1 Wednesday, 26 September 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Just have the headphones put on, please,

6 Mr. Raider. Would you just have him put his headphones on, please.

7 Good morning, Mr. Andjelkovic.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to

10 speak the truth by reading aloud the document being shown to you.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

12 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.

14 You will now be examined by Mr. Visnjic on behalf of Mr. Ojdanic.

15 Mr. Visnjic.

16 WITNESS: LJUBOMIR ANDJELKOVIC

17 [Witness appeared via videolink]

18 [Witness answered through interpreter]

19 Examination by Mr. Visnjic:

20 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

21 A. Good morning to you.

22 Q. General, can you tell the Chamber briefly about your career, your

23 schooling, and your duties in the VJ.

24 A. I completed my secondary schooling, then I went on to the military

25 academy, and then I completed the higher military academy. I started as a

1 platoon commander. I moved through all the other duties, and eventually I

2 became head of communications and electronic operations of the Main Staff

3 for communications infomatics and electronic operations.

4 Q. Thank you very much, General. And what were your duties in 1998

5 and 1999?

6 A. Chief of sector for communications, infomatics and electronic

7 operations and I was also assistant Chief of Staff for that sector.

8 Q. General, very often in our documents we come across the word VIED,

9 I suppose that is the abbreviation for your sector, communication,

10 infomatics and electronic operations.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Can you tell us what that sector comprised?

13 A. Well, the name speaks for itself, three administrations:

14 Communications, informatics, and electronic actions.

15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Visnjic's

16 microphone please be switched off as the witness answers questions.

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. What were the tasks of the communications [Realtime transcript

19 read in error missing word "communications"] administration department?

20 A. In the system of command it was supposed to secure protected

21 telecommunication and communication with units with regard to their

22 levels. For each level there was a unit that made sure communications ran

23 smoothly and in a protected manner.

24 Q. The infomatics sector or department?

25 A. They were in charge of IT for the command, but up until 1998 and

1 1999, that went up to the corps level and that was as far as it went.

2 Q. And lastly electronic operations?

3 A. They were supposed to gather information through electronic

4 surveillance and radio surveillance and submit this information to the

5 relevant bodies for further processing and analysis.

6 Q. Electronic surveillance and radio surveillance, that is what you

7 said, isn't it? In intelligence documents particularly we often come

8 across the following explanation: Information was received by radio

9 surveillance or electronic surveillance or from VIED, that's your

10 department, and so on and so forth. Tell me, sir, your electronic

11 operations administration or any of the lower-level units in 1998 and 1999

12 were they monitoring and processing information in relation to the Kosovo

13 Liberation Army?

14 A. No, we weren't processing information. We received information

15 and submitted it to the relevant bodies for further processing.

16 Q. General, how exactly did communications work, I mean the system

17 used by the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1998 and 1999?

18 A. Throughout this period they used hand-held radio-sets. They would

19 talk openly, not in a code. They would have up to 20 participants in a

20 certain network. As soon as the number exceeded 20 they would switch to a

21 different network. For the most part they didn't use any codes. As soon

22 as they used up one location, they would switch to another. They had

23 light equipment that was easy to transport, that was until the arrival of

24 the verification mission. After that I assume - I cannot be certain - they

25 had better equipment and then in their communications encryption was often

1 used, it was scrambling for the most part, it wasn't state-to-the-art

2 protection, but at a lower command level it was very difficult to track

3 down. So much for their features, the features of their communication,

4 but if I may just add something --

5 Q. General, just a minute, please.

6 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, with with your leave, I think that we

7 have an error in transcript, page 2, line 18, the question which

8 Mr. Visnjic asked the witness was: What were the tasks of administration

9 department? I think that Mr. Visnjic said: [Interpretation] What was the

10 task of the communications department?

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, what was your question?

12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, communications department, as

13 Mr. Cepic said.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

15 Please move on. Thanks.

16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. General, you were about to add something about the communications

18 system, the characteristic features of the system used by the KLA.

19 A. I just wanted to say that they maintained communication with NATO

20 forces in Albania and Macedonia. We don't know what sort of equipment

21 they used or how they got it. They probably got it from somewhere by way

22 of a reinforcement, but that was more powerful equipment.

23 Q. At what time exactly were the KLA in communication with NATO?

24 A. I think it was in the second half of 1998.

25 Q. General, now that you mention NATO, what were the communications

1 systems used by NATO when they operated in the territory of the FRY?

2 A. For the most part they used radio communications. This is

3 state-of-the-art equipment. There is the option of encrypting all forms

4 of communication, usually by satellite at a tactical level they used

5 communication channels between the air-borne pilots, their bases on the

6 ground, fighter planes, and AWACS. We don't really know much about the

7 modulation that their equipment performed or its technical parameters, but

8 we monitored their communication for the most part, we knew what they were

9 doing.

10 Q. At one point in time during the war were you monitoring their

11 communications? Were you able to intercept communication between NATO

12 pilots?

13 A. Yes. You have meetings of the collegium and transcripts, you see

14 that we intercepted their conversations, especially when this was about

15 information concerning facilities to be targeted. So we were in a

16 position to inform our units in a timely manner. At one point we

17 disclosed our presence, they knew we were monitoring them, and then they

18 switched to encryption.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The interpreters could not

20 hear the last part of the witness's answer.

21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Could we please go to P933 now, General.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Interpreters can now hear

24 neither counsel nor witness because of the noise. Thank you.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: We seem to -- hold on. We seem to have a problem.

1 The interpreters say that they can't hear anybody because of noise. What

2 can we do that, if anything. You need your microphone on. No one else

3 has a microphone on.

4 I don't know, interpreters, what else we can do. Mr. Visnjic will

5 switch off when he's asked his question.

6 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General, your page is page 6, paragraph at the top of the page.

8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] For e-court this is page 9 -- page

9 7, rather. Paragraph 4 in English.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, take the witness to the right page so

11 he can stop turning over the pages and then go on with the question.

12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, have you got the right page, page 6?

14 A. Yes, page 6 and page 8 and page 9.

15 Q. No, just page 6, please. At the top we see your contribution at

16 the collegium meeting of the Chief of the General Staff on the 4th of

17 March. Can you please explain the gist of your contribution at that

18 meeting?

19 A. By that time they had used individual planes for reconnoitre and

20 this time for the first time there was a whole squad. These planes were

21 used to reconnoitre possible targets in Kosovo and were providing

22 coordinates for fighter planes.

23 Q. By the 4th of March [Realtime transcript read in error "April"], I

24 understand up until the 4th of March reconnoitre had been done on a

25 individual basis and this is the first time that a whole squad appeared

1 over Kosovo?

2 A. Yes, indeed.

3 Q. General, when we speak of the 4th of March, 4th of March, not the

4 4th of April, as the transcript says.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You told us that the KLA were in touch with NATO; did that apply

7 in 1999 well during the war.

8 A. Yes. They maintained communication with NATO commands in

9 Macedonia and Albania.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: I was going to ask you -- I was going to ask you,

12 Mr. Visnjic, where the witness said communication with NATO. Can you give

13 me a reference to that. I know he said communication with Albania and

14 Macedonia. I didn't assume NATO and I don't know if he said NATO so far.

15 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I wasn't following the

16 transcript. The witness said that he was in communication with NATO and

17 Albania and Macedonia previously. He mentioned 1998, that's several pages

18 earlier on, I think page 4 of the transcript --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: I thought we were talking about communication

20 between the KLA and Albania and Macedonia.

21 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, page 5, line 8 through 16 talks about

22 intercepting NATO communications and then when they found out that they

23 were monitoring them NATO switched to encryption.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, but that doesn't say that there's

25 communication between NATO and the KLA. It's that particular point that

1 we are concerned about.

2 MR. IVETIC: That was just before that. Hold on. Just one

3 moment. Page 4, line 22 is the question: "At what time were the KLA in

4 communication with the NATO."

5 Line 23: "I think it was the second half of 1998."

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. General, at the time you were listening to radio communication

9 between plans -- planes, radio traffic, did that in a way enable you to

10 keep track of their potential targets?

11 A. Yes, they were providing target coordinates for the locations that

12 would be targeted. We had sufficient time to inform our units, units

13 lower down the chain of command, and tell them which facilities and

14 locations would be targeted.

15 Q. And you told us that it lasted up until a certain point in time?

16 A. Until they realised that we were monitoring them.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: When was that?

19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. I think that the -- that His Honour asked you when was that point

21 in time.

22 A. Yes, I heard a question, but I didn't realise it was asked of me.

23 That was sometime in mid-April, I can't remember the exact date, but it

24 was sometime in mid-April.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could I please have Exhibit P929,

2 page 28 in the B/C/S, page 25 in English.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have a page 28. I have 454

4 and so on.

5 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Let me help you General, do you see the numbers up there, the --

7 the page that I'm interested in bears the number 744, that's the last

8 number.

9 A. It's fine. I found it now.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters kindly ask: Could the microphone

11 be moved away from the papers. We can hear just the papers shuffling, the

12 witness's microphone.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do you hear me?

14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm just waiting for the

15 shuffling of papers to subside.

16 Q. General, this was the collegium held on the 9th of April, 1999,

17 and we have in front of us your presentation. I'm interested in the last

18 passage in what you said which begins with the word "further."

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And my question in this regard is as follows: Did you have

21 information that there was some activity in the territory of the FRY with

22 various people spotting for NATO planes?

23 A. Well, at first we had suspicions that such activity was going on,

24 but at that point we were convinced that it was so, in particular once we

25 intercepted the communication between pilots in the air who blamed a spy

1 on the roof or something that had happened. This told us that there were

2 spotters for certain targets, but those were mostly targets in urban

3 areas. They would put spotters, or rather, they would put locators --

4 they would put locators on some targets and then it was easier for the

5 NATO planes to target those facilities.

6 Q. Now I'm interested in the situation in Kosovo. According to your

7 information, who conducted this activity, who spotted for the planes?

8 A. Well, it was the AWACS. I don't think that in Kosovo there were

9 any people putting the locators except if some Siptars did it.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, I'm afraid I don't understand what he

12 means by "AWACS."

13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. General, could you please explain to the Trial Chamber what AWACS

15 are.

16 A. It's a NATO aeroplane, it's a US plane, used for reconnaissance

17 and for guiding planes to their targets.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: So what is this about locators, Mr. Visnjic? Is

19 this something that happened in parts of Serbia other than Kosovo, since

20 the witness says he didn't think there were locators used in Kosovo?

21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that's the way I

22 understood the witness too.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps you could find out what part of Serbia this

24 was happening, since it seems slightly odd.

25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. General, first of all I want to ask you to explain what a locator

2 is. You used that term.

3 A. These are special devices that emit at a certain frequency, and

4 planes then receive this signal and they can then locate the target and

5 fire at it. That would be the simplest possible explanation.

6 Q. And the Judge asked you whether you can tell us where you

7 suspected that those locators were used or where you actually found those

8 locators.

9 A. I don't know if His Honour heard me. I said that this mostly

10 happened in urban areas. Belgrade is a case in point, so is Nis airports,

11 bridges, and later on power-plants, transformer stations, transmission

12 lines, and so on.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Andjelkovic, how are these located on their

15 targets?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in simplest terms, civilian

17 aviation uses radio beakons to guide the planes and pilots use those radio

18 beakons to guide their planes to fly along a certain path and this is a

19 kind of radio beakon that is used to guide planes to their targets.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, if this matters, Mr. Visnjic, you'll need to

21 have it explained more clearly to me; if it doesn't matter, then just move

22 on. I have no idea how these locators are either put on place or picked

23 up by the flights.

24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, I think that His Honour actually wanted to ask you -- or

1 let me ask you. Do you know how those locators were set on the targets or

2 where did those locators come from?

3 A. I don't know how they came to our territory, but people would set

4 them close to the target that was supposed to be targeted. These are

5 autonomous devices. They have certain amount of power supply, autonomous

6 power supply, and they emit at a certain frequency. I explained. I don't

7 know whether you understood me --

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand now -- I understand now. I just

9 wanted to be clear in my mind that it was infiltrators that were suspected

10 of putting them there.

11 Please continue.

12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, when you say that these were autonomous devices, could

14 you please tell us, how long were they able to function with the power

15 supply that they had? How long could they actually emit this signal?

16 A. Well, they were autonomous and they were able to operate for long

17 enough to enable the pilots to actually get their signal, a couple of

18 hours, maybe up to five hours. It depended on the amount of energy that

19 they actually used.

20 Q. Thank you, General. General, could you please explain to us what

21 kind of communications equipment were used by the VJ in 1998 and 1999,

22 what were the characteristics?

23 A. Well, there's no difference between 1998 and 1999. The Yugoslav

24 Army system was organized according to the levels of command in terms of

25 personnel, radio relay systems, and radio system. 90 per cent -- almost

1 90 per cent of all the communications that were available in peacetime,

2 mobilisation, and imminent threat of war were used as the communications

3 system and there were some additional radio sets that were used. As the

4 war began, as the units joined the war, radio communications were used up

5 to the corps level. At the lower levels of command from brigade down to

6 squad, they used only the radio system, and quite soon the radio system

7 was jammed and the communication is impossible. From operational and

8 strategic level we were able to encrypt our written and spoken

9 communication, but from brigade down there was no this possibility. That

10 would be the briefest description of the communications system in the Army

11 of Yugoslavia. I can add --

12 Q. Thank you, General. At the collegium meetings you spoke about the

13 communications system several times. This was your area of expertise.

14 Now I would like us to look at a collegium meeting, again that's one of

15 the 4th of March, that's 5933, page --

16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters couldn't hear the page

17 reference because of the papers shuffling.

18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Page 10 in English.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yeah, I found it.

20 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] 3D, or rather, sorry, P5933 -- P933.

21 Q. General, you were able to find the page, it bears the reference

22 871 up there at the top. I'm just waiting for the Trial Chamber to get

23 the page up. Yes, that's fine. We can see it in English.

24 Could you now tell me again, you're talking about the use of

25 mobile telephones. Could you explain to the Judges in detail what this

1 was all about?

2 A. Well, some officers used mobile phones to communicate with their

3 immediate subordinate units, and that was very dangerous and highly

4 destructive, because it is very easy to discover the intentions of the

5 unit and the operations of the unit in combat operations. The problem was

6 not only in mobile phones, but also hand-held radio sets that were used.

7 We intervened several times to prohibit the use of mobile phones, but

8 apparently to no avail. Officers continued to use mobile phones to

9 tell -- to say where they were, what was happening in the unit, what the

10 opposite side especially -- and the oppose side, especially Siptars, used

11 that to great effect.

12 Q. General, if I understand you correctly, General, you had

13 information because you intercepted, you monitored, radio traffic that

14 despite this ban they continued using radio sets and mobile phones. And

15 in this manner some data considered confidential actually were

16 confidential no more, it is possible for them to be intercepted?

17 A. Yes. The data --

18 Q. General Dimitrijevic took the floor after you --

19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think this is a

20 translation issue, but I would like General Andjelkovic to read to us the

21 way he sees this sentence that General Dimitrijevic said.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Should I read it out?

23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. "Practically the entire Grom 3 was blown in this manner."

1 Q. Here in the -- in the translation we have the 3rd Army and that's

2 not what it was?

3 A. No, no, no. That's a code-name for an operation that was to be

4 launched if NATO ever launched a ground invasion.

5 Q. Thank you, General. Could you please move to the next page.

6 A. Yes.

7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could we also have the next page in

8 English, please.

9 Q. It says here: "The attacks on the column are the consequence of

10 open communication."

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. This is what you said. What is this all about, General?

13 A. Well, obviously there was some conversation over mobile phones or

14 radio hand-sets. The other side heard that and our marching column came

15 under the attack by the enemy. That's what this is all about. This is

16 more evidence proving that it was easy to monitor the movements of our

17 forces through conversations over mobile phones and radio hand-sets.

18 Q. General, thank you. Now I would like us to look at P931, page 13,

19 and could you please not shuffle the papers for a moment because the

20 interpreters have a problem, they hear the shuffling. That's page 13 in

21 e-court.

22 And, General, that's on page 11 in the papers that you have in

23 front of you that begins with number 832, that's page 15 in the English

24 version.

25 A. Yes.

1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I think it's page 15 in the English

2 version. I don't think that we have the relevant part.

3 Q. General, this is the collegium from the 2nd of February, 1999,

4 again we have your intervention, and I'm interested in the third paragraph

5 in what you said in that meeting, that's on the next page, actually, in

6 B/C/S and in English it begins on this page, it begins with the word "the

7 next dilemma has to do -- that I have to face is the issue of the

8 competence of the army."

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. I'll read the following sentence.

11 "If it's --" --

12 A. "If it's true that the subordinates are doing what they're not

13 supposed to be doing and reporting to us and that they didn't do that and

14 we have adequate information that they did that and nobody's taking any

15 responsibility or bearing any consequences for that. I couldn't possibly

16 agree with that. It's perfectly right for someone to raise the issue of

17 our competence."

18 Q. General, what was your contribution to that exactly?

19 A. The previous question about the attack on that column and the

20 mobile phones being used which was something that wasn't called for. This

21 was about the too liberal use of mobile phones and hand-held radio sets.

22 We sent out warnings. We warned subordinate units to try to stop this

23 type of equipment from being misused. However, this did not receive

24 appropriate support at a subordinate level, and the 10th of August

25 meeting, 10th of August, 1998, shows that. And on the 3rd of December,

1 1998, another meeting that shows that, and then again sometime in March

2 and in April 1999. No one paid this any heed, especially the MUP units,

3 and that's why I raised the issue. Were we sufficiently competent to

4 issue an order that would put a stop to this sort of practice. That's

5 what it was about.

6 Q. Thank you, General. During the war what was your duty? Where

7 were you?

8 A. I was at the command post. My duty was the same as in back in

9 1998, head of communications and electronic operations and assistant of

10 the Chief of the General Staff for this particular area. I was at the

11 command post of the Supreme Command.

12 Q. General, were you involved in the work of the collegium? Did you

13 attend their evening briefings throughout the war?

14 A. Yes, except for some rare meetings that I did not attend because

15 my presence was required elsewhere.

16 Q. You mentioned the MUP a while ago. As for the communications

17 system that was used at the Supreme Command Staff, can you tell me this:

18 How exactly was it set up in relation to the external factors?

19 A. There was a direct line of communication to the MUP units, I'm

20 saying between the Supreme Command Staff, Chief of the General Staff,

21 Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, and the federal MUP normally.

22 Normally these were telephone lines. There was the option of radio

23 communication but that would break down as soon as the cable connection

24 was down, and then down the chain of command each level had a certain

25 number of channels connecting them to MUP units. As for the other --

1 Q. General, just a minute, please. My next question, the

2 communications system that was used in relation to lower-ranking units,

3 how was that organized and were there any breakdowns during war operations

4 in terms of the communication system between the Supreme Command Staff and

5 its subordinate units?

6 A. As I said at the outset, the system was organized at all levels of

7 command. The Supreme Command Staff had direct communication with the

8 strategic groups, the individual armies, and commands at the operative

9 level. You went further down the chain of command than that only if

10 absolutely necessary, but there was nothing in place from the brigade

11 level down. There were three different types of connections: Cable,

12 relay, and radio. Each level of command had a certain number of channels

13 linking them to their subordinate units down to squad level in practical

14 terms. With these types of communication there was a certain number of

15 channels. Cable was between 12 and 24 channels, for example; radio relay

16 was between 8 and 12; and radio was between one and three. Depending on

17 the level of command, the number of channels would decrease, and at the

18 lower level of command there was normally only a single channel being

19 used.

20 Q. Thank you, General. My other question about this was: Was there

21 ever some sort of a communication breakdown between the Supreme Command

22 Staff and the strategic groups throughout the operations?

23 A. Yes. This depended on stationary knots in terms of

24 communications. The availability of the system slowly decreased. At

25 first the rate was 100 per cent, and then at the highest level of command,

1 our level of command, we reached 35 per cent, that was the lowest rate.

2 There was a period when between the strategic command and the strategic

3 groups there were serious communication breakdowns. Fortunately this only

4 went on for a very brief time until we could redress the damage, but at

5 lower levels of command those breakdowns were quite frequent and quite

6 long sometimes. I wonder how they managed to maintain any sort of

7 communication going at all.

8 Q. General, back to the command post of the Supreme Command Staff

9 now. Can you tell us briefly how work was organized. I especially want

10 to know about what is normally referred to as operations duty.

11 A. At the command post of the Supreme Command each of the

12 administrations had their own rooms where they held meetings and went

13 about their work. We carried out assessments, we prepared orders, we all

14 did our jobs. In the evening hours, based on reports, we would propose

15 measures to the Chief of the General Staff. He would transform these into

16 specific orders. As soon as the next morning, this would be submitted to

17 all the units. This was team-work. It was a collective effort. The

18 Chief of the General Staff and the chief of the Supreme Command was

19 adamant that this team-work should be pursued, and he often cautioned us

20 that we should not be making any proposals on our own, that proposals

21 should be a result of collective assessments carried out by the entire

22 team, if that's what you had in mind.

23 Q. We also heard the leader of the duty operations team; and if so,

24 please tell us exactly what this entailed?

25 A. Assistant chief of the Supreme Command, heads of sector, and

1 individual administrations were also leaders of their respective duty

2 operations teams at the command post of the Supreme Command. This means

3 that each of the administrations had their own representative there who

4 would monitor the situation on the ground over a 24-hour period. They

5 would prepare information for the evening briefing, and in the evening

6 they would brief the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. I was the

7 leader of our operations team. I was in charge of our work. I collected

8 certain information which I then submitted to the Chief of Staff of the

9 Supreme Command. The number varied, the number of people included in this

10 effort. Sometimes there were 18 persons, sometimes 12, sometimes 15,

11 depending on our needs, on what the situation required.

12 Q. General, are you aware of the fact or do you know of a plan being

13 implemented by the VJ to expel the Albanian population from Kosovo?

14 A. No, I know of no such thing. I can claim with certain that not

15 only was there no such plan, but nobody had ever thought of it to begin

16 with. There was several collegium meetings where the Chief of the General

17 Staff was adamant that international law of war should be complied with in

18 the strictest possible terms, that prisoners should be treated in a humane

19 way, and he also ordered that all subordinate units down to the last

20 soldier must be served a hard copy of rules governing their conduct along

21 the front line, the rights of prisoners, and so on and so forth. And this

22 was, in fact, done and each soldier had a copy of this document on them.

23 Therefore, I can claim with full responsibility that there was no such

24 plan.

25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this concludes my

1 examination-in-chief. I have no further questions.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Visnjic.

3 Mr. Andjelkovic, you'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Cepic on

4 behalf of Mr. Lazarevic.

5 Mr. Cepic.

6 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Just one second to prepare

7 the stand.

8 Cross-examination by Mr. Cepic:

9 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, General, good morning. My name is

10 Djuro Cepic. I will ask you questions on behalf of General Lazarevic.

11 A. Good morning, Mr. Cepic.

12 Q. General, can you explain at the VJ level which body or which unit

13 ensured normal functioning of the stationary communications system

14 throughout the territory of the FRY during the war in 1999?

15 A. It was a special-purpose unit and its only job was to maintain the

16 stationary system of communications, this was the 235th centre for

17 stationary communication and this was a blanket body that covered all the

18 other units that were in charge of this this, the Pristina 52nd Corps, for

19 example, add their own centre for stationary communications. At the 235th

20 centre was in charge of all stationary communication in the FRY throughout

21 1999 and even before.

22 Q. Thank you very much, General. Can you just please slow down a

23 little so that everything you say might be recorded.

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. In keeping with what you've just told us, what about all these

1 communication units including the 52nd Corps in Kosovo and Metohija, were

2 they all subordinated to the 235th administration?

3 A. Yes.

4 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Can we please call-up the following

5 document, Defence Exhibit 5D1097.

6 Q. General, sir, can you read the header? Do you recognise this

7 unit?

8 A. Yes. This is the administration of the 52nd Corps centre for

9 stationary communication, strictly confidential, number 66-8, the date is

10 the 29th of March, 1999.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: No overlap, please.

12 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Go ahead, sir.

14 A. This is the corps centre for stationary communication of the

15 Pristina Corps in Pristina.

16 Q. So that was the administration that was subordinated to the 235th

17 centre, right?

18 A. Yes, yes.

19 Q. Will you please now go to item 2 of paragraph 2, communications

20 situation and information KZ, third paragraph: Radio relay

21 communications. Can you please read that out loud for our benefits since

22 we don't have an English translation.

23 A. "Radio relay communications, the 1299 line is out of order, that

24 is the stationary communications for Djakovica, and then Mokra Gora

25 because the Djakovica stationary communications centre is down radio relay

1 device 800" -- fine, fine. Please tell me when I can continue.

2 Q. Please go ahead, slowly, please.

3 A. "The 800 radio relay device and the Z12K are scattered all over

4 the room -- all over the territory and the cables are disrupted. Three

5 system blocks SCB, Butovacki Breg, numbers 2293, 2268, and 2297 from FM

6 200 device that were being prepared at the Pristina MUP, communications

7 department, burned down in the MUP building that was bombed by NATO

8 planes."

9 Q. Thank you very much, General. My question: Can you explain what

10 the targets were for NATO in terms of their long-distance strikes and

11 air-strikes at the beginning of the war?

12 A. Their primary and principal targets, the primary and principal

13 targets for NATO planes at the beginning of the war were communications

14 systems, air surveillance, and reporting systems, radar systems. As far

15 as communications systems were concerned, we had stationary nodes

16 communication, that's SCV, regardless of whether these were in Kosovo or

17 in Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, at the beginning of the war

18 immediately all the nodes were destroyed that were completely above the

19 ground, such as Fruksa Gora but those nodes which were partly underground,

20 they had their anti-rocket systems destroyed at the beginning of the war,

21 but the part that was underground continued to function. Pristina,

22 Djakovica, Urosevac, Pec, and let me not go any further into that. There

23 were centres there that were targeted at the beginning of the war, and the

24 stationary communications centre of Djakovica was the first to be

25 destroyed.

1 As the operations developed, all the other centres followed,

2 including Pristina. Not only were these stationary communication nodes

3 and those belonging to the army targeted, but also the PTT centres and

4 buildings were targeted, the one in Pristina, the one in Djakovica, those

5 were all targeted and destroyed, the intention being to destroy the

6 command system of the VJ.

7 Q. Thank you, General.

8 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, again error in transcript, page 24, line

9 2, I think that we missed the words "in area on Kosovo and Metohija." So

10 could I ask again witness for this question or this clarification.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: It's unnecessary. The places he's mentioned are in

12 Kosovo.

13 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Q. [Interpretation] General, I would now like you to look at PD1098.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that 5D?

16 MR. CEPIC: Yes, 5D1098, please.

17 Q. [Interpretation] General, could you just please read the heading

18 here, the unit, and the date.

19 A. "Administration of the 52nd stationary communications centre at

20 the corps level strictly confidential number 66-15, dated the 5th of

21 April, 1999."

22 Q. General could you read the first sentence, number one enemy, and

23 what does it say here.

24 A. "The Stari Trg facility was targeted, the above-ground part of the

25 facility sustained substantial damage, the transformer station and

1 partially the ariel pilar .

2 Q. Thank you, General. Could you please tell us, General, Stari Trg,

3 could you please tell us where is or where was this facility?

4 A. In Kosovo and Metohija.

5 Q. Am I right if I say that this is close to the city of Mitrovica,

6 Kosovska Mitrovica?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Thank you, General.

9 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 5D1099.

10 Q. General, am I right if I say that this document originated from

11 the same administration, the 52nd?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Could you please read the second paragraph in item 2 that begins

14 with the words: "Radio relay communications ..."

15 A. "The following radio relay axis are disrupted" --

16 Q. No, no, General, we don't want to waste time. Just a quickly

17 question. On the basis of these designations that you can see here in

18 this document, am I right if I say that all the communications axes

19 between the command of the Pristina Corps and the units in the wider

20 Pristina area were disrupted?

21 A. Yes, you're right.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Could I have 5D349, please.

24 Q. General, do you have the document in front of you?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Could you please read the heading.

2 A. "The 3rd Army command, strictly confidential number 3110-18, dated

3 the 31st of March, 1999."

4 Q. It says "urgent," and then it says: "Difficulties in gathering

5 data, report."

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Could you please read the next sentence because we don't have the

8 translation so we have to go about it in this manner.

9 A. "Combat operations have intensified, frequent attacks from the

10 ground and air-space, units are deployed in the area in elements, and

11 there is a need for quick adaptation to the tactical and operational

12 situation, particularly in the Pristina Corps area, which means that the

13 command posts have to move quickly and it is difficult to establish

14 reliable and protected communications. This makes it difficult and in

15 some situations even impossible to gather in the given time and process in

16 a reliable manner the information that has been requested."

17 Q. Thank you, General. You already said, I think that we can now

18 conclude, that the communications systems, in particular in the Kosovo and

19 Metohija area, was operating in difficult conditions and that it was

20 critically threatened in some periods of the war. It was even impossible

21 to communicate and that created difficult in communications?

22 MR. HANNIS: [Previous translation continues]...

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, he's cross-examining and if he wants to

24 ask questions like that which have got virtually no value whatsoever, at

25 least for which the answers have got virtually no value for the Trial

1 Chamber, that's up to him.

2 Mr. Cepic, it's pretty pointless to ask that sort of question. It

3 was more a speech than a question. We can't stop you since you're

4 cross-examining.

5 MR. CEPIC: I can move on right now, Your Honour, if you allow.

6 Thank you for clarification. And just one error in transcript ...

7 [Defence counsel confer]

8 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. General, the disruptions that we mentioned and that we saw

10 reflected in the documents, how did this affect the command in the Kosovo

11 and Metohija area?

12 A. Well, it had a very negative impact. If you can't communicate

13 with a unit, you cannot command that unit, so this passage that I just

14 read out tells us that it is difficult to gather information. It was

15 impossible to gather information, and therefore it was impossible to

16 command the units. Because if the command posts moved quickly that means

17 that the communications units have to move quickly, and to move a

18 communications unit to a new location -- well, you need some time, first

19 of all, to set up the communications system, to stabilise it, and then the

20 command structures can continue to function. And that is why at the

21 beginning if you listened to what I said, I said that I really wondered

22 how at that level the command system managed to function.

23 Q. Thank you, General.

24 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like 5D208 to be placed on

25 the screen.

1 Q. General, could you please read the heading of this document.

2 A. "The Pristina Corps command, strictly confidential number

3 692-1/13 ..."

4 MR. CEPIC: We haven't got a link with Belgrade I'm afraid.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can hear you.

6 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation].

7 Q. Thank you, General. I mixed up something. Could you please read

8 the date on this document.

9 A. The 7th of April, 1999.

10 Q. Thank you. Could you please read what it says under paragraph

11 1.2, electronic operations.

12 A. "Because of the air-strike against the Pristina post office, a

13 part of the communications systems relied on by the VJ communications was

14 damaged, causing the disruption of the communications with the units of --

15 with parts of the units of the Pristina Corps. There were disruptions

16 with all groups except with group 21, where all communications are

17 functioning."

18 Q. Does this confirm what you just told us?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Thank you. And my last question, General: Could you confirm that

21 the General Staff -- VJ General Staff sector that you headed sent teams to

22 Kosovo and Metohija during the war to the Pristina Corps to control and

23 assist them?

24 A. Yes. We did send our team to Kosovo and Metohija, particularly to

25 Pristina Corps, to assist and control, if necessary. But control was not

1 the primary task.

2 Q. Thank you very much, General. Thank you very much, General.

3 MR. CEPIC: I have no further questions. Thank you.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Cepic.

5 Mr. Andjelkovic, we have to have a break at this stage for 20

6 minutes, so the court will be adjourned for that period and we will resume

7 at 25 minutes to 11.00.

8 --- Recess taken at 10.14 a.m.

9 --- On resuming at 10.37 a.m.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, do you have cross-examination?

11 MR. IVETIC: No questions, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Andjelkovic, you'll now be cross-examined by

13 the Prosecutor, Mr. Hannis.

14 Mr. Hannis.

15 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis:

17 Q. Good morning, General. You mentioned the infomatics --

18 A. Good morning.

19 Q. The infomatics sector or department and you said they were in

20 charge of IT for the command. What's IT stand for, is that information

21 technology or what does that mean?

22 A. Yes, yes, information technology, but that's not a sector, that's

23 not the section, it's the administration.

24 Q. Thank you for that. I have some trouble with those terms. You

25 also told us that you -- your group was involved in intercepting

1 communications, but you said you didn't process that information. You

2 received it and then you submitted it to the relevant bodies for further

3 processing. Can you tell us, who are the relevant bodies, what

4 organization was that that did the processing of intercepted

5 communications?

6 A. That was the intelligence administration and sometimes the

7 security administrations -- administration and if the data gathered

8 through electronic surveillance were of interest for other

9 administrations, then they got the data in any form, either the original

10 form or just the excerpts.

11 Q. Okay. And how was the determination made as to which of those

12 two, the intelligence administration and the security administration, how

13 was it decided which one of those to send the materials to? Was that

14 based on who was being intercepted or the content of what was heard?

15 A. Well, it depended on the communications that were intercepted and

16 their contents.

17 Q. And was it somebody in your -- I'm sorry, should I use the

18 word "department" or "administration" or "sector," was it somebody in your

19 group that was responsible for making that decision?

20 A. Yes, there was the administration for electronic operations, and

21 it had the section that dealt with analysis of the data that were

22 gathered, and it gave the data to whoever needed them.

23 Q. And who was the head of that administration for electronic

24 operations?

25 A. Colonel Radovanovic.

1 Q. Can you tell us --

2 A. He was to become a general later.

3 Q. I'm sorry. Could you tell us his first name?

4 A. I think it's Dobrosav.

5 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that the KLA were in touch with NATO,

6 and I want to be clear, was it your information or your understanding the

7 KLA was in contact with NATO before the conflict started in 1999? Were

8 they in contact with NATO in 1998?

9 A. Yes, they were in contact with NATO in 1998, too, because NATO was

10 gathering information about the movements of our forces and the KLA could

11 not monitor the movements of our forces on their own, they didn't have the

12 proper equipment. This means that they must have gotten the information

13 from another command and the only command that was there was NATO or some

14 kind of a subcommand of NATO.

15 Q. Well, the way you phrased that answer, General, it sounds like

16 you're making an assumption. You don't have any hard evidence of that, do

17 you? Because General Naumann from NATO testified here that the -- that

18 NATO was not in communication with KLA before the war because they deemed

19 KLA a terrorist operation and they couldn't deal with them. He said that

20 was part of their problem in trying to reach the October agreements

21 because they couldn't force KLA to participate in the negotiations because

22 NATO couldn't talk with them. I understand how you might have reached

23 that conclusion, but that's just an assumption on your part, isn't it?

24 A. Well, you can either trust what Naumann said or what I told you.

25 I told you what I know.

1 Q. Well, how do you know it? It sounded that you were just forming a

2 conclusion that they had this information, and as far as you know the only

3 one that could have given that information was NATO or a subgroup of

4 NATO --

5 A. Sir, if you were listening closely to what I was saying, we don't

6 need to receive information from anybody. I hope you were listening to

7 me. I said we had no ...

8 Q. I'm sorry, General, the signal seems to be breaking up. Your

9 picture that I see on my screen is frozen and I'm not hearing the rest of

10 your answer.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: The IT cavalry are on their way, Mr. Hannis.

12 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

13 JUDGE BONOMY: We're asked to be patient while they try to

14 reconnect.

15 We have you back, General. We did not get the whole of the last

16 answer so Mr. Hannis will ask you that question again.

17 Mr. Hannis.

18 MR. HANNIS:

19 Q. Sir, I'd asked you how you knew because I understood your earlier

20 answer to be that you were assuming that NATO was in contact with the KLA

21 because the KLA could have only have gotten certain kinds of information

22 from NATO or a subgroup of NATO. And the part of your answer we heard

23 before we lost the signal was that you said to me: "Sir, if you were

24 listening closely to what I was saying, we don't need to receive

25 information from anybody. I hope you were listening to me. I said we had

1 no ..."

2 And then we lost you. Can you continue your answer from there?

3 A. Do you have anything to add or is that your question?

4 Q. That's my question. It didn't appear that you had finished

5 answering when we lost the signal before. I wanted to give you a chance

6 to finish if you had something else.

7 A. Yes, yes. Well, it's just what I said earlier. We had a unit, or

8 rather, units for radio monitoring, monitoring any traffic by radio

9 communications. We tracked the KLA and we realised that they were keeping

10 in touch with some command in Macedonia and one in Albania. Based on the

11 language they were using, we concluded that these were NATO forces.

12 Q. What language were they using that concluded -- that caused you to

13 conclude they were NATO forces? Were you -- they were using the Albanian

14 language or the Macedonian language or some special NATO language?

15 A. English and Siptar.

16 Q. Thank you --

17 A. Depending on each individual case.

18 Q. All right. I want to move to another topic. Mr. Visnjic asked

19 you about the kinds of communication equipment used by the VJ in 1998 and

20 1999, and you explained that for us. You talked about however from the

21 operational and strategic level you were able to encrypt written and

22 spoken communication at the higher levels, but from brigade down there was

23 not this possibility. Why were you not able to encrypt communications

24 from the brigade level down?

25 A. Based on the equipment plans that we had, we envisaged that the

1 higher levels of command should be equipped first and then you went down

2 the chain of command, but the war broke out and we simply had run out of

3 time to provide appropriate equipment for the lower levels of command.

4 Q. In such situations is it an alternative to use coded

5 communications or code talk for the brigade levels and lower?

6 A. Yes, there is the option of using a code book in order to keep

7 this sort of communication confidential, but this greatly slowed down the

8 process of command. So to the extent that this was possible we tried to

9 have open communications regardless of the prejudice to this type of

10 communication.

11 Q. Okay. Were coded communications used sometimes at the lower

12 levels during the war?

13 A. This was a matter of whoever was using this. Each commander

14 decided for himself when he would use this or not use this code talk I

15 mean.

16 Q. And I seem to recall some occasions where couriers were used to

17 transit messages; that was also done during the war, correct?

18 A. Yes, or liaison officers, soldiers or couriers and there were also

19 officers in charge of signals, signals officers. This greatly slowed down

20 the whole command system.

21 Q. Mr. Visnjic talked to you about -- I think it was a collegium

22 session where you discussed the problem of the use of mobile phones by

23 commanders, and he had you read a part where I think it was

24 General Dimitrijevic was discussing the problems about that and said:

25 "Practically the entire Grom 3 was blown in this manner."

1 You told us that Grom 3 was a code-name for an operation that was

2 to be launched if NATO ever launched a ground invasion. Were you aware of

3 earlier plans named Grom 2 and Grom 1?

4 A. No.

5 Q. You didn't hear of either one of those?

6 A. No. I did hear of Grom 3, but not 1 and 2.

7 Q. And how was it that you heard of Grom 3? Did you receive a copy

8 of the plan or was it discussed in a collegium meeting? Do you recall?

9 A. No one received copies of Grom 3. This is a confidential

10 document, and everybody can use it to the extent necessary. How did I

11 know about Grom 3? If you look at the last paragraph, command and

12 communications, who on earth do you think did that?

13 Q. Well, I thought that was probably you, and to the extent there was

14 a necessity for communications for Grom 1 and Grom 2, I thought that you

15 might be aware of those as well.

16 A. I don't know if Grom 1 and Grom 2 were about the same issues. I

17 am not sure if there was any necessity for a communications command. I

18 know nothing about those two.

19 Q. Okay. Thank you. You mentioned that you were involved in the

20 work of the VJ collegium and that you attended the -- that you attended

21 most of the evening briefings during the war except when you were required

22 to be elsewhere. Was there someone who attended in your place when you

23 couldn't be there?

24 A. I can't hear you.

25 Q. For those collegium or those evening briefings during the war that

1 you were unable to attend because you were required elsewhere, was there

2 someone who represented you who attended the meetings when you couldn't?

3 A. Yes. This was the head of the communication administration or

4 some other head when I wasn't there. For the most part there was

5 Colonel Brajovic, who was head of the communications administration, who

6 later became a general.

7 Q. Thank you. You were discussing at page 18 today the problems

8 caused by the NATO bombing of the communications system. You mentioned

9 that at the lowest point you reached 35 per cent, and I want to ask you,

10 what does 35 per cent mean in real-life terms, how that affected

11 communications between the Supreme Command Staff and the subordinate

12 units? What does that mean -- you were only able to communicate with them

13 one-third of the time or with one-third of the units? Do you understand

14 my question?

15 A. Yes. It wasn't about the time or the units, it was about the

16 capacity. For example, you take the rate of 100. For example, we had 100

17 channels, links, to a certain unit at a given point in time. When certain

18 centres had been bombed, this decreased to 35, 35 channels, which is 35

19 per cent in this case. And that is why availability was lower. When

20 there were less channels, one has to prioritize as to who would be using

21 these channels and who wouldn't.

22 Q. Okay. And when you were at 100 per cent capacity, were all

23 channels being used all the time?

24 A. Depends on the amount of traffic going on. Some were available.

25 I don't know if they were used or not. Sometimes all the available

1 channels were being used and sometimes not a single one. This very much

2 depended on how thick and fast the communication was going.

3 Q. Okay. When you were at this point of 35 per cent capacity, I

4 think you said it only went on for very brief time. Can you tell us, are

5 you talking about hours or days, what period of time?

6 A. This depends on the extent of damage to a certain facility or

7 device. Sometimes this would take one or two hours, sometimes 15,

8 sometimes 24, sometimes there was a 48-hour breakdown.

9 Q. How many times did you have breakdowns of 24 hours or more during

10 the 78 days of the conflict?

11 A. I can't say exactly how many times, but at least ten times, I'm

12 talking about the strategic command level now.

13 Q. The reason I --

14 A. At the tactical level it was more frequent.

15 Q. Sorry to interrupt you. The reason I ask, I've seen most of the

16 minutes of the evening briefings, and you are there for most of them or if

17 you're not, Colonel Brajovic seems to be there or some representative of

18 your section. And most of the reports in those daily briefings seem to

19 say that despite the damage from the bombing and despite the problems,

20 that communications were functioning okay. Is that an incorrect

21 assessment on my part or was there some reluctance to give General Ojdanic

22 bad news about the communications?

23 A. First of all, let me tell you this. This sort of awe never

24 existed. Nobody was awe-stricken by General Ojdanic because was he was a

25 reasonable man. Whenever there was a breakdown we simply never felt it

1 was necessary to tire the collegium with that at one of our meetings. It

2 was something we had to deal with. The collegium could do nothing to help

3 us with this. If the work of the collegium was under threat because of

4 these breakdowns, then certainly I would have been responsible for

5 informing them of the general situation concerning our communications; if

6 this wasn't necessary, I didn't say anything. I enjoyed full autonomy as

7 far as taking decisions was concerned. Talking about the

8 telecommunications system, I had -- General Ojdanic had transferred his

9 powers to me.

10 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us where the collegium was physically

11 located during the war? Where did you meet during those evening briefings

12 between 24 March and early June 1999?

13 A. The meetings always took place at -- in a room of the operations

14 centre at the command post.

15 Q. Where was the command post located?

16 A. In Belgrade.

17 Q. Where in Belgrade?

18 A. Tejo Drajzera [phoen] Street.

19 Q. Now, we had evidence about a meeting of the collegium on the 9th

20 of April, 1999, that was held at another location, it was held at I think

21 the VMA, and you attended that meeting, didn't you?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Was that the only time the collegium met at a different location?

24 A. There was that one meeting, the principal objective being to visit

25 the wounded who were being treated at the military hospital, to raise

1 their morale, to lend their moral support, to make them see that they were

2 being looked after, so that's why the meeting was held there so that in

3 addition to holding the meeting we could also visit our wounded.

4 Q. Well, as I recall from the minutes of that collegium session, that

5 meeting lasted about three hours and resulted in the production of a

6 document called a directive for I think combatting NATO. Do you recall

7 that?

8 A. Sir, not a single meeting of the collegium was just simply about

9 courtesy, a matter of courtesy. There was always something to be

10 discussed. It would have been a waste of time for us to go to the

11 military hospital and then just all disperse. We decided to hold a

12 meeting there and the subject matter at that particular meeting was

13 precisely what you said.

14 Q. Let me show you Exhibit P1481, which is the 9th of April, 1999,

15 directive for engagement of the VJ and defence against the NATO

16 aggression. I'm looking at what's numbered page 11. It's the

17 next-to-the-last page in your Serbian version, I believe, General.

18 A. Yes, go ahead. I think the number is 6.

19 Q. Yes. Command and communications, and I'm reading the English. It

20 says: "Deployment of VSO," which I understand is Supreme Defence

21 Council, "and the VJ GS," the army General Staff, "KM," I understand

22 stands for command post, "in current sectors."

23 Is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Where was the Supreme Defence Council command post on the 9th of

1 April, 1999?

2 A. The building at Drajzer Street.

3 Q. And where is -- is that the same place where the collegium met?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And to your knowledge, who was in the Supreme Defence Council at

6 that time?

7 A. The president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the

8 presidents of the republics. When needed, the defence minister, the Chief

9 of the General Staff were also invited.

10 Q. Also under that title is an acronym NPKM in the Mataruska Banja

11 sector. Can you tell me what NPKM stands for?

12 A. This is the rear command post, next rear command post or adjacent

13 rear command post.

14 Q. Okay. Because two lines up I see PKM is translated as rear

15 command post. Can you explain the difference between those two?

16 A. No. PKM, if you look at PKM, that's rear command post; and RKM is

17 reserve command post. NPKM, if it's necessary to leave a rear command

18 post, the next place that they will move to is the NPKM, which is in

19 Mataruska Banja.

20 Q. Okay. So that's an alternative rear command post if for some

21 reason the other one is not available or appropriate; is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Thank you. Now, I've got some confusion in connection with the

24 Supreme Command Staff and the collegium and the General Staff. Let me

25 explain what I'll -- then I'll ask you a question. My understanding was

1 that the General Staff of the VJ was the body of the high-ranking generals

2 who met during peacetime, and that once the war started this General Staff

3 sort of transformed or became called the Supreme Command Staff. Is that

4 correct so far?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And what's the difference between the General Staff during

7 peacetime and the collegium? Are those the same persons? What's the

8 difference between those two bodies?

9 A. The collegium of the Supreme Command Staff comprises the

10 presidents and some other persons; the collegium of the Chief of Staff of

11 the Supreme Command, it's like the General Staff in peacetime.

12 Q. Okay. Now, I think there's an evening briefing from the 29th of

13 March, it's Exhibit 3D582, I hope you have that there, General.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And I need you to go to page 4 I think in your Serbian version

16 about two-thirds of the way down where General Ojdanic is speaking.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And my English translation says he is saying: "The collegium did

19 not meet because I was otherwise engaged."

20 And then going down a couple lines he says: "I will not be here

21 all the time, being a member of the Supreme Command Staff."

22 So that sounds to me like the Supreme Command Staff is a different

23 body that's meeting somewhere else, is that correct, this was something

24 different from the collegium.

25 A. The Supreme Command Staff is a different body, it's not the same

1 as the collegium.

2 Q. Okay. And we've also heard sometimes the term supreme commander

3 which everyone seems to agree referred to President Milosevic; you would

4 agree with that?

5 A. In general terms. The Supreme Command had a number of equal

6 members, but Milosevic was the most senior one so he was the supreme

7 commander.

8 Q. And then along with him, who were the other members of the Supreme

9 Command, as you understand it?

10 A. The presidents of the republics.

11 Q. Thank you. While we're on this document, can I have you go back

12 one page to the top of page 3 in your Serbian version. And this relates

13 to a question that Mr. Cepic asked you about Exhibit 5D1097 which talked

14 about the communications hub in Djakovica being destroyed. Here at this

15 evening briefing on the 29th of March you mention that it was destroyed,

16 but if I read this correctly it says: "Of the 606 channels, 531 are

17 usable."

18 So does that mean you still had about, I don't know, 85-plus per

19 cent capacity at that location?

20 A. No. When I said about Djakovica, it doesn't mean that it had 606

21 channels, but as for RR800 and 12K this would imply that Djakovica, the

22 stationary node, the communication node centre there had only 12 channels.

23 Q. Okay. And before we leave this document, just going back to the

24 question I had earlier about General Ojdanic saying he couldn't be here

25 with you in the collegium all the time because he was member of the

1 Supreme Command Staff. Where were they meeting? Were they in the same

2 building or were they across the street, do you know, how far away?

3 A. Sometimes they were in the same building that we were in, and I

4 have no idea where they went to when and if they left the building.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: General, the question that was asked a moment ago

6 about Djakovica and the reference to of the 606 channels, 531 are still

7 usable, what is that referring to?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was about the number of

9 channels that the staff of the Supreme Command had to their subordinate

10 commands, the total. The Djakovica stationary communication centre had a

11 total of 12 channels from their centre, so those 12 were destroyed, not

12 606, with 530-something remaining in operation. Djakovica was far too

13 small for such a large number of channels.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

15 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

16 Q. General, Mr. Cepic also asked you about whether it was correct for

17 him to say that all the communications axes between the command of the

18 Pristina Corps and units in the wider Pristina area were disrupted and you

19 said "yes." Can you explain disrupted for me. I take that to mean some

20 kind of breakdown in communications, but how long are we talking about?

21 Are we talking about a day or weeks? Are we talking about one time or 20

22 times? "Disruption" is a very general term. We had a disruption in our

23 communications earlier.

24 A. Yes. We had our communication breakdown, but that was just one

25 line down and we're talking about the communications with the subordinate

1 units. The nodes were destroyed, the nodes that were aimed at certain

2 units, meaning that those units were left without any means of

3 communication. I don't know how long this disruption lasted. This was

4 not the level of command that I was in charge with -- in charge of. That

5 was the corps command level, and they knew best what happened, how long it

6 lasted, and what they did to remedy that.

7 Q. Were you aware of or do you have any specific examples or where

8 these disruptions resulted in a complete breakdown of command and control

9 in the Pristina Corps or their subordinate units?

10 A. I had received reports on some occasions that the lines of

11 communication between the Pristina Corps and its unit were down. I don't

12 know how long it lasted, I can't give you that information, given the time

13 that passed, but I did have information that the lines of communication

14 between the 3rd Army and the Pristina Corps were down. And also I heard

15 from the reports of the 52nd communications centre that there had been

16 communication breakdowns between the Pristina Corps and its brigades. I

17 don't know how long that lasted, but when they asked us to reinforce them

18 with some equipment we did send it, but it takes some time for equipment

19 to be taken out of some depots and to be sent to them. It lasted a day or

20 two or even longer than that.

21 Q. Now, he also asked you, Mr. Cepic also asked you about Exhibit

22 5D208, which is dated the 7th of April, 1999, and talked about the

23 air-strike against the Pristina post office and damage to some of the

24 communications systems relied on by the VJ, which caused disruption of

25 communications with parts of the units of the Pristina Corps. How long

1 did those disruptions related to that event last, do you know? They were

2 temporary, correct?

3 A. Well, I can't give you the time because I don't know how long it

4 lasted. I know when that happened. The cables were cut, and then you had

5 to bridge those cables. It may have lasted some hours, a day, maybe even

6 two days. I don't know the scale of the damage to the Pristina post

7 office.

8 Q. This certainly normal --

9 A. If that had been total --

10 Q. I'm sorry, did you finish? I started speaking and I think maybe

11 you weren't done.

12 A. Yes, I'm done.

13 Q. I think you would agree with me that during a wartime it's not

14 unusual, indeed it's normal and expected, to have these kinds of

15 disruptions in your communications, correct?

16 A. Well, yes, of course.

17 Q. And I take --

18 A. Of course you expected something of the sort to happen.

19 Q. And you have contingencies in place to deal with those problems.

20 They may not be at the same level of the desired communications, but you

21 do have back-up plans and methods of maintaining those essential

22 communications, right?

23 A. Yes. Before the air-strikes started, we made a detailed

24 assessment about possible points that might be at greater risk during the

25 bombing, and in those sectors we established some back-up in personnel and

1 equipment. And if this facility would be destroyed, we were able to

2 set-up the new equipment from this back-up depot. And the breakdown in

3 communication lasted for as long as it took us to actually install the new

4 equipment.

5 Q. And, sir, were you aware that by the 7th of April several, perhaps

6 as many as 500.000 Kosovo Albanians had already been expelled from Kosovo

7 to Albania and Macedonia? You knew about that?

8 A. Well, I wouldn't use the term "expelled." I don't know the number

9 of people, but at any rate I wouldn't use the term "expelled." They left

10 themselves, in fear of the air-strikes.

11 Q. Well, some of them have testified here and told us they left

12 because in some cases their family -- portions of their family were killed

13 in their presence and they were directed at gunpoint by soldiers or

14 policemen from the Serbian security forces to go to Albania, or in some

15 cases, for example, in Pristina, they were put on the train and directed

16 to go to Macedonia. You know about that, don't you?

17 A. I know that some people were killed in Kosovo, not only Siptars.

18 Why don't you say how many Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija were killed or

19 interred. I can't claim that nobody pointed a gun at anyone, there were

20 such cases, but that was not widespread phenomenon. Those were just

21 isolated cases.

22 Q. Hundreds of thousands of isolated cases?

23 A. That's your information. My information does not say that there

24 were hundreds of thousands. It all depends on your point of view.

25 Q. Okay. General, were you aware of a body that we, the Prosecution

1 in this case, say existed in 1998 and in 1999 called the Joint Command for

2 Kosovo and Metohija?

3 A. I heard this Joint Command being talked about, but I can claim

4 with full responsibility that such a command, such an organ is something

5 that is completely foreign to me. I don't know anything about that. I

6 don't know who the members of the command were, who was the supreme chief,

7 who provided communications for this command, who were its superiors, who

8 were its subordinates. I would have to know all this and yet I don't know

9 any of these elements.

10 Q. Let's have a look at Exhibit P1487. This is a one-page document,

11 General, dated the -- dated the 17th of April, 1999.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And you'll see that's from the Supreme Command Staff, staff

14 operations department, to the 3rd Army command, to the commander

15 personally, which would have been General Pavkovic at the time. And its

16 suggestions from General Ojdanic. Do you see the line that says: "Link

17 Kosovo and Metohija Joint Command order strictly confidential number

18 455-148 of 15 April 1999"?

19 A. Yes, I see that.

20 Q. Have you ever seen that document before today?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Well, you see -- you saw that reference to a specific order of the

23 Joint Command, and below that you see suggestions from General Ojdanic,

24 who as I understand it was the highest-ranking uniformed officer in the

25 military in Yugoslavia at the time. Do you have an explanation for why he

1 would be making suggestions in relation to an order issued by some other

2 body called the Joint Command. Isn't he the highest-ranking officer,

3 shouldn't he be telling them what to do, not making suggestions?

4 A. That means that this body, this body was not superior to

5 General Ojdanic, and General Ojdanic was not its subordinate. That's what

6 this document tells us. That is why he is suggesting and not ordering,

7 and he didn't have the -- any right to order, but just to suggest. That

8 body could not have been in command of the Army of Yugoslavia or of the

9 forces in Kosovo.

10 Q. Well, this document appears to be a reference to an order that

11 requires the 3rd Army commander, General Pavkovic, to do something, and

12 General Ojdanic in this document seems to me to be deferring to the Joint

13 Command by making suggestions rather than over -- taking over from them.

14 So what was General Pavkovic supposed to do in this situation, follow the

15 Joint Command order or follow the suggestions of his superior,

16 General Ojdanic?

17 A. At any rate, he must obey the suggestions made by his superior.

18 Q. My question is: In this context, who's his superior, General

19 Ojdanic or the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija?

20 A. General Ojdanic is the superior of the 3rd Army command because

21 the supreme commander conferred the powers he had on General Ojdanic to

22 command the 3rd Army, and this Joint Command had no superior authority

23 over it.

24 Q. Well, sir, I suggest that you don't know that because you told us

25 you didn't know anything about the Joint Command. Do you allow for the

1 possibility that Mr. Milosevic, the supreme commander, may have created

2 this body called the Joint Command and conveyed power upon it?

3 A. I --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the answer.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Andjelkovic, the interpreters did not hear your

6 answer; could you repeat it, please.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What Mr. Prosecutor said, can I

8 allow for the possibility that President Milosevic could have formed such

9 a body and conferred some powers on that body, I said that, yes, it was

10 possible.

11 MR. HANNIS:

12 Q. Thank you, General. I want to ask you now about a collegium

13 meeting on the 4th of March, 1999, this is Exhibit P933. And I want to go

14 to the last page of the Serbian.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Do you have that, General?

17 A. Just a moment, it's in English. Let me find the last page -- yes,

18 yes.

19 Q. And do you find the paragraph where you're speaking?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Right above that I want to read from the preceding speaker, who if

22 you go back a couple pages it appears it was General Marjanovic, who I

23 understand was the deputy, and he appears to have been conducting this

24 particular meeting. And he's saying: "I would ask Ljubo who took on the

25 obligation as the fourth task to write an order to disband the command of

1 the special unit corps."

2 Is he referring to you there when he uses the name Ljubo? Pardon

3 my pronunciation.

4 A. No, no, no, no. That's not me. I didn't have any authority to

5 write such things or to issue any orders to that effect.

6 Q. Okay. But you're the next speaker and you talk about requests

7 from the Pristina Corps and the 3rd Army for personnel. Do you know --

8 what do you know about this --

9 A. Yes, yes, I am, I am the next speaker, but there are other people

10 called Ljubo, not just myself.

11 Q. Okay. Do you know what -- who that would have referred to?

12 A. I can comment on the last passage, but I am not the person

13 identified here, that's for sure.

14 Q. Okay. Do you know who that would have been, to write that order

15 to disband the command of the special unit corps?

16 A. Do you mean the last passage where I'm speaking?

17 Q. No, right when general --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please not overlap.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All the orders came from the

20 operations and staff affairs sector and the operations administration was

21 the one and if I'm not mistaken this is a reference to General Obradovic,

22 not to myself.

23 MR. HANNIS:

24 Q. Okay. Do you recall what the decision was and why the command of

25 the special unit corps was being disbanded?

1 A. No, no, I don't remember.

2 Q. And did you have a comment to make about what you said at this

3 meeting about the request for personnel, the disparate number between the

4 Pristina Corps and the 3rd Army request?

5 A. Well, during the air-strikes, training centres were set up to

6 train troops, and every unit on the basis of the recruitment sent some of

7 its soldiers to those centres. And those soldiers came back to the units,

8 the units that had sent them to the training centres. The 3rd Army first

9 requested the number of soldiers that it had and then an increased number

10 of soldiers, which meant that other units that sent their soldiers to be

11 trained in those centres should be taken out and sent to the 3rd Army to

12 reinforce it. That is what I was talking about.

13 Q. Okay. Thank you. The last topic I want to ask you about was at

14 the very end of your questioning by Mr. Visnjic. He asked you if you knew

15 of a plan being implemented by the VJ to expel the Albanian population

16 from Kosovo. And you said: "No, I know of no such thing. I can claim

17 with certain that not only was there no such plan, but nobody had ever

18 thought of it to begin with."

19 My question -- my questions begin with this one: If nobody had

20 ever thought of it, why was there a need to issue so many orders about

21 obeying international humanitarian law?

22 A. Well, I don't know how many orders were actually issues, but all

23 soldiers were warned at the beginning of the combat operations. That's

24 for sure. That's quite obvious, but you cannot rule out the possibility

25 that some individuals might conduct themselves in an inappropriate manner

1 because we're talking about a large number of people in a large area. And

2 there was no such plan, that's what I maintain.

3 Q. Are you aware of what Slobodan Milosevic is reported to have said

4 to General Naumann and General Clark in October of 1998 when their

5 agreement was signed about how he proposed to deal with the Kosovo problem

6 in the spring of 1999, that is, by taking out the Albanians and shooting

7 them, as had been done in Drenica in 1945 and 1946, did you know about

8 that?

9 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Visnjic on his feet.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that this part

12 of the question that was put to the witness is incorrect, and I think

13 Mr. Hannis knows quite well which portion I'm referring to that's

14 inaccurate.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]...

16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I'm talking about the spring of

17 1999.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

19 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, as I recall he said that he would

20 have a solution in the spring. I may be wrong about that, but I seem to

21 recall there was evidence about that, either in General Naumann's

22 statement and/or in his testimony.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: You say that's wrong, Mr. Visnjic?

24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] As far as I can recall, the spring

25 of 1999 was not mentioned. I have no objection to the rest of the

1 question, but as far as I can recall the spring of 1999 was not mentioned.

2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I may be wrong there because I think he

3 said in October "in the spring." He may not have said in the spring of

4 1999, but I believe he said in the spring.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: My inclination from memory is that you're correct,

6 Mr. Hannis, however you can rephrase this to solve the problem.

7 MR. HANNIS:

8 Q. General, did you ever hear about that allegation that

9 Mr. Milosevic had told Clark and Naumann of his proposed solution for the

10 Kosovo problem in the terms that I described above, without a reference to

11 1999?

12 A. This is the first time I hear of it. I don't know anything about

13 it.

14 Q. Okay. And then if you allow for the possibility that that,

15 indeed, was said, how can you say that no one -- nobody ever thought of

16 it, nobody ever thought of expelling the Kosovo Albanians or killing the

17 Kosovo Albanians to get rid of them?

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Before -- don't answer that question.

19 Before Mr. Visnjic gets to his feet, that's a hypothesis too far I

20 think, Mr. Hannis.

21 MR. HANNIS: Okay.

22 Q. Let me ask you this, General: I concede that you're an expert in

23 communications, but you're not a mind-reader, you don't know what was in

24 the mind of every individual in the high government authorities, the VJ,

25 and the MUP, do you?

1 A. Sir, when I said that no such plan existed and that it would never

2 occur to anyone to think of such a thing, I was talking about the soldiers

3 and the collegium where I was present. I'm talking about the military

4 leadership, the top echelons. Now, as to what other people, civilians,

5 were thinking, no, you're right, I cannot know what everybody was

6 thinking.

7 Q. Well, General, you couldn't have known what was in the mind of

8 every member of the VJ in 1998 and 1999, could you?

9 A. Well, the VJ does not have 18 people, it had several thousand --

10 thousands of people. I was talking about the collegium. I was in a

11 position to know what everybody in the collegium was thinking.

12 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour, I have no further questions.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

14 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, just if you allow me one correction in

15 transcript, page 54, line 5, I think the witness also said

16 [Interpretation] "People outside of the army were thinking." I think

17 that's what he said.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

19 Mr. Fila.

20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your permission I

21 would like to pursue this speculation a little bit further contained in

22 Mr. Hannis's question, whether Milosevic may have set up a Joint Command

23 and conferred some powers on it. I would like you to look at the question

24 the way it is phrased and the witness did not rule that out. If we were

25 to stop there, we could have something that would be akin to manipulation.

1 I would like to go further into this because this is a document from 1999,

2 we're talking about the Joint Command in 1998, 1999, and so on and so

3 forth, with such a speculative statement, with such a sentence that the

4 witness was led into uttering. I don't think that it would take us too

5 far. I would like, with your permission, to question the witness a bit

6 further on that.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Which line are you talking about?

8 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] That's page 48 --

9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't hear the line because of

10 background noise.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Which --

12 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] And the response is at page 49, line 7.

13 It's just hanging there like a leaf that just fell off the branch. It's

14 not connected to anything. That's line 20 on page 48, that's the

15 question, and the answer is 49, line 7. So this is a typical answer ...

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, have you any difficulty with this?

17 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

19 Please proceed, Mr. Fila.

20 Further cross-examination by Mr. Fila:

21 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General. My name is Toma Fila.

22 I'm defending Nikola Sainovic in this case, and unfortunately I will have

23 to take some of your time.

24 A. Good morning, Mr. Fila.

25 Q. In answer to a question by Mr. Hannis you answered that you

1 allowed for the possibility that Slobodan Milosevic may have set up a

2 Joint Command of some sort and conferred something on it, some powers.

3 First let me ask you: Do you have any idea that any such thing existed or

4 was established or is this just pure speculation on your part?

5 A. I have no idea that something of the sort had been established,

6 but I could not rule out the possibility that I didn't know about

7 something that had been established.

8 Q. On the basis of your participation in the work of the army in 1998

9 and 1999, including the wartime period, did you notice that the chain of

10 command was compromised anywhere in the sphere of communications where you

11 worked or anywhere else by the existence of some kind of a Joint Command?

12 A. As far as the VJ was correspond, I never noticed any such thing.

13 There were no disruptions in the VJ communications system by anyone,

14 except if we talk about the army proper.

15 Q. But we cannot get too hypothetical about this, can we?

16 [Defence counsel confer]

17 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Would you have noticed if there was some Joint Command during the

19 war or even in 1998 that was a body that was superior to General Ojdanic

20 and, by the same token, to you? Would you have noted anything like that?

21 Could it have slipped your attention?

22 A. No, it couldn't possibly have slipped my attention and it never

23 did.

24 Q. Thank you. Did you perhaps notice that any civilian, quite apart

25 from Slobodan Milosevic in a manner of speaking, who was the supreme

1 commander, the commander of the VJ in both peace and wartime, that any

2 civilian gave any sort of orders to General Ojdanic? Did you notice

3 anything like that?

4 A. No, never, with the exception of President Milosevic.

5 Q. What about any subordinate officers giving orders to the commander

6 of an entire army --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: You've had your answer. There's a limit to how

8 much argumentation you can present in the context where we are obliging

9 you by allowing you to do this. It sounds to me as though you're abusing

10 the privilege now that you've been given.

11 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have the same

12 impression, that's while I'll now desist from any further questioning.

13 Thank you.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.

15 Mr. Visnjic, we have to break now, I think --

16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, two questions and I'm

17 finished with this.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

19 Re-examination by Mr. Visnjic:

20 Q. [Interpretation] General, the Prosecutor asked you about the fact

21 that you told us about that NATO were in touch with the KLA in 1998. You

22 were asked about the language that was used, you said English and

23 Albanian. My question is this: What sort of information was exchanged?

24 A. For the most part, information concerning where our units were and

25 where they were moving to, as well as information on facilities where the

1 KLA were, or rather, the terror groups.

2 Q. And lastly, General, who in your opinion could have been privy to

3 that type of information?

4 A. I don't understand what you mean by "who." You mean who was in a

5 position to obtain such information or who was in possession of such

6 information once this type of information had been obtained.

7 Q. What I meant was: Who would have been in a position to have this

8 sort of information available to them?

9 A. The intelligence administration, we would gather this information,

10 we would give it to them, and it was then available to them to do with it

11 as they saw fit. The KLA distributed information to their own groups on

12 the ground.

13 Q. Thank you. Just one more question. Mr. Hannis narrowed down the

14 number of people for you, the people you talked about in terms of being

15 certain that they had no plan to expel Albanians in mind. Do you include

16 General Ojdanic in that group?

17 A. By all means.

18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour. I

19 have no further questions.

20 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Andjelkovic, that completes your evidence.

22 Thank you for coming to give evidence to the Tribunal. You're now free to

23 leave once we have risen and the link is disconnected.

24 We'll adjourn now and resume at 1.15.

25 [The witness withdrew]

1 --- Recess taken at 11.50 a.m.

2 --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: We apologise to you all for the disruption of the

4 schedule, but it was caused by the meeting we attended lasting longer than

5 had been anticipated. So we'll now try to do our best to compensate you

6 in whatever way we can.

7 So, Mr. Visnjic, if you want another hour added on to the day,

8 then you just need to say the word. Your next witness?

9 MR. VISNJIC: [Microphone not activated]

10 [The witness entered court]

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, our next witness is

12 Nedjo Danilovic, but may I just address the Court briefly before the

13 witness starts; therefore, if the witness could be asked to leave the

14 courtroom briefly.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: No, please put -- you have a problem that you need

16 to raise in his absence, do you?

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry, Mr. Danilovic, we thought we could get

19 started quickly, but there is a matter of law to be dealt with. I wonder

20 if you could please leave the courtroom briefly.

21 Yes, Mr. Visnjic.

22 [The witness stands down]

23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, first and foremost,

24 given that there are certain indications that the Prosecutor might object

25 and also what you said about Novkovic and this is to do with this witness,

1 we looked at the summary again and about the summary we decided to cut his

2 evidence short, substantially so, in fact. It will be in reference to the

3 following issues.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, you can always do that, cut witnesses'

5 evidence as you see fit, and you don't need to set that out for us. If

6 anyone needs to know, it's Mr. Hannis, but I don't think we need to spend

7 time on that just now.

8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] While the witness remains outside,

9 there's just another matter that I wish to raise, it's not about this

10 witness but I would like to take this opportunity.

11 Mr. Hannis proposed that our expert appear at the end of the

12 trial, along with all the other experts --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm going to raise that with you at the end of

14 today's business.

15 MR. VISNJIC: Okay.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Just while you're on witnesses, though, I think you

17 added a witness this week, is the name Petkovic?

18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: It was difficult at first sight to see what the

20 issue is in his evidence. If you were to ask Mr. Hannis whether he

21 accepted that NATO may have changed their position on the use of certain

22 weapons, then you might get an answer, I don't know for sure, but you

23 might get an answer that makes some of this evidence redundant. And if

24 you ask him whether these weapons included cluster bombs and depleted

25 uranium, you might also get an answer that might cut down, on the other

1 hand, you might not. I'm not saying for sure. We're not here, as you

2 know, to deal with the rights and wrongs of NATO conduct. We are only

3 here to deal with NATO conduct so far as it may be relevant to the issues

4 in this trial, such as the movement of population.

5 So give some thought to whether the evidence heralded from him is

6 all entirely necessary.

7 Now we can have Mr. Danilovic.

8 [The witness takes the stand]

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you for your patience, Mr. Danilovic, we

10 dealt with the issue that arose. Could you now make the solemn

11 declaration to speak the truth by reading aloud the document which will

12 now be shown to you.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

14 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: You'll now be examined by Mr. Visnjic on behalf of

18 Mr. Ojdanic.

19 Mr. Visnjic.

20 WITNESS: NEDJO DANILOVIC

21 [Witness answered through interpreter]

22 Examination by Mr. Visnjic:

23 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.

24 A. Good afternoon.

25 Q. Can you please describe your military career briefly for the

1 benefit of the Trial Chamber and briefly your duties in 1999.

2 A. By all means. After completing my secondary education I graduated

3 from the JNA military academy in 1979. I was the third-best rated student

4 that year. In 1980 I was the best-placed student at the security school.

5 In 1992 I completed the General Staff academy of the JNA. I took my MA

6 degree at the school of political sciences. In 1997 I got my Ph.D. at the

7 VJ military academy and then another Ph.D. at the faculty of political

8 sciences in Belgrade early in 2005. In the JNA, and later the VJ, I held

9 a number of posts. I started as platoon commander and I ended up as

10 assistant army commander. During my work at the General Staff, I was

11 chief of the morale department and then chief of strategic studies

12 department and defence policies. At the time of the air-strikes against

13 the FRY, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command put in a request on the

14 1st of January, 1999, for me to become head of the morale department of

15 the General Staff of the VJ. Right now I'm a colonel in retirement. I

16 retired last year at my own request. I now teach at the first private

17 university, American university, in Bijeljina about 100 kilometres from

18 Belgrade. I am the head of the security department at the faculty of law

19 and the general manager at this university.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: When were you awarded your doctorate at the VJ

21 military academy?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the 18th of February, 2002.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

24 Mr. Visnjic.

25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

1 Q. You were - I'm just looking at it - head of the morale department

2 during the war in 1999, right? What did your department do, briefly?

3 A. The morale department of the Supreme Command Staff was organized

4 based on the war organizational chart, wartime, it was meant to internally

5 inform army members to permanently monitor and assess the morale during

6 the air-strikes, to directly prepare in moral and psychological terms the

7 soldiers in order to make them better able to endure the hardship they

8 were facing. Another important task of our department was to take

9 advantage of this difficult social situation in order to apply scientific

10 matters and study the behaviour of persons under these difficult

11 conditions.

12 Q. Thank you very much. This internal informing system, exchange of

13 information, within that framework in the army, was there such an area,

14 such a field that dealt with or comprised certain negative phenomena, or

15 rather, information on any crimes and violations committed by members of

16 the VJ?

17 A. One of the tasks of internal information, not the only one, was to

18 monitor the soldiers and members of all units and commands and to keep

19 them informed on the situation in their unit. This is the third element

20 of internal informing, informing about the situation in one's own unit.

21 This also dealt with negative phenomena, any negative phenomena which may

22 have occurred on one of the previous days in the area of responsibility of

23 a specific unit; hence, if one of the members of a particular unit

24 committed one of the negative phenomena or was involved in some of the

25 negative actions that were taken or was involved in a crime, this was read

1 out when units were reviewed in front of everybody, it was based on such

2 individual cases that warnings were issued to others, saying that any such

3 actions or violations would be punished.

4 Q. Let us now move on to this last area that I think you mentioned,

5 the application of scientific methods in the study of human behaviour

6 under these difficult conditions. Is it true that you conducted several

7 rounds of research, your institute I mean, during the war itself. Certain

8 scientific methods were used and inquiries were made into the elements of

9 combat morale. Can you tell us what the elements were that you studied?

10 A. Yes, it is true, there was an order from the Chief of Staff of the

11 Supreme Command and we launched two investigations empirical

12 investigations. We studied everybody in the VJ, but the focus was on the

13 3rd Army. The first round was between the 16th of April and the 26th of

14 April, 1999, and 1.200 subjects were studied, the focus being on the 3rd

15 Army and particularly the Pristina Corps. The sample was about 40 per

16 cent.

17 Q. [No interpretation]

18 A. Another study was conducted at the end of the air-strikes after

19 the signing of the Kumanovo Agreement and the sample used was 2.600

20 interviewees, the focus again being on the 3rd Army, the Pristina Corps.

21 The percentage in this case was 50.2 [as interpreted] per cent that was

22 made up by members of the 3rd Army.

23 Q. Can you now please look at 3D7773 [as interpreted], it's a Defence

24 exhibit.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: What do you mean by the percentage in relation to

1 the April study you say the sample was about 40 per cent, 40 per cent of

2 what?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm talking about the overall sample

4 of all members of the army that were interviewed, 1.200 members and then

5 the subsample belonging to the 3rd Army was 40.2 per cent, the reason

6 being the 3rd Army was at the heart of combat operations, they were right

7 there in the middle of the theatre of war and was suffering the severest

8 attacks by NATO planes. It was under those conditions that we wanted to

9 measure the mood of the people there. The chief of the -- the Chief of

10 Staff was really interested in getting these results so that he might make

11 informed decisions on how to use these soldiers from there on.

12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] 3D733, please.

13 Q. Colonel, what is this document? It says positions and opinions of

14 members of the Pristina Corps regarding certain indicators of combat

15 morale?

16 A. This is one of the preliminary reports covering results obtained

17 by this research. This was about members of the Pristina Corps. We used

18 these preliminary results and we applied them to the overall sample. As

19 for the results of this research, pursuant to an order of the Chief of

20 Staff of the Supreme Command, I informed the Supreme Command once the

21 research was over. We decided to deal with every sample and subsample,

22 the 3rd Army and the Pristina Corps, and then there was a special

23 preliminary report in relation to each and every one of these so that we

24 might deal with the most responsible officers of this corps and this army

25 so that they might then use this to further direct their work and take

1 decisions on the use of their own units.

2 Q. If you look at this table on the left-hand side we see duties, and

3 this reflects the structure of those interviewed, the make-up of those

4 interviewed, and on the right the social background of the interviewees?

5 A. Yes. You can see when looking at this table that the sample

6 included is soldiers 37 per cent, officers 17.3 per cent, and reservists

7 about 45.7 per cent.

8 Q. Thank you. Colonel, let's go to page 4 of this document now.

9 Before that appears in e-court, I mean page 4, can you tell me this, sir:

10 How exactly was this research conducted?

11 A. While preparing for this research, the assistant was enlisted from

12 the greatest experts of social psychology and social work for the faculty

13 of phylosophy in Belgrade, it's part of the Belgrade university. I tried

14 to put together a team around me of eminent experts in the field of social

15 psychology so that we might together draw up an instrument, an instrument

16 which we could then use to measure what we wanted to measure, which

17 reflected the demands made on us by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme

18 Command. A questionnaire was drawn up. This was verified before taken to

19 the field. A test sample was used where the variables displayed very high

20 metric characteristics, which allowed us to conclude that we could go on

21 and use it as a valid scientific instrument to measure the positions,

22 attitudes, and convictions of members of the army.

23 Q. If I understand you correctly, this research was conducted based

24 on a questionnaire or questionnaires that were then answered by the

25 interviewees, right?

1 A. The questionnaire contained 67 variables, 1 to 4 in relation to

2 each variable, and sometimes 1 to 5, I'm talking about the indicators,

3 about 1.000-something indicators based on which we measured the combat

4 morale or the members of the army. We measured and checked the attitudes

5 and positions, I mean of the members of the army, during the NATO

6 air-strike.

7 Q. Could you please explain to us what we see on page 4 of this

8 document, 3D733, the head -- the heading is: "Sources of fear." And in

9 particular what we see here in the table, I want to know what kind of

10 conclusions did you reach, what the possible sources of fear are, and then

11 I will be asking you some questions about it in greater detail.

12 A. This is part of the instrument that we used to measure the

13 attitudes and the convictions of people regarding the psychological

14 efforts, sources of fear, and the determination of the emotional state of

15 the troops. Currently in front of us on the screen we have a scale that

16 was used to measure the sources of fear and the intensity of fear among

17 the troops, the VJ members, during the NATO air-strikes. As you can see

18 from this overview, fear among the members of the Pristina Corps was

19 slightly more pronounced than fear among other army personnel that was --

20 this was expected because this corps had for almost a year been in the

21 combat zone. They were exposed to greater psychological and physical

22 strain, and they were the ones that suffered the brunt of NATO

23 air-strikes. As you can see from item 3.4 on this scale, strong fear and

24 very strong fear was present among about 26, 27 per cent of the members of

25 the Pristina Corps, while for the overall sample of the VJ troops the fear

1 was present among 13 per cent of them. The feeling of fear --

2 Q. Could you just slow down a little bit.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, what is the issue in the case that we

4 should have in mind when we're looking at this?

5 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in fact, this was my

6 next question. I was about to stop the witness, but if I were to give you

7 my argument, then I will be asking a question for this witness. But if

8 you allow me to ask the question you will get the answer to your question

9 and that would, in fact, conclude this whole issue.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: One more may do no harm at this stage. Continue.

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. This table here where you have item number 3, NATO bombing, we can

13 see that in the whole -- in the entire sample NATO bombing was the source

14 of fear for 23 per cent, and the Pristina Corps it was 39 per cent. And

15 you actually did say that the Pristina Corps had reason that Pristina

16 Corps personnel had reason to feel this increased rate of fear because of

17 the air-strikes. Now, I want to ask you the following. Based on your

18 experience as a scientist, as a soldier, and perhaps this is something

19 that you could conclude, would there be a difference between soldiers and

20 civilians in the intensity of fear when faced with -- let me be specific,

21 when faced with NATO air-strikes?

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Don't answer that question. Is there no objection

23 taken to that question?

24 MR. HANNIS: I do object to that, Your Honour. There's no

25 foundation for him to express an opinion on that.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: What's the basis for this witness expressing an

2 opinion on that matter, which is a matter of expertise for a start?

3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, well I think it is

4 actually beyond the scope of questions for experts. We had a number of

5 witnesses, Prosecution witnesses, who said that they were not afraid of

6 NATO air-strikes and that they were not afraid of bombs at all. And here

7 we tried to present empirical research carried out by the VJ among its own

8 personnel, people who should have had a lower tolerance, threshold,

9 compared to ordinary civilians, and as you can see --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: You're not answering the question, with respect.

11 What is the basis for this witness being able to make that comparison?

12 What qualification has he got that I don't have to assess that?

13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, he's a soldier,

14 so I guess he was involved in the training of soldiers and he was probably

15 preparing them for the situations that followed, and within this framework

16 I assume that he might be in a position to explain to us what the effect

17 of something is on a person who had undergone preparations and a person

18 who had not been prepared at all for something.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, we consider you have not established a

21 foundation for asking the question that you've just asked, and therefore

22 we will not allow you to seek that opinion based on what we've heard so

23 far as to the basis for it. If the witness has been observing Albanians

24 or has some questionnaires relating to the reactions of Albanians, it

25 would be different. But to draw a conclusion based on his research among

1 soldiers when he's not an expert in this field of psychology, then it

2 would be inappropriate for him to be expressing an opinion. So please

3 move to something else.

4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. While we're on this point, Colonel, did you go to Kosovo at all?

6 A. Yes. At one point at the end of the air-strikes, the results of

7 this study showed that there were some -- there was some slipping of the

8 combat morale among some of the units, and the Chief of Staff of the

9 Supreme Command ordered that team of high-ranking officers should go to

10 Kosovo and Metohija to determine the level at which tasks were being

11 carried out, to determine the state of morale, to provide assistance to

12 the units, to eliminate those defects, in order to then be able to submit

13 the report that could be used by the Chief of Staff of the -- and the

14 Pristina Corps and the 3rd Army so that they, in turn, could take

15 additional measures.

16 Q. We will come back to that.

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] But could we please now have page 2

18 of this document that is in front of us, that's 3D733.

19 Q. Could you tell us, but very briefly, what is this table that we

20 see in front of us and could you please explain if there is a difference

21 between the results obtained for the Pristina Corps and for the rest of

22 the Army of Yugoslavia.

23 A. Well, in front of us we have a pie chart that expressed the

24 measure of the general fatigue in the army personnel. We have the

25 preliminary results for the subsample of the Pristina Corps personnel, and

1 you can see from this that the personnel in this corps - and this is in

2 correlation with what we had seen for the previous issue, fear - that they

3 had greater -- suffered greater fatigue and psycho-physiological strain

4 along with the other personnel. The mean for the whole sample was 3.18,

5 and the Pristina Corps subsample, it was 2.89. This told us that this was

6 a moderate fatigue because the mean value was close to 3, that was the

7 mean for the whole scale that was used.

8 Q. And finally let us look at another page, that's the next page,

9 page 3.

10 Could you please explain to us, what is this table all about and

11 the values for the whole sample and for Pristina Corps?

12 A. What you have in front of you, Your Honours, is the scale that was

13 used to measure the emotional state of the army personnel. It measures 11

14 variables, and each variable had four indicators, four degrees that were

15 measured. As you can see from this scale, the mean value for the army

16 personnel is 3.18, and for the Pristina Corps it's 2.89. A higher value

17 on the scale means better emotional state, and a smaller figure designates

18 that the emotional state was worse. This is the standard Liker-type scale

19 and it is very precise, it measures precisely what you want it to measure.

20 And on the basis of this we can conclude quite reliably that the

21 emotional state of the Pristina Corps personnel was slightly worse than

22 the emotional state of the overall sample, which is quite logical, normal,

23 and expected. We, the researchers, expected that, but it was still within

24 the limits of a positive emotional state. As you you can see, 2.89 is

25 quite close to the mean value on this scale, that would be: I do not

1 agree. I do not agree to the statements. I do not agree that my

2 emotional state was at threat. That means that this is a positive -- an

3 expression of a positive opinion.

4 Q. Could you just slow down a bit.

5 A. I think thta from this scale the 11th variable is relevant for the

6 Trial Chamber, the 11th parameter. It describes the emotions of the

7 Pristina Corps members. It -- the sentence reads: "I am obsessed with

8 the desire for revenge."

9 As you can see, the mean value for this parameter on the scale is

10 higher than the mean value for the overall sample. I said a little while

11 ago that a higher number, higher value, means a better emotional state.

12 For -- as far as this parameter is concerned, the emotional state of the

13 Pristina Corps personnel was positive, it was quite satisfactory, and it

14 was a little bit higher than that for the rest of the army. There is a

15 rational explanation for all that. The Pristina Corps personnel had

16 already been prepared in social psychological manner to deal with the

17 efforts, with the air-strikes, constant combat, ambush, minefields that

18 were laid by the KLA and so on. The rest of the troops were subjected to

19 daily air-strikes from a safe distance, and this caused greater anger

20 among them than among members of the Pristina Corps who were under this

21 daily combat strain. As a whole, this scale shows good emotional state of

22 the personnel, which means that they had undergone proper social

23 psychological preparations, that they were properly trained, properly

24 informed to deal with all the strain that they were facing. And if you

25 allow me to conclude, if you had troops of this kind in such an emotional

1 state, and I am familiar with the wars of the 20th century, I had studied

2 that for 20 years, it is difficult to expect that any crimes, particularly

3 not organized crimes, could be committed by such personnel.

4 Q. Thank you. Some other measures were taken, too, but just very

5 briefly. To mobilise psychologists in the command, could you please tell

6 me what was the purpose? Why were the psychologists mobilised and what

7 were they to do?

8 A. Well, in peacetime we had psychologists in all the units in corps

9 brigade -- at the regiment brigade level, and that was a person who was

10 supposed to assess the psychological state of the troops. On the orders

11 of the Supreme Command Staff chief there was an additional psychologist

12 and two psychologists in every brigade, one psychologist for every

13 battalion. Their basic tasks in those units was to assist the commanders

14 of the basic units, the officers in the commands, the unit commanders

15 themselves, to deal with the problems that are a normal consequence of all

16 fighters in the war, that all fighters experienced, to deal with them in a

17 more easier manner.

18 Q. Colonel, you told us that you were in Kosovo during the war. You

19 said that that was at the end of the war. Let us narrow this down. Was

20 that part of the control that was organized by the General Staff in the

21 period between the 23rd and the 26th of May, 1999?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Who was in charge of the control?

24 A. The team leader was Major-General Spasoje Djurovic, he was the

25 chief of the infantry administration. The two of us on the orders of the

1 chief of the staff of the -- of the Supreme Command were tasked to visit

2 the 7th Infantry Brigade, where those negative phenomena occurred, where

3 combat morale was decreased.

4 Q. What kind of minor negative phenomena are you talking about?

5 A. You see, this unit is from the Krusevac area, Zupski Aleksandrovac

6 and Trstenik.

7 Q. Can you tell us what minor phenomena you're talking about?

8 A. Abandoning their combat positions because of powerful propaganda

9 and rumours that were circulating that had been launched by propaganda

10 centres outside our own country.

11 Q. What about after this control, did you have a joint meeting of all

12 the teams that were part of this initiative and at this meeting results

13 were considered that had been reached by all the teams?

14 A. Yes, that is the established practice. After each round of

15 control, since this entailed the entire corps, the team leaders would

16 report to the overall team leader. The corps commander would normally,

17 tend the army commander as well, and there were reports on the situation

18 that was encountered. On-the-spot measures were taken to energetically

19 deal with problems in certain units.

20 Q. Thank you very much. During this round of control were you

21 perhaps told that because of failure to implement an order on

22 resubordination and because of wilful action taken on the ground, a number

23 of MUP members, and to a large extent also entire smaller groups, were

24 committing crimes against the Siptar civilian population in Ulezbegovi

25 [phoen] in settlements, refugee centres, that there was looting, murder,

1 aggravated theft, and other such crimes, and that these crimes were being

2 systematically attributed to units or individuals from the VJ?

3 A. No. Throughout my three days in the Klina area, in the area of

4 responsibility of the 7th Infantry Brigade, there were no indicator

5 whatsoever of that nature nor did the command staff of that particular

6 brigade tell us anything like that.

7 Q. Thank you very much.

8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no further

9 questions for this witness.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Visnjic.

11 Any Defence counsel with cross? None.

12 Mr. Hannis.

13 You'll now be cross-examined by the Prosecutor, Mr. Hannis.

14 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

15 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis:

16 Q. Colonel, who was your immediate superior during 1998 and 1999?

17 A. In 1999 -- I was not attached to the General Staff in 1998. In

18 1999 it was head of the morale and information administration.

19 Q. And who was your superior?

20 A. Major-General -- up until the start of the air-strikes,

21 Gradimir Zivanovic then Colonel Novkovic and during the air-strikes Major

22 Aleksandar Bakocevic.

23 Q. I see in the VJ collegium minutes the evening briefings that

24 oftentimes Colonel Novkovic is there to report about morale, but it seems

25 other times you are at those meetings reporting about the same topic. Did

1 the two of you ever attend meetings at the same time?

2 A. No. No. I would stand in for Colonel Novkovic whenever he was

3 away.

4 Q. And I wanted to ask you, you told us about your Ph.D. That you

5 received in 2002 I believe it was. What was the topic of that?

6 A. The topic was about sociology of morale, it was about empirical

7 research, combat factors, factors of combat morale of the VJ in the

8 defensive war against NATO.

9 Q. And you mentioned that one of the tasks of internal information

10 was to inform about the situation in one's own unit. This dealt with

11 neglect phenomena. Can you give us some examples of what you classify as

12 negative phenomena?

13 A. Internal information in the VJ has a much broader context than

14 simply informing the troops about any negative phenomena. This comprised

15 in its entirety the situation in our surroundings and further afield in

16 the entire world, and anything that was relevant to us, to our army. This

17 also included the situation in the overall unit in terms of morale and

18 combat-readiness. This third issue, situation in the unit, it was

19 inevitable that the daily informing sessions or briefings that would

20 normally last between 10 and 15 minutes and the periodic briefing that

21 would take place about once a fortnight included negative phenomena that

22 occurred in certain units, sometimes wilful abandonment of combat

23 positions, desertion from units, drunkenness on the part of individual

24 soldiers, and minor misdemeanours, such as theft and looting in the course

25 of combat activities. Maybe there was a disciplinary or military

1 infraction that occurred in the area of responsibility of a certain unit.

2 In such cases it was inevitable for the commander of the unit to talk

3 about this in front of all the soldiers in his unit. He would use these

4 incidents to increase motivation among his soldiers, their motivation to

5 carry out their tasks. He would seize the opportunity to tell everybody

6 else what sort of fate they would meet were they to commit an infraction

7 like that.

8 Q. And as it developed in 1999 during the combat situation, wasn't

9 the primary focus of these examples on crimes against the army, primarily

10 desertion, going absent without leave, insubordination, drinking or drugs

11 on duty, et cetera. In terms of numbers, that was the overwhelming

12 majority of negative phenomena that were dealt with in this fashion,

13 correct?

14 A. I talked about at least segments of our results following this

15 empirical research, but I'll repeat now. Not a single indicator pointed

16 to more serious crimes. Therefore, in answer to your question I can only

17 talk about minor negative phenomena that tend to be a normal side effect

18 of every war and the behaviour of any army in the situation of war. Of

19 course especially towards the end of the air-strikes when people were

20 already greatly fatigued, both emotionally and psychologically, and there

21 were rumours that were launched by sources outside our own country,

22 individuals and smaller combat groups leaving their positions, and this

23 was something that was reported every day. It was based on this type of

24 information that the morale was built up among the remaining members of

25 the army, in a bid to motivate them to comply with their combat tasks in

1 keeping with the combat regulations that applied.

2 Q. Colonel, how can you say there was not a single indicator that

3 pointed to more serious crimes? Did you review the military court records

4 or did you consult with General Vasiljevic or General Farkas about reports

5 of crimes being committed by VJ personnel during the NATO air-strikes?

6 A. I suppose you have been following closely my evidence here. You

7 see this was between the 16th of April and the 26th of April, the study

8 that was conducted. The indicators that we used to measure the state of

9 combat morale included 67 variables, each containing four or five

10 indicators. There was absolutely no indication whatsoever of any problem

11 like that. Had this not been the case, we would have looked into it, that

12 much is certain. We looked at all the 1.200 questionnaires, and the last

13 question was not a question actually. Everybody who was interviewed could

14 provide information of their own accord. And we looked at all these

15 answers, and we never found anything, we never came across anything to

16 indicate more serious phenomena of crimes occurring in their area of

17 responsibility.

18 Q. Okay. I'm sorry I wasn't -- I guess I wasn't clear on the date of

19 this survey. So I take it it was between the 16th and 26th of April,

20 1.200 questionnaires to members of the Pristina Corps, correct?

21 A. No, not just members of the Pristina Corps, the VJ as a whole.

22 The Pristina Corps's sample was 352 interviewees.

23 Q. Well, I see on page 1 of Exhibit 3D733 it says there were 1200

24 persons for the Yugoslav Army as a whole, and among the Pristina Corps

25 there were 335 interviewees. Is that correct?

1 A. Yes, that's right. Yes.

2 Q. So the Pristina Corps interviewees, how was the survey done, was

3 it anonymous? Because I see there's a letter of authorisation from

4 Colonel Ojdanic attached to the last page, authorising blank name,

5 personal ID card number blank to conduct a study. Is that you who was

6 authorised to conduct a study?

7 A. Sir, Mr. Prosecutor, I was in charge of the entire project. In

8 the introductory part of my evidence I said that I put together a number

9 of expert civilians for the most part who talked at the faculty of

10 philosophy which is part of the Belgrade university. We also included in

11 our team a number of volunteers, professors from the military academy;

12 therefore, civilians, well-respected professor of the Belgrade university

13 who taught psychology and andragogy at the military academy. We pulled

14 out of the units all the professors who taught at the military academy and

15 who taught social sciences at the academy. We enlisted the assistance of

16 some professional psychologists working for the VJ. When I was given the

17 task of conducting this study, I put together a total of 12 teams, each

18 comprising five --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: You're not answering the particular question that

20 was asked. I think, Mr. Hannis, if he wants an answer will focus it

21 better.

22 MR. HANNIS:

23 Q. Let me stop there and ask you a particular question. The Pristina

24 Corps interviewees, how were they selected, do you know? Who picked them

25 to participate in the interviews?

1 A. In the teams that I put together pursuant to an order from the

2 chief of the Supreme Command, went straight to the field these team, they

3 would pick a random sample, they would interview people in the areas of

4 responsibility of each of these units. Therefore, these weren't

5 deliberately selected samples. The samples were random among those units

6 of the Pristina Corps who happened to be at their combat positions at the

7 time. The questionnaire was entirely anonymous. It was compiled by those

8 from the Pristina Corps who were given this questionnaire. They all

9 carried pens and they distributed these questionnaires in the areas of

10 combat activity. This is the most complex form of wartime research.

11 Science had not seen anything like this before. This is not only a

12 hallmark for our Serbian science. I would say this is a general hallmark

13 in the history of psychology and history of psychology.

14 Q. The questionnaires then were filled out by the individual soldiers

15 on their own and returned to your personnel conducting the survey?

16 A. Yes. My investigators insofar as combat situations allowed for

17 this would put together groups consisting of between 15 and 20 combatants,

18 they would distribute these questionnaires to them, they would explain the

19 motives, the purpose, and the importance for this scientific research, not

20 just for them but for the army, society and science as a whole. They

21 asked them to be sincere in their answers. They distributed pens to them

22 because it was hardly to be expected that they would carry pens on them

23 along the front line. They filled in these questionnaires and in an

24 organized manner under the supervision of the questionnaire they would

25 bring these back. These questionnaires were brought back to Belgrade,

1 they were fed into computers, statistical analyses were conducted, and

2 then the results were processed after which -- after which reports were

3 drafted.

4 Q. And if you could, try to keep your answers short if my question

5 permits. Did the questionnaire include any questions about whether the

6 interviewee had committed any crimes against civilians?

7 A. There was a group of questions about negative phenomena occurring

8 across units. I don't remember how many questions this set included, but

9 I think it was part 3 of the questionnaire and there were those questions,

10 too, that were included. As I said a while ago, in those answers we came

11 across nothing to indicate at that time, I'm talking about April, the

12 commission of any crimes.

13 Q. Sorry. Did you honestly expect that anyone who might have

14 committed a war crime would report himself as having done so? Would that

15 be a natural human reaction?

16 A. Well, an individual may not denounce himself, but his fellow

17 soldiers, someone from a neighbouring unit might. Over 50 per cent of

18 those mobilised in Kosovo-Metohija were reservists. It was nearly

19 impossible that looking at the overall sample of those interviewed not a

20 single person would step forward and disclose this information that nobody

21 would mention any crimes. You know how many interviewees there were,

22 1.200. It is statistically impossible that not a single person would come

23 forward and talk about this. These were independent questionnaires, and

24 independent scientists from the whole world can have a go if they like and

25 check these questionnaires. And I can state with full responsibility

1 before this Trial Chamber that were they to apply the same methods, were

2 they to apply the same scientific approach and use these same

3 questionnaires, the results eventually obtained would always be identical.

4 Q. And one of those results being no reports of any crimes committed.

5 Couldn't that be because people who commit crimes aren't likely to report

6 it on a questionnaire presented to them in the context where they're with

7 15 or 20 of their colleagues?

8 A. Sir, Mr. Prosecutor, it wasn't our job to track down individual

9 perpetrators. Our job was to conduct a reliable scientific study, an

10 independent one, not just for this but in order to be able to extrapolate

11 for the sake of science based on this war that was foisted on the FRY.

12 Really, I must say this again, it was entirely impossible that none of the

13 1.200 interviewees would have pointed out that crimes had been committed

14 during the air-strikes over those 78 days of everyday suffering. You saw

15 that box which talks about revenge among the ranks of the Pristina Corps,

16 and this only backs what I'm saying. There was no pronounced thirst for

17 revenge. They were professional soldiers, properly trained for the

18 conditions, the dangerous conditions, that they were facing. Their

19 concern was about their families, about mass murder back home, it wasn't

20 concern for their own safety and lives, and this is a particularly salient

21 feature that comes across if you study this piece of research that we

22 produced which we believed might be of consequence for science at large.

23 Q. Well, let's talk about that for a minute. Your chart with those

24 11 variables or 11 questions, I am obsessed with a desire for revenge.

25 Why was it phrased in that way, "obsessed"?

1 A. Just one explanation, we're not talking about reprisals, we're

2 talking about revenge. In the context of your question, what we wanted to

3 do is to check on the emotional state scale this kind of emotion among the

4 troops in a war. From experience from other wars in the 20th century, it

5 is quite well-known that the hatred towards the enemy is very pronounced,

6 and based on the experience from other wars, 40 to 50 per cent of the

7 troops hate their opponent. We wanted to check this, not because of our

8 internal needs, but for the sake of science whether the VJ troops, and in

9 particular the Pristina Corps troops, felt this anger towards the enemy.

10 And I wanted to explain, I tried to explain, why this feeling of hatred

11 towards the NATO air-strikes was not so well pronounced. They felt rage

12 much more than hatred because they couldn't reach them. And as for

13 members of the KLA and the civilian population, there was a positive

14 emotional attitude, and a scientist can draw a valid conclusion on the

15 basis of these data that there were no such serious crimes, in particular

16 I'm talking about grave crimes. I'm not denying that some individuals may

17 have committed such crimes, but the sample of our interviewees that we

18 interviewed does not support this. I'm talking about facts. This does

19 not support such a claim.

20 Q. Well, you pointed out that there was a higher number, and

21 therefore a better emotional state, among the Pristina Corps than among

22 the rest of the army in connection with item number 11, the desire for

23 revenge, correct?

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Because this is the reverse --

2 Q. You've answered my question.

3 A. [In English] Okay.

4 Q. Let me ask you another one. I suggest to you that one of the

5 reasons for that difference is the soldiers in the Pristina Corps had had

6 the opportunity of seeing some of their fellow soldiers and MUP policemen

7 commit crimes against civilians, Kosovo Albanian civilians in Kosovo that

8 may have made them feel more tolerant about war in general, feeling that

9 it is a horrible crime, it affects everyone in terrible ways, and they

10 have less desire for revenge because they know how needless and stupid war

11 is, compared to their compatriots in Serbia who did not see the same kind

12 of thing. That's a variable you did not consider in your survey, correct?

13 A. [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor, I talked about facts --

14 Q. Sir -- sir --

15 A. -- Fact tells us that there was no indicator that any of that

16 happened --

17 Q. My question was: Is that a variable that you considered, yes or

18 no?

19 A. I do apologise. Could you please repeat your question; it was

20 rather long.

21 Q. Did you consider the possible variable that the soldiers in the

22 Pristina Corps would have been in a position to see crimes committed by

23 some of their fellow soldiers and/or MUP policemen against Kosovo Albanian

24 civilians, which the soldiers in other parts of Serbia did not see; and

25 having seen that and the results of that kind of conduct may have

1 instilled in them less of a desire for revenge because they realised the

2 futility and stupidity of war. Is that a factor, a variable, that you

3 considered in trying to distinguish the difference in those results, yes

4 or no?

5 A. No, no, that is not a factor.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.

8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I want to object to

9 that question because I can't see how what Mr. Hannis presented to the

10 witness is a variable, it's not a variable, it's a conclusion. Mr. Hannis

11 should perhaps tell us how he envisages this question, how it should be

12 phrased in the questionnaire, because he merely offered this conclusion to

13 the witness that he based on some facts, but that was not a variable that

14 was supposed to be subject of a question, or perhaps I misunderstood his

15 question.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you've certainly given the witness the answer

17 for your re-examination question, Mr. Visnjic. That was an improper

18 objection to take after the question had been answered.

19 Mr. Hannis.

20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: As far as time is concerned, can you help me

22 because I was assuming that we would be finishing at quarter to?

23 MR. HANNIS: I'm checking with my case manager regarding that,

24 Your Honour. I think I have no more questions. Let me check two tabs

25 here.

1 No, Your Honour, thank you. I'm finished.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

3 Mr. Visnjic.

4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No questions.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Danilovic, that completes your evidence; thank

7 you for coming to the Tribunal to give it. You're now free to leave the

8 courtroom.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

10 [The witness withdrew]

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Visnjic, you are going to deal with the

12 situation in relation to Radinovic.

13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour. I

14 discussed this with the Prosecution and with several of my colleagues, and

15 if I am not mistaken nobody's objecting so that we would support this

16 motion by the Prosecutor to have the expert witness testify at the end.

17 Let me just check.

18 [Defence counsel confer]

19 MR. VISNJIC: Okay. So maybe there is some objections, but ...

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, is there someone else wants to address us on

21 it?

22 Mr. Ackerman.

23 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, I just object to that because I

24 think the witness Radinovic should be presented during the case for

25 Ojdanic because it can have a rather dramatic effect on the case I'm

1 trying to present to prepare for General Pavkovic. And we have a right to

2 expect that to happen, we had no reason to expect it not to happen, and

3 all of a sudden at the last minute to have it change on us requires to

4 re-evaluate some things that I'm doing. I think it should just happen in

5 the regular course of events, and there will be a break occurring between

6 I think the end of the rest of Mr. Visnjic's witnesses and the beginning

7 of his testimony and the Ojdanic testimony that would give Mr. Hannis

8 plenty of time to deal with it.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: We haven't explored the basis on which there was

10 some agreement about other expert evidence being led at the end of the

11 case. That differs from the situation in relation to this witness.

12 MR. ACKERMAN: Those are primarily joint expert testimonies that

13 will be put in for all of us together. This is not a joint expert. This

14 is a expert for the Ojdanic case only.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

16 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, as I recall we put Mr. Fila's

17 expert at the end of the case already, and I don't think it's fair for the

18 Prosecution to be put in this box because there's a disagreement between

19 Mr. Pavkovic's lawyer and Mr. Ojdanic's at this point. I think a solution

20 could --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you can't fault Mr. Ackerman in this

22 situation, can you?

23 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour, but I think dealing with his problem

24 could be handled by at the end of the case if there is something new that

25 comes out with the expert, that he could point to you why he needs to

1 re-open, it could be addressed at that time.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: One other possibility, Mr. Visnjic, is that you

3 have his evidence after Mr. Ojdanic's evidence and that would allow time.

4 It's a bit of a compromise, but it gives Mr. Hannis more time depending on

5 the order we make, but it allows us more flexibility to make a more

6 generous order, bearing in mind that neither the Prosecution or

7 Mr. Ackerman can be faulted for this situation.

8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, all options were equal

9 to me in this matter. The only thing I'm asking you is not to have

10 Mr. Ojdanic put on the stand before the seven-day break, I already gave

11 you the reasons, and I believe that we will be able to complete all the

12 evidence we want to put in next week. We have four, maybe three witnesses

13 for next week, so that's -- I anticipate that we will be done by that time

14 anyway.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: I think I already indicated we didn't think your

16 reason was a very good one for having him after the break, that you had

17 had plenty of time to consult with him in the period that you were

18 allowed. So we'll think about that, along with the issue of the timing of

19 the expert evidence, and make a ruling on that tomorrow.

20 Mr. Ivetic, have you thought further on the --

21 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour, in discussions with lead counsel we

22 will be withdrawing the part of the submission asking for action on the

23 part of the Trial Chamber with CLSS. We are satisfied that the Court is

24 apprised of the difference and distinction between the two words and we

25 will to endeavour to use the full Serbian name of the

1 "Posebne Jedinice Policije" and "Specijalne Jedinice Policije." We hope

2 that the evidence will show the distinction that is between those two

3 words in Serbian is not evident in the English translation and we're sure

4 that Your Honours will be able to follow that in the way that we present

5 our evidence. Thank you.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: What you're saying is you withdraw your request for

7 relief?

8 MR. IVETIC: Yes.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: And we will allow you to do that.

10 Unfortunately because of arrangements tomorrow for the delivery of

11 judgements in the afternoon in this courtroom, we will have to start at

12 8.30, so we're now adjourned until 8.30.

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.01 p.m.,

14 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 27th day of

15 September, 2007, at 8.30 a.m.

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