130823ED

Page 15567

1 without Mr. Baraybar, I'm sure that we don't have to -- if we don't work

2 on Monday we will still finish both witnesses next week.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. If you would sit together with Mr. Groome and

4 work out a schedule to which the parties commit themselves.

5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I can say to the Chamber now without

6 Mr. Baraybar there is an estimate of ten and a half hours for next week.

7 So if Mr. Lukic is granted some additional time, it seems that it is

8 quite certain we will finish next week, if we do not sit Monday.

9 JUDGE ORIE: If we would not sit on Monday.

10 Yes. Let's -- let's try to proceed in that way then.

11 Then is -- could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

12 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 [The witness takes the stand]

15 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Donia.

16 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps there's no need, but nevertheless, I would

18 like to remind you that you're still bound by the solemn declaration

19 you've given at the beginning of your testimony.

20 And Mr. Lukic will now continue his cross-examination.

21 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]

22 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic: [Continued]

23 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, doctor.

24 A. Good morning.

25 Q. [In English] You were hesitant to answer in B/C/S; I saw that.

Page 15568

1 A. [Interpretation] Yes. Good day.

2 Q. [Interpretation] Now we're just going to go back to a few general

3 questions a bit. This is an area that I also found in the transcripts

4 that I reviewed, the transcripts of your previous testimony, that is.

5 And I noticed that you were asked to testify against an accused Serb or

6 against -- or against an accused Croat. You never testified against a

7 Muslim.

8 Is that correct?

9 A. [In English] That's correct.

10 JUDGE ORIE: May I just -- language used. May I take it that you

11 wanted to ask whether the witness testified in a case against an accused

12 Serb. Testimony is not against an accused. Testimony is to tell the

13 truth and -- may I take it that that is how you wanted to phrase --

14 MR. LUKIC: That the case was against, yeah.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The case. That is not the same as to testify

16 against. And I take it that your answer has to be understood in a

17 similar way.

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, that's right.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. In the past, you openly expressed your views, claiming that

22 Slobodan Milosevic was guilty of what he had been accused of; is that

23 correct?

24 A. I -- probably so. I don't have a specific recollection of saying

25 those words, but ... would not be surprised if I had.

Page 15569

1 Q. About 50-something persons were mentioned with whom a letter was

2 signed concerning the guilt of Slobodan Milosevic; do you remember that?

3 A. I remember signing a letter. I don't -- I don't specifically

4 recall the contents of that letter as including the conclusion that

5 Slobodan Milosevic was guilty.

6 Q. All right. Is it correct that in previous reports you wrote

7 about General Ratko Mladic? In the reports that were written for this

8 Tribunal.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Is it also correct that you believe that General Ratko Mladic is

11 guilty of what he stands accused of?

12 A. I don't know. That's not my judgement to make and would prefer

13 not to -- I won't make it.

14 Q. Very well. In your reports or, rather, when preparing your

15 reports, you did not talk to the main participants in what happened,

16 Alija Izetbegovic, Ejub Ganic, Radovan Karadzic?

17 A. Well, I -- I talked to Ganic a little bit briefly but not in

18 great detail.

19 But the other two persons, other than my 24 hours in court

20 conversing with Mr. Karadzic, did not speak to him or Mr. Milosevic.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, sorry to interrupt you.

22 You referred to a letter, and the witness said he didn't

23 remember. Do you intend to tender that letter or to --

24 MR. LUKIC: It's from the transcript. I don't have the actual

25 letter.

Page 15570

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Because the -- the question is very suggestive

2 and nothing wrong with that. But then the Chamber, of course, would very

3 much like to see the content of that letter, in whatever way. Unless

4 there's any dispute about what is in the letter.

5 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, at this point I have no idea what

6 letter is being referred to.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Lukic, if you could, in one way or

8 another, provide the Chamber with content.

9 If not, then, of course, the questions are without a factual

10 basis.

11 MR. LUKIC: I will try to locate it in the transcript.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.

13 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

14 Q. [Interpretation] Can we agree that you never talked to anyone --

15 that you never talked to anyone who represented the ideas of the SDS?

16 A. No, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't agree to that. And I am kind of

17 hard-pressed right now to think of who I have spoken with. I haven't,

18 for example, interviewed anyone of that -- formally interviewed anyone of

19 that viewpoint but I've spoken to a number of people who share it over

20 the years.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Lukic please

22 repeat his question and speak into the microphone. Thank you.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you're invited to repeat your question

24 and to speak into the microphone.

25 MR. LUKIC: Mm-hm.

Page 15571

1 Q. [Interpretation] Can you recall a name of a member of the SDS

2 that you talked to?

3 A. That's a different question from the one you've just asked about

4 those who share the SDS viewpoint. But in either case, as I say, I can't

5 recall a specific name right now, but I have heard that viewpoint

6 expressed personally a good number of times.

7 Q. Doctor, we saw that newspapers are a large share of your sources,

8 particularly "Oslobodjenje" from Sarajevo. Would you agree with me that

9 newspapers in Bosnia and Herzegovina were very biased, nationally

10 coloured, before the war and particularly during the war?

11 A. They -- I think most of them became nationally coloured in the

12 course of the war. I would not agree that they were nationally coloured

13 before the war. Some of them underwent this fairly obvious and even

14 radical transformation on the very eve of the war, such as the newspaper

15 "Glas" which became "Srpski Glas," and that was kind of a more, perhaps,

16 crystal-clear instance of the change in orientation. But virtually every

17 paper assumed some sort of colouration on the war, whether it was that of

18 a particular ethnic group or a multi-ethnic orientation.

19 Q. Is it correct that a branch, as it were, seceded from

20 "Oslobodjenje" and an "Oslobodjenje" was founded on Serb-held territory

21 and it is precisely because of the policy followed by "Oslobodjenje"

22 before the war?

23 A. I know there was a -- a "Srpsko Oslobodjenje" formed in Pale. I

24 think it was quite late in the war, if I'm not mistaken, maybe 1994 or

25 something like that. But I think that a hard -- I mean, it was clear at

Page 15572

1 that point that they were trying to imitate or benefit from the name

2 "Oslobodjenje" in the Sarajevo -- the paper in Sarajevo itself.

3 I think that given the number of Serb journalists who stayed with

4 the "Oslobodjenje" in Sarajevo throughout the war or part of the war

5 anyway, I would have to say I don't think that the reaction was an

6 exclusively national one on the part of these people who founded it.

7 Q. Would you agree that "Oslobodjenje" was the official newspaper of

8 the SDA, the party of Alija Izetbegovic?

9 A. No, it was not. It never was.

10 Q. In "Oslobodjenje," from that time, did you ever see an

11 affirmative article about a Serb, a favourable article about a Serb

12 politician?

13 A. Many of them. And I think it's just crystal-clear from going

14 through "Oslobodjenje" in the period particularly prior to, let's say,

15 April 6, 1992, that the purpose of the paper, that the commitment was to

16 give equal play to all three groups, to all three, let's say, national

17 parties. And, in some cases, those were done through commentators. Many

18 stories appeared in "Oslobodjenje" actually originated in "Tanjug" in

19 Belgrade and were simply printed word for word as is often the case with

20 wire service stories. So I don't have any problem finding many instances

21 of "Oslobodjenje" in the pre-war period giving balanced accounts of

22 leaders of all three groups.

23 Q. Which, of course, was not the case during the war; right?

24 A. The -- the orientation of "Oslobodjenje" shifted and shifted

25 quite radically starting in about April 6th. But it wasn't so much

Page 15573

1 anti-Serb as it was anti, let's say, SDS. It was something that was a

2 part of the general culture in Sarajevo that was deeply opposed to the

3 attacks and siege and favoured retaining the Sarajevo that people were

4 used to before the war.

5 Q. Every newspaper has an editorial policy as well, isn't that

6 right, and editorial policy, as a rule, is partial, not objective. Would

7 you agree with that?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Would you remember that you said, on one occasion, that you

10 thought that there is not a single newspaper whose editorial policy is

11 neutral and impartial?

12 A. No, I don't recall saying that.

13 Q. On page 10 of your report in e-court, you mention Stipe Mesic.

14 Can you tell us what the position was of Stipe Mesic, the last president

15 of the Presidency of Yugoslavia? What was his position vis-a-vis this

16 Yugoslavia? Did he favour the survival of that state, or, as president,

17 did he work on breaking it up?

18 A. Well, his position was opposed to the continuation of Yugoslavia.

19 He expressly stated, I think, in his book that he published that he --

20 you know, favoured destroying Yugoslavia.

21 I don't perceive his actions in the Presidency as directed toward

22 that goal or at least not that goal alone. He actually was -- it seems

23 to me, trying to work out some arrangements where at least if that

24 process were to go forward, it would do so peacefully.

25 Q. Due to Mesic's views, Serbia was against him being appointed as

Page 15574

1 the president of the state. However, that nevertheless happened due to

2 pressure coming from the European community; is that right?

3 A. It came about as a result of an agreement that was negotiated by

4 the European community, yes.

5 Q. European community was of the view that Mesic had to be the

6 president of that state; is that right?

7 A. Yes. The European community negotiators felt that the succession

8 as it had taken place for the past decade dictated that message be

9 confirmed in the position of the Presidency which, as you know, took

10 place, I think, on October 8th rather than on May 15th, as it had

11 originally happened in -- in prior years, when the Presidency --

12 president of the Presidency came up.

13 Q. We now need page 10 e-court of your report, D1999 [as

14 interpreted] --

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: P1999.

16 MR. LUKIC: Yes, I think I said P. We don't have this many.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed.

18 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. So P1999, page 11 in English

19 version, and page 10 in B/C/S version.

20 Q. [Interpretation] Here, you write that in the majority -- in most

21 instances, the JNA would remain in control of contested territory or turn

22 it over to local Serbs.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Where on page 7 are you reading, Mr. Lukic?

24 MR. LUKIC: Should be page 11 in English version in e-court --

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay --

Page 15575

1 MR. LUKIC: -- page 7 of the paper. It's the first line on that

2 page:

3 "But in most instances, the JNA remained in control of contested

4 territory or turned it over to local Serbs, manifesting its gradual turn

5 toward Serb nationalism."

6 Q. [Interpretation] These territories that you call "contested"

7 here, were these instances of the JNA seizing Croatian villages, Croatian

8 land, and turning it over to the Serbs, or was this, in fact, Serb

9 villages and Serb land?

10 What do you mean by "contested territory"? And what were those

11 instances, if you could give us some examples, please.

12 A. I -- I don't think there was a instance in which it was not the

13 case that the JNA moved into these areas without an existing conflict

14 breaking out between the Croatian security forces and local Serb police,

15 or local Serb political leaders.

16 So they were, indeed, in the first instance, acting in accord

17 with their policy at the time, which was to separate the warring sides,

18 separate the disputing sides. So, naturally, in a lot of cases, most

19 cases that I know of here, the villages concerned were inhabited by

20 Serbs.

21 Q. In English version, on page 12 in e-court, in paragraph 3; in

22 B/C/S version, also page 12, paragraph 3. You say in the second line of

23 this paragraph:

24 "On the 25th of June, 1991, assemblies of both republics

25 simultaneously passed declarations of independence in a direct challenge

Page 15576

1 to both the JNA and the federal governing bodies."

2 In your research, did you come across any texts which claimed

3 that these declarations were illegal and anti-constitutional?

4 A. Of course, there's a plethora of texts issued by the Presidency

5 of -- of Yugoslavia that argued that these were unconstitutional and

6 illegal, became sort of a fundamental theme of the Serb relationship of

7 the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro with the negotiators. And,

8 likewise there were many tracts that argued they were fully legal and

9 authorised by virtue of the referenda that had taken place before them.

10 Those texts, of course, coming from the Croat and Slovene states.

11 Q. In the following sentence, you say:

12 "Two days later, the JNA moved to secure Slovenia's international

13 border-crossing points and airports ... claiming that they were under

14 federal jurisdiction."

15 Were these border-crossings and airport, indeed, under federal

16 jurisdiction?

17 A. Well, that -- at the end of the day, becomes a legal question and

18 one of competing constitutional claims on the part of the Slovenes and

19 Yugoslavia. So I -- I really would not want to try to resolve it.

20 If you mean by that, was it under, let's say, the administration

21 of federal authorities, I would say, yes, it was. It was under the

22 administration of federal authority, probably border guards and things

23 like this, that were a part of the federal security system rather than

24 Slovene ones.

25 Q. Actually, an operation of Slovene forces preceded this. Slovene

Page 15577

1 forces took up these border crossings; is that right?

2 A. That would be -- yes, that's correct.

3 Q. The war in Slovenia was short lived. In your research, did you

4 come across the fact that the JNA did not even issue proper ammunition to

5 its members?

6 A. I have read that allegation and have no reason to dispute it.

7 Q. Thank you. On page 12 in e-court in the B/C/S version, page 13

8 in the English version, paragraph 1, in line 1 in the English version,

9 you say:

10 "In the wake of its humiliation in Slovenia, the JNA in Croatia

11 abandoned its strategy of restraint and began to side overtly with Serb

12 nationalists."

13 Is it true that, at that time, there were already attacks against

14 JNA barracks under way?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. The JNA did not go out of the barracks and attack anybody.

17 Rather, they remained within the barracks and defended themselves from

18 the barracks by opening fire on the Croatian forces who attacked the

19 barracks; is that right?

20 A. It -- it's kind of a multi-faceted answer to that question.

21 There were -- first of all, I'm trying to describe here the progression

22 of this policy change in the late summer -- summer to late summer of

23 1991.

24 The besieging of the barracks, of the JNA barracks by Croatian

25 security forces preceded that. In the cases where they were easily taken

Page 15578

1 by security -- by Croatian security force, in many cases they were, and

2 the weapons and ammunition was then seized by Croat forces, which, in the

3 opinion of many observers, was really what fueled their war capability in

4 that time.

5 The larger ones, of course, were not so much attacked as they

6 were besieged, encircled, and just kept encircled for a period of time,

7 rather than subject to a full-scale attack to try to conquer them.

8 Q. Doctor, you are familiar with the situation, and I'm not

9 dissatisfied with your answer. I'm simply waiting for the interruption

10 to conclude before putting my next question.

11 Is it true that, in those barracks which were under siege, water

12 and electricity supply were disconnected and they were also -- they --

13 the food supply was also cut off from them; is that right?

14 A. Interrupted intermittently, certainly, yes, and I think that's --

15 General Mladic himself stated those facts in -- before the Bosnian Serb

16 Assembly, and I accept that that was, indeed, the case.

17 Q. In your research, did you come across the fact that the JNA gave

18 weapons to all of those who responded to the call-up, regardless of their

19 ethnicity?

20 A. Well, I -- I think you're referring to -- well, first of all, I

21 would want to know exactly what time-period you're talking about, if

22 you're talking about Bosnia or Croatia, and in what time-period.

23 Q. At any point in time. In 1991 and 1992. Before the war broke

24 out in Bosnia. Did the JNA refuse to issue weapons to anyone on the

25 basis that they were a Croat or a Muslim? Did you ever come across such

Page 15579

1 a fact?

2 A. No. I believe the -- I mean, the JNA distributed arms in two

3 ways.

4 One was to those reservists who were mobilised, and those

5 reservists who were mobilised were indeed -- included, particularly prior

6 to late full 1991, included a good number of Croats and Muslims.

7 It issued weapons freely to them regardless of their ethnicity or

8 identity.

9 The other process, though, that was going on, which was much

10 more, let's say, discreet, was the arming of local committees of the SDS

11 and arms that were specifically given to organised Serb entities, whether

12 they were political -- the political party itself, or even, in some

13 cases, the local, call them paramilitaries, or leaders.

14 Q. When it comes to arming the Serbs outside of the JNA

15 establishment, what was the purpose of that, if it was a well-known fact

16 that anybody could respond to the mobilisation and be issued with a

17 weapon by becoming a member of the JNA? Why would the JNA be organising

18 distribution of weapons when anybody could receive those weapons by

19 responding to the call-up?

20 A. Well, this was part of the plan or the, let's say, wish that

21 started, really in the -- with Belgrade authorities to provide arms to

22 local Serb forces outside of the JNA, to strengthen their ability to

23 resist or to actually take over areas from Croatian security forces. And

24 eventually to fuel the Serb forces in Bosnia.

25 So that was a very different process. The -- many local Serbs in

Page 15580

1 both Croatia and Bosnia were very suspicious of the JNA and wanted it to

2 become much more of a Serb army much faster than it did, and so that

3 distrust caused them to want weapons of their own, apart from the JNA and

4 that those requests were honoured and, in fact, sometimes stimulated by

5 authorities, both within the JNA and the governments of Serbia and

6 Yugoslavia.

7 Q. Now page 14 in e-court, page 14 of your report, line 5 in the

8 English version, and the first paragraph on page 14 in the B/C/S.

9 You say that the presence of the Croat police in Kijevo and

10 Vrlika, the two small Croat majority towns on the road between Knin and

11 Sinj, was intolerable obstructions of the JNA's vital communications and

12 transportation links to the south.

13 I would like to ask you whether the mere existence of these

14 villages was the obstacles -- obstacle or was it the barricades on the

15 road which were, in fact, the obstacles preventing the JNA from having

16 normal communication with other parts and other units?

17 A. I think both. Not a -- and I would add a third factor which was

18 the buildup of the Croatian security forces which General Mladic reported

19 on in his diary, and all three factors, really, were considered threats

20 to the smooth functioning of that passageway to the JNA.

21 Q. However, you did find trace of the barricades around these two

22 settlements on the roads around there; right?

23 A. Yes. I mean, I'm relying on a number of accounts in this

24 section, including the work of Srdjan Radulovic and General Mladic

25 himself, and, you know, other observers, and they certainly all report

Page 15581

1 barricades being used, at least occasionally, in this area.

2 Q. Further on in e-court, on page 15 in both versions, paragraph 3

3 in the English and 2 in the B/C/S, you say:

4 "The JNA took over a new role as an initiating belligerent."

5 Would you agree that these attacks served to pull out people from

6 the barracks under siege?

7 A. Not this particular one, as I understand it. I don't think there

8 was anything under siege specifically in Kijevo, if that's what you're

9 referring to.

10 The -- these actions were not - at least as I can determine -

11 designed to lift the sieges of the JNA troops that were in the urban

12 barracks that were then under siege.

13 Q. However, would you agree that in urban areas, such as the

14 barracks in Zadar, the barracks in Split, one could not approach them if

15 the roads were blocked and there was no possibility to free the members

16 of the JNA who were under siege? In Zadar, for example.

17 A. Yes, I think that's the definition of "siege."

18 Q. Thank you.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the whole issue about whether it was just

20 the mere existence of those two villages, if I carefully read the

21 paragraph, all the matters you asked the witness are answered in that

22 paragraph. It is about check-points. It is about not being able to

23 freely move. It is about the Croatian security forces.

24 It's all explained there. And then you ask: Was it the mere

25 existence of a village. Of course, that's not what the report says.

Page 15582

1 And, again, everything you asked, all the answers given, are -- well, if

2 not for the full 100 per cent, then at least for 80 or 90 per cent in

3 that paragraph.

4 So I'm just concerned about re-eliciting the same from what we

5 read already in the report. But please proceed and keep this in mind.

6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 The key issue for us was to explain the reasons for the attacks.

8 Those were not attacks aimed at taking up territory or anything of the

9 sort. They had a different purpose, and this is what we wanted to

10 explain, and this is something that cannot be found in this report.

11 JUDGE ORIE: The facts you asked for -- and you didn't ask

12 whether this explained it. The facts you asked for are found in the

13 report.

14 Please proceed.

15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Q. You go on to say that the military and strategic aims of the JNA

17 coincided with the political aims of the local armed Serbs. Would you

18 agree that there was, indeed, solely one purpose; namely, to maintain the

19 joint state and not allow it to fall apart?

20 A. No.

21 Q. You would not agree?

22 A. No. I think my view on that would be the quotation that I used

23 from General Kadijevic in describing this transition in the late summer

24 of 1991, in which he explained the relationship between the specific JNA

25 commitment to Yugoslavia and its transition to siding with the Serbs,

Page 15583

1 with the local Serb forces.

2 That, to me, is an extremely well expressed, very clear statement

3 of where the JNA was coming from.

4 Q. Are you trying to say that the Serbs and the JNA did not want to

5 preserve Yugoslavia? Your answer is not entirely clear to me.

6 A. Well, I think we could go to -- I can't locate it right here.

7 But the statement of General Kadijevic, in my view, accurately captures

8 that -- the answer to that question, and I have included it in this

9 report.

10 Q. Then in another part, you speak about the attack on Dubrovnik.

11 What was the role of General Mladic in the attack on Dubrovnik? Did he

12 play any role in that?

13 A. I don't -- I don't know.

14 Q. You speak of combat around Vukovar. Would you also agree that

15 General Mladic played no part in that combat either?

16 A. I don't know.

17 Q. We went through 1991 in your report, and now, although the report

18 is entitled: "Sarajevo" --

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic either is seeking contact with

20 Mr. Stojanovic or he indicates that it would be time for the break.

21 Perhaps it's the latter.

22 Perhaps we should take that break then now. Yes.

23 But, first, we'd like Mr. Donia to be escorted out of the

24 courtroom.

25 [The witness stands down]

Page 15584

1 JUDGE ORIE: We take the break and will resume at ten minutes

2 to 11.00.

3 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

4 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

6 [The witness takes the stand]

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, please proceed.

8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 Q. Dr. Donia, before we move on to Sarajevo, we're just going to

10 briefly deal with the following.

11 You also worked on other reports, not only this one about

12 Sarajevo. In the course of your work, did you come across the following

13 information: How did the war break out in Bosnia? What happened in

14 Sijekovac in 1992?

15 A. Those are two different questions and may be tangentially

16 related. But to address the second one first, in Sijekovac on, I think,

17 the 29th of March, 1992, it might have been a day or two earlier or

18 after, a Croatian paramilitary group crossed the Drina -- or crossed the

19 Sava - Sijekovac is a community just across the border from Croatia - and

20 attacked the community with -- with -- with weapons, and killed a large

21 number of people, a significant number of people anyway, and then

22 returned back to the -- basically devastated the village. There has been

23 all sorts of debate since then about who exactly was targeted and who the

24 victims were and how many of them there were. It hasn't been established

25 to my satisfaction in anything that I have seen exactly what the

Page 15585

1 motivation for that was. It's certainly known that there were local,

2 kind of a low-level almost terrorist war going on between Serb and Croat

3 nationalists in the region with explosions directed against particularly

4 cultural institutions, one group of the other, and may have been an act

5 of retaliation for that. May have been caused by other forces. But it

6 was the -- unquestionably the Croatian paramilitary coming to this area

7 and launching that attack that you're referring to.

8 Now as to the second part of your question, what caused the war

9 in Bosnia? That's -- I mean, people have written so many volumes on this

10 topic, and it seems to me it's -- it's really hard to sort of encapsulate

11 that in any kind of reasonably brief period of time to your answer [sic].

12 But I would, I guess, say generally that you had a -- one overwhelmingly

13 large military force, overwhelming large military force in the JNA and a

14 number of political factions seeking to mobilise their followers to

15 promote the actual independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina; whereas the

16 political objectives of the SDS and the Serb followers of that party was

17 to contest that and to carve out their own state and, for that purpose,

18 they essentially mobilised or allied with the JNA, eventually assumed

19 control of many of its units, and the hostilities reflected these things,

20 on the military side anyway, resulted from this asymmetry of forces and

21 the political ambitions [Realtime transcript read in error "ammunitions"]

22 of each side.

23 Q. Thank you for this lengthy answer.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I just interrupt. If I may interrupt you,

25 Mr. Lukic.

Page 15586

1 Mr. Donia, you did say "political ambitions of each side," or did

2 you say "ammunitions"? You are recorded as having said "ammunitions."

3 THE WITNESS: I did say "ambitions."

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Before this massacre in Sijekovac, were there any armed conflicts

7 in that area at all, or was it civilians who fell victim in Sijekovac?

8 A. Again, that's two questions.

9 The -- the first part of it, were there armed conflicts in the

10 area. There were. I would characterise the situation generally as

11 consisting of episodic armed conflicts dating back to the fall of 1991 in

12 Bosnia in those areas that were immediately adjacent to the Croatian war

13 zone. And then --

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. -- could you switch off the microphone.

15 Mr. Mladic. Yes, and low volume.

16 Please proceed.

17 THE WITNESS: And then smaller episodes of assassinations and

18 terrorist acts and skirmishes that seemed to have accelerated, and also

19 barricades in various places. It kind of accelerated in the first three

20 months of 1992. So I think you can say there -- there were, indeed,

21 military activities and clashes going on, although not of particularly

22 high level.

23 And, I'm sorry, the second part of your question was?

24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Were civilians killed in Sijekovac?

Page 15587

1 A. Absolutely, yes. Yes.

2 Q. Now, going to move on to this part where you talk about Sarajevo.

3 That is somehow the beginning.

4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Page 21, line 2, in the English

5 version. And that's what we need in e-court. The second paragraph on

6 page 20 in B/C/S.

7 Q. You provide a description for this street that has east and

8 westbound lanes and you say in its western half it was called the Street

9 of the Proletarian Brigades and Vojvoda Putnik Street in its eastern

10 portion closest to Marin Dvor.

11 These streets no longer bear these names, right, the names of

12 streets in Sarajevo were changed?

13 A. Yes. Virtually every street got a new name.

14 Q. That was done during the war, as far as back as that; right? It

15 started then. The process was not over then.

16 A. I think actually it was largely complete, at least for the centre

17 part of the city, by 1993. There's a map from 1993 which has many of the

18 new names on it. So -- and may have started as early as late 1991.

19 Q. All the names of streets that were Serb were changed; right?

20 A. All the street names were changed. A few actually received the

21 names of intellectual scholars, people who were Serbs, but basically all

22 the names that had existed before, who tended to be revolutionary heros

23 of the Second World War or period of socialism, were changed to various

24 types of names, names sometimes after units, sometimes after individuals

25 who were regarded highly in the history of Sarajevo, and sometimes for,

Page 15588

1 you know, any other institution or purpose.

2 Q. Would you agree that streets were named only after Muslims,

3 almost?

4 A. As I've said, no, I wouldn't agree that they were named only

5 after Muslims.

6 Q. Would we agree that blue boards bearing street names were

7 replaced by green boards or plaques? Or, rather, the colour used was the

8 colour that, in Bosnia, is affiliated with Muslim. So all of these

9 plaques bearing street names are green, Muslim green?

10 A. Well, green, yes. And I would further agree that green in Bosnia

11 and a whole bunch of other places is the colour that is used by Muslims

12 in flags and it -- it's essentially a symbol of Islam.

13 Q. Now I would like us to take a brief look at page 24 of your

14 report.

15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] In the English version, it's the last

16 paragraph. It is also page 24 in the B/C/S version, the last paragraph.

17 Q. You say to us there that the SDA candidate Ejub Ganic came

18 seventh in terms of the seats in the Presidency. He had identified

19 himself as Yugoslav in the 1981 census.

20 Ejub Ganic is one of the most extremist members of the SDA party.

21 Would you agree with me on that?

22 A. No, that would be your characterisation, not mine.

23 Q. Is it correct that the SDA party instructed its voters that --

24 or, rather, to do the following: To vote for Ejub Ganic, in terms of

25 this seventh seat?

Page 15589

1 A. Well, "instructed." All political -- all of the three national

2 party formations asked their members to vote for their particular

3 candidate for that seventh seat. So, for the Serbs, they actually

4 nominated a Jew, Ivan Ceresnjes. I forget who the Croats nominated, but

5 it was someone who, some way or another, met the criteria for this

6 category of other. So the answer to your question is, yes, they did.

7 The SDS -- SDA did request its members to vote for Ganic as the party's

8 candidate.

9 Q. It became obvious there how this principle of one man, one vote

10 works in Bosnia; isn't that right? One could see that the Muslims could

11 outvote anyone in Bosnia-Herzegovina unless some other mechanisms were

12 used to protect national interest.

13 A. This election, to me, did not make that clear, no.

14 Q. You know of this constitutional category in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

15 constituent peoples, you read about that, didn't you?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Today, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we have this institute of

18 protecting basic national interests; isn't that right?

19 A. Are you referring to the parliamentary -- body in parliament,

20 yes.

21 Q. So before the war and after the war, the accepted principle was

22 that, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there had to be some kind of control for the

23 democratic voting based on the principle of one man, one vote. You will

24 agree with me on that, won't you?

25 A. Yes. The -- I mean, the system of selecting members of the

Page 15590

1 Presidency clearly was not based on one man, one vote, and it's, I think,

2 arguable that the elections to the Assembly were, but certainly the

3 Presidency was already trifurcated by -- and, in fact, quadrifurcated by

4 national affiliation.

5 Q. On pages 29 through 31, you speak about different belligerent

6 statements made by Karadzic, Koljevic, about the division of Sarajevo and

7 the division the population. The period that you speak about here is up

8 until the 16th of April, 1992.

9 You will agree that, in that period, General Mladic was not in

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina at all?

11 A. Yes. To my knowledge, he was not there ever, at that time.

12 Q. In your view, what was the crucial turning point that showed that

13 the conflict would start in Sarajevo?

14 A. Well, I -- I don't know that there was one, and depending on a

15 how one assesses these various -- the significance of these various

16 military operations, the conflict did not start in Sarajevo. It could be

17 said to have started in October 1991 in the village that was attacked by

18 the JNA over the border with Croatia. Could equally be said to have

19 started along a couple of other border incidents. Certainly could be

20 said to have begun on the April 1st with the first incursion of

21 paramilitaries into Bijeljina.

22 So I -- in fact, it's not really till the 6th of April that these

23 decisive events start to take place in Sarajevo and they are trailing a

24 number of other events that might be said to have started the war.

25 Q. Thank you. I'm going ask you about Sarajevo itself.

Page 15591

1 You are aware of that incident or, rather, the killing that took

2 place on the 1st of March, 1992, when the father of a bridegroom was

3 killed at a wedding in Sarajevo. Nikola Gardovic was killed.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. He was killed at his own son's wedding.

6 A. Yes. And I believe a clergyman, a Serbian Orthodox priest, was

7 wounded.

8 Q. Exactly. Radenko Mitrovic, a clergyman, was wounded; and Nikola

9 Gardovic, who was killed, is also an Orthodox priest. You remember that,

10 don't you?

11 A. I didn't know that Gardovic was a priest, but certainly accept

12 that, yeah.

13 Q. Is it correct that Serb representatives in the MUP after this

14 incident asked for the killer to be apprehended? Did you find that in

15 various documents?

16 A. Not only MUP representatives but the political leadership of the

17 SDS vociferously demanded that he be arrested, and in fact, I believe a

18 warrant was put out for his arrest.

19 Q. We're going to discuss that a bit later.

20 But do you know that "Oslobodjenje" newspaper, or, rather,

21 Rasim Cerimagic, a journalist, wrote on the occasion of this killing:

22 What were the members of a Serb wedding party doing in Bascarsija in the

23 first place?

24 Did you see that?

25 A. I looked pretty carefully at the "Oslobodjenje" coverage of that

Page 15592

1 event, and it was -- it was extensive, a number of different stories over

2 the subsequent five days. I don't specifically recall that. I have --

3 that statement. I have heard other Bosnian Muslims raise that question

4 in exactly those terms.

5 Q. You did find in documents that the killer was Ramiz Delalic,

6 Celo; right?

7 A. Well, he certainly was the prime suspect and was actually finally

8 brought to court and charged with the murder in 2007. So long time

9 between the act and his being brought to justice, but before -- I think

10 after the very first day of the court, the trial, he was given a

11 provisional release and was killed by an assassin, who I believe turned

12 out to be Albanian, in a gang war dispute that had nothing to do with

13 this original crime.

14 So I think we can't definitively say that he was the killer, but

15 certainly on the basis of evidence presented at that first day of trial

16 and the assumption all along was that, yes, he was the -- he was the

17 killer.

18 Q. Did you have an opportunity of seeing TV programme on Sarajevo

19 state TV, August 1992, in which Ramiz Delalic, Celo, explained how it was

20 that he killed Nikola Gardovic?

21 A. I have not seen it. I know that it was admitted at the trial on

22 that first day in 2007.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, could I ask you, we have now listened

24 for many, many minutes to the details of the killing at the wedding party

25 in Bascarsija. Is there any dispute about these matters?

Page 15593

1 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I don't believe that there is.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, one simple question, or two simple

3 questions, could have sought the confirmation of this witness what seems

4 not be in dispute between the parties, if it is relevant at all.

5 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, this report is about the beginning of

6 conflict --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

8 MR. LUKIC: -- and we are trying to establish what was the

9 beginning of the conflict.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The witness has told us that it didn't start

11 in Sarajevo. And if you would have asked him -- and perhaps I could ask

12 you now: Did it trigger further violence in Sarajevo, this killing at

13 the wedding party?

14 THE WITNESS: Well, it coincided with it, because this was the

15 last day of the referendum on independence, in which the vast majority of

16 Croats and Muslims voted yes, and the Serbs boycotted it. And that --

17 the final hours of that voting seems to have been the precipitating

18 incident for the SDS erecting barricades throughout the city and

19 blockading -- cutting the city off from the outside and stopping traffic.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

21 THE WITNESS: So it -- it certainly coincided with that, and the

22 SDS tried to argue that this was a spontaneous response to the

23 killings -- or the killing in Bascarsija.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, it may be clear from this question that

25 it is not that the Chamber is not interested in the role of that, but to

Page 15594

1 go over all kind of details seems not to be -- and just out from the

2 witness, put it to the witness, saying, Is it -- but please proceed.

3 This case is about more than what triggered the war to start.

4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Thank you, Dr. Donia, for the answer that you provided to

6 His Honour Judge Orie. Those were the questions that we wanted to put,

7 the setting up of the barricades and the killing of Gardovic.

8 This man, Ramiz Delalic, Celo, was the commander of the military

9 police of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the municipality of

10 Stari Grad; is that correct?

11 A. Well, he was first and foremost a gangster and really one of

12 several very powerful and influential gangsters who took up the -- as

13 part of their gangsterism took up the defence of the city of Sarajevo and

14 entered into combat with the -- with the JNA and local Serb forces. Most

15 of those appointments -- actually, a couple of them held appointments

16 such as commander of police or something like that, and most of those

17 were extracted from the government kind of at the -- at the point of

18 great pressure because of the -- the advantages that that gave them in

19 their various activities, including the -- the combat for the defence of

20 the city.

21 Q. Thank you. You say that this video footage was shown at trial

22 when he spoke about the killing of Nikola Gardovic and he said that he

23 did not hide after the killing because he actually organised the killing,

24 together with the police in Sarajevo. He did that as well?

25 A. What's -- what's the question? I -- sorry.

Page 15595

1 Q. Do you know of this piece of information, that he himself

2 admitted that he organised the killing of Gardovic together with the

3 police, or rather, with the Muslim part of the police in Sarajevo?

4 A. I -- as I say, I haven't seen that video myself and I don't know

5 exactly what he represents in that. I know that he represented that he

6 was the killer. But beyond that, I'm not certain what he actually said.

7 Q. At that time, the MUP of the Ministry of the Interior was still a

8 joint organisation where both Serbs and Muslims, as well as Croats,

9 worked together.

10 A. Yes, that's -- that's the case.

11 Q. Is it also the case, have you come across that when researching

12 the documentation, that MUP, in fact, was the corps from which Muslim

13 armed forces later emerged, that the Serbs joined the JNA, whereas the

14 Muslims joined the MUP, and this is how they were predominantly armed.

15 Are you familiar with that?

16 A. Well, I think it would be organisationally proper to say that the

17 Territorial Defence was the core, was the basis on which the ARBiH, the

18 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was founded rather than the MUP. The MUP

19 certainly had a role particularly after it -- after the Serbs withdrew

20 from it on, I believe, March 30th, under the direction of the deputy

21 minister of MUP, Momcilo Mandic. But organisationally, I think it's more

22 the TO than the MUP that was the core of this new fighting force.

23 Q. Sarajevo, as a city, after the conflict broke out, split along

24 the ethnic lines; right?

25 A. Well, I would say it was split along ethnic lines by force. And

Page 15596

1 that process was sort of -- took some time and was accompanied by varying

2 degrees of violence. It didn't just spontaneously break into its -- into

3 ethnic components. No, it did not.

4 Q. Is it true that the Muslims also violently took those parts of

5 the city where they held majority? Is it also true that Serbs were

6 kicked out from certain SUPs where they were a minority, in parts of town

7 where Muslims were in majority?

8 JUDGE ORIE: Could I receive an explanation of the use of the

9 word "SUP" here. Certain SUPs. Or was it souks.

10 MR. LUKIC: SUP is a smaller organisational unit of MUP. It

11 covers usually one municipality but can cover more.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I -- now see, yes, I was a bit confused by

13 parts of the city and then a police structure which is -- the one is a

14 geographical reference, the other one is an organisational reference so

15 that confused me slightly.

16 But if the witness has understood the question, he may answer it.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, agree with what SUP was and the sort of local

18 MUP junior, the local level police.

19 I would say that's not a -- your question was not a good

20 characterisation of what happened. I would agree that there were places

21 in which Muslim forces dislocated Serbs, drove them out, and took

22 control. But, really, this took place, by and large -- the exception of

23 some overt military offensives in the western suburbs, as police stations

24 split up and one force or the other tried to consolidate territory within

25 the city. That was the more common problem of what you described as the

Page 15597

1 ethnic division of the city and what I said was accomplished by

2 considerable violence over a long period of time.

3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. You said on page 35, English version, 37; B/C/S version 35, last

5 line, last paragraph. You will recognise the sentence:

6 Claiming the land on a which the Serbs lived which practically

7 surrounded the centre of the town, the SDS created a military base for --

8 or, rather, created a territorial base for the military siege of

9 Sarajevo.

10 The fact is that the land around Sarajevo was predominantly owned

11 by Serbs, the neighbouring, adjoining villages around Sarajevo. Isn't

12 that right?

13 A. No, it's not.

14 Q. So this sentence in your report is not true.

15 A. Well, I -- I'm -- I must say, looking at it now, my -- my

16 modifier is not terribly clear. And when I say -- what I meant to say in

17 this sentence is the SDS had thus established a territorial basis that

18 nearly encircled the city centre. It wasn't the Serb-inhabited lands

19 that nearly encircled the city centre and I, you know, regret that it is

20 subject to that interpretation.

21 But that was -- that was clearly not the case. As one went

22 through these various areas, just demographically looking at them as of

23 1991, there were some pure Serb areas, there were some pure Muslim areas,

24 and there were large areas which were settled by members of any and all

25 groups in large measure because of the growth of the -- the urban growth

Page 15598

1 of the city in the 1970s and 1980s, but also because of this practice of

2 building weekend cottages which was engaged in by everybody regardless of

3 their ethnicity.

4 So I think that's a -- it's not the case. I know it's one of the

5 founding myths of Bosnian Serb national belief that this -- there was a

6 Serb encirclement of the city with Muslim -- or with Serb villages and

7 it's just simply not the case.

8 Q. At the referendum on the 29th of February and the 1st of March,

9 the Croats and the Muslims voted for a cessation from Yugoslavia, that is

10 to say, for independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11 In the historical context, how do you see that? Namely, that, on

12 the one hand, they did not wish to live with the Serbs from Serbia but

13 they allegedly wanted to live with the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14 Are there perhaps two kinds of Serbs?

15 A. I don't see any -- any significant distinction there. The -- I

16 mean, the voting on the 30th -- 29th and 1st was for a political option

17 that -- you know, it was one that had been under discussion for a long

18 time and was supported by both the national parties of the Croats and

19 Muslims at that time.

20 I don't think that has anything to do with the wish of those

21 peoples to get along with and to co-operate with, to have among them,

22 Serbs. And, in fact, I think that both the Serbs, many of whom remained

23 in Sarajevo through the war, and the -- many of those Croats and Muslims

24 who voted still favoured continuation of the common life of all three

25 peoples in -- in Sarajevo.

Page 15599

1 Q. Naturally, we cannot speak of Sarajevo in this context alone. We

2 have to look at the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 On page 37, we have a title, which is quite specific. You say

4 simultaneous desire for independence in Bosnia and Herzegovina --

5 simultaneous pursuit of Bosnian independence and Serb separatism,

6 October 1991, April 1992.

7 You basically here see this as two different things: Pursuit of

8 Bosnian independence, on the one hand, and Serb separatism on the other

9 hand. Why do you see it as such? Why do you not see Serbs a part of

10 Bosnia? Why do you exclude them for opting for independent Bosnia?

11 A. Well, some -- a few did favour such independence, but I would say

12 in -- in the main, your -- the answer to your question is -- here is that

13 these two movements certainly interacted and in some sense reacted to the

14 other. And then one could argue which came first and which was the

15 initiator. But no question that the drive for independence which was

16 sponsored by the Croat and Muslim parties, was, in substantial measure, a

17 response to what they observed the Milosevic regime doing in trying to

18 expand its command or control of Yugoslavia. That was long-standing.

19 And then the, let's say, tendency of the Serbs of Bosnia, at

20 least the political SDS portion of it, to ally with that movement was a

21 further reason for them to consider moving toward independence. On the

22 other hand, as they discussed and moved toward this independence, it

23 spurred, as I indicated yesterday, it spurred the SDS to take actions to

24 form a specifically separate Serb state on Bosnian territory.

25 Q. In your report, you said that Serbs favoured status quo? Do you

Page 15600

1 remember that? In the early part.

2 A. I -- I don't know exactly -- if you could maybe give me a page

3 reference, I can ...

4 Q. I can't find it right now. But, trust me, you did say that in

5 the earlier stages, the Serbs favoured status quo. And the status quo

6 presupposed remaining in the same state. It presupposed there no -- that

7 there should be no changes and that the initiative for changes had to

8 come from Muslim and Croats because the Serbs favoured the status quo.

9 They did not want anything to change. Right?

10 A. As -- as a matter of reality, they did want something to change.

11 And as they began organising this -- this -- these divisive activities in

12 the course of, let's say, after October 15th, 1991. At one point, in an

13 Assembly session, when they were speaking about the strategy of carving

14 out these areas to remain in Yugoslavia, which was the ideological way

15 that they stated this, one delegate stood up and said, Why are we

16 withdrawing from anything? We don't have to do that. If we can favour

17 the status quo, we do nothing at all.

18 And of course, the leaders explained that they had to take these

19 actions urgently in order to save the Serb people.

20 Q. You did not answer my question --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Is it possible that there's any confusion, that

22 Mr. Lukic referred to the situation before the 15th of October, that the

23 Serbs were happy to stay within a Yugoslavia which comprised Serbia and

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina in a kind of a federative situation, and what your

25 answer is about, is the -- about the suggestion after the 15th of

Page 15601

1 October and after the events of the 15th of October, where someone said,

2 Could we not keep the status quo? And that, in that situation, the

3 leaders explained that they could not. That's --

4 Mr. Lukic, have I spotted a possible source of confusion?

5 MR. LUKIC: Expect the answer from me -- I'm sorry, I was more

6 concentrated on Mr. Mladic who obviously does not feel well --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

8 MR. LUKIC: -- and he almost fell off the chair.

9 JUDGE ORIE: We can take a break now and see. We are a little

10 bit early than --

11 MR. LUKIC: Five minutes early.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Five minutes. Yes, a little bit early.

13 But could you think or perhaps re-read that part of the

14 transcript to see whether that caused the confusion.

15 First, could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.

16 [The witness stands down]

17 JUDGE ORIE: We will take a break and we will resume at five

18 minutes past 12.00.

19 --- Recess taken at 11.44 a.m.

20 --- On resuming at 12.09 p.m.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you're on your feet.

22 MR. LUKIC: Yes. I was informed that I should inform

23 Your Honours about the situation with the health of Mr. Mladic, and it's

24 really bad. At this moment, he has -- everything spins. Everything is

25 spinning. He cannot follow the trial at all. And his right hand and