1 Tuesday, 25 April 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Before we go into the proper business of this

6 Court, you will observe that we are sitting in the absence of Judge

7 Moloto. He is sadly absent by reason of urgent personal business in South

8 Africa, his mother having passed away during the Easter holiday. In the

9 circumstances, Judge Hoepfel and I, the other members of the Chamber, have

10 made an order pursuant to Rule 15 bis in the interest of justice to

11 proceed in his absence in consideration of not only a fair, but an

12 expeditious trial. And in those circumstances, we sit sadly in the

13 absence of Judge Moloto.

14 Before we proceed into the substantive business of the Court,

15 there is an outstanding housekeeping matter, and it concerns two Defence

16 exhibits, namely Exhibit 111 and Exhibit 112. On the 3rd of February,

17 2006, the Prosecution, having taken an objection, the parties agreed that

18 the title of Exhibit 111, "Croats on their way, UN on the run" is not part

19 of the evidence. The parties further agreed that the title of Exhibit

20 112, "The morale of the troops,' is not part of the evidence. The Trial

21 Chamber would therefore like to correct the orders by way of a redaction

22 of Exhibits 111 and 112 accordingly and the Chamber is requesting that the

23 correct versions be put in place before Friday, the 28th of April, 2006.

24 So could we please have that done in a timely manner, Mr. Whiting and Mr.

25 Milovancevic?

1 MR. WHITING: Yes, of course, Your Honour. As they are Defence

2 exhibits, I don't know if Mr. Milovancevic wants us undertake the

3 redactions or if he would like us to deal with them. We're happy to deal

4 with them either way.

5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Milovancevic?

6 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] We will do that, Your Honour.

7 Thank you. It is our exhibit, and we have fully agreed with the

8 submission that the original headlines were not part of the document.

9 Thank you.

10 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, Mr. Whiting?

11 MR. WHITING: Yes, that's fine with the Prosecution. Thank you,

12 Your Honour.

13 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Okay. I think we can proceed, Mr. Whiting.

14 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 First, on behalf of the Prosecution I would like to express our

16 condolences to Judge Moloto. He is obviously not present to receive

17 them. We will express them more directly when he returns, but our

18 thoughts are, of course, with him during this sad time and we are sorry he

19 is not present with us.

20 Before we call our next witness, who is Ambassador Peter

21 Galbraith, there is just a procedural matter to raise with respect to his

22 testimony. As the Court is aware, an order was entered on the 13th of

23 January 2006 with respect to this witness, with respect to particular

24 measures. As the Court is aware, this witness is testifying about matters

25 that he observed and heard and was aware of in his capacity as the United

1 States Ambassador to Croatia. His testimony is being received under a

2 waiver of Rule 70 by the United States government, and certain conditions

3 have been imposed. The first -- and these have been ordered by the

4 Court. The first, of course, is that the cross-examination must be

5 restricted to the scope of the direct examination, and the topics that are

6 covered on the direct examination have been carefully prescribed by

7 negotiations with the U.S. Government; that is, to be more precise, the

8 Prosecution made a request to the government that it be allowed to have

9 Mr. Galbraith testify about certain topics and permission was granted for

10 him to testify about those topics. So our direct examination is

11 restricted to those topics and the cross-examination must also be

12 restricted to those topics.

13 The second condition that was ordered by the Court was that a

14 representative of the United States government is present -- be present

15 here in court, and she is present. I would like to introduce her, she's

16 seated her between Mr. Black and Ms. Valabhji, her name is Heather

17 Schildge, her last name is spelled S-c-h-i-l-d-g-e. She is a deputy legal

18 [Realtime transcript read in error "league"] counsel at the United States'

19 embassy and is here representing the United States' interest in this

20 matter. She is seated here only because there no other seat in the

21 courtroom, but of course she is not a part of the Prosecution team; she is

22 here on behalf of the government.

23 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: You did say that she's deputy lead counsel not

24 lead counsel?

25 MR. WHITING: I am speaking too quickly. She is deputy legal

1 counsel.

2 With those introductory remarks -- oh, one other matter just to

3 raise. Because of the changing schedule, I just want to alert the Court

4 that we have managed to secure two witnesses for this week to -- this

5 witness and another witness. I don't anticipate that we will be able to

6 fill the whole week. We will probably end early. But I think the Court

7 will understand.

8 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Indeed.

9 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour. Now the government -- not

10 the government -- resorting back to my old job. The Prosecution would

11 like to call Ambassador Peter Galbraith.

12 [The witness entered court]

13 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Could the declaration be taken by the witness?

14 THE WITNESS: I solemnly swear that I will speak the truth, the

15 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

16 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 WITNESS: PETER GALBRAITH

18 Examination by Mr. Whiting:

19 Q. Good morning, Ambassador. You may be seated.

20 A. Thank you. Good morning. Can you hear me clearly through those

21 earphones.

22 A. I can. Probably without as well.

23 Q. Well, it's as you prefer. I think you'll find it easier to use

24 the earphones.

25 A. Okay.

1 Q. Could you state your name, please?

2 A. Peter Woodard Galbraith.

3 Q. Before I go into your background, just a procedural matter. Of

4 course, we speak the same language and there are -- my questions, your

5 answers, are being interpreted. In order for the interpreters to keep up,

6 what we have to do is number one, not speak too quickly, which we both

7 will probably forget at times, but we have to try to remember. And

8 secondly, and maybe even more importantly, we have to insert pauses. So

9 when my question finishes, just count to two or so and -- before you

10 answer, and I'll do the same after you finish your answer. Okay?

11 A. All right.

12 Q. Okay. Just going to go through your background and quickly lead

13 you through it. You were born on the 31st of December, 1950, you received

14 your bachelor's degree from Harvard university in the United States, a

15 masters degree from Oxford University, a law degree, JD, from Georgetown

16 University, also in the United States. From 1979 until 1993 you were the

17 senior advisor to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the United

18 States. From the 24th of June, 1993, until the 3rd of January, 1998, you

19 were the United States' ambassador to Croatia, which is why you still

20 retain the title Ambassador. Is that all correct?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Thank you. I'm going to ask you now questions about your time as

23 the United States Ambassador, and I'm going focus first on your meetings

24 with various persons during that time. First of all, can you tell us

25 where you were stationed as the United States Ambassador? Where was the

1 embassy?

2 A. It was in Zagreb, the capital, located on Andrije Hebranga street,

3 in the downtown part of the city.

4 Q. And during the time that you served as United States Ambassador,

5 can you tell us approximately how frequently would you meet with President

6 Tudjman?

7 A. In the first two years that I was ambassador, that is to say from

8 1993 -- well, through the end of 1995 I met with him very frequently,

9 several times a week, sometimes several times a day. After the end of

10 1995 our relations became more strained and I saw him much less

11 frequently.

12 Q. During that time period while you were United States Ambassador,

13 how frequently did you meet with representatives of the so-called

14 Republika Srpska Krajina, RSK?

15 A. Less frequently, but from the period from March of 1994 until

16 August of 1995, I was a principal in the peace process that attempted to

17 find a settlement between the RSK and Croatia. So I would meet with

18 various figures from the RSK once a month, or once every other month.

19 Then in September and October of 1995 I was involved in a shuttle

20 diplomacy between Zagreb and the local authorities in Eastern Slavonia.

21 At this point they were no longer calling themselves the RSK and I saw

22 them very, very frequently in that period.

23 Q. Now, can you tell us why, Ambassador, the RSK was generally

24 referred to as the, "So-called RSK'?

25 A. Because it was the self-styled Republika Srpska Krajina, it was

1 not recognised by anybody in the world, and every country accepted that --

2 recognised that this territory was part of the Republic of Croatia.

3 Q. Could you tell us, please, Ambassador, when you first met Milan

4 Martic?

5 A. In April of 1994 I went down to Knin, and I met him there.

6 Q. And in what capacity -- what position did he hold at that time?

7 A. At that time he considered himself to be the president of the RSK.

8 Q. Can you tell us approximately how many times after that first time

9 you met with Milan Martic?

10 A. Maybe five or six times.

11 Q. Where did those meetings occur?

12 A. In Knin.

13 Q. How would you get to Knin?

14 A. I would -- well, the first time I went down, I drove. Afterwards

15 I would go typically by helicopter. That was a flight that UNPROFOR

16 provided.

17 Q. Can you tell us when you first met with Milan Babic?

18 A. On the 23rd of January, 1995.

19 Q. And what was his position at that time, when you met with him?

20 A. He was the foreign minister of the RSK.

21 Q. I want to ask you some questions now about what you refer to as

22 the peace process that you engaged in. Did that have another name?

23 A. It was -- the name that was commonly associated with it was the

24 Zagreb 4 process which was then shortened to the Z-4 process. It began as

25 a -- perhaps I should explain. The Z-4 were the United States, the

1 European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United Nations. And I was

2 the American representative in that process. It began with cease-fire

3 negotiations in the Russian embassy that were hosted the 19th of March

4 1994 by the Tali Vitaly Churkin, the Russian deputy foreign minister.

5 Those negotiations concluded successfully on the 30th of March, 1994, and

6 those of us who were sponsoring those negotiations, the same, the Z-4,

7 felt that we needed to continue the momentum. So the first phase was the

8 cease-fire; the second phase was in an effort to reach an agreement on

9 economic and confidence-building measures between Zagreb and Knin; and

10 then the final stage was intended to be a political plan, which would have

11 provided for the peaceful reintegration of the Krajina and Slavonian

12 regions into Croatia in circumstances that gave the Serb-majority areas

13 very substantial autonomy. The Z-4 plan, as distinct from the Z-4

14 process, refers to the last phase, namely the effort to find a political

15 solution.

16 Q. Thank you for that explanation. I want to ask you about the first

17 phase, the cease-fire, which you said was concluded successfully on the

18 30th of March, 1994. Can you tell us what -- what was the positions of

19 the various sides with respect to that cease-fire?

20 A. There was a broad agreement between the Croatian side and the Knin

21 authorities that there should be a cease-fire. The issue related to the

22 modalities of the cease-fire, what was the separation zone, where could

23 police go, what kind of identification they would have to have, and then a

24 political issue where the Croatians wanted a statement that basically

25 recognised that this was part of Croatia in the chapeau to the agreement.

1 But because both sides actually wanted a cease-fire, we were able to work

2 those issues out.

3 Q. Now, in your earlier answer, you said that the final stage was

4 intended to be a political plan that was -- would have provided for

5 substantial autonomy for the Serb-majority regions. What regions were --

6 did that include?

7 A. Basically it was the greater part of what was known as sectors

8 north and south of the UN-protected areas. So Knin, Petrinja, these

9 areas. It did not include -- it did not include western or Eastern

10 Slavonia, which had not had a Serb majority as of the 1991 census. And we

11 operated -- when we spoke of Serb majority areas, we operated off of the

12 pre-war census, since obviously these areas were almost purely Serb thanks

13 to the ethnic cleansing that had taken place in 1991.

14 Q. Now, you told us that the cease-fire was achieved on the 30th of

15 March, 1994. And you told us what was contemplated to occur after that,

16 the second phase and the third phase. Can you tell us what, in fact,

17 happened, if anything, after the cease-fire was achieved on the 30th of

18 March, 1994?

19 A. It was a very difficult process that followed. The negotiations

20 were meant to resume two weeks later, that is in the middle of April in

21 1994. And the Serbian side, the RSK authorities, began to play all sorts

22 of games, reasons that they were not going to have substantive

23 negotiations. Just to illustrate what happened with the first round,

24 after the -- there were two rounds for the cease-fire. 19th of March 29t

25 of March 1994 at the embassy. At the 19th of March round, the Serbian

1 side asked if they could bring journalists to the next round. And the

2 Croatian side agreed. They brought two journalists which is possibly as

3 many journalists that they had. When it came time for the April round,

4 which was going to be at Plitvice in the Serb-occupied territory, the

5 Croatians wanted to bring five journalists, which actually represented a

6 major effort on their part to bring the smallest possible number of

7 journalists, but they wanted one print journalist, one radio, television

8 man and so on. The Serbian side said -- refused, said we only had two -

9 although the Croatians hadn't limited; simply the number they wanted to

10 bring - you only get to bring two. And it was this kind of games that

11 then led to the cancellation of the trip and, in fact, that is why I made

12 my first trip down to Knin, which I think was April 11th, 1994, to try to

13 persuade the Serbian side to go ahead with the meeting. Of course I was

14 unsuccessful.

15 This process dragged on, that is the economic and

16 confidence-building measures from April of 1994 until December of 1994,

17 when an agreement was eventually reached. But as it dragged on, the

18 Croatian side was losing patience with the whole peace process.

19 Q. When you went down to -- to make that first trip to Knin, that was

20 when you met Milan Martic for the first time?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And can you tell us what was Milan Martic's attitude towards the

23 Z-4 process at that time, specifically towards the economic and

24 confidence-building measures?

25 A. He was, in my judgement, not supportive of that process.

1 Q. And do you know why he was not supportive?

2 A. He was opposed to -- he was opposed to any relationship between

3 Knin and Croatia. He imagined that the RSK could be an independent state

4 or perhaps become part of Greater Serbia. He -- but the truth is, he was

5 also, in my judgement, completely over his head. He didn't really

6 understand anything about politics, international relations, negotiations,

7 and he reacted, as people often do in those circumstances, by refusing to

8 do anything.

9 Q. What, if anything, did you tell him about the Z-4 process and

10 about the position that he was taking with respect to the Z-4 process?

11 A. I warned him repeatedly that this would end up in a catastrophe

12 for the Krajina Serbs, as indeed it did. There was an opportunity to

13 negotiate a peace agreement with Croatia that would provide substantial

14 political autonomy, would give -- in which Krajina would escape the

15 sanctions which applied to it. That the international community would

16 help in the reconstruction of the region. And that if he refused this,

17 the -- it was almost certainly going end up in a war, and it was almost

18 certain -- it was certain that his side, which, after all, had about

19 180.000 impoverished people, was going to lose.

20 Q. Did you address his belief that the RSK could become an

21 independent state or perhaps become part of a Greater Serbia?

22 A. I told him that would never happen, that there wasn't a country in

23 the world that would recognise the RSK as an independent state, that the

24 territorial integrity of Croatia was supported by the European Union -

25 they were part of the Z-4 process - by Russia, which many Serbs had

1 thought was pro-Serbia; nonetheless, the Russians supported the

2 territorial integrity of Croatia; the United States and, of course, the

3 position -- this was the position of the United Nations itself.

4 Q. You told us earlier that you didn't have your first meeting with

5 Milan Babic until the 23rd of January 1995. Nonetheless, did you have

6 occasion to learn, during 1994, what Milan Babic's position was with

7 respect to the Z-4 process, and specifically the economic and

8 confidence-building measures?

9 A. Yes. I tried to see Milan Babic in 1994, but he wouldn't see me.

10 He was opposed to the economic and confidence-building measures. I think

11 his opposition was not intrinsic to the substance of those negotiations or

12 the substance of the agreement that emerged, but he was a bitter political

13 rival of Milan Martic. He felt, correctly, I think, that Martic had

14 stolen the 1993, 1994 presidential election from him. And he was

15 determined to use the negotiations as a club against -- a political club

16 against Martic.

17 Q. Just to anticipate some future questions, did Milan Babic's

18 position with regard to the Z-4 process ever change?

19 A. Very radically. Not on the necessarily on the economic and

20 confidence-building measures, which was an agreement that was concluded on

21 December 2nd, 1994, but in January of 1995, 23rd of January, I met him for

22 the first time. I outlined to him the substance of the Z-4 political

23 plan; that is, the plan that would have reintegrated Krajina into Croatia,

24 giving very substantial autonomy to the Serb-majority areas, and he was

25 very interested in that plan.

1 Subsequently I saw him in March of 1995. He accepted the plan,

2 physically took it. Not accepted the substance, but agreed to look at it,

3 agreed to receive it. And then I saw him again on the 2nd of August,

4 1995, and he agreed to accept the plan in substance. That is, that he

5 would accept the idea of reintegration into Croatia, although by the 2nd

6 of August he clearly understand that it would be much less autonomy than

7 had been suggested in the Z-4 plan.

8 Q. On the 23rd of January, 1995, when you met with Milan Babic, did

9 you actually give him a copy of the plan, or did you just outline it for

10 him?

11 A. No, I just discussed it in outline form. We were waiting until

12 the 30th of January to make the formal presentation, both to the Croatian

13 side and to the Serbian side. So this was a -- really an effort to

14 prepare the ground for that formal presentation.

15 Q. And did that meeting occur in Knin?

16 A. It did.

17 Q. Were you, after your meeting with Milan Babic, were you supposed

18 to meet with somebody else?

19 A. I was supposed to meet with Milan Martic.

20 Q. What happened?

21 A. He sent word that he was cancelling the meeting because I had

22 violated protocol by meeting with the foreign minister before meeting with

23 the president.

24 Q. So did you meet with him that day?

25 A. I did not meet with him that day.

1 Q. What happened on the 30th of January?

2 A. On the 30th of January, in the morning, the Z-4, so the Russian

3 ambassador, myself, several European Union ambassadors, United Nations

4 representative, we went to -- first up to see President Tudjman in the

5 presidential palace in Zagreb. We made a presentation about the plan, we

6 presented the plan to him, handed it over, and I can tell you that he did

7 not like the plan. But he did what we asked. Namely, he agreed that he

8 would negotiate on the basis of the plan. The plan was never a take it or

9 leave it proposition, it was simply intended as a document to be the basis

10 of negotiation.

11 We then flew down to Knin where, in the late afternoon, early

12 evening, we met with the leadership of the RSK in the castle in Knin.

13 That was their headquarters. We made a presentation about the Z-4 plan.

14 The Russian ambassador then attempted to hand it to Milan Martic, and he

15 refused to receive it. He refused to touch the document.

16 Q. Can you tell us who else was present at that meeting from the RSK

17 side?

18 A. Yes. Milan Babic was there, as was the -- Prime Minister Nikolic,

19 among others.

20 Q. Did Milan Martic explain why he was refusing to take the document?

21 A. Yes. He said -- the Croatians had, at the beginning of January,

22 announced that they would not extend the UNPROFOR mandate beyond its

23 expiration date which I think was the end of March of 1995. And he said

24 that he would not negotiate until -- unless the Croatians agreed to extend

25 the UNPROFOR mandate.

1 Q. Did there come a time when the UNPROFOR mandate was, in fact,

2 extended?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. When was that?

5 A. In March of 1995 this was a product of American diplomacy led by

6 assistant second Richard Holbrook. We -- Holbrook had come to Zagreb and

7 we had gotten the Croatians to agree in principle to -- to agree to an

8 extended United Nations mandate. There were cosmetic changes. Among them

9 the name was changed from the UN mission from UNPROFOR to UNCRO which --

10 well, it was meant to convey United Nations in Croatia, but it had some

11 other -- the CRO had another word -- set of words that went with it,

12 cooperation, reconstruction, I forget the details. But basically the

13 mandate was continued until the 1st of December, 1995, and that deal was

14 sealed in a meeting, the social summit in Copenhagen, where vice-president

15 Gore met with President Tudjman. Holbrook, myself were there.

16 Q. And that was in March of 1995?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. After that occurred, did Milan Martic accept the Z-4 plan and

19 agree to engage in the Z-4 negotiation process?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Going back to the meeting of 30th of January, 1995, when Milan

22 Martic refused to accept the document, how did you react?

23 A. We spent two hours trying to persuade the Serbian side to

24 reconsider. We explained that they were not committed -- by accepting the

25 document, by agreeing to negotiate on it, they were not committed to any

1 of the terms of the document. We tried to explain that if they refused to

2 engage in the peace process that -- that they would increase greatly the

3 chance of a renewed conflict. We tried to explain that the -- I explained

4 that the international community had limited patience. That, after all,

5 they had here the most powerful countries in the world, and certainly the

6 most powerful ones operating in the Balkans, that this was an opportunity

7 and that the opportunity would not always be there. And I made these

8 arguments, the Russian ambassador made these arguments, the European Union

9 representatives made these arguments, and it had no effect whatsoever.

10 Q. Can you tell us how the meeting ended?

11 A. At the end of the meeting the Prime Minister Nikolic, who was

12 sitting next to Martic, looked at us and he said, "You think that you are

13 professional diplomats, but you have made a huge mistake."

14 Q. What did you say, if anything?

15 A. I looked at him and I looked at Martic and I said, "A huge mistake

16 has been made, but we will see who has made it."

17 Q. Did Milan Babic say anything at the end of the meeting?

18 A. As we were leaving, shaking hands, he came up to me and he said,

19 in English, "I'm sorry."

20 Q. And how did you understand that?

21 A. I understood it to mean that he recognised that this was a huge

22 mistake on the part of the leadership of the RSK, and that an opportunity

23 was being lost.

24 Q. Did you try to present the plan to Slobodan Milosevic?

25 A. That -- the idea was that we would present the plan to Tudjman, to

1 the RSK leadership, and to Milosevic. Milosevic said that he would not

2 receive the plan, and he would not receive the Z-4 delegation.

3 Q. Do you know why Slobodan Milosevic opposed the plan, or the

4 process?

5 A. Milosevic supported part of the process, namely the cease-fire

6 arrangements, agreement, and the economic and confidence-building measure.

7 I can give you my informed opinion as to why he refused the Z-4 plan,

8 which is that he was very much afraid that the level of autonomy that was

9 being promised to the Serbs in Krajina under the plan would set a

10 precedent for Kosovo, and he did not want to see that take place.

11 I also believe that by January of 1995, or even 1994, he had

12 already decided that he would give up the Krajina, and that he -- that he

13 wanted to trade, if you will, the Krajina for other territory, possibly

14 Eastern Slavonia and territory in Bosnia. And therefore, he was not

15 particularly interested in seeing a peace agreement between Zagreb and the

16 Serbs in Krajina.

17 Q. Now, when you say that he had already decided that he would give

18 up the Krajina by that time, by January of 1995, or even 1994, did that

19 represent, to your knowledge, a change in his position?

20 A. Yes. I think when the wars of the former Yugoslavia began in

21 1991, that his dream of a Greater Serbia included Eastern Slavonia, it

22 included the Krajina, and included Dubrovnik and the region around it.

23 Q. And do you know why his position would have changed between that

24 time, 1991 wars, and what you described earlier -- what you described in

25 your previous answer, January 1995?

1 A. I can again only offer an informed opinion, but what happened in

2 between was that there was international recognition of Croatia and of

3 Bosnia, and international sanctions on Serbia of increasing effectiveness.

4 And it became clear to Milosevic that there was no possibility that the

5 world was going to accept changes in these borders. So therefore, the

6 dream of a Greater Serbia was -- was disappearing, and that the most that

7 he might hope for were smaller territorial changes by agreement with the

8 Croatians. And I think he had the thought that he might be able to get

9 Eastern Slavonia and, frankly, I think David Owen, the -- one of the

10 international mediators encouraged him in the belief that he might be able

11 to get a border change that would give him some Croatian territory.

12 Q. Now, I want to just look at the Z-4 plan itself that you -- that

13 you presented to the parties on the 30th of January, 1995.

14 MR. WHITING: And if we could have 65 ter Exhibit 351 on the

15 screen, please.

16 Q. Do you see that in front of you, Ambassador?

17 A. I do.

18 Q. And can you tell us what that is, if we could scroll down on the

19 page there.

20 A. It is a code cable from Thorvald Stoltenberg, who was the UN

21 representative in this process, and he is attaching to it a copy of the

22 Z-4 plan with some of the final modifications that were made following a

23 meeting in my residence in Zagreb.

24 Q. Is this the plan that was presented to the parties on the 30th of

25 January, 1995?

1 A. If it is -- it is the plan or it is extremely close to the plan.

2 There might have been some minor changes even after this date.

3 Q. I just want to look at a few provisions of the plan. And as we're

4 doing that, if you -- if you think of any of the changes that might have

5 occurred, let us know.

6 MR. WHITING: But if we could look at page 9 first. And if we

7 could just scroll down to Article I.3, "Flags and emblems."

8 Q. The plan, the proposal would have allowed the Krajina to adopt its

9 own emblem and flag?

10 A. That is correct. This was a very important issue for the Serbs,

11 who wanted to have their own symbols so they could have the Serbian flag,

12 and that was permitted under the plan.

13 Q. Could we look at the next page, please? At the top, Article

14 I.4, "Language," the use of the Serbian language and Cyrillic script was

15 also provided for?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. If we could look at the next page, please. At the bottom of point

18 2 there, it's a list of competencies that would fall under the government

19 of Krajina?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And education, culture, housing, public services, and if we could

22 now go to the next page, because that list continues. And there -- I

23 won't go through all of them, business, charitable activities, energy and

24 so forth.

25 MR. WHITING: If we could go to page 14, please. There on the --

1 scroll down, please.

2 Q. Article III.1 provides for a legislature in the Krajina

3 government?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. And if we could go to the next page, please. There, Article III.2

6 provides for a president and various provisions for the president of the

7 Krajina. That was also provided for?

8 A. That is correct.

9 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could that be admitted into evidence

10 and given a number.

11 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: The document is admitted into evidence. Could a

12 number be assigned be assigned.

13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 381, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you.

15 MR. WHITING:

16 Q. Now, Ambassador, you have touched on this indirectly in some of

17 your answers, but I want to ask you more directly now about Slobodan

18 Milosevic's relationship with the leaders of the -- of the so-called RSK

19 you referred earlier about the presidential elections that were held in

20 the RSK in the 1993 and the beginning of 1994. Did you -- first of all,

21 if you could tell us what happened to your knowledge in these elections

22 and, secondly, of what Milosevic's role, if any, was in those elections?

23 A. The elections were a two-stage process. The first round in

24 December of 1993, and a run-off in January, if I have that -- those dates

25 correctly. In the December round Babic got I think around 49 per cent of

1 the vote, Martic in the mid-20s. In the second round Martic had 53 per

2 cent, and Babic had 47 per cent. Now, in the history of democratic

3 elections I don't think you will find a case where a candidate who is that

4 far behind has been able to overtake, in a second round, a candidate who

5 almost had a majority. And, indeed, Babic's strength was confirmed by the

6 fact that his party won the parliamentary elections for the RSK assembly.

7 Based on the reporting that we had from a variety of sources, we

8 believed that the election was rigged, and rigged with the active

9 participation of the Serbian authorities, presumably acting under

10 Milosevic's instructions. Milosevic did not like Babic. He -- his

11 preferred candidate was Mikulic, but Mikulic had no basis of support in

12 Croatia, so as an alternative to Babic, he supported Martic. When I saw

13 Babic on the 23rd of January, 1995, he also told me that Milosevic had

14 been responsible for rigging the election against him.

15 Q. Now, do you know during the time that you were U.S. Ambassador to

16 Croatia and the so-called RSK existed, do you know if the RSK received any

17 financial assistance from Serbia?

18 A. It received major financial assistance from Serbia.

19 Q. Of what kind? Do you know?

20 A. The Serbian government paid the -- paid for the army, that -- the

21 salaries of the army of the Republika Srpska Krajina. I suspect they also

22 paid for the salaries of the police. They provided fuel, and other

23 essential commodities. The Krajina was an extremely poor area, with no --

24 very few indigenous resources, and so it was almost entirely dependent on

25 a life-line that came through Bosnia from Serbia.

1 Q. Now, in your dealings with the various RSK leaders that you've

2 talked about, were you able to tell if they consulted with Slobodan

3 Milosevic?

4 A. It certainly was my belief that they didn't do anything

5 significant without consulting with Milosevic. Babic told me as much, and

6 this, I think, became particularly clear to me when I was negotiating the

7 Eastern Slavonia agreement, what became the Erdut agreement. This was the

8 process that began in September of 1995, and ended successfully on the

9 12th of November, 1995, in which the Serbian negotiator, Milan Milanovic

10 went to Belgrade to get his instructions after -- before every negotiating

11 session and told me as much. And, in fact, we met in a room where there

12 was a large picture of Milosevic on the wall, even though ostensibly this

13 was a different country.

14 Q. After the shelling of Zagreb on May 2nd and May 3rd of 1995, was

15 there a change in the army of the RSK?

16 A. Yes. The army commander was replaced, and I think because -- on

17 Milosevic's instructions, because Milosevic was -- did not want to have

18 another incident in which there was a shelling of Zagreb. And, indeed,

19 during Operation Storm in August of 1995, there was no shelling of Zagreb.

20 Q. Do you know who -- which commander was taken away, and which

21 commander came in?

22 A. Yes, Selekovic [phoen] was removed and Mrksic was installed in his

23 place.

24 Q. I want to go now to October of 1994 and specifically I believe

25 it's the 24th of October, 1994, did you have a meeting with Milan Martic

1 on that day?

2 A. I did. I went down to Knin, and I meant with him in the castle in

3 Knin and that was followed by a dinner in a restaurant on the grounds, the

4 castle grounds.

5 Q. What was the purpose of the meeting, what was discussed at the

6 meeting?

7 A. The military situation was getting worse. There was, at that

8 time, an offensive by the Bosnian Serbs supported by the Croatian Serbs

9 into Bihac, rather similar to what happened in July of 1995. There was a

10 danger that the Bosnian government forces in Bihac might collapse, that

11 there might be Croatian intervention. There was growing Croatian

12 impatience with the games that were being played with regard to the

13 economic and confidence-building measure negotiations. And so I went down

14 to try to get Martic to stop his activities in Bihac, and to engage

15 seriously in peace negotiations because time was running out. And my

16 message to him was that time was running out, and if they did not engage

17 seriously in the peace process, it would end with war.

18 Q. How did Milan Martic respond?

19 A. He -- he said that the RSK had the means to defend itself, and

20 that it had the capability of damaging or destroying Zagreb.

21 Q. What did you think he was referring to when he said that?

22 A. I knew what he was referring to, which was that they had rockets

23 that were capable of hitting Zagreb.

24 Q. Did you have further conversation about that?

25 A. At the dinner, which was a very friendly dinner, we were talking,

1 and he said to me, said, "You are a young man, I am a young man, I like

2 you, I don't want anything to happen to you, we can do business, I can't

3 deal with Tudjman. So if things get tense, you should be in touch with me

4 so that -- and I'll let you know when you should leave Zagreb".

5 Q. By the way, do you know if -- do you know if he knew where the

6 embassy was located in Zagreb?

7 A. He asked about where the embassy was located in Zagreb.

8 Q. And what did you tell him?

9 A. I told him that it was where it was, in Zrinjevac, and that it was

10 in the downtown part of Zagreb.

11 Q. When he said, "I'll let you know when you should leave Zagreb,"

12 how did you respond?

13 A. I told him that I could not abandon the embassy, I certainly

14 couldn't leave Zagreb, and I told him that a rocket attack on Zagreb would

15 be a crime.

16 Q. Why did you tell him that?

17 A. Because he clearly was threatening to strike Zagreb with rockets

18 if the situation deteriorated.

19 Q. When you said that, that when you told him that a rocket attack on

20 Zagreb would be a crime, could you tell if he heard you?

21 A. I'm sure he heard me.

22 Q. Did he respond?

23 A. He did not respond, that I recall.

24 Q. Now, let's move ahead in time to May 2nd of 1995. Can you tell us

25 where you were on that day?

1 A. I was in my office, and looking through documents and actually

2 looking at some pictures I'd been sent at -- I think around 10.00 -- well,

3 a little after 10.00 in the morning.

4 Q. Did something happen?

5 A. There were some explosions, and since this was the -- just after

6 Croatian operation blitz, and I had firmly in my mind Martic's threat from

7 the previous October, I concluded immediately that those explosions were

8 rocket attacks on Zagreb.

9 Q. Now, you referred to Croatian operation blitz, was that an

10 operation that was also sometimes referred to as Operation Flash?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. When you heard the explosions, what did you do?

13 A. I ordered the staff, the alarm in the embassy to be sounded and

14 the staff to go to our shelter, which was in the basement of the embassy

15 building, and that is where we all went.

16 Q. Do you recall how long you stayed in the shelter?

17 A. A couple of hours.

18 Q. What did you do after you left the shelter?

19 A. In the late afternoon I went out and looked at the sites that had

20 been -- some of the strikes -- sites that had been struck by the rockets.

21 Q. Do you recall some of the sites?

22 A. I certainly do.

23 Q. Could you describe them for us, please?

24 A. Yes, on Vlaska street, which is right by the main square, the Trg

25 Jelacic, there was a car parked on the side of the road. There was a hole

1 in the windshield of the car, and there was a note that had been left in

2 the windshield that said, "I'll be back in 20 minutes". But the man had,

3 in fact, been killed in his car by the rocket so of course he never

4 returned.

5 Q. So what else did you see that day?

6 A. I went over to the school, a school that had been hit, in fact a

7 school where the foreign minister Granic's children attended. And the

8 playground and the side of the school building was sprayed with the

9 pockmarks from the rockets. And the school authorities told me that the

10 attack had occurred about five minutes after the morning recess had ended.

11 I think there were a couple of kids that were injured at the school. But

12 had the attack occurred five minutes earlier, there would have been -- it

13 would have been a massacre.

14 Q. This is a school for what age children, if you know?

15 Approximately. Are we talking younger children, older children?

16 A. As I recall, I think it was served -- middle -- middle school age,

17 but I actually at this stage don't fully remember.

18 Q. And were you able to --

19 A. I also went and saw the -- the site of the -- I think of the

20 explosions that had first caught my attention, which were just across

21 Zrinjevac park about 100 metres from my office, where the rockets had

22 landed on some cars and caused a fire.

23 Q. Were you able to ascertain, and maybe you weren't, but were you

24 able to ascertain what the reaction of the people in the street was, to

25 this attack?

1 A. I think people were shocked and frightened, terrorised. I mean it

2 was a beautiful May day, and nobody expected to have death raining down

3 from the sky on them.

4 Q. That leads to my next question. I think you have already answered

5 this, but had there been any warning that there was going to be such an

6 attack?

7 A. None.

8 Q. Aside from the warning that -- the vague warning that you

9 received?

10 A. There was no warning that there was going to be an attack. This

11 was totally unexpected.

12 Q. Now, did something happen on the following day, May 3rd, 1995?

13 A. There were another set of rocket attacks on Zagreb.

14 Q. And where were you when that occurred?

15 A. I was in my office again.

16 Q. And did you, on that day, observe any of the results of the

17 attacks?

18 A. We went again to the shelter, but then foreign minister Granic

19 called me up and asked if I would go with him to the children's hospital,

20 which was struck by a rocket. Over the objections of my security, I

21 agreed to go and I travelled in Granic's car to the hospital. And we went

22 into the hospital, we saw where the rockets had landed, it was, as I said

23 a children's hospital. And even worse for me than seeing the physical

24 damage caused by the rockets was the -- seeing all the children who had

25 been evacuated to the basement, some of them with -- with critical needs,

1 cancer patients, and that sort of thing. And of course these children

2 were terrified.

3 Q. Was there an official response from the United States to these

4 attacks?

5 A. Yes. On instructions I sent a brief memo to Martic, Mikulic, and

6 Babic. It observed that these attacks had taken place in close proximity

7 to the American embassy, and it observed that historically American

8 presidents have considered attacks on American citizens to be attacks on

9 the United States.

10 Q. Do you recall when that memo or letter was sent?

11 A. I sent it May 4th.

12 Q. To your knowledge, was there any military justification for the

13 attacks, for these attacks that you've described?

14 A. These were terror attacks. There was no military justification

15 for them whatsoever.

16 Q. I want to show you a map of downtown Zagreb, and it's -- it's ERN

17 number 0469-9051.

18 MR. WHITING: Is it possible to -- is it possible to turn that so

19 it's not side ways? There. And if we could move -- slide it over to --

20 so the right side is more visible. Now -- there.

21 Q. Now, Ambassador, and if the usher could assist the witness, we're

22 going to try marking this electronically.

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. So you will be given a special pen. And it's hard to see, so I

25 think you have to do it -- you're going to have to mark on the screen to

1 your left, I believe. I'm wrong about that, I'm sorry.

2 A. I can -- I think I can -- this strains the limit of my eyesight,

3 but I think I can find the locations.

4 Q. I apologise. So if you can mark where the U.S. Embassy was

5 located on this map, please.

6 A. That's the -- it should be right here. [Marks].

7 Q. And could you put a number 1 next to that so we'll know that that

8 is the location of the U.S. Embassy?

9 A. Yeah. [Marks] It's sort of a 1.

10 Q. Just so the record is clear, and there is no doubt about that,

11 it's -- it is just below the D on Donji Grad on the map?

12 A. Right.

13 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Whiting, the Chamber is not able to have the

14 benefit of knowing where the witness is indicating.

15 MR. WHITING: Okay.

16 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Should it not happen that we also are able to

17 see where his pointer is going?

18 MR. WHITING: Yes, that's absolutely right, Your Honour. I have

19 it on my screen, perhaps the usher could assist in terms of putting it on

20 the right screen. I have it on English -- the map on the courtroom

21 monitor.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you, I can see it now. We are most

23 grateful.

24 I don't know if the interpreters though would like to have further

25 benefit, are they okay? They have indicated that everything is in order.

1 Thank you, Mr. Whiting.

2 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

3 Q. Ambassador, I don't know if you will be able to do this, are you

4 able to mark any of the other locations that you've made reference to?

5 And if you can't, it's all right.

6 A. I can. If I make a 2 here, that's roughly where the rocket landed

7 that was across the park from the embassy.

8 And right here, 3, that's Vlaska -- on the south side of the

9 street is where the car was with the man who had left the note, "I'll be

10 back in 20 minutes," who was killed. I don't think I can find the school.

11 I didn't refer to it, but here is the Croatian National Theatre which was

12 another site that was hit.

13 Q. And you've put a 4 there?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. The children's hospital is -- the -- the school is, I think, to

16 the east, and the children's hospital to the west?

17 Q. To the east and west of what?

18 A. Of the embassy and indeed of the places I've already marked.

19 Q. Thank you, Ambassador.

20 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could this be marked as an exhibit,

21 please.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: It is admitted as an exhibit. Could a number be

23 assigned.

24 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 382, Your Honours.

25 MR. WHITING: Thank you. I'm done with that map now.

1 Q. I would like to show you now a clip from -- from a video which

2 is -- it's 65 ter Exhibit 1816. It's ERN number is V 0000449. We don't,

3 however, need to have it brought up on the e-court because we're going to

4 show -- we've put the clip into Sanction so that the transcript --

5 actually there is no transcript on this. But in any event we've put it

6 into Sanction because we have just one little clip to show from it.

7 Ambassador, I'm going to ask you to watch this clip and see -- I

8 think the usher can be relieved of his immediate duty. So if we could

9 switch over to Sanction, and Ambassador, if you could tell us if you

10 recognise anything.

11 MR. WHITING: Have we -- I think we need the assistance of the AV

12 booth to switch over to Sanction.

13 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Could we ask the AV booth to switch over to

14 Sanction?

15 MR. WHITING: Let's try it again.

16 [Prosecution counsel confer]

17 MR. WHITING: I don't know if anybody is seeing this. No, nobody

18 is seeing it. Your Honour, I think it actually -- this falls conveniently

19 because we're right about the break. Perhaps we could take the break and

20 we will address this issue.

21 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: It might be a convenient time now to take the

22 break to give you the opportunity to do that which is necessary. Thank

23 you, Mr. Whiting.

24 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: We are now going to take the break until quarter

1 to 11.00. Thank you.

2 --- Recess taken at 10.14 a.m.

3 --- On resuming at 10.46 a.m.

4 MR. WHITING: May I proceed, Your Honour?

5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Please do proceed.

6 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour. I think we have sorted the

7 technology.

8 Q. So Ambassador, I'm going to show you this clip and see if you

9 recognise it.

10 MR. WHITING: And it should be the computer evidence screens,

11 which on our buttons is the top right button. If we could play that now

12 There should be an image -- there it is.

13 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, I believe there is some success now.

14 [Videotape played]

15 MR. WHITING:

16 Q. Now, Ambassador, just for the record, the clip that we just saw

17 shows some burning cars and some fire trucks pulling up to the scene. Are

18 you able to recognise that location?

19 A. Yes, I am.

20 Q. What is it?

21 A. It is where the rocket landed across the Zrinjevac park from the

22 embassy.

23 Q. And approximately how far away is that from the embassy?

24 A. It's very close, around 100 metres.

25 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could this video be admitted into

1 evidence, please, and given a number.

2 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: It is admitted into evidence. Please assign an

3 exhibit number.

4 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 383, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Before you proceed, this clip relates -- sorry,

6 does it relate to the 2nd or the 3rd, for completeness, of May, that is?

7 MR. WHITING:

8 Q. Ambassador, which day did that relate to?

9 A. That is the 2nd of May, possibly the -- the first explosion that I

10 heard when I was in my office, which seemed quite close.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Was it heard --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Honourable Judge, please.

14 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Sorry. How long after you heard the explosion?

15 Or was it simultaneous? Please tell the Chamber. Explain a bit more for

16 me, please.

17 THE WITNESS: I'm afraid I don't quite understand the question.

18 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: You said that it was the 2nd of May, possibly

19 the first explosion that I heard when I was in my office, which seemed

20 quite close. So you are referring to the clip, are you not?

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, I am.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: So what I am asking then is was this happening

23 shortly after, and how long after, or was it simultaneous or please

24 explain to the Trial Chamber.

25 THE WITNESS: There was -- there was an explosion that I heard in

1 my office followed by some other explosions. We moved immediately, or

2 quickly to the basement of the embassy. And I went and visited that site

3 later in the afternoon, so actually after the fire was extinguished.

4 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: About how long after? You said you were

5 actually in the basement a couple of hours, so please give an indication.

6 THE WITNESS: I think I visited the site around 4.00 p.m.. The

7 first missile struck at either 10.23 or 10.27.

8 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you, Ambassador Galbraith.

9 MR. WHITING:

10 Q. So just to be clear in that clip you recognise the location, but

11 you did not actually see the fire burning?

12 A. I did not see the fire, it had been put out by the time I got to

13 the location.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, I'd like to show some -- you some photographs and

15 ask you if you recognise them. And if we could first bring up 65 ter

16 Exhibit 1652. And I think we have to switch off of the Sanction.

17 Now, I'm just going to go through some of these pages. This is

18 the first page of this exhibit. And are you able -- are you able to

19 recognise what this is? And if could you scroll down, please. And then

20 actually, I'll go through the pages, if we could go through the next

21 page. Next page, please. And the next page, please. Okay. Now, could

22 we scroll down, because I just want to get the ERN number of this

23 particular page. For the record it's 0031-2230.

24 Ambassador, are you able to recognise that?

25 A. Yes, I am. It was the school that was hit on the 2nd of May.

1 Q. And what do you see there on the wall, on the lower picture on

2 this page?

3 A. These are marks that are made by the force of -- of the rocket,

4 projectiles that were in the rocket.

5 Q. And is this the yard of the school?

6 A. It is the playground of the school or the yard of the school, and

7 you can only imagine what would have happened had it been full of children

8 when the rocket hit.

9 Q. Could we scroll up to the upper picture? There, that's -- there

10 the yard is visible. Could we go to the next page, please? And this is

11 ERN number 2231.

12 Do you recognise these pictures?

13 A. Yes, it's the yard of the school, playground. And again you can

14 see on the ground the marks that are made by the projectiles coming from

15 the rocket.

16 Q. And for the record, the ground is depicted in the picture on the

17 lower part of that page?

18 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I'm sorry. Before you proceed, is it possible

19 in some way for an indication to be given of the marks that are made by

20 the projectile?

21 THE WITNESS: Yes.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: For the record.

23 THE WITNESS: I'll try to circle.

24 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, I think that would be very helpful.

25 THE WITNESS: [Marks]. There were quite possibly more. It's hard

1 to tell from this picture what is a -- where the asphalt is gouged by the

2 projectile and what is debris from the -- from where it's been gouged out.

3 MR. WHITING: Now, I was going to admit the whole thing into

4 evidence, but I think we need to admit this now separately before we move

5 on to another page, otherwise we'll lose the markings.

6 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Very well.

7 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 384, Your Honours, for

8 the photograph marked by the witness.

9 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: So Exhibit 384 for the photograph as marked by

10 the witness.

11 MR. WHITING: And could we go to the next page of this document,

12 please? This is -- if we could just scroll down to the lower picture,

13 please. And this is page 0031-2233.

14 Q. Do you recognise that, Ambassador?

15 A. Assuming that it's in the same place it is, looks like one of the

16 marks that's at the school.

17 Q. And do you recall seeing those sorts of marks in the -- in the

18 yard?

19 A. Absolutely.

20 Q. Okay. And then finally, if we could go to the next page, which is

21 2234. No, I'm sorry, I didn't actually want to see that page.

22 MR. WHITING: Could we admit this collection of photographs into

23 evidence, please, Your Honour?

24 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: The collection of photographs?

25 MR. WHITING: Yes, Your Honour. The ones that we have just been

1 observing, unmarked by the witness.

2 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Very well. Yes. Could the photographs as a

3 collection be admitted into evidence, and an exhibit number now assigned

4 to them, please.

5 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 385, Your Honours.

6 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you.

7 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour. Could we now get 65 ter

8 Exhibit 1644, please? And could we go to page 30? And if we could go

9 scroll down to the bottom so I can just read out the ERN number of this

10 particular page. This is 0031-2336. And could we then look at page -- at

11 the next page, please? Which is 2337.

12 Q. Ambassador, do you recognise anything from these photographs on

13 these pages?

14 A. Yes, I recognise the car on Vlaska street where the rocket

15 projectile went through the wind screen and where the man was killed.

16 Q. Now, to be clear, when you saw this, was -- in the pictures we see

17 there is a body next to the car. Was the body there when you saw this?

18 A. No, there was no body. That had been removed sometime before.

19 MR. WHITING: Could this be admitted into evidence, Your Honour,

20 please.

21 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Admitted into evidence. Could an exhibit number

22 please be assigned.

23 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 386, Your Honours.

24 MR. WHITING: Could we have now 65 ter Exhibit Number 1655? And

25 if we could scroll down. And the ERN number of this first page is

1 0031-2466. And I'm going to ask that we look at the photographs on the

2 first eight pages, this being the first page, and go now to the second

3 page.

4 Q. Ambassador, do you recognise this location?

5 A. I do. It is the children's hospital.

6 Q. And this is a hospital that you visited on the 3rd of May, 1995?

7 A. With Foreign Minister Granic, and in the hospital was deputy Prime

8 Minister Kostovic [phoen] whose daughter had been -- was one of the

9 victims of the attack.

10 Q. Now, if we could look at the third page of these photographs.

11 Scroll down, please. Could we look at the next page, please? This is the

12 fourth page, and just for the record it's 0031-2469.

13 Did you see this kind of debris in the hospital?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15 Q. Could we look at the next page, please? And go down to the

16 bottom, please.

17 Did you see this?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Could we go to the next page, please? This is 0031-2471. Could

20 we go to the next page, please? And finally to the last page, 2473.

21 Did you see what has been depicted in all these photographs that

22 we've shown you?

23 A. Yes. Damage caused by the rocket attack on the hospital, and I --

24 if you are looking at the lower picture on 0031-2473, I specifically

25 remember this corridor with the windows blown out.

1 Q. Thank you, Ambassador.

2 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could this be admitted into evidence,

3 please.

4 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: It is admitted into evidence, and could an

5 exhibit number please be assigned?

6 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 387, Your Honours.

7 MR. WHITING: And I'm done with that exhibit.

8 Q. Ambassador, in the -- after the first day of shelling, did Milan

9 Martic, to your knowledge, make any statements in the media concerning the

10 shelling of Zagreb?

11 A. He did. He took credit for it.

12 Q. I'm going to show you a television broadcast. It's 65 ter Exhibit

13 2262, and its ERN number is V000-0448, but we will be playing it on the

14 Sanction because we have the synchronised transcript. So, Ambassador, I

15 would like you to watch the broadcast and see if it looks familiar to you.

16 [Videotape played].

17 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "I wish to address you with a few

18 words and tell you about the situation that has befallen us and what we

19 plan to do to get out of all this.

20 "First of all, I wish to tell you that I sincerely sympathise with

21 all the suffering that you've endured. I have preferred the situation to

22 be good and that I've come to attend a wedding in Western Slavonia instead

23 of having to come here when you are in your darkest hour to explain how to

24 get out of it and how to find a way out of all of this so that you don't

25 wander around and so that we can keep our land.

1 "We've had a meeting here with civilian authorities, the military

2 leadership, and our archpriests. What Croatia has done to us is

3 undoubtedly a crime which was supported by foreign powers, America, and

4 Germany. This was not a matter of treason. It was only that our enemy

5 had the upper hand at that moment and managed to take control of the

6 motorway and of this part as you know.

7 "But I'm telling you one battle does not mean that the war is. As

8 a countermeasure to what Tudjman did to you here, we have shelled all

9 their cities. Sisak several times, Karlovac, Zagreb, yesterday and today.

10 This was done for you. But let me tell you that the attack by Tudjman's

11 forces did not focus only on Western Slavonia. He also attacked Lika and

12 Dalmatia. Lika managed to defend itself and in Dalmatia their forces were

13 removed from Mount Inera [phoen].

14 "Today an ultimatum followed. If they continued to attack our

15 besieged forces, we would continue to pound Zagreb and destroy their

16 cities. Then they begged us to stop shelling Zagreb and said that they'd

17 let our people out of the encirclement, which is what interests you the

18 most."

19 MR. WHITING:

20 Q. Ambassador, is this broadcast that you've just been shown

21 consistent with the media reporting that you were aware of at that time on

22 the 2nd of May, 3rd of May, 1995?

23 A. It is completely consistent, yes.

24 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could this video and the accompanying

25 transcript be admitted into evidence, please?

1 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: The video and transcript are admitted into

2 evidence. Please assign an exhibit number.

3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 388, Your Honours.

4 MR. WHITING: I'd like to now play a radio transmission, and here

5 we'll just hear the voice and see the exhibit it is 65 ter Exhibit 1473

6 the transmission is T000-0250. Again we'll play it on the Sanction.

7 Q. Ambassador, if he could just follow along and see if this is also

8 consistent with the reporting that you heard at the time.

9 [Audiotape played]

10 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Croatia halted its aggression. It

11 was halted for one simple reason. After our ultimatum that we would

12 continue shelling Zagreb. I don't have anything to hide. I personally

13 gave you the order to counter Franjo Tudjman and his leadership for his

14 order to carry out the aggression on Western Slavonia and commit a crime

15 against the civilian population in Western Slavonia. My order to shell

16 Zagreb ensued and I would say that was what influenced them most to hold

17 the aggression. At the moment the aggression has been halted and we are

18 now negotiating with the UNPROFOR. As you know, an agreement was signed

19 so that our civilians and soldiers with their arms, they can pull out of

20 the encirclement and cross into Republika Srpska."

21 MR. WHITING:

22 Q. Ambassador, was that radio transmission consistent with the media

23 reporting that you were hearing at that time?

24 A. Yes, it was. It was consistent with the reporting we had from the

25 media and from other sources that Martic was taking credit for ordering

1 the rocket attacks on Zagreb.

2 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could this transmission and the

3 accompanying transcript be admitted into evidence, please?

4 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Transmission and transcript are admitted into

5 evidence. Please assign an exhibit number.

6 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 389, Your Honours.

7 MR. WHITING: Could we now have 65 ter Exhibit 1822, which is an

8 article from the Herald Tribune. And that I need from the e-court,

9 please. I don't have it on the screen, I don't know if anybody else does.

10 I'm getting a shaking from the head. Do we need to switch from the AV

11 booth, from Sanction over to -- back to the e-court? There it is. Could

12 scroll down so the top is visible, please? The other way.

13 Q. This is an article from the Herald Tribune dated the 16th of May,

14 1995, so it's some two weeks later. Do you -- were you aware of this

15 article in the Herald Tribune at the time.

16 A. Almost certainly I was aware of it.

17 Q. I want to scroll down, please, and the article includes an

18 interview with Milan Martic, and there on the right-hand column part way

19 down it says -- if we could -- that's fine. It refers to the interview.

20 In the interview Mr. Martic, and then it says -- he's quoted as

21 saying, "I'm very sorry if civilian targets were hit because our aim was

22 to hit military targets," he said. Now, do you recall him at this time,

23 some two weeks later, making statements to that effect?

24 A. I -- I -- I'm quite sure that I read this article, either in the

25 international Herald Tribune or in the Washington Post where it originally

1 appeared.

2 Q. And with respect to that quotation that I just read to you from

3 this article do you have any comment or reaction to that?

4 A. Yes, I do. Mr. Martic had long indicated that he considered an

5 option to launch attacks on Zagreb aimed at damaging, or in his words,

6 destroying the city. This is what he indicated to me on the 24th of

7 October. He -- this was the same statements that he made in the radio and

8 television clips that you previously showed. He had indicated to me in

9 effect that -- that attacking civilian targets in Zagreb, attacking the

10 city itself, was an option, a way in which the RSK could respond to an

11 attack to Croatian pressure or to a Croatian attack on the RSK. Again

12 that is confirmed in the clips from the television and radio broadcast, I

13 think the television broadcast from the 3rd of May.

14 Now, two weeks after the event, he's slightly changing his story

15 that he's coming to the realisation that what I told him on the 24th was

16 true, namely that this was a war crime and he could be held responsible.

17 So he was attempting to find, after the fact, a military justification for

18 the attack by suggesting that he was really after military targets in

19 downtown Zagreb. There were not military targets in the area that he was

20 hitting. It was an indiscriminate attack on the city. It hit a

21 children's hospital, it hit the Croatian National Theatre, it hit a

22 school.

23 Q. Thank you, Ambassador.

24 MR. WHITING: Could this be admitted into evidence, please?

25 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Could an exhibit number be assigned.

1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 390, Your Honours.

2 MR. WHITING: And I am done with the exhibit.

3 Q. I want to move ahead in time, please, to July, August of 1995.

4 Did there come a time when you learned that Croatia was planning military

5 action against the Krajina?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Do you recall when that was?

8 A. On or about the 21st of July, 1995.

9 Q. And do you know why -- did you learn why this military action was

10 being contemplated?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And can you tell us?

13 A. Yes. What had happened in the -- in July of 1995 was a series of

14 developments that were --

15 Q. I'm sorry, did you -- okay. Sorry. I'm sorry to interrupt. Go

16 ahead.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. I misheard you. Go ahead.

19 A. Was a -- so let me just start. In July of 1995 the Bosnian Serb

20 army had overrun Srebrenica, massacred [Realtime transcript read in error

21 "had overrun"] some 7.000 men and boys, it had overrun another safe area,

22 Zepa, and it, along with the forces of the RSK, was launching an attack on

23 Bihac, that looked like it might prevail. This was intolerable for the

24 Croatian government, as indeed was intolerable for the United States. The

25 Croatians feared that if Bihac was overrun, that the -- there would be

1 another massacre, that the survivors would end up in Croatia which already

2 had been burdened by receiving some two million refugees passing through

3 the country since 1991. That it would create a solid western Serb entity

4 of the RSK, plus the Bosnian Serb territory, so it put Croatia at a

5 strategic disadvantage and the Croatian government was not going to let

6 that happen. They also saw that there was no prospect of a successful

7 peace negotiation with the Krajina Serbs, given the attitude of the

8 accused who refused to negotiate. And the -- so that basically what was

9 going on in Bihac and what had taken place in Srebrenica and Zepa,

10 provided them with an opportunity to launch a military action that would

11 relieve the siege of Bihac and retake the Krajina, and therefore solve the

12 problem of this break-away region of Croatia. And so they moved in late

13 July to do just that.

14 Q. Can you tell us where Bihac --

15 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Whiting, before you appropriate, at page 42,

16 approximately line 30, there is a sentence that says in July of 1995 the

17 Bosnian Serb army had overrun Srebrenica, had overrun men and boys, and

18 had overrun another safe area. Could I get a clarification there? That's

19 a typo.

20 THE WITNESS: That it's an error, what I said was the Bosnian Serb

21 army had overrun Srebrenica, had massacred some 7.000 men and boys, and

22 had overrun Zepa which is another UN-protected safe area.

23 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: The Chamber is grateful, thank you.

24 MR. WHITING:

25 Q. Can you tell us where Bihac is located?

1 A. Bihac is located in northwest Bosnia, it was a UN protected safe

2 area. On the -- to the north and west of Bihac was the territory of the

3 RSK, and therefore also of the Republic of Croatia. And to the south and

4 east was Serb-held territory in Bosnia. It was -- it was, in short,

5 completely surrounded.

6 Q. You said in your -- in an earlier answer that the -- that the

7 attack on Bihac by Bosnian Serb forces and forces of the RSK was

8 intolerable to Croatia and also to the United States. Why? Can you just

9 explain that, please?

10 A. Well, first, it was a -- well, let me -- for -- let me take

11 those -- that question in separate parts. For the United States it was

12 intolerable because this was a United Nations protected safe area, which

13 was not being protected. And because we believed that if Ratko Mladic

14 took over Bihac, he would likely do the same thing he had done in

15 Srebrenica, which was massacre the men and boys, and that the population

16 of Bihac being four or five times that of Srebrenica, we were talking

17 about in the neighbourhood of 40.000 men and boys being -- in danger of

18 being murdered.

19 For the Croatians, it was intolerable because -- well, for some of

20 those same reasons. But also because they did not want to have an

21 influx of the survivors coming into Croatia, adding to the burden of

22 refugees in the country already. And it also would have put Croatia at a

23 strategic disadvantage. As long as Bihac was there, the Serbs -- that is,

24 the Croatian Serbs, the RSK, and the Bosnian Serbs had internal lines that

25 is they had to defend. So they had to have forces that were facing the

1 Bosnian 5th Corps that was in Bihac. If that no longer existed, then

2 those forces could be transferred to the border between the RSK and the

3 government-held part of Croatia, and in addition, could be transferred to

4 the fight against the federation, that is the Croat-Muslim federation in

5 Bosnia.

6 Q. Did the participation of the RSK forces in Bihac also, just to be

7 clear, entail crossing or engaging an international border?

8 A. It did. They crossed the international border. From a legal

9 point of view, Croatia was responsible for maintaining its international

10 borders. What you had then was an attack emanating from Croatian

11 territory on to the territory of another state for which the government of

12 Croatia was legally responsible to prevent such an attack. The a attack

13 that Martic ordered on Bihac helped provide a legal pretext for Croatia to

14 take the actions that it did in launching Operation Storm.

15 Q. What position, if any, did the United States take with respect to

16 this anticipated military action by Croatia that you learned about on the

17 21st of July, 1995?

18 A. We took no position on whether the action should take place or

19 not. We -- I did -- I personally warned Tudjman, pursuant to

20 instructions, that if there was military action he had an obligation to

21 protect the lives and property of Serb civilians in the Krajina region,

22 and also to protect the UN peacekeepers that were present in that region.

23 Q. Now, after you learned about this contemplated action on the 21st

24 of July, 1995, did you have any meetings with any leaders from the RSK?

25 A. Yes, I did. I met with Milan Babic in Belgrade on the 2nd of

1 August.

2 Q. Can you tell us how that came about?

3 A. Yes. It was clear that Croatia intended to take military action.

4 The United States did -- did not feel that we could tell the Croatians not

5 to do it because if -- because of the danger that the combined RSK and

6 Bosnian Serb offencive would overrun Bihac with the consequences I have

7 previously decided. So we basically took the decision that we were not

8 going to provide not a green light, not a red light, but no light at all

9 in terms of the Croatian military offensive. Nonetheless, it was the

10 desire of the United States to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict

11 in Croatia, if at all possible. So when I was in Brioni meeting with

12 Tudjman on the 1st of August, I told him that I had been in touch with

13 Babic, and that Babic had proposed that I meet him in Belgrade the next

14 day. Incidentally, my original idea was to meet Babic in Knin, but Babic

15 said no, you can't come here, Martic will not let you come. So we have to

16 do it in Belgrade. So in the morning of the 2nd I flew on a UN plane from

17 Zagreb to Belgrade. I met that evening at the American embassy with Babic

18 and we had a -- a long discussion. I warned him that there was going --

19 that there was going to be a Croatian offensive, that the RSK had no

20 support whatsoever, and that -- that he -- at this stage if they were to

21 avoid a war, they had to accept Tudjman's terms for a peaceful

22 reintegration of the Krajina into Croatia.

23 Q. And do you recall generally what those terms were, and did you

24 communicate them to Milan Babic in that meeting?

25 A. I did -- I do -- I -- I -- I do recall. I communicated five

1 points to him. They were first in -- an immediate withdrawal of all RSK

2 forces from Bihac and the stopping of offensive actions in Bihac. It

3 was -- was the immediate reopening of the gas pipeline from -- that went

4 through sector north, a commitment to open immediately the railroad that

5 went from Zagreb through Knin to the coast, an agreement to start

6 negotiation, I think within 48 hours, on opening the road through Knin,

7 and an agreement for a political settlement based on the Krajina being

8 reintegrated into Croatia.

9 Q. How did Milan Babic respond?

10 A. He was very serious. He began by telling me that he fully

11 understood why the -- Croatia was about to attack the Krajina and that he

12 could not understand why his government was attacking Bihac. He --

13 Q. Did he make any reference to the meeting that you had had with him

14 and Milan Martic on the 30th of January, 1995?

15 A. He did. He said that he could not understand how it was that --

16 that they had behaved in the manner that they had, that Martic had behaved

17 in the manner that he had, with regard to a peace plan being presented by

18 the leading powers of the world. That was an -- and he -- he apologised

19 for it.

20 Q. Did he respond to the conditions and demands made by Tudjman that

21 were communicated to you -- by you?

22 A. He accepted the first four points. But with regard to the fifth,

23 which related -- which was the peaceful reintegration of -- of the Krajina

24 region into Croatia, he said that -- well, he asked about how this

25 impacted on Eastern Slavonia, would that have autonomy. And I said no,

1 under the Z-4 plan, Eastern Slavonia was -- would not -- had there been a

2 transitional period of five years to full Croatian control, but it would

3 not have autonomy because it was not a Serb-majority area under the 1991

4 census.

5 That was a problem for him and -- but basically I said, look, let

6 me propose this: Why don't you say that you accept the Z-4 plan as a

7 basis of negotiation, but you have to understand one point. You will

8 never get as much autonomy as was envisioned in the Z-4 plan. You might

9 have had that chance in January of 1995, but that's lost now. And I need

10 to tell Tudjman privately, from you, that you understand that the -- a

11 final settlement is going to be -- resemble much more closely the autonomy

12 that is envisioned in the Croatian constitutional law than ti will what is

13 in the Z-4 plan. He said, "Yes, I understand that. I will say publicly

14 that I accept the Z-4 plan, but privately you can convey that to Tudjman."

15 Q. Did Milan Babic say anything about Milan Martic's position at the

16 I am time?

17 A. Well, I asked him. I said, "You've accepted this, but what about

18 Martic, will he accept it?" And Babic said, "One sentence from Milosevic

19 and he will accept it."

20 Q. And did Milan Babic say anything further about Milosevic and his

21 position?

22 A. He said that he had been trying to see Milosevic and that

23 Milosevic would not see him.

24 Q. What happened after this meeting?

25 A. I sent a report on it to the state department, I got instructions

1 from the state department, I got instructions and Rudi Perina the charge

2 d'affaires in Belgrade got instructions that we were to go and see -- I

3 was to see Tudjman and Perina was to see Milosevic to ask for them to

4 support the Galbraith-Babic deal. Babic was to make a press conference

5 the next day, the 3rd of August, accept being the first four points, and

6 accepting the Z-4 plan. I spoke to him that morning, and he confirmed

7 that he would go ahead and do it. I flew back to Zagreb, I briefed the --

8 some of the key foreign ambassadors. I then went up and I saw

9 Milosevic -- sorry, saw Tudjman at 5.45 p.m. I told him what had

10 transpired in Belgrade, what Babic had said. And I urged him to delay

11 military action for several days. I said -- he -- he expressed great

12 scepticism about the sincerity, about Babic's sincerity, and also about

13 whether he could get Martic and the other Krajina Serbs to go along. I

14 said, well, I understand why you say that, given the experience that

15 you've had in dealing with them, but why don't you just wait for a couple

16 of days, and there are things that they have to do under this agreement

17 immediately. If they do them, then you will see that they are sincere, if

18 not, well then you still have the military option. But frankly, at that

19 stage, it was too late. He didn't believe that -- that the Krajina Serbs

20 and particularly Martic, would go along with this and the momentum toward

21 war had gone too far. I met with him at 5.45. At 6.00 p.m. he convened

22 his national Security Council and they took the final decision for war,

23 and, well, the advance operations began later that night.

24 Q. Now, you -- did Milan Babic hold the press conference and make the

25 public statement?

1 A. He did.

2 Q. And was it consistent with what he said he would do?

3 A. It was consistent. I wish he had been a little stronger, but it

4 was consistent.

5 Q. And you said Rudi Perina the charge d'affair in Belgrade was

6 tasked to go see Milosevic. First of all, why was the charge d'affair

7 given that task?

8 A. We did not have diplomatic relations with the federal Republic of

9 Yugoslavia and so there was no ambassador. The charge d'affair was the

10 senior American diplomat and he was the man who would normally deal with

11 Milosevic.

12 Q. Did you learn whether he was able to meet with Milosevic?

13 A. He was not able to meet with Milosevic.

14 Q. And do you know why he was not able to?

15 A. My understanding at the time was that Milosevic refused to see him

16 because he did not wish to support this deal. Subsequently, in testimony

17 in this Tribunal in the Milosevic case, I have learned that Milosevic says

18 that he was on vacation at the time.

19 Q. I want to look at 65 ter Exhibit 294, and ask you if you recognise

20 it. If we could just blow it up so we can read it.

21 Ambassador, do you recognise this?

22 A. I do.

23 Q. What it is?

24 A. It is a cable from the British ambassador to Zagreb, Gavin Hewitt,

25 back to the foreign and commonwealth office to the briefing I gave him and

1 the other ambassadors on the 3rd of August about my meeting in Belgrade.

2 Q. Have you had an opportunity to review this cable?

3 A. I have.

4 Q. And is it accurate?

5 A. It is accurate. He was an extremely competent diplomat.

6 Q. I want to draw your attention to page 2, if we could go to page 2,

7 point 8. If we could just scroll down, so we could see point 8, please.

8 Here it says in point 8 about the middle of the paragraph it

9 says, "Milosevic was being briefed by the American embassy in Belgrade."

10 Could you just explain that, please?

11 A. At the time that I did -- did this briefing with the -- with the

12 key ambassadors in Zagreb, I believed that Perina was going to be able to

13 see Milosevic and therefore would be able to brief him on the deal that I

14 had concluded with Babic, and hopefully get his support. I did not know

15 at that time that Perina had been unable to see Milosevic.

16 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could this document be admitted into

17 evidence, please.

18 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: The document is admitted into evidence. Could a

19 number please be assigned to it.

20 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 391, Your Honours.

21 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. Finally, Ambassador, you've been testifying today about your

23 dealings with the -- with various officials of the RSK with respect to the

24 Z-4 plan, with respect to events in Zagreb and the shelling of Zagreb, and

25 now with respect to this meeting in July and -- or rather on August 2nd of

1 1995 with Milan Babic. And I just want to ask you if you could give us

2 your assessment please from your experience and dealings you've described

3 of some of the various leaders of the RSK and I would like to start with

4 Milan Babic. Could you give us your assessment of him, please?

5 A. I think he was the only leader who had -- who had in his heart the

6 interests of the people of the Krajina region. He -- at the end, when

7 the -- when it was the -- a choice between making a deal and -- that might

8 have enabled the people of Krajina to remain, and sticking with his

9 hard-line position, he put the interests of the people first and he was

10 prepared to make a deal. He was easily intimidated by Martic and

11 Milosevic, he was -- I wished he had been braver, I wish he had been more

12 courageous, but I at least think he had the interests of the people in his

13 heart.

14 Q. You -- you've described -- you made reference to his hard-line

15 position. Would you describe him as a nationalist?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, could you give us now your assessment of Milan Martic?

18 A. I -- I thought he was a man of very limited abilities, limited

19 intelligence, who was way over his depth as the leader of the Krajina

20 Serbs. He -- I don't think he had the interests of the Krajina Serbs in

21 his heart. He -- he pursued his own interests, his own position. Faced

22 with what everybody in the entire world saw, everybody saw, as forces that

23 were going to wipe out the Krajina Serbs, that they were going to be

24 defeated, when everybody saw that Milosevic was not going to support him,

25 when everybody saw that the Bosnian Serbs were not going to support him,

1 he still refused to negotiate. He still refused a deal that not only

2 would have enabled people to stay, but would have given them an enormous

3 amount of self-government. They could have had their own flag, they could

4 have had their own bank-notes. They didn't want to have the Croatian

5 currency, the kuna, because they said that was the same currency that was

6 used by fascist Croatia in the Second World War, but the Z-4 plan allowed

7 them to have separate bank-notes, the way Scotland had their Scottish

8 pounds. They could have run most of their own affairs. In fact, so much

9 so that when I met with Babic he said, "This is too much autonomy. We

10 don't want to have to pay our own pensions. Couldn't Zagreb do that for

11 us?"

12 He not only refused the plan, but refused to talk about it. In

13 that sense Milan Martic was Franjo Tudjman's best friend and ally. He

14 gave Franjo Tudjman the excuse that Tudjman wanted to take military action

15 against the Krajina and an action that got the result that Tudjman wanted,

16 namely that there would not be very many Serbs living in the Krajina

17 region.

18 Q. Thank you, Ambassador.

19 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I have no further questions.

20 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Milovancevic?

21 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Cross-examination by Mr. Milovancevic:

23 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Galbraith, I am defence counsel for

24 Mr. Martic. My name is Predrag Milovancevic. We will start now with

25 what we call here cross-examination and we will touch upon some topics

1 that might be important to the defence of the accused. I will kindly ask

2 you to make a pause before you answer my questions to make the work of the

3 interpreters easier.

4 In the information you provided as your personal background,

5 Mr. Ambassador, and in your response to the Prosecutor's questions, you

6 said that you are -- have a degree in law. Have I understood that

7 correctly?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You've also explained that between 1993 and early 1998 you were

10 the ambassador of the United States of America to Croatia with the seat in

11 Zagreb. Is that correct, Mr. Ambassador?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. In view of the fact that before you assumed the post of ambassador

14 you were a person who dealt with diplomatic matters, were you familiar

15 with the situation in the former Yugoslavia before your arrival there that

16 includes of course the territory of Croatia and that of the Republic of

17 Serbian Krajina?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. At the time of your appointment as the U.S. Ambassador to the

20 Republic of Croatia, was it the case that in a section of the Croatian

21 territories there were United Nations troops deployed and were these areas

22 called the United Nations protected areas?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Am I mistaken in saying that the Republic of Serbian Krajina, or

25 perhaps I should say the so-called or the then Republic of Serbian

1 Krajina, I'm referring to the political and geographical area there, am I

2 mistaken therefore in saying that the Republic of Serbian Krajina

3 practically embraced those areas that were under the then Serb plan and

4 the resolution of the Security Council included in the United Nations

5 peace plan for Yugoslavia and where the United Nations troops were

6 deployed?

7 A. Yes, with the exception that in sector west UNPA, UN-protected

8 area, also included territory that was under the control of the Republic

9 of Croatia.

10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. You stated that as soon as you assumed

11 the post of ambassador you had frequent contacts with the president of the

12 republic and the representatives of the state authorities there; is that

13 correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You've also explained that in a period of time when a peace

16 solution was being sought that was in 1993, and particularly in 1994 and

17 1995, you had weekly and even daily contacts with the Croatian president,

18 Mr. Tudjman and, where necessary, even more frequently; is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you believe that to have been a normal practice for an

21 ambassador of a country, to visit the president of the republic that often

22 in view of the customary diplomatic practice worldwide?

23 A. I think it depends on what country you are the ambassador from and

24 the circumstances in the place where you are serving.

25 Q. You have explained that practically from September, October 1994

1 onwards a negotiation process or a peace-making initiative was launched in

2 order to find a peaceful solution to the crisis existing at the time in

3 Croatia and in the former Yugoslavia; is that correct?

4 A. I testified that there was a peace process that began on the 19th

5 of March, 1993, and continued through -- sorry. That began on the 19th of

6 March, 1994, and that continued through to the 3rd of August, 1995, to try

7 to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Croatia, between the

8 Krajina region and Zagreb. The political component of that, the process

9 that led to the so-called Z-4 plan, began in September, with meetings by

10 the diplomats who were its sponsors, namely myself, the Russian

11 ambassador, the EU representative Gert Arends [phoen] and Kai Eide, the

12 United Nations representative and that continued until the presentation of

13 the plan in January, and then of course there was the effort I described

14 to try to revive it just before the war.

15 There were, of course, separate diplomatic tracks that -- in which

16 the United States was involved that were -- preceded this, that related to

17 the conflict in Bosnia, both a diplomatic tract in which I was involved in

18 the war between the Bosniaks and the Croats and a larger effort to try to

19 find a peaceful settlement to the war in Bosnia.

20 Q. When you talked of the peace initiative which had to do with the

21 Republic of Croatia where you were the U.S. Ambassador at the time, you

22 mentioned three phases and for the first phase you said that it had to do

23 with the cease-fire agreement which was the well-known Zagreb agreement,

24 you said that it was dated 30th March of 1994, and I suppose we are

25 referring to one and the same, the Zagreb cease-fire agreement that was

1 reached in 1994?

2 A. That is -- that is correct. The agreement is actually dated the

3 29th of March, 1994, but it was, in fact, concluded at about 3.00 in the

4 morning on the 30th of March.

5 Q. Thank you for the clarification, Mr. Ambassador. This agreement

6 that was reached in Zagreb between the 29th and the 30th of March, 1994, a

7 cease-fire agreement, could it be said that this was an international

8 agreement in view of the parties that had contributed to the reaching of

9 the agreement, that had brokered the agreement, could it be put in those

10 terms?

11 A. I would describe it as an agreement between two parties within

12 Croatia that was brokered by international mediators. But the mediators

13 were not parties to the agreement.

14 Q. Am I right, Mr. Ambassador, in saying that there were indeed two

15 parties, one was that of the representatives of the Croatian authorities

16 and the other of the representatives of the then Republic of Serbian

17 Krajina, which two parties reached an agreement regulating the cease-fire

18 with certain provisions as to how to separate the warring parties.

19 Therefore, these were -- this was an agreement reached by the two sides

20 that I've just mentioned, with the mediation of the international

21 community?

22 A. Yes, I think that is a correct characterisation.

23 Q. This agreement was reached quite a long time ago. I am interested

24 in hearing whether you recalled details of the agreement that the

25 agreement provided for the following in view of the existing lines of

1 separation, the warring parties had to be separated so that the pieces of

2 weaponry had to be distant about one kilometre, one from each other,

3 mortars at a -- had to be pushed back at a distance of 10 kilometres,

4 whereas tanks and artillery had to be placed at a distance of 20

5 kilometres. Was this indeed the subject of the agreement?

6 A. It's been a long time since I've looked at this agreement, so I

7 couldn't say specifically a lot about the details. But I think what you

8 have described sounds correct. Certainly I recall there was a

9 one-kilometre zone in which all military forces were prohibited. I think

10 one kilometre on each side of the line, actually, so it was a

11 two-kilometre zone. And then there were other zones of categories of

12 weapons, but the details I don't remember at this point in time.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Basically you have answered my

14 question. You do recall that the agreement dealt with the separation of

15 the warring parties.

16 My next question is the following: Do you know that for instance

17 the Republic of Serbian Krajina had established commissions which had to

18 deal with the separation lines, thee were commissions charged with

19 discussing the -- these matters as to how to separate the warring parties

20 with the other side that was signatory of the agreement. Are you aware of

21 this?

22 A. Frankly, I don't recall the details, but I believe there were

23 joint commissions that were meant to work out some of these modalities.

24 Q. Another brief question before we break. Mr. Ambassador, can it be

25 said that this cease-fire agreement, complete with the modalities we've

1 referred to, was in force from the period when it was signed, that's to

2 say late March, 1994, up until May 1995, or the 1st of May, when Operation

3 Flash was launched, that in this period there were no activities that

4 constituted significant violations of the agreement? And I'm referring to

5 both the Croatian and the Serb side.

6 A. I do not recall there being significant violations of the

7 agreement in the period that you describe. I do recall many complaints

8 from both sides that the agreements were being violated, which -- part of

9 which had to do with an ambiguity in the agreement about police in Western

10 Slavonia.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe this

13 could be an appropriate moment for a break.

14 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: We will take the break now and come back at

15 12.30 p.m.

16 --- Recess taken at 12.01 p.m.

17 --- On resuming at 12.32 p.m.

18 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, Mr. Milovancevic.

19 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

20 Q. Mr. Galbraith, before the break we talked of the Zagreb agreement

21 on the cease-fire from late March 1994. The next topic we will discuss

22 now has to do with the agreement on the economic cooperation between the

23 Republic Serbian Krajina, the then Republic Serbian Krajina and Croatia.

24 You mentioned it as the second phase of the negotiations with a view to

25 finding a peaceful settlement of the crisis. Do you recall what time of

1 year it was -- rather it was in the second half of 1994, but do you recall

2 which month it was when this agreement on the economic cooperation and

3 trust-building between the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Croatia was

4 reached?

5 A. It was signed, as I recall, on the 2nd of December, 1994.

6 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Milovancevic, please take it just a little

7 bit slower, having regard to the interpreter. Thank you.

8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I will

9 pay attention to that.

10 Q. The economic agreement was reached after the cease-fire agreement,

11 therefore, and it envisaged measures for the establishment of economic

12 ties which had to do with the oil pipeline and some other areas; is that

13 correct?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. Are you aware of the fact that the government of the Republic of

16 Serbian Krajina held its meeting on the 30th of November 1994 adopted a

17 package of -- of provisions, measures, concerning economic ties with

18 Croatia, it was proposed by Mr. Mikulic, and do you recall the government

19 of the RSK taking such a decision?

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. I will put a further question to you in order to avoid

22 misunderstandings in the transcript. In your response to the Prosecutor's

23 question you mentioned in addition to Mr. Martic and Mr. Babic also Mr.

24 Nikolic, but that should have been Mikulic, am I right, the then Prime

25 Minister Mikulic?

1 A. I'm sure that I said Mikulic and not Nikolic.

2 Q. Thank you. In addition to the decision taken by the government,

3 are you aware of the fact that the RSK assembly also adopted a text of the

4 agreement on mutual economic cooperation and relations between the RSK and

5 Croatia, this was in late 1994?

6 A. I -- I think that is correct, yes.

7 Q. Thank you. In your testimony so far you explained that in January

8 1995 the so-called Z-4 plan was finalised. You explained that it stood

9 for Zagreb 4 and you explained who the four parties were. This was a

10 proposal for the peaceful solution of the crisis between the RSK and

11 Croatia; is that correct?

12 A. Yes, that is correct.

13 Q. You have also explained that you first offered the agreement to

14 the RSK leadership in Knin, and that you turned to the president of the

15 Republic of Croatia, Tudjman, later; is that correct?

16 A. No, that is not correct. It was offered to -- it was proposed to

17 the president -- to President Tudjman on the morning of the 30th of

18 January, 1995, and then to the leadership of the so-called RSK on the

19 evening of that same day.

20 Q. I apologise, I must have misunderstood you. You offered the text

21 of the agreement to both sides and you explained to us, is that correct,

22 that this was not a take it or leave it offer, but an offer for political

23 negotiations; is that correct?

24 A. That is correct. The -- the proposal was meant to be the basis

25 for negotiation. The idea was that the parties would look at the text,

1 they would say the following points we can accept, we want changes in the

2 following places. We would hear that from the Croatian side. We would

3 then get the same reaction from the Serbian side. We would try to fashion

4 a new text that accommodated as much of what each side wanted and continue

5 that process until there was an agreement.

6 Q. You have explained that the RSK leadership did not want to receive

7 the plan at all in January, 1995, that they had refused to physically

8 accept it. Is that correct?

9 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, if I may. I have an objection, and

10 it's -- I would draw the Chamber's attention back to its order of the 13th

11 of April. It says 2004, but I think it's supposed to say 2006. It's the

12 Chamber's order that just came out with respect to conduct of the trial

13 and specifically Annex A, point 3. The -- the order states that the

14 parties are requested to avoid interpreting or paraphrasing what a witness

15 has previously either testified or stated, and it goes on to give the

16 reasons for that. I understand that sometimes it's necessary to quote

17 back to -- in cross-examination to ask further questions; however, I would

18 submit that every single question so far has been paraphrasing what the

19 witness has said. And this last paraphrase -- sometimes accurately,

20 sometimes inaccurately. The last paraphrase, I would submit, is

21 inaccurate because the testimony is not that the RSK leadership did not

22 want to receive the plan. As I recall the testimony it's that Milan

23 Martic refused. So I would object on the grounds that the -- that Defence

24 counsel is not adhering to what the Court ordered in its most recent

25 order, and that this particular paraphrasing mischaracterises the

1 evidence.

2 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Milovancevic, do you have anything to say

3 that the objection that is raised by Mr. Whiting of the OTP?

4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I am aware of the

5 order of the Honourable Chamber, and I've been trying, in dealing with a

6 political topic about which the Ambassador is testifying, to get to the

7 substance of the discussions that were held at the time, and I'm trying to

8 put specific questions to the witness. Of course, if the Prosecutor

9 objects to my questions, I can paraphrase them, I can -- rather, I can

10 rephrase them, but it wasn't my intention to have the witness repeat what

11 he already said.

12 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: It seems that there was a bona fide error in

13 your referring to the RSK leadership instead of Mr. Milan Babic, which is

14 accepted, but in future, please try not to paraphrase, to observe the

15 terms of the order that was given. We realise that it's sometimes

16 difficult, but try to contain yourself within the confines of the

17 guidelines, if you will. Thank you. Mr. Milovancevic.

18 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, if I may, I hate to be picky, but I

19 think Your Honour may have misspoke when --

20 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Sorry, Martic and not Babic. I stand

21 corrected. You are perfectly right, Mr. Whiting. Thank you.

22 You've heard that, Mr. Milovancevic. It is, in fact, Mr. Martic.

23 Please do continue. Thank you.

24 Thank you, Mr. Whiting.

25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. Mr. Galbraith, can you tell us whether the president of the

2 Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, or the Croatian government, whether they ever

3 accepted the plan, Z-4, that is?

4 A. President Tudjman agreed to negotiate on the basis of the plan.

5 He was not asked to accept the plan, and he would not have accepted the

6 plan in the form that it was in. We knew that.

7 Q. When you explained the reasons for which Mr. Milan Martic, as the

8 president of the RSK, turned the plan down, you said more or less that he

9 had pointed out to the problem of the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate in

10 Croatia, and that issue was resolved only in March 1995; is that correct,

11 Mr. Galbraith?

12 A. He -- he explained that the RSK leadership would not receive the

13 Z-4 plan, would not physically receive the Z-4 plan or negotiate on it

14 until Croatia agreed to extend the UNPROFOR mandate.

15 Q. After the UNPROFOR mandate was extended did you put forward the

16 proposal to the leadership of RSK again?

17 A. I saw Mr. Babic, and I gave him a copy of the plan in March.

18 Q. Can you tell us where you saw him and whether you gave him the

19 complete plan or just a summarised version or a draft of it? Earlier on

20 you've told us that only a draft proposal was presented to him.

21 A. In March I gave him the complete plan. In -- when I saw him on

22 January 23rd, 1995, I -- I -- I summarised the plan for him because the

23 plan had not yet been formally presented, so we needed to follow certain

24 procedures. And we were not going to give the plan officially to either

25 party until we made the formal presentation first to the president of

1 Croatia, since it was a plan that related to Croatia, and second to the

2 leadership of the Krajina Serbs.

3 Q. In March 1995 when you gave the plan to Mr. Babic, did you, either

4 before that or immediately after that, present the same plan to

5 Mr. Tudjman and what was his reaction, was it the same as it was in

6 January?

7 A. We had already presented the plan to President Tudjman on the 30th

8 of January, so there was no need to present it to him again in March.

9 Q. As regards Mr. Babic's reaction when you met him in Knin in

10 January 1995, you also provided us with a detail he when Mr. Babic said

11 that he was sorry as you were leaving, he said, "I'm sorry," that's

12 quoting you quoting him. And in your testimony in the Milosevic case

13 Mr. Tapuskovic as the amicus curiae confronted you with the European

14 Community document dated January 31, 1995 in which it reads as

15 follows: "Mr. Babic -- Babic's position was that the placing of Krajina

16 under the sovereignty of Croatia would be something that would be decided

17 by the population of Krajina." Are you ware of that fact?

18 A. It is possible that -- that Babic, in his public statements said

19 something along those lines, but what I was testifying to was his reaction

20 in a private meeting to a proposal that would have given the Krajina

21 region of Croatia almost complete self-government, and he found that

22 proposal to be a very interesting proposal, his attitude toward it was

23 positive, because he believed it accomplished most of what the Krajina

24 Serbs wanted -- what the Krajina Serbs needed, and at the same time

25 avoided a war.

1 Q. In response to my learned friend's questions about the contents of

2 the Z-4 plan and the autonomy that was offered to the Serbs in Croatia,

3 you explained that the area of the Eastern Slavonia and the Western

4 Slavonia were not the areas that according to the Z-4 were areas that

5 could have autonomy as a result of the 1991 census and the number of Serbs

6 that lived in those two areas; is that correct, Mr. Galbraith?

7 A. Actually, there were different levels of autonomy. The

8 Serb-majority areas in the Krajina, by which I am referring here to

9 sectors north and south, they would have had a very, very high level of

10 self-government. They also would have been areas, and this is very

11 important, that would have been demilitarised; that is, the Croatian army

12 would not have gone into those areas. It wouldn't have been the entire

13 sectors north and south, because there were towns in there, like Slunj,

14 which had a Croat majority and that -- at least the entire town of Slunj

15 would not have been included.

16 In regard to sector east, Eastern Slavonia, it would not have

17 enjoyed that level of autonomy that the Krajina region would have had, but

18 there were provisions for cultural autonomy and other rights for the

19 Serbian community in that area. There was also a five-year transitional

20 period to the restoration of a full Croatian sovereignty.

21 Q. When you are talking about a significant autonomy that the Serbs

22 would have been given, according to the plan, you have also told us that

23 the -- that this did not apply to the entire area of the RSK but just some

24 of the areas of sectors south and north. Can you be more specific and

25 tell us what municipalities that referred to? What municipalities were to

1 be given that kind of autonomy in the sectors south and north?

2 A. Most of the municipalities in sectors north and south would have

3 had that autonomy. It would have been all the municipalities that had a

4 Serb majority in the 1991 census. There was, in fact, a map that went

5 along with the Z-4 plan, which we worked -- which we spent a lot of time

6 working on. But we never presented that map, because we recognised it

7 would cause a huge amount of controversy and we preferred the parties to

8 think first about the levels of autonomy before we got to the specific

9 areas that might be included. But the basic idea was the municipalities

10 that had a Serb majority in 1991, according to the census, would be those

11 that would be -- that would have the highest level of autonomy under the

12 Z-4 plan, and if you provided me with a map that showed ethnicity in the

13 1991 census, I could list those municipalities for you.

14 Q. We shall come back to the autonomy somewhat later, but now I would

15 be interested in the following: You've told us what Martic's position was

16 to the Z-4 plan, you've also told us how Babic behaved in January and how

17 he behaved in March, 1995. And finally, you've also explained to the

18 Chamber that on the 21st of July, 1995, or around that date, you arrived

19 at a conclusion that Croatia was preparing a large-scale military

20 operation. Is all this correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Milovancevic, you are entering into the area

23 of paraphrasing again and repeating what has been said by the witness

24 previously without going on to another question. In essence, please try

25 and serve the rules that have been laid down, will you?

1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Once all this happened, when it comes to the attempt to present a

3 plan, we arrive at the 1st of May, 1995. The Operation Flash and the 1st

4 of May, 1995, do the two have anything to do with the Z-4 plan?

5 A. Not -- not directly.

6 Q. Can you explain your words, "Not directly," to avoid me drawing a

7 conclusion from your answer, Mr. Galbraith. So can you explain your

8 answer, "Not directly"?

9 A. What happened was that the part of the economic and

10 confidence-building measures agreement, that is the agreement of 2

11 December, 1994, opened the highway that went through sector west. There

12 was a shooting incident at one of the rest areas, I think outside, just

13 outside the sector west, and then in re -- I think a Serb was killed

14 there. In retaliation Serbs, perhaps the local authorities, fired on

15 motorists inside sector west. The Serbian authorities - Mr. Martic,

16 actually - closed down the highway and the Croatians took advantage of his

17 decision to close down the highway to launch a military action ostensibly

18 aimed at opening the highway, but which was, in fact, intended to

19 recapture all of sector west. Perhaps I need to continue to answer your

20 question. None of that was directly related to the Z-4 political plan,

21 but it represented a significant further escalation of -- of tensions that

22 made it very difficult to resume a -- a political process. And

23 furthermore, as you heard Mr. Martic explain in -- in one of the -- the

24 television or radio address, no, sorry, in the interview he gave John

25 Pomfritt of the Washington Post on the 16th of May, 1995, he considered

1 Operation Flash to prove his point that there was no -- that it was futile

2 to negotiate with the Croatians, that that was not something that should

3 be done.

4 Q. With regard to the situation that you have just mentioned, and the

5 events that happened on the highway, first the killing of the man, the

6 retaliation, and then the highway being closed down, when did this happen,

7 in what part of April, 1995? Do you remember that, Mr. Galbraith?

8 A. It was at the very end of April, as I recall.

9 Q. Are you aware of the fact what explanation was given by the

10 Serbian authorities or Mr. Martic as to why the highway had to be closed

11 down on that occasion?

12 A. I'm sure I was aware of it at the time, but I do not now recall.

13 Q. Am I right in saying that the highway being open from Okucani

14 through to Slavonia was the result of the economic agreement that --

15 dating 2nd December, 1994?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Can then one say that the Serbian side, the authorities of the

18 RSK, honoured the agreement that the highway was indeed opened and that as

19 a result of the incident that took place towards the end of April 1995,

20 the highway had to be closed down as a result of that incident?

21 MR. WHITING: I think I'm going to object to this question,

22 Your Honour. I think the witness has answered that he -- I think he is

23 addressed this to the extent that he can. He answered that he cannot

24 recall at this time what Mr. Martic said as to why the highway had to be

25 closed down on that occasion, so I think he has addressed -- I think it's

1 been asked and answered, Your Honour. And also, while I'm on my feet, I

2 think we're beginning to get very close to questions that are beyond the

3 scope of the direct examination, which is a problem both in terms of the

4 order of the Court of 13 April, 2006, ordering that questions stay within

5 the scope of cross-examination, and also the specific order with respect

6 to this witness, where it's even particularly important, because of the

7 circumstances of this witness, that questions stay within the scope of

8 cross-examination. I think we're very close to reaching that point, Your

9 Honour.

10 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Milovancevic, do you have anything to say in

11 response to the objections taken by Mr. Whiting?

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, given the first

13 part of the objection, I will withdraw the question about the closing down

14 of the highway. And as for the second part of the objection, that we are

15 almost beyond the scope of the interrogation in chief,

16 examination-in-chief, I would like to say that this incident led to the

17 Operation Flash that was the subject of examination-in-chief. That's why

18 I am putting all these questions, to lead me to Operation Flash and not to

19 go beyond the scope of the examination-in-chief.

20 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, Mr. Whiting, the Chamber sees that you are

21 on your feet. You did say "almost going beyond the scope".

22 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour. Of course there was a

23 reference to Operation Flash because Operation Flash did immediately

24 predate the shelling of Zagreb and was referred to as one of the reasons

25 for the shelling of Zagreb. However, I don't think that that then opens

1 the door for a full inquiry into all of the circumstances of Operation

2 Flash, how it occurred, what occurred during Operation Flash, and so

3 forth. The focus here is on the shelling of Zagreb. That was the focus of

4 the testimony in direct. And while there is a reference to Operation

5 Flash, and I can understand some questions, and I have not objected to

6 some questions about Operation Flash, I will object quite strenuously to a

7 full cross-examination and inquiry into all of the details of Operation

8 Flash which I submit go well beyond the direct examination.

9 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I think that Mr. Milovancevic accepts that.

10 But, Mr. Milovancevic, what would be the purpose of your questions

11 in relation to Operation Flash? Having regard to what Mr. Whiting has

12 said concerning his manner of leading the evidence before the Court and

13 its purpose.

14 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. Whiting put

15 questions to Mr. Galbraith as to what he personally experienced during the

16 shelling of Zagreb and he asked him whether the shelling was militarily

17 justified and whether it represented an illegal act, an act that was

18 permissible under the law. And by doing that, Mr. Whiting compels us to

19 clarify the circumstances that led to that operation and why it was

20 conducted in the way it was conducted. In other words, the Defence is

21 adhering strictly to the subjects mentioned by Mr. Whiting. Mr. Whiting

22 asked the witness to provide his opinion as to why the shelling was

23 militarily justified and we have to clarify that. This is an -- a matter

24 of essence for the Defence case.

25 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, Mr. Whiting.

1 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, first of all, I -- I did not ask

2 whether it represented an illegal act. I asked whether it was militarily

3 justified. That's the first point. The second point is, I don't -- I

4 don't understand how the questions into Operation Flash would address the

5 issue of whether it was militarily justified because I can't imagine that

6 Defence counsel would be taking the position that Operation Flash somehow

7 provided a military justification for the shelling of Zagreb. So I

8 don't -- so I don't see -- I don't see any connection at all between my

9 questions and -- and substantial inquiry into what happened with Operation

10 Flash.

11 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Honourable Judge, please.

13 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, thank you. I crave the indulgence of both

14 yourself and Mr. Whiting for the Chamber to consult.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, Mr. Milovancevic. If the purpose of your

17 questions is to respond to the issue of whether or not the attack on

18 Zagreb was justified, then you may put the questions in relation to

19 Operation Storm [sic] on the understanding that it's strictly limited to

20 establishing that fact and that fact alone. So do not go beyond that and

21 confine yourself and do not stray. That is the ruling of the Chamber.

22 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Sorry, Operation Flash, not Operation Storm, I

24 stand corrected. But you are to be confined in that fashion.

25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. Mr. Galbraith, are you familiar with what happened at the meeting

2 between the president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, with

3 the military leadership of Croatia on the 30th of April, 1995? At that

4 meeting the decision was reached to conduct the Operation Flash on the 1st

5 of May, and also upon the proposal of Mr. Tudjman a decision was taken to

6 stage the highway incident in order to use that incident as a

7 justification for the Operation Flash. Are you aware of that meeting and

8 are you aware of the fact that those things were indeed what happened at

9 that meeting?

10 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I object. It doesn't seem to me that

11 this -- this is -- follows what the Court has ordered with respect to the

12 scope. I don't see the -- I don't see it being with respect to the

13 military justification.

14 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Milovancevic, what is the connection?

15 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe that the

16 problem lies in the fact that Mr. Whiting claims that the Defence is

17 trying to justify the shelling of Zagreb, which is absolutely incorrect,

18 and it would make no legal sense, and in factual terms it would not be

19 serious. We're talking about the reasons for the existence of a military

20 act which can be either justified or not justified. I'm trying to

21 establish whether Mr. Ambassador who was in Zagreb at the time when the

22 Operation Flash started, whether he knows how this operation was planned

23 and how it came about. In order for us to be able to understand

24 Mr. Galbraith's answers we have to understand the behaviour of the side

25 that conducted this operation, and I don't see it -- how it could be

1 possible for the Defence to talk about the shelling of Zagreb if it

2 didn't -- if it didn't point to the behaviour of the Croatian authorities

3 at the time.

4 We are only trying to reach an answer to the question whether

5 there is a causal link between the two. We received an answer before from

6 the witness that there is no military justification, and this is the part

7 of the witness's testimony that we are compelled to clarify, to check.

8 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: You seem to be adopting a rather circuitous

9 route that might not, frankly, be the right route. If you have a cause,

10 you may put it to the witness, but you can't put it in a manner which

11 offends the rules which have been laid down. So, at this stage, the

12 Chamber's view would be that you should go no further here, unless you're

13 going to be direct and put what you have as a cause to the witness.

14 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I will proceed with my

15 cross-examination, respecting your instruction.

16 Q. Mr. Galbraith, you've told us that on the 2nd of May you were in

17 Zagreb in your office in the embassy, and that you heard an explosion.

18 You've also told us that this repeated on the 3rd of May, 2005 [as

19 interpreted]. Can you tell us at the time on the 1st, the 2nd, the 3rd,

20 the 4th of May, you had information as to what was going on in Western

21 Slavonia which was, at the time, a UN protected area.

22 A. Yes, we had -- I had some information about what was going on in

23 Western Slavonia.

24 Q. Can you tell us briefly what sort of information this was?

25 MR. WHITING: This is just another way around the Court's order,

1 Your Honour. And I would object. The issue is, what was the cause of the

2 shelling of Zagreb, as the Defence counsel has put it, though the Defence

3 counsel has also said that it's not -- he is not trying to justify the

4 shelling of Zagreb, in which case I'm not sure what the relevance is --

5 becomes of the cause of the shelling. But the witness has already

6 testified about this, has already said what -- and there is plenty of

7 evidence what the cause was and that it was in reaction to Flash, so this

8 is just further efforts to get into the subject of Flash and what happened

9 in Operation Flash and so forth, which is beyond the scope of direct

10 examination, it is also not relevant. It is not relevant to the issues of

11 this trial, what happened in Operation Flash.

12 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Milovancevic.

13 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as a Defence

14 counsel I find it difficult to put nonsensical questions. If that suited

15 the Prosecutor, I would be able to do that. However, the witness stated

16 that he was the American ambassador to Croatia on the 2nd and 3rd of May,

17 and that the attack that took place on that date was not militarily

18 justified. And every question I put to him, aimed at getting an answer to

19 him as to what the basis was for his conclusion that the attack was not

20 militarily justified. And if I'm not allowed to put such questions to the

21 witness, then I'll simply have to desist.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Are you saying that --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the --

24 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes.

25 Are you saying that the attack was militarily justified? Is that

1 the Defence position? And are you further giving a reason for a military

2 justification? Please answer me, Mr. Milovancevic.

3 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence is not

4 yet at the stage when it can conduct examination-in-chief. It is merely

5 cross-examining with a view to exploring a part of the testimony given by

6 the witness to the Prosecution. The witness is not a military expert, but

7 he was a very important person at that period in time in Croatia, and I

8 believe that this sort of information that we can hear from the witness,

9 whether there was military justification or not, could be of interest to

10 both the Defence and Prosecution. We have already heard some Prosecution

11 witnesses who had -- who talked about May 1995, there was Mr. Dzakula,

12 there were others. I'm merely putting those questions that we deem

13 relevant. We are trying to explore certain views expressed by the

14 witness. There is nothing in what we are trying to do to point to what

15 our submissions are, if any, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: It has not to do with submissions, it has to do

17 with your right to cross-examine in a particular way and on a particular

18 area, an area that arose in the course of examination-in-chief, but in

19 respect of which there are rules that say you have to be confined in a

20 particular manner. If you are not going to be questioning to challenge

21 the witness on the issue of whether or not there was military

22 justification, and what that military justification was, then I do not

23 think you can take it any further. You are entitled to put those

24 questions to the witness.

25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. Mr. Galbraith, you were on the premises of the U.S. Embassy in

2 Zagreb, it was in the course of the morning, on both the 2nd and the 3rd

3 of May when the same situation occurred where you heard explosions. Can

4 you tell us, what did you base your position on that the events involving

5 explosions in Zagreb were not militarily justified? What was the basis

6 for such a conclusion on your part?

7 A. They were attacks on a -- a city, on civilian targets. There were

8 no military targets in the vicinity, they were aimed or struck the

9 national theatre, the children's hospital, a school, a main square, a

10 street near the main square. I -- I thought -- I did not -- there was no

11 military justification for striking civilian targets, even though there

12 was armed conflict between the Croatian forces and the forces of the

13 so-called RSK. And since, in my view, it was -- these attacks were not --

14 these attacks were intended to terrorise, and they did terrorise.

15 Further, the accused had previously indicated to me that he would

16 be launching attacks for the purpose of striking Zagreb, damaging Zagreb,

17 destroying Zagreb, attacks that I understood, I believe he intended, were

18 for purposes of terrorism rather than for any military reason.

19 Q. When you talked about the meeting with Mr. Martic at which he

20 warned you that if the Croatian authorities led by Franjo Tudjman were to

21 attack the RSK, actions were to follow against Croatian cities, did he

22 tell you why he would fire upon the Croatian towns in that case, what

23 would have been the purpose of such activities?

24 A. The context of the discussion was that I had warned that the

25 actions undertaken by the RSK, particularly with regard to Bihac, and the

1 failure to negotiate were increasing greatly the likelihood of Croatian

2 military action. I further warned that in my judgement the RSK cannot

3 survive military action, a judgement that was completely vindicated by the

4 events that took place in 1995. He was -- he responded to my assertions

5 by saying that I was wrong, that the RSK did have the ability to defend

6 itself, that it had an ability to attack Zagreb. So that really was the

7 context of -- of his warning, and in essence he was saying we can deter a

8 Croatian attack, or we can make it so painful that they -- because we can

9 hit their cities and we can hit their capital, that they won't attack us.

10 Q. Mr. Galbraith, since you are a fellow lawyer, have you heard of

11 the term, "retaliation" --

12 THE INTERPRETER: Reprisals, interpreter's correction.

13 A. First, to be clear, while I have a law degree, I have never been a

14 practicing lawyer. Second, I have heard the term "reprisals", but I do

15 not believe it is legal or moral to have reprisals against civilian

16 targets.

17 Q. So far we talked about the Zagreb cease-fire agreement dating from

18 late March, 1994, we talked of the economic agreement, and you said that

19 the territory of the RSK was, in fact, part of the UNPA zones. Was this

20 particular agreement, the Zagreb agreement dating from late March, 1994,

21 providing for a cease-fire, was it, in fact, in force in May, 1995?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. In the area of Western Slavonia, which was the subject of

24 Operation Storm, were there UN troops, UNPROFOR troops deployed there in

25 late April and May, 1995?

1 MR. WHITING: I'm sorry --

2 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, Mr. Whiting.

3 MR. WHITING: I think it's either a misinterpretation or counsel

4 misspoke in the last question. There is a reference to Operation Storm.

5 I think it's intended to be a reference to Operation Flash.

6 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you, Mr. Whiting.

7 Mr. Milovancevic, was it, in fact, a reference to Operation Flash?

8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I

9 misspoke. I meant Operation Flash on the 1st of May, 1995.

10 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Very well.

11 THE WITNESS: The answer is yes.

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Do you know how many days Operation Flash lasted, and what

14 happened to the Serb population in the area in that period of time?

15 MR. WHITING: Objection, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, Mr. Whiting.

17 MR. WHITING: This is -- this is beyond the scope of direct

18 examination, and it's also not relevant. And for all the reasons that

19 have been put forth before, and this goes beyond what the Court ordered,

20 as I understood it, in terms of limiting the cross-examination to military

21 justification. And here I don't see that in the -- in the question.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, Mr. Milovancevic.

23 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] My intention was to verify

24 whether the witness, who was the U.S. Ambassador at the time, who was

25 staying on the 2nd and 3rd of May on the premises of the embassy, which is

1 outside of the area where the operation took place, whether he was able to

2 assess the military justification of the event. My learned friend asked

3 of the witness who held the position he held at the time, and was in the

4 position that he was, to answer the question whether it was justified or

5 not. My question was simply a follow-up on that.

6 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Are you saying that Operation Flash constituted

7 the substance for military justification? Is that your position?

8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour --

9 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Please answer directly.

10 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I am trying to establish the

11 causal link between the shelling of Zagreb and Operation Flash. I want to

12 establish a direct causal link, and that's the basis of my question.

13 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: What is that --

14 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] For my question.

15 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: -- causal link, please tell the Chamber. I will

16 see if I can help you. What is the direct causal link, Mr. Milovancevic?

17 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] The direct causal link lies,

18 Your Honour, in the fact that the first Prosecution witness examined in

19 this case stated that the operation lasted on the 2nd and 3rd of May and

20 beyond. And the second witness, who testified there, said that in the

21 month of May, according to the official information, there were 180

22 victims in the area where the operation took place, and there were eight

23 of them in Zagreb. And I was simply trying to establish whether the

24 witness was able to conclude whether something was militarily justified or

25 not.

1 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Have any of those witnesses said that that fact

2 therefore justified the military intervention, in the bombing of Zagreb,

3 rather, and that it constituted justification for so doing?

4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I did not state

5 that at any point of in time. It will be up to the Honourable Trial

6 Chamber to decide that. The only matter I'm trying to assist the Trial

7 Chamber in is to establish facts, those facts that this witness is able to

8 testify about. This witness, in answering a question thus phrased by the

9 Prosecutor, was not able to answer the question, because it went beyond

10 the scope of his expertise, because he was unable to be that familiar with

11 the situation on the ground, and I was merely trying to arrive at the

12 basis upon which he deemed himself able to answer the question.

13 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Well, Mr. Milovancevic, if, in fact, those

14 witnesses did not draw the conclusion, I don't see how you can put it to

15 the witness in that form. I repeat, and I think I have been very patient

16 in the circumstances, the Chamber has been, if you have a cause, it can be

17 put to the witness. You can confront the witness in this matter, in this

18 manner. But I really do believe that it's time to move on, if you're not

19 going to do it in the way that it has to be done. And I think the Chamber

20 has to be firm now.

21 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. Mr. Galbraith, in answering my questions you stated that the

23 Croatian authorities seized the opportunity they saw in the highway

24 incident to capture Western Slavonia. Did they, in fact, succeed in

25 capturing Western Slavonia through Operation Flash?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you know whether this capture of an UNPA zone was done in a

3 forcible, military way?

4 MR. WHITING: I'm going to object. This is -- the Defence counsel

5 keeps coming back to the same question in one form or another, again and

6 again. And I would submit at this point counsel is defying the order of

7 the Court on this issue.

8 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Milovancevic, please abide by the rules.

9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will do so.

10 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: [Previous translation continues] ... the rules.

11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Witness, you were shown film where Mr. Martic speaks of the action

13 when Zagreb was attacked on the 2nd and the 3rd of May. Do you recall

14 that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. In answering the Prosecutor's questions you explained that what

17 Mr. Martic said was something you had otherwise heard and recognised as

18 the reason, or rather as the way in which he is explaining the way things

19 happened. Is that correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Am I right in saying that you confirmed that Mr. Martic had

22 explained that the firing of the rockets upon Zagreb had prevented the

23 further military operations and further suffering of the population?

24 A. No. What I meant was that he -- he explained in the film clip

25 that the bombing, the rocket attack on Zagreb was retaliation for the

1 Croatian military action. That is what we understood from all of our

2 sources to be his reason for doing it, and frankly, what I understood from

3 my own conversation with him. That this was -- was an act of reprisal or

4 of retaliation aimed at the City of Zagreb in response to the Croatian

5 military action. And that is what he said in the film clip, and that is

6 what I was confirming as my understanding -- as my understanding of his

7 explanation.

8 As to the consequences, I do not believe for a minute that the

9 retaliation, that the retaliation, that the bombing of Zagreb, in any way

10 was the reason why the Croatians stopped the military action, they stopped

11 their military action because they had conquered all of Western Slavonia

12 and there was no reason for them to continue further military action.

13 Q. What you just stated is your understanding of what Martic had

14 explained; is that right?

15 A. I understood Martic to say that he -- in that film clip, that he

16 ordered rockets -- that he ordered rockets against Zagreb and that he did

17 so in retaliation for the Croatian attack -- for the Croatian military

18 action in Operation Flash.

19 Q. Just one more question in relation to this situation. You said

20 that Croatia stopped the operation because it had captured the entire

21 zone. Do you know when it was that it did so?

22 A. It did so very quickly. The -- there may have been mopping-up

23 actions that continued for some days after the initial military action,

24 but within three or four days or a week it had full control over the zone.

25 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: What do you mean by, "mopping-up actions"?

1 THE WITNESS: Well, they moved militarily down the highway, took

2 that, and then there were some Serbian forces that were north of the

3 position that the Croatians had, and they captured them, maybe there were

4 some additional skirmishes, but the operation was over very quickly.

5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you.

6 Yes, Mr. Milovancevic.

7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Your view that there was no military justification for this

9 operation, did you include in that position the report by the special UN

10 rapporteur, Mr. Akashi as to what happened in the area at the time of

11 Operation Flash?

12 MR. WHITING: I'm going to object again, Your Honour. On the same

13 grounds.

14 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, Mr. Whiting.

15 MR. WHITING: I think that -- I think the witness has answered the

16 question that -- with respect to Operation Flash, that it does not --

17 there is no military justification. And Defence counsel has refused

18 repeatedly to answer the Court's question about whether it is taking the

19 position that Operation Flash constituted a military justification for the

20 shelling of Zagreb. And without answering that question, I don't think

21 counsel should be permitted to continue asking these questions.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Milovancevic.

23 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as far as the

24 objection concerning the question involving Mr. Akashi is concerned, I

25 wanted to know weather the position put forth by the witness has his own

1 position, the position of his government, or that of the United Nations.

2 That was why I put the question to him.

3 As for the latter part of the objection which has to do with the

4 position of the Defence as to whether something is a justification or not,

5 I am not claiming that Operation Storm [as interpreted] is a justification

6 for Zagreb; rather, I am claiming that these are events which happened

7 simultaneously and which definitely have a causal link between them. And

8 now, as to which course the events, in fact, did take is something that we

9 will learn from, among others, this witness here.

10 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Well, put it to him directly and get on with it

11 and get over it, once and for all. What you have just told the Chamber,

12 put that to the witness now, let us finish, and you move on.

13 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Q. Mr. Galbraith, in responding to the Prosecutor's question that

15 there was no military justification, you put forth a position, a position

16 that came from a former U.S. Ambassador to Croatia. Was this your private

17 position, the position of your government, or the position you arrived at

18 in consultation with UN representatives and other representatives of the

19 international community?

20 A. It was the position of the United States, that is of my

21 government, that there was no military justification, no legal

22 justification, in fact no justification whatsoever, for the shelling of

23 Zagreb. That was also my personal position. I believe it is the position

24 of the United Nations. And to answer your broader point, which I think I

25 can do, it is my position and it was the position of my government that

1 whatever human rights violations that were committed by the government of

2 Croatia, and we were among the strongest critics of the government of

3 Croatia over its human rights actions, and particularly its human rights

4 policies with regard to the Krajina Serbs, that whatever their human

5 rights violations were, and there were violations, that they in no sense,

6 and in no way, provided a justification for the intentional killing of

7 innocent civilians in a major Croatian city.

8 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: And that would be directly related to Operation

9 Flash.

10 THE WITNESS: That -- related to operation --

11 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: What took place during the course of that

12 conflict.

13 THE WITNESS: Whatever took place during the course of Operation

14 Flash or in any other action, because this is also relevant to Operation

15 Storm and other circumstances. In fact, there was also, Your Honour, a --

16 there were significant human rights violations against the local Serb

17 population in Croatia, in the part of Croatia that was not included in the

18 so-called RSK. All those things happened, we objected to them, but

19 nonetheless, we did not in any way consider those to justify the ethnic

20 cleansing or the rocket attack on Zagreb or any other of these actions

21 that we considered to be crimes.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you.

23 I believe that would answer your question, Mr. Milovancevic.

24 And it is now time for us to take our adjournment, I believe. So

25 I would hope that when we resume tomorrow you would be going on to another

1 topic.

2 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence is

3 finished with the topic today. Thank you.

4 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: And I think we can safely now take our

5 adjournment and we will return tomorrow morning at 9.00.

6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

7 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 26th day of

8 April, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.

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