 military organs. But nonetheless, it remains close coordination and

13 support at the municipal level for those developing military organs.

14 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, if I may, I have two tabs to finish

15 this binder. It may take me a minute or two past 12.30.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.

17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

18 Q. Tab 128, Ms. Hanson, master tab 100, I believe, is a document that

19 we may have talked about before from Prijedor.

20 A. Yes. We saw -- this is the decision on the organisation and work

21 of the Crisis Staff of Prijedor municipality. We've seen it before in

22 connection with the instructions -- Djeric's instructions of April 1992.

23 And in echoing Djeric's instructions, it indicates the role of the Crisis

24 Staff in organising and coordinating measures of defence.

25 Q. Could you address particularly Articles 2, 6, and 9.

1 A. All right. Article 2, it shows that the Crisis Staff is being

2 established to defend municipal territory, provide security for the

3 population. So in addition to other municipal, governmental functions,

4 there is a function of defence and security.

5 And Article 6 is the most clear on its defence functions. "The

6 Crisis Staff shall coordinate the work and activities of all protagonists

7 in the system of all people's defence; review questions related to

8 mobilisation, the development and reinforcement of the armed forces and

9 other structures, fostering cooperation between these structures and the

10 competent municipal authorities; resolve questions related to the material

11 and financial requirements of the TO on the basis of special requests made

12 by the commander of the Municipal TO Staff; keep abreast of the situation

13 in the municipality and all vital aspects of the armed struggle and shall,

14 accordingly, undertake the necessary measures; monitor recruiting

15 activities and intervene when necessary to ensure they are implemented."

16 Article 9: "The Crisis Staff shall maintain constant cooperation

17 with units of the JNA, the Territorial Defence, Civilian Protection, and

18 the public security system via the senior officers of these institutions

19 and organs and, through the municipality's executive committee, with all

20 other economic and social subjects in the municipality."

21 Q. Thank you. Now, the last one before the break, if we could go to

22 tab 129, master tab 72. This is an excerpt from the March 27th Assembly

23 session. And I believe the English, on page 10 at the bottom, the speaker

24 is shown as Dr. Radovan Karadzic. The highlighted portion you wanted to

25 talk about is on the following page. I have a copy here for the usher.

1 A. It's page 19 and 20, I think, not 10. It's on page 20 in the

2 translation.

3 Again, we've seen this speech of Karadzic before, but since I'm

4 talking about the question of the military authorities and the military

5 structures, I look at it again in a new light. He says: "When you return

6 to your municipalities, form Crisis Staffs. Find a number of reserve

7 officers for those staffs and have them register everyone who owns weapons

8 as well as units. They should organise Territorial Defence. And if the

9 JNA is there, they must be placed under its command; if not, let them be

10 placed under the command of reserve officers."

11 Again, one factor, this is the geographical factor, is there a JNA

12 unit there.

13 The last two paragraphs on page 20: "If war breaks out, you will

14 get the plans, but I urge you to immediately organise the people within

15 Territorial Defence units headed by reserve officers. Form squads,

16 platoons, and Crisis Staffs and engage retired officers. This must be

17 done throughout our areas."

18 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours. I appreciate the extra time

19 to finish that binder. We'll have a new presentation binder passed up

20 before we start the next session.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Before we adjourn, the copies that have now

22 been distributed, the binders, is there one for Mr. Krajisnik as well, or

23 --

24 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

2 JUDGE ORIE: I'm still waiting for some answers in respect of the

3 issue raised by Mr. Stewart. It might be wiser not to try to deal with

4 the matter with incomplete information during this break. But if the

5 parties would be available, even after this hearing, to see whether we can

6 resolve the matter.

7 Then we'll adjourn until five minutes to 1.00.

8 --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.

9 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hannis, before I give you the opportunity to

11 proceed, are we more or less on schedule?

12 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour, I think we are. I had anticipated

13 it would take all of the rest of the week for me to finish with Ms.

14 Hanson, that I would finish by the end of the day Friday. I actually told

15 Mr. Stewart earlier, I think I will finish sometime around the end of the

16 first session or before the second session on Friday. My estimate may

17 change as we move slower and faster, but right now I think we're on

18 schedule.

19 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it might be -- if I could, because it

20 will only take a couple of seconds -- well, that's not literal. But I

21 mentioned to Mr. Hannis -- I wasn't going to mention it right now, but

22 it's convenient as it follows on from that.

23 On Mr. Hannis's projected schedule, Your Honour, the timetable

24 then has allowed Monday and Tuesday for this witness, and I would expect

25 to be able to complete the cross-examination of this witness on Monday and

1 Tuesday, and then there's another witness coming on Wednesday.

2 Your Honour, taking my chances entirely as to when exactly Mr.

3 Hannis finishes on Friday, it would be terribly helpful, Your Honour, if

4 we were then -- if Your Honours were then willing to stop and allow me

5 that extra time to spend with Mr. Krajisnik on Friday, in other words, not

6 start cross-examination then but then break -- we don't know whether it's

7 going to be an hour or an hour and a half or something like that. But

8 then I would cross-examine on Monday and Tuesday and Your Honour would --

9 JUDGE ORIE: We will consider it, let's say it this way at this

10 moment.

11 MR. STEWART: But Your Honour has the point. It is very difficult

12 to get ample time with Mr. Krajisnik. Can I just say, for example, that

13 Ms. Loukas has to see tomorrow in relation with other witnesses. I'm sure

14 Your Honours are well aware of the tightness and the pressures to get that

15 time. And if we go to a quarter to 2.00, it's 3.00 by the time we start,

16 and Your Honour knows how little time, in practice, is available one once

17 gets through security in order to spend time with one's client.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I'm aware of it.

19 Mr. Hannis, please proceed.

20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours. I think we have the new

21 binders, number 4, for you on the registrar's desk. And we'll hand one

22 copy to Ms. Hanson, too.

23 Q. The first tab in that binder is presentation tab 130, which is

24 master tab number 40.

25 Ms. Hanson, I think this is a document as part of your discussion

1 about cooperation between the Crisis Staffs and the JNA.

2 A. Yes. This is a document we've seen before. The conclusions of

3 the municipal board of the SDS Zvornik of the 22nd of December forming the

4 Crisis Staff. In this context, I would note at the bottom, the list of

5 the members of the Crisis Staff, that the command staff of the Zvornik

6 municipality JNA is listed as a member, indicating that the general intent

7 of the 19 December instructions of cooperation and coordination with the

8 command staff of the JNA is being followed here.

9 Q. The next tab, tab 131 in the presentation, master tab 260.

10 A. This is minutes of a meeting of the Crisis Staff held on the 29th

11 of January, 1992, it says, in the local community of Lukavica, but it

12 appears to be the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staffs. But it's not -- I just say

13 that on the basis of the membership that we saw in earlier decisions. But

14 it just --

15 Q. And it indicates Lukavica as the location --

16 A. Location, yes. Here, under number 10, on the second page in the

17 original but number 10 on the first page of the translation: "All

18 battalion commanders are to be called to the Crisis Staff meeting. In

19 charge of this is Momo Garic."

20 You'll recall that Momo Garic was one of the speakers in an

21 intercepted phone conversation with Momcilo Krajisnik that we listened to

22 before the break. So once again, the invitation to battalion commanders

23 indicates the coordination, exchange of information, with -- between

24 Crisis Staffs and military.

25 Q. Next is presentation tab 132, master tab 259.

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness raise the microphones a little

2 bit, thank you, so that we avoid the noise of paper-shuffling. Thank you

3 very much.

4 MR. HANNIS:

5 Q. And I believe this is an interview with a military officer, and

6 you want to talk about particular excerpts?

7 A. Yes. This is an interview from May of 1994 in a daily newspaper

8 of VRS with Colonel Zelja, who was then the commander of the 43rd Prijedor

9 Brigade. In April 1992, as he explains in this - excuse me - interview,

10 he was deputy commander. He is describing the cooperation between the JNA

11 and the SDS leadership in Prijedor.

12 On page -- it's a little difficult to follow the original because

13 it's a newspaper article in columns, so to say exactly where it is -- I

14 have the right one up on the Sanction right now. But on page 3 -- that

15 was good. Page 3 in the translation -- I just want to see -- yes.

16 They're talking about the time when the brigade came to Prijedor after

17 fighting in Slavonia, so this is the winter of 1991/1992.

18 And Zelja says: "The brigade commander was immediately linked to

19 the leadership of the SDS, giving them important support, as they do for

20 all decent Serbs, to organise themselves for self-defence in case of an

21 attack by the Muslim forces".

22 At the bottom of this same speech of his, he says: "We have never

23 given up these goals, and it is the creation of a Serbian state in these

24 areas."

25 So he says, as soon as the command arrived, they were linked with

1 the leadership of the SDS.

2 On page 4 in the translation, in the middle of page -- well, the

3 second paragraph of his speech, he says: "We then offered maximal help

4 and support to the SDS, both in organising preparations and in advising

5 them, in order to overcome certain problems and to take power. Such

6 cooperation was also established with the leaders of the party, the people

7 in power, the Crisis Staff, and all decent Serbs who were, and still are,

8 are of importance for this town."

9 That's what I had highlighted from that section, indicating the

10 way that certain people in the JNA command did cooperate with the -- make

11 contact with the SDS and did help the Crisis Staffs.

12 Q. All right. If we could go next to presentation tab 133, and it is

13 master tab number 261. Can you tell us what that document is and what it

14 shows?

15 A. This is an order from - well, it's described as minutes on the

16 second page - from Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, the Federal Secretary of

17 National Defence of the FRY, that is, of the JNA, of the Federal Republic

18 of Yugoslavia. It's a bit confusing because the first page is a cover

19 sheet.

20 What he's -- the interesting page is on -- yes, on page 2, the

21 Federal Secretary gave the tasking: "In the shortest possible time, form

22 the staffs, squads, and brigades of voluntary units of the reduced

23 structure and adequately re-enforce them with the JNA officers, weaponry

24 and equipment, the voluntary units to be militarily organised and

25 connected to the JNA commands in their area of responsibility."

1 This is in regard specifically to Bosnia. Although it doesn't say

2 what kind of voluntary units, as we'll see in practice, this is consistent

3 with the forming of voluntary units of the SDS and their cooperation with

4 JNA commands. So the fact that this was a tasking by the federal

5 secretary of defence shows that the kind of contacts and cooperation Zelja

6 was talking about as individual actions were becoming more and more army

7 policy, or at least open -- openly acknowledged in the JNA, as we see in

8 the next document, more clearly.

9 Q. Which is tab 134 in the presentation binder, and master tab number

10 263. Can you tell us who this is from and whom it's to?

11 A. This is a regular operative report of the reserve command post of

12 the 2nd Military District to the command of the 2nd Military District

13 Operations Centre, dated the 6th of April, 1992. And in the middle of the

14 page, it says-- he reports: "We have remained in constant contact and

15 coordination of operations with the Pale Crisis Staff."

16 So a JNA unit is reporting constant contact and coordination with

17 a Crisis Staff.

18 Q. Next, we have another one which, I think you'd indicated, shows a

19 little different perspective. This is tab number 135 in the presentation,

20 master tab 276, from Prijedor.

21 A. Yes. This is the minutes of a meeting of the municipal board of

22 SDS Prijedor, on the 23rd of April, 1992. You will recall that this is

23 shortly before the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, therefore, the army

24 of Yugoslavia was declared, so the future of the JNA was still unclear at

25 this point.

1 And we see the decisions of the municipal board. Number 1, "to

2 approach the garrison command and ask them if they were going to protect

3 the Serbs in the event of a conflict or not."

4 Then under number 5, "to immediately start working on the

5 takeover, the coordination with the JNA notwithstanding."

6 Under 6, "Put the point across. If Zelja JNA does not declare

7 that the JNA is indeed going to protect the Serbs, the SDS will call upon

8 all Serbian soldiers to leave the JNA and take all their weapons."

9 This is the same Zelja that we saw the interview with, who, in

10 retrospective, is saying what good contacts we had. But we can see that

11 they're still not entirely sure to what extent the JNA is going to back

12 their plans, but they plan to go ahead regardless of the stance of the

13 JNA. As we saw from the interview, however, the JNA does, in fact, back

14 their plans.

15 Q. Now, let me move to a related topic. Moving from the JNA, were

16 there other types of military units that were involved with the Crisis

17 Staffs?

18 A. Yes, and that is what further complicates the picture, because in

19 addition to the federal army of the JNA, each republic also had its own

20 Territorial Defence, which was organised and managed at the municipal

21 level, with its own republic command structure reaching to the republican

22 level.

23 So one issue was, as we saw, is there a JNA command in the area,

24 and to what extent they will cooperate with the Crisis Staffs, and the

25 Crisis Staffs with them. Another issue is then the local Territorial

1 Defence forces. And, in those places, the influence of the Crisis Staffs

2 over the Territorial Defence depended, in part, on how much control the

3 SDS and Crisis Staff over municipal organs, including the municipal TO

4 staff. But until the formation of the VRS, the Serb TO was essentially

5 the military force of the Serb Republic, because of the transition of the

6 JNA. So another aspect is the relations with the TO.

7 Q. Let's talk about presentation tab 136, master tab number 241, in

8 that regard.

9 A. This also indicates that, in some places, the Crisis Staffs, or

10 the SDS in general, where they might not control the Territorial Defence,

11 also formed its own units; sometimes secretly, sometimes fairly openly,

12 calling them Serb Territorial Defences. Again, the openness or the

13 secrecy depended on a number of factors, especially their control over the

14 municipality.

15 But here we see in Sanski Most, because these are the conclusions

16 of a meeting of the Crisis Staff, held on 21 and 22 April 1992, of Sanski

17 Most, under item 6: "The Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality of

18 Sanski Most hereby adopts the conclusion that the Serbian defence forces

19 are to be placed at the disposal of the commander of the Serbian

20 Territorial Defence and engaged as a special unit of the Serbian

21 Territorial Defence."

22 And here we have the formation of a Serb Territorial Defence based

23 on, in this case, a unit calling it -- a force called the Serbian defence

24 forces.

25 Q. Let me ask you about the situation in Bosanska Krupa.

1 A. Here --

2 Q. Tab number 137 in the presentation is master tab 221. And the

3 title page of this refers to it as a report on the work of the municipal

4 Assembly.

5 A. Yes. The internal evidence in the -- of this report indicates

6 it's a report summarising the work of the municipal Assembly and War

7 Presidency from the 1st of January, 1992, to 20 April 1993. So it's

8 giving a retrospective on the work of the War Presidency.

9 Q. Can you direct the Court to the excerpts that you're going to talk

10 about, and the page number?

11 A. On page 4 of the English translation, which is -- if I could see

12 the whole of the B/C/S, it is 0552816. That's for the first section --

13 Q. The ERN is rather hard to read on the Sanction presentation, but

14 it looks like it's page number 2 at the top?

15 A. Yes. Last paragraph, page 2 at the top of the B/C/S. First full

16 paragraph on page 4 of the English translation. This report is noting

17 that "SDS members in the Serbian police reserve, the Serbian municipality

18 and TO staff, and the municipal SDS subcommittee for defence and

19 protection of the Serbian people stepped up their efforts to prepare the

20 Serbian people for war."

21 At the bottom of this same paragraph, it talks about that

22 individuals were -- who were involved. "This is a report on their work,

23 and the protagonists were Serbs, members of the SDS. So here we will

24 mention just a few of them, those who are the most responsible, and they

25 are: Miroslav Vjestica, Dmitar Ziganovic, Drago Damjanic, Mile Vojinovic,

1 Mile Mijic, Drago Skoric, and others who worked in parallel in providing

2 weapons and organising reserve units of the Serbian police and units of

3 the Serbian Territorial Defence, as well as those who worked to organise

4 and establish government authorities.

5 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask to stop, because I sought the

6 assistance of the registrar. But my tab 137 is empty so I can't make any

7 notes on it.

8 If you will just allow me 30 seconds to re-find in the transcript

9 what I missed.

10 MR. HANNIS: I'd like to assure Your Honour that there's no

11 conspiracy on our part to deprive you of the documents. I know that's the

12 second time it's happened, and it appears you're the only victim so far.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Conspiracy is a typical, I would say,

14 English/American concept of law, so I'm unfamiliar with it.

15 Please proceed.

16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

17 Q. Ms. Hanson, if you could continue.

18 A. Yes, I've finished that section. I'm just trying to identify the

19 next section. In this same document, on page 6 of the English translation

20 -- I'm trying to find it in the B/C/S, it's on page number -- seen as page

21 4 in the B/C/S. The ERN ends in 18. It's the first paragraph -- first

22 full paragraph on page 6 in the English translation.

23 "Another task which had to be handled by part of the War

24 Presidency was the integration of Serbian Territorial Defence units into

25 the 10th Corps of the JNA to avoid the situation in which we would be

1 declared and treated as paramilitaries."

2 So we see that the SDS and Crisis Staff members were involved in

3 forming certain Territorial Defence units. They were then integrated into

4 the JNA corps.

5 If you can recall Adzic's order on staffing JNA -- of volunteer

6 units and putting them under JNA command, this is consistent with that

7 tasking.

8 Q. All right. Is there anything else in that document?

9 A. We'll come to it later in another topic.

10 Q. Okay. I want to now go to an Assembly session excerpt. This is

11 the 1995 Assembly. And I'd ask you if we have Mr. Karadzic talking about

12 the formation of SDS units during this time.

13 A. Yes. This is Karadzic's speech, as you said, in April 1995 --

14 Q. Excuse me. Let me note the tab number. Presentation tab 138,

15 master tab 49. And if you could tell the Judges where you're beginning.

16 A. I'm beginning on page 323 of the English, going on to 324. We've

17 seen this speech earlier as his recollection of the A and B document, but

18 I would like to give a slightly longer excerpt because he also discusses

19 the military preparations.

20 In the middle of the lower paragraph on page 323, he talks about

21 how, "when the war began, we had municipal power, we held it firmly." He

22 reminds the Assemblymen of the A and B variant document. He says: "In

23 the B variant, where we were in the minority, 20 per cent/15 per cent, we

24 had set up a government and a brigade, a unit no matter what size, but

25 there was a detachment with a commander."

1 Then at the last two lines of that paragraph -- of that page:

2 "Distribution of weapons was carried out thanks to the JNA. What could be

3 withdrawn was withdrawn and distributed to the people in the Serbian

4 areas."

5 We're now at the top of page 324.

6 "But it was the SDS which organised the people and created the

7 army. It was an army. Together with the police, those were the armed

8 forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They created the

9 space, liberated and created the space. In some places, with the help of

10 the JNA; in others, without the help of the JNA; and in yet others,

11 without the JNA knowledge, since Huso and Juso were commanding in the JNA

12 at that time. And what happened? We made various calculations and

13 agreements with Yugoslavia. We decided to set up the TO, the Serbian

14 brigades, which were indeed led by the SDS, but not as a party army but as

15 a people's army."

16 And finally in this same speech, seven lines up from the bottom of

17 page 324, he says: "The corps of the army existed in every municipality.

18 I would like to hear in which municipality it does not exist."

19 I think this is the best summary of how they formed units and, in

20 some places, had the help of the JNA; in other places, they hid it from

21 the JNA, because, when there's reference to Huso and Juso - I believe just

22 a generic Muslim name - in some places, Muslims were commanding in the JNA

23 and they hid from them the formation of units led by the SDS. And, of

24 course, in connection -- he refers to the 19 December instructions at the

25 beginning of this passage.

1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

2 MR. HANNIS:

3 Q. Now I want to talk about other paramilitary units, not the JNA,

4 not the TO, not SDS units per se. Did your preparation for the report

5 reflect the existence of relations between some of the Crisis Staffs and

6 various volunteer or paramilitary units?

7 A. Yes. The military picture is further complicated by the fact that

8 there were various kinds of paramilitary units. Some came from elsewhere;

9 some formed -- from outside Bosnia; some from other parts of Bosnia also

10 operating. But we do see contacts and cooperation between municipal

11 Crisis Staffs and paramilitary units from outside the municipality who

12 came to them.

13 Q. Let me take you to tab 139 in the presentation binder, master tab

14 122.

15 A. This is a report from the Bijeljina police station to the Minister

16 of the Interior. I'll just check the date. It's -- no obvious date, but

17 it's following a dispatch from the minister of 9 April 1992. So it's

18 reporting on the situation in Bijeljina. That's just the dating there on

19 the first paragraph. But on page 2 of the translation, a third --

20 Q. Can you tell us where that is in the B/C/S?

21 A. I'm sorry, yes.

22 Q. Does that copy in Sanction seem to be fairly --

23 A. Yes, the Sanction copy is very hard to read. The translation is

24 based on, I think, actually looking at the original document, which is

25 more legible than the electronic version. It is on page 00749560,

1 starting about six lines from the top. But the English is a lot clearer.

2 On page 2 in the translation, third paragraph, it says -- talking about

3 the events on the 31st of March, 1992:

4 "During the night and the following day, the Territorial Defence,

5 the Serbian National Guard, and the Serbian Volunteers Guard began to lift

6 the blockade of the town under the guidance of the Crisis Staff of

7 Bijeljina municipality."

8 In this context, I might recall, then, the report of the Crisis

9 Staff of Bijeljina, dated the 1st of April, 1992, which we've seen as an

10 example of reporting. The forces mentioned here, the Serbian National

11 Guard and the Serbian Volunteers Guard, were paramilitary units. The

12 Serbian National Guard was led by Ljubisa Sava, known as Mauzer, and the

13 Serbian Volunteers Guard were led by Arkan, Zeljko Raznatovic. And it

14 says that they took over the town under the guidance of the Crisis Staff.

15 Q. And for our next document, I don't believe we have this up in

16 Sanction. Tab number 40 -- 140 in the presentation binder is master tab

17 463. Can you tell us what this is and --

18 A. It's simply to identify -- to provide an identification for

19 Mauzer's Serb National Guard.

20 Q. And what is that document?

21 A. It's a report on paramilitary formations in the territory of the

22 Serbian Republic of BiH, from 28 July 1992. I included it merely for

23 reference. I don't use it otherwise.

24 Q. Tab 141 in the presentation, master tab 438.

25 A. Is information on the training of Arkan's volunteers by the --

1 from the security department of the general staff of the army of

2 Yugoslavia, from May 1993. Similarly, I included it just to identify the

3 Serb Volunteer Guard as Arkan's forces.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Just for reference.

6 Q. And does that document also identify any other members of Arkan's

7 group who we talk about --

8 A. Yes, thank you. It identifies, in the bottom paragraph on page 1

9 of the translation, or the third paragraph in the B/C/S, it makes

10 reference to the major known as Legija, who is commander of the training

11 centre in Erdut and the commander of the Super Tigers. We'll be hearing

12 an intercept with Legija. So just to identify him in advance as a leading

13 member of Arkan's Serb volunteer guards.

14 Q. Tab 142 in the presentation, master tab number 238. How does this

15 pertain ...

16 A. This is an order to pay out money. It's from the provisional

17 government of Zvornik. As I note in my report, Zvornik was an exception

18 in that there was a Crisis Staff but at the time of the takeover, shortly

19 after the takeover in Zvornik, it created a provisional government. This

20 is the only municipality in which I see the term "provisional government."

21 But it was -- it replaced the Crisis Staff and acted in a matter

22 consistent with the Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies we've seen. There

23 was no other organ calling itself the municipal government. This was the

24 municipal government at the time.

25 Q. And what was the date of that document, and what was its purpose?

1 A. This is the 4th of May, 1992, and it's an order to pay out money

2 for the use of the needs of the special unit, the volunteers from Loznica.

3 And the money will be taken over by the commander of the union Zuca. He

4 was a notorious paramilitary commander in Zvornik.

5 Q. All right.

6 A. So it shows that the temporary government is paying a special unit

7 of volunteers, led by Zuca.

8 Q. And related to that, tab 143 in the presentation, master tab 49.

9 Can you tell us what that --

10 A. Yes, this is a series of documents showing the charges, and then a

11 bill and that it's being paid, from a bus driver. On page 2 of the

12 translation, which is 01328425 in the B/C/S, this is a bill for the

13 transportation of volunteers on the route from Belgrade to Zvornik. So a

14 bus driver is charging the provisional government for his transporting

15 volunteers.

16 Q. Thank you. The next one I want to talk about is an intercept, and

17 I think you have identified three separate excerpts that you want to

18 discuss in connection with this one. It's dated the 15th of May, 1992,

19 and involves a person named Legija, Arkan, and another unidentified

20 individual.

21 A. Yes. It's a very long conversation in which Legija, as we saw,

22 who is a -- one of Arkan's commanders -- commanders of one of Arkan's

23 forces, calling in to the Erdut training centre, reporting on what he's

24 been doing in Ilidza. And then he later talks to Arkan himself, again,

25 describing his cooperation with the Ilidza Crisis Staff.

1 Q. And can you tell the Judges and Defence where we're starting the

2 first excerpt?

3 A. It's, I think, maybe starting on page 4 of the -- yes, starting on

4 page 4 of the translation, and then we will go to - there are three

5 excerpts so it's going to be a little complicated - page 7 of the

6 translation, and later page 13.

7 Q. Let's start with the first segment.

8 [Intercept played]

9 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

10 "Legija: All the things he said, forget about it. That was not

11 adopted, we came here and started organising things on our own initiative,

12 you know.

13 Unknown male: Yes, yes.

14 Legija: He did not hook us up with anyone. I hooked up with the

15 Crisis Staffs here in Ilidza and I organised everything, barracks,

16 mobilisation, training. And yesterday during the attack when the first

17 casualties occurred, everything became completely disorganised and

18 discipline broke down.

19 Unknown male: Yes, yes. Tell me, who controls Ilidza now?

20 Legija: Our men still control Ilidza.

21 Unknown male: Ours?

22 Legija: Yes."

23 MR. HANNIS:

24 Q. Any comment on that first segment?

25 A. Just that he connected with the Crisis Staff in Ilidza. It will

1 be, as we see, a series of conversations. There will be more. The extent

2 of his cooperation with the Crisis Staff will be seen.

3 Q. And what unit was he associated with at the time?

4 A. Arkan's Serb Volunteer Guards.

5 Q. The second segment begins in the English on what page?

6 A. Seven.

7 Q. Can you direct Mr. Krajisnik to the approximate place on the B/C/S

8 hard copy? I'm sorry, I don't have it marked in my ...

9 A. I'm sorry, I don't have it marked in this copy since I just got

10 the copy. It's at the bottom of 03290472 to the top of the following

11 page, 0573.

12 Q. We'll play that one now.

13 [Intercept played]

14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

15 "Legija: You understand, but when the first casualties occurred,

16 can you imagine that amid the fighting there the peasants stole the car,

17 our car and fled.

18 Unknown male: What did they do?

19 Legija: They took our car, the car we got from the Crisis Staff,

20 do you understand?

21 Unknown male: Took it?"

22 A. So he got a car from the -- Arkan's soldiers got a car from the

23 Crisis Staff in Ilidza.

24 MR. HANNIS:

25 Q. And the next segment?

1 A. I believe page 13 -- 13 in the translation. It starts on 03290476

2 in the B/C/S, the sixth box from the top.

3 Q. If we can play that one.

4 [Intercept played]

5 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

6 "Legija: Secondly, here in Ilidza, I, we got to Ilidza. I hooked

7 up with ...

8 Zeljko RAZNATOVIC: Speak louder, I can't hear you.

9 Legija: I hooked with their Crisis Staff.

10 Zeljko RAZNATOVIC: Aha.

11 Legija: And then I had to split up that Crisis Staff, because

12 some politicians and some warriors and who knows who, were interfering, so

13 I transferred that military staff to us.

14 Zeljko RAZNATOVIC: Aha.

15 Legija: And I organised mobilisation and set up two barracks and

16 started with the training and all."

17 A. So he's reporting to -- Legija here is reporting to Zeljko

18 Raznatovic, Arkan, that he hooked up with, connected with, the Crisis

19 Staff in Ilidza. And then we can see in his description of the Crisis

20 Staff the way some Crisis Staffs were combining political and military

21 functions, because he says he had to split up the Crisis Staff. "Some

22 were politician and some were warriors. And he transferred the military

23 command to us." So he saying -- I take this to mean that the Crisis Staff

24 had some amateurs, that he had to split up, make a division of labour

25 between the political and military, and as a military man, he set up the

1 military command.

2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I'm about to start a new section. I

3 don't know if there were any other administrative matters you wanted to

4 deal with in the last three minutes, but this would be a good point for me

5 to break.

6 JUDGE ORIE: I have no administrative matters in mind, but I

7 wouldn't mind having an earlier break since I understand Mr. Petrov is not

8 available any later than 2.00.

9 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

10 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, does that mean we might be able to sort

11 out this issue today? Because each day it arises in practice.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

13 MR. STEWART: So before Mr. Krajisnik leaves this building.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Well, whether it will be before he leaves this

15 building is another matter. I'm available immediately now to briefly

16 discuss the matter. I also do understand that -- I misunderstood that Mr.

17 Petrov said he had a meeting at 2.00 and therefore would not be available.

18 Of course, we have some information.

19 Mr. Hannis, it might be -- well, I don't think at this moment that

20 we need your assistance in resolving the matter. If you would not mind

21 that I discuss the matter with Mr. Stewart --

22 MR. HANNIS: I don't mind at all.

23 MR. STEWART: I told Mr. Hannis what the issue was, Your Honour,

24 which seemed perfectly reasonable, so that the Prosecutor didn't feel

25 there was some mystery that I wasn't sharing with them.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll see whether we can resolve the matter.

2 But this is all none of your concern, Ms. Hanson. I would like to

3 give you the same instructions I gave you yesterday, that is, not to speak

4 about the testimony you have given and the testimony you're still about to

5 give. You have an idea now as well how much time it will take,

6 approximately. It's expected to take until at least next week, Tuesday.

7 And we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.00, in the same

8 courtroom.

9 We'll adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00, courtroom II.

10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,

11 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 3rd day of March,

12 2005, at 9.00 a.m.

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25