1 Monday, 19 June 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.24 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone.

6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number

8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

10 Mr. Krajisnik, we again received a couple of documents, copies of

11 documents, with a short summary. They have been provided to the parties

12 again so that they can decide what to do with it, and, as usual, the

13 summary will be translated with priority. We will see the appropriate

14 action is taken in order to achieve that. Then, Mr. Krajisnik, before we

15 will continue, I'd first like to deal with a few procedural matters,

16 mainly about exhibits.

17 First, I'd like to address the parties in relation to Exhibits

18 P1091 and P1092.

19 On the 10th of March of this year, two clips after film were

20 played in court. The first clip, played at transcript page 21116, showed

21 a ceremony honouring 18 new so-called Chetnik Vojvodas. This was admitted

22 under exhibit number P1091. The second clip, which was part of the same

23 exhibit, showed statements by Vojislav Seselj and Radovan Karadzic when

24 Dr. Seselj took the new Chetnik Vojvodas to Pale. This was played at

25 transcript page 21118 and inadvertently assigned a different exhibit

1 number, namely P1092.A. The Chamber hereby instructs the registrar to

2 correct the record by reassigning to the second clip the correct exhibit

3 number, that is P1091.

4 Then next issue is the numbering of P292 and P389.

5 A binder of telephone intercepts was tendered by the Prosecution

6 on the 27th of September, 2004, and admitted as Exhibit P292. A CD of

7 telephone intercepts was tendered on the 8th of November, 2004, and

8 admitted as Exhibit P389. In order to identify and cite these intercepts

9 more easily, the Chamber hereby instruct the registrar to number each

10 intercept as a separate tab under the corresponding exhibit number. This

11 change is to be reflected in the Registry's exhibit list which is to also

12 contain a reference to the KID identification number of each intercept,

13 since the number has often been used in the courtroom to identify specific

14 intercepts.

15 Then the next issue is a reminder of the 6th of June order on

16 exhibits. The Chamber would like to remind the parties that in accordance

17 with the Chamber's order on exhibits rendered on the 6th of June, 2006,

18 all missing items and translations must be provided to the registrar by

19 tomorrow, that is the 20th of June.

20 And finally, the Chamber wants to set a deadline for submission of

21 Mr. Krajisnik's documents. During his testimony, Mr. Krajisnik has

22 provided a large number of documents. These documents were distributed to

23 Prosecution and Defence counsel in order to determine which documents they

24 wished to have translated and offered into evidence. The Chamber is

25 hereby setting a deadline on Friday, the 23rd of June for the parties to

1 submit those documents which they wish to tender into evidence. Of

2 course, if translations are not fully ready, an extension of time can

3 always be applied for. These were some of the procedural issues the

4 Chamber wanted to address.

5 Mr. Stewart or Mr. Josse, are you ready to start the

6 re-examination of Mr. Krajisnik?

7 MR. JOSSE: We are, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to remind you that

9 you're still bound by the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning

10 of your testimony.

11 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]

12 [Witness answered through interpreter]

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse you may proceed.

14 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

15 Re-examination by Mr. Josse:

16 MR. JOSSE: Could I begin by handing to Mr. Krajisnik a binder of

17 documents? In part, the place I'm going to take him on occasions has been

18 marked, as happened during the examination-in-chief.

19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you were asked a number of questions about

20 Sarajevo. I'd like to first of all take you to a document that is

21 labelled "B1," which formed part of the agreed principles at Dayton.

22 This is an English-language document. You have provided this.

23 Where did you get it from, please?

24 A. It comes from the material that I brought from Dayton. I think

25 every participant had the same package of background material and brought

1 it with them from Dayton.

2 Q. Have you any idea who is the author of this document?

3 A. The mediators, the people who worked there, including

4 representatives of the European Community and representatives of the U.S.;

5 one of them drafted and proposed this. A similar proposal to this was

6 topical when Sarajevo was discussed as a district.

7 Q. The handwriting at the very top of this page belongs to whom?

8 A. It's my handwriting.

9 Q. What does it say?

10 A. "I: Proposal for Sarajevo."

11 Q. As a matter perhaps of form and curiosity, how was this document

12 translated for you at the time?

13 A. I don't think it was actually translated. We made do somehow.

14 Somebody who knew English interpreted it. There was no time to translate

15 it for those who didn't speak English at the conference, but we got a

16 translation later and I have a Serbian version. I don't know how come

17 that you didn't get it.

18 Q. Why do you say this document is significant?

19 A. Because in Dayton, during the discussions, between our delegation

20 and Mr. Holbrooke, our delegation, the delegation of Serbs from

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is Republika Srpska, accepted this proposal and

22 we believed that Sarajevo should be a district because we did not see any

23 other quality solution. We also thought that Sarajevo was at that moment

24 an obstacle to achieving an all-round solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25 Q. Where do you say this document fits into the Prosecution's

1 suggestion that you wanted to see the city of Sarajevo divided?

2 A. All the way up to Dayton, the proposal of the mediators was not to

3 divide Sarajevo but to transform it, with one-third of the inner city

4 belonging to Republika Srpska and two-thirds to the Federation. And we

5 always kept saying that just as there was an umbrella organisation over

6 all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there should be an umbrella linking

7 Sarajevo because many things in the workings of a town inevitably have to

8 be dealt with jointly. Perhaps that is what they saw as a basis for their

9 claim that -- in fact, I did advocate that we, too, have a right to

10 certain neighbourhoods, parts, of Sarajevo, without dividing Sarajevo as

11 it is divided today.

12 Q. And the document that we see, to what extent did the Serbian side

13 accept what it proposed?

14 A. Even back with the Cutileiro Plan, the Serb side had accepted this

15 solution as a provisional one, pending a quality solution, namely that

16 Sarajevo should be a district, because Sarajevo was the most difficult

17 problem to solve. And it was always the greatest stumbling block because

18 the Muslim side wanted all of Sarajevo to belong to them, and that's where

19 the problem lay. We, on the other hand, thought that we were entitled to

20 a part of it, and there is still a debate today in Bosnia and Herzegovina

21 published in Slobodna Bosna, namely transcripts of the deliberations are

22 being published from 1993, when the leadership discussed this. It is

23 being published now. I have that article and I can produce it, if

24 necessary; it's a debate on several pages.

25 MR. JOSSE: Could this have a number, please, Your Honour?

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.

2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D253, Your Honours.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

4 MR. JOSSE:

5 Q. Now, you have also produced for the Chamber's consideration what

6 amounts, in part, to an interview with General MacKenzie on video; is that

7 correct?

8 A. Right.

9 Q. And the interview is -- forms part, itself, of an extract from

10 some sort of television documentary; is that right?

11 A. Yes. You're right. It's a whole film of which the statement of

12 General MacKenzie is only a part, and that DVD is available; however, I

13 was unable to open it on my computer. I was able to open only certain

14 parts.

15 Q. Well, we're proposing to play a section, five to ten minutes,

16 which includes this interview with General MacKenzie.

17 Before we do that, Mr. Krajisnik, are you able to assist with who

18 produced the programme that we are about to play?

19 A. I couldn't possibly know that. It's spelled out there. It was a

20 broadcast that was seen in Yugoslavia, on TV. Somebody in Europe made

21 it. I don't even know who the participants in that programme are, but it

22 was shown on -- in prime-time in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and

23 elsewhere, and that's why we sent this DVD as evidence.

24 Q. And it had been obtained by investigators; is that correct?

25 A. Yes, yes. Our investigators got hold of it.

1 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, the programme is in English. It is

2 subtitled, fully, as far as we can make out in B/C/S. At this stage,

3 there is no transcript whatsoever. Your Honour perhaps, with respect,

4 might need to give some guidance to the interpreters as to what they

5 should do. As I say, I repeat, it's subtitled in B/C/S; it's in English.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Translations and subtitles are known not always

7 to be very precise, also because there is limited space to write down

8 something. I would like to invite the interpreters, to the extent

9 possible, to translate the English as they hear it into B/C/S. They

10 might, however, face such problems, which is entirely understandable. So

11 therefore, we will consider whatever you translate, because we can't slow

12 down those speaking on this television -- on this clip. We'll take that

13 as a very provisional translation, and the Defence is invited to have the

14 English transcribed and to submit it for translation to CLSS so that we

15 get a final translation. So whatever is translated now is only a

16 provisional translation.

17 Is there any comment from the interpreters on what I suggested,

18 whether that it's workable?

19 THE INTERPRETER: Yes.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's give it a try.

21 THE INTERPRETER: We haven't heard it yet, so we have no idea what

22 the sound track is like.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We don't know about quality, we don't know

24 about speed of speech. Let's just see.

25 MR. JOSSE: It's fast. Let me warn the interpreters.

1 THE INTERPRETER: Then it is undoable, especially without a

2 transcript of the English in the original.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. If -- Mr. Josse, at least those who understand

4 English can at least try -- I hope I can follow it, and I hope that my

5 colleagues can follow it as well, but we're not even sure about that.

6 Let's see how things work out, and you are -- the interpreters are excused

7 even before we have started.

8 MR. JOSSE: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed.

10 MR. JOSSE: We'll try.

11 [Videotape played]

12 "The Muslims have been represented as the victims and the Serbs as

13 the aggressors. It should be remembered, however, the first bloodshed in

14 the struggle was Serb blood. Two Muslim gunmen and one Croat shot the

15 Serb Orthodox wedding party in the heart of old Sarajevo; the father of

16 the groom was killed, the Orthodox priest was wounded.

17 "The killing of Nikola Gardovic on March 1st was a prelude to the

18 war in Sarajevo. Despite promises from the government, the killers, who

19 were well-known, were not arrested. The following day, roadblocks were

20 set up by both Muslims and Serbs. Unable to protect their -- civilian

21 population, Serbs began to insist that predominantly Serbian areas of the

22 city be controlled by their own police or that Sarajevo become a UN

23 protectorate. Muslims insisted on the Izetbegovic government's right to

24 control not only Sarajevo but all of Bosnia. To get the West to

25 intervene, they needed to persuade western public opinion that the Serbs

1 were aggressors.

2 "[Indiscernible] -- and you can very easily see them as the

3 aggressors.

4 "The American press corps, the diplomatic corps, and also the

5 foreign correspondents themselves are heavily influenced by what is said

6 and what is done in Washington DC. What the State Department says is the

7 most important thing.

8 "In his autobiography, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker says

9 that he instructed the press secretary, Margaret Tutwiler, to help Bosnian

10 foreign minister, Hari Silajdzic, utilise western mass media to build

11 support in Europe and North America for the Bosnian parliament.

12 "There have been times in the posts and at networks

13 [indiscernible] networks, there was clearly a pro-Bosnian Muslim bias, and

14 they were egging their reporters on because it made a better story. It's

15 a simpler story, it's a -- just Serb holocaust against the Muslims, and

16 it's a civil war with atrocities on both sides. Even if you find out when

17 there is a real reckoning of what happened, a preponderance of -- or a

18 higher proportion of the atrocities were committed by the Serbs, it

19 doesn't mean it wasn't a civil war. It doesn't mean that there weren't

20 two sides of the story.

21 "This is part of our history, it's part of our culture, it's

22 promoted by the entertainment industry, and then the -- so in the scene of

23 Bosnia, we had to have a good guy and a bad guy. And we like to have a

24 good guy, so it was very easy there because -- wait a minute, the Muslims

25 are the victims; the Serbs are the bad guys; and the Croatian are kind

1 of" --

2 MR. TIEGER: Could the video stop for just a moment, please?

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger?

4 MR. TIEGER: There seems to be a lot of material contained on

5 this. I'm not sure what specific point it goes to with respect -- in what

6 sense it's re-direct. It certainly appears to me to be what I would have

7 expected to arise, if it arose at all, during the course of

8 Mr. Krajisnik's testimony. So I mean, I'm seeing a lot of people talking

9 about a number of topics. I don't know what it's directed to. It's

10 certainly the kind of thing we should have had the opportunity to see and

11 consider and address if it's relevant at all, and I'm just not sure in

12 context of re-direct what it goes to.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse?

14 MR. JOSSE: Two --

15 JUDGE ORIE: Because we have not heard any questions yet, so

16 therefore -- but Mr. Josse.

17 MR. JOSSE: Two comments. First of all, as the Chamber is aware,

18 Mr. Krajisnik produced this as at an early stage; it was made available to

19 my learned friends. They could have considered it. They could have dealt

20 with, as the Chamber repeatedly made clear to my learned friends. That's

21 my first observation as far to what they say.

22 Secondly, we are introducing this as Mr. Krajisnik's counsel in

23 the context of Sarajevo and the questions, the robust questions, the

24 suggestions that were put to him so far as Sarajevo was concerned. And,

25 as will become clearer in a few moments' time, it leads up to an interview

1 with General MacKenzie in relation to the suggestions the Prosecution made

2 which were refuted by Mr. Krajisnik.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger?

4 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I think we've been -- the Prosecution

5 has attempted to be as fair-minded and even liberal as possible with

6 respect to the [indiscernible] evidence I hope during the course of this

7 case. However, I have to point out, it is unfair to suggest that because

8 Mr. Krajisnik repeatedly produced materials for often unknown reasons,

9 each morning during the course of his case that we were expected to

10 address each and every one without knowing what it was going to. So I

11 don't accept that -- the fact that it came up in that context as being a

12 reason why we, the Prosecution, was in a position to deal with it during

13 the course of Mr. Krajisnik's cross-examination. I don't want to make a

14 bigger issue out of this than it is, however -- and I'll wait to see what

15 it supposedly goes to, but it does strike me that we are seeing a good

16 deal of information that might need attention. And we'll certainly be

17 asking the Court for the opportunity to do so if that's the way the

18 Defence intends to use it. As Mr. Josse just pointed out, all we knew

19 about this thing at the beginning was something about General MacKenzie,

20 and it wasn't entirely clear what that was going to be about, nor could --

21 was everyone able to access it at the time as I recall.

22 Again, I'm not trying to interpose any unnecessary procedural

23 obstacle; I just want to keep this as fair as possible. And seeing this

24 video at length, which appears to me to be something that would have been

25 expected during the course of Mr. Krajisnik's examination-in-chief, I

1 raise the issue now.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

3 Without expressing on the size of the issue at this moment, the

4 Chamber also waits to see what it goes to. So please proceed.

5 [Videotape played]

6 "To a certain -- line which was anti-Serb, as opposed to actually

7 trying to create balance of what the Bosnians were doing at the same

8 time.

9 "The press would have us believe that the Serbs had seized

10 two-thirds of Bosnia. The fact is the Serbs had lived in that territory

11 for 1500 years, and the fact is they are farmers and they are spread all

12 over the landscape, so they have always been on two-thirds of the

13 landscape.

14 "The statement that has become an absolute [indiscernible] that

15 the Serbs have taken over 70 per cent of Bosnia, again the underlying

16 assumption is that there were no Serbs in Bosnia before the conflict

17 started, when in reality much of the land of Bosnia was Serb land before

18 the fighting ever began. But the implication is that the Serbs dropped in

19 from some other planet and just took over nearly two-thirds of the

20 country.

21 "Based on what he now calls highly biased reporting, Penny

22 [phoen] became a hard-line critic of the Bosnian Serbs, whom he considered

23 aggressive. In an influential opinion column in the New York Times, Penny

24 and U.S. Air Force General Michael Dugan argued that Bosnian Serbs should

25 be bombed by NATO.

1 "I personally was responsible for perhaps one of the most

2 important things the State Department did is labelling what was going on

3 "ethnic cleansing." I had tried to gain that public opinion, and part of

4 my job was to draft material for the spokesman, Margaret Tutwiler. And

5 she was always looking for inflammatory material, but in any

6 case my colleague in Belgrade sent me a cable one day saying the Serbs

7 were doing what they described as ethnic cleansing. I thought: Okay,

8 great. I'll put this into Margaret Tutwiler's noon briefing. And to my

9 surprise, no senior official took the words out.

10 "The aggressors and extremists pursue a policy, a vial policy, of

11 ethnic cleansing.

12 "From that point on, the term 'ethnic cleansing' entered public

13 discourse, but it was not in use before. And I think that that image

14 somehow stuck, and then further down the road people tried to convert that

15 into an image of genocide, and which doesn't really correspond to

16 reality.

17 "The reality was that all sides had been carrying out ethnic

18 cleansing since the beginning of the war.

19 "An example of it is that there's -- that's going on in all

20 sides. It's going on in the United Nations Protected Areas, it's going on

21 in the area of Bosnia.

22 "Media perceptions influenced policies in western countries

23 towards Bosnia in ways that widened and prolonged the conflict. The one

24 force capable of keeping order in Bosnia might have been the Yugoslav army

25 based in Sarajevo, which had the officers, men, and equipment to counter

1 the many militias, Serb, Muslim, and Croat, that formed in the spring of

2 1992. General Kadijevic tried to do just that in meetings with leaders on

3 all sides; however, under the threat of sanctions and pressed by the U.S.

4 the JNA was forced to demobilise. In Sarajevo, most of the heavy weapons

5 fell into the hands of Serbian forces, while in other areas Croats and

6 Muslims inherited JNA weapons and armament factories. Instead of a

7 standing army which could be held accountable for keeping order, a lightly

8 armed force of UN peacekeepers was given the nearly impossible mandate of

9 separating the warring sides. UN General Lewis MacKenzie criticised

10 Serbian forces for their use of heavy artillery in the area of Sarajevo,

11 but he also wrote later that most of the 19 cease-fires he had negotiated

12 were broken by Muslim forces because their policy was, and is, to force

13 the West to intervene.

14 "There was an obvious short-term advantage in perpetuating the

15 fighting in some areas in order to encourage the world to intervene. I

16 don't think that's an illogical deduction at all, and I think most people

17 would agree with that.

18 "The fighting in Sarajevo was described by news organisations as

19 a siege, but the reality was that of a divided city, its front line

20 changed little in the course of the war. Serbs fired from areas they held

21 into areas controlled by Muslims, and Muslim forces fired into areas

22 controlled by Serbs.

23 "And I think people don't really understand that in fact Serbian

24 community in Bosnia suffered in exactly the same way that the other two

25 communities suffered.

1 "Veteran military correspondents such as Colonel David Hackworth

2 at News Week observed that with 300 tanks at their disposal, 'taking out

3 Sarajevo would be easier than sliding down a greased pole.'

4 "General MacKenzie agreed that the Serbs could have captured the

5 city in a matter of days early in the war, if that had been their

6 intention.

7 "Bearing in mind the extra JNA equipment that was there and

8 the -- as admitted by the presidential side, the overwhelming superiority

9 and gunnery and in tanks that was available in Lukavica then certainly a

10 very -- a formidable assault could be made against the city with a fairly

11 good chance of success.

12 "Many observers wondered why a government under siege would shell

13 its own airport.

14 "On several occasions, the UN documented and reported and made

15 clear publicly two or three days later that there were cases where the

16 Bosnians had a mortar into areas where you wouldn't expect there to be

17 military like the airport.

18 "In his book, "Balkan Odyssey," Lord Owen wrote that Muslim

19 forces would 'from time to time shell the airport to stop relief flights

20 to focus world attention on Sarajevo.'

21 "Sarajevo became after all a sort of icon of the problems of

22 Bosnia because there was a satellite dish which was shipped in very early

23 on in the crisis. It was easy, if you like, to have ready access to the

24 war on a day-by-day, real-time, instant minute-by-minute basis, if

25 possible.

1 "And what was going on in Sarajevo was somewhat posturing from

2 the international media. Whether we like it or not the presence of CNN,

3 ICUTV [phoen], BBC, and the Sky News network and many others was an

4 intimidating factor for any military operation going on in Sarajevo. That

5 would be seen by the world, and the world would pass judgement based on

6 what was going on in Sarajevo. As a soldier, it probably made a lot of

7 sense to tie-up the media in Sarajevo, and then whatever your objectives

8 were in the rest of Bosnia could be done without the presence of the

9 media."

10 MR. JOSSE:

11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we heard various quotations there from

12 General MacKenzie. First of all, an assertion that it was Muslims who

13 broke Sarajevo's cease-fires. What do you say about that?

14 A. Well, what I said here by way of testimony was only what our

15 soldiers had told us, when they were faced with the accusations leveled by

16 the international community. They said that it was the Muslims who were

17 breaking the cease-fire, that they were only responding. I really don't

18 know what was correct, but I found this statement made by Mr. MacKenzie

19 that is along similar lines, and that's why I presented it here.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Could we try to find out what period of time we are

21 talking about? Is this 1992? 1992 only? Is it 1992 until 1995? I've

22 got no idea. I think he was talking about 19 cease-fires. I don't know

23 whether they can be located in 1992.

24 If -- Mr. Krajisnik, if you do know, please tell us; if you don't

25 know, please tell us as well.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I just know that Mr. MacKenzie

2 was there in 1992, and that later there were other UNPROFOR commanders.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So it is your assumption that he only speaks

4 about the time he experienced himself?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. That is my assumption, that

6 he's talking about his own experience. But I don't know. I just know

7 that he was there then.

8 MR. JOSSE:

9 Q. Was your understanding, Mr. Krajisnik, of what the general was

10 saying that he had personally negotiated these 19 cease-fires, personally

11 been involved in their negotiation?

12 A. Yes, yes, and that can be seen by what he says. Out of the 19

13 cease-fires, most were violated by the Muslims, not all of them. I know

14 that he was there with our soldiers, and Mr. Koljevic had most contacts

15 with him, as far as the civilian authorities are concerned.

16 Q. He also stated that at the start of the war, had Serbian forces

17 wanted to, they would have had no difficulty capturing Sarajevo. Are you

18 able to comment on that?

19 A. I am not a military strategist. It would be so hard for me to

20 comment on that. I think that the intention really was not to take

21 Sarajevo, and I think it is hard to take Sarajevo no matter how many tanks

22 you have. Well, this is what I feel as a layman, but they are soldiers

23 and they know better. However, the intention was not to take Sarajevo but

24 to keep one's positions, as far as I know, that is. Now, whether the

25 soldiers were planning something different, that I cannot confirm.

1 Q. What about his assertion that it might have been to the advantage

2 of the Muslims to keep fighting ongoing in Sarajevo in order to win

3 western or further western support?

4 A. It is with regret that I can say that that is certainly correct.

5 Negotiations did not suit the Muslim side. They had a recognised,

6 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina; their government was legitimate and legal,

7 as far as the international community was concerned; and Bosnia was

8 recognised as a unitary state rather than as a transformed state, which is

9 what the other two sides had called for. Therefore, every conference was

10 superfluous, as far as they were concerned. They wanted the situation to

11 remain as it was.

12 MR. JOSSE: Could that CD have a number, please?

13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D254, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

15 MR. JOSSE:

16 Q. Now, I want to move --

17 JUDGE ORIE: Could I just put one or two additional questions to

18 this.

19 Mr. Krajisnik, when we are talking about -- you said every

20 conference was superfluous, as far as they were concerned. What was the

21 percentage of the territory under Serb control by -- well, let's say, at

22 the end of 1992?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it must have been over

24 50 per cent. But, Mr. President, I'm going to tell you why I think that

25 it was in the interest of the Muslim side not to have conferences held.

1 They sought military intervention in order to deal with the rebel Serbs,

2 or perhaps even the rebel Croats, to have someone handle them, to have

3 NATO come in so that Bosnia would become peaceful in that way. That is

4 why conferences did not suit them. That's why they thought that they

5 should make a sacrifice and that they would show in that way that they

6 were under threat, and that then NATO would move in; and that was the case

7 several times.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Were there -- at that moment, were there

9 municipalities where there was a Serb majority which were militarily

10 controlled by the Muslim and Croat forces?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot say exactly. Even if that

12 was the case, there were very few such cases; however, maybe I should add

13 something, Mr. President. In the central part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in

14 the big cities, there was a large Serb population where Serbs were a

15 minority. So there weren't municipalities, but there were a lot of Serbs

16 who were there who remained in Muslim territory, that is, Zenica, Tuzla,

17 Mostar, Travnik, and so on, in Sarajevo. So it wasn't municipalities, but

18 there were a lot of them -- well Tuzla I know, too.

19 JUDGE ORIE: And that was the same on the other side, I take it

20 that there were -- there was Muslim and Croat population in municipalities

21 even forming a majority in those municipalities which were militarily

22 under Serb control.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, but in Serb territory, it

24 was only Banja Luka, perhaps Prijedor, that were big towns; the rest were

25 small towns. But you are certainly right. What was under Serb

1 territory -- Serb control was, say, Vlasenica, with 8.000 to 10.000

2 inhabitants; and then perhaps Bratunac and so on. The only difference is

3 in the size of the municipalities concerned.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yeah, the other difference is that -- isn't it true

5 that, as you said at the beginning, that there were no municipalities with

6 a Serb majority under Muslim and Croat militarily control? Isn't that one

7 of the differences as well? Because that's how I started my questions.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. I'm saying that I don't

9 know whether there were any municipalities that were majority Serb

10 municipalities that belonged to them. If that was the case, there were

11 perhaps only one or two such municipalities - I cannot recall now -

12 because for the most part these were smaller municipalities. However,

13 what is certain is that you're right, that there were some municipalities

14 that were smaller indeed, but there were majority municipalities and they

15 say -- came under the control of the Serb army. For example, in Tuzla,

16 there were more Serbs than in three or four municipalities in eastern

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is where Serbs were a minority and also in

18 Zenica. Big towns have a large population and you're in a minority.

19 Mostar as well.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Josse.

21 MR. JOSSE:

22 Q. I'd like to turn to the issue of the Cutileiro Plan. You have

23 produced, Mr. Krajisnik, at C2 a further map.

24 A. Are we done with this?

25 Q. As far as I'm concerned, yes.

1 A. Well, it would be useful if I were to answer the first question.

2 I submitted it to you today, and I see that you have made a proposal here

3 to that effect, where I said that Sarajevo should be Serb. Is it

4 necessary for me to --

5 Q. Give me one moment. Yes, I was going to deal with that a little

6 bit later, but I'm happy to deal with it now.

7 A. It's all right. We can do it later. Whatever you prefer. Please

8 go ahead.

9 Q. Okay. I was going to turn to a Cutileiro document that you have

10 produced. It's in this particular bundle, C2, and it purports to come

11 from an Institute for International Law and International Business

12 Cooperation in Banja Luka in 1997 saying: "Dayton-Paris documents." Now,

13 I have got a colour copy here, and perhaps that can be placed on the ELMO

14 because that is really essential for an understanding of this particular

15 map.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Let's put it on the ELMO.

17 MR. JOSSE:

18 Q. Whilst that is being done, Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps you could tell

19 us about the institute and the obtaining of this particular document. If

20 you could answer my question, then we'll look at the map.

21 A. There is a book, it was prepared by Dr. Vitomir Popovic and

22 Dr. Vlado Lukic. Dr. Vlado Lukic was a participant in the Dayton Peace

23 Conference. Within that book - and the name of the book is, "The

24 Dayton-Paris Agreement," and it includes all the documents - there are

25 certain maps that were - how should I put this? - made during the course

1 of the negotiations and one of the maps is this map. I can bring the book

2 here so that you can see that it's from this book.

3 Q. Now, is the map in the book in colour?

4 A. Yes, yes. This is what it's like, just the way you see it now.

5 Q. And why did you want to bring this map to the Trial Chamber's

6 attention?

7 A. Well, I was really surprised when I saw that this was turning into

8 a problem here, namely what the Cutileiro map was; that is why I found yet

9 another source so that you would see what was made public as the Cutileiro

10 map. I remember this map. This is the only one I remember. I don't

11 remember any other map. And we called this map the Cutileiro map. I

12 really have to say that I never heard of any other map. Perhaps there

13 were some working maps, but this was the map that we called the Cutileiro

14 map, and on the basis of which we based our strategic objectives.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, could we then have a bit more explanation

16 on the map. What is green? What is red? What is white? What is --

17 MR. JOSSE: Yes, there is an index.

18 Perhaps the index could be brought into show, please.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, perhaps if we move it up a little bit. Yes. I

20 now see that it seems the green is Muslim, red seems to be Croat, white

21 seems to be Serb, where Sarajevo has its own --

22 MR. JOSSE: Pink, really.

23 JUDGE ORIE: -- pink colour. So let me just have a look at it.

24 MR. JOSSE:

25 Q. What about the depiction of the corridor on the eastern side of

1 Bosnia, according to this map? What do you say about that, Mr. Krajisnik?

2 A. Well, if you remember that map of mine, this is where the corridor

3 should be, that would - how should I put this? - link Semberija up. I'm

4 talking about the eastern part now. That's where the corridor would be,

5 where in this narrow section it would link up Semberija. You didn't ask

6 me about the corridor in Posavina, right?

7 Q. I didn't. But comment on that --

8 JUDGE ORIE: But what I do not understand is who proposed this

9 map? You say this is the Cutileiro map. Is this the map you agreed to?

10 Because you always said: We agreed to the Cutileiro plan. Is this then

11 the map you agreed to or how then should I understand this map? I have

12 some difficulties in believing you would have done so, but -- so you say

13 this is the Cutileiro map - it says it's from February 1992 - whereas I

14 understand that if there was any agreement, that it was in March rather

15 than --

16 MR. JOSSE: Could I interrupt, Your Honour? Do I understand Your

17 Honour's question to be: Is the witness saying that this map that is on

18 the ELMO was the actual map that was at the negotiations? Or is the

19 question: Was it a map similar to this?

20 JUDGE ORIE: No. My question is: What role did this map play? I

21 can't imagine that during all of the negotiations there have been only one

22 map on the table. I mean, we've seen many here already.

23 MR. JOSSE: Precisely.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Therefore, if Mr. Krajisnik tells us this is the

25 Cutileiro map, I'd like to know who presented this map. Was it

1 Mr. Cutileiro, or the Serbs, or the Muslims, or the Croats? At what

2 time? What role did it play in the negotiations? Just saying: Well, I

3 had forgotten about it but this is the Cutileiro map is -- doesn't assist

4 me in understanding what this map actually is.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, when Mr. Cutileiro

6 decided -- or rather, when we reached that stage of establishing three

7 constituent units, then the territories became bigger, so to speak. This

8 was drawn by the late Mr. Darwin. I remember him. I remember his last

9 name. He was an Englishman. And he said: Well, roughly these are the

10 territories that we could have in larger terms. They are not 100 per cent

11 Serb, 100 per cent Muslim, or 100 per cent Croat, but now you can have

12 different exchanges, barters, and then you can turn them into compact

13 units or other constituent units. You're right, no agreement was reached;

14 this was a working map. And further work was supposed to be done on this

15 and further agreements were supposed to be reached.

16 Before that, all of us made our own proposals of maps and you saw

17 those maps. That's why I don't know whether there were any other maps.

18 Well, maybe there were. It's been a long time. But I know -- well, how

19 should I put this? This is appropriate for the three constituent units.

20 He identified territories that we could -- how shall we put this? - one

21 constituent unit, the other constituent unit, and the third constituent

22 unit. It is certain that this is the one and only and most important

23 map. I don't remember any other map, and I attended all the talks.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Do I see when I'm trying to look at the map in more

25 detail, is it -- do I see that Prijedor is here to become Croat? Is that

1 correct?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Prijedor -- well, the border is

3 right next to Prijedor, and that's where Croat territory is. So you're

4 right on that. This is the Croat part. And then there is this dot here,

5 right on the edge of the yellow area or, rather, the red area that belongs

6 to the Croats.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Any -- I still -- I do understand that someone

8 presented this map as somewhere in the point of negotiating, the map which

9 is, from what I see, quite different from many of the other maps that

10 followed since then. Mr. Krajisnik, do you remember whether this was

11 early February or late February or ...?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that it was a basis for us on

13 the 12th of May, when we were working on our strategic goals, and that's

14 why I thought it was done -- or rather, that's why I said that was made

15 before that -- well, it wasn't after that.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You say this map was an inspiring moment for

17 you to further think of your strategic goals to be achieved in these

18 negotiations. Is that a correct understanding?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. I said it very clearly.

20 This map was before us when we formulated the strategic goals for the

21 Assembly of the 12th of May. It was the Cutileiro map. And we said:

22 Well, these are the goals with which we enter negotiations. Now, that is

23 what I can say.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Josse.

25 MR. JOSSE:

1 Q. When you thought you had an agreement with the Muslims in relation

2 to the negotiations that Mr. Cutileiro had chaired, how did that agreement

3 relate to the map that is on the ELMO?

4 A. On the 18th of March, an agreement was reached on three

5 constituent units; and the map was a working map that was supposed to be

6 worked on, that is to say that it was a basis for us, namely that we were

7 supposed to continue working on this map, that we should try to exchange

8 territories, or perhaps make some improvements or prove that we have some

9 rights somewhere, and so on and so forth. If you remember, we had one

10 such round of talks with the Croats, and on the 12th of May we said that

11 we would re-compose territories in Posavina so that we would get a

12 corridor. I stated that, not Karadzic, and I provided copies to you

13 here. So on the 18th of March an agreement was reached between the

14 Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and the European Community, in 1992.

15 MR. JOSSE: Could this map have a number, please?

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar?

17 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D255, Your Honours.

18 MR. JOSSE: With the front page presumably as well?

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it that the front page setting out in

20 which book this map is found is part of the exhibit.

21 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

22 Q. Could I next invite to you looks at C1, please, Mr. Krajisnik?

23 MR. JOSSE: Could that be distributed?

24 Q. This is an extract from the Economist magazine of --

25 A. I haven't got C1; I just have C2.

1 JUDGE ORIE: May I nevertheless go back to the --

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh I'm so sorry. Yes, it here it

3 is. I'm so sorry.

4 JUDGE ORIE: I'm sorry, I have to --

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please forgive me.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, would you please be so kind to go back

7 to the map, the coloured map, we had earlier? Because I had to find a few

8 matters. You said this map, which you call the Cutileiro map - and let me

9 just find your words literally -- referring to -- just trying to digest.

10 When I tried to summarise your testimony, you said: "I said it very

11 clearly. This map was before us when we formulated the strategic goals

12 for the Assembly of the 12th of May. It was the Cutileiro map."

13 And then you were asked by Mr. Josse: "When you thought you had

14 agreement with the Muslims in relation to the negotiations that

15 Mr. Cutileiro had chaired, how did that agreement relate to the map that

16 is on the ELMO?"

17 And I'm trying to understand. We have now a map in front of us, a

18 map of February 1992, which is quite different from what I understand was

19 the basic if not agreement, at least the starting point for further

20 negotiations that was agreed upon on the 18th of March. And now you say

21 on the 12th of May it was the February map rather than the 18th of March

22 map which guided us in formulating our strategic goals. Is that --

23 MR. JOSSE: I'm sorry to interrupt --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

25 MR. JOSSE: -- but we are of a view, Mr. Stewart and I, that

1 perhaps Your Honour could point out to Mr. Krajisnik what the differences

2 are between this new exhibit and what Your Honour had understood the

3 position to be hitherto.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Then I have to look at the other maps. Perhaps I

5 will do that during the next break to see where the differences are, but

6 if you say it's the same, then I have perhaps -- better to compare them

7 better.

8 MR. JOSSE: Well, we are not saying they are the same; we are

9 saying they are similar. We have not done a very detailed

10 cross-referencing, so to speak, but clearly that needs to be the starting

11 point bearing in mind the question Your Honour was formulating for the

12 witness.

13 JUDGE ORIE: I'll compare them what D7 and --

14 MR. JOSSE: B, I think.

15 JUDGE ORIE: I'll try to do that, and perhaps meanwhile you'll

16 continue, Mr. Josse.

17 MR. JOSSE: Yes.

18 Q. There is another Cutileiro document, as I already said, that we

19 would like you to look at, Mr. Krajisnik. And this comes from the

20 Economist magazine of the 15th of December of 1995. It doesn't say that

21 on the article, but we have checked it. And this is a letter to the

22 editor of that publication from Mr. Cutileiro. It's not presently

23 translated, so I'm going to read it out. Headed "Prewar Bosnia."

24 It says, "Sir, in your article on Bosnia, November 25th, you say

25 that in February 1992, before the war had started, Lord Carrington and I

1 'drafted a constitution that would have turned the country into a

2 confederation of Swiss-style cantons. The Muslims refused to accept what

3 they considered to be disintegration of Bosnia.' Not quite. After

4 several rounds of talks, our 'principles for future constitutional

5 arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina' were agreed by the three parties,

6 Muslim, Serb, and Croat, in Sarajevo on March 18th, as the basis for

7 future negotiations. These continued, maps and all, until the summer when

8 the Muslims reneged on the agreement. Had they not done so, the Bosnian

9 question might have been settled earlier with less loss of mainly Muslim

10 life and land. To be fair, President Izetbegovic and his aides were

11 encouraged to scupper that deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state

12 by well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew better."

13 First question, Mr. Krajisnik: Does that support your view of

14 what happened in the spring and summer of 1992?

15 A. I'm certain that all that Mr. Cutileiro stated here is absolutely

16 correct, and that furthermore Mr. Izetbegovic, if he had been deciding

17 alone, would have stuck to his promise. However, he was under pressure by

18 some agencies to renege on the agreement.

19 Q. That was my next question. Are you able to say who you think

20 Mr. Cutileiro means when he talks of "well-meaning outsiders"?

21 A. Well, I cannot call them outsiders, but I know that Ambassador

22 Zimmerman certainly suggested to Mr. Izetbegovic that he should reject the

23 agreement. However, Mr. Izetbegovic also had in his own circle people who

24 were not accountable for anything, but they did advocate the rejection of

25 any transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These people wielded

1 certain power in relation to Mr. Izetbegovic. They had the possibility to

2 influence him, and he was in a vice between his own desires and the wishes

3 of outside policies, foreign policies. I know Mr. Izetbegovic -- I knew

4 him, rather, and I spent quite a lot of time with him. And I know that if

5 he had been alone to decide, he would have stuck to the agreement.

6 MR. JOSSE: Could that have a number, please?

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar?

8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D256, Your Honours.

9 MR. JOSSE:

10 Q. I'd like to stick with the subject of Mr. Izetbegovic and look,

11 please, at an interview that he gave in October of the year 2000, which is

12 document F1 in your bundle, Mr. Krajisnik.

13 This is a quite a long interview. There is only a short bit that

14 I wish to ask you about. What publication is this from?

15 A. This is a Sarajevo publication, a Muslim newspaper called Dani.

16 Q. And we can -- would you read out what the title of the interview

17 is, please?

18 A. "The only kind of people I hate are traitors."

19 Q. And we see somewhere in the introduction, about five lines down, a

20 word that begins, n-a-j-e-k, and a sentence that ends in your name. Could

21 you read that part out, please?

22 A. "He confirms, in the most explicit way ever, that he found

23 Krajisnik the easiest to agree with, and finally - and seemingly

24 unconvincingly - response to all the critics who did not have any sympathy

25 for him over the morning and afternoon opinions. And finally, after all

1 these years, claims that he would rather form a coalition with the SDP

2 than with the SDS or HDZ, on certain conditions that are such that they

3 mean that he would actually never form such a coalition."

4 Q. If we could turn to page 19, which is the last page of this

5 interview, in the far right-hand corner - it's been marked for your

6 benefit, Mr. Krajisnik - we have a question that begins, "Jednom." Could

7 you read the question and then the answer, but slowly, please?

8 A. "You stated on one occasion - and correct me if I'm wrong - that

9 of all the representatives of the Serbian people in Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina, you found Krajisnik the easiest to agree with, to talk to.

11 Why? Are Radisic and Jelavic nationalists?"

12 This was the question.

13 Izetbegovic answers: "Yes. I did say something like that. I

14 have spent dozens of hours in difficult negotiations with Krajisnik. I

15 shall never forget our lengthy tug of war over the Bosnian currency. That

16 was real torture, but I had no feeling of hatred towards Krajisnik. The

17 only kind of people I hate are traitors. That is due, probably, to my

18 experience of prison. Krajisnik, however, was not a traitor. He fought

19 for the Serbian people to the best of his understanding of that people and

20 their interests. I will leave Jelavic and Radisic for some other time."

21 MR. JOSSE: Could that have a number, please?

22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D257, Your Honours.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

24 Mr. Josse, may I seek clarification of one of the previous

25 answers?

1 You were asked by Mr. Josse whether the letter sent by

2 Mr. Cutileiro to the Economist, whether that supports your view of what

3 happened in the spring and the summer of 1992. Now, there is a lot said

4 in this letter. It's clear that Mr. Cutileiro takes the position that if

5 the Muslims would have stuck to an agreement, a three partite agreement,

6 that it would have saved, as he says: "... so, the Bosnian question might

7 have been settled earlier, with less loss of mainly Muslim life and land."

8 .

9 Where you said that this letter does support your view on what

10 happened, would that include, I'm just asking, not to be confused about

11 it, that it was mainly Muslim life and land that was lost by not settling

12 earlier the Bosnian question? Would that be included or would that not be

13 included?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Muslim life also, there would be

15 less loss of life, Muslim, Croat and Serb.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I'm asking, Mr. Cutileiro writes,

17 "mainly Muslim." I'm just asking you whether you agree with that or you

18 disagree with that, that it was mainly Muslim life and land that was lost

19 due to the late settlement of the Bosnian question. Nobody says, neither

20 does Mr. Cutileiro say that there was no Serb life lost and no Serb land

21 was lost, or Croat life was lost, but he says that it was mainly Muslim

22 life and land that was lost. Do you agree with that or do you not agree

23 with that? I'm just trying to find out to what extent you agree with what

24 Mr. Cutileiro wrote.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think Mr. Cutileiro is right. The

1 greatest loss of life and loss in general was on the Muslim side. I have

2 to be honest.

3 JUDGE ORIE: And land as well?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. As far as land is concerned, I

5 have my reservations at that point, because Muslims lived in towns. As

6 for life, Mr. Cutileiro is right, and I have to be honest and say that

7 it's true. Although there was loss on other sides as well, but mostly on

8 the Muslim side.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Josse -- oh, I'm

10 looking at the clock and see that it's -- we had a late start, so if you

11 had -- I don't know. We started, due to technical problems, 15 minutes

12 late, so if you would have for the next ten minutes, then you can continue

13 and then we'll adjourn close to 4.00.

14 MR. JOSSE: I'm going to now ask Mr. Krajisnik, he doesn't need to

15 see the document, but it's for the Chamber's reference, P1213.

16 Q. And Mr. Krajisnik, you faced a number of questions, primarily from

17 the learned Presiding Judge, about an issue to do with Russian-made

18 automatic rifles. And if you look at your binder, could you turn to

19 document I1, please? It should be in the binder in front of you,

20 Mr. Krajisnik.

21 First of all, this is a document that appears to have an ERN

22 number upon it. Notwithstanding that, how did you obtain this document,

23 Mr. Krajisnik?

24 A. Well, this document is filed as an OTP document. I found it in my

25 documentation. It has a number, too. I don't know if somebody sent it.

1 It has a number in the upper corner but, it also has an ERN number

2 005973. It's part of a report from the 1st Krajina Corps.

3 Q. Would you read out the title slowly, please? In other words, the

4 words above the table.

5 A. "Overview of weapons and equipment issued to staffs and units of

6 the TO by the 5th Corps."

7 Q. Now, bearing in mind we don't have a translation, which line do

8 you say is relevant to this issue of Russian-made automatic rifles?

9 A. Line 6 in the table. I can read what is written: "Automatic

10 7.62 millimetres, M49/57." It's a model, 49/57.

11 Q. And how -- what light does this show -- let me start that again.

12 And what light does this shed on the issue?

13 JUDGE ORIE: Before we get all kind of confusion, could we -- and

14 could you assist us, Mr. Josse, in identifying the issue? The issue was

15 the interpretation, I think, of a report on weapons found in a motor

16 vehicle; and the issue was, I think, that - but please correct me when I'm

17 wrong - that this was understood, I think even by Mr. Krajisnik, as

18 weapons that were old-fashioned. And that was the issue.

19 MR. JOSSE: The age of the weapons was the issue, as I recall it,

20 precisely.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I remember with old automatic rifles. Yes.

22 Then, that being the issue, Mr. Krajisnik, could you please

23 respond to the question what the sixth line -- what light it sheds on this

24 issue?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, those are automatic rifles

1 with a drum, models from 49 to 57, and they originated in the Second World

2 War. The ammunition is 7.62, and as we can see two blocks up, rifle

3 7.62 millimetres, automatic rifle. That is a new product and that one is

4 an old product from 49 to 57, and it originated in World War II. Those

5 are the rifles with a drum barrel that the TO had. They emerged at the

6 beginning of the war.

7 MR. JOSSE:

8 Q. And how do you know that this refers to the weapons that are

9 mentioned in P1213, the report to the minister of the interior in

10 Sarajevo?

11 A. Well, the only automatic weapons of Russian -- Russian-made were

12 those with a drum barrel. And since what was written there was "Russian

13 automatics," then I understood that to mean those with the drum barrel.

14 In fact, my answer was that I didn't know anything about it. I just

15 attempted to interpret what that was all about. These, too, are Russian

16 automatics. That's what they were called, the drum-barrel ones.

17 MR. JOSSE: Could this have a number, please?

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D258, Your Honours.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, could you tell us what the other

21 automatic weapons, rifles, what origin they have on this list? I don't

22 know. It's difficult for me to read it, but --

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll try to explain, Your Honour.

24 The first one is a pistol, 7 - I think it says - 52. It was produced by

25 the Crvena Zastava factory in Kragujevac. Then comes the pistol 7.65,

1 automatic.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The first, it say "pistol," and then could you

3 read it? I have some difficulties in reading it. The first line is --

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With great difficulty, but I can see

5 what it's about.

6 JUDGE ORIE: What does it say? The first word, what does that

7 say?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Pistol, 7.62 millimetres."

9 JUDGE ORIE: Now, you say this is a certain make. What makes you

10 believe that this is a certain make?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I had that kind of pistol

12 before the war myself.

13 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand you. What makes you believe that the

14 pistol described in the first box is of - what did you say? Let me just

15 have a look - is of a certain make?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I'm telling you as a man who

17 is not a military man, but I know that all these pistols indicated here,

18 except the first, second, and third one, were produced by the military

19 branch of the Crvena Zastava factory in Kragujevac and they were available

20 on the market to people who wanted to buy weapons to have in personal

21 possession.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So you say you can't learn this from the

23 document, but it's general knowledge that leads to you conclude that this

24 must be CZ-produced pistols?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Because Crvena Zastava had a

1 very modern factory that produced weapons. For instance, the 7.62 rifle,

2 it's in the fourth box, that's the Kalashnikov, the automatic. Crvena

3 Zastava used to produce a modern automatic rifle using a Kalashnikov

4 licence. That's a modern rifle, that one. Number 5 is PAP, 7.62; it's a

5 semi-automatic rifle.

6 JUDGE ORIE: I'm very much a layman in this respect. You say

7 "Kalashnikov licence." May I then take it that it was -- Kalashnikov is

8 a Russian firm but has given licences to other companies to produce -- I'm

9 unfamiliar with the matter, so please tell me what it is. You say it's

10 under Kalashnikov licence. What -- yes?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Kalashnikov was a scientist, it's

12 the name of a scientist, so that rifle was named after him. He came

13 recently. He is 85 years old, and he gave Zastava licence to manufacture

14 that. I know that as a citizen. And that was a lethal weapon.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now --

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Everybody had these Kalashnikovs.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Now you're telling me that in the fourth box the

18 7.62 millimetre automatic rifle was produced under Kalashnikov licence.

19 Then if I understood you well, by CZ. Is that correct?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes, yes, that's correct.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Were there other licences given by Kalashnikov

22 to produce Kalashnikov weapons, of Kalashnikov-type weapons I should say.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't know. You know, in the

24 former Yugoslavia there was this distribution of military production. So

25 something would be manufactured in one particular city, and in Zastava and

1 Kragujevac it was that kind of small weapons, and then in Vitez, in

2 Slovenia, everybody made whatever they were supposed to make. Somebody

3 made tanks, and so on and so forth. Some made guns, cannons.

4 JUDGE ORIE: So it was all Yugoslav-produced, if I understand you

5 well?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Then we now go to the sixth -- I'm not very familiar

8 with these kind of matters, so I'm just trying to understand. Now you say

9 the sixth box, that is Russian, 7.6. Could you first of all read what it

10 exactly says?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Automat 7.62 mm," that means

12 millimetres. Then there is a capital "M49/57."

13 JUDGE ORIE: And that was produced in Russia?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. They were just called

15 Russian automatic weapons. These Automat Dobosar type, the ones with the

16 drum barrel. Now, where was this produced, in Zastava? In Russia? Well,

17 that's what they were all called, because they were old.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Kalashnikov were never referred to as Russian

19 rifles. What was the nationality of Mr. Kalashnikov?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, no, automatic rifles,

21 automatic rifles. What was said was automatic rifles.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But that's what box six says as well, "Automat,

23 7.62."

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, but the ammunition is

25 different, Mr. President, and they call them obtuse bullets. The model is

1 different. Up here there is a rifle and down here there is an automatic

2 weapon, "Automat."

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then the fifth box, "PAP, 7.62." What does

4 that stand for.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is a semi-automatic rifle.

6 Semi-automatic rifle, 7.62. I think -- I think there was also

7 manufactured by Zastava, Crvena Zastava Kragujevac, that is, as far as I

8 know. And they were there only in the beginning of the war and later on

9 there were only automatic rifles.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, at least it has become a bit clearer to

11 me. Mr. Josse -- oh, looking at the clock, it's -- yes, I'm just trying

12 to understand what conclusions I draw from this table in relation to the

13 issue we discussed before.

14 Then we'll adjourn until 4.30.

15 --- Recess taken at 4.02 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 4.38 p.m.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, the Prosecution has provided the Chamber

18 with the information that the document I1 was already in evidence.

19 MR. JOSSE: They helpfully informed us as well.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and I think it was attached to P741.1. And from

21 the original, we see that the word "Automat" is used. That was the whole

22 starting point on how to interpret what kind of weapon it would have

23 been. The interpreters, when the issue -- when the issue was raised told

24 us how to understand "Automat," it means even a translation in the sixth

25 box where it reads, "Machine-gun," might not be because it's unclear

1 whether it was a machine-gun or an automatic rifle so let's take that for

2 granted.

3 At the same time, the issue also might have been whether this

4 relatively old weapon was still of any use during the conflict. At least

5 I can imagine that that -- I mean, but perhaps we ask Mr. Krajisnik.

6 Mr. Krajisnik, you said this was weaponry from the Second World

7 War, I think you said. What would be the relevance of weapons being that

8 old, apart from that it's not state of the art?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, no. I was just talking about

10 this type of weapon, that it went back to the days of the Second World War

11 and we can see that it was manufactured after the Second World War, too.

12 I had an uncle who was in the Second World War and he was in the army, and

13 he had this kind of weapon, with a drum barrel. That's how I knew it was

14 from the Second World War.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's a lethal weapon but obsolete.

17 You can actually kill a person with it.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but would it still be used? Would it still be

19 used for military purposes? In 1992, would you still use that?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, at first, this did

21 exist, but as soon as more modern things came in, these other ones

22 disappeared. Everybody wanted to have a more modern weapon. I don't know

23 what happened to the rest, though.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Would the old-fashioned weapons, would they still be

25 distributed for use in the conflict in 1992?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I guess so, but I

2 don't know.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Because that's what is even P741 tells us, because

4 that is a letter sent by Major General Talic to the 1st Krajina Corps

5 command in which he explains that this is the weaponry that is -- that's

6 weapons issued to units and TO staffs; in other words, to structures

7 outside of the armed forces, since the beginning of the activities aimed

8 at protecting Serbs from genocide in Croatia and the Serbian Republic. So

9 I do understand from this letter, to which this list was attached, that it

10 still could play an active role in hostilities. Or do I -- is this a

11 wrong understanding of --

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. Mr. President, the

13 Territorial Defence was under the Yugoslav People's Army, but it was

14 separate. I mean, it was a separate entity. When weapons are

15 distributed, they are being distributed for the purpose of waging war,

16 you're quite right, not for people to keep them at home. You're right.

17 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, might I make an observation?

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

19 MR. JOSSE: Whilst I appreciate that we have chosen to re-examine

20 on this topic, bearing in mind the exchange between Mr. Krajisnik and

21 indeed yourself in relation to these Russian automatic rifles, many of the

22 questions, with respect, that Your Honour is now asking would surely be

23 better asked of some of the many witnesses who appeared before there

24 Chamber who are far more qualified to deal with what actually happened in

25 the field than Mr. Krajisnik. The Chamber has heard from many people who

1 were involved in the conflict on a daily basis, and the Chamber has heard

2 from military experts who also, I suspect, could deal with this issue.

3 Just an observation which might assist.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

5 MR. JOSSE: Mr. Krajisnik has made it clear he's not a military

6 expert. It's not in dispute that he physically wasn't involved in the

7 fighting; that's one area that the parties are agreed upon.

8 JUDGE ORIE: There was, however, a possible suggestion of obsolete

9 weaponry, which of course would tend to diminish the importance of the

10 event that happened at that time. And Mr. Krajisnik was quite explicit on

11 that, and very quickly -- and we now see that it's in evidence already and

12 that the -- although perhaps being obsolete, that it was still at least in

13 a document presented as a weapon which was actively distributed at the

14 time. I think that's -- but if there is any further dispute of that,

15 we'll further hear. Please proceed, Mr. Josse. One of the consequences

16 is since P741 is already in evidence, number D258 would be vacated.

17 MR. JOSSE:

18 Q. Yes, perhaps that could be given instead to the next document

19 which is H1 in your binder, Mr. Krajisnik. H1, please.

20 MR. JOSSE: This is an interview with Mr. Krajisnik from Srpski of

21 the 21st of December of 1992. And, Your Honour, what we have done is in

22 fact the penultimate question and answer is the question and answer we are

23 interested in. And if one turns to second page of this extract, that has

24 been blown up to make it easier for all concerned.

25 Q. So you've got it highlighted in yellow, Mr. Krajisnik. You've

1 also got the blown-up portion. Could you read, please, that question and

2 answer, slowly?

3 A. "You know that the commission for human rights, the UN commission

4 on human rights, even adopted a resolution blaming only the Serbs in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina for genocide." That was the question.

6 Answer: "The term 'ethnic cleansing' does not correspond, at

7 least not entirely, to what is going on in the territory of the former

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, because we do not think that the Serbs - I'm taking

9 them by way of an example - were expelled from Vitez or from Zenica, if

10 they were enabled to move out peacefully or, rather, to go where they

11 would be safer, the territory of Republika Srpska. I personally am

12 against any form of coercion. I energetically condemn any attempt of

13 forcible removal of people from their homes, centuries old. That is why

14 this term, 'ethnic cleansing,' has to be taken with a certain

15 reservation. It was used only in the report of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the

16 former Polish Prime Minister, who extremely one-sidedly, hypocritically,

17 as if he were making this report through a commission, blamed only the

18 Serbs in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

19 Do you want me to read on?

20 Q. Do you remember giving this interview?

21 A. I do not remember from this distance when I gave this interview,

22 but I know that this was my position with regard to ethnic cleansing and

23 the report of Mr. Mazowiecki.

24 Q. And does that differ from your position today?

25 A. Unfortunately, as far as the Mazowiecki report is concerned, there

1 is no difference. As for ethnic cleansing, I know what it means to leave

2 your home. To this day, I am deeply opposed to any kind of forcible

3 expulsions of populations because I believe that this is the gravest

4 emotional upheaval that can befall a person. To this day, I sometimes

5 have dreams of my village, although I was not ethnically cleansed; I just

6 left.

7 MR. JOSSE: Does Your Honour now want this to bear the number

8 D258?

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

10 MR. TIEGER: I'm pretty sure it's a Prosecution exhibit, Your

11 Honour. We are checking on the number right now.

12 JUDGE ORIE: It's a Prosecution exhibit. Then we'll wait and see

13 whether -- have you done with these documents or are you putting questions

14 to Mr. Krajisnik about it?

15 MR. JOSSE: I'm not putting any further questions about this

16 interview.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

18 Mr. Krajisnik, I'm trying to closely read what you said. You

19 said: The term 'ethnic cleansing' does not correspond, at least not

20 entirely, to what is going on in the territory of the former

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina." And then you give the reasons.

22 You say: "We do not think that the Serbs were expelled from Vitez

23 or from Zenica," just giving an example, "if they were enabled to move out

24 peacefully."

25 This answer suggests that they did not take that opportunity to

1 move out peacefully, or is this a wrong understanding?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President. I said that

3 people were happy when they left imperiled areas, when Serbs came to our

4 territory. Perhaps that's even more important, a lot more important, than

5 the reason why they had left because they managed to stay alive so people

6 were happy. So, by way of reciprocity, I was thinking about this, and I

7 was receiving information about it too, that that is the same way the

8 Muslims in our territory felt, that they wanted to go to safer areas. I

9 would be opposed to expelling anyone. That is the gist of what I said.

10 I had the opportunity to observe Serbs and to draw certain conclusions on

11 the basis of that. A lot of them had left Central Bosnia.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So I do understand that you say that if you

13 finally decided to go to a safer place, then that is not ethnic cleansing.

14 My next question would be: If you make life so miserable or if

15 you make life so dangerous that--

16 MR. JOSSE: Well, I -- may I interrupt?

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

18 MR. JOSSE: They are quite different in many ways, aren't they?

19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then I'll split it up.

20 If you make life so dangerous, to start with that, that people

21 have to -- that people are choosing to go to a place which is safer, would

22 that -- and I'm trying to formulate my question as carefully as I can -

23 would that exclude for the possibility that this could be ethnic

24 cleansing?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a sensitive question,

1 Mr. President. I am against any kind of coercion. It is hard to prove

2 coercion, though, because it is mixed with objective and subjective

3 reasons; and if you want to highlight something, you highlight subjective

4 reasons. If you want to proceed in an objective fashion, you say: I am

5 afraid because I am a minority. So it only depends on how many elements

6 there are involved. I cannot be an arbiter to that, as to what prevailed

7 in the minds of Muslims who left. If somebody made their life difficult

8 on purpose, not due to the war -- the war brings about many difficult

9 situations, but if somebody did that intentionally -- maybe this also

10 happened to the Serbs in Zenica, I don't know -- well, thank God these

11 people left and they stayed alive. It was different when people were

12 being expelled by force, then you have a clear-cut situation. That is why

13 I said that I was opposed to ethnic cleansing, and I compare that to the

14 Serb side, not the Muslim side because I don't know what prevailed in

15 their heart of hearts. They all signed that they wanted to leave and so

16 on and so forth, and they were glad to leave and later they said they were

17 ethnically cleansed. So it is very hard to deal with this.

18 It is easy to create a difficult situation in a war. It is

19 sufficient that there is a war going on, that is quite sufficient. There

20 is no food, many things are lacking, that's sufficient for a person to

21 want to leave. It doesn't have to be intentional; it can be

22 unintentional, too. I saw that.

23 JUDGE ORIE: The line you just spoke: "They all signed that they

24 wanted to leave and so on and so forth, and they were glad to leave. And

25 later they said they were ethnically cleansed. So it's very hard to deal

1 with this," would that mean that it's, in your view, that it could not

2 have been ethnic cleansing or that it's difficult to decide whether it was

3 ethnic cleansing or whether it depended on the circumstances on whether it

4 was ethnic cleansing? Could you give us your views on that.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll try to be as objective as I

6 can. At least it is not pure ethnic cleansing. I gave you the example of

7 Pale. I talked to everybody about this, I asked everybody about this.

8 There was no coercion, but later on some people came out and said that

9 they were ethnically cleansed. So now you have to collect some kind of

10 evidence to prove that that was not the case because everybody was fleeing

11 from areas where they were minority. Now, perhaps somebody was forcing

12 them, too, as you had put it, but it is sufficient for people to be in a

13 minority and want to leave most towns. I cannot be the judge of that,

14 what happened in a particular municipality, because I was not there, but I

15 am trying to be as objective as possible.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

17 Mr. Josse, please proceed. And for your information, the

18 interview is in P583, tab 121.

19 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you referred earlier to the interview at the front

21 of your bundle which is labeled A6, and you told the Chamber that you wish

22 to refer to that.

23 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, this is P1241. We do have further

24 copies, although of course it was exhibited recently in the course of the

25 cross-examination of this particular witness.

1 Q. In the middle of the page, page 5, the far right-hand corner,

2 which is as much as anything is for the benefit of the interpreters, about

3 halfway down that final column you have a passage, Mr. Krajisnik, that is

4 highlighted. That passage was not translated by the Prosecution. It's not

5 a criticism, it's just a fact. Could you read that passage out slowly,

6 please?

7 A. "Thus, whose fault is it? Maybe it's rather the fault of their

8 mentor than the fault of the Muslim side, although they too should have

9 taken the war into account. But they are to blame when we are talking;

10 when they are talking, we are to blame. And I'm not to go any further

11 into that problem. The basic thing is, since the war was imposed, that

12 the war has brought new realities. Unfortunately, the product of this new

13 reality are many victims. Now, there are no Serbs in Central Bosnia, or

14 at least there are a lot fewer of them. Maybe there are 100.000 of them

15 in Eastern Bosnia, where there used to be Muslims, but nowadays, there are

16 no Muslims there. Instead, they have fled to the central part of Bosnia.

17 Now, simply, Serbs, Muslims and Croats have separated or, more precisely,

18 Serbs separated from the others, because in the Federation there are still

19 mixed enclaves. They have separated like oil and water, whether we like

20 it or not. In every aspect of life, when you put -- when you fill a

21 bottle half with oil, half with water, and you shake it, then it turns

22 into one liquid; when you set the bottle down, then the layers separate.

23 The former system used to hold it all together through different keys and

24 a little bit of force, and thus we were 'mixed' as one whole."

25 Q. So these were remarks that you made in 1995. How do they fit in,

1 if at all, with the questions that you've been asked, both by the learned

2 Prosecutors and by the learned Presiding Judge, about your view of ethnic

3 cleansing?

4 A. What I was trying to say here was that the war had created new

5 realities. I didn't want to go into whether people were forced out of

6 their homes, whether they were expelled or whether they left of their own

7 will. But the fact is that there were no Serbs in Mostar, there were no

8 more Muslims in Zvornik, and so on and so forth; and when I was saying

9 that, I really meant that all three ethnic groups were in the same

10 position. It would be very harsh to say that all the Serbs left Central

11 Bosnia of their own accord, whereas all the Muslims had been expelled. I

12 continue to believe that during the war all three ethnic groups suffered

13 equally and the conditions that led them to leave their homes were much

14 the same for all the three groups.

15 Under the socialist system, there was a false appearance of

16 brotherhood and unity where we were all as one. However, as soon as the

17 war began, the underlying animosities came to the surface, leading to an

18 all-out war among the three ethnic communities. Under the socialist

19 system, in that era, there was great 'love' among the three groups;

20 however, when the war began, it turned out to be completely untrue. They

21 became enemies. I say that with regret but I have to say it because

22 that's the reality.

23 Q. I next would like --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Hanoteau was a question for you.

25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, you said:

1 [In English] "Under the socialist system, there was a false appearance of

2 brotherhood and unity where we were all as one."

3 [Interpretation]: And a little further down you say:

4 [In English] "Under the socialist system, in that era, there was great

5 'love' among the three groups."

6 [Interpretation] Isn't this an oxymoron? You seem -- sorry,

7 Mr. Krajisnik, I didn't let you finish, but you seem to be saying that

8 there is a brotherhood which is imposed in a certain way by the socialist

9 regime; and on the other hand, you were telling us that there was love in

10 that society. Thank you. Please tell us if, yes or no, this is a

11 contradiction in terms.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said love under quotation marks

13 which maybe led you to misunderstand me. I believed all that. I believed

14 that there could never be war between us, among us. I never believed that

15 there was any hatred. I had friends among Croats, among Muslims. We were

16 in a relationship of mutual respect, but it's simply hard to believe that

17 hatred came to the surface out of nowhere when the war began. And it

18 can't only be the fault of the leaders.

19 As soon as the war began, people started remembering events and

20 drawing on examples from a hundred years ago, and I realised that what I

21 believed in, the love, the brotherhood, the unity, that all that was

22 false. I realised that the so-called principle of the key, the

23 proportional representation system, under which, if you had a Muslim

24 director, the deputy had to be a Serb and so on, that principle ruled

25 everything. There is no greater love than the love that links brothers;

1 however, when they quarrel, their hatred can be as strong as their love

2 used to be. And what we witnessed was enormous bloodshed.

3 It's been 12 years since Dayton now, and still, today in those

4 territories, the hatred lives on, the animosity lives on. In Mostar, in

5 all the other places, there are no more any -- no longer any war criminals

6 among them, but the animosity still exists. The people who say that

7 everything is all right there are lying. There is a rift among the

8 people. People are isolating themselves within their communities, even

9 now, 12 years later. I cannot explain it. Maybe psychologists could have

10 a go at finding an explanation for that. The easiest thing to say is that

11 somebody else is to blame for all of that, that the war was not their

12 fault; however, the seed itself had to be there, since it spread so fast.

13 I don't know if I managed to explain.

14 I have said here, in this interview, when we are discussing, it's

15 their fault. When they are discussing, it's our fault. Everybody blames

16 somebody else. If you listen to a Serb, the Muslims are to blame. If you

17 listen to a Muslim, then the Serbs are to blame. It's always somebody

18 else's fault.

19 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [No interpretation]

20 JUDGE ORIE: There seems to be no English translation at this

21 moment.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, the microphone wasn't on.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Hanoteau would you please re-ask your question?

24 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I wanted to say the following,

25 Mr. Krajisnik. I wanted to ask you the following question,

1 Mr. Krajisnik. I heard what you just told us and have listened with great

2 attention, but I would like to know today, after all these years, in

3 hindsight, were you able to find an explanation for this reoccurrence of

4 hatred which caused so much suffering? We understood that everybody

5 suffered. This is what we heard.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Muslim issue, the

7 Croat issue, the Serb issue in Bosnia, none have been resolved. Everybody

8 believes that the Croats should get their own unit, their own entity, but

9 I believe that the Muslims should get their own unit, their own entity,

10 because the problem is that somebody always wants to lord it over somebody

11 else, and all the three communities should be in an equal position. They

12 used to live together peacefully, but only when there was equality among

13 them. Today, the Croats do not have their own unit, the Muslims do not

14 have their own unit, and they are both against Serbs who do have their own

15 unit. And the hatred was resurrected because those three ethnic

16 communities did not get their opportunity for certain things, that they

17 should have had. I think if certain ambitions that they had had been

18 realised, they would have been able to live in peace. If you had an

19 amount of self-government rather than another nation deciding your fate, I

20 think that would have satisfied each of the three communities. That is my

21 opinion, maybe I'm wrong.

22 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.

23 MR. JOSSE:

24 Q. I'd next like to ask you a question about the 22nd Session and an

25 extract from a speech by Mr. Srdjo Srdic.

1 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, we've examined this, and we found two

2 different translations. I know that Mr. Tieger had mentioned to the

3 Chamber that this was a -- this was a session where the Prosecution

4 provided a new translation. Perhaps I could give Mr. Krajisnik the --

5 this part, the relevant extract.

6 MR. TIEGER: If you could cite the pages, please, in B/C/S and

7 English we could be of assistance.

8 MR. JOSSE: In B/C/S it's 02149745, it's page 37. Could that be

9 handed to Mr. Krajisnik, please?

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, could you please assist?

11 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, could that be repeated, please? My

12 apologies.

13 MR. JOSSE: Yes, it's 02149745.

14 MR. TIEGER: Okay.

15 MR. JOSSE: So far as the English is concerned, as I say, we have

16 two different translations, one bears a page number 115 at the bottom, the

17 other bears a page number 118 of 123 at the bottom. I don't know whether

18 my learned friend Mr. Tieger can assist.

19 MR. TIEGER: [Microphone not activated]

20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Tieger. Thank you.

21 MR. TIEGER: Page 115 in the English is -- appears to be the

22 corresponding text to the B/C/S page cited by my learned friend in what --

23 in the revised translation, which, simply by its length, I think you can

24 tell is a more helpful translation. So I think that citation is correct.

25 MR. JOSSE: Sadly for this particular passage, it is less helpful

1 because it has a number of words as illegible, important words, we say, in

2 the context of this particular speech. I am going to read this, if I may,

3 from the other translation, ask Mr. Krajisnik to follow it closely in the

4 original, and if one of these words is not there or is not clear, perhaps

5 he could say.

6 Mr. Srdic --

7 MR. TIEGER: Why don't we have -- assist the translators and

8 interpreters in doing so, which seems to be -- I mean, if there is going

9 to be a question about what's objectively legible and what's not, I mean,

10 they might as well be -- seem to be the most helpful people to follow, and

11 we can try to do the same as well. I certainly share my learned friend's

12 concern that we get all the legible portions translated fully.

13 MR. JOSSE: I'm happy with that. We've got a number of copies of

14 the original translation. New translation I've just got one that could go

15 on the ELMO. Entirely in the Chamber's hands.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you put it on the ELMO --

17 MR. JOSSE: The original or the new one, Your Honour? I'd like to

18 read from the original one.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Is it possible to put it in such a way on the ELMO

20 that we have both copies so that we even can compare? I don't know -- of

21 course if the one is at the bottom and the other at the top, then could we

22 try to have them --

23 MR. JOSSE: Yes. Allow me to show the usher.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you indicate to the usher -- if they could

25 be put on the ELMO.

1 MR. JOSSE: One of these versions I've underlined; the other I

2 have not, in fact.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

4 MR. JOSSE: That's the original which is underlined.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and if you could move in in such a way that we

6 also see the other one, isn't it? So could you please move it a bit, the

7 text, a bit down, so that we can see -- and perhaps a little bit less

8 enlarged so that we see the other copy as well, Mr. Usher. We now only

9 see one of the copies. The relevant portion of the other one -- yes. If

10 you move on -- yes.

11 MR. JOSSE: That's both on the same --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now a little bit further down, please. A

13 little bit more so that we see Mr. Srdic on both. Well, if you read the

14 underlined part -- I take it then, Mr. Josse, you want to -- no. It was

15 fine as it was but let's not -- yes. That's --

16 MR. JOSSE: Excellent. Thank you.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

18 MR. JOSSE:

19 Q. "Prijedor has on average 10 and a half and sometimes even 12.000

20 soldiers on the front. We will pull them all back from the front lines

21 and we will crush. We did not ask you, nor Mr. Karadzic, nor Krajisnik,

22 what to do in Prijedor. The only green municipality in Bosanska Krajina

23 was Prijedor. If we listened to you, it would still be green. We would

24 still be Krupa, and Prijedor would not be Prijedor. We have dealt with

25 them and packed them with hard stone to where they belong."

1 And then there was applause. Is the word "green", Mr. Krajisnik,

2 clear in your version?

3 A. Yes, yes, that means Muslim.

4 Q. Because apparently it was illegible in some version. Anyway,

5 let's not worry about that. The essence of both translations is exactly

6 the same. What did you take Mr. Srdic to mean in the extract from that

7 speech that received applause?

8 A. Mr. Srdic was against the deployment of the Canadian Battalion in

9 Banja Luka, and Mr. Koljevic, since he was the contact person for the

10 UNPROFOR, proposed for the Assembly to make a decision favouring a

11 deployment of the Canadian Battalion in Banja Luka. So Mr. Srdic is

12 coming out against this and he says: We didn't ask you, Mr. Koljevic, and

13 we didn't ask Mr. Karadzic or anyone else, about what to do in Prijedor.

14 We did, as we saw fit, because if we had asked you, the municipality would

15 be green to this day. And then he goes on to use some words like "packing

16 them off," and you can interpret them in different ways. But since this

17 is a reference to the departure of a large number of Muslims from

18 Trnopolje, Manjaca, and so on, it could also be interpreted to mean that

19 they had packed their bags and left for the west, but that they in

20 Prijedor had forbidden this Cedo Aleksic from coming back.

21 It's simply a speech in opposition to the deployment of the

22 Canadian Battalion, and he says that they were going to take radical

23 steps. And I thought it was mere words. He was just intent on making his

24 point that he was against the Canadian Battalion; but since his speech was

25 so temperamental and so aggressive, he was applauded by the audience, and

1 we were hard-put to decide how to implement this deal with the UNPROFOR.

2 But one important component of his speech was when he -- is when he says:

3 We didn't ask you what to do, and we will do this and that if you bring

4 those troops. And it's true that, in Prijedor, the police took over,

5 nobody knew when it happened that morning -- I mean, they seized power.

6 Q. I want to ask you a little bit more detail about these words: "We

7 did not ask you, nor Mr. Karadzic, nor Krajisnik." Was that a comment

8 designed in any way to illustrate the links or lack of links between that

9 municipality and Pale, or did it only relate to the Canadian Battalion?

10 A. No. It's a fact, when he says that we had no links with

11 Prijedor. All of that was done by them without consulting anyone. It's a

12 fact, and he states that fact. But all this was in the context of the

13 discussion about the Canadian Battalion, and it's true, this part where he

14 talks about Prijedor, that they liberated it, and that it's no longer a

15 green municipality but a Serb municipality, that they did that all on

16 their own.

17 Q. I'd next like to take you, if I may, to P1225, which was a report

18 to the minister of the interior, that you were asked about in the context

19 of the presence of Arkan's men in Pale. And in one part of this report,

20 top of page 3 in the B/C/S, top of page 3 in the English --.

21 MR. JOSSE: I think the witness needs it, Your Honour. It's very

22 well it being provided to the Court.

23 JUDGE ORIE: I fully agree.

24 MR. JOSSE:

25 Q. Page 3, Mr. Krajisnik. It says, and I'm paraphrasing, that whilst

1 inspecting the Pale public security station, the group of Arkan's men are

2 still present at the Panorama Hotel. Chief Koroman presents that as a

3 solved problem because he's expecting their commander in a couple of days,

4 with whom he would solve it without a problem.

5 Who was Chief Koroman, firstly, please?

6 A. That's Mr. Malko Koroman. He was chief of police then, and later.

7 Q. Was he a man you spoke to regularly or at all during the course of

8 1992?

9 A. Well, I think it was quite seldom, but I knew the man, no denying

10 that. I don't even know when I talked to him, but I do not rule out

11 having talked to him. I talked to him but I don't know when. I mean, I

12 had no reason to talk to him often. I talked to him very rarely.

13 Q. Did he ever mention to you what is contained within this report,

14 namely that Arkan's men were present at the hotel?

15 A. Well, he didn't, Mr. Josse. I'd like to explain this. The

16 minister was in Pale too, the minister of the MUP, and this Radevic, and

17 the government, all of them, and they were in Panorama together with me.

18 So they all could have seen Arkan's men. There would not have been a

19 debate about refugees at a government meeting, but the question would have

20 been what to do with Arkan's men. I claim that there were no men of

21 Arkan's where I was, maybe there were some refugees. But perhaps this

22 other facility within panorama, Buducnost, where the wounded were, whether

23 they were there, well that's what I don't know.

24 Anyway the minister was there, and Radevic found out only when he

25 went to the police, he heard from Koroman that Arkan's men were there --

1 although Radevic was in Pale, and the minister and everybody was in Pale.

2 Why would he find out only from him? He could have known, too, that they

3 were in Panorama. I mean, I really don't know about them being there.

4 Nobody ever told me that, and I never saw them.

5 Q. In the years subsequent to 1992, but prior to your removal from

6 Pale to The Hague, did you ever talk to Mr. Koroman at all?

7 A. Yes, I did. I mean -- well, at that time -- I mean later, but

8 never about there problem and he never told me anything about this -- or

9 rather, I never asked him about it. Perhaps he would have said something

10 to me had I asked about it, but I never asked and he never said anything.

11 I mean, I never saw this report either.

12 Q. In tab P1 -- let me start again.

13 In P1224, which is a report also to the minister of the interior

14 and I could show it to you if need be, someone called the chief and

15 commander in SJB Pale is mentioned. Page 3 in the English, top of page 3

16 in the B/C/S. Who was the chief and commander in the SJB Pale?

17 A. It was Mr. Arkan -- oh, my goodness, Mr. Koroman.

18 Q. So it's one and the same person?

19 A. Yes, yes, yes. One and the same person. He was chief, and I

20 don't know who the commander was. This report was before the first one --

21 I mean the one that we discussed earlier on followed after this report.

22 Q. The commander and the chief are two different people? The chief

23 was Mr. Koroman; you don't know who the commander was?

24 A. Yes. I don't remember who the commander was, but Koroman was the

25 chief.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 I'd now like to move to tab 268 of the Prosecution presentation.

3 I'm afraid I -- this is the 5th Session of the Presidency of the Serbian

4 Republic of BH held on the 10th of June of 1992, and I regret to say I do

5 not have the exhibit number at hand.

6 JUDGE ORIE: It's written at the top that it's P64A, tab 730, so

7 that's at least what appears on our --

8 MR. JOSSE: Not on mine, but I'm very grateful, thank you.

9 JUDGE ORIE: The Prosecution has provided it.

10 Yes, please proceed.

11 MR. JOSSE: That's very kind of them.

12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, on the last page there is a reference to Dr. Buha.

13 And in the course of your evidence, you were asked about an extract at

14 around that point from these minutes, and you told the Chamber that you

15 wanted to say something to them about Mr. Buha. The learned Judge stopped

16 you, said it wasn't the appropriate time, and it could be dealt with

17 subsequently. I'm now giving you that opportunity to deal with it

18 subsequently, if you can remember.

19 A. Yes, yes. Well, I just wanted to indicate something in support of

20 what I said, that these meetings were always attended by more people than

21 actually recorded. See here, it's Mr. Buha. And if you recall,

22 Mr. Djokanovic also testified that he was at that meeting, and he was not

23 recorded as an attendee. That was the point. Now, it looked as if Buha

24 were a member of the Presidency too, or I don't know what, but it just

25 depended on the recording clerk, what he wrote down. That was what I

1 wanted to say with regard to this document.

2 MR. JOSSE: We have nothing else, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Josse.

4 One second, please. Yes, I have one question -- it's not at the

5 beginning of the questions by the Bench, but we are just talking about

6 Mr. Koroman. Are you aware of any links between Mr. Koroman and

7 paramilitary units or paramilitaries?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I did not know, although I saw

9 this evidence here, that those yellow wasps were in Pale once. But at

10 that time, I didn't know about his links to the paramilitary units. That

11 Dzudza came to Pale once. I saw that here.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that answer.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE ORIE: We'll first have the break, Mr. Krajisnik, and then

15 questions by the Bench will be put to you.

16 We'll have a break until five minutes past 6.00.

17 --- Recess taken at 5.41 p.m.

18 --- On resuming at 6.05 p.m.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, Judge Hanoteau will put the first

20 questions to you.

21 Questioned by the Court:

22 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Krajisnik, please. I

23 would like to go back to the very beginning of your testimony and I would

24 like you to tell us more about first the environment you were raised in,

25 what kind of family you were raised in, if you don't mind, of course.

1 What your parents were doing, you know, how the family -- the make-up of

2 the family and so on. And you know, whether you were raised in the city

3 or in the country, what school you went to. I'm going all the way, you

4 know, if you let me. And of course what I'm interested in is what you

5 said earlier, you know, you were talking about this plural ethnic

6 society. Were you raised in this pluri-ethnic society? Did your family

7 invite Croats, Muslims? Did you have social relationships? Did you see

8 each other and so on?

9 And then given your age, I'd also like to know when you started to

10 understand that there were tensions between these communities. You talked

11 about this brotherhood that had been maybe covered by a political regime,

12 but was it just a facade, you know, a real brotherhood? How did you

13 experience all this? How did you feel during your childhood, your

14 teenage, until you became an adult, you know, the formative years, if I

15 may say so. Thank you.

16 A. I was born in a village. My mother and father had another son, so

17 we were two brothers. And I had several uncles on my father's side and a

18 rather large family. Zabrdje, where I was born, was purely a Serb

19 village, but I went to school to Reljevo village, and that school was one

20 school for the broader area of Rajlovac. It was attended by Serbs,

21 Muslims and Croats. Serbs outnumbered the others but there were others,

22 too. I had friends among them, and I never viewed any schoolmates as

23 anything but friends. I had to walk to school, about four kilometres, and

24 there was another village a bit further up from mine, Smiljevici which was

25 mixed, Serb-Muslim.

1 Our family was a patriarchal one. We believed in God and

2 respected our elders, and we respected the customs of other people, too.

3 When Muslims came to visit - and they don't eat pork - my mother would

4 cook separately for them. She would always say, "This is the table for

5 the Muslims and this is what Croats and Serbs can eat." And we always

6 joked around, saying, "Let's eat the Muslim table first." I frequented

7 Muslim families as well, including the family of a very good friend of

8 mine in Rajlovac who was my schoolmate through primary and secondary

9 school and also the university and later on we worked together.

10 After primary school, I went from Rajlovac to Sarajevo by train,

11 seven or eight kilometres, perhaps. I shuttled every day, and did the

12 same throughout university, and after graduation I found a job with a

13 large company Energoinvest. We were all hard workers in our family. I

14 worked throughout my childhood. I helped around the house and with all

15 the other work, and I was never bothered by it because I believed that one

16 should earn one's living and work for whatever one gets. And our family

17 was rather well off in that area.

18 As for contact with other ethnic communities, my parents brought

19 me up to respect people of other ethnic communities, maybe even more than

20 Serbs, because it is easier to offend people of other communities than

21 your own. Just for example, the attending physician of my wife was a

22 Muslim, whose name I won't mention because I want to keep him from having

23 any unpleasantness in Sarajevo. He called my mother later, asking her to

24 ask me to send some medication for his mother who suffered from asthma. I

25 bought those medicines in Geneva and gave them to the Muslim delegation to

1 take it to him. However, later, when my investigators asked him to make a

2 statement about me, he refused because he said, you know, I don't want to

3 get into trouble. And I was a little disappointed, I must say.

4 Whenever I could help to send a parcel to somebody, to get

5 somebody out of prison, to do whatever, I always did, and I'm not saying

6 this to -- by way of a mitigating factor, because I believe that God sees

7 it all, so I don't need to say that in mitigation. And in answer to your

8 question as to whether I had taken any steps when I heard about crimes, I

9 remembered something yesterday that I want to mention now.

10 A high Muslim representative once told me: Look, there is a

11 brothel somewhere in your area and there is a girl there, a Muslim girl,

12 that I would like you to bring to the airport. I was very surprised. I

13 thought that couldn't be true. I sent somebody over there and indeed they

14 found her. When they -- when they brought her, I asked her whether she

15 had really been in a brothel. She said: Nothing of the kind. I asked

16 whether she had had any problems? She said no. I took a statement from

17 her before sending her on to her father. And anyway, I was happy to have

18 helped because I too have a daughter, and I did the same all my life.

19 You also asked me when, at which moment, I felt intolerance among

20 ethnic communities. I would say that it's not the political parties who

21 caused all the problems when they appeared. It's the moment when all the

22 three ethnic groups felt a kind of freedom; they were free to be Serb,

23 Muslim, or Croat as much as they wished. And at that moment - I have to

24 be honest - at that moment somebody said, "You, gentlemen, Muslims, you

25 can now apply to have your own state." I'm not condemning them, but it's

1 their fault the war started. It was a great temptation for them. All

2 their lives, they were in between two sides; they were a bargaining chip

3 between Serbs and Croats. So they did apply, Bosnia was recognised, and

4 chaos set in.

5 I don't know what I would have done in their shoes, what I would

6 have done if somebody had told me: It takes only one move for you to get

7 a Serbian state. I don't know. But when I became president of the Serb

8 Assembly, I had a lot of ideals about building a society of mutual

9 tolerance and respect and then I saw that everybody was pulling to their

10 own side. I realised there was an invisible hand orchestrating,

11 conducting, all the three sides away from tolerance, away from

12 understanding. Only history will be able to tell.

13 But when we speak about the break-up of Yugoslavia, all our

14 problems from the Ottoman Empire, from long ago history, were resurrected

15 at the moment when a Bosnian state became reality. All the negative

16 things were resurrected, revamped, and conflict ensued. So the answer to

17 your question is: The moment that talks began about an independent

18 Bosnia, the relationships deteriorated a great deal.

19 I was not a member of the League of Communists, but I knew -- I

20 grew up to believe that there are people of other faiths, other ethnic

21 groups, that you have to respect. And when somebody here alleged that I

22 called them Turks during the war, I never wanted to say a bad thing about

23 them, although they were enemies.

24 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I wanted to know what your father

25 was doing. He was a farmer? What was his job?

1 A. My father was a farmer and my mother was a housewife. They both

2 had four years of primary school, and the same is true of all my uncles.

3 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So to come back to what you said

4 on that society that existed before the events that we are dealing with,

5 so before these parties actually were created. Do you think that under

6 the socialist regime, at the time there was repression and it was thanks

7 to repression that these tensions didn't crop up? Was it a police state?

8 Was that what was making this cohesion between -- what looked like

9 cohesion in this society? Was it thanks to the police state?

10 A. Well, I've already said I was not a member of the League of

11 Communists. I was not a member of the party. But now when everybody is

12 attacking the party, I'm in a position almost to defend it because nobody

13 seems to be -- to have been in favour of the party. Everybody is just

14 attacking it. There was no repression of that kind, Your Honour, but this

15 is what happened. Quite simply, there was no freedom in the true sense of

16 the word.

17 For example, if you'd go to church, if you'd celebrate a holiday,

18 you were branded a black sheep. That didn't go only for the Serbs; it

19 went for all three ethnic communities. Or if you were not a member of the

20 League of Communists of Yugoslavia, you could not get promoted. I was a

21 director though, but I had to work three times as hard in order to prove

22 myself as compared to people who were members of the party. But in

23 principle I did not want to join the party because that would have been an

24 unfair way to get promoted, if I can put it that way. And then if they

25 would find a nationalist, say a Serb, ten days later they would find a

1 Croat, they would find a Muslim, too, so they would say: We are not

2 opposed to anyone in particular, it has to do with all three communities.

3 For example, a man sang a song when his son was born, and then he

4 was sent to prison for 40 days. So that was one of the shortcomings of

5 this socialism. My youth was in the times of socialism, so I cannot say

6 that nice things didn't happen; but quality was not respected in work,

7 only affiliation to this one and only party.

8 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 Now I have a second question on what -- on the activities -- your

10 activities after the Dayton agreements. So I would like to know exactly

11 what happened to you right until you were arrested. What happened to you

12 after the Dayton Agreements? What was your employment and so on?

13 A. After Dayton -- well, first of all I was really bitter in Dayton

14 because Sarajevo was handed over in an unfair way and because I knew that

15 there would be an exodus. When the Main Board of the Serb Democratic

16 Party left -- or rather, the Presidency of the Serb Democratic Party, they

17 were putting forth candidates. Since Karadzic could not be office holder,

18 who would be the Speaker of Parliament? Who would be president of the

19 republic? Who would be president of the party? And who would be a member

20 of the Presidency? Nobody wanted to be a member of the Presidency in

21 Sarajevo at the time.

22 First of all, emotionally, because they thought that after all,

23 Serbs were harmed, Sarajevo was seized from them; and on the other hand

24 they didn't want to quarrel with the Muslim and the Croat representatives

25 and to struggle with them, so to speak. When nobody wanted to take that

1 on, it was very easy for them to reach agreement who would be president of

2 the republic, Speaker of the Assembly. I said: I don't want to be

3 Speaker of the Assembly. I've had enough of that. Quite simply, I want

4 to devote myself to my family and to myself. When no one accepted to be a

5 member of the Presidency, I did. Everybody said: Well, we don't know

6 what it's going to be like for you out there, but I went to Sarajevo and I

7 was there with Mr. Izetbegovic, the late Mr. Izetbegovic, and Mr. Zubak.

8 I spent two years there. I thought that I was supposed to represent Serb

9 interests and I did, to a maximum. But I did not want to harm the other

10 two peoples in any way. They were in coalition, the two of them, and very

11 often they outvoted me. At one moment, Mr. Zubak and I were on one side

12 and Mr. Izetbegovic on the other side. Then we were supposed to take a

13 vote in order to defeat Mr. Izetbegovic, and I said: No, I won't, I will

14 be neutral. I don't want to have any out-voting here. We have to have a

15 joint position, because it's easy to out-vote someone and to create

16 discord. We should make a maximum effort to implement the Dayton

17 Agreement. I did implement a great many things, together with the two of

18 them, that is.

19 After those two years, another person came and then I saw that in

20 fact I had nothing to live on. I had to do something, so since I'm an

21 economist I went into a bit of private business. I started doing

22 something, and then I got this concrete factory and I tried to get a

23 cement factory going, it was very primitive. But I wanted to provide for

24 my family and to make it possible for myself to live on. Throughout the

25 war -- and also, when I was arrested I was in Panorama. I only went to

1 see my parents during the weekend, and they were actually subletting an

2 apartment in a house. Ten days before I was arrested, my relatives who

3 lived upstairs went to their own house that they had built and I was

4 upstairs with my children when I was arrested, so there are many problems

5 left there, credits that have to be repaid, loans -- well, of course my

6 brother and other members of my family are trying to help out. This is a

7 small company, in actual fact, but I think that they are doing their

8 best. My father died; the first Chamber did not allow me to attend the

9 funeral. My mother is old, barely alive. All three of my children

10 finished university in Pale. They got degrees in economics. I couldn't

11 send them away anywhere. I could only afford Pale so they live there.

12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, so you decided to

13 leave your political mandate. Did you do that before you started your

14 private business?

15 A. There were election rules. I was a candidate once again for being

16 a member of the Presidency, but then there were votes within

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then there were votes that came in by mail. I won

18 in the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but when the votes from abroad

19 came in, because the Muslims and the Croats and the Serbs had the right to

20 vote -- I'm not trying to say anything, whether this was regular or

21 irregular, but after that -- I don't know how many votes it was that led

22 to the fact that I lost the election and then I went into private

23 business. So I was a candidate for Presidency member for another term,

24 yes.

25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] During those months before your

1 arrest, you knew that there were charges brought against you by the

2 International Criminal Tribunal? You knew that, didn't you?

3 A. I had no indications whatsoever. But I had a degree of

4 psychological pressure there because in front of the building where I

5 worked there was often a SFOR APC, and I wrote a letter to General Adams

6 asking him why this is disturbing me there and if he has anything against

7 me he should tell me. And therefore, people felt uncomfortable to come

8 see me; quite simply, they were afraid. When I was arrested, I couldn't

9 come to. I think that my blood pressure soared to 200 or whatever. I

10 went through all sorts of checks. I mean when you're a candidate you do.

11 It never crossed my mind that I could have been indicted for war crimes

12 here. Actually, in all fairness, if somebody is following you all the

13 time, then you feel sort of uneasy. It's not that you know something, but

14 you simply feel uneasy. However, I simply could not conceive of any such

15 thing that I could have been arrested or charged.

16 Even a high official, I don't want to mention his name, from the

17 international community, with whom I was on good terms, some

18 representatives of Republika Srpska were talking to him once and they said

19 that he had said he is the only one I know was not indicted for war

20 crimes. I wanted him to be a witness for me, but time was brief and

21 therefore we gave up on that because we cooperated on different matters.

22 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I now have a third question for

23 you, Mr. Krajisnik.

24 During the cross-examination of the 29th of May, the Prosecutor

25 stated or quoted something that was said during the 11th Assembly Session

1 and talked about the intervention of Mr. Zekic. Mr. Zekic stated, and I

2 will quote him in English because I found the passage in English. He

3 talks about Muslims.

4 [In English] "With their birth-rate, they will gradually stifle

5 our territories and we will find ourselves in a difficult situation."

6 [Interpretation] The Prosecutor asked you a question on that

7 particular sentence, and you answered. Was it a threat for us? No. It

8 was rather our human rights. It was rather the human rights, our human

9 rights, that were threatened. There was enough room for everybody, more

10 than we all needed. And I would like to know if you could kindly

11 elaborate on this. Why was there an eventual threat on your individual

12 rights, whilst if we take into account that everybody was living together,

13 that you were living in a Bosnian Croathood and, as you mentioned, so

14 often that we were used to living together, quote and unquote?

15 So why is there all of a sudden a threat that could threaten

16 people and the rights of those people?

17 A. Let me just talk about space. Bosnia-Herzegovina is 50.000 square

18 kilometres and the population was 4 million. When I compare this to the

19 Netherlands that has a population of about 17 million and there could have

20 been a population three times bigger, so it wasn't a lack of space that

21 was a problem. The problem was in human rights. In a democracy, if you

22 look at birth-rates and if you are trying to use your numbers in order to

23 out-vote someone and to deny someone else their human rights, that's a

24 problem, when there is more of someone else, when there is not an

25 instrument that could protect a minority.

1 Quite simply, at the beginning of our multi-party activities, if I

2 can put it that way, quite a few people were terrified by that because we

3 couldn't even agree on the oath in the beginning. There was a coalition

4 that was set up straight away, and you feel as if you were a minority.

5 And then when you feel that you're a minority and on the other hand you

6 were a constituent people, then everything that you feel is sacred to you

7 can be taken away from you, symbols, your flag, your alphabet and so on

8 and so forth. I'm saying the birth-rate was not a problem for its own

9 sake. There could have been a population of 15 million. How can somebody

10 blame someone else for not having any more children? Serbs have less

11 children, Muslims have more. But if you abuse that and if you say: I

12 want to have a civil state, and if you know that you want to be

13 51 per cent, so that you could impose your own authority on others - and

14 on the other hand you have a history, which is the way it is - then you're

15 afraid of that birth-rate. Because due to these numbers, in an irregular

16 way, the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina was affected.

17 And also, when they say we cannot live with you Serbs because

18 you're a majority in Yugoslavia and then we say: Well, if you're afraid

19 of us because we are a majority, how are we not going to be afraid of you

20 in Bosnia if you're going to be a majority there? That's the problem of

21 the birth-rate, and it's evident that the Muslims had much bigger families

22 than the Serbs and the Croats did. So if the birth-rate is

23 instrumentalised, not in terms of taking territories, then that turns into

24 a problem.

25 Zekic was a bit more radical but I am saying what turned out to be

1 a problem amongst us when this political life started taking place in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zekic spoke, well, along the following lines: Before

3 the war, it was a bit local so he was looking at it locally, I think.

4 Srebrenica, such a misfortune now. Through the centuries it went from

5 Serb hands to Muslim hands to Hungarian hands and I don't know, so

6 everybody takes their own point of departure, regardless of whether they

7 are right or not. And he was from Srebrenica and he was a minority there

8 and he was afraid of being a minority.

9 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] If you allow, Mr. Krajisnik, I

10 would like to make a comment. You say, "if the birth-rate was

11 instrumentalised," what do you mean by that exactly? I can't quite follow

12 you. I can't follow your explanation. If you say that the birth-rate is

13 not necessarily instrumentalised, it is what it is and it always is.

14 Birth-rates take place or not. Why do you say that the birth-rate is

15 instrumentalised? Was it instrumentalised? You're talking about Muslims,

16 of course, more than Croats when you say that.

17 A. The Croats were in the most difficult position of all, but let me

18 tell you what I was trying to say. The Serbs and the Croats were moving

19 away, moving to Serbia and Croatia. In addition to the low birth-rate,

20 they were leaving, they were going to Serbia and Croatia, whereas the

21 Muslims were moving in and they had a higher birth rate, too. So for the

22 first time when you have a multi-party assembly, and when there are

23 instruments of protecting those who are minority, and then there is

24 someone who goes about this by force -- the Muslims and the Croats had a

25 shared objective and they violated the constitution. So then you wonder:

1 What's going to happen the following day when Bosnia will be a state based

2 on the rule of law and one man, one vote, et cetera? Then what will

3 happen? Bosnia-Herzegovina had all the prerogatives of a state and

4 Yugoslavia too, but we said: All right, if you don't want to be in

5 Yugoslavia, just give us what Bosnia and you had in Yugoslavia. We are

6 going to agree to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, but let us have some kind

7 of small autonomy where we can exercise our own rights.

8 So we saw in effect what it was like when the majority

9 instrumentalised this, and the majority was due both to the birth-rate and

10 to the fact that Muslims were moving in. If they were 51 per cent - that

11 was our understanding - they would have rejected the Croats; now they

12 needed the Croats because they did not have 51 per cent on their own. We

13 couldn't have done a thing otherwise. We were just seeking instruments of

14 protection. All of that exists nowadays, Your Honour, all of this was

15 introduced after the Dayton Accords. Quite simply, the Croat people have

16 become even smaller than they were before, but there can be no

17 out-voting. You simply have to reach agreement on certain things. You

18 cannot simply impose your own will because there is more of you. That was

19 it. That is what the Serb people were afraid of. Probably the Croat

20 people too, but then I'm speaking about the Serb people because that's

21 what I know about.

22 We couldn't agree on the alphabet, believe me. In the beginning,

23 there was the Serbo-Croat language. All of a sudden it became Croat,

24 Serb, Bosniak and then the letter was -- and then the alphabet, it -- was

25 it Cyrillic? Was it the Roman script? We spent days and days working on

1 unproductive things, if I can put it that way. I would even have to have

2 breaks in the work of the Assembly so that they could go to the mosque to

3 pray. I really made an effort on all scores. I really tried to be

4 helpful to the very end. Unfortunately there had to be a collapse,

5 unfortunately. It's not only the collapse and the war that were a

6 problem, but also the fact that crimes and evil things are remembered for

7 hundreds of years in Bosnia. Today people remember what happened 500

8 years ago, so the consequences are going to be terrible in the

9 consciousness of the people for years and years on.

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, a small precision,

12 please. I didn't quite understand an explanation that you just gave us.

13 You said that your first very first project at the onset was to create

14 municipal assemblies, Serbian municipal assemblies. Your goal was not to

15 obtain Serbian territories. Do you recall that sentence? Do you recall

16 uttering that sentence?

17 A. I did say that we wanted to create assemblies, municipal

18 assemblies, after the statement of Mr. Izetbegovic. I did say that.

19 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Exactly. So I would like to

20 obtain a very clear explanation. I may not have heard it. I may not have

21 understood it. If you take one municipality, for instance, and that

22 municipality is comprised of a main city and many other villages around

23 it, villages or hamlets, within that municipality, therefore, let's

24 imagine that there is a Serbian minority living there. That Serbian

25 minority, I would imagine that before the conflict, which is at the heart

1 of this trial, was -- this Serbian minority was very frequently outvoted

2 in municipal assemblies, in municipal institutions, I suppose. And I

3 believe that that was at the crux of the problem. You wished that that

4 Serbian minority could be protected by institutions that were her -- their

5 own institutions. Did I understand you correctly so far? So if we take

6 this as a hypothetical standpoint, what was happening with the Muslims and

7 the Croats, your Serbian minority is creating institutions in order to be

8 represented, but how the other -- how can the other communities live

9 then? The other communities, are they going to have their own

10 institutions, therefore I'm talking about Croatian institutions and Muslim

11 institutions? And how will these three municipal institutions live

12 together? How will they function? How did you envisage the situation?

13 Could you please clarify that point.

14 A. Provided I understood your question, you're talking about Serbs

15 who are a minority in a certain municipality and are being outvoted. We

16 issued clear instructions when the republic Serb Assembly was formed, if I

17 can call it that, then we received initiatives from the municipal level

18 where there was out-voting and coalitions. We instructed them to remain,

19 both officials and deputies, to remain in the Municipal Assembly. And if

20 they form a Serb Assembly, that that Serb Assembly should deliberate only

21 on issues that involve vital Serb interests, like waste depots, like

22 communal things. They should be a council of the people. The Serbs

23 should then say in the common Municipal Assembly: On this issue Serbs do

24 not agree. This is what we think. So it was envisaged that we remain in

25 the Municipal Assembly, but when there is no other recourse, when we

1 disagreed, we should --

2 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I'm stopping you here, if you'll

3 allow me. But that was the case already within that municipality, right,

4 the municipality that we are hypothetically talking of? The minority, the

5 Serbian minority, was already represented. So what was a new instrument?

6 What was this new instrument that you were implementing? This is what I

7 would like to understand. The Municipal Assembly was comprised of Muslim,

8 Croat, and Serb representatives. In my -- according to my hypothesis, the

9 Serbs were in the minority and they were able to express themselves within

10 that Municipal Assembly. Let's say that they were out-voted, so I imagine

11 that that could happen, that they could be out-voted, and you wanted to

12 implement something to create an institution, to create an instrument, in

13 order for that not to happen. But what is it that you wanted to create?

14 What is this new instrument that you wanted to create which would allow

15 the Serbs not to be out-voted, so which would prevent the Serbs to be

16 outvoted? I don't understand how you thought this could be done. How did

17 you want to get to this? Please explain.

18 A. It was not the problem, the out-voting; that's a democratic way.

19 The problem was when somebody violated your rights, the rights that you

20 had according to the legislation, to the constitution. In that case the

21 club of Serb deputies would say: "This is the Serb Assembly, and we don't

22 agree with being out-voted against the law."

23 We were out-voted hundreds of times in the Republican Assembly, on

24 a law, on a regulation, on whatever, but when we were outvoted on

25 something that touched on our vital interests, that was the problem. We

1 could not go through with it in the Republic Assembly, but at least our

2 voice could be heard. I'm just explaining what we wanted to do. If

3 somebody rises and says: We want an independent Bosnia. You say: Okay,

4 if it's according to the law, the constitution, but if they want to go

5 against that, then we don't agree.

6 I produced one document here, when Mr. Muhamed Filipovic said in

7 his book: We couldn't do it the legal way, so we went ahead with the

8 referendum. The referendum, however, was not the legal way. The legal

9 way was through the Assembly. The referendum could only show the opinion

10 of the people. So when somebody is violating the rights that you have

11 according to the conventions, the constitution, the law, that was a real

12 problem.

13 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So when this Serb minority is

14 systematically out-voted, and because of this you wished to create an

15 autonomous institution which would represent them entirely; is that

16 correct? You thought that they could create a purely Serb Municipal

17 Assembly which would exist and co-exist with the other Assembly, Municipal

18 Assembly; is that right?

19 A. Yes. You're right. So that Club of Deputies would become a Serb

20 Assembly, would discuss a decision on which they had been out-voted, but

21 they still continued to work in the Municipal Assembly. And there is the

22 decision whereby they should continue in their posts because we did not

23 want to overthrow the existing Assembly. But it was our only defence, our

24 last resort, when somebody was violating our rights, it was a way to show

25 that we disagreed, although we couldn't do anything because the Assembly

1 was the only forum that was entitled to make such decisions. However,

2 even that didn't last long.

3 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, sir, and I

4 also have a fifth question for you.

5 I would like you to tell me something about Mr. Davidovic.

6 Mr. Davidovic was a witness, so therefore my question relates to him, and

7 he testified about his presence on the territory of Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina, and he explained very precisely and very clearly and I will

9 quote him in English.

10 He said: [In English] "Federal secretary to -- Federal SUP

11 secretary told Davidovic that the group of policemen was sent as part of

12 an offer of help from Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic to the

13 leadership of the BS Republic. After the latter had complained that it

14 could not control Serbian paramilitaries in BH, who were killing Muslims

15 and looting."

16 [Interpretation] This quote made by Mr. Davidovic relates to the

17 leadership of the Bosnian Serb Republic; it pertains to that. So what I

18 would like to know from you, Mr. Krajisnik, is if at any point in time you

19 heard, through the people you worked with, that a support was going to be

20 needed from a special federal force to get rid of that problem, the

21 problem of the paramilitaries, was that ever said? Was that ever told --

22 said directly to you? Did you ever hear about it? Was it ever discussed,

23 either in your presence or outside of your presence? And I'm terribly

24 sorry for making such long sentences or asking such long questions,

25 Mr. Krajisnik. But Mr. Davidovic arrived on the field, he arrived with a

1 mission, he had orders, so how is it -- how can you explain his presence,

2 other than the fact that he was required to come by the authorities of

3 your own republic to put an end to the paramilitaries? And can you

4 therefore say that you were absolutely not aware of the fact that this

5 specialist which would intervene was called? Can you answer that

6 question, sir?

7 A. I saw Mr. Panic only once in the Hyatt Hotel in Belgrade. I saw

8 him only once, although I know him. He was president of Yugoslavia.

9 Never in my life had I seen this Davidovic who testified here, nor did I

10 know that the special units of Serbia or Yugoslavia had been in Republika

11 Srpska. I spoke to some detainees here, and they told me that in Brcko

12 there were some men with red caps. To me, it was all like a tale, like a

13 story. You will have opportunity to hear Mr. Stanisic here. And as for

14 special units of Yugoslavia, if they had been on the territory of

15 Republika Srpska, they had to be invited or brought by somebody.

16 In my immediate circle, Karadzic, Koljevic, Plavsic, I don't think

17 that any of them had asked those special units to come. I never even

18 spoke to that Davidovic. I had seen him maybe in this villa Bosanka in

19 Belgrade. Maybe he was there, but I never had anything to do with him.

20 He said a lot of things that were untrue and that hurt me a lot, about the

21 yellow wasps, about Bijeljina. I don't know whether he was involved in

22 that. He probably was, because there are some documents wherein the

23 municipality of Bijeljina declared him unwelcome. I didn't even know that

24 he was in Pale or in Vrace. I had never heard of that man. I knew other

25 man named Davidovic, but of this one I had never heard.

1 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Just one last question pertaining

2 to this, and I will end my questions for today. Today, do you have the

3 feeling that things or events were hidden from you while you were still in

4 power?

5 A. No. I'm convinced that nothing was kept from me. I'm convinced

6 that I was rather well-informed and that what he's saying is untrue. I

7 may be wrong, but there was no reason for anyone to keep something from

8 somebody else. There was no reason why a minister wouldn't tell me what

9 he was doing. I'm not aware of any reason why somebody would be keeping

10 information from me or other people. There is a record of that government

11 meeting where Mico Stanisic was placed in charge of dealing with things in

12 Bijeljina, and he did indeed go to Bijeljina. Whether he had invited

13 somebody, that he should tell you himself when he comes here. That was

14 not in my province, and I was not even particularly interested in

15 following up on somebody who was going away to do a job. We discussed a

16 lot of things and whatever you might decide to ask me, I will tell you

17 whether somebody had discussed it with me or not.

18 I knew about those yellow wasps in Zvornik, and my information was

19 that it was a special unit of the MUP of Republika Srpska who did that

20 job. I never heard anything about any involvement of any Davidovic. They

21 had intercepted Mr. Ostojic, they mistreated him, together with

22 Mr. Trbojevic, and then he raised it at a government session and they said

23 then that the special unit of the MUP would take care of it. Those two

24 deputies that I'm referring to were intercepted in Zvornik and abused and

25 that's what I heard at the time.

1 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.

2 JUDGE ORIE: We have to finish for the day, Mr. Krajisnik. I'd

3 like to instruct you not to speak with anyone about the testimony already

4 given or still to be given.

5 We'll adjourn until tomorrow, the 20th of June, Courtroom II,

6 quarter past 2, but I would like to inform the parties that on Thursday,

7 we have a little bit of an irregular schedule. That is we'll start at the

8 normal time but in the morning, then have a bit of a longer break. I

9 think it's from 11, or something like that, to 12.30, and then we'll

10 continue and finish relatively early for the day. It's due to all kind of

11 practical problems we are facing with the scheduling of that day. So this

12 is just to inform you about the irregular times we'll be sitting on

13 Thursday.

14 We will adjourn for the day until tomorrow, quarter past 2.00,

15 same courtroom.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.,

17 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 20th day of

18 June, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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