130208ED

Page 8285

1 had before us yesterday, Mr. Banbury. Could we now please show in

2 e-court P764 and could we look at paragraph 3(a) -- rather,

3 paragraph 4.3.

4 If you recall, sir, yesterday we discussed a document that was

5 drafted as a summary of the talks that you attended, the talks on the

6 21st of July, 1994, and we talked about the issues that were broached by

7 General Mladic at that meeting. Now I would like you to take a look at

8 paragraph (e) which reads -- I don't know if you can see it before you.

9 It's point (e) where it says that Mladic stated that the Serbs were very

10 upset over the reduction in food deliveries by UNHCR to the Serb side.

11 He said that the Serbs now had great difficulty bringing in food, medical

12 supplies, fuel, and spare parts for the motor transport industry which

13 was creating extreme economic hardship for the Serb people.

14 I'd just like to ask you this: From what you knew about the

15 situation on the ground, the situation in which the Serb people in

16 Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself, was that in fact in accordance with

17 what you were told by General Mladic at this meeting?

18 A. I certainly am aware that throughout the conflict many Serb

19 civilians suffered all different kinds of deprivations including in the

20 humanitarian sphere, access to enough food, access to heating in winter,

21 so I know that civilians throughout Bosnia, regardless of their national

22 origin, really suffered from the impact of the war on a humanitarian

23 level.

24 In terms of the other issues raised in that paragraph such as

25 degradation of roads, I'm less aware of that, though. It was an issue

Page 8286

1 that I know UNPROFOR engineers worked on a lot. We had armoured

2 personnel carriers, some of them tracked that certainly impacted roads.

3 In terms of industrial or agricultural production of any of the sides,

4 that was not something that UNPROFOR spent much attention on.

5 Q. And now I would like you to take a look at paragraph (e)of your

6 summary of this meeting where you paraphrased the words of General Mladic

7 that he insisted on the Serb continuing check the convoys in detail, and

8 he requested, in particular, equipment for checking the presence of

9 explosives so that these controls could be carried out more easily. He

10 said that he had already promised that by Generals Briquemont and

11 Morillon.

12 My first question is: Do you have any knowledge of that, that

13 before you arrived in talks with Generals Briquemont and Morillon that

14 such a possibility was envisaged?

15 A. I do not have any personal knowledge of anything that

16 General Briquemont or Morillon may have pledged to General Mladic in this

17 regard, though I do know that it was a somewhat common practice for UN

18 representations to be later on misrepresented by the -- in particular the

19 Bosnian Serb leadership. What we had said we would do was often

20 mischaracterised later in a different context.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, you're referring to a section,

22 capital A. Where is it exactly what you are referring to? Which page?

23 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, perhaps there was a

24 problem with interpretation. I mentioned point 3(e) under freedom -- and

25 the title is "freedom of movement."

Page 8287

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That is (g) rather than (e). That may have

2 caused the --

3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] (g) (i).

4 JUDGE ORIE: I've found it meanwhile. Please proceed.

5 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 Q. The next thing I wanted to ask you about this message of yours is

7 this: You said that Mladic insisted that the Serbs would continue to

8 closely examine our convoys. In the agreement on the movement of

9 convoys, was the possibility envisaged that the documents and the goods

10 that are being transported can be cross checked?

11 A. Sorry, which particular agreement are you referring to? We had

12 many different arrangements over the course of time on convoy movements.

13 Q. Well, let me ask you about July 1994 then. At that time, the

14 Serb side or the federation side in the event that convoys went through

15 the territories under their controls, did they have the ability to

16 actually cross-reference the documents, the accompanying documents, and

17 the goods that are being transported on those trucks?

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, you said did they have the ability.

19 Your previous question was about agreement. Did you mean practical

20 possibilities to do or whether they were entitled under whatever kind of

21 agreement? If it is the latter, you should clearly indicate which

22 agreement you're referring to. If it's the former, then please make that

23 clear to the witness.

24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. So first I'll ask you - thank you. Thank you, Your Honours -

Page 8288

1 first, I'll ask you were they entitled to do these checks?

2 A. In my view no party was entitled to conduct such checks as matter

3 of the -- or based on the legal status of UNPROFOR and the rights given

4 to us by the Security Council. Having said that, UNPROFOR often did

5 enter into arrangements, in particular with the Bosnian Serb side as a

6 very practical matter to get our convoys through. Otherwise, they could

7 not -- the Bosnian Serbs would not let them pass. So while they were not

8 entitled to legally speaking, we nonetheless agreed to arrangements that

9 let them do certain cross-checking between the documents we submitted and

10 the checks of the convoys on the ground.

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Excuse me, Mr. Banbury. Did the federation side

12 have similar entitlements? I think that was the question that was put by

13 Mr. Stojanovic, whether the federation did have this cross-checking of

14 goods with consignments.

15 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour. The arrangements with the

16 federation were always very different, and we never had these kinds of

17 difficulties with transport of our goods, our personnel, humanitarian

18 supplies, convoys, et cetera, with the federation. The legal rights of

19 UNPROFOR, of course, were the same, but as a practicality matter we were

20 not -- it was not necessary for us to enter into those kinds of

21 arrangements with the federation or either of the two component parts of

22 the federation because they did not place the same kinds of restrictions

23 on us.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

25 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 8289

1 Q. I will conclude with one last question about the movement of

2 convoys. Would you agree that these convoys that were inspected by the

3 Republika Srpska authorities were convoys the destination of which was

4 the area in the territory of the federation and specifically the

5 enclaves?

6 A. It depends on -- on which convoys you're referring to. We had

7 convoys moving on a daily basis or sometimes it wasn't even a convoy. It

8 could have been a single passenger vehicle with a couple civil affairs

9 officers, but the destination in principle was immaterial. It's a

10 United Nations convoy. Secondly, the destination was either an UNPROFOR

11 establishment, wherever it was located, it was to an UNPROFOR military

12 base or an UNPROFOR office or an UNPROFOR civilian police office, or it

13 was a humanitarian assistance destination, a warehouse, a distribution

14 point for humanitarian assistance. Geographically where it was located

15 for the UN, I think, was much less material but oftentimes it was into

16 the eastern enclaves.

17 Q. And do you know of any case where the convoys meant for

18 Republika Srpska crossed over the territory of the Federation of Bosnia

19 and Herzegovina?

20 A. I'm sure that must have happened on a very regular basis given

21 our supply lines and the humanitarian supply lines coming up from the

22 coast. I'm sure there must have been on a very regular basis convoys,

23 whether it was humanitarian or UNPROFOR resupply or simply UNPROFOR

24 personnel who went from federation-controlled area to Serb-controlled

25 area, yes.

Page 8290

1 Q. Thank you. Could we now take a look at paragraph 5 of this

2 document. Here, the way I read it, in your summary you mention your own

3 words, what you said to General Mladic on that occasion relating to the

4 release of prisoners and detainees. If I read -- am reading this

5 correctly, and that's why I'm asking you, on that occasion you said to

6 Mr. Mladic that you could understand -- that you understood what he was

7 talking about and that you were determined -- it to affect an

8 unconditional release of all prisoners and detainees in co-operation with

9 the ICRC.

10 Now, I'm asking you this: What -- because you mentioned what the

11 possible problem might be. So what I would like to know is: Did you

12 have any information at any point in time it actually did happen that an

13 unconditional release of all prisoners and detainees materialised as

14 General Mladic mentioned?

15 A. I should first clarify that the I pronoun in this paragraph

16 refers to Mr. Andreev and not myself. Though I drafted the document,

17 it's signed by and sent by Mr. Andreev. So it's he who made that

18 representation to General Mladic and not myself. In terms of the

19 specific answer to your question, I do not believe that there was ever

20 any unconditional release of or exchange of prisoners of war between the

21 sides during the conflict.

22 Q. Thank you. I now conclude with paragraph 9 in this document.

23 Paragraph 9 which completes the message and it stresses, among other

24 things, the following: We have to avoid a situation in which the Serbs

25 believe that UNPROFOR is biased, in favour of one of the parties in the

Page 8291

1 conflict. Therefore, we have to take advantage of opportunities to

2 co-operate with Serbs in the field with regard to issues such as taking

3 rubbish away, and so on, so that the level of trust between the Serbs and

4 UNPROFOR can be raised. What is the reason for which the conclusion is

5 that you have to avoid a situation in which in which the Serbs might

6 believe that UNPROFOR is biased?

7 A. This issue was a dominant theme throughout my time in Bosnia, and

8 it -- it was at the basis of the relationship between the Bosnian Serbs

9 and UNPROFOR, and I know that UNPROFOR worked extremely hard to do its

10 job in a fair and unbiased and impartial manner putting first the needs

11 of the civilian population in Bosnian. Sometimes that worked to the

12 advantage of one party, sometimes to the advantage of another, hopefully

13 always to the advantage of the civilians. But General Mladic and some of

14 his colleagues in Pale worked very hard to pressure UNPROFOR to do

15 more -- to act in a way that would favour them more and to make us feel

16 like we were biased or make us feel guilty or make us feel like we were

17 doing something wrong and constantly pointing out areas where they

18 thought we had failed or accusing us of misbehaviour in order to

19 precisely get the reaction or response from UNPROFOR that is reflected in

20 that document, where we sought to bend over backwards to show that we

21 were not biased so we would go to extra lengths, whether it was

22 collecting garbage in towns or any other number of ways to try and

23 demonstrate that we were not biased, so that we could get other things

24 that were important to us, particularly related to protection of -- or

25 assistance to civilian populations, and I think that this is -- it's a

Page 8292

1 very good example of that extremely unfortunate dynamic in the

2 relationship between the Bosnian Serb leadership and the UNPROFOR

3 leadership.

4 Q. Thank you. I will now show you another document that -- I would

5 like us to have P764 before us, and please focus on one of the sentences

6 that General Mladic said according to this transcript.

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Paragraph 6 (a), Your Honours,

8 in this document. Could we please have a look at it. Here it says that,

9 among other things, Mladic also mentioned the issue of the alleged bad

10 relationship with the Serbs in towns under Bosniak control; for example,

11 Sarajevo, Tuzla, Travnik, and Busovaca and Konjic. Could we now see

12 1D00711, and then I'll put some questions to you about these issues.

13 Q. First of all, according to the information you have, sir, during

14 that period of time in 1994, were there still Serbs living there, and did

15 you have any information on what the relationship was with the Serbian

16 population in the towns mentioned by General Mladic?

17 A. Yes, there were Serbs living in those towns, but sorry, I didn't

18 understand the second part of your question about the relationship, the

19 relationship between those Serb populations and UNPROFOR or the

20 federation authorities? I'm sorry, I didn't understand.

21 Q. The relationship between the federal authorities.

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we go back to the previous document. P764.

23 You asked for paragraph 6(a), and it was on the screen but it

24 disappeared.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please --

Page 8293

1 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] 6(a). 6(a), thank you.

2 JUDGE ORIE: It's page 4 in e-court.

3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. My question concerned this relationship, this attitude of the

5 federation authorities with regard to the Serbian population in the towns

6 that were referred to.

7 A. Your -- your question is on the federation authorities, and I

8 believe that as a political matter, the federation authorities had a very

9 strong commitment to the multi-ethnicity of the federation. They -- they

10 did it for perhaps a variety of reasons, but nonetheless they sought very

11 hard to maintain the multi-ethnic character of not only Sarajevo but the

12 federation as a whole, and we -- I saw that in -- in any number of ways.

13 So that was the federation authority official policy. No doubt there

14 were cases of individual Serbs or Serb families or Serb communities

15 living in different parts of the federation who were suffering various

16 kinds of deprivations including humanitarian. That being said, the

17 Muslim or Croat family living next door to them was usually suffering the

18 exact same kinds of humanitarian deprivations.

19 Q. Would you agree with me if I said that people moved towards

20 territory under the control of the army that was composed of their own

21 ethnicity? Serbs moved towards Republika Srpska, the Muslims moved

22 toward territory under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

23 and Croats moved toward territory under the control of the HVO. Is that

24 how this operated?

25 A. As a general matter, yes, I would certainly agree with that

Page 8294

1 characterisation, though there were absolutely important exceptions to

2 that general trend, especially in Sarajevo, less so in perhaps rural

3 areas or smaller cities, but Sarajevo throughout the conflict did

4 maintain in its society, its commercial aspects, its way of life and even

5 in the government, a multi-ethnic dimension. And I, for instance, had

6 Serb friends living in Sarajevo who absolutely refused to consider

7 leaving the city during the war. So as a general trend, yes, but

8 important exceptions.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could we see 1D711

11 in e-court again, please.

12 Q. Sir, this is a document dated the 1st of October, 1992, drafted

13 at the request of the ICRC after a meeting in Geneva. Let's have a look

14 at page 2 both in the English and the B/C/S version.

15 At the meeting it was proposed under 1 that civilians who desired

16 to temporarily leave the territory controlled by one of the parties to

17 reach the territory controlled by another party should be entitled to do

18 so.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]

20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it's page 2 of

21 document 1D711, paragraph 1 of the conclusion. After the title the

22 underside -- under the heading, in fact, the undersigned submit the

23 following recommendations to the deliberation of the

24 internation conference on former Yugoslavia. Thank you.

25 Q. Sir, did you have any information about the fact that as early as

Page 8295

1 1992 such a proposal was made concerning the possibility for civilians to

2 leave the territory under the control of one of the parties and move over

3 to territory under the control of one of the other parties?

4 A. I was not aware of this particular document that was written a

5 long time before I arrived in Bosnia and just a few months after the

6 conflict began, but I would say it's -- and I used to work for UNHCR as

7 well. It's a fundamental principle for the United Nations that people

8 should be allowed free movement and should not be held prisoner or should

9 not be restrained from free movement whether for travel purposes or to

10 relocate, to live somewhere else. So that is certainly a principle that

11 the United Nations, the one contained in paragraph 1, certainly a

12 principle that the United Nations would subscribe to.

13 Q. In paragraph 3 it says that civilians should be able to leave in

14 an organised manner under international supervision and, if necessary,

15 protection. Its security -- or their security will be guaranteed by each

16 party in the territory it controls. Did you have any information about

17 the fact that this is how during that difficult wartime period an attempt

18 was made to ensure that the population could move around freely?

19 A. There were many efforts to ensure the security of people who

20 wished to leave from one area and move to other whether by UNPROFOR or

21 the ICRC. So this is consistent with certainly efforts by different

22 international organisations. I know that there were many, many times

23 where it was not possible for the UN to ensure that this particular --

24 the principles in this particular paragraph were respected.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 8296

1 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to

2 tender this document.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

4 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D711 receives number D192,

5 Your Honours.

6 JUDGE ORIE: D192 is admitted into evidence.

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 Q. Sir, were you aware of the fact that the policies of one of the

9 warring factions included calling on the people that were the majority in

10 the territory under their control and appealing to them to move out of

11 territory under the control of the opposing faction?

12 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have one specific warring faction in mind,

13 Mr. Stojanovic?

14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours, but I will in

15 relation to the next document that I will be using.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please answer the question, Witness.

17 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I'm a little confused by

18 the question in re-reading the transcript. I wonder if -- I think I

19 understand the question, but maybe in the transcript the way it's worded

20 it --

21 JUDGE ORIE: We'll first invite Mr. Stojanovic to repeat the

22 question.

23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours. Thank you.

24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll try -- I apologise if it

25 was very general. I'll try and be more specific. At any point in time

Page 8297

1 did you have any information according to which the warring factions, the

2 ABiH and the federation authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, appeal to

3 the Bosniak and Croatian population to move to territory under their

4 control and vice versa? Did you have any information according to which

5 the authorities in Republika Srpska appealed to the Serbian population to

6 move to territory under their control and to leave their homes?

7 A. I believe that -- well, it's certainly the case that the question

8 of population residences of different groups, minority, majority,

9 population movements were difficult and dominant issues throughout the

10 conflict, and many things were said by many people formally and

11 informally during the course of the conflict. I don't know what the

12 official stated policy by the highest authorities of the different

13 factions were with respect to the population movements. I -- well, on

14 the federation side, I know that they -- they wanted to certainly

15 maintain the multi-ethnic character of the federation as I mentioned

16 before. I believe they also for various reasons wanted to maintain

17 the -- maintain minority populations in Serb-controlled areas.

18 I believe the Bosnian Serbs were much more interested in having a

19 mono-ethnic character to the land they controlled, and they associated

20 the presence of Serbs in an area with sovereignty over the land, and I've

21 heard senior Bosnian Serb officials say very clearly that where a Serb

22 boot rests that will be Serb land. Whether that's the official policy or

23 position, it's I think a little hard to -- for me to say, but that was my

24 understanding of the positions of the different sides.

25 Q. Could we have a look at 1D709. Sir, it's because of this

Page 8298

1 document that I, in fact, put this question to you -- or in relation to

2 this document that I put this question to you, because I think we'll be

3 able to comment on it if we bear in mind the date when this document was

4 drafted. It was drafted by the Party of Democratic Action in Trebinje on

5 the 20th of January, 1993. The title of the document is "instructions

6 concerning moving out from Trebinje," signed by the then SDA secretary,

7 Hasan Cengic.

8 And paragraph 1 says: Through activists we should animate all

9 Muslims, especially prominent and wealthy ones so that they leave

10 Trebinje as soon as possible and move to Montenegro. Paragraph 2

11 suggests what should be done with property. And paragraph 3 says: Do

12 not refrain from exerting pressure and even using force against those

13 Muslims who fail to respect this order.

14 First of all, would we agree that in 1993, Trebinje was under the

15 control of the authorities of Republika Srpska?

16 A. Sometimes my recollection of which town was under the control of

17 which party or faction at a given time isn't perfect at this stage, but I

18 certainly accept that that is very likely the case, yes, sir.

19 Q. Thank you. Secondly, could we agree that the

20 Party of Democratic Action, the SDA, was the most prominent political

21 organisation, the strongest political organisation that held power, in

22 fact, in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

23 A. In January 1993, there was no federation yet, but the SDA was

24 certainly the most powerful political party in the territory controlled

25 by the government or the ARBiH.

Page 8299

1 Q. And could we agree that this document drafted by the secretary of

2 that party appeals to the Muslims and encourages them to leave Trebinje.

3 It says that force could be applied or should be applied against those

4 who fail to respect this order. That's what it says here.

5 A. Yes, that's what the English translation that I have here says,

6 yes.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, talking about English translation, I

8 don't know whether it is original but the English language now and then

9 strikes me as not the best, perhaps. Do you know whether this -- for

10 example, this heading at the top is not translated. Where does this

11 translation come from? Is it an official translation, or has it been

12 distributed at the time in two languages, which is also of course

13 possible?

14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I can't answer

15 that question with certainty, but I know where I obtained it from. I

16 obtained it from the Karadzic case, but at this point in time I can't

17 tell you who did the translation, but I could check up on this.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you please inform us. Could the parties

19 pay attention. Could they have a look at the English version and see

20 whether it needs to be reviewed or not. Please proceed.

21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. I will conclude with another sentence from this document.

23 Mr. Banbury, please have a look at paragraph 5 where it says: All your

24 property -- or you will be reimbursed for all your property when we

25 achieve our goal and we'll know how to value your sacrifice, and this is

Page 8300

1 what the Muslims throughout the world expect of you. Respectfully

2 "selamu alejkum" SDA secretary, Hasan Cengic. During your stay from

3 April up until the summer of 1995, April 1994 to the summer of 1995,

4 during that period of time did you learn anything about the fact that the

5 parallel policies of the SDA were, in fact, an attempt to move the Muslim

6 population out of territory that was under the control of

7 Republika Srpska?

8 A. I did have the impression that the SDA sought to manipulate

9 population issues, including the Muslim population of Bosnia in ways that

10 it perceived as favourable to it, and while I certainly was not aware of

11 this document, the approach taken in it is absolutely reprehensible and

12 one that UNPROFOR would have sought to fight against, and we consistently

13 did confront extremely difficult population issues and always sought to

14 protect the rights of civilian populations.

15 That being said, we would do that working with the official

16 authorities of the different factions. In the case of the Bosnian

17 government, it would be the government and not the SDA.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, your reference to paragraph 5 must

19 have been a reference to the B/C/S version, because the English version

20 has no paragraph 5. There seems to be another mistake there, an

21 additional reason to have the translation reviewed.

22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours. I suggest

23 that 1D709 be marked for identification at this point in time, and we'll

24 try to obtain an official translation and tender that into evidence when

25 it is provided.

Page 8301

1 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D709 receives number D193,

3 Your Honours.

4 JUDGE ORIE: D193 is marked for identification.

5 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I think it might be time to have

6 a break as has been suggested to me.

7 JUDGE ORIE: It certainly is time for a break. Could the witness

8 first be escorted out of the courtroom. We'd like to see you back in

9 20 minutes.

10 [The witness stands down]

11 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break and we resume at 10 minutes to

12 11.00.

13 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

14 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

16 Meanwhile, Mr. Groome, there was a motion yesterday for the Theunens

17 report, the 30 days to be counted on from the refiling of the Theunens

18 report. You've seen that motion?

19 MR. GROOME: I haven't yet, Your Honour, but I was familiar with

20 some e-mail correspondence that preceded it.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is there any -- is there any final

22 disagreement because the motion says at a certain moment we propose to

23 the Prosecution but we didn't receive a response. Is there any problem

24 with starting the 30 days when the new report is filed?

25 MR. GROOME: It's going to be our position to oppose that,

Page 8302

1 Your Honour, because the Chamber's asked us to redact material and we

2 believe that the issues relevant to the response are all in the table at

3 this stage.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll wait for your -- we'll wait for your

5 response.

6 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE ORIE: When can we that approximately?

8 MR. GROOME: If I can tell you at the next break, Your Honour,

9 I'd appreciate that.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

11 [The witness takes the stand]

12 JUDGE ORIE: Welcome back, Mr. Banbury. Mr. Stojanovic will

13 continue his cross-examination.

14 Mr. Stojanovic, could you give us any idea as far as time is

15 concerned? Any more precise?

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just as we said

17 yesterday, I believe that I will be done after the second session, these

18 two sessions; in other words, another two hours.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then we would have one session left. I

20 need at the end of this session I need two or three minutes of the time

21 of the parties for a matter to be dealt with in private session. But

22 let's first start the continued cross-examination. Please proceed.

23 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 Q. Mr. Banbury, I would like again to refer you to your statement,

25 P874, and briefly to paragraph 44 of your statement. Among other things

Page 8303

1 there it is stated and this is on the 28th of August, 1994 -- among other

2 things it says there that the Bosnian government had threatened to cut

3 off the supply into the entire country as well as the 30 per cent

4 diverted to the FRY. Now, I would just like to ask you this: When you

5 said that, what did you mean? In what way or how was it that the Bosnian

6 government could cut off the supply of gas to the entire country and the

7 30 per cent to the FRY? Technically speaking or physically, how was that

8 possible?

9 A. I'm not a technical expert on this matter at all, but I do know

10 that because of the particular way the natural gas delivery

11 infrastructure system was built in the former Federal Republic of

12 Yugoslavia that the gas came or some of -- a large portion of the gas for

13 Bosnia and some even for the other parts of the FRY came into Sarajevo

14 and then in -- I guess some kind of large pipeline and then was

15 distributed to out in smaller ways to different parts of Bosnia and the

16 FRY, which did create a very interesting and in some ways I'd say helpful

17 dynamic, because each party depended upon the other to have natural gas.

18 So that is a very general nontechnical, nonexpert description of what my

19 understanding of the situation is.

20 Q. So have I understood this correctly: Your understanding of this

21 threat by the Bosnia-Herzegovina government, was it in fact something

22 that could be accomplished, that could be effected? Is that how you

23 understood the -- this distribution line?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Very well. Thank you. I will not insist on this any longer.

Page 8304

1 Now let us take a look together at paragraph 54 of your statement. Do

2 you have it before you? Could we please also show it in e-court.

3 Paragraph 54.

4 So let me give you some context. These are developments of

5 September 1994 which can be seen from the previous page of your

6 statement.

7 So I'd just like to ask you this: Do you remember that at some

8 point in time the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the then Federal

9 Republic of Yugoslavia authorities or government in fact introduced

10 economic sanctions on the Drina River --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- to the -- to Republika Srpska.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. In paragraph 54, you talk about describing Slobodan Milosevic.

15 You talk about his policies. Up until then, how many times did you have

16 occasion to meet with and hear the positions of Mr. Milosevic?

17 A. I'm sorry, because I don't know the date of this -- that is

18 encapsulated in this paragraph. If -- in the previous paragraph,

19 paragraph 53, refers to August 1994. If -- and I see in paragraph 56

20 it's September 1994. So if we are talking about the period of summer of

21 1994, I had not at that time ever met President Milosevic.

22 Q. In paragraph 54 here, as far as I can see, this relates to late

23 August. You say here that you thought that Slobodan Milosevic had a

24 great influence on the Bosnian Serbs, including Radovan Karadzic and

25 Ratko Mladic. And then you say there was a mutual desire also to have

Page 8305

1 close ties between the FRY and the RS, two entities with symbolic

2 barriers between them to facilitate the ready exchange of people, goods

3 and services. As time progressed, their interests became evermore

4 divergent and as that happened Milosevic's ability to impose his will

5 diminished. My question is this: What did you base this conclusion on?

6 A. Perhaps first just a technical correction. In my paragraph I

7 referred to two entities with low barriers between them and in the

8 translation it said with symbolic barriers between them. But to answer

9 your question, sir, I based this conclusion on -- it's an analysis based

10 on an overall assessment or effort to understand what was happening in

11 Bosnia and beyond, drawing on all available resources, conversations that

12 I happened to be present for between senior UNPROFOR officials and

13 Bosnian Serb leaders, reports from other parts of UNPROFOR, a lot on the

14 press reporting from the time, including Bosnian Serb and FRY press

15 reporting. So it was an overall assessment based on all the material I

16 had available to me.

17 Q. Later on during your the later months of your stay in the area of

18 the former Yugoslavia, this divergent tendency after the sanctions were

19 imposed on Republika Srpska by the FRY, did this divergence actually

20 continue? Did it grow wider?

21 A. Yes. It was my impression that the divergence did grow wider,

22 but that was especially true in the relationship between the political

23 forces and, in particular, President Milosevic and Dr. Karadzic and also

24 perhaps in the commercial area, the movement of goods, commercial goods,

25 across the Drina or from FRY to the -- to the Republika Srpska. But I

Page 8306

1 think the relationship between the Yugoslav Army and the

2 Bosnian Serb Army and the leadership of the Bosnian Serb Army,

3 General Mladic, and President Milosevic and General Perisic, remained

4 much closer than the differences in the political and commercial area.

5 Q. Thank you. We will get back to that a little later when we speak

6 about a meeting that you mention a little later in your statement, but

7 for now let us take a look at paragraph 65 of your statement.

8 Mr. Banbury, do you remember that there was a continuing problem of the

9 Sarajevo airport and its use, because in paragraph 65, you say that it

10 was another frequent topic.

11 A. Yes, absolutely. The issue of Sarajevo airport, the ability for

12 the UN to operate in and out of it was a continuing problem for UNPROFOR

13 during the conflict.

14 Q. And do you remember that the BH Army, too, at -- in some moments

15 in fact made it impossible for the airport to be used because they opened

16 fire on the airport facilities?

17 A. I am not personally aware of any time that the Bosnian Army shut

18 down the airport because of military actions it took. There were times

19 where UNPROFOR planes were shot and it was impossible to determine the

20 origin of the firing, so I do not rule out the possibility that our

21 operations at the airport were impacted by Bosnian Army activity. But I

22 have no knowledge that -- of a single incident where the Bosnian Army

23 shot at our planes. On the contrary, we know for a fact that there were

24 many, many instances where the Bosnian Serb forces shut down UN

25 operations at the airport either by targeting our aircraft or simply by

Page 8307

1 telling us that they could not guarantee the safety of our aircraft which

2 by definition, whenever they told us that we would cease flying.

3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could we now have

4 1D716 in e-court.

5 Q. Mr. Banbury, this document is dated the 13th of August, 1994.

6 That's the period that we're discussing right now. It is sent by

7 Brigadier-General van Baal to Brigadier-General Jovan Divjak, deputy

8 commander of the Supreme Command Staff of the armed forces of

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 Now, first of all, do you know or does the name

11 Brigadier-General van Baal mean anything to you?

12 A. Yes, I personally know General van Baal.

13 Q. And do you know General Jovan Divjak?

14 A. I -- yes, I have met General Divjak. I knew General van Baal

15 rather well and worked frequently with him. General Divjak I only met on

16 a small number of occasions.

17 Q. In this document, Mr. Baal says - I'll be brief - that in close

18 to this letter, he also sends a report by the commander of the airport

19 regarding the opening of fire on the 18th of August. And in paragraph 2

20 it says it turns out again that three bullets were fired from the area

21 under the control of the BH Army, which led to the air-lift being cut off

22 or the suspension of air-lifts, and in fact this was -- in essence this

23 was an irrational act.

24 Does this help refresh your memory that there were incidents as I

25 suggested, incidents caused by the BH Army that led to occasional

Page 8308

1 suspensions of air-lifts?

2 A. I do not recall this particular incident, but I have no reason

3 to -- to doubt it, and as I said, I was -- I accept the possibility that

4 there were -- was firing by the Army of the BiH that impacted airport

5 operations. So I -- while I'm not familiar with this incident, I accept

6 the letter from General van Baal and if there's a report from the airport

7 commander that says it, the UN airport commander, then I would accept

8 that as being the -- what happened.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to

11 tender this document into evidence. That's D716, 1D716. That's its

12 65 ter number.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D716 receives number D194, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE ORIE: No objections, therefore admitted into evidence.

15 Please proceed.

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now could we see

17 1D720 in e-court, please. 1D720.

18 Q. We see that the situation there is similar. I would just like to

19 show you this document again. It's authored by General van Baal

20 addressed to General Jovan Divjak, and this time --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, the witness said that he -- that UN

22 aircraft were fired at, that it was impossible to -- at least for this

23 witness and he has no knowledge of the origin of fire, therefore to put

24 him to him other examples where he says he doesn't know, unless, Witness,

25 you would change -- have changed your mind since five minutes ago.

Page 8309

1 Otherwise, I would say: Can the Prosecution and the Defence agree under

2 these incidents were reported and this is the documentary evidence

3 related to that? Yes?

4 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Would you like to tender this one, Mr. ...

6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's right, Your Honour. That

7 was the only reason. So I would like to tender 1D720, and we can move

8 on.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D720 receives number -- number D195,

11 Your Honours.

12 JUDGE ORIE: D195 is admitted into evidence.

13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Q. And now, Mr. Banbury, would you please focus on paragraph 69 of

15 your statement, and could we have P876 in e-court. P876, that is the

16 document you discuss in paragraph 69 and 70, 71. No. I apologise.

17 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] My apologies, Your Honour. This

18 is document 10058, a 65 ter document under the number of 10058.

19 65 ter 10058. And I apologise for that error. Thank you once again.

20 Q. Mr. Banbury, you talked about this in paragraphs 69 through 71 of

21 your statement, and I'd just like to refer you to a couple of things.

22 The document at issue is a telegram, dispatch sent by Mr. Viktor Andreev,

23 on the 19th of November, 1994, and in paragraph 4 of this document -

24 could we have it, please - it is stated as follows, and I'm referring to

25 this outgoing dispatch:

Page 8310

1 "General Gobilliard presented his latest press release to

2 Karadzic in which Gobillard condemned moderate acts made by the BH Army

3 from within Sarajevo as well as firing of mortars by the BSA from weapons

4 collection points as an example of UNPROFOR's neutral approach to the

5 conflict."

6 Now, could you please try and recall this and tell us what it was

7 that triggered General Gobilliard's reaction and his condemnation of

8 these particular attacks? Which events were underlying this?

9 A. Well, drawing on the document, I think there were most likely

10 specific incidents of firing by the BiH from within Sarajevo outside

11 against the Serbs, and firing by the Bosnian Serb Army into Sarajevo

12 against the BiH. I -- this was a somewhat routine occurrence. Routine

13 is perhaps the wrong term. Frequent occurrence. And whenever -- or it

14 would be quite normal for the United Nations following such an incident

15 or incidents to protest to both sides, and I see this in that context.

16 Q. Was this at the time of the cease-fire agreement that had just

17 been signed and that demilitarisation?

18 A. I do not recall a cease-fire agreement in November 1994. There

19 was a cessation of hostilities agreement a month later in December of

20 1994. A lot happened between mid-November and late December in Bosnia,

21 but in -- in this case I don't recall a cease-fire agreement, and as far

22 as I know, there was no agreement to demilitarise Sarajevo.

23 Q. Very well. Could we now see paragraph 8 of this document,

24 please. And again I assume that you authored this telegram as indicated

25 here.

Page 8311

1 In conclusion, we see that it says:

2 "We must pursue a concerted policy to convince the Bosnian Serb

3 leadership that our presence is indeed in their interest and that our

4 departure would be disastrous for them, for if they make the calculation

5 that their interests are better served by our departure, the implications

6 will be disastrous not only for them but also for the cause of peace in

7 the former Yugoslavia."

8 When you say in your conclusion "we must pursue a concerted

9 policy," who are you referring to?

10 A. By "we" I refer to UNPROFOR, and in particular the leadership of

11 UNPROFOR.

12 Q. Thank you. You mentioned demilitarisation of Sarajevo, and what

13 I would like to ask you about is the demilitarisation of Igman, Mount

14 Igman. Do you recall at any point in time --

15 JUDGE ORIE: Where are you referring to, demilitarisation?

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my apologies. I

17 didn't understand your question.

18 JUDGE ORIE: You said -- let me just check. You said, "You

19 mentioned demilitarisation of Sarajevo," and I was wondering what you

20 were referring to exactly, to this document or to the statement of the

21 witness or to any other source, or did I miss ...

22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] The witness mentioned the

23 demilitarisation of Sarajevo in his earlier answer, and what I said was I

24 am not really going to refer to that but, rather, the Mount Igman

25 demilitarisation.

Page 8312

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The witness said, "There was no agreement to

2 demilitarise Sarajevo." So that's clear. No -- where does he say

3 anything.

4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's correct.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Does he say anything about Mount Igman? I mean, is

6 it an open question not in relation to any part of his statement or ...

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour,

8 although that can be found in the statement, and we'll touch upon it

9 later.

10 Q. But the reason I'm asking you this now is because of the

11 following -- the document that will come next. My question is, was there

12 any talk about the demilitarisation of Mount Igman in 1994? Were you

13 aware of any of that?

14 A. Yes. I know that there was some agreement between the

15 Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government on the -- that was facilitated

16 by UNPROFOR calling for the demilitarisation of Mount Igman or at least

17 parts of Mount Igman. I believe that agreement was reached shortly

18 before my arrival in Bosnia, and I am not very familiar with the details

19 of that agreement, but, yes, there was an agreement that the parties

20 entered into that created -- in which they took on obligations, each of

21 them, yes.

22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could we have a

23 look at a document. It's a 65 ter document, 1D719.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Did you want to tender the last one we had on our

25 screens, Mr. Stojanovic, or --

Page 8313

1 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours. This

2 document bears the number 10058. It's a 65 ter document.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

4 THE REGISTRAR: Document 10058 receives number D196,

5 Your Honours.

6 JUDGE ORIE: D196 is admitted. Please proceed.

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] These two documents are related,

8 and this might answer your previous question, Your Honours. We'll go

9 back to this document now. So could we see D196 again, please.

10 Q. And this is the reason for which I'll be putting this question to

11 you: The question has to do with the demilitarisation of Igman. That's

12 the question I put to you. Please have a look at paragraph 3 of this

13 message that you drafted, which states the following:

14 "According to the report from the meeting, Karadzic and Tolimir

15 pressed us hard on the continued presence of BiH in the Mount Igman area

16 of the demilitarised zone."

17 Could you see that sentence. I asked you about what you knew

18 with regard to those tasks.

19 Could we now have a look at 1D719, 1D719. And in August 1994,

20 prior to the comments that were made by Karadzic and Tolimir,

21 General van Baal again writes to the Brigadier-General Jovan Divjak and

22 he says the following:

23 "After I wrote to you on 6 August 1994 regarding the deliberate

24 violations of the demilitarised zone on Mount Igman, I have again been

25 informed that your soldiers are continuing to violate the agreement. In

Page 8314

1 my last letter I informed you of a certain number of violations. In the

2 meantime, five incidents have been reported to us."

3 And then these incidents are listed. And in the last sentence of

4 the document it says that UNPROFOR again stresses that such activities

5 are unacceptable and represent a direct violation of the agreement --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Is that on the next page or -- it seems to be --

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. It's the last sentence on

8 the next page, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.

10 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. I apologise,

11 Your Honours.

12 Q. "UNPROFOR reiterates that such activities are unacceptable and

13 represent direct violations of the agreement reached with you last year."

14 My question is whether this document has refreshed your memory

15 about the fact that in the course of frequent contact that you had with

16 the authorities of Republika Srpska and with the Republika Srpska Army,

17 in the course of such meetings were such objections by the

18 Republika Srpska often made with regard to the ABiH?

19 A. Yes. Such objections often were made. I don't recall saying

20 that I could not remember the Bosnian Serbs making such objections. It

21 was rather common for the Bosnian Serb military and political authorities

22 to object to UNPROFOR about alleged violations of various

23 responsibilities, commitments, et cetera, by the BiH, yes.

24 Q. Thank you. Thank you. I apologise. I was waiting for the

25 interpretation to finish.

Page 8315

1 What I wanted to ask you about, bearing in mind everything that

2 you testified about yesterday which I found very interesting and of much

3 importance, concerns your interpretation of safe areas. In this

4 situation -- in such a situation in 1994, did UNPROFOR have a mandate to

5 demilitarise Igman?

6 A. I would have to look at the Igman agreement, but normally what

7 would happen when we would facilitate negotiations between the parties on

8 some agreement, whether it was on Mount Igman or cessation of

9 hostilities, the agreement would contain obligations voluntarily entered

10 into by the parties that imposed -- imposed obligations on the parties.

11 Sorry, I'm being redundant. It would not normally be the case that

12 UNPROFOR was responsible for ensuring or enforcing one party or the

13 other, any party, to fulfil their obligations. Normally the UNPROFOR

14 role would be to monitor, observe, facilitate, patrol, report, but we

15 would not be -- we would not enter into a commitment to force the

16 Bosnian Serbs or force the Bosnian government to fulfil their

17 obligations.

18 In the case of Mount Igman, the agreement, I'd really have to

19 look at it to comment in any detail. I would also say there is a very

20 important distinction between Security Council Resolutions and legal

21 character of those resolutions and the obligations they commit or confer

22 on the parties involved as compared to the -- the nature of legal

23 obligations stemming from an agreement between two state or non-state

24 actors. While such an agreement can confirm important obligations on

25 such actors, they are of a very different nature than a

Page 8316

1 Security Council Resolution.

2 So for instance, it could not be the case that the Bosnian

3 government and the Bosnian Serbs would enter into an agreement that

4 created a mandate for UNPROFOR or create obligations on us that

5 superseded or even complemented those that were given to us by the

6 Security Council.

7 Q. Thank you. While we're dealing with the Igman area and the

8 situation in Sarajevo, I'd like to ask you the following: Do you know,

9 did you have any information at your post at the time according to which

10 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina used the Igman area to provide

11 logistics through the supply to the 1st Corps through the ABiH in

12 Sarajevo, and digging was done, a route was dug out in order to be able

13 to provide liquid fuel to Sarajevo.

14 A. I'm well aware of the so-called Mount Igman route which was a

15 road over Mount Igman and down into Sarajevo that was very heavily relied

16 upon by the Bosnian government, Bosnian military, citizens of Sarajevo to

17 transport goods into the city and also to travel out of the city. The

18 city was essentially cut off from resupply, and the Mount Igman route was

19 often the only route open that would -- that was available to bring goods

20 into the city for the Bosnian government, the Bosnian -- or the Sarajevo

21 citizens. So, yes, that was certainly used.

22 In terms of the digging of a fuel supply line, I'm not aware of

23 it, but I can certainly imagine that such a fuel supply line existed. I

24 seem to have some small recollection of hearing something to that effect,

25 and I can certainly imagine that such a fuel line did exist, but I don't

Page 8317

1 have personal knowledge.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to

4 tender this document now into evidence.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D719 receives number D197,

7 Your Honours.

8 JUDGE ORIE: No objections. Therefore, D197 is admitted.

9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Q. Let's have a look at paragraph 79, 80, and 81 in your statement,

11 which is P874, and let's focus on paragraph 81. I just have one question

12 I'd like to put to you about it. Here you meaning the

13 12th of December, 1994, and that's what you say in paragraph 79. You

14 mention the meeting between Mr. Andreev, General Michael Rose,

15 Colonel Danijel, and also Krajisnik, Koljevic, Generals Gvero and Tolimir

16 on the other side. And then on the 12th of December, 1994, this is in

17 paragraph 81, you say that the army told the political leaders that

18 improving relationships with UNPROFOR depend on clearing Igman and

19 Bjelasnica. Within two days in the course of the remainder of the

20 meeting the Bosnian Serbs expressed positions that demonstrated a unified

21 position -- or indicating a unified leadership, in fact. And my question

22 is: What was this about, in fact? When you use the expression "clearing

23 Igman," are we dealing with the same problem again?

24 A. Yes. Broadly speaking, yes.

25 Q. When you say the army made this request, when you say the

Page 8318

1 military told the political leaders, do you have Mr. Gvero and

2 Mr. Tolimir who were present at that meeting in mind?

3 A. Yes, I believe I do.

4 Q. Thank you. And new could we see P876. And while waiting for it

5 to appear on the screen, Mr. Banbury, I'd like to put a question to you

6 in relation to your previous answer.

7 Given your understanding of UNPROFOR's obligations and the

8 requests that the army conveyed through Gvero and Tolimir, was it

9 justified to request that Igman, being a demilitarised zone, should not

10 be used to provide logistics, equipment, weapons and ammunition to the

11 members of the warring factions, and in particular to the 1st Corps of

12 the ABiH in Sarajevo?

13 A. I think I would need to refer to the Igman agreement and

14 specifically read it to understand exactly what the obligations were on

15 the parties and what, if anything, UNPROFOR undertook to do based on the

16 agreement. So, I'm sorry, I don't have a good enough recollection of the

17 specifics of that agreement in my mind to give you a good answer to your

18 question.

19 Q. In that case, if such equipment was provided as you assume, it

20 had to go through the tunnel in order to reach Sarajevo; isn't that

21 correct?

22 A. In principle, yes, it would go through the tunnel, over Igman and

23 through the tunnel.

24 Q. And can we agree that if the Republika Srpska Army respected the

25 terms of the agreement on demilitarisation and didn't have the

Page 8319

1 possibility of controlling the situation, would we say that this would be

2 a very frustrating experience for one of the warring factions?

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, if two parties make agreement, if

4 one of the parties is not keeping to its commitment to the agreement, the

5 other party will be frustrated unless we are in a very exceptional

6 circumstance, Witness, where they were happy. But I have never seen

7 that, at least not often in my life. It's -- it's asking for the obvious

8 it seems. Please proceed.

9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I don't want to force an issue

10 that seems clear. It's clear to me. Let's go back to the document we

11 have in front of us.

12 JUDGE ORIE: You are aware it doesn't say anything about

13 frustration, because your question was totally hypothetical. If the one

14 party and if the other party, of course, that is still to be established

15 and has not been established with this witness, because he says, "I don't

16 recall -- I have no recollection of the details of the agreement." So

17 also for that reason, it is -- the question was not very helpful. Please

18 proceed.

19 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now have a

20 look at -- and it's in document P876, paragraph 8. Could we have a look

21 at paragraph 8 in P876. And I'd like to remind you that this is a weekly

22 report for the period 5 to 11 March, from the 5th to the 11th of March.

23 You are the author of this report, and the report states the following:

24 "General Mladic, expressing discontent over the sanctions regime

25 imposed on the Bosnian Serbs as well as the amount of humanitarian

Page 8320

1 supplies provided to them also threatened to cut off delivery of all aid

2 to the enclaves if sanctions were not lifted and if a greater percentage

3 of total aid delivered in Bosnia was not given to the Serbs."

4 And then you say:

5 "Mladic's threats for the moment are more likely a form of

6 pressure on UNPROFOR than an expression of genuine intent given the

7 likely reaction by the international community in the event of a total

8 blockade of the enclaves or an effort by the BSA to expel us from them."

9 What is the source for this part of your weekly report?

10 A. It is my own analysis.

11 Q. But you said here General Mladic expressing discontent over the

12 sanctions regime. What is the source for that sentence?

13 A. I do not recall offhand. My expectation is that it would have

14 come from recent -- recent as in shortly before the writing of that

15 report, a meeting between some UNPROFOR officials and General Mladic in

16 which he would have expressed such a sentiment. That is what I would

17 expect it's from.

18 Q. But you're not in a position to tell us now where you obtained

19 this piece of information when you say that General Mladic expressed

20 discontent over the sanctions regime imposed on the Bosnian Serbs. So

21 was this verified?

22 A. I am not in a position to tell you now from where exactly

23 General Mladic or we would have -- we and UNPROFOR would have received

24 such an expression from General Mladic, but it is certainly the case in

25 what was always the case for me and I think for my colleagues that if we

Page 8324

1 Chamber. We've been waiting there for ten minutes. You have until

2 quarter past 1.00 to finish your cross-examination.

3 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, just briefly on the matter the Chamber

4 inquired about, our position with respect to when we could file a

5 response. We would be unable to file a response until next Wednesday.

6 Given that it has some consequences for today, the Prosecution would have

7 no objection to the time for the Defence to file their 94 bis filing

8 until the Chamber would decide after -- decide the issue after seeing our

9 submission next Wednesday, if that's acceptable to the Court.

10 [The witness takes the stand]

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's clear.

12 Mr. Stojanovic, if you're ready, please proceed.

13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Q. Mr. Banbury, we're still on the same subject. Could we have P876

15 on our monitors, please, and I'd like to refer you to paragraph 13. And

16 I will have a few questions about that paragraph.

17 [No interpretation]

18 JUDGE ORIE: One second, Mr. Stojanovic. We do not receive

19 translation at this moment. Could you please restart.

20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

21 Q. Sir, this paragraph reads as follows: The international peace

22 effort to resolve the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina appears to be

23 stalled with the contact group largely in disarray following its

24 fragmentation into three informal though separate blocks, each with its

25 own agenda. And then you go on to describe this further. You cite the

Page 8325

1 then defence minister, US Defence -- Secretary of Defence, Mr. Perry.

2 You cite him as saying that: I don't not see prospects of a near term

3 political solution but then he -- and our present policies are not

4 satisfying but the alternative choice would be worse. So my question is

5 this: This told peace effort that you described in paragraph 13, would

6 that have a reflection or an impact on the agreements that would be

7 reached in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

8 A. Usually there was -- excuse me. Usually there was an inverse

9 relationship between the strength of the peace process and the strength

10 of the -- or the activity of the military effort by the parties in

11 Bosnia. When the peace process was going well, the military activity

12 tended to be less. When the peace process was stalled or going poorly,

13 usually the military activity was greater, and one or the other or all

14 sides tended to pursue their objectives through military means when they

15 were not able to achieve progress through political means. And I think

16 in this case that would have applied.

17 Q. Thank you. Bearing in mind that you mention a number of

18 documents here, at that point in time in whose favour would a cessation

19 of hostilities and a cease-fire be in March 1995 in other words?

20 A. I think that question to be properly answered by me would need

21 additional information. The -- just the cessation of hostility, it would

22 depend what other aspects went along with the agreement, if any. So it's

23 very hard for me to answer that, though I would say that I think by

24 March of 1995, the Bosnian Serbs had recognised that they were very

25 unlikely to meet what they defined as their minimal political objectives

Page 8326

1 through political means.

2 Q. In view of the territory that was held by the BH Army and the HVO

3 on the one hand and the RS on the other, in the negotiation and contacts,

4 in all of these negotiations and contacts was it the Serb side that was

5 in favour of a cessation of hostilities on all sides? Would that be

6 correct to say?

7 A. I don't, I don't believe that would be correct. I think it would

8 be correct to --

9 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any problem. As usual, 30 seconds. We'll

10 first wait for the witness to answer the question, and then you have 30

11 seconds to consult at low voice with Mr. Mladic.

12 Could you first finish your -- Mr. Stojanovic, it would not -- I

13 would listen to the answer of the witness first before you consult with

14 your client. Mr. Mladic, please be seated. You will have 30 seconds

15 after the witness has finished his answer.

16 Would you please complete your answer.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. Bosnian Serb side regularly

18 thought the conflict asserted its interest in and I referred to this

19 yesterday, I believe, regularly asserted its interest in a peace

20 agreement in cessation of hostilities and cease-fire, but would as a

21 matter of course attach conditions to the peace or the cessation of

22 hostilities that they were interested in and those conditions were

23 invariably unacceptable to not only the Bosnian government but usually

24 key members of the international community, states, government that were

25 trying to promote a solution. So I think it's incorrect to say that the

Page 8327

1 Bosnian Serbs wanted -- it's misleading at least to say the Bosnian Serbs

2 wanted peace. They wanted peace but only on their terms and those terms

3 were unacceptable to -- to many others whose agreement would be necessary

4 for such a peace.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, you have 30 seconds to consult with

6 your client. And low voice, please.

7 [Defence counsel and accused confer]

8 JUDGE ORIE: Please continue, Mr. Stojanovic.

9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now pull up

10 in e-court 65 ter 10593.

11 Q. And that's the document you discussed in paragraph 99, 100 and

12 109 of your -- and 101 of your statement. And could we focus on

13 paragraph 7 of this document. This is a weekly report sent by you

14 covering the period 12th through 18th March 1995.

15 Among other things, it states the blue routes across Sarajevo

16 airport were closed on the 12th of March at the insistence of the

17 Bosnian Serbs following the sniping deaths of two girls aged 9 and 10 in

18 Grbavica in Serb-held Sarajevo.

19 Did you have any information about what had actually happened and

20 what was the reason for this kind of decision by the authorities?

21 A. If -- well, because the report I wrote indicates that these two

22 girls were killed by sniping, I have no doubt at all that it's true that

23 two young Serb girls were in a very horrible way killed by sniping, in

24 this case by the Bosnian government -- or Bosnian government soldier. So

25 at that clearly happened in my view.

Page 8328

1 The response of the Serbs, they had different responses at

2 different times to sniping by Bosnian Army forces. At this period of

3 time, they were saying that for every Serb civilian or at least Serb

4 person killed by sniping, then they would respond by shutting the blue

5 routes across the airport, that were critical to allowing large numbers

6 of civilians from both sides, though more from the Bosnian government

7 side, to travel in and out of Sarajevo. They would close these routes

8 for 30 days for each person killed by Bosnian government or Bosnian Army

9 forces by sniping.

10 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. We will move on to

11 the next document. I do not intend to tender this one, Your Honour,

12 because I've quoted the paragraph that I was concerned with.

13 Could we now have 65 ter 10597.

14 Q. It's another weekly report covering the period -- or actually

15 dated the 15th of April, 1995. I would like to focus on paragraph 1, in

16 which you state in this report, that's paragraph 1 on the next page,

17 thank you. And it says there:

18 "A French soldier was killed by sniping in Dobrinja on 14 April

19 while standing in his light armoured vehicle. On 15 April, another

20 French soldier was killed by sniping while erecting an anti-sniping

21 barricade on snipers' alley. An investigation of the first incident has

22 so far proven inconclusive, and it is unlikely that evidence will be

23 sufficient to attribute responsibility for the murder."

24 And my question is this: Do you know whether after the drafting

25 of this report it was established who shot this French soldier?

Page 8329

1 A. No, I'm sorry, I do no. I certainly do not recollect at this

2 time. I don't know if I ever knew.

3 Q. Thank you. And now I would like to briefly move to another

4 document and we'll return to this one. Could we see 65 ter 1D712. I

5 wanted to discuss this document together with you. It's dated the

6 22nd of April, 1995. It is addressed to army General Rasim Delic, the

7 general of the BH Army, by the president of the Presidency of the

8 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9 Thank you. I believe there is an English version.

10 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] ... in e-court.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, your microphone was not activated.

12 There is no English version in e-court if I understood you well.

13 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE ORIE: On your list for the cross-examination, its even

17 indicated that there is only an original and not translation,

18 Mr. Stojanovic.

19 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour. We

20 have agreed to submit a request for an official translation, but with

21 your leave I will read the document, and then I will tender it for

22 identification purposes alone pending an official translation.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Let's -- I'm looking at Ms. Bibles.

24 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, I was trying to determine whether

25 we've done translations through the booths in this manner. I certainly

Page 8330

1 don't oppose the process, but --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Well, of course the booth, our interpreters are not

3 there to translate, that is to -- but if you slowly read the relevant

4 portion of this document, which seems to be a document coming from

5 Alija Izetbegovic, dated the 21st of April, 1995. So it's two documents.

6 It's two documents, as a matter of fact. We have the document on our

7 screen consists of two documents, it seems. The upper part,

8 22nd of April, 1995; the lower part 21st of April, 1995. The lower part

9 apparently coming from the BiH republic and then the Presidency, I take

10 it, and the upper parts seems to be more of a military document.

11 From which part are you going to read, Mr. Stojanovic?

12 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] The second part, Your Honour,

13 dated the 21st of April, 1995. Where the president of the Presidency of

14 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina writes to General Delic, the commander

15 of the General Staff of the BH Army. I will try to pace myself. Thank

16 you.

17 Alija Izetbegovic in this document says to the commander,

18 Commander Delic, the following:

19 "General, this morning the French ambassador Henri Zakolen

20 visited me in my office and told my counsellor, Memija, among other

21 things the following: The official France is very angry because of the

22 murder of its soldier in Dobrinja. Military expertise shows that the

23 soldier was shot from a position under the control of the Bosnian Army,

24 but we cannot verify that which gives rise to suspicions. The Chetniks

25 have been extremely co-operative in this case, allowing UN investigators

Page 8331

1 to enter every apartment and to have access to every position along their

2 line."

3 JUDGE ORIE: I'm going to stop you at this moment. [Microphone

4 not activated] ... I wonder what we expect.

5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I believe I'm not being heard either.

6 You were just not heard or recorded on the record.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Let me then try to repeat what I said. I think my

8 microphone was activated but there seemed to be some practical problem.

9 Mr. Stojanovic, the witness told us that he already at that time

10 reported that they could not attribute responsibility. If this is about

11 the first one, is it? If so, then of course it's not of great use to put

12 to the witness what others may have said about it unless you would expect

13 him to have any specific knowledge about what others may have found or

14 may not have found or written down. So would you please keep that in

15 mind.

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I will, Your Honour. And if you

17 allow me, the next sentence will actually be my question.

18 Q. The document -- this document further reads as follows:

19 "The French ambassador took a soft guard when he claimed that he

20 had evidence that of the 24 of their soldiers, members of the UN, who

21 were killed not counting those who were killed in a car accident on

22 Igman, more than half of these were committed by the BH Army.

23 Now, the question is this: During your mission, did you receive

24 information to the same effect in this period?

25 A. As a very specific matter that half or more than half of the

Page 8332

1 French soldiers killed in other than a car accident, they were killed by

2 Bosnian Army actions, I do not have that specific information. As a more

3 general matter, there were very often claims made either by the Bosnian

4 Serbs or by UNPROFOR officials that UNPROFOR personnel had been targeted

5 by Bosnian Army personnel. In -- according to my knowledge, in a rather

6 small portion of those cases was it proven that the attack had come from

7 the Bosnian Army, but it is certainly the case that some attacks against

8 UNPROFOR, shootings or other incidents, were originated by Bosnian Army

9 forces, yes.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Let me see. You said: In a rather small portion of

11 those cases was it proved that the attack had come from the Bosnian Army,

12 but it is certainly the case that some attacks against UNPROFOR shootings

13 originated by Bosnian Army forces. It looks as if you're making a

14 distinction between two or were you just repeating what you said? It's

15 Bosnian Army twice.

16 THE WITNESS: Yes. I'm sorry, Your Honour, for the lack of

17 clarity. I was repeating essentially the same point that while there was

18 a very small portion, certainly some attacks had come from the

19 Bosnian Army.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's clear. Please proceed, Mr. Stojanovic.

21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Honour, at this

22 point I'd like to tender this document, 1D712 for identification pending

23 a translation.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D712 receives number D198,

Page 8333

1 Your Honours.

2 JUDGE ORIE: And is marked for identification.

3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Q. Now I would like to refer you to your statement. That's P874,

5 specifically paragraph 120, which discusses this particular document, and

6 what I would like to ask you is this: Are you aware that at this time

7 there was intense sniping from positions held by the BH Army and that

8 this was an ongoing complaint by the VRS authorities?

9 A. Sniping was a very recurring problem by both sides including the

10 Bosnian Army, and I'm not a hundred per cent certain at this specific

11 time that there was a high rate of sniping incidents, but I can certainly

12 anticipate that having been the case and we -- we did face problems with

13 Bosnian government forces sniping, whether it's a 9-year-old girl or a

14 10-year-old girl or an older woman. There were terrible incidents

15 involving sniping against Serb civilians that UNPROFOR worked very hard

16 to combat and stop and follow up on, as we did on all sides.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, your reference to P874 must have

18 been mistake. The statement is P876. I don't know whether it's a

19 translation error or anything else, but let's proceed. It is the correct

20 number. Yes. Apologies for that.

21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Thank

22 you.

23 Q. Now let us return to your statement, and we have it in e-court,

24 and I would like to refer you to paragraph 153 of your statement. So

25 this would be P876.

Page 8334

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is P874.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As I said before, I made a mistake when

3 correcting you. I apologised for that, but we are with your statement in

4 P874. I might have seduced you to make a similar mistake as I did.

5 Please proceed.

6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 Q. So let us take a look at paragraph 153, and this because I would

8 like to mention a document related to that. Here we have an

9 interpretation and your comments on the minutes of a meeting attended by

10 Mr. Karadzic that was held on the 30th of April, 1995. That you can see

11 in paragraph 145 of your statement, but what I would like to ask you

12 about is this: You mentioned there and said that Karadzic told all those

13 seated at the table that the Serbs did not wish to dominate over the

14 Muslims but, rather, it is the Muslims who want to dominate the Serbs.

15 And he said, "We have lived with the Muslims for 500 years." The same

16 situation can be seen in Cyprus and so on, but this is what I would like

17 to ask you: Are you aware whether Mr. Karadzic ever said something like

18 that, and so that you have knowledge about it, but on the basis of what

19 was it that he claimed that at that point in time the Muslims wanted to

20 dominate the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Did he ever make any reference

21 to why it was that he was claiming that?

22 A. I do not recall a specific reference by Dr. Karadzic as to why he

23 held that belief. He certainly made many complaints or observations

24 about the behaviour or intentions of the Bosnian Muslim community and

25 political structure, but do I not recall a specific reference he made as

Page 8335

1 to why he held that belief at that time. I do know that at that time in

2 Bosnia the cessation of hostilities agreement that had been negotiated

3 with the assistance of President Carter had essentially collapsed and the

4 political process was in a very bad state and there was heightened

5 military activity, heightened isolation of the Bosnian Serbs in Pale,

6 whether it was from Belgrade or Moscow or the strengthening of the

7 federation. And there was military activity on the ground that was

8 perhaps not going in the favour of the Bosnian Serbs and probably some

9 more strengthening including through external arm shipments of the

10 federation armies. So at that particular time, I think one could

11 understand if the Bosnian Serbs felt as if things were not going their

12 way and they were under more and more pressure politically and

13 militarily.

14 Q. Thank you. I'll ask you this question, because I would like us

15 to have a look at 1D710. 1D710. And I would like us to comment on it.

16 Your Honours, this is the transcript of the minutes of a meeting

17 held on the 29th of April, 1995, one day earlier. The meeting was held

18 in the cabinet of the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman. The meeting

19 was attended on behalf of the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

20 Ejup Ganic, Muhamed Sacirbey and Kasim Trnka; Mr. Tudjman was also

21 present and Mr. Sanader and Mr. Radin. At this meeting they discussed

22 the situation and the relationship of Croatia with the

23 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Could we now have a look at pages

24 23 and 24 in the B/C/S version and I've been told its page 3 and 4 in the

25 English version because only the part that I'm interested in, the part

Page 8336

1 that I want to use, has been translated. And, Your Honours, this

2 translation is the Defence's unofficial translation.

3 The discussion between the individuals I have just mentioned,

4 Mr. Banbury, at one point in time Mr. Tudjman said -- and this is noted

5 in the margin. Could we see please see the following page in the English

6 version. He says:

7 "Look, either we will create this federation, because if what we

8 have agreed in isn't pursued, then we won't leave those Croatian parts."

9 And then Ejup Ganic replies:

10 "Mr. President, perhaps I'm not being realistic, but I think that

11 strengthening the federation Serbian entity would be marginalised. Do

12 you understand me?"

13 Tudjman says:

14 "It's understandable."

15 And then Ejup Ganic says:

16 "We have to unite militarily but officially pretend to be mad.

17 We have to unite. We need to arm ourselves better. Why are you imposing

18 restrictions on us in that respect?"

19 And he says:

20 "We know what the world will allow us. We can put the Serbs in

21 Bosnia in a marginal position."

22 These are things that Mr. Karadzic said on that occasion and you

23 referred to that in paragraph 143 of your statement. Was it that the

24 Serbs didn't want to dominate the Muslims? Is that what is said? Was it

25 said that it is the Muslims who want to dominate the Serbs?

Page 8337

1 A. I had never seen this document before, but I find it to be very

2 consistent with remarks I made a moment ago about the increasing

3 isolation of the Bosnian Serbs, the strengthening of the federation

4 militarily and politically, including through perhaps increased arms

5 shipments, and hence it would be understandable if the Bosnian Serb

6 leadership at this time felt under increasing political and military

7 pressure and greater isolation. I do not take away from this document

8 either that the Bosnian Serbs did not want to dominate the Muslims nor do

9 I take away from Dr. Karadzic's statement that -- I do not necessarily

10 believe that because he said it, it meant it was true. And at the same

11 time I do not take away from this document that the Bosnian government or

12 the federation wanted to dominate the Serbs. I think there are important

13 distinctions between the -- the Republika Srpska and the Serb people, and

14 I think there is a big difference between seeking to marginalise or

15 weaken an enemy against whom one is fighting and what the future

16 intentions might be in terms of treatment of populations, majority,

17 minority, or plurality and minority in a future political entity in a

18 peace agreement. So I think it's one -- I'm reluctant to generalise

19 along the lines that you've suggested.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, may I ask you what you exactly

21 asked, because what you said, you are referring to a meeting on which

22 reports were written by the witness about what Mr. Karadzic said, and

23 then you come up with the minutes of another meeting, and then your

24 question was: Was it that the Serbs didn't want to dominate the Muslims?

25 Is that what is said? Was it said that it is the Muslims who want to

Page 8338

1 dominate the Serbs? Now, that's clear, because in the report we find

2 what Mr. Karadzic said, and it's exactly what you quoted.

3 Now, may I take it that your answer was whether what was said

4 during the meet with the Croatian president, whether that is consistent

5 with what was said by Mr. Karadzic? Was that your question? Because I'm

6 totally lost, to be quite honest.

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That was in fact my question.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, you didn't phrase it like that, but

9 apparently that's what you wanted to ask the witness. The witness told

10 us some of his thoughts on the matter.

11 Would you agree with me and perhaps we could ask the witness that

12 what was said during the meeting in the -- with the president of Croatia

13 that that was about the federation who was fighting against Serbs and was

14 not specifically about Muslims as a group, but that the Muslims together

15 with Croats would marginalise the Serbs. I'm asking myself to what

16 extent a general sweeping statement on Muslims always wanting to dominate

17 and then to refer to certain countries where this happened how that -- do

18 we have to understand that to be the same as the Muslims making an

19 affiliation with another people or nation, whatever you would like to

20 call it, the Croats, and then to fight against the Serbs? It's unclear

21 to me, but I do not know, Witness, apparently you have understood what

22 the question was. I had difficulties understanding it. But was that one

23 of the differences you pointed at when you gave your -- could I say

24 little speech rather than an answer to the question?

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, that was one the points that I had sought to

Page 8339

1 make, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you. Then that is at least clear. Could

3 you try to formulate your questions in such a way that they are

4 understood well.

5 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I

6 would like to tender this document into evidence. At the moment, it's

7 marked as a 65 ter document, 1D710.

8 JUDGE ORIE: That is the recording in the transcript of the

9 conversation with the Croatian president.

10 Ms. Bibles, do you have no objections? What I see -- yes, not --

11 not to be MFI'd [microphone not activated] of apparently a large document

12 where small portions are taken out which I think -- has the whole of the

13 document been disclosed to the Prosecution or is it your document?

14 MS. BIBLES: It was originally, I believe, a document seized by

15 the OTP, Your Honour, or taken by the OTP.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then the Chamber, however -- if there is a

17 more full translation of it, then of course the Chamber would like to

18 have a possibility to look at the context of the excerpts that are

19 presented in this document.

20 Madam Registrar.

21 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D710 receives number 1D -- the number

22 D199, Your Honours.

23 JUDGE ORIE: D199 is marked for identification.

24 Please proceed.

25 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 8340

1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Banbury. You mentioned the tunnel on a number of

2 occasions and I would like to ask you something about that. Were you

3 familiar with this manner of providing Sarajevo with supplies? Did you

4 have any personal experience of this manner of providing Sarajevo with

5 supplies?

6 A. I was well aware of the existence of the tunnel and the manner of

7 supplying Sarajevo with supplies using it. I never personally observed

8 any physical aspect of the tunnel, the entrance to the tunnel, et cetera.

9 Q. Did you have any information according to which in addition to

10 military equipment, narcotics, tobacco, goods of a general kind were

11 provided, goods that could be used on the black market or sold on the

12 black market?

13 A. It was my understanding that all manner of goods were transported

14 in and out of the tunnel, well, particularly through the tunnel to

15 Sarajevo. To the extent that they showed up on a so-called black market,

16 I don't know what arrangements the Bosnian government may have had, but I

17 assumed they controlled the tunnel very well, which meant they must have

18 approved the supplies going through it. So if the government approved

19 it, I don't think it means they would end up on a black market. So --

20 but there were certainly commercial goods going in the tunnel.

21 Q. Could you tell us given the work you did which units of the ABiH

22 had control over that feature, which particular unit had control?

23 A. I'm sorry, I was never much of an expert on military units and

24 which units on either side were deployed in which area, so I cannot tell

25 you the -- the answer to that question, I'm sorry.

Page 8341

1 Q. Could we have another look at paragraph 180 of your statement,

2 Exhibit P874. I just have one question about this part of your

3 statement. It's the 10th of July, 1995. That's the date. It concerns

4 the situation around Srebrenica. And you say that evening, on 10th of

5 July, the commander of UNPROFOR, Janvier, spoke to General Tolimir and

6 suggested that he establish a cease-fire. Tolimir said that he issued

7 an order -- that he had issued an order for a cease-fire. Did

8 General Tolimir -- or, rather, was General Tolimir at the time a person

9 who was in the position to issue an order of this kind for a cease-fire?

10 A. I don't know the answer to that question. It's possible that on

11 July 10th when that conversation took place UNPROFOR, including myself,

12 would have thought he would be in a position because we did not know the

13 enormity of the military undertaking that had been initiated by the

14 Bosnian Serbs. Instead, we at the time may have thought it was a

15 localised skirmish, a routine kind of, you know, probing attack that we

16 had seen on many other occasions which could be stopped by

17 General Tolimir given his position. In retrospect, knowing what we know

18 now, I don't believe he would have been in a position to give that order.

19 Q. Since I have limited time, I just have another question. You

20 said that Tolimir said that he had issued an order for a cease-fire. I'm

21 only asking you whether you stand by that claim. According to the

22 information you had, did he in fact say that he had issued an order to

23 establish the cease-fire?

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Stojanovic, I read stop the firing, not

25 cease-fire which are two different concepts. Cease-fire includes two

Page 8342

1 parties. Stop firing can be done one-sidedly.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps the witness could answer the question now

3 then whether Tolimir said that he gave an order to stop firing, whether

4 that's what you heard.

5 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours. I certainly stand by the

6 representation in the paragraph that General Tolimir told General Janvier

7 that he, General Tolimir, had issued an order to the Serb forces to stop

8 firing, yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, we are close to the point where

10 you're expected to conclude. If you have one or more -- two -- a few

11 more questions, then I'll give you another three minutes.

12 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Thank you, Your Honours. I'd like to draw attention to

14 paragraph 183, 185, and 186 of your statement which refer to your meeting

15 with General Mladic in Mali Zvornik on the 1st of September, 1995. What

16 interests me in relation to this meeting that you described in detail is

17 whether you remember whether at that time the French pilots whose planes

18 were shot down above Republika Srpska were discussed.

19 JUDGE ORIE: We'll first -- you have an opportunity to consult

20 with Mr. Mladic, and then we'll see whether after the break there's any

21 additional question.

22 Could you first please finish your question. We'll hear the

23 answer from the witness, and then we'll take the break.

24 Mr. Mladic, please be seated for the next one or two minutes.

25 THE WITNESS: My -- if you'd like me to respond to the question.

Page 8343

1 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps what Mr. Stojanovic said is that he was

2 interested in the relation between the meeting you have described at the

3 time and whether the French pilots whose planes were shot down were

4 discussed.

5 Was it your question whether that incident was discussed at this

6 meeting? Was that the question, Mr. Stojanovic? Could you answer that

7 question.

8 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour.

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I -- to be certain, I would prefer to

10 refer to my notes, but it's my recollection that I believe they were

11 discussed.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, I suggest -- Ms. Bibles, how much

13 time would you need after the break?

14 MS. BIBLES: Very little time, Your Honour, if any five minutes

15 at this moment at this point.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Then I suggest the following: We take a break now.

17 You'll have a possibility to consult with Mr. Mladic during the break.

18 We will resume at 20 minutes to 2.00, and you'll then have, I would say,

19 another 15 minutes at the maximum so that there will be sufficient time

20 for Ms. Bibles for any re-examination.

21 We'll proceed in that way. We'll take a break.

22 Would you please follow the usher.

23 [The witness stands down]

24 JUDGE ORIE: We will resume at 20 minutes to 2.00.

25 --- Recess taken at 1.19 p.m.

Page 8344

1 --- On resuming at 1.39 p.m.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

3 Meanwhile, I'd like to inform the parties that the matter we

4 discussed this morning in private session, the decision on the motion

5 involved, has been made and will be communicated to you by e-mail within

6 the next half an hour or perhaps it may even already be there.

7 [The witness takes the stand]

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, you may proceed.

9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Sir, if you remember, before the break we were dealing with the

11 analysis of a meeting in Mali Zvornik on the 1st of September, 1995.

12 Would you agree with me that that was a period of intense NATO aircraft

13 overflights; at the time NATO planes were flying over the territory of

14 Republika Srpska?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. I asked you about two French pilots, and I asked you whether they

17 were discussed at the meeting, and you say that you believe so but that

18 you would like to consult your notes. To the best of your recollection,

19 could you tell the Chamber the nature of the discussion concerning the

20 French pilots? Could you tell the Chamber something about the discussion

21 about the pilots?

22 A. The two French pilots were being held by the Bosnian Serb forces

23 and there was a strong desire and effort by UNPROFOR and the French

24 contingent in UNPROFOR and certainly been the French authorities to gain

25 the release of the pilots. The objective was simply to get the pilots

Page 8345

1 released by the Bosnian Serb authorities.

2 Q. Are you aware at one point in time these French pilots were

3 released.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Do you know where this happened, and do you know who handed over

6 the pilots in question and to whom?

7 A. I'm sorry, I do not recall the specifics. I probably have a

8 record of it somewhere, but I don't recall myself.

9 Q. Would it refresh your memory if I said that the French Ministry

10 of Defence participated in these discussions that related to handing over

11 the French pilots to the French authorities? Are you aware of this?

12 A. Yes, that is consistent with my recollection.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Any dispute about these matters, for example? Is

14 there any dispute between the parties on -- I mean the witness is kind

15 enough to answer the questions, but ...

16 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the Prosecution's not even sure how

17 this would be necessary or relevant to an adjudication of the indictment,

18 but again I'm reluctant to make agreements off the top of my head, but

19 I'm happy to discuss with Defence any possible agreement on facts.

20 JUDGE ORIE: But it has been not explored. Therefore,

21 Mr. Stojanovic, please proceed.

22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 Q. I will then ask you if it would refresh your memory if I said

24 that this hand-over of the wounded French pilots, the pilots whose wounds

25 were treated, took place in the municipality of Zvornik in

Page 8346

1 Republika Srpska?

2 A. I can certainly believe that to be the case. I again don't

3 recall specifically, but that seems entirely plausible to me.

4 Q. And given the fact that we intend to call them as witnesses, I

5 would like to ask you whether you have noted down any information on

6 these pilots, their first and last names and other personal details that

7 concern them?

8 A. I do not recall having done so. It's possible. I have some --

9 some record of personal details in my notes on the pilots. I think it's

10 somewhat unlikely though, but the fact that they had been shot down,

11 taken captive, held, released, I would have some of that information in

12 my notes.

13 Q. Given that in the summary of your statement, which has been

14 admitted or will be admitted into evidence, there's nothing about those

15 discussions held on the 1st of September 1995 about that subject that was

16 discussed there. So is there a reason for which you didn't answer those

17 questions, or did the Prosecution not put any questions to you that

18 concerned the situation that the pilots were in?

19 A. I certainly would have tried to answer any questions to the best

20 of my ability, and I'm sure that if the issue were discussed or to the

21 extent it was discussed in the September 1 meeting in Mali Zvornik, I

22 would have taken notes of that and those discussions would be reflected

23 in the notes that I have. But not -- my -- my notes are voluminous and

24 my statement is a very short abridged summary of some aspects of them, so

25 not everything in my notes of course appears in the -- my statement.

Page 8347

1 Q. I ask you to comment on paragraph 187 of your statement, P874. I

2 apologise. Paragraph 188. At one point in time General Mladic left the

3 meeting. He protested because there were NATO aircraft overflying the

4 territory of Republika Srpska right up until the end of that meeting. Do

5 you remember that?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. And four hours later, the meeting resumed after General Mladic's

8 proposals were accepted relating to the NATO overflights that should stop

9 pending this resolution.

10 A. Correct. I think there may have been a slight adjustment to the

11 final arrangement. The final arrangement was slightly different perhaps

12 than what General Mladic had proposed, but broadly speaking those were

13 the conditions under which the meeting recommenced.

14 Q. And at this continuation of the meeting, in view of what you said

15 in paragraph 188 of your statement, General Mladic raised the issue,

16 among other things, why his proposal was not accepted, the proposal

17 relating to the establishment of a joint commission after Markale II

18 incident. Do you recall that question of his, and did any -- did

19 Mr. Janvier offer any response to that?

20 A. I recall that issue, and while I am not certain what

21 General Janvier's response was, I know the UNPROFOR position on that

22 issue which I would anticipate General Janvier would have communicated at

23 the time, and the UNPROFOR position was that we had done an investigation

24 using competent professionals to conduct it, and we were satisfied with

25 the results and we found the results to be conclusive. So there was no

Page 8348

1 need from the UNPROFOR perspective to pursue any further investigation.

2 The results to us were clear.

3 Q. Did the use of NATO -- the NATO Air Force come upon a request of

4 General Smith, and is it true that Mr. Gobillard was not at that point in

5 time in Bosnia?

6 A. Yes, it's true that the use of NATO airpower following that

7 Markale incident in August 1995 came at the request of General Smith.

8 Your question -- on the transcript it says "Janvier" I heard "Gobillard."

9 Smith was Gobillard's superior officer so his presence would not have

10 mattered but it is true that General Janvier was outside of the UNPROFOR

11 area of operations and hence not in a position to call or not call for

12 NATO air support at that time.

13 Q. There was a transcript problem on page 68 in line 9. My question

14 related to General Janvier, so my question was whether General Janvier

15 was at that point in time when the NATO aviation was called, whether he

16 was in the Balkans.

17 JUDGE ORIE: I think the matter was resolved already, Mr. --

18 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, perhaps I failed to

19 see the reply, because I know that Gobillard was mentioned, but my

20 question was whether Janvier was there because this meeting was on the

21 1st of September, in other words three days after the events surrounding

22 Markale II.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the Defence counsel please repeat the

24 last portion of his question.

25 JUDGE ORIE: What the witness told us is that he heard the name

Page 8349

1 Gobillard mentioned, but that he took it that the question was about

2 Janvier and then he -- he responded -- he has answered that question as

3 if it had been about the presence of General Janvier being away,

4 General Janvier being away. So the matter has been resolved.

5 Mr. Stojanovic, it's about time, I think, to conclude.

6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I just have a few

7 more questions and I will stick to the 15 minutes that were agreed.

8 JUDGE ORIE: You have used approximately your 15 minutes. You

9 can put one or two more questions and also in view of the matters you

10 raised, Mr. Stojanovic, the Chamber is not inclined to give you more time

11 than we have done already. Let's say two more questions and then it's

12 time for Ms. Bibles to further examine the witness if she has any need.

13 Please proceed.

14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Thank you could we see in e-court P874, paragraph 161. This is

16 May 1995, Mr. Banbury. You talk about the notes that you took when you

17 accompanied Mr. Akashi at his meeting with Mr. Milosevic, and you say

18 that he said, among other things, and that's in paragraph 161: I will

19 get in touch with Mladic and then -- and convince him to meet with Smith

20 to resolve this issue, these banality. It's like a child's game. He's

21 an honest man, you know. He has some problems with his political

22 leadership, but if Karadzic finds out he'll exploit it and say he's under

23 my influence.

24 Now, I'd like to ask you this: While you were in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, when you had all these meetings with Mr. Mladic and

Page 8350

1 contacts with various political and military leaders, was this position

2 on General Mladic, the position that you described yesterday during the

3 examination-in-chief, was that position something that you yourself also

4 took?

5 A. I'm sorry, I don't understand precisely the question. Which

6 position was -- are you asking if I took?

7 JUDGE ORIE: Please rephrase the question, Mr. Stojanovic. Make

8 it a clear question.

9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I will.

10 Q. This phrase that General Mladic was an honest man, was that

11 something that was always present in the background in people's minds in

12 all these meetings that you attended? Did you actually hear a similar

13 assessment of General Mladic from Mr. Milosevic?

14 JUDGE ORIE: I thought that this is what Mr. Milosevic had said.

15 This is the -- what Mr. Milosevic -- Mr. Milosevic is reported to have

16 said that he considered Mr. Mladic to be an honest man. So now to ask

17 this witness: Did you actually hear a similar assessment of

18 General Mladic from Mr. Milosevic. Do you intend to say that at any

19 other occasion Mr. Milosevic had said the same or is it that other people

20 would have said the same about Mr. Mladic? What's your question?

21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. The latter, sir. Is -- did you hear a similar assessment of

23 General Mladic from other people as well?

24 A. I did not hear other Bosnian Serb officials characterise

25 General Mladic's character. I did hear very often, in participating

Page 8351

1 conversations, very often with senior UNPROFOR officials and it was I

2 think the widely held view among UNPROFOR people who dealt with

3 General Mladic that he very often misrepresented the truth to us.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, one last question.

5 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I have no further

6 questions.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Stojanovic. Ms. Bibles, any

8 questions in re-examination for the witness?

9 MS. BIBLES: No questions for re-examination of this witness,

10 Your Honour. We do have 12 associated exhibits to deal with later but I

11 don't believe we need the witness for those.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's see whether my colleagues or I have any

13 further questions.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE ORIE: We have no further questions. We don't need the

16 witness for the associated exhibits, which means that, Mr. Banbury, this

17 concludes your evidence. I'd like to thank you very much for come to

18 The Hague and for having answered all the questions that were put to you

19 by the parties and by the Bench, and I wish you a safe return home again.

20 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE ORIE: You may follow the usher.

22 [The witness withdrew]

23 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, which are the remaining -- which are the

24 remaining associated exhibits to be tendered?

25 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, we could begin with 09738, which was