130917IT

Page 16887

1 rules of this Tribunal, a witness, that would be you in this case, may

2 object to making any statement which might tend to incriminate that

3 witness, that is that would incriminate yourself. We, then, however, we

4 could compel you to answer that question, although an answer compelled in

5 this way could not be used against you in any way. I just want you to be

6 aware that you have the opportunity to object to making such a statement,

7 which might incriminate yourself. Is that clear to you?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: I add to this that if you are compelled to answer,

10 and if -- and that answer cannot be used against you apart from the

11 situation where you're not telling us the truth. So such a statement

12 could be used as evidence if there would be reasons to prosecute you for

13 false testimony.

14 Mr. Milovanovic, you'll first be examined by Mr. Groome.

15 Mr. Groome is counsel for the Prosecution. You'll find him to your

16 right.

17 Mr. Groome, you may proceed.

18 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.

19 Examination by Mr. Groome:

20 Q. Sir, could I ask you to state your full name for the record?

21 A. Manojlo Milovanovic.

22 Q. Is it true that you are appearing here today pursuant to a

23 subpoena issued by this Chamber on 24 July 2013 and served on you in

24 Banja Luka several weeks ago?

25 A. Yes.

Page 16888

1 Q. General Milovanovic, is there any agreement of immunity between

2 you and the ICTY Prosecutor? In other words, is there or has there ever

3 been any agreement between you and the Prosecution that if you provided

4 information related to its investigations and prosecutions, that you

5 yourself would not be investigated or indicted?

6 A. I have never reached any agreement with anybody from this

7 Tribunal. The only thing that happened was that I was interviewed on

8 27th of March, 2001, by your military expert, General Richard Butler who

9 has just left the courtroom.

10 That interview was about helping the Tribunal to see the other

11 side of the coin, as it were. I.e. how could military experts from the

12 VRS provide their statements before this Tribunal? That interview was

13 recorded on seven pages, which I handed over to the OTP of this Tribunal.

14 Q. Was anything ever said to you which you implicitly understood as

15 a promise that you would not be indicted?

16 A. No.

17 Q. General, I'm going to ask you to provide evidence on a number of

18 issues of importance in this trial. In order to do this in a way that

19 the Chamber can best understand your evidence, it is important that we do

20 it in an organised way. I would like to begin my questions to you this

21 morning by asking you some questions about your background. Can you tell

22 us the year and place of your birth?

23 A. I was born on 21st November 1943 in Laminci village in the

24 municipality of Gradiska, Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that 65 ter 26000 be brought to our

Page 16889

1 screens?

2 Q. While that is being brought to our screens, can I ask you what

3 year did you enter military service?

4 A. The date when I entered the JNA was the 27th of July, 1961. That

5 was when I completed my education for non-commissioned officers.

6 I started that education on the 30th of August, 1959.

7 Q. And what year did you retire from military service?

8 A. I was pensioned off on the 31st of March, 2001.

9 Q. Now, General, if I can direct your attention to the screen before

10 you, you have had a lengthy professional career. While it is important

11 that the Chamber is aware of the positions you held, it is not necessary

12 that we discuss it in any great detail at this moment.

13 After you arrived in The Hague, were you asked to review a

14 summary of your professional assignments?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And is that what we see on our screens now before us?

17 A. Yes.

18 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that we go to the last page in both

19 versions.

20 Q. And, General, if I can draw your attention to the end of the

21 document. Upon reviewing this document, did you wish to amend it by

22 adding two additional pieces of information?

23 A. Yes. When it says career in the Army Republika Srpska and where

24 it says chief of the Main Staff of the VRS, I would like to add to that

25 that I was also the deputy commander of the Main Staff of the VRS.

Page 16890

1 And the second thing that I wanted to add was that I served as

2 the Minister of Defence in the government of Republika Srpska from the

3 18th of January, 1998, to the day when I was pensioned off, on the

4 31st of March, 2001.

5 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, with those amendments the Prosecution

6 tenders 65 ter 26000 into evidence as a public exhibit.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar?

8 THE REGISTRAR: Document 26000 receives number P2211, Your

9 Honours.

10 JUDGE ORIE: P2211 is admitted.

11 MR. GROOME:

12 Q. General, are you willing to answer any additional questions

13 regarding your professional career that either the Chamber or the Defence

14 may have for you?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, General, can you tell us how long have you known General

17 Ratko Mladic?

18 A. I met General Mladic in April 1981. We first met in the Titov

19 Veles garrison where he had arrived to inspect the unit where I served as

20 the chief of the operations organ.

21 Q. During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, he was the

22 commander of the Army of Republika Srpska and you were his deputy. Can

23 you describe in a summary way his command style as well as yours? I'm

24 not asking you to tell us about any specific events at this moment, but

25 to simply summarise, in a sentence or two, your respective command

Page 16891

1 styles.

2 A. His command style will be best explained if I quote his own words

3 from those times. On one occasion, I asked him, "Why did you choose me

4 to be your deputy?" And he told me, "I am quick tempered, and you are

5 somewhat slower and as a tank man you know that that's the best way to

6 drive." And one of his statements, at meetings or when we were eye to

7 eye, he told me that the two of us were two bodies and one soul.

8 Q. General, can you please describe your relationship with

9 General Mladic during your tenure as his Chief of Staff and

10 deputy commander of the VRS?

11 A. Before the war broke out, we were friends. We were comrades. We

12 sometimes agreed to disagree in professional matters. However, during

13 the war, our relationship was that of a very strict military

14 subordination, a relationship between a subordinate and superior. Before

15 the war we were not on first-term basis, and as the war -- or rather, we

16 were on first-term basis before -- on the first-name basis before the

17 war, and then I started, out of respect, addressing him in a more

18 respectful plural form.

19 Q. General, I want to now turn your attention to the establishment

20 of the Army of Republika Srpska and I want to ask you to explain to the

21 Judges the events leading to the establishments of the VRS and your role

22 in those events. Can I draw your attention to February of 1992, in

23 particular the JNA's withdrawal of its forces from Macedonia? Can you

24 tell us what, if any, role you had in that event?

25 A. At the beginning of 1992, and you say that it was in February, at

Page 16892

1 that time, the JNA was withdrawing from Macedonia after an agreement had

2 been reached to that effect. We are talking about a 3rd Army. And the

3 troops were being deployed in the territory of Serbia, Kosovo, and some

4 of them in Montenegro.

5 I was tasked with supervising the withdrawal of the combat part

6 of the JNA, i.e. personnel, weapons, and ammunition, and I was supposed

7 to deploy them across the aforementioned areas. There was just one

8 condition, i.e. I received just one order, that during the withdrawal,

9 not a single bullet could be fired on the Macedonian people.

10 We did everything very efficiently, owing to the Macedonian

11 authorities, which were committed not to allow any provocations, ill

12 treatment of members of the JNA, something that was seen previously in

13 Slovenia, Croatia, and in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The

14 process was completed on the 9th of March, 1992. We started withdrawing

15 on the 3rd of March from Skopje to Nis, and on the 9th of March the

16 logistics part of the 3rd Army eventually withdrew from Macedonia and

17 completed the whole withdrawal process.

18 Q. General Milovanovic, where were you stationed between March and

19 the 11th of May, 1992?

20 A. In the Nis garrison, in the command of the 3rd Army. I was the

21 chief of operations and education body, and I was the acting chief of the

22 army command because General Vukovic was supposed to arrive from

23 Banja Luka in order to become the chief of the army. Vukovic arrived in

24 Nis on the 20th of --

25 Q. General, I'm not sure that we need all that much detail in that

Page 16893

1 particular aspect. Could I draw your attention now to the

2 8th of May, 1992? Did you receive an order from the president --

3 Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on that day?

4 A. Yes. I received two decrees on that day, in the evening.

5 Q. Can you tell us what each one was?

6 A. According to one of the decrees, I was reassigned from the

7 Nis garrison to the Sarajevo garrison, where I was to serve in the

8 command of the 2nd Army District as the chief of the operations and

9 education body, and it said on that -- in that decree that General Mladic

10 was also assigned from Knin to Sarajevo to become the Chief of Staff of

11 the 2nd Military District. And the second decree, I don't know which was

12 one was the first and which one was the second, according to the second

13 decree from the Presidency of the SFRY, I was promoted to the rank of

14 Major General. On that same piece of paper, it stated that General

15 Ratko Mladic was also promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General.

16 Q. Now, General, when you received this order, did you have an

17 understanding of any particular task you were to undertake when you

18 arrived in Sarajevo?

19 A. According to that first decree, I believe that on the following

20 day, I called General Mladic and I asked him if he knew anything more

21 about that decree and about that order, because our names were on the

22 same piece of paper.

23 He told me, and you have to be aware that that was on the

24 8th of May, when the whole situation surrounding Dobrovoljacka Street was

25 completed, i.e. when the command of the 2nd Army District was withdrawn

Page 16894

1 from Sarajevo.

2 General Mladic told me that General Kukanjac, commander of the

3 2nd Army District, would probably be removed from his position as well as

4 his Chief of Staff, General Stankovic, I believe that his name was but I

5 don't know. He also told me that he would possibly become the commander

6 of the military district in which case I would become the Chief of Staff

7 of the 2nd Military District.

8 In practical terms, that meant that the second decree that we

9 received promoted us one step further in the command of the 2nd Military

10 District. The second decree was shown to me in Belgrade on the

11 11th of May, because General Mladic and I had agreed to meet in Belgrade

12 in the General Staff of the JNA building at 7.00 on the 11th of May.

13 Q. And can you tell us when it was that you agreed with

14 General Mladic to meet him on 11 May? When did that occur?

15 A. I believe that it was on the 9th of May, when I called him. The

16 day after I received my first decree. When I wanted him to give me more

17 detail. I arrived on the 11th of May at 7.00 but General Mladic was not

18 there.

19 The chief of the personnel of the Yugoslav General Staff received

20 me. He was General Vojko Krstic, I believe. He then verbally

21 communicated to me the contents of the second decree about the vertical

22 promotion in the command of the Sarajevo Military District, and I was not

23 very happy and I told him, and I asked him how come that Mladic and I,

24 and some other people who had received those orders, were being

25 transferred to Sarajevo knowing that the 2nd Military District didn't

Page 16895

1 exist? I was told then that the JNA was tasked with withdrawing from

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina before the 19th of May, 1992. That was to be within

3 the next eight days. The way I saw it was that the JNA was disappearing

4 from Bosnia-Herzegovina and I really didn't understand why we should be

5 in Sarajevo if the command was no longer in Sarajevo and actually it no

6 longer existed.

7 I was told that General Mladic would be able to explain. I asked

8 him to put me through to General Mladic. I was put through to General

9 Mladic. The General was somewhere in Herzegovina at the time. He told

10 me this: Go to Batajnica. Go to the airport. A helicopter is waiting

11 for you there. Get on board and wherever the pilot stops, that's where

12 you should be. That's where you should be waiting for me.

13 Q. Just to ensure that it's not becoming confused, who was it that

14 told you that the JNA would be withdrawing from Bosnia-Herzegovina?

15 A. General Gojko Krstic. And that same evening, that was confirmed

16 to me by General Mladic himself, once we met.

17 Q. So did you in fact meet with General Mladic in Batajnica on the

18 11th?

19 A. No. General Mladic ordered me to go to Batajnica because there

20 was a helicopter waiting for me there and that helicopter took me to Crna

21 Rijeka, near Han Pijesak. As for my meeting with General Mladic, I met

22 him a few hours later when he arrived from Herzegovina. That was

23 sometime after 1600 hours.

24 Q. Now, can you tell us who else, if anyone, was present during this

25 meeting with General Mladic?

Page 16896

1 A. I was waiting for General Mladic near the helicopter. I don't

2 think that anybody else was present. We started walking towards a

3 prefabricated building that was closest to the place where the helicopter

4 landed. It was some 50 metres away.

5 And it took us about 45 minutes to walk the distance, if not

6 more. And while we were walking, Mladic told me about the situation in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he put me in the picture, he told me more or less

8 what we were to expect. We walked into that prefabricated buildings and

9 in one of the rooms there, there were some other people, some ten people.

10 So all in all, there were about a dozen of us there, four generals,

11 Mladic, Djukic, Gvero, and myself, and eight or rather seven

12 lieutenant-colonels, colonels and one captain. There was a dozen of us.

13 Q. Before we get to the substance of this meeting, the record

14 records you as saying that Mladic told you: More or less what you were

15 to expect, what we were to expect. Can I ask you to give us a bit more

16 detail on what Mladic told you was to be expected?

17 A. As a matter of fact, when we greeted each other I asked him, "And

18 now what?" And then he told me that the war in Bosnia was inevitable,

19 that there were combat operations going on around Sarajevo, primarily

20 around Sarajevo and in some other municipalities of the future Republika

21 Srpska, that armed incidents had already started, mostly on the line

22 separating the members of the Muslim and Croat coalition on the one hand

23 and members of the JNA on the other.

24 The skirmishes started already on the 22nd of April when some

25 mortars opened fire on the Serbian settlements in Sarajevo and the fire

Page 16897

1 was opened from a brewery. And then on the bank holiday on the

2 1st of May there were some attacks on the command of the 2nd Military

3 District, on the military hospital, on the JNA hall, and a few barracks,

4 which accommodated cadets of JNA military academies. I don't know which

5 barracks existed in Sarajevo at that time -- at the time, by inter alia

6 military cadets were attacked in Pazarici shooting round.

7 General Mladic's conclusion was that the war is inevitable in

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it would follow the same scenario as in

9 Croatia when the war broke out between the Croats and the Serbs. Up to

10 that time, Muslims --

11 Q. General, can I ask you now to tell us, or recount for us, what

12 occurred during the meeting that General Mladic had with yourself and

13 these other 12 people?

14 A. In the room where we were assembled, General Mladic first told us

15 what we had discussed en route from the helicopter to the building, the

16 conversation he and I had. He said that the war was imminent in all

17 likelihood, and that, since the JNA was prematurely withdrawing from

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina because previously it had been agreed that the JNA

19 would remain in BiH for the next five years, until 1997, in order to

20 protect the interests of all three majority peoples in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, acting as a buffer zone, which is something it had

22 done previously in Croatia and Slovenia.

23 Since the JNA had to withdraw that protection that was to be

24 accorded to the Serb people was no longer and that it was the position of

25 the BiH leadership, Serb leadership, decided to establish the army of the

Page 16898

1 Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The next day, on the 12th of May, a

2 decision was supposed to be made during an assembly session of the

3 Serbian people to be held in Banja Luka.

4 Q. Can I now turn your attention to that assembly session? Did you

5 attend that session?

6 A. I did not.

7 Q. Do you recall what you did that day, the 12th of May, 1992?

8 A. Yes, I do. However, it might be good if I told you what we did

9 during the night between the 11th and the 12th of May, just before the

10 assembly session.

11 Q. Yes, please do that.

12 A. That evening, we only supposed that General Mladic was going to

13 be appointed commander of the Main Staff by the assembly. We knew that

14 the Main Staff had no documents pertaining to its doctrine in wartime,

15 should the assembly decide in favour of the war option, which is what

16 indeed happened the next day. Those of us as peers acting together with

17 General Mladic as the first among equals, we discussed what was to be

18 done once the decision is in place.

19 Some 21 tasks became obvious. We formulated them and later on,

20 actually, they were not tasks but conclusions, and later on, I grouped

21 them into some ten guidelines, in terms of the future Republika Srpska

22 Army doctrine. It started with us having to rely, or make use of, all

23 what remained after JNA's withdrawal, so as to use it as the basis to

24 create the new armed forces of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 Then, the conclusions and discussions further developed such

Page 16899

1 issues as armaments, unifying the armed forces, et cetera. And according

2 to General Mladic's words, the then-party in power, SDS, had distributed

3 weapons to the Serb military conscripts and according to Mr. Mladic's --

4 General Mladic's words, by that time we have already had between 85 and

5 90.000 people who were armed and who had to be made a part of the

6 structure.

7 We also discussed the issue of paramilitaries, of which there

8 were many in the territory of what today is Republika Srpska and at the

9 time was the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 It was agreed that the commanders, dukes or bosses of those

11 paramilitary forces be assembled, someone to have a talk with them, so

12 that they would be asked to place themselves under the command of the

13 Army of Republika Srpska. Whoever accepted that was welcome. Those who

14 refused had to leave the territory of Republika Srpska as agreed. Those

15 who opposed it were supposed to be dealt with.

16 Q. Could I ask you a few specific questions about that answer that

17 you've just given us? Did you consider that the group that had been

18 gathered together for this meeting, did you consider that group to be the

19 early formation of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska?

20 A. I didn't have to dwell on it too long. During our walk from the

21 helicopter to the building, I told General Mladic the following: I had

22 thought that I was supposed to be appointed commander of the Herzegovina

23 corps since General Perisic was withdrawing from the JNA and I told

24 General Mladic that I had sufficient time to arrive in Bileca by

25 helicopter but he said: You are not going anywhere, you are staying

Page 16900

1 here. If the decision is put in place tomorrow you will be the chief of

2 the Main Staff and my deputy. So by that point, it was all clear to me.

3 During the session, as you rightly noted, it was so decided and I did see

4 it as the nucleus of the Main Staff and of the future Army of Republika

5 Srpska.

6 Q. I want to ask you one more question about your recounting of this

7 meeting. You said that there was an assessment that there were 90.000

8 armed people. Was that an assessment of the number of armed people that

9 would be available for the VRS army or was that an assessment of all

10 people of all ethnicities who had arms in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

11 A. I did not think about the ethnic makeup but what I learned was

12 that the 85.000 to 90.000 armed men were put inside TO brigades in the

13 municipalities around the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some of

14 the municipalities deeper inside the territories also formed their own TO

15 brigades. Their staffing strength and manning levels were very diverse

16 depending on the ethnic makeup and number of population in each of the

17 municipalities. The figure varied from a few hundred to a few thousand

18 armed men who, by that time, were still not under any kind of unified

19 command. The party in power had established Crisis Staffs in

20 municipalities.

21 Q. If I can just be a bit more specific in my question: That

22 90.000, did that figure, was that the assessment of the armed men that

23 were available to be formed into an Army of Republika Srpska? Is that

24 what that figure referred to?

25 A. General Mladic said this, more or less: Now we have between

Page 16901

1 85 and 90.000 men who are armed. I don't know where he received that

2 information from but we obviously saw it as relevant. He also said that

3 they were supposed to be placed inside military units, given structure,

4 and grouped into different corps.

5 So in addition to the remnants of the JNA, it was another

6 contingent or another element that we relied on or counted on when we

7 were structuring the army. It was also the most important, the most

8 significant, component.

9 Q. Can I now go to my --

10 JUDGE ORIE: Just to avoid any misunderstanding, the 85 to 90.000

11 men, armed men, were men to be recruited for what would become the VRS;

12 is that what you're referring to? Or at least available to be recruited?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Neither, because the decree on

14 general mobilisation in the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina followed

15 only ten days later. It was simply a potential that could be absorbed

16 into the structure of the newly created armed forces.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That answers my question. Please proceed.

18 MR. GROOME:

19 Q. Can I now return my earlier --

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just from my understanding does this number

21 include those who have previously served for the JNA? In the JNA?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. Those who had served with the

23 JNA were included under the category of the remnants of the JNA. They

24 were supposed to remain with the armed force after the 19th of May, once

25 the JNA had withdrawn.

Page 16902

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

2 MR. GROOME:

3 Q. Can I now return to my earlier question about what you did on the

4 12th of May while the 16th Assembly session was taking place?

5 A. I think it was the 19th session but perhaps it is not so

6 important. At dawn, General Mladic, General Djordje Djukic,

7 General Gvero, Colonel Tolimir, flew to Banja Luka. I was tasked to stay

8 in Crna Rijeka and during the day, out of the 12 who had met the previous

9 night and a number of officers from the 2nd Military District who were

10 extracted, who withdrew on the 3rd of May together with the rest of the

11 2nd Army Command, I was supposed to take all those men to establish and

12 make operational a body in charge of creating the armed force and waging

13 the war which was imminent. In other words I was supposed to create the

14 Main Staff.

15 Q. Who gave that you task?

16 A. I'm sorry, I haven't completed.

17 Q. Please continue.

18 A. My second task was to use those officers who had fled from

19 Sarajevo to work with them on the 21 conclusions I have mentioned. We

20 were supposed to transform them into appropriate orders, information and

21 notifications, that is to say to put them in written form which was

22 mostly dealt with. My next task was to establish communication with the

23 detached corps commands of the former JNA, to preserve their

24 infrastructure.

25 There were already people in place who had been corps commanders

Page 16903

1 in the JNA. Thus, it was a key task, to establish direct links between

2 the Main Staff, corps commands, logistics, the logistics base, whose

3 infrastructure was inherited from the JNA, as well as some other parts

4 that were supposed to be directly linked to the Main Staff. That was

5 done before the team returned from Banja Luka.

6 There were some other minor things also, such as providing the

7 guards service, securing the Main Staff location, and so on and so forth.

8 Q. Could I ask you two questions about that last answer? Who gave

9 you these tasks?

10 A. Who else than General Mladic.

11 Q. And you said that -- the record records you as saying that was

12 done before they returned from Banja Luka. What was done before they

13 returned from Banja Luka?

14 A. All of the things I've mentioned. So the written orders were

15 drafted, as well as notifications, information, reports and so on and so

16 forth. Next, communication was put in place with the subordinate

17 commands. The security service around the Main Staff was set up. The

18 offices and premises in the two buildings we found were distributed, in

19 terms of who was to work where.

20 I did not go name by name but I simply assigned offices to the

21 commander of the Main Staff, his deputy, operations officer, command

22 centre, and so on and so forth. Because at the time, there were only 12

23 of us in the Main Staff, but we expected that our staffing levels would

24 increase once the Main Staff was fully established. I thought I would

25 have time to do that in peacetime. But, as we were establishing

Page 16904

1 communication with the subordinate commands, we began receiving combat

2 reports.

3 General Mladic had not warned me of this once he left, and I had

4 to make do. It turned out that there was fighting all over Sarajevo.

5 The Muslims were aware of JNA's withdrawal and they were attacking all

6 things JNA, including personnel, property and equipment. So from one

7 moment to the next, I kept receiving reports of combat. It was happening

8 along the way and we had to deal with it. I believe we managed.

9 Q. Now, General, when did the team return from Banja Luka?

10 A. I think it was already dark by the time they gathered in my

11 office.

12 Q. And was it on the same day as the assembly session, on

13 the 12th of May?

14 A. I think so. Well, actually, it is, it was.

15 Q. And am I understanding your evidence correctly that before they

16 returned, effective communications had been established with subordinate

17 units?

18 A. Yes. I began explaining about the corps commands when I was

19 interrupted. I don't know whether you want me to continue in that vein.

20 Q. I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt you. Yes, can you explain

21 what tasks you completed with respect to the corps commands?

22 A. First of all, communication was established, push-button

23 communication was established, protected communication, with each of the

24 corps commands. We had a command desk in the building, and we had a

25 button for each corps command. It was sufficient for the general to

Page 16905

1 press the appropriate button in order to be responded to by a colleague

2 from the subordinate command at the corps level.

3 Q. And where was this push-button protected communications set up?

4 In whose office?

5 A. There was literally a desk, rather than a specific point. It was

6 in the office where General Mladic and I sat.

7 Q. Now, when the men returned from the 12th assembly session, did

8 you have a conversation with Colonel Gvero regarding what some people

9 said at the assembly session and, in particular, something General Mladic

10 said?

11 A. I have to correct you: General Gvero. All of them expressed

12 their views and impressions. It was important for me that General Mladic

13 said something to this effect: Chief of Staff, as from this day, we are

14 a legitimate, lawful Main Staff. I am part of the Main Staff. You are

15 the chief of that staff and my deputy. And he repeated what he had said

16 the previous evening. He told us who was to take up which duty out of

17 the 12 of us.

18 People expressed their impressions. They were discussing

19 different deputies' remarks, and in all that, General Gvero said that

20 following Dragan Kalinic's remarks, who was the Minister of Health in the

21 government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who asked that the

22 Muslim people be proclaimed the enemy, the enemy side, saying that no

23 further life together is possible with them and that we had to deal with

24 them once and for all. Following his remarks, General Mladic reacted to

25 it, at least according to what General Gvero told me, and later on

Page 16906

1 I indeed found it in the transcript of the Assembly. It seems that

2 General Mladic said, he actually cautioned all those present that the

3 minister's proposal or position would amount to genocide and that it was

4 prohibited. One could actually find it on one of the transcript pages of

5 that session.

6 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, would that be a convenient place to

7 break?

8 JUDGE ORIE: It is a convenient moment for a break. We would

9 like to see you back in 20 minutes. You may follow the usher.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 [The witness stands down]

12 JUDGE ORIE: We will resume at quarter past 12.00.

13 --- Recess taken at 11.57 a.m.

14 --- On resuming at 12.18 p.m.

15 JUDGE ORIE: While the witness is escorted in, I have to make a

16 correction on something I said earlier today.

17 We were discussing P2192. There was a problem with the date and

18 a new version of P2192 was uploaded. I then said: And then that new

19 replacement is the admitted evidence. I had overlooked that it was

20 marked for identification. So therefore I should have said: And then

21 the new replacement is the exhibit marked for identification, because

22 there is still a general objection pending against the intercepts. That

23 is hereby corrected.

24 If there is anything to be distributed --

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 16907

1 [The witness takes the stand]

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, you may proceed.

3 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Could I ask at this time, P431 be brought to our screens? It is

5 a transcript of the 16th Assembly session held on the 12th of May. Can

6 I ask that we go to page 34 in the original and 35 in the translation.

7 Q. Now, General Milovanovic, just before the break, you said one

8 could actually find it on the transcript pages of that session. When

9 this transcript comes up before you, can I ask you to review it and, if

10 you see the portion of the transcript which you believe is what Gvero was

11 referring to, could I please ask you to read that portion?

12 A. The letters are really small. I can't see. Can the page be

13 zoomed in?

14 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that we zoom in on the top half and then

15 we will go to the bottom half.

16 Q. And see if you see the portion that you were referring to.

17 A. That's good.

18 Q. We won't be able to see anything you point to, so if you can

19 simply read the passage, if you do see it. Sorry it's gone from our

20 screens now. It's being returned.

21 A. Yes. But now I've lost that part that includes genocide. Scroll

22 up a little. I found it. It is on the screen now but I'm not supposed

23 to touch the screen. I can see.

24 Q. Are you able to read it?

25 A. Yes.

Page 16908

1 Q. Please do that.

2 A. "Therefore, we cannot clean, we cannot have a sieve to sift

3 everybody but the Serbs, or for the Serbs to go through the sieve and the

4 rest to leave. This cannot happen. I don't know what Mr. Krajisnik and

5 Mr. Karadzic are going to tell the world. This is genocide. We have to

6 call everybody who has not been able to enter the territory of the state

7 that we want to create their places here with us. Mr. Ostojic said it

8 well. He noticed things very well. He saw that picture in my native

9 village and then there is a description of how we went to that village."

10 Should I go on reading?

11 Q. I'm just asking you to identify the passage that Gvero referred

12 to. If you've done that, then there is no need to continue reading.

13 A. Yes. That's that.

14 Q. Okay. Thank you.

15 Now, in my next series of questions, I will ask you to describe

16 your understanding of the legal structures of the VRS and the name -- and

17 name the individuals who held particular positions. I would ask you not

18 to volunteer too much detail at this moment. Once the Chamber has a

19 clear overview of the structure, I will then ask you more detailed

20 questions. So my first question --

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Groome --

22 MR. GROOME: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- before you do that, is it possible to see what

24 the witness was reading in the English?

25 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, it's on -- about the middle of the

Page 16909

1 page, if we can go to the English.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The first third, at the end of the first third of

3 that page.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

5 MR. GROOME:

6 Q. So my first question about the legal structure of the VRS is:

7 Can you tell the Chamber what the Supreme Command was?

8 A. The Supreme Command was the political body of the Serbian

9 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in charge of warfare. It is said that

10 war is a thing too serious for generals to run it. It has to be run by

11 politicians and generals should only be executors.

12 As for the Supreme Command, from 12 May, it was the Presidency of

13 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the president of the

14 Presidency was Radovan Karadzic, the vice -- one of the vice-presidents

15 was Biljana Plavsic, and the other was Nikola Koljevic. The president of

16 National Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik was also a member of the Presidency,

17 although I don't think that was really legitimate. That was the four

18 people who politically ran the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina. And before the Supreme Command -- or, rather, before the

20 Main Staff was set up, the Main Staff received its task from

21 President Karadzic, who told him how to run the Army of Republika Srpska.

22 Q. General, if you'll allow me, I want to ask some very specific

23 questions. If I could ask you to limit your answer to the particular

24 question just to ensure that the Chamber understands this Supreme

25 Command. When was it formed?

Page 16910

1 A. I learned about the setting up of the Supreme Command on the

2 6th December 1992, which means it was set up in the first half of

3 December 1992.

4 Q. Prior to December 1992, did Radovan Karadzic serve as the supreme

5 commander or political commander of the VRS?

6 A. Before the Supreme Command was set up, Radovan Karadzic was the

7 supreme commander, based on the constitution of the Serbian Republic of

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina and subsequently drafted acts on the defence and Army

9 of Republika Srpska.

10 Q. Now, which members of the Supreme Command, once it was

11 constituted in 1992 -- in December 1992, could issue direct orders to the

12 army?

13 A. When the Supreme Command was established, its members were the

14 four persons that I already mentioned, plus the prime minister of the

15 Serbian Republic, the minister of defence, and the minister of the

16 interior. At first, the vice-presidents or the vice prime ministers were

17 not members of the Supreme Command and neither was General Ratko Mladic,

18 although he should have been its members according to the act on

19 All People's Defence. The Main Staff held it against Karadzic that

20 Mladic was not a member, and then they included Biljana Plavsic and

21 Nikola Koljevic as members of the Supreme Command but not General

22 Ratko Mladic. The Main Staff insisted to no avail. They maintained that

23 General Mladic in the Supreme Command would mean that it would be the

24 Supreme Command of the Main Staff.

25 The first session was held on the 12 December. I attended that

Page 16911

1 session, and pursuant to an order of the Main Staff, I presented those

2 objections. Karadzic told me that he could not change that, that that

3 could not be changed, that Mladic could not be a member of the

4 Supreme Command because, allegedly, the military was not a political

5 body, whereas the Supreme Command was.

6 This is how things would be done during the war. All the orders

7 and directives and other combat documents would be issued to the

8 Main Staff and the Army of Republika Srpska only by him as the

9 Supreme Commander. No other members of the Supreme Command could issue

10 orders to the army save for the persons that he appointed to act on his

11 behalf in his absence when he was abroad, and the most often that person

12 designated by him would be Biljana Plavsic.

13 Q. Now, just so the record is clear, when you say that -- when you

14 refer to "him" as the Supreme Commander, are you referring to

15 Radovan Karadzic?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And also to be clear, you said that General Mladic was not a

18 member of the Main Staff. Despite not having -- not being a member and

19 not having a vote on its decisions, did members of the Main Staff

20 regularly attend meetings convened by the Supreme Command?

21 A. Yes. At that meeting where President Karadzic and I tried to

22 convince each other of our respective views, he said that he would invite

23 General Mladic or one of his assistants to all of the Supreme Command

24 sessions depending on the topics on the agenda. If the Supreme Command

25 was to make a decision by voting, we were not to be allowed to take part

Page 16912

1 in the voting, i.e. we would be treated as observers only. That's how

2 things were done throughout the existence of the Supreme Command and the

3 Main Staff.

4 Q. Now, General --

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, before we continue, could you have a

6 look at page 46, the first two lines of your previous question? You said

7 and also to be clear, I think -- 46, line 22, it's for me.

8 MR. GROOME: I think we are only up, according to my LiveNote, to

9 page 25.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: 25 in e-court, which is 46 or 47 in LiveNote.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, 25 on -- it would be page 25, line 11,

12 especially the fourth and the fifth word, also to be clear, you said that

13 General Mladic was not a member of -- and then I would expect you to

14 refer to the Supreme Command rather than to the Main Staff.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just to clarify the confusion with the page

16 numbers, in e-court, page 22 ended at line 13 and then the entire

17 transcript started again with page 1.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

19 MR. GROOME: Clarified now, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ORIE: It's been clarified. You intended to refer to not

21 being a member of the Supreme Command.

22 MR. GROOME: That's correct.

23 JUDGE ORIE: That nevertheless members of the Main Staff being

24 invited to meetings although not voting there.

25 MR. GROOME: That's correct.

Page 16913

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then this having been corrected now, let's

2 proceed.

3 MR. GROOME:

4 Q. General Milovanovic, can you give us some sense of how frequently

5 General Mladic or other members of the Main Staff attended meetings of

6 the Supreme Command?

7 A. I can't tell you. I don't know how many times the

8 Supreme Command met. They may have met without inviting us. But I can

9 tell you that it was rather often that either General Mladic or I were

10 invited, if General Mladic was not in Bosnia, or one of General Mladic's

11 assistants would be invited. For example, on the 6th of December, I was

12 informed about the setting up of the Supreme Command by General

13 Djordje Djukic and Lieutenant-Colonel Zdravko Tolimir. They had been

14 invited to a meeting in Pale and that's when Karadzic told them that the

15 Supreme Command had been set up.

16 Q. General, I now want to turn to the structure of the VRS.

17 MR. GROOME: And while I do this, I would ask that 65 ter 26016

18 be brought to our screens. It's an organisational chart. I have a large

19 copy of this in the courtroom, which General Milovanovic will be invited

20 to point to to describe the organisation of the VRS, and I have

21 distributed copies to both Chambers and the Defence. They may find it

22 easier to have a version of this document in front of them as

23 General Milovanovic is asked to explain the organisational structure of

24 the VRS.

25 Q. Now, General Milovanovic, somewhere on the desk in front of you

Page 16914

1 there should be a pointer. There is no need for you to get out of your

2 chair, hopefully. Now, my first question to you is: Do you recall being

3 asked to review an organisational chart --

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, Mr. Milovanovic, if possible,

5 please remain seated because the microphone will not catch your words

6 when you're standing, so to the extent possible, remain seated. If not

7 possible, then please stand and then return to your seat.

8 MR. GROOME:

9 Q. Do you recall being asked to review an organisational chart of

10 the Main Staff and other components of the VRS by the Office of the

11 Prosecutor in an earlier case?

12 A. Yes. That was in 2007, between the 29th of May and the

13 1st of June, when I testified in the Srebrenica group case. I was given

14 the same chart to peruse.

15 Q. Is the -- the diagram that's next to you, which is 65 ter 26016,

16 is that a copy of the chart that you reviewed in that earlier case?

17 MR. GROOME: Could the usher assist General Milovanovic? I think

18 he's asking for the thing to be adjusted so he can more easily point to

19 items. Could I ask it just be back a bit so that I can see the witness?

20 I'm unable to see the witness. Okay. Thank you. That's good.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot move my neck horizontally

22 which is why I asked for the chart to be closer.

23 Yes, this is the chart which I amended. For example, in the

24 first version some of the units were omitted. Some of the staff organs

25 were linked erroneously to wrong bodies. This has been corrected in the

Page 16915

1 meantime. I don't know what you would like to know more specifically.

2 MR. GROOME:

3 Q. I'm going to ask you specific questions about this chart. Now,

4 this chart is comprised of a series of boxes indicating different

5 organisational components of the VRS. At the top of this chart, at the

6 centre, we see a box with General Mladic's name inside. Can I first

7 direct you to the two boxes to the right of General Mladic's box? The

8 first one to the left has the name of Warrant Officer Rajko Banduka. Can

9 you tell us who he was and what was the responsibility of the warrant

10 officer to General Mladic?

11 A. Warrant Officer Rajko Banduka was General Mladic's adjutant

12 throughout the war. He received his telephone calls, he received his

13 mail, he forwarded whatever mail needed to be forwarded to

14 General Mladic. So he was like a personal assistant to General Mladic

15 throughout the war.

16 Q. To the right of that box is a box containing two names and is

17 entitled, "Department for Civil Affairs." Can you give us a brief

18 summary of what was the area of responsibility of this department?

19 A. The Department for Civil Affairs was subsequently set up sometime

20 in mid-1994. The Supreme Command issued a decision that a commission

21 should be set up at the government level and that commission would be in

22 charge of cooperating with UNPROFOR in respect of the transport of

23 humanitarian aid into the enclaves. Our representative, the

24 representative of the Main Staff in that commission, was Colonel

25 Milos Djurdjic. His assistant was Colonel Slavko Kralj. I don't know

Page 16916

1 where Djurdjic was before that but I know that Slavko Kralj was a member

2 of the 1st Krajina Corps in the command and he was in charge in liaising

3 with foreigners, with non-governmental organisations that were involved

4 in humanitarian aid, with UNPROFOR and so on and so forth.

5 Q. Can I now direct your attention to the seven boxes immediately

6 below General Mladic's name and connected to him with a black line.

7 These are seven sectors or components of the Main Staff. I'm going to

8 ask you to go one by one and tell the Chamber what each sector or

9 component was responsible for. Please pause after each sector so I can

10 ask you some additional questions about it. I will work from left to

11 right.

12 The first box is entitled "staff sector" and has your name at the

13 top. Can you summarise the areas of responsibility which came under this

14 sector?

15 A. The staff sector. It is one of the key sectors in the

16 Main Staff. It is in charge of combat readiness of the armed forces, the

17 use of the armed forces, carrying out analyses of the functioning of the

18 armed forces and anything else that is directly linked to combat

19 activities. It had its own administrations, such as the operational

20 administration, based on commanders' decisions. It was in charge of

21 issuing directives, orders and information.

22 The next sector is the training sector. Actually, sorry, it is

23 an administration, administration for training, in charge of training

24 soldiers and officers in the VRS.

25 The third segment, albeit it is not an administration, are the

Page 16917

1 heads of combat arms directly linked to the Main Staff. The chief of the

2 Main Staff is also deputy commander because, in this seven-box structure,

3 it was supposed to be the first among equals and that is why that person

4 also is tasked with being deputy commander, because he was also in charge

5 of combat activities on the front lines.

6 Q. Can I ask you to explain who Major General Miletic is and what

7 his responsibilities were?

8 A. General Miletic was the chief of the operations administration in

9 the staff sector. In terms of function, he was my deputy. That is to

10 say, deputy of the Chief of Staff, which does not automatically mean that

11 he was the deputy in the -- my capacity of deputy commander. The task of

12 his administration was to translate information into orders, as ordered

13 by the commander.

14 Q. Now, to help us understand the role of each sector, can you tell

15 us what would be the responsibilities of your sector in the case of a

16 hypothetical military operation to take control of a town called A?

17 A. The task of my sector, or, rather, my task, that I am supposed to

18 implement through the three administrations, the training administration,

19 the combat arms administration, and the operations administration, was as

20 follows: First of all, assessing the situation, having in mind the

21 enemy, the possibility of our own armed forces to act in a particular

22 area.

23 Also, I had to submit a proposal to the commander, in terms of

24 how the operation should be carried out. If the commander accepts it, he

25 can accept it partially or as a whole. Once the commander has said, "I

Page 16918

1 have decided," irrespective of what my proposal was, these

2 administrations, and primarily Miletic's administration, is in charge of

3 issuing documents, be it directives, orders, information, or anything of

4 the sort. Later on, they would also be in charge of analysis, anything

5 envisaged by the commander is something the operations administration is

6 supposed to translate into combat documents.

7 Q. Now, between your sector the staff sector and the other

8 components of the Main Staff, we see a green line which, according to the

9 legend, indicates coordination. Can you briefly tell us how this worked

10 in practice, this coordination function?

11 A. In practice, coordination mainly took place at the Main Staff

12 meetings. General Mladic had, under his direct command, my sector, the

13 staff sector, then the sector for morale, religious and legal affairs,

14 headed by General Gvero, also the logistics sector providing materiel

15 support headed by General Djukic. Next, the sector for the organisation,

16 mobilisation and manning levels, headed by Petar Skrbic whereas initially

17 it had been General Grubor. The next sector is the intelligence and

18 security administration headed by General Tolimir.

19 He also had two administrations directly linked to him because

20 they could not be placed within any of the sectors. The administrations

21 being the one for planning and finance, headed by General Stevo Tomic,

22 and the administration for the air force and anti-aircraft defence headed

23 by Jovo Maric. Later, it was Colonel Radoslav Pantic, since Maric was

24 killed at some point. In any case, it was towards the end of the war.

25 Q. General, can we return to some of the sectors so that I can you

Page 16919

1 some specific questions. With respect to the sector on moral guidance,

2 religious and legal affairs, what would be the responsibility of this

3 sector with respect to this hypothetical operation to take control of

4 Town A?

5 A. That sector, first of all, had to ascertain the level of morale

6 in our ranks, i.e. whether the armed force is capable to fight, whether

7 it is willing to fight or reluctant to fight.

8 Secondly, he had to tour the units, which were supposed to

9 implement the task, in order to explain the soldiers, and I always told

10 General Gvero that he had to hold meetings to tell soldiers about the

11 importance of particular tasks, so as to encourage those with low morale,

12 in order to have it raised to an appropriate level.

13 In addition to working on their morale, his sector was also in

14 charge of legal affairs pertaining to the VRS. In other words, they

15 monitored the work of military courts, they initiated or launched certain

16 court proceedings, unless it was done by the military prosecutor's

17 office, and they also controlled and analysed their work.

18 The third task they had was -- were religious affairs. He was

19 supposed to be in contact with the various religious communities in the

20 territory of Republika Srpska in order to meet their requests or to place

21 requests before them. For example, to make it possible for the soldiers

22 to freely express their religious denomination, et cetera. So in general

23 terms, cooperating with the various religious communities in

24 Republika Srpska.

25 Q. With respect to the logistics sector, what would its

Page 16920

1 responsibility be in terms of this hypothetical operation, briefly?

2 A. The first task of the sector would be to tell us what we have at

3 our disposal. How many pieces of weapons, how much ammunition, how much

4 food, fuel, based on the calculations by the Main Staff. They were also

5 supposed to ensure that sufficient qualities [as interpreted] are

6 available.

7 The sector was not tasked with distributing it to units

8 individually because it was done by the staff sector. It was in charge

9 of distributing the so-called strategic materiel such as weapons,

10 ammunition, fuel, food, clothing and footwear. That was within the

11 competence of the staff sector. Every soldier, every day, irrespective

12 of whether it is peacetime or wartime, has to be clothed and I delegated

13 that responsibility to the logistics sector, whereas I retained the right

14 of the staff sector to be in charge of distributing the three main

15 assets: Weapons, ammunition and fuel.

16 Q. Now if we go to the bottom of the diagram, we see 21 boxes, six

17 of them containing the name of corps, one the name the air force and air

18 defence and the remainder different units whose name is indicated in the

19 individual box. I want to draw your attention to some of those boxes,

20 which have more relevance to this particular case, and ask you to explain

21 their primary responsibilities. Can I first direct your attention to the

22 65th Motorised Protection Regiment? Can you tell us what its primary

23 responsibilities were?

24 A. The very name of the regiment speaks to its tasks. It is a

25 protecting --

Page 16921

1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- Motorised Protection Regiment

3 providing protection to the Main Staff or individuals from the Main Staff

4 temporarily detached from Crna Rijeka. It was headed by Milomir Savcic.

5 He was promoted from Captain First Class to Colonel.

6 They had units trained to defend the Main Staff and the main

7 command post and they also used it frequently as the Main Staff's reserve

8 to intervene at such front lines where there was need to do so. In any

9 case, they were used to reinforce other corps. We rarely used it to

10 provide security at the command location. We mainly used it to assist

11 other units, depending on where the situation was at its worst at a

12 particular point in time at the front lines.

13 MR. GROOME:

14 Q. Under that box, we can see Military Police Battalion. Can I ask

15 you to describe what its responsibilities or function was?

16 A. The MP Battalion was part of the Motorised Protection Regiment.

17 The Intervention Unit was a unit supposed to keep internal order and

18 discipline in other units. In addition to the MP Battalion there was the

19 Protection Regiment had two motorised battalions which were supposed to

20 go in combat. They were also in charge of regular policing that the

21 military police usually does, including providing security for the

22 prominent officers of the army.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness kindly repeat which

24 particular officers he mentioned.

25 MR. GROOME:

Page 16922

1 Q. The interpreters are asking to you repeat the names of the

2 officers that you mentioned. They didn't hear it.

3 A. The commander of the 65th Motorised Protection Regiment, as we

4 can see here is Lieutenant-Colonel Milomir Savcic. The MP Battalion

5 commander is Major Zoran Malinic. He was there throughout the war.

6 Q. Now could I draw your attention to the 10th Sabotage Detachment?

7 Could I ask you to describe --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, I'm wondering whether -- what the

9 interpreters asked, whether that is -- I got the impression that they

10 were asking for the prominent officers of the army which were included in

11 the security system. Now, the answer seems to be about who was the

12 commander of that 65th Motorised Protection Regiment.

13 Witness, did you -- when you said that the military police

14 provided security for the prominent officers of the army, did you mention

15 any prominent officers?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not. That is why I think

17 the interpreters intervened. For example I did not mention the

18 MP Battalion commander's name but I did say that his military police was

19 to provide security for the prominent figures in the VRS who were mainly

20 from the Main Staff because the corps had their own military police in

21 charge of it. Do you want me to specify the names of the people that the

22 military police was supposed to provide security for?

23 JUDGE ORIE: There is no need to do that unless Mr. Groome would

24 ask you for it.

25 MR. GROOME:

Page 16923

1 Q. General, did General Mladic have the authority to give a direct

2 order to anyone in the army?

3 A. Yes. One can find it under item "command" in the military

4 lexicon. A commander has the right to issue orders to anyone in the

5 armed forces.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The commander.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Mladic abided by that

8 rule. For example, if he wanted to issue an order to someone in the

9 brigade, he went through the corps commander. Karadzic, as the Supreme

10 Commander, by the same token, had the right to order -- issue orders two

11 levels down, say to a corps commander, but he was duty-bound to inform

12 General Mladic of it. When such a person received an order from the

13 Supreme Commander, at the earliest opportunity, he had to notify

14 General Mladic of having received such orders from the Supreme Commander.

15 In this case, General Mladic needed not to go through me as his deputy to

16 issue a task to, say, another sector. For example, to Skrbic, who was in

17 charge of organisation, mobilisation and manning levels. He could do it

18 directly because Skrbic was his direct subordinate. He was his assistant

19 for mobilisation. By the same token General Djukic was also his

20 assistant for logistics.

21 Q. General, could I return to my earlier question about the

22 10th Sabotage Detachment? Can you tell us what its area of

23 responsibility and function was?

24 A. Yes. I realised there was a mistake. The 2nd Sabotage

25 Detachment --

Page 16924

1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The 10th Detachment.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were in -- directly linked to

3 Colonel Salapura in the intelligence administration. The intelligence

4 administration was supposed to collect data on the enemy, neighbours,

5 et cetera. They engaged in the so-called forceful acquiring of

6 information. When that was necessary, they would engage the sabotage

7 detachment.

8 Forceful acquiring of information, in other words, means

9 provoking a conflict with the enemy in a particular area to observe its

10 reaction, and based on the intensity of fire or the width of the front

11 line and its depth, the sabotage and reconnaissance personnel could

12 assess the enemy's strength, size, power, et cetera.

13 One can acquire information in two ways: By observation,

14 following documents and so on, or by forceful reconnaissance. Each

15 subordinate unit, such as the corps and brigades, had their respective

16 reconnaissance units for that. The sabotage detachment was used by

17 Colonel Salapura for the very thing, to acquire forcefully information on

18 the enemy.

19 Q. Now my final question on this diagram is -- the Chamber has heard

20 evidence about municipal Crisis Staffs. Did municipal Crisis Staff have

21 any role to play in the command structure of the VRS?

22 A. No. During the first meeting of the Main Staff, I think the

23 third conclusion that was reached was: To remove the power from the

24 Crisis Staffs to command the armed forces, including the 85 to 90.000 men

25 I mentioned, who were armed at the time.

Page 16925

1 That intention of ours was not implemented quickly, though,

2 because the brigades, and later on when the VRS was established, had

3 strong links with their respective municipalities in terms of food

4 supply, clothes and even fuel supply. Those people who provided

5 financial assistance believed that they had the right to command the

6 brigade that they supported.

7 Q. I apologise for interrupting you but I'm conscious of the time

8 and my only query was whether or not they had a role to play in the

9 command structure.

10 Could I now turn your attention to your office and General

11 Mladic's office? Can you describe that office and where you sat in

12 respect to General Mladic?

13 MR. GROOME: I'm sorry, while the witness is changing his

14 glasses, could I tender 65 ter 26016 into evidence as a public exhibit?

15 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar?

16 THE REGISTRAR: Document 26016 receives number P2212, Your

17 Honours.

18 JUDGE ORIE: P2212 is admitted.

19 MR. GROOME:

20 Q. So, General, can you describe where your desk was in relation to

21 General Mladic's?

22 A. The very first evening when we gathered, General Mladic, inter

23 alia, said the following: I probably won't quote him precisely. But it

24 was to the effect that General Milovanovic was supposed to be his deputy.

25 He said everything I know he needs to know too. Alluding to the

Page 16926

1 importance of that with his assistants, saying that they ought to keep me

2 informed as well as General Mladic unless it is done during a common

3 meeting. He said that the room where we assembled, which was at the

4 entrance to the northern building in the first office on the right-hand

5 side, he said that it was to be our joint office, that is to say his and

6 mine.

7 He said that there may be opportunities when he would with be at

8 the front lines and I would be there, and vice versa, so he was trying to

9 save space. We had a single desk, which faced my seat, that is to say

10 the drawers were on my side, whereas General Mladic always sat on the

11 opposite side. If one of us was away from the Main Staff,

12 General Miletic came to be there instead of the person who was absent.

13 That is how we rotated throughout the war.

14 Next to the office was my resting room, so from the office one

15 could enter the room where I rested, whereas General Mladic had his

16 resting premises about a kilometre away. Under the regulations, the

17 commander and his deputy could not spend the night in each other's

18 proximity so as to avoid having both of them killed.

19 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that 65 ter 26005 be brought to our

20 screens? After the Chamber has had an opportunity to see the title of

21 the document, could I ask the usher to move to the second page of the

22 translation?

23 Q. General Milovanovic, when you see the document on the screen, can

24 you familiarise yourself with it? I'm not interested in the substance of

25 the document. What I'm interested in is for you to review the list of

Page 16927

1 telephone extensions belonging to members of the Main Staff. And my

2 question is simply whether these extension numbers are accurate, to the

3 best of your recollection.

4 A. It is dated the 28th of September, 1995, which is when I was on

5 the western front, be it in Drvar, Mrkonjic Grad or Banja Luka. I can't

6 tell you precisely. But I don't see any phone numbers here. You may

7 have mentioned another page?

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You have to go to the next page in B/C/S.

9 MR. GROOME:

10 Q. I believe I see them on the page in B/C/S on the screen if I'm

11 not mistaken. It's just below the middle of the page?

12 A. I see it. Okay. I see them there.

13 Q. So it records your telephone number as extension 155. Do you

14 recall that as being accurate?

15 A. It is accurate.

16 Q. And with respect to the other extension numbers of the other

17 people there, do you recall those extensions as being accurate?

18 A. I can't say whether they are correct or not. I even forgot my

19 own extension, and in one of my testimonies, I was reminded by the

20 Prosecutor.

21 Q. Did General Mladic ever use your telephone extension with respect

22 to either making phone calls or receiving phone calls?

23 A. The extension 155 was the extension of the Main Staff. It is

24 next to my name here because I was the chief of the Main Staff. That is

25 to say the most senior person. It was in my and General Mladic's office.

Page 16928

1 Whenever the phone went off, if General Mladic was there, we did not have

2 an assistant or secretary to answer the call, and it was always done by

3 the most senior person in the office. In this case, the person being

4 General Mladic. So in other words, yes, he did use it.

5 I also had a line installed in my bedroom, as well as in the

6 operations centre, where there were between 12 and 15 people on a daily

7 basis making up the team that was on duty. It was also installed in the

8 building where General Mladic was during the night. It was also

9 installed in the subterranean command location in the operations room.

10 So on a daily basis, there could have been some 30 people who

11 passed by that phone. To conclude, General Mladic regularly used this

12 extension whenever we were in the office together.

13 Q. To clarify, you've now mentioned a physical location, several

14 physical locations of phones. Am I correct in understanding your

15 evidence that if someone rang 155, the appropriate phone would ring,

16 whether you were in your office or your bedroom or some of these other

17 locations that you've described?

18 A. No. We had an automatic switchboard. If somebody wanted to talk

19 to me personally, then the switchboard operator would first dial the

20 extension in my office. If I wasn't there, especially during the night,

21 he would then dial the number in my bedroom. If I wasn't there either,

22 then he would dial the extension number in the operations centre.

23 Those people, the duty officers, always knew where to find me.

24 If somebody wanted to talk to General Mladic, the procedure would be the

25 same. The only thing that they would skip would be my bedroom. I don't

Page 16929

1 know how the switchboard operators did that. In any case, it never

2 happened that all the telephones that responded to the number 155 rang at

3 the same time.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, I'm looking at the clock.

5 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, just before the break could

6 I tender this Exhibit 65 ter 26005 as a public exhibit?

7 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar?

8 THE REGISTRAR: Document 26005 receives number P2213, Your

9 Honours.

10 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.

11 Mr. Milovanovic, you may follow the usher. We'll take a break.

12 [The witness stands down]

13 JUDGE ORIE: We will resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.

14 --- Recess taken at 1.17 p.m.

15 --- On resuming at 1.42 p.m.

16 JUDGE ORIE: The witness will be escorted into the courtroom.

17 [The witness takes the stand]

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, you may proceed.

19 MR. GROOME: Thank you.

20 Q. General, I'd like to return for a moment to that period of time

21 when the VRS was being established and ask you: What role did the

22 existing JNA rules and doctrines play in the establishment of VRS rules

23 and doctrines?

24 A. Since most of us had been trained in the JNA, we were familiar

25 with those rules and regulations, and that's why it was decided that we

Page 16930

1 should continue applying them in the Army of Republika Srpska.

2 Obviously, to a lesser extent, in accordance with the size of the

3 army, the territory where it operated, the conduct of the enemy towards

4 us, and the material or financial circumstances of the state, and of its

5 army. We adopted all the rules and regulations of the JNA and adapted

6 them to our needs, obviously.

7 Q. Now, General, you've made a reference to the two roles that you

8 held. One was Chief of Staff to General Mladic, and also deputy

9 commander. Could I ask you to spend a few moments describing the

10 different responsibilities that each of those titles held?

11 A. As Chief of Staff, I managed the staff sector, first and

12 foremost, and then the staff as a whole. This means that I organised its

13 work, submitting reports to the commander about the work of the staff,

14 and as the deputy commander, I stood in for the commander when he was not

15 in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Or if I was authorised by

16 him to be in charge of a sector, either in the western front or the

17 eastern front, in the Podrinje area, in Herzegovina, wherever he sent me,

18 I would have the right to make fully legitimate decisions instead of the

19 commander.

20 Standing in for the commander could last for up to 30 days,

21 according to JNA rules. And if the commander didn't return within 30

22 days, either somebody else would be appointed, or I would be appointed as

23 fully fledged commander, and then my replacement would be appointed.

24 Luckily enough no such thing happened.

25 Q. In Mladic's absence, when you're serving in the capacity of

Page 16931

1 deputy commander, did you have the authority to issue an order to anyone

2 in the VRS?

3 A. Yes. But I had to inform General Mladic about everything that

4 I undertook, that I ordered, or any similar thing that happened during

5 his absence. And then he would either approve my move or he would evoke

6 [as interpreted] my decision, but in most cases he approved my decision.

7 Q. Now, when General Mladic is present, and you're serving as his

8 Chief of Staff, do you have the authority to issue an order to anyone in

9 the VRS without informing him or without his consent?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Now, if General Mladic left the country on a particular day, and

12 you became deputy commander, would you have changed or withdrawn orders

13 that Mladic had issued just prior to leaving the country?

14 A. No, not even in a condition that something happened to Mladic.

15 For as long as his decision was in effect, it would have been fully

16 implemented.

17 Q. General, one of the terms used by military organisations is

18 "command and control." Can I ask you to explain to the Chamber, in

19 theoretical terms, what the understanding of this concept was to the VRS?

20 A. Command and control is a common term in the definition for

21 managing military in wartime and in peacetime. But let me talk about

22 wartime. Warfare is something that politicians do. It was the

23 Presidency of the Serbian Republic until the command was set up. And

24 then it was the same people when the Supreme Command was set up, it was

25 the Supreme Command who was in charge of war.

Page 16932

1 So the Supreme Command issues a decision to start a war or to

2 launch wartime activities, to determine war objectives and targets, and

3 to declare the war over. However, the command and control functions

4 exist in the army as well, especially when it comes to strategic and

5 operative commands. It is there that the Main Staff and the corps

6 commands, to a certain extent, run the war policy, they collect

7 information on the enemy, they propose to the Supreme Command as to how

8 the military as a whole should be used, how its separate parts should be

9 used. It is very difficult to separate the two functions, the control

10 and the command functions. I take the liberty to say that command means

11 to implement control, or it is a direct element of the control function.

12 And now on to the command function. Command is centralised,

13 first and foremost, and it goes top to bottom, from the Supreme Command,

14 across the Main Staff, corps commands, brigade commands, battalion

15 commands, to the commands of companies, squads. Persons in charge are

16 commanders in units higher than the battalion and komandirs for units

17 that are smaller than a company, including a company.

18 The command function has to be and it was in our military

19 centralised, it was continuous, and every activity had to finish with an

20 analysis exercise. In the meantime, between the analysis and the

21 previously issued order - which means that issuing order is also an

22 element of the command function - there is or -- the supervision or

23 control of how the order is implemented. Some militaries in -- of the

24 world have the so-called control organs in their staffs. We didn't have

25 that. We only introduced that towards the end of the war, after the

Page 16933

1 Dayton Accords were signed, we set up a group that controlled combat

2 readiness.

3 During the war, we did that through our command system. If an

4 operation involved several corps, somebody from the Main Staff would be

5 assigned, it would be either the commander or his assistant, who would be

6 in charge of that operation that involved two or more corps.

7 The commander would authorise us to be in full command in such

8 sectors. It was usually one of the two of us, either General Mladic or

9 I, that would be sent to such a sector.

10 If war operations involving two or more corps were taking place

11 in two separate areas, then one of us would be sent to one place, and the

12 other to the other. Or the commander, in order to ensure the continuity

13 of the work of the Main Staff could assign one of his other assistants,

14 apart from me, to be in charge or rather to command such a combat

15 operations.

16 I believe that that happened only once during the war,

17 General Gvero was assigned to be in command of the operation Pancir that

18 involved the Sarajevo-Romanija and Drina Corps who were both engaged on

19 the front line facing Olovo [phoen].

20 Q. Now, General, earlier today --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, could I take the parties back to page

22 44, line 6, where it reads: And then he would either approve my move or

23 he would evoke my decision. I understood that logically to be revoke my

24 decision, but since evoke is an existing word as well.

25 MR. GROOME: If the Chamber likes I could clarify that with the

Page 16934

1 witness.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, could we -- could do it right away.

3 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter confirms that the word should

4 have been "revoke."

5 JUDGE ORIE: Then it has been confirmed by the interpreters that

6 we have to understand the answer as revoke.

7 Please proceed.

8 MR. GROOME:

9 Q. Now, General, earlier today, you described that one of the first

10 tasks that General Mladic assigned to you was to establish

11 communications, and that you did this on the 12th of May. Can I ask you

12 to tell us, what is the relationship between effective communications and

13 effective command and control?

14 A. Orders and information that were issued by the superior bodies to

15 the inferior units are conveyed in several ways. The first way is using

16 telephone. Obviously, it has to be a protected telephone line during the

17 war. The second way was to be -- was to send coded texts. The third way

18 was to use radio communication system. We used this very little between

19 the strategic and operational level. It is normally used on a tactical

20 level.

21 And the fourth way was using couriers, i.e. couriers would be

22 physically carrying mail. When I spoke about establishing communication

23 with corps command using a button, the push of a button, I wanted to

24 emphasise the speed of conveying a message from superior command to all

25 the subordinated -- subordinate units and vice versa.

Page 16935

1 JUDGE ORIE: Clarification of a matter which appears in the

2 transcript as between brackets with a question mark.

3 MR. GROOME:

4 Q. Could I clarify something to make sure that the record accurately

5 records your evidence. When you said radio communications were used, in

6 what types of operations were radio -- was radio communication typically

7 used?

8 A. Radio communication means were most commonly used in tactical

9 conditions, i.e. in actions, I can't say operations. However, in the

10 course of fighting that involved brigades and battalions. That would be

11 the tactical level because those units were on a tactical level and they

12 were the ones who most commonly used radio communication means.

13 Using the command code for the secret command of units. So this

14 was a coded message. They would say one thing when sending a message,

15 and the receiver would understand the message although the words that

16 were used were completely different. So there was a coded message. For

17 example, the message could be: Launch an attack 555. The subordinated

18 unit would understand that 555 is actually the code for launch an attack.

19 Q. Now, General, between the time that you established

20 communications on the 12th of May, 1995, until the very end of the

21 conflict, at the end of -- I'm sorry, 1992, 12th of May, 1992, until the

22 very end of the conflict at the end of 1995, was there ever a time that

23 communication systems failed?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. When was that?

Page 16936

1 A. I believe that it happened on the 29th of August, 1995, when NATO

2 started bombarding the Army of Republika Srpska. It lasted for 17 days.

3 On the first day, 13 Tomahawk projectiles were launched, all of them at

4 the same time, and they hit all of our 13 communications hubs. For two

5 hours after that, we did -- our system was not operational, all of our

6 systems were down. That was the only interruption. In the course of the

7 war, there were small interruptions here or there in a smaller area but

8 they were never total interruptions in the communication system.

9 Q. Without going into detail, how many levels of backup were there

10 in the event the primary communication system failed? How many

11 independent systems were there?

12 A. I would like to call them communication system sets. We

13 inherited our communication systems from the 2nd Military District, i.e.

14 the command of the 2nd Military District. We also inherited the

15 communication system of the republican staff of Territorial Defence of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was headquartered in Pale. And we also had a

17 communication set of the brigade of the Supreme Command, which had

18 withdrawn from Sarajevo back to Serbia, i.e. the personnel and the

19 vehicles withdrew and what remained behind were the communication system.

20 That's how we ended up with one set always operational, the second at the

21 ready, and a third set was usually out for repairs in one of our

22 factories, either Cajevic or Kosmos in Banja Luka. The fourth set, the

23 courier communications is what I didn't mention because the only thing

24 that we had as parts of that system were couriers and their vehicles.

25 Q. Do I understand your evidence correctly that between the

Page 16937

1 12th of May, 1992, and the end of the war in 1995, there was only one

2 complete interruption of the communication systems for two hours and then

3 there were some minor interruptions that were restricted to a particular

4 geographic area? Do I understand your evidence correctly in this regard?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, General, I want to return to the concept of command and

7 control, and would I be correct in saying that the conduct of regular

8 meetings was an important feature of how General Mladic exercised his

9 command and control over VRS troops?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. I will ask you detailed questions about these meetings. To

12 assist the Chamber, can I ask you first to list all of the regular

13 meetings and then all of the ad hoc meetings and then I will ask specific

14 questions about each one, including who was present and what was the

15 typical agenda. My first question is: Did Mladic have a regular daily

16 meeting?

17 A. Yes. When he was in the Main Staff.

18 Q. Did Mladic hold a weekly reporting meeting?

19 A. General Mladic had regular meetings, every day, every morning.

20 Those meetings started around 7.00 in the morning. If needed, those

21 meetings were also organised in the afternoon, if anything had happened

22 during the day that required such a meeting to take place.

23 Q. I'll ask you some very specific questions about this meeting.

24 First, who were the regular attendees at this regular daily meeting?

25 A. The commander and all of his assistants. It also happened that

Page 16938

1 deputies of the commanders' assistants were present. For example,

2 General Miletic would sometimes attend with me. Colonel Kovacevic was

3 sometimes with General Djukic. Later on, Colonel Milanovic would also

4 attend. Savo Sokanovic sometimes attended together with Gvero. In other

5 words, us assistants were allowed to bring on our assistants or deputies,

6 but most often it was only the commander and his assistants.

7 Q. And to be clear, when you use the phrase "assistant," you're

8 referring to the assistant commanders in charge of the different sectors

9 and components of the Main Staff; is that correct?

10 A. Yes. Those were the deputies of the chiefs of various sectors.

11 There were no sector commanders. There were sector chiefs.

12 Q. Now, you've mentioned that during certain periods, it was held

13 more than once a day. Can I ask you to summarise which periods of the

14 conflict this was and at what time of the day would such meeting

15 typically be held?

16 A. Those evening meetings would take place if something changed on

17 the front lines. For example, if we had lost some territory or we -- if

18 we had suffered major losses. Or if in the meantime the Supreme Command

19 had requested something from us or ordered us to do something, it was

20 then that the commander would invite us to an evening meeting in order to

21 decide as to how to react, whether to try and return the lost territory,

22 how to carry out and implement the Supreme Commander's order, i.e. how to

23 remedy any situation that may have occurred during the day.

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would like to clarify one matter in relation to

25 the regular morning meetings. Mr. Milovanovic, you told us who were the

Page 16939

1 regular participants, and I think the last question of Mr. Groome was not

2 properly understood and answered. You said the assistants were present,

3 and the question of Mr. Groome was were the assistant commanders in the

4 Main Staff present during these morning meetings. The assistant

5 commanders meaning the chiefs of administrations.

6 Did you understand my question?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did understand it, but I'm

8 waiting for your permission to speak.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: When I finished my question, you were allowed to

10 speak. Please answer my question.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The way I understood your question,

12 or Mr. Groome's question, was that Mr. Groome misspoke when he said

13 "commanders." It was not commanders but chiefs of sectors. There was

14 just one commander in the staff, and that was General Mladic. All the

15 others, including me, we were all chiefs. So when I said "assistants,"

16 Mr. Groome interpreted that as commanders' assistants but those were the

17 assistants of the chiefs. In the army, we speak about the person's

18 titles starting or ending with a K.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I understand that but exactly that is the

20 misunderstanding. I understood the question of Mr. Groome to be: Are

21 these the assistant commanders who are the chiefs of sectors in the

22 Main Staff? Are they called assistant commanders of the commander of the

23 Main Staff?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Each of the sector chiefs is

25 also the assistant commander for that sector. Just as I was also the

Page 16940

1 deputy commander.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is now well understood. Thank you very

3 much.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, I'm looking at the clock. It would be

5 time to adjourn.

6 MR. GROOME: That would be a suitable place to break.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, we will adjourn for the day. We

8 would like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.30 in this same

9 courtroom. I would like to instruct you that you should not speak with

10 anyone or communicate in whatever other way about your testimony, whether

11 that is testimony you've given today or whether that's testimony still to

12 be given. If that is clear to you, you may follow the usher.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand. Thank you.

14 [The witness stands down]

15 JUDGE ORIE: We adjourn for the day and will resume tomorrow,

16 Wednesday, the 18th of September, at 9.30 in the morning in this same

17 courtroom, I.

18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.16 p.m.,

19 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of

20 September, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.