131111IT

Page 19043

1 WITNESS: FRANCIS RICHARD DANNATT

2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please be seated.

3 Mr. Dannatt, if I address you as Mr. Dannatt and not by rank or

4 title that is not to express in any way a lack of appreciation for titles

5 or ranks, but it is the way in which the Chamber usually addresses

6 witnesses who come to tell us the truth.

7 THE WITNESS: That's fine. Thank you, sir.

8 JUDGE ORIE: You'll first be examined by Mr. Groome. You'll find

9 him to your right. Mr. Groome is counsel for the Prosecution.

10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

11 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Examination by Mr. Groome:

13 Q. General Dannatt, can we begin by having you place your name on

14 the record, your full name?

15 A. My name is Francis Richard Dannatt, and I was a general in the

16 British army until 2009 when I retired.

17 Q. What offices do you presently hold?

18 A. Currently I'm constable of Her Majesty's Tower of London and

19 I sit as a cross bench, that's an independent member of the

20 House of Lords in the British parliament.

21 Q. Now, General Dannatt, paragraph 7 to 22 of your report, which we

22 will have before us in a few moments, sets out in some detail your

23 professional training and experience. In short, you describe your

24 military training and experience during a career between 1971 and 2009, a

25 career that culminated with your appointment as Chief of the

Page 19044

1 General Staff, the professional head of British Armed Forces; is that

2 correct?

3 A. That is correct, except I joined the British army in 1969 and my

4 first two years were as an officer cadet under training and

5 I commissioned as an officer in 1971.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Please slow down while

7 reading.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Could we ask you to slow down because the

9 interpreters have a difficult task in following your speed of speech.

10 THE WITNESS: That's fine, sir.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

12 MR. GROOME:

13 Q. General Dannatt, in the fall of 2011, did I ask you whether you

14 were willing to serve as an expert in this trial --

15 A. [Overlapping speakers]

16 Q. Sorry.

17 A. Yes, you did. You asked me and I agreed.

18 Q. And part of -- well, what you were asked to do was to examine a

19 set of documents and answer a series of questions based upon your study

20 of those documents as well as based on your expertise as a military

21 commander; is that correct?

22 A. Yes. That is correct. And I examined those documents and

23 produced a report.

24 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, at this time, could I ask that 65 ter

25 number 28317 be brought to our screens. It is a document dated

Page 19045

1 23 April 2012 and entitled, "Statement of General Dannatt." It was

2 officially filed with the Chamber on the 24th of April, 2012. And,

3 Your Honours, I have a clean, hard copy of this document. Could I ask

4 that the witness have this before him during his testimony?

5 JUDGE ORIE: Any objections by the Defence?

6 MR. IVETIC: None, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Then may the hard copy be given to the witness.

8 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

9 MR. GROOME:

10 Q. General Dannatt, we can now see 65 ter 28317 before us. Is this

11 your report?

12 A. Yes, sir, it is my report.

13 Q. Can I ask that we go to the last page of this document so that we

14 can see the date of this report?

15 A. Yes, I'm looking at that now.

16 Q. And can you confirm that this is indeed your report?

17 A. It is dated the 23rd of April, 2012.

18 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, at this time I would ask for this

19 document to be marked for identification. I will tender it formally at

20 the conclusion of General Dannatt's evidence.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, the number would be?

22 THE REGISTRAR: Document 28317 receives number P2629,

23 Your Honours.

24 JUDGE ORIE: And is marked for identification.

25 MR. GROOME: Could I ask at this time that 65 ter 28317A be

Page 19046

1 brought to our screens. Your Honours, General Dannatt prepared his

2 report prior to the commencement of the trial, and, thus, the citations

3 in the report refer to 65 ter numbers and ERN numbers. To assist the

4 Chamber in working with the report, we have prepared a chart of the

5 documents referred to in it with citations to the exhibit numbers of

6 documents which have now been admitted. I would ask that this document

7 be marked for identification and I will tender it formally as a

8 demonstrative exhibit when I tender the report itself.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, the number would be?

10 THE REGISTRAR: Document 28317A receives number P2630,

11 Your Honours.

12 JUDGE ORIE: And is marked for identification.

13 MR. GROOME:

14 Q. General Dannatt, in paragraph 3 of your report, you set out your

15 understanding of your task. In paragraph 4 you state -- and I if I could

16 ask that we return to P2629, this is on the first page in both versions.

17 In paragraph 4 you state:

18 "On occasion, I have requested additional material to satisfy

19 myself on certain points of detail."

20 My question is: Do you consider that you had access to a

21 sufficient body of documentary evidence regarding the Army of the

22 Republika Srpska to make comprehensive and reliable conclusions about the

23 command function of that army?

24 A. Yes, sir, I do, and I asked for additional material and it was

25 provided, and I felt I had sufficient on which to base my conclusions and

Page 19047

1 opinions.

2 Q. Before we look at the analysis and opinions contained in your

3 report, I want to spend some time discussing your qualifications. I will

4 not ask you to repeat the details of the comprehensive biography you have

5 provided in your report, but do want you to address some particular

6 points which may be relevant for the Chamber in its consideration of

7 whether to recognise you as an expert.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Could I again ask that the speakers make a short

9 pause between question and answer and answer and question and that they

10 slow down.

11 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, that's my fault.

12 Q. General Dannatt, have you been recognised by a Trial Chamber of

13 this Tribunal as an expert in matters related to commanding -- command

14 and control?

15 A. Yes. I took part in a trial in the case against General Krstic a

16 number of years ago, and was recognised as an expert in that case at that

17 time.

18 Q. Have you been recognised by the Judges of the

19 International Court of Justice as an expert on military matters related

20 to the former Yugoslavia?

21 A. Yes, sir, I have, and similar matters were put to me in that

22 previous trial as I believe will be put to me in this trial today.

23 Q. In paragraph 11 --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Could I -- you are talking about a trial where the

25 question dealt with the International Court of Justice. Now, did you

Page 19048

1 refer to the International Court of Justice or did you refer to your

2 previous testimony before this Tribunal?

3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. I misheard the question. As well

4 as giving evidence in this court, in a previous case, I did take part in

5 another case at the International Court of Justice as an expert.

6 I apologise. I misheard the question, but thank you for correcting me.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Groome.

8 MR. GROOME:

9 Q. In paragraph 11, that can be found on page 3 of the report in

10 e-court, you state the following:

11 "I was the lead author of army doctrine publications volume 1,

12 operations, which set out a revised war fighting doctrine for the British

13 army appropriate for the post-Cold War security environment."

14 My question at this point is whether you were assigned the task

15 of writing this manual and other publications you refer to because of

16 your expertise in topics related to military command and control?

17 A. Yes, sir. I was given this task because at the time, I was the

18 colonel responsible for the higher command and staff course at the

19 British army staff college, and rather as the name implies, that course

20 teaches selected senior officers the art of war at the operational and

21 strategic level, and to be able to do that, one has to have extensive

22 knowledge not only of the way the British army operates but comparative

23 knowledge of the way that other armies operate. And at the time,

24 1992/1993, in the immediate post-Cold War years, it's almost obvious that

25 much of our focus on other military systems would have had us focusing on

Page 19049

1 the Soviet model, an alternative model, and I had to become very

2 conversant with that in order to sensibly frame a British army doctrine

3 against the possible doctrines of other armies that we might find

4 ourselves opposing. As we know, the world moved in a different direction

5 but it was important to understand both the way we operated and the way

6 that potential adversaries might operate. And against that background,

7 I wrote the British army war fighting doctrine for the post-Cold War

8 period.

9 Q. For what period of time did this publication remain in effect for

10 the British army?

11 A. It remained in effect until approximately 2005, which is about

12 the length of time that I would expect it to remain in effect. The world

13 doesn't stand still, and therefore any organisation, any military

14 organisation, needs to keep reviewing its doctrine and the way that it

15 conducts its business against the way the world is looking at any given

16 moment. And the world looked one way in the immediate post-Cold War

17 years throughout the 1990s, but after 9/11, the world began to look

18 somewhat differently, and the British army, therefore, felt it was time

19 again to revise its doctrine and a new doctrine was produced in 2005.

20 Q. In paragraph --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. -- it is only now that the B/C/S translation has

22 finished. Could you please keep in mind to adapt your speed of speech.

23 MR. GROOME:

24 Q. In paragraphs 12 and 14 to 15 - and this can be found in e-court

25 pages 3 to 4 of both versions - you describe your deployments to the

Page 19050

1 former Yugoslavia, in particular to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as

2 Kosovo, work that included, in part, the implementation of the

3 Dayton Peace Accord. During this work, did you ever have occasion to

4 meet with Ratko Mladic himself?

5 A. No, sir. I have never met General Mladic himself.

6 Q. In paragraph 11, you state that you were asked by

7 Major-General Sir Michael Rose, then commander of UNPROFOR, to draft what

8 you describe as a campaign plan for Bosnia, a plan you delivered to

9 General Rose in February 1994. My question to you is: Do you know why

10 you were selected for this task?

11 A. I was selected for that task by General Rose immediately prior to

12 becoming commander of UNPROFOR. General Rose had been the komandant of

13 the army staff college and I was on his staff as the colonel running the

14 higher command and staff course, and writing the war-fighting doctrine

15 which I've just referred to. He got in touch with me and said, You teach

16 campaign planning at the staff college. I believe the operation by

17 UNPROFOR in Bosnia needs greater clarity. I want you to put a team

18 together and write me a campaign plan for Bosnia.

19 So, effectively, he was asking me to do, in practical terms with

20 regard to Bosnia, what I was teaching and studying in theoretical terms

21 at the staff college. It was, as you can imagine, an interesting

22 challenge, and one which I and the team of experts that I put together

23 rose to with enthusiasm, and I then took that plan to Sarajevo and gave

24 it to General Rose.

25 Q. Did your work on drafting this plan require you to become

Page 19051

1 familiar with the armies of the respective sides in the former

2 Yugoslavia?

3 A. Yes, sir, it did. But as you can imagine, the conflict in Bosnia

4 had been running for some time by that moment, in early 1994, and,

5 therefore, at the staff college we had been studying what was going on in

6 Bosnia and in the former Yugoslavia considerably. So although at that

7 stage in January 1994, I had not served in Bosnia, I had a good

8 background knowledge of what was going on, and many of the instructors at

9 the staff college had already served in Bosnia. I therefore built on my

10 background understanding by asking many questions, conducting many

11 interviews, conducting a lot of research, with the team of military

12 experts that I assembled at the staff college in order to be able to

13 produce this campaign plan for General Rose. Self-evidently, that plan

14 had to be well-founded, well-researched, and of practical use, otherwise

15 it would have not served its purpose for General Rose.

16 Q. I'd like to now turn to the report itself. In paragraph 23,

17 which can be found on e-court pages 5 in both versions, you state that

18 there are certain basic principles that apply to all conventional armies,

19 and you set out the first principle in paragraph 24, where the first

20 sentence reads:

21 "The first principle is that a superior commander gives orders to

22 subordinate commanders who obey these orders and implement them."

23 My question to you is whether there are differences in the way

24 this principle is applied in the case of different national armies?

25 A. No, sir. I believe that that principle is a fundamental

Page 19052

1 principle common to all armies, to all military organisations.

2 Commanders give orders to subordinate commanders who obey those orders

3 and carry them out. That is the way a military organisation functions in

4 any army.

5 Q. You set out the second principle in paragraph 25, where you

6 state:

7 "The second principle is that subordinates must report upwards

8 the results of their actions to inform their superior of progress or

9 otherwise in order for the higher command to carry out its own

10 decision-making process."

11 Again, I ask you whether there are differences in the way this

12 principle is applied among national armies?

13 A. The basic principle is common to all armies. The way that it is

14 conducted differs from army to army, somewhat dependent upon the military

15 doctrine that a particular army follows. I'm very happy to elaborate

16 that now, now or later.

17 Q. I'll ask you some more detailed questions about that in a few

18 moments, but before I do, could we return to the first principle,

19 superiors give orders to subordinates. Can I ask you to enumerate the

20 different ways in which a commander can give an order to a subordinate?

21 A. A commander can give an order to a subordinate in a variety of

22 ways. He can issue a written directive, which is a general statement of

23 future intentions. He can issue an operational order, which is a

24 detailed statement of what is to be done. He can give orders in person,

25 speaking person to person. He can give orders on the radio. He can give

Page 19053

1 such orders in an abbreviated fashion using modern technology such as

2 e-mails and texts. The underlying principle is that the subordinate must

3 understand what the superior wants him to do, and there are a variety of

4 ways in which that intimation of what the superior requires can be

5 conveyed. There is no right way or wrong way to give an order. There

6 are a variety of means. The important thing is that the meaning is

7 understood and that the action will then be carried out.

8 Q. Does the fact that an order was given orally and not put in

9 writing diminish the subordinate's obligation to comply with that order?

10 A. Not at all. Provided the intention has been clearly conveyed,

11 any form of conveying the intention is equally legitimate. An oral order

12 is perfectly acceptable.

13 Q. Is it possible for an order to be given neither in written form

14 or orally but simply through the use of a gesture?

15 A. I think I would stand by my earlier answer, that provided the

16 intention of the superior is accurately conveyed to the subordinate, it

17 doesn't matter the means by which that intention is conveyed. If --

18 well, I use, I suppose, the historic example of gladiators fighting in

19 the coliseum in Rome. When the culminating point of the engagement is

20 reached, people looked to the emperor for either a thumbs up or a thumbs

21 down, and we all know the implication of that. So I think a gesture is a

22 perfectly acceptable way of conveying an intention but not the usual way.

23 Q. In your report at paragraphs 27 and 28 - this can be found at

24 e-court page 7 in the original and 6 in the translation - you set out two

25 general paradigms or concepts of military command, Auftragstaktik, or

Page 19054

1 manoeuvrist approach to operations, and Befehlstaktik, an approach that

2 relies on a centralised command. Can I ask you in a few sentences to

3 describe for the Chamber the essential difference between the manoeuvrist

4 approach and the centralised command approach?

5 A. Yes, I will. And I will try to be brief. These are both German

6 terms. Auftragstaktik is a military doctrine best used by professional

7 armies when the standard of training is high and the military education

8 content, particularly of officers, is high, and it's a form of command

9 and control which is intended to optimise the initiative of junior

10 commanders. Very briefly, a superior commander would state his general

11 intention, he would delegate tasks to individuals, and then expect them

12 to use their initiative within the wider framework of his general

13 intention to achieve the mission and to achieve the objective. And in

14 this way, it means that the well-trained brains of junior commanders can

15 be harnessed to better effect and to carry out the operation well.

16 The third element of that system is that even though the superior

17 commander will have delegated tasks, he has an absolute obligation to

18 supervise the execution of those tasks, and he will do it either closely

19 or less closely depending on his confidence in the subordinate to whom

20 he's given the task. This is how a professional army that's well-trained

21 operates. It characterises western armies, such as the British army,

22 United States army, and is in very general terms the way that NATO armies

23 try to operate.

24 The other system known as Befehlstaktik, another German word, is

25 a doctrine that is more centralised. It's characteristic of an army that

Page 19055

1 is large, probably made up of conscripts, and where the level of training

2 is lower. Under that system, there is not the flexibility and delegation

3 that you find in Auftragstaktik, following armies that I've just

4 described, by which I mean that a superior commander will give detailed

5 instructions to his subordinates who will carry out those instructions,

6 and when they are complete, the subordinate would expect to be given

7 further instructions. So the key point that I'm trying to make is that

8 under the centralised Befehlstaktik doctrine, there is much less scope

9 for the use of initiative by junior commanders than there is in the other

10 system that I have described.

11 And as a final comment referring back to one of my other answers,

12 under both systems, it is imperative that subordinates report upwards the

13 results of their activities. Under the centralised Befehlstaktik

14 doctrine, this would be done regularly and without fail and in some

15 detail. Under Auftragstaktik, it is considered acceptable to only report

16 when you have something of importance to say, and without putting it too

17 simply, no news is good news, and the superior commander assumes that all

18 is going according to plan.

19 Q. Just give the interpreters a moment now and then I'll ask my next

20 question.

21 On this issue of reporting, under Befehlstaktik or centralised

22 command approach, what would typically happen if a report did not arrive

23 when it was expected?

24 A. If a report didn't arrive at the prescribed time, one would

25 expect an operations staff officer from the superior headquarters to most

Page 19056

1 probably get on the radio, or these days send an e-mail to the

2 subordinate headquarters and say, Where is your report? What is the

3 situation? What is going on? Why are you not keeping us in the picture?

4 It would be chased up.

5 Q. I'd like to now --

6 JUDGE ORIE: You really have to slow down.

7 MR. GROOME: Sorry.

8 JUDGE ORIE: It goes too fast for the interpreters.

9 Please proceed.

10 MR. GROOME:

11 Q. I would now like to turn your attention to the VRS itself and

12 your conclusions about its command and control systems.

13 What type of command system was used by the VRS? Which of these

14 models?

15 A. The VRS has the characteristic hallmarks of a centrally

16 controlled army, following what I have described as the Befehlstaktik

17 doctrine, and if I could explain why I think that is so: History will

18 show that the VRS was formed from the army of the former Yugoslavia, and

19 although Yugoslavia was not -- well, Yugoslavia was a looser member of

20 the Warsaw Pact, and under Soviet influence. Nevertheless, the military

21 system that the Yugoslav National Army followed was one very much

22 influenced by the Soviet model, and that was a model based on centralised

23 control characterised by Befehlstaktik which I've talked about.

24 Q. During the course of your work, did you come to a view regarding

25 how the first principle of militaries, superiors giving orders to

Page 19057

1 subordinates, how this functioned in the Army of Republika Srpska?

2 A. Yes. All my investigations show me that the

3 Army of Republika Srpska operated in the way that I would expect any army

4 to do, and that directives, operation orders, and sometimes verbal

5 orders, were passed to subordinates to carry out missions and tasks in

6 the classic fashion.

7 Q. General, in paragraph 32, that can be found at 9 in the original,

8 8 in the translation, you describe an event when you were commander of

9 the 4th Armoured Brigade on mission in Bosnia to implement the

10 Dayton Peace Accord, and your efforts to meet with General Talic. What

11 did that interaction or event demonstrate to you about the command

12 structure of the VRS?

13 A. Without going into detail of the situation at the time, whereas I

14 had had routine meetings and discussions with the commanders of the

15 Muslim and Croat forces, I had not had the opportunity to meet commander

16 of the Bosnian Serb forces. And under Dayton, we were required to move

17 into Republika Srpska and operate within the territorial area of

18 Republika Srpska. I was concerned that although agreement had been

19 reached at the strategic level at Dayton, that maybe the soldiers on the

20 ground would not understand that NATO troops would be coming into

21 Republika Srpska and that fighting would occur. And I decided that the

22 way to ensure this didn't happen was that I would go to Banja Luka and

23 see General Talic and confirm for myself with him that he understood his

24 obligations under Dayton to allow my troops to cross into

25 Republika Srpska and operate to implement the Dayton agreement.

Page 19058

1 I let it be known through liaison officers that I was coming, and

2 duly travelled to Banja Luka, but I was not able to meet General Talic

3 because he had not received authority from General Mladic to see me. And

4 I passed the message that I wanted to pass through liaison officers from

5 General Talic's staff. What this told me was that General Talic had no

6 delegated authority to make a decision on his own account to see me but

7 that he would only do so if General Mladic, as the army commander, gave

8 that authority. And that reinforced to me as an example the centralised

9 command and control nature of the Army of Republika Srpska.

10 Q. In the penultimate sentence of paragraph 30, you state:

11 "The culture of regularly reporting upward never changed, and

12 indeed regulations required the upward passage of information."

13 Can I ask you what did you base this conclusion about the

14 reporting function of the VRS on, if you could summarise the basis for

15 that view?

16 A. In a number of documents that I saw, it was stated very clearly

17 that there were reporting obligations placed on subordinate headquarters

18 to send reports at certain time each day to their superior headquarters

19 so that the superior headquarters was well-informed. I also looked at

20 several documents at various stages during the conflict which were

21 examples of those reports being sent from a brigade headquarters to its

22 superior headquarters, and from a corps headquarters to the Main Staff

23 headquarters.

24 And even when the fighting became difficult and the war reached a

25 climax in 1995, that system of upwards reporting remained in place as

Page 19059

1 I would expect it to have done, and indeed my investigation showed that

2 this indeed was the case, and that the command and control mechanism

3 stayed in place and functioned effectively.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I ask -- at this point in time I have one

5 question: You told us about your wish to meet General Talic and you told

6 us that he didn't get the permission by General Mladic. How do you know

7 that? From whom did you receive this information?

8 THE WITNESS: The liaison officer who I spoke with was

9 apologetic, and he told me that General Talic -- it was nothing personal,

10 but that he had not received authority to see me, and therefore would

11 I please convey my message through the liaison officer. There was a

12 colonel and a captain. I'm afraid -- Captain Popovic was the name of the

13 captain, and I have a picture of the colonel in my mind but I can't now

14 remember his name.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.

16 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that P353 be brought to our screens and

17 I'm interested in an entry that spans e-court pages 246 to 272 in the

18 original and 244 to 270 in the translation. So if we could please go to

19 244 now.

20 Q. General, while that's being brought to our screens, last evening

21 did I ask you to take a look at an entry from General Mladic's notebook?

22 A. Yes, you did.

23 Q. We are still trying to bring up the English translation. Do you

24 recall an entry in which Mladic records information he receives at a

25 meeting that he has with municipal leaders?

Page 19060

1 A. Yes, I do. I saw that last night. I currently am not looking at

2 the English translation. Ah, I think I am now.

3 MR. GROOME: This is page 244. Could I ask that we go to 246.

4 I may have reversed the English and translation. It's 246 in the English

5 and 244 in the B/C/S, and the B/C/S is the transcription, not the

6 original image. There we go for the English.

7 Q. Is this the entry that you looked at?

8 A. Yes, sir, it is.

9 Q. Now, this notebook entry is in evidence and the Chamber will be

10 able to study it. Can I ask you to summarise how this meeting, this

11 meeting with local government officials, fits into the reporting

12 requirement or the gathering of information by a commander in order to

13 make command decisions?

14 A. My answer to the question really has to be placed in the context

15 of the kind of conflict which characterises the war in Bosnia, 1992 to

16 1995. Whereas in straightforward military operations, when one army is

17 fighting another, in which case you would gather intelligence about the

18 enemy, frame your plans and conduct operations, in this set of

19 circumstances, it was very much as we describe as war amongst the people,

20 the civilian population, the local communities, very much part and parcel

21 of the background and the circumstances of the war.

22 So it's absolutely inevitable and quite proper that military

23 commanders at all levels have regular dialogue and regular meetings with

24 civilian authorities, whether it's town mayors, local government

25 ministers, local community leaders, and it's important that those

Page 19061

1 civilian leaders understand what the military is doing and the military

2 listens to what the civilian community wants to tell them. So

3 civil-military relations are a very common characteristic of this kind of

4 conflict, which is not pure war fighting in a simple force-on-force

5 nature but it's within what one might call the messy and complex

6 circumstances of what I've described as war amongst the people where the

7 civilian population is absolutely critical as part of the background to

8 what the militaries are doing.

9 Q. I'd like to now turn your attention a different topic. General,

10 you prepared your expert report before this trial began and your analysis

11 was based on documentary evidence and some video materials. Prior to

12 giving evidence today, did I provide you with the testimony of

13 General Manojlo Milovanovic, General Mladic's Chief of Staff, and did

14 I ask you to review that testimony?

15 A. Yes, sir, you did. And I have read that and reviewed that.

16 Q. And did you review it in its entirety, both the direct exam, the

17 cross exam and the questions posed by the Judges?

18 A. I have now done that. Initially, you provided me with some of it

19 and more recently you provided me the whole transcript, which I have

20 read, and it took quite some time to read it.

21 Q. Before I ask you to provide us with any observations you may

22 have, can I ask you to spend a few moments describing for the Chamber the

23 role of a Chief of Staff to a commander?

24 A. The Chief of Staff in any formation is in a unique position, in

25 that not only is he, as the name implies, the Chief of Staff, the head of

Page 19062

1 the staff, the leader of the headquarters, but he also acts as the deputy

2 commander.

3 Now, this isn't the case in every army. In the British army, the

4 Chief of Staff will act as the deputy commander if the commander is away

5 or incapacitated for any reason and he will hold command until a

6 replacement commander is nominated.

7 In the case of the Yugoslav National Army and therefore the

8 Army of Republika Srpska, the Chief of Staff is the deputy commander and

9 has singular authority to act in the command function if the commander is

10 away. And therefore, when the commander is not present, the Chief of

11 Staff in his capacity as deputy commander holds equal authority to the

12 commander himself. So Chief of Staff is a very important position for

13 those two reasons.

14 Q. Having read General Milovanovic's testimony, does it further

15 inform your opinion regarding the Army of Republika Srpska? In other

16 words, does it confirm your conclusions or cause you to amend them?

17 A. From a professional military point of view, I was fascinated to

18 read the entirety of General Milovanovic's testimony and

19 cross-examination because it told me a lot about the origins of the

20 Army of Republika Srpska, much of which I knew from my own research, but

21 it was fascinating to me to read his description of what happened because

22 it tallied with my understanding from my own research as to what

23 happened. And from it, I could see that the Army of Republika Srpska

24 undoubtedly had its origins in the former military district of the

25 Yugoslav National Army, that the doctrine and regulations of the VRS were

Page 19063

1 taken pretty much in entirety from the doctrine and regulations of the

2 Yugoslav National Army which was a professional army of considerable

3 competence, and that there was a functioning system of command and

4 control that I recognised. And although it was a challenge in May, June,

5 early part of 1992, to get the Army of Republika Srpska functioning

6 quickly, given that a civil war was breaking out, this was achieved

7 remarkably quickly because the doctrine and the regulations and many of

8 the personnel were transferred en bloc from one army to the other.

9 Moreover, it was very interesting to sense - I think that's the

10 right word - from General Milovanovic's testimony, the significant

11 presence of General Mladic as the commander of the Main Staff. It's

12 quite clear that General Mladic was and is what I would describe as a big

13 person, had a big personality, and that nothing that was done was not

14 done without his authority. And on those occasions when General Mladic

15 for one reason or another was away, away from the headquarters or out of

16 the country, and General Milovanovic in his capacity as deputy commander

17 took decisions, he was always very quick to ensure that General Mladic

18 was informed of those decisions and his agreement was sought or if his

19 agreement was not forthcoming then amendments were made to the decisions

20 that had been taken.

21 And this, to me, speaks volumes of the personality and character

22 and style of command of General Mladic, and it came out very clearly to

23 me in General Milovanovic's testimony.

24 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I see that we are at the time for the

25 break. Before I ask the next question, would we break now?

Page 19069

1 you, Mr. Ivetic, for having given already a brief response.

2 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

3 Ms. Marcus, you are excused.

4 Mr. Groome, as far as time is concerned, are we on track?

5 I think you asked for one hour and a half.

6 MR. GROOME: I'm on track, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Which, in fact, will mean that you do not need

8 the whole of the session we are -- we will be in from now.

9 [The witness takes the stand]

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dannatt, Mr. Groome will now continue his

11 examination.

12 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

13 MR. GROOME:

14 Q. General Dannatt, I want to draw your attention and seek your

15 comment on a few specifics elements of General Milovanovic's testimony.

16 At transcript 16932, he said:

17 "The command function has to be and it was in our military

18 centralised. It was continuous and every activity had to finish with an

19 analysis exercise. In the meantime, between the analysis and the

20 previously issued order, there is the supervision or control of how the

21 order is implemented."

22 Can I ask you to comment on that testimony and help us understand

23 it within the conceptual framework that you set out earlier today?

24 A. Yes. This is a clear description of how a military organisation,

25 an army, based on a centralised command philosophy would function, and

Page 19070

1 that's what General Milovanovic is saying is that a task is decided,

2 orders are given, activity starts, activity is monitored - that's

3 supervision - and then an analysis is conducted of what has happened and

4 what has not happened for the better understanding of the success or

5 otherwise of the operation so that another time it might go better.

6 So what he is describing is the complete process from decision to

7 execution and then to feedback of -- at the end of an operation.

8 Q. In paragraph 56 of your report, that can be found at 19 in the

9 English and 16 in the B/C/S translation, you opine that:

10 "The VRS communication system appears to be diverse and robust."

11 Did you find any support for this opinion in your review of

12 General Milovanovic's testimony?

13 A. General Milovanovic, as the Chief of Staff, concentrates very

14 largely on the process of reporting and information flow, and talks about

15 the issue of directives, he talks about the issuing of orders, the use of

16 secure telephone, of radio, and he makes it quite clear that a very

17 important part of effective functioning of the command of the army is the

18 flow of information upwards from subordinate headquarters and subordinate

19 formations for the better understanding and subsequent decision-making

20 process of the superior headquarters. And as with other well-organised

21 armies, there is always a redundancy in communication methods to ensure

22 that if one method of communication is jammed or, say, radios are not

23 functioning well, that information can still get through by another

24 means, and that is a normal procedure, to make sure that a superior and

25 subordinate headquarters can stay in touch with one another.

Page 19071

1 Q. I'd like to now turn your attention to General Mladic personally

2 as the commander of the General Staff -- of the Main Staff, I apologise.

3 In paragraph 39 of your report, you make the following statement:

4 "In practice, even if not according to VRS regulations,

5 General Mladic exhibited all the characteristics of a hands-on army

6 commander."

7 Can I ask you to expound on that? In particular, what were those

8 characteristics?

9 A. Well, it's clear to me from things I have read, television

10 reports and video clips that I have seen, that General Mladic was a very

11 effective commander, and that he kept close control on -- on what

12 happened. I suppose the most obvious example, and it's a well publicised

13 example, is to look at his activities in Srebrenica in July 1995.

14 Srebrenica was in the area of operations of the Drina Corps but

15 it was the focus of activity at that time, so it could be called as the

16 army's main effort at that time, and therefore it was not unreasonable

17 that General Mladic, as the army commander effectively, went forward into

18 the Drina Corps area to see what was going on.

19 And it's quite obvious from the material that I reviewed that he

20 exercised a large measure of personal control as to what was going on.

21 There are three meetings, for example, in the Fortuna hotel which he

22 chaired those meetings. There is video coverage of him moving through

23 the town, giving direction.

24 So what this says to me is that this is very much a hands-on army

25 commander. He was known, and I've mentioned it before this morning, to

Page 19072

1 be a big character who people certainly respected and I suspect feared a

2 certain amount as well. And therefore, what he said and what he ordered,

3 people were likely to do. And I think in that way I'm trying to sum up

4 what I mean when I describe him as a hands-on commander. He was not

5 remote in some distant headquarters but he liked to be forward,

6 exercising personal control. And that is a perfectly reasonable way of

7 military activity.

8 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it that you misspoke when you were

9 talking about the "Fortuna hotel" and that you intended to refer to the

10 "Fontana Hotel"?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, you're absolutely right. My apologies,

12 thank you.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

14 MR. GROOME:

15 Q. General Milovanovic testified that Mladic located himself in the

16 Sarajevo area at the beginning of the war. Would this be consistent with

17 what you have now described as a hands-on approach?

18 A. It would be consistent with the commander going to what I've --

19 I would describe as the point of main effort, by which I mean where the

20 most significant activities are going on. That is where a commander

21 would want to place himself so that he has a good feel and a good

22 understanding of the situation in the most critical area at the time.

23 And not surprisingly, Sarajevo being the capital of Bosnia, very much the

24 centre of activity certainly in the early years, it doesn't surprise me

25 at all that that's where he chose to locate himself so that he knew what

Page 19073

1 was going on and could influence what was going on.

2 Q. At paragraph 62 of your report, you discuss the concept of

3 Fingerspitzengefuhl or finger-tip control. Could I ask you to describe

4 what relationship, if any, there is between the concepts of hands-on

5 control and the concept of Fingerspitzengefuhl?

6 A. Yes. I apologise for introducing yet another German term. But

7 in military theory, the Germans did largely shape the lexicon.

8 Fingerspitzengefuhl is a term understood to mean how a commander develops

9 an instinctive sense of how things are and how things should be and how

10 he thinks he wants things to develop. You can do that not necessarily

11 being present on the ground. You can do it by gathering information,

12 analysing and understanding and giving orders and direction. But often

13 part of that sensing what is really significant takes you to the point of

14 main effort, to the place that is the focus of activity at the time. So

15 there is an overlap between Fingerspitzengefuhl, this sense of knowing

16 what was going on, being able to direct sensitively what was going on,

17 with actually being present, and the notion of being a hands-on commander

18 is a sub-function, if you like, of the Fingerspitzengefuhl that I've been

19 describing.

20 Q. In paragraph 60 of your report, which can be found at e-court

21 page 20 in the original and 17 in the translation, you make the following

22 statement:

23 "However, whether physically present or not, a commander remains

24 responsible for the actions of the troops under his command or in some

25 circumstances within his delegated TAOR. Indeed, radio telephone

Page 19074

1 intercepts discussed elsewhere in this statement demonstrate clearly that

2 Mladic received reports and gave orders whether or not he was physically

3 present at the scene of action."

4 Can I ask you to elaborate on that and explain how you came to

5 that conclusion?

6 A. The point that I'm trying to make is that a commander is

7 responsible for a plan that he develops in fulfilment of a particular

8 mission, and in some circumstances, and this is why I use the term

9 "TAOR," tactical area of responsibility, in some forms of conflict, and

10 I think the Bosnian war is one of those forms of conflict, whereby the

11 territory under dispute is divided into tactical areas of responsibility.

12 Everything that goes on within an area of responsibility is exactly that,

13 it is -- it remains the responsibility of the commander. So whether he

14 or she is physically present actually is not the relevant issue. Tasks

15 can be delegated but responsibility can never be delegated. If you've

16 made yourself responsible for an operation and for a plan, it is your

17 responsibility, even though you've delegated the execution of it. And

18 within a conflict which has territorial subdivisions, then what goes on

19 in your tactical area of responsibility remains your responsibility, and

20 that is the point that I'm trying to make here.

21 Q. In paragraph 80, you discuss the operational challenges of

22 transporting all of the people in Potocari out of that location. You

23 say:

24 "At the outset, however, the military must bear in mind that once

25 it sets out to move a large body of civilians from one place to another,

Page 19075

1 then under international law the military takes on certain

2 responsibilities and has certain legal obligations."

3 My question to you is the following: Under what circumstances

4 would it be appropriate for a military force to physically move such a

5 large group of people?

6 A. The legitimate use of military force is against other military

7 forces. Earlier today I've talked about the expression "war among the

8 people," and the responsible military commander has to think about the

9 safety of civilians and non-combatants within his tactical area of

10 responsibility or within the geographic area of an operation that he's

11 going to carry out. And therefore, it may be the responsible thing to do

12 to offer to the civilian non-combatants in an area the opportunity to

13 leave that area for their own safety. And indeed, that offer might have

14 to include the provision of transport to remove them. I use the word

15 "offer" because I think that is the appropriate way to go about it.

16 Compelling people to leave their home is probably verging on the

17 internationally legally unacceptable. And certainly compelling people to

18 move or compelling people to move would be the wrong thing to do. The

19 correct action to take would be to so shape your military operations that

20 you avoid a centre of population, if that population has chosen to stay

21 put.

22 But in this case, it looks as if there were a large body of

23 people that, for one reason or another, were to be moved. Whether it was

24 voluntary or involuntary, the fact of the matter is they were going to be

25 moved, and that elements of the VRS took responsibility for moving that

Page 19076

1 large number of people from one place to another.

2 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that P363 be brought to our screens.

3 This is a portion of the military notebook of General Mladic. Could

4 I ask that we go to e-court page 4 in both copies.

5 Q. General Dannatt, I want to show you an entry from

6 General Mladic's military notebook, and this entry records a meeting in

7 Dobanovci, the outskirts of Belgrade on the 15th of July, 1995.

8 Attending that meeting were Milosevic, Stoltenberg, Akashi, Bildt and

9 Generals de la Presle and Smith. Now, we can see at the bottom of this

10 page that Mladic records a separate meeting between himself, de la Presle

11 and General Smith. Do you know General Smith, General Rupert Smith?

12 A. Yes, I know General Smith well.

13 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that we go to the next page in both

14 versions.

15 Q. We can see that General Mladic -- just be a moment now to call up

16 the next page. We can see here that General Mladic records a statement

17 by General Smith. I want to draw your attention to the paragraph that

18 begins with the number 4. Mladic writes down what Smith is saying. He

19 records:

20 "Treatment of the population in Srebrenica and Zepa. There are

21 rumours about atrocities, massacres and rape."

22 My first question to you is: Based on your training and

23 extensive experience as a commander, what would be the likely purpose of

24 one commander telling another commander about information regarding

25 crimes being committed by that second commander's troops?

Page 19077

1 A. Well, if one commander tells another commander that he has got

2 information or he has heard rumours of improper or illegal activity being

3 conducted by the other commander's troops, as would appear to be the case

4 here in the conversation between General Smith and General Mladic, then

5 the responsible action of the other party, the one against whom

6 allegations were being made, would be to initiate some kind of

7 investigation. Of course, I do not know whether this did indeed occur,

8 but certainly if I had been a party to that conversation, and someone had

9 made an allegation, I would feel honour-bound and obliged to investigate.

10 And to give a more up-to-date example, when I was head of the

11 British army, from time to time allegations were made of improper actions

12 by British soldiers either in Iraq or Afghanistan, and one understands

13 the absolute importance of investigating openly and transparently these

14 rumours, these claims, to either be able to dismiss them authoritatively

15 or if there is substance to them, then to have a more detailed

16 investigation, and if necessary bring about perpetrators of improper or

17 illegal acts to the judicial system and if necessary bring them before a

18 court. And this, sadly, in the odd occasion, in the experience of the

19 British army is something that we've had to do but it's the right thing

20 to do.

21 MR. GROOME: Can I now ask that we see another notebook entry

22 from later in July. It is P345. And the entry I'm interested in begins

23 in e-court page 229.

24 Q. General, while that's being brought to our screens, we now know

25 that General Mladic, upon receiving this information from General Smith,

Page 19078

1 did not return to Srebrenica but, instead, attended wedding of a friend

2 the next day. In your view, was that appropriate for a commander of

3 forces that has received information of such possible atrocities? Ignore

4 the --

5 A. It hasn't come up on the screen, but it doesn't matter. I think

6 it's surprising that if allegations of that substance have been made,

7 that a commander should choose to go to a wedding, a social occasion,

8 rather than vigorously follow up and start to investigate the

9 circumstances. I can't get inside the head of General Mladic over that

10 day or two, but it does seem quite surprising to me that if he took

11 General Smith's allegations seriously, that he wasn't that concerned that

12 he would wanted to have followed up as thoroughly as possible and not

13 wanted to have seen to have trivialised the allegations by himself going

14 to a social event, going to a wedding. I find it surprising that he put

15 himself in what I would regard as an inappropriate situation and open

16 himself up to criticism.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may intervene, Mr. Groome. Mr. Dannatt, is

18 it not permissible or possible that a commander in that situation could

19 give orders to his next in chief, his right-hand man, to undertake the

20 investigations or any other one that he thought appropriate could do the

21 job?

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, that's entirely possible, and may well be

23 what happened. I think the point that I'm trying to make is that if

24 these allegations were as serious and significant as they were, I just

25 ask the question as to whether the most senior commander, the person most

Page 19079

1 responsible, was perhaps being wise to be seen at a social event at a

2 time of great sensitivity and great difficulty. His presence at the

3 wedding didn't stop an investigation, but the question I ask, and

4 I haven't got the answer, is whether it was the right place for him to

5 be, given serious events that had been alleged.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Groome.

7 JUDGE ORIE: I have also a question. Do you consider this to be

8 within your expertise because what is wise or not, where to show up, if

9 you have -- let's just for argument's sake assume that orders were given

10 for an investigation or were not given, but, apart from that, is the fact

11 whether it's wise, isn't that more a policy matter rather than that it

12 has got anything to do with command and control of an army?

13 THE WITNESS: An aspect of command and control, sir, is

14 judgement, and the wise use of judgement. I think it's perfectly proper,

15 as a military expert, to just ask the question: Was General Mladic on

16 that day in question correct in making the decision to go to a wedding

17 when serious allegations had been made against his army. It's merely a

18 matter of judgement.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, you remain seated. Mr. Mladic, you

20 remain seated.

21 Apparently counsel would like to consult.

22 [Defence counsel and Accused confer]

23 JUDGE ORIE: Please, volume. Inaudible. I think the usher has

24 misunderstood me. "Inaudible" is an instruction for Mr. Mladic that he

25 speak --

Page 19080

1 Mr. --

2 MR. GROOME:

3 Q. General Dannatt, Judges Moloto and Orie have both raised with you

4 the possibility of Mladic, upon receiving this information from

5 General Smith, of giving orders to undertake an investigation of such a

6 matter. In your review of the materials that you were given to study,

7 did you see any evidence or anything that indicated to you that upon

8 receipt of this information, General Mladic gave an order in response to

9 it or to initiate an investigation?

10 A. I -- I don't believe that I have seen anything. But, again,

11 I only know what I know and there may be documents that I'm not aware of

12 or other material that I'm not aware of which would have indicated that

13 he had initiated an investigation, but I've not seen anything to that

14 effect.

15 Q. Now if I can draw your attention to the screen before you, where

16 we now have P345 on our screens - it's e-court page 229 - we can see in

17 this entry from General Mladic's notebook that he records a meeting on

18 the morning of 24 July 1995, a time when information about what happened

19 in Srebrenica is now publicly known. He's meeting with

20 President Milosevic and General Perisic, the Chief of Staff of the

21 Yugoslav army. He records Milosevic saying, "Srebrenica and Zepa have

22 damaged us greatly."

23 If the president of a neighbouring and supportive country, in the

24 presence of the commander of its army, tells the VRS commander that what

25 happened in Srebrenica and Zepa has caused great damage, would such

Page 19081

1 information be a basis for that commander to initiate an investigation

2 into what exactly happened and who was responsible?

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Groome, I'm not sure if you have the right

4 page in B/C/S on the screen. Could you please check that?

5 MR. GROOME: Not speaking B/C/S, I'll see what I can do,

6 Your Honour. But perhaps Mr. Ivetic can assist us. I think it might

7 help if we have the transcription of the notebook instead of the digital

8 version.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Because you are referring to the entry at

10 0930 hours. This could be the lower part of it but it's nearly

11 illegible.

12 MR. GROOME: I'll be guided by --

13 JUDGE ORIE: I think apart from legibility, it looks as if we

14 have the right page on our screen, Mr. Ivetic. Would you confirm that,

15 the first bullet point starting with what seems to be "SM"? I think we

16 have the right one in B/C/S at this moment, unless it's challenged.

17 MR. IVETIC: I'm told it appears to be the right page, although

18 very illegible on our monitors.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

20 MR. IVETIC: If I may consult with my client, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, at least if Mr. Mladic speaks with a volume so

22 soft that no one can hear him.

23 [Defence counsel and Accused confer]

24 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, my client was just indicating that he

25 has difficulty reading on his monitor and would ask for a hard copy of

Page 19082

1 this page, if the Prosecution has it available.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Is it in order to follow the questions or in order

3 to verify whether it really says what it says? Because, as you know,

4 there is a transcripted version in B/C/S as well, if we would have that

5 on our screen. But I don't know whether --

6 MR. IVETIC: He needs to be able to do both, but primarily to

7 follow the questioning.

8 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, perhaps -- it's an extremely brief

9 entry, perhaps if I simply read it and then we will do our best to try to

10 find a copy that Mr. Mladic can read later on. It says:

11 "Meeting with President Milosevic and General Perisic. SM,

12 Srebrenica and Zepa have damaged us very greatly. You must have a

13 political dimension in the post of the commander of the army. I wanted

14 to prove to everyone that you are a serious man."

15 That's the end of the entry.

16 JUDGE ORIE: You have not read everything, Mr. Groome. The first

17 bullet point starts with an asterisk and then SM, then we have a second

18 bullet point without at least explicitly a speaker identified and then we

19 have a third bullet point. So you read it but without the layout as we

20 find it, at least in the English translation. Please proceed.

21 MR. GROOME:

22 Q. General Dannatt, if I can --

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Perhaps we should add that this is an entry

24 Belgrade 24th of July, 1995, 930 hours, as indicated in the translation.

25 MR. GROOME:

Page 19083

1 Q. General, if I can return to my question: If a commander receives

2 this information, would this be a sufficient basis to initiate an

3 investigation into what exactly happened in Srebrenica and Zepa and who,

4 if anyone, might be responsible within the Army of the Republika Srpska?

5 A. In my view, this is a pretty serious comment made by

6 Mr. Milosevic. I'm assuming that the three bullet points are comments

7 that Mr. Milosevic, President Milosevic, made. And if they were being

8 made to me and if I was General Mladic as a party to that meeting,

9 I would actually feel rather embarrassed. The allegation that Srebrenica

10 and Zepa -- and one has to assume that we are not talking about the

11 military attack to capture those towns but whatever may have happened

12 subsequently, I'd be embarrassed that actually that was damaging.

13 I would be embarrassed that I was being told as an army commander that

14 I must be sensitive to politics and to the political dimension of my role

15 as an army commander. And I would be embarrassed that the president of

16 another country is saying, Look, I really want to help and to get

17 everyone to understand that you actually are a serious man. My take-away

18 from all that is that if I hadn't initiated an investigation to find out

19 what had happened and who was responsible, I would be -- my embarrassment

20 would have turned into anger and I would have gone straight away to get

21 to the bottom of this because being told off, if you like, by the

22 president of another country is embarrassing. I keep using the word

23 embarrassing. And embarrassment turns to anger pretty quickly and

24 I would have done something about it. What was done, I'm not entirely

25 sure. That's my -- that's my interpretation of that.

Page 19084

1 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, before I move to the next document,

2 Ms. Stewart has printed a hard copy of this entry, if I could have the

3 assistance of the usher to provide that to the Defence who can in turn

4 provide it to Mr. Mladic if he needs to read it.

5 Could I ask that 65 ter 02261 be brought to our screens. That

6 may take a moment.

7 Q. But this is a document, it's an evaluation of

8 Major-General Radislav Krstic for a period which includes July 1995.

9 This appraisal was done on the 6th of November, 1995, well after what

10 happened at Srebrenica was public knowledge. Before I take you to a

11 passage in the document, can I ask you whether you are familiar with the

12 use of staff appraisals in the military and, if so, what function do they

13 fulfil?

14 A. I'm very familiar with the process of staff appraisals. In the

15 British army it is usual for everyone at whatever rank to receive an

16 annual report on their activities and conduct, and the -- there are two

17 principle purposes of the annual appraisal: One is to help an individual

18 improve their capability, to improve their performance; and secondly,

19 it's to evaluate their suitability for promotion to a higher rank or to

20 another appointment, perhaps a more demanding appointment. So I am very

21 familiar with the process. And when I first saw this document, I was

22 very interested, being very familiar with British army processes and

23 procedures, to see how the Army of the Republika Srpska conducted such

24 appraisals, and I've read the words that General Mladic wrote about

25 General Krstic.

Page 19085

1 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that we go to the second page and if we

2 focus on a section entitled, "Description and conclusion." And if we

3 read it we can see that Mladic writes positive and detailed comments

4 about Krstic's service throughout the war, including during the time of

5 Srebrenica. On this last page of his appraisal, he assesses Krstic's

6 performance as, "Excellent." In fact, the last phrase of the appraisal

7 states:

8 "General Krstic is one of the most successful and most promising

9 generals of the Serbian people."

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we go to the next page in English.

11 MR. GROOME: I apologise.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, although you -- yes.

13 MR. GROOME: "... most promising generals of the Serbian people."

14 Q. In your experience as a commander, if we accept that Mladic was

15 sincere in his praise of General Krstic, does this indicate anything

16 about Mladic's intention regarding what happened in Srebrenica?

17 A. I do find this -

18 MR. IVETIC: I'm going to object to the question. It calls for

19 speculation and goes beyond the expertise of the witness.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.

21 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, General Dannatt has explained the use

22 of such appraisals in the military system. I'm simply asking him now

23 what would this indicate about General Krstic's conduct in Srebrenica

24 given the comments that we find here.

25 MR. IVETIC: That's not the question that was asked.

Page 19086

1 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have any objection to the question as it's

2 now rephrased, Mr. Ivetic?

3 MR. IVETIC: If that's the question that's being asked, I would

4 ask -- yeah, then I don't have an objection.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dannatt, could I ask your assistance and perhaps

6 read again the second question, the question as rephrased by Mr. Groome,

7 and answer that question?

8 THE WITNESS: I'm just reading that now, sir, and I'll endeavour

9 to do that.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, it's now the third time today that I

11 have to ask you to keep your voice at a low volume. I'm not intending to

12 repeat that again and again. Please proceed.

13 THE WITNESS: Endeavouring to answer the question as phrased, my

14 understanding, General Mladic, as the army commander, is writing a report

15 on one of his corps commanders, General Krstic in this case, and in

16 grading him excellent is approving of his conduct as a successful

17 general.

18 The problem that I have, and it's not for me to try and answer

19 the question, is we know as a matter of fact that around 8.000 men and

20 boys met an untimely death at Srebrenica and someone was responsible for

21 that. General Krstic was the commander of the Drina Corps and these

22 untimely deaths took place within the Drina Corps area of operations. We

23 have to assume that this was not an activity that was ordered by

24 General Mladic or ordered by General Krstic, so one has to assume that

25 some illegal activity took place on a very large scale.

Page 19087

1 Well, if that was the case, I can't really see how

2 General Krstic's performance could be considered to be excellent in the

3 way that General Mladic describes. His performance early in the war

4 might have been, but this big question mark over how 8.000 men and boys

5 came to meet an untimely death in the Drina Corps area stands as a very

6 big question mark. So I'm surprised, as a professional officer, that the

7 grading of excellent can be given when such a large question mark is out

8 there.

9 MR. GROOME:

10 Q. General Dannatt, my final question to you is the following: The

11 question of whether General Mladic has committed any crimes is for the

12 Chamber. That is beyond your remit. What is properly within your remit

13 is whether you have an opinion as to whether General Mladic, from a

14 purely military perspective, is responsible for the conduct of his

15 subordinates and their actions related to the city of Sarajevo, to areas

16 in Bosnia under the control of the VRS, and in what happened related to

17 Srebrenica. Do you have an opinion as to that, from a purely military

18 perspective?

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.

20 MR. IVETIC: Object. It infringes upon the purview of the

21 Chamber and is overly broad.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, the Chamber understands the questions

24 have been asked and have been answered because the witness told us that

25 responsibility cannot be delegated, and therefore that includes in the

Page 19088

1 understanding of the Chamber, unless the witness would say that's not

2 true, that you have a military responsibility for what is done by your

3 subordinates because you can't delegate your responsibility. And this is

4 of course a rather abstract statement, but the Chamber considers the

5 question to have been asked and to be answered. Unless we have

6 misunderstood your answer, Mr. Dannatt.

7 THE WITNESS: No, sir, you've understood my previous answers

8 correctly. Tasks can be delegated. Responsibility cannot be delegated.

9 But where one has concerns about things that people under your command

10 have done in carrying out tasks that have been delegated to them,

11 remembering that you are personally responsible, then to investigate and

12 to, if necessary, bring to court, is an important part of your discharge.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As a matter of fact, you are extending the

14 question a bit and saying what does that entail to be responsible, but

15 you have answered that question now to some extent as well.

16 Mr. Groome.

17 MR. GROOME: If I can just follow up Your Honour's comments.

18 Q. Judge Orie takes your previous answer to be a response to this

19 last question but said that it was a rather --

20 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber does.

21 MR. GROOME: I'm sorry, the Chamber.

22 Q. But that it was a rather abstract statement. Can I ask you to

23 apply that abstract -- the concept to your study of documents and other

24 evidence related to General Mladic?

25 A. Well, I think we have to come back to the documents that we were

Page 19089

1 discussing a few minutes ago when it would seem that on one occasion

2 General Smith made reference to rumours of rape, massacre and killings,

3 and President Milosevic made reference to such things being damaging, and

4 applying that to my earlier answer, that you can't delegate

5 responsibility, so if you are concerned about things that have happened

6 effectively in your name, then the only responsible thing that you can do

7 is to begin to investigate to find out where the truth lies and if other

8 people have done wrong things, then they, rather than you, need to be

9 brought to account, because if you don't do that, you are making yourself

10 liable to be negligent in not fulfilling your responsibilities to ensure

11 good order and military discipline. So negligence and not doing the

12 right thing is an important part of all this.

13 MR. GROOME: I have no further questions, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Groome.

15 It's time for a break. Mr. Dannatt, we now take a break of

16 20 minutes. Would you please follow the usher.

17 [The witness stands down]

18 JUDGE ORIE: We will resume at 20 minutes past mid-day.

19 --- Recess taken at 12.00 p.m.

20 --- On resuming at 12.21 p.m.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

22 Mr. Groome.

23 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I neglected to tender 65 ter 2261, that

24 is the evaluation of General Krstic. I would do that now.

25 MR. IVETIC: No objection.

Page 19090

1 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Document 2261 receives number P2631,

3 Your Honours.

4 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.

5 I'll start with a matter but if Mr. Dannatt comes in I might stop

6 it. I would like to deal with the subpoena for witness RM225, which was

7 issued on the 22nd of April of this year. To put matters short, I don't

8 think that witness will further be called to testify and I'll deal with

9 it later, but perhaps you'll think about what the consequences should be,

10 Mr. Groome.

11 [The witness takes the stand]

12 Mr. Dannatt, you'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Ivetic.

13 Mr. Ivetic is a member of the Defence team of Mr. Mladic. Mr. Ivetic,

14 please proceed.

15 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:

17 Q. Good day, general.

18 A. Good afternoon.

19 Q. First of all, sir, I would like to ask if you consider yourself

20 to be an expert on the topics of the JNA, the Yugoslav All People's

21 Defence doctrine and the Territorial Defence or TO system which was in

22 place in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia prior to 1992?

23 A. I have made some study of those things, and I believe I'm fairly

24 conversant with them, in the wider context of my other military studies

25 and my 40 years as an officer in the British army.

Page 19091

1 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, based upon all that do you consider

2 yourself an expert or not?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. Do you consider your expertise on these topics to cover the

5 entire history and origin of the JNA, the All People's Defence doctrine,

6 and the Territorial Defence system from their inception to their

7 conclusion?

8 A. I have made considerable study into those things. How do you

9 define expert? Do I -- are you asking me if I know absolutely

10 everything? I think I would find it difficult to say yes. If you are

11 asking me whether I have a sufficient knowledge to be able to offer

12 comment within the wider context of the matters in hand, then my answer

13 is yes.

14 Q. Using your own definition of expert, do you consider yourself to

15 be an expert on the topic of the VRS, the Army of Republika Srpska?

16 A. I would make the same answer to you. I have made considerable

17 study of the VRS within the wider context of the matters in hand, and

18 I think I am able to offer an opinion.

19 Q. Do you consider your expertise as to the VRS to cover and include

20 the entirety of the time period of 1992 through 1995?

21 A. Without wishing to be boring and repetitious, I could not claim

22 to know everything that had occurred between 1992 and 1995, but I have

23 looked at a number of issues, I have been present in Bosnia at various

24 times between 1992 and 1995, and I think I have sufficient understanding

25 to offer the Court some opinion, and that is why I'm here.

Page 19092

1 Q. Did you ever have occasion to meet with and participate in

2 exchanges with JNA officers or former JNA officers in any of the years

3 prior to 1992?

4 A. Prior to 1992, no.

5 Q. Apart from the expert reports that you have authored for the

6 Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal in the Krstic case and in this

7 case, have you authored any articles or other publications on the command

8 and control doctrines of the JNA, the VRS or the

9 Yugoslav All People's Defence doctrine?

10 A. No, I've not.

11 Q. And you have published a book, I believe, which you mention at

12 paragraph 22 of your expert statement in this case. Would you agree with

13 me that this book is more of an autobiography rather than being an

14 authoritative text on the command doctrine of either the JNA or the VRS

15 or the Yugoslav All People's Defence?

16 A. I believe on the cover of the book, it says, "the autobiography"

17 which I think answers the question.

18 Q. Well, sir, in your statement, with respect to this book that

19 you're now saying is just an autobiography, you also say it is in part a

20 study of leadership. That is what I'm asking you. Is it an

21 autobiography or is it also to be considered an authoritative study on

22 leadership including command and control concepts?

23 A. It certainly has a lot of coverage on leadership and aspects of

24 command and control. I don't think because it's described as an

25 autobiography it disqualifies itself from being a discussion of

Page 19093

1 leadership. And throughout the 12 chapters of the book, there are

2 significant passages relating to my experience on leadership and right

3 throughout the book, either implicitly or specifically, is reference to

4 command and control and my own experience of it. I don't see any

5 inconsistency there at all.

6 MR. IVETIC: Now, if we could briefly take a look at P2629 marked

7 for identification.

8 Q. This would be your expert statement. And if we could turn to

9 page 3 in both versions, and I'd like to focus on paragraph 11 of the

10 same, and here you talk about the time you spent as an instructor and you

11 mention that part and parcel of the syllabus of the course was the

12 comparative study of other armies' command and control procedures. Did

13 any of those comparative studies which you taught involve the armed

14 forces of the SFRY?

15 A. To the extent that the armed forces of the SFRY have their

16 doctrinal antecedents in the wider doctrinal basis of the Soviet Union

17 and Warsaw Pact armies, then the answer is -- is yes. And furthermore,

18 we made extensive study of the Warsaw Pact in the round, of which one

19 includes the JNA at the time, and therefore by wider implication, my

20 answer is yes.

21 Q. What years was the JNA a member of the Warsaw Pact, general?

22 A. I think the point that I'm trying to make is the wider doctrinal

23 understanding of the JNA is influenced by the Soviet style of command and

24 the -- many members of the JNA attended staff courses and courses of

25 instruction in Russia, and therefore the general doctrinal understanding

Page 19094

1 flows from that significant influence of the Russian army and the

2 Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact down into the JNA.

3 Q. As an expert are you unable to answer my question as to what

4 years the Yugoslavs were part of the Warsaw Pact, sir?

5 A. I can't answer that question.

6 Q. Now, in your statement, you also mention that you authored the

7 revised British war fighting doctrine known as the manoeuvrist approach

8 to operations. This is, I believe, in paragraph 22 of your statement,

9 which is on page 5 in the English, page 5 in the Serbian. Would you

10 agree with me that this doctrine which you and your team authored is

11 inapplicable and irrelevant to the study of the VRS and our work here

12 today?

13 A. I don't think I would argue that it was directly applicable. I

14 believe that mention of it is made in my statement as an indication that

15 I have a considerable understanding of the importance of doctrine and the

16 importance of an army having a doctrine which conditions the way that it

17 thinks appropriate to a given set of circumstances. And the task that

18 I was given was writing a military doctrine appropriate for the British

19 army in the post-Cold War years. That is the claim that I'm making and

20 I think that claim is substantiated.

21 Q. I don't take dispute with that, sir.

22 A. Thank you.

23 Q. If we can turn to the first page of your statement, P2629 marked

24 for identification, and if we could focus on paragraph 4 of the same.

25 Here, sir, you say that you have had certain documentary materials made

Page 19095

1 available to you by the Office of the Prosecution and that you have

2 reviewed the same and can comment on the same. My first question in this

3 regard is to inquire if you maintained a log of all such documentation

4 provided to you by the Prosecution for this review?

5 A. I didn't maintain a log as such, but there is another document

6 which we have referred to which lists for the helping of the Court the

7 documents that I've looked at and have ascribed to them a number relevant

8 to this case so that they can be identified. And I don't have it in

9 front of me at the present moment, but it runs to about three or four

10 pages of documents, and they are all listed as to what their content is

11 and there is a number pertinent to this case that is attributed to each

12 of those documents. So that constitutes the list of documents that I've

13 looked at.

14 Q. I believe the list you're referring to is entitled, "Index to

15 material cited in expert report of General Dannatt, 23 April 2012," and

16 the copy I have only identifies documents that you have actually cited

17 within your statement. Is that the same list that you are talking about,

18 sir?

19 A. Could I see that document on the screen in front of me, please?

20 JUDGE ORIE: Is it uploaded already, Mr. Groome?

21 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. It's marked for identification as

22 P2630.

23 MR. IVETIC:

24 Q. Is this, sir, the chart that you have been talking about?

25 A. Yes, it is. Thank you.

Page 19096

1 Q. And does this identify each and every single document that you

2 reviewed that was provided to you by the Office of the Prosecutor for the

3 performance of your expertise?

4 A. My recollection, and I put this report together some 18 months

5 ago, when I thought I was first going to be giving evidence in this

6 trial, is that this list is documents that I certainly looked at, and

7 I refer to in my report. Whether each and every one is referred to in my

8 report, I'm afraid I couldn't confirm without actually going back through

9 it again myself at this stage, but the intention of producing this list

10 was so that there could be numbers pertinent to this case for the better

11 information and assistance of the Court.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dannatt, I think that there is some

13 misunderstanding to the extent that what Mr. Ivetic apparently wants to

14 know is whether apart from the documents you refer to explicitly in your

15 report, whether there are other documents which you have reviewed but

16 which you did not explicitly refer to in your report. Now, this list

17 seems to be the index to the material which was cited. Mr. Ivetic would

18 like to know whether there are materials you have not cited so that he

19 has a complete overview of the material which you reviewed and which may

20 be at the basis of your report.

21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I understood that to be

22 his question as well, and there was other material, but he had asked me

23 earlier whether I had a log of it and I don't have a log of it, so if the

24 next question is what else have you looked at, I can't answer that

25 question as I do not recall.

Page 19097

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, that would have been your next question,

2 I take it?

3 MR. IVETIC: Well --

4 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps not.

5 MR. IVETIC: Perhaps not, yes.

6 Q. Now, sir, this corpus of documentation which was provided for

7 you, was that something that the Office of the Prosecutor had preselected

8 for you, or did you have a hand in telling them what kind of materials to

9 provide?

10 A. Well, as was made clear earlier this morning, I have taken part

11 in a previous trial within the ICTY and also another case involving

12 Bosnia and Serbia and, therefore, in the course of those two trials,

13 those two cases, and this, I've looked at quite a wide amount of

14 material. With regard to this case in particular, there were some

15 documents that the Office of the Prosecutor drew to my attention, but

16 this list that's in front of you does not represent a reading list, if

17 you like, that the Office of the Prosecutor gave to me. Many of these

18 documents I'd seen some 12, 13, 14 years ago when I was preparing for the

19 Krstic trial.

20 Q. If we could just briefly go back to the preparations that you

21 undertook in the Krstic case to prepare an expert report. At that -- at

22 that time, was documentation preselected for you by the

23 Office of the Prosecutor and given to you to review for purposes of doing

24 your expertise?

25 A. I had some extensive preparation for that trial, for that case,

Page 19098

1 including several lengthy meetings with representatives of the

2 Office of the Prosecutor, with investigators, and indeed I spent some

3 time on the ground in Bosnia looking at these matters. So it was a

4 fairly wide-ranging preparation that I made before that trial, to have a

5 good understanding of the background, the ground on which the events took

6 place, and indeed subsequently, I was back in Bosnia a year or so after

7 I'd given evidence and returned to that ground on several occasions. So

8 my understanding of the issues, my understanding of the background, is

9 rather broader than just looking at a number of documents.

10 Q. I understand that, sir. We are taking one by one. I'd like to

11 stay with the documents and I'd like to get an answer to my original

12 question. Were you given a corpus of documents by the

13 Office of the Prosecutor that had been preselect for you for you to do

14 your expertise in the Krstic case?

15 A. Yes, there were some documents that I was given to look at. That

16 was not the totality of my research and the totality of my preparation

17 for the case. I think it would have been surprising were that not to be

18 the case, actually.

19 Q. Now, if we could return to your statement, P2629 marked for

20 identification, and while we wait for that, sir, did you write this

21 statement on your own or were there others that assisted you in its

22 preparation?

23 A. The statement in this case draws fairly extensively on the

24 statement that I had made and prepared for the Krstic case, which

25 I drafted -- just checking my own recollection to make sure I'm factually

Page 19099

1 accurate because this was back in 1999. I recall drafting myself. In

2 this particular case, I was assisted by someone with a legal background

3 who assisted me draw up this particular statement, but like everything

4 that goes under your signature or above your signature, every word in it

5 I'm content with and every word I own. So whether it was part drafted by

6 me and part assisted by another, I would regard as immaterial. I signed

7 that statement and I own the words.

8 Q. With respect to the individual with the legal background who may

9 have assisted you in drafting parts of it, could you tell us under whose

10 employ was that individual at the time that he assisted you?

11 A. The person concerned, so we are not beating about the bush, is my

12 daughter-in-law, Lucinda Dannatt. She is a human rights lawyer in her

13 own standing and has worked on a number of cases in a number of courts.

14 At the time she was not working, being the mother of three small

15 children, and to answer technically your question, who paid her, I think

16 I did, out of the small amount of money that the court made available to

17 me for my time in preparation for the case. So I can't remember the vast

18 sums involved, which were not vast, but I paid her for her time myself.

19 Because, frankly, I'll be absolutely honest, the Krstic case was hugely

20 time consuming. The time I was serving in the army and I regarded it as

21 part of my duty -- I still regard it as part of my duty, but having

22 retired from the army and doing many other things the amount of time

23 I needed to prepare properly for this case was more than I could actually

24 make available myself, and therefore I invited my daughter-in-law, who

25 has, as I say, some experience of working in these sorts of cases, to

Page 19100

1 assist me, and I'm very grateful for her support.

2 Q. If we could just finish up with this topic I'd like to call up

3 1D1448 in e-court and while we wait for that, sir, I can let you know

4 that this ought to be a copy of some extracts from your book, if I've

5 gotten the number right. I apparently have. If we can turn to page 11

6 of the version in e-court. It should correlate to pages 218 and 219 of

7 the underlying book. At the top of the left-hand column, you have, I

8 believe, here a reference to -- I'll just read it. It says:

9 "As it turned out, later on my eldest son Tom's wife, Lucinda,

10 was to work as an international criminal lawyer for the

11 International Criminal Court in The Hague, and then in Sarajevo, work

12 I followed with great interest and approval."

13 Sir, could you clarify for us whether, in fact, your

14 daughter-in-law, who is referenced here and who assisted you with the

15 report, worked for the International Criminal Court or for this Tribunal?

16 A. Now you're asking a very narrow question. It's a very good

17 question. And if I'm pursuing truth, I've got to say I'm not sure. I

18 know she lived and worked in Sarajevo for quite a while and has done work

19 here in The Hague. If my description in that paragraph is loose, then

20 loose it is, but I think -- I would like to think that you and the

21 Chamber would understand that I'm trying to explain probably to a lay

22 audience that this is her line of work and that was some of her

23 experiences. If it's a narrow point you want to make, you've probably

24 made it.

25 Q. To me, it's more important just to know what branch she worked

Page 19101

1 for. Was it the Prosecution, the Defence or some other entity, if you

2 know? If you don't know --

3 A. To be honest, I'd be speculating. I can't remember. She's moved

4 on to a number of other cases of fairly exotic nature most recently on

5 the Defence side. In fact, the one she is currently involved with is a

6 fairly high profile international case, and, again, she is on the Defence

7 side. So she is not a prosecutor per se, she will follow the work, as

8 lawyers often do.

9 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, I'd like to return to your witness

10 statement, P2629 marked for identification, and I'd like to return to the

11 first page where we were before this little digression.

12 At paragraph 4, you identify that the principal documents on

13 which you have focused appear to be reports authored by another proposed

14 expert of the Prosecution, Richard Butler. Is that an accurate reading

15 of this paragraph?

16 A. Yes, certainly Richard Butler's work, I studied extensively and

17 I found it very informative, and accepted his status as someone who

18 understood much of the circumstances of the matters in hand.

19 Q. Do you recall what Mr. Butler'S rank and position in the US armed

20 forces was?

21 A. Short answer, no.

22 Q. Can you tell us what was it that led you to identify Mr. Butler's

23 work as being authoritative on the topics that are identified? Was his

24 work known to you prior to being contacted to be an expert for the Krstic

25 case?

Page 19102

1 A. No, I first came across Mr. Butler in preparation for the Krstic

2 case and read the material that he had provided. And I'm just going back

3 into my own recollection and I believe I met him and talked with him in

4 the preparation of the Krstic case, but I could be mistaken there. But

5 my recollection is that I have met him and was impressed by him and

6 certainly informed and interested by his opinions and the written

7 material that he'd produced.

8 Q. In relation to his report, sir, are those written materials which

9 would have been preselected and provided for you by the

10 Office of the Prosecutor or did you come across them by some other means?

11 A. No. I came across them because having been invited -- I think

12 the background, as I recall it, was that the Chamber, I think the senior

13 prosecutor - I'm just grasping for what would be the right answer here -

14 approached the British army in 1999 to ask for a senior general to act as

15 an expert witness for the enlightenment of the Court on matters relating

16 to command and control - and you see them listed in paragraph 3 - and the

17 Chief of the General Staff of the day, knowing of my own background,

18 asked whether I was prepared to be that expert witness. At which I said

19 yes. And at that point, came to The Hague. I met senior Prosecutor,

20 I met the Prosecution team, and our conversations went on from there.

21 So I don't claim to have had any great prior knowledge of

22 General Krstic and the Krstic case before being invited to help the Court

23 in its understanding of military command and control and took a detailed

24 interest in the Krstic case. So perhaps not surprisingly, much of the

25 material initially that was made available to me was made available to me

Page 19103

1 by the Office of the Prosecutor because they, for the enlightenment of

2 the Court, are the ones who had engaged me to get involved, to study, to

3 write a report, which I've already said was very time consuming, spend

4 time on the ground in Bosnia looking at the issues around Srebrenica, and

5 then coming to The Hague to give my evidence. So I didn't do this

6 because I thought it was a good idea, I did it because my commanding

7 general invited me to do it at the invitation of the

8 Office of the Prosecutor.

9 Q. Did you perform any research into the professional background and

10 prior publications of Mr. Butler to assure yourself of the experience,

11 expertise and reliability of Mr. Butler's work on the topics of these

12 reports?

13 A. I think I took Mr. Butler's work and credentials at face value,

14 and certainly having read his reports, this seemed to be a reasonable

15 supposition to make, that he was someone of integrity and someone of

16 ability and that, therefore, the product of his research and his writings

17 was something one could place a sufficient degree of credibility on to

18 make use of.

19 Q. Did you only review Mr. Butler's various reports or were you

20 given access to Mr. Butler's testimony in other cases before the

21 Tribunal?

22 A. May I just clarify your question? Is that a question relating to

23 my preparation for the Krstic case?

24 Q. In total, the Krstic case and this case. If there is

25 differences, if you could please identify wherein lies the difference.

Page 19104

1 A. The answer to both questions in that case or both parts of the

2 question is that I have not looked at Mr. Butler's testimony in other

3 cases beyond the Krstic case and the extent to which there was material

4 relating to this case.

5 Q. Can I then understand your testimony to mean that you have

6 reviewed the transcript or the recording of Mr. Butler's testimony in

7 this case, the Mladic case?

8 A. Again, let me just clarify the question. Are you asking if I

9 have read Mr. Butler's -- the transcript of Mr. Butler's testimony in

10 this case?

11 Q. Correct.

12 A. The answer is no, I have not. And to be honest, I haven't got

13 time to do that. I am quite a busy person and I've prepared myself in

14 the best way that I can to give my evidence. And, actually, I don't

15 think I really would want to have spent time reading many other people's

16 points of view. General Milovanovic is a very interesting separate case

17 in point because of his unique position as the deputy to General Mladic,

18 and I've been fascinated, as I said earlier, to have read his transcript

19 and I'm very grateful to the Office of the Prosecutor for having made it

20 available to me.

21 Q. Well, sir, the reason I ask is because Mr. Butler has testified

22 in this case and that in order to understand his reports and understand

23 corrections that he has made to his reports, one would have needed to

24 review prior transcripts of his testimony. Were you aware of that, sir?

25 A. No.

Page 19105

1 Q. If we can -- first of all, at the time when you were first

2 approached to prepare an expertise for the Krstic case, did you or anyone

3 on your behalf undertake to perform a review or survey of all the

4 literature that was out there on these topics?

5 A. If you're suggesting a comprehensive survey of the material that

6 was out there, no. I think I've already said, and I'm perfectly content

7 to say, that my start point was my initial visit here to meet the staff

8 of the Office of the Prosecutor who made certain material available to

9 me, which gave me a way into the case. And from that, I was able to

10 expand my own inquiries, and, indeed, as I've said, had extensive

11 discussions with investigators and also spend time on the ground in

12 relation to the Srebrenica aspects of the Krstic case. So my way in was

13 undoubtedly through material provided to me by the Office of the

14 Prosecutor and I have no difficulty personally with that.

15 Q. If we can turn to the very last page in both versions of your

16 statement, paragraph 110 relates to an opinion or I should say an

17 assessment about the quality of Mr. Butler's various reports, and I want

18 to ask you why is this in here? Was this something that either the

19 Office of the Prosecutor or Mr. Butler asked you to include as part of

20 your expertise in this case?

21 A. Can I just clarify that you're talking about paragraph 110 and

22 not paragraph 109?

23 Q. I believe, sir, that 109 and 110 refer to the exact same reports.

24 Please correct me if I'm wrong.

25 A. Yes, I think, well, you're right. It's just that 109 is rather

Page 19106

1 more definitive in that actually it references Richard Butler's work.

2 Now, I'm going to be honest, absolutely, with you. I can't remember.

3 I produced this report 18 months ago, and, inevitably, there were some

4 iterations of that report. And truthful answer to your question is

5 whether this was something I wanted to put in or whether in discussion it

6 therefore seemed sensible to put in, but the fact of the matter is

7 paragraphs 109 and 110 are above my signature, and they are my words and

8 my opinion and they stand.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Butler, the question remains -- yes,

10 Mr. Dannatt, sorry, the question remains. Whether you take

11 responsibility for what is said there doesn't answer the question who

12 took the initiative to adopt those two paragraphs or at least paragraph

13 110 in the report. I mean, these are two entirely different questions.

14 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, for the avoidance of any doubt at all,

15 all the words in the 110 paragraphs of my statement are words that I own

16 and I take responsibility for. They are my words.

17 JUDGE ORIE: But it still doesn't answer the question about even

18 if you accept full responsibility for the text, that doesn't answer the

19 question who thought about adopting this text and make it part of the

20 report.

21 THE WITNESS: Well, sir, I just stand by what I said a little

22 while ago. I put this together 18 months ago and I genuinely can't

23 remember, and I think that's the honest and fair answer to your

24 question --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

Page 19107

1 THE WITNESS: -- and the answer would be guessing and I might be

2 wrong.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

4 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

5 Q. Would you characterise the type of study that you did of the VRS

6 as including an extensive study of the JNA?

7 A. Well, again, we are into semantics now and what is extensive and

8 what is not extensive. But what I found absolutely fascinating was --

9 this is the relevant bit, as far as I'm concerned, is to look into the

10 origins of the Army of Republika Srpska which clearly came from a

11 military district of the JNA, and that is -- I think we would all agree

12 that that is the factual course of what happened, and it answers the

13 question which otherwise was very much in my mind, sort of 13, 14 years

14 ago, when I first started looking at these things. How could an army

15 that was created in the middle of an emergency in 1992 take on command

16 and control, take on regulations, take on substance so that it could

17 function as an operating army, just conjured up out of nothing. And when

18 my research showed me quite clearly that the answer to the question is

19 the VRS took on the regulations, form and substance of a part of the JNA,

20 that answered the question. Otherwise, creating an army out of nothing

21 in a hurry in the middle of a civil war would have been an impossibility.

22 Q. I would like to take a look at 1D1450 with you. While we wait

23 for it on the screen I can introduce it to you as the testimony that you

24 gave before the International Court of Justice on 20 March 2006.

25 If we could turn to page 3 of the same in e-court, and that will

Page 19108

1 correlate to page 11 of the underlying compte rendu of the ICJ, and I

2 would like to draw your attention to the last question and the first part

3 of your answer.

4 And it reads as follows:

5 "Ms. Korner: Thank you very much, General Dannatt. I'm now

6 going to move straight away to one of the aspects that we would like you

7 to assist the Court with, and that is the theory of command doctrines and

8 decision-making. Could you assist the Court with the main theory or

9 theorys of those doctrines?

10 "General Dannatt: Put succinctly, armies conduct their business

11 in one of two ways. Both are characterised by a somewhat complicated

12 German word. One is known as the Befehlstaktik approach to command and

13 control, and the other is the Auftragstaktik method of command and

14 control."

15 And I'd like to stop right there and ask you in relation to this

16 part of the answer so far, do you stand by the same as being truthful and

17 accurate in its content such that you would repeat the same today?

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I think the witness has explained to us

19 that is -- was his answer today to many questions as well.

20 THE WITNESS: And I think all I would say additionally, if I may,

21 and I'll read it again, is that the transcript is not entirely accurate

22 because it refers to commander control as opposed to command and control.

23 So this sentence is a little bit corrupted, but I would agree with the

24 Judge's comment. I have talked about Befehlstaktik and Auftragstaktik

25 today. I cannot think of any reason why I should take a different view

Page 19109

1 two hours later.

2 MR. IVETIC:

3 Q. Well, here is my question, sir, and it's very clear in the ICJ

4 testimony, you state that there are only two ways that an army conducts

5 its business. Is it your testimony that apart from these two

6 German-sounding tactics, that there are -- that there is not a spectrum

7 between the two of various command and control doctrines as understood by

8 persons in your field?

9 A. Of course the answer is yes. When you're trying to -- as in this

10 case I am, and in the previous case I was, trying to illuminate issues

11 for the benefit of the Court, it's helpful, if you like, to describe a

12 course of action and another course of action. And I think most

13 commentators would realise that nothing in life comfortably fits into a

14 template and that there will always be shades of grey or toning, tuning,

15 between one side of an argument or the other side of an argument, one

16 side of a doctrine or the other side of a doctrine. But I think it's

17 perfectly reasonable for the illumination of a discussion to try and

18 explain in theory one approach and to explain in theory another approach.

19 And this is why I think military matters can often be complicated. And

20 it's a debate that's run for a long time. Is command an art or is

21 command a science? Actually, we would say it's an art and not a science.

22 The use of military force may well rely heavily on technology and

23 science but command is an intuitive thing, it's a thing in which

24 judgement is terribly important, and we often refer to operational art as

25 a descriptor of what a general does and in the planning of a campaign.

Page 19110

1 So Befehlstaktik and Auftragstaktik describe, if you like, two

2 sides of an argument. This is not a scientific issue. It's an artistic

3 issue. And what I do and what you do and what General Mladic might do on

4 a different day will be very different, but it will be informed by the

5 overarching doctrine within which one has been brought up, and that's the

6 point that I'm trying to make. Because just the last thing, and I've

7 read elsewhere in some of the transcripts and some of the material,

8 discussion about what is doctrine and what is a directive. Really

9 important point to understand is that a doctrine, the doctrine of an

10 army, is the way an army thinks. And the way an army thinks will heavily

11 influence its education of its officers and its training of its officers

12 and soldiers. Doctrine is about thought. A directive is, as the word

13 rather implies, it is a document that directs activity. So doctrine is a

14 thought. Directives are of activity.

15 Q. Okay. If we can turn to the next page of the testimony from the

16 ICJ, I would like to discuss with you in greater detail the testimony

17 that starts at approximately the middle of the page. And the question

18 there is as follows:

19 "Ms. Korner: We are going to look at a little detail about how

20 the JNA, the Yugoslav National Army, worked and its subsequent entities.

21 But you do respect the JNA followed the Befehlstaktik method. How are

22 you able to say that, first of all?

23 "General Dannatt: I can say that with a fair degree of

24 confidence, from the result of my extensive studies, and also by way of

25 personal example. I mentioned earlier that I was one of the commanders

Page 19111

1 in Bosnia in 1995. At the particular time when we were planning the

2 transfer from UNPROFOR to UNFOR I needed, amongst other people, to talk

3 to General Tadic, who was then commanding one of the Krajina Corps in

4 Banja Luka. I was not in the course of my normal duties able to get --

5 go to Banja Luka but I passed a message to him that I wished to meet him

6 and indeed got to Banja Luka where I was told that he was not able to

7 meet me as he had not received authority from General Mladic, his

8 superior. It was quite surprising that he was not prepared to meet,

9 because what I had to say to him would have been quite helpful in terms

10 of the conduct of future operations. But as he had not received that

11 clearance, he did not have the authority to meet me on his own authority

12 and I use that as an example of a centralised type of command."

13 Now, sir, the question I have for you is: The question very

14 specifically directed you to focus, first and foremost, on the JNA, the

15 Yugoslav People's Army, and your answer talks about an incident in 1995.

16 Am I correct that by 1995, the JNA was no longer in existence?

17 A. I find this a very interesting line of questioning which I think

18 you're now picking out Ms. Korner for her line of questioning. I can't

19 recall the detail of our conversation at that stage when she said, But

20 you do respect the JNA following the Befehlstaktik model, and then I gave

21 that example. I would probably previously have made the point that the

22 VRS came out of the JNA and that, therefore, the same operational

23 doctrine, Befehlstaktik model, is the one that characterised both. So I

24 don't think it's unreasonable that I use an example of what happened in

25 1995. If you want to discuss that particular example, I'm very happy to

Page 19112

1 do that, but I think I've failed to follow the point that you're trying

2 to make with regard to Ms. Korner's question.

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just for the clarity of the record, in the

4 document we see in front of us, there is a reference to again

5 General Tadic. You explained earlier this morning, Mr. Dannatt, that you

6 wanted to meet with Mr. Talic; is that correct?

7 THE WITNESS: Oh, yes, sir. I mean this comment is shot through

8 with mistakes. UNPROFOR to IFOR, for example, not General Tadic but

9 General Talic and he was commanding 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka.

10 This is full of mistakes but I don't take responsibility for that.

11 I didn't write this.

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Of course not. Thank you.

13 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

14 Q. Thank you, sir.

15 A. Not at all.

16 Q. Now the point of my question is: As an expert preparing this

17 very serious expertise, do you consider it to be an appropriate

18 methodology to draw conclusions from one isolated experience, such as

19 this incident with General Talic that indeed is recited in somewhat the

20 same detail in paragraph 32 of your statement?

21 A. I think it would be an appalling way to reach a judgement.

22 I completely agree with you. And of course that is not what I'm trying

23 to do. But life can be quite boring at times, and to put an illustration

24 in makes it a little more interesting and a little bit illuminating. As

25 you know full well, I suspect, that the examples of centralised command

Page 19113

1 and control which we've seen in the VRS and formerly in the JNA are

2 frequent in the other documentation that we've listed and that we've

3 looked at. And, of course, if you've got time, I'm very happy to talk

4 further about that. This is an example which I thought added a little

5 colour to the factual and theoretical material otherwise we were dealing

6 with.

7 Q. Did you consider that maybe General Talic didn't want to meet

8 with you for some personal reasons of his own and just used the excuse

9 that he had not been authorised? Is that not a plausible explanation of

10 this as well?

11 A. It's perfectly possible. But as I said earlier on today, the two

12 liaison officers - and I've said earlier Captain Popovic was one and the

13 colonel was another - were I felt a little embarrassed when they said

14 that General Talic was unable to meet me because he had not had approval

15 to do that and he could only have got approval from one person, and that

16 was from General Mladic.

17 I actually can't think of any reason otherwise why he wouldn't

18 have wanted to meet me because I'd made it quite clear that I was trying

19 to get to Banja Luka at some difficulty to myself to try and give him

20 some information which probably would have been helpful in the wider --

21 in the wider delivery and implementation of the Dayton agreement. And

22 I can't think of any reason why he wouldn't otherwise have wanted to meet

23 me. It was a perfectly reasonable thing to do. Generals meet each other

24 fairly regularly and I'd asked to see him, and had I thought he wouldn't

25 have seen me, I wouldn't have set out on what was actually quite an

Page 19114

1 awkward journey to Banja Luka to try and meet him.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I'm looking at the clock.

3 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour, we can take a break.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Time for a break. Yes. Mr. Dannatt, perhaps good

5 for you to know that advocacy is often described as an art, but

6 Mr. Ivetic now knows that command is described as an art as well.

7 Perhaps something to think over for the next 20 minutes. We take a

8 break. You may follow the usher.

9 [The witness stands down]

10 JUDGE ORIE: If you want to further consult, you can do it during

11 the break, Mr. Mladic. We take a break and we resume at 20 minutes to

12 2.00.

13 --- Recess taken at 1.20 p.m.

14 --- On resuming at 1.42 p.m.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Before we continue, Mr. Mladic, I asked you to

16 several times this morning not to speak aloud. When we left the

17 courtroom it was even louder than before. Please take care that -- don't

18 bring us in a position that we have to take measures. So if you would

19 please do that, then we can -- you can attend the proceedings.

20 Then the other matter I'll finish now, Mr. Groome, the Chamber

21 takes the opportunity to state on the record, I introduced it before,

22 that the Prosecution will not adduce the evidence of Witness RM225 and

23 for that reason, the Chamber withdraws the subpoena and relevant parts of

24 the corresponding request to the state where the witness resides and

25 instructs the Registry to inform the proposed witness and the appropriate

Page 19115

1 state authorities of this oral decision, and notify the Chamber when it

2 has done so.

3 MR. GROOME: The Prosecution has no objection to that course of

4 action, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, I've taken this action by now so

6 therefore -- and this concludes, of course, then the decision of the

7 Chamber on this matter. Could the witness be escorted.

8 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, while the witness is coming in, can

9 I just bring to the attention of the Chamber two possible scheduling

10 problems ahead of us. One is that this Thursday the arrangements have

11 been made for a Polish interpreters, since the witness will be testifying

12 in Polish. So it does require some -- if it goes beyond that we -- there

13 will be a bit of a problem. And then earlier today Mr. Lukic informed us

14 that he was revising his estimate for the examination of Mr. Brown up to

15 eight hours, which, again, looking at next week, makes it a very full

16 week and I would want to inform the Chamber that Mr. Treanor would be

17 unavailable to carry over to the week after that. So perhaps everyone

18 could think about that. We could take five minutes to discuss scheduling

19 before the week is out.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Before the end of this week, you would say,

21 yes.

22 [The witness takes the stand]

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, you may continue your cross-examination.

24 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. General, I propose to return to your written statement, P2629

Page 19116

1 marked for identification, page 4 in the English and page 3 in the

2 Serbian, and paragraph 12 of the same, but at least the last sentence of

3 paragraph 12, which is indeed on page 4 of the English. Here, you cite

4 to meetings that you had with the senior commanders of all three warring

5 factions. Did you ever have occasion to meet with any members of the

6 Main Staff of the VRS?

7 A. Yes. I'm just trying to remember, General Gvero came to

8 Mrkonjic Grad. If I did my research I could give you the exact date. It

9 was the date that we were required under the terms of the Dayton

10 agreement to return Mrkonjic Grad and an area of country around there

11 from Croat control back to Serb control. General Gvero came on that

12 occasion.

13 Most of my other dealings were not with Main Staff officers but

14 with General Talic and others in Banja Luka. And then subsequently,

15 General Simic, I got to know well, but that was later when I was back as

16 the NATO deputy commander in 1999 -- wrong, 2000/2001.

17 Q. Now, just to stay with the meeting that you would have had with

18 General Gvero, would that have been approximately at D- plus 90 of the --

19 A. Yes, I guess that probably was. I'm just trying to remember now

20 the sequence of events, but that seems about right. There was a 45-day

21 period during which the Croat forces had to leave. I think they left at

22 D-plus 45 and at D-plus 90 VRS forces were allowed to return and I'm

23 pretty certain that was on the day that the VRS forces came back.

24 I could be wrong but I think that's about right.

25 Q. And, sir, we have been using "D-plus" as a shortcut. Could we

Page 19117

1 fill everyone else in on what that means?

2 A. Yes, I'm sorry. D was the day that the Dayton peace agreement

3 became operative which I think was the 20th of December, 1995, or might

4 have been the 21st, and therefore all the steps of implementation were

5 related to that date and were known as D-plus something or rather.

6 Q. Thank you, sir. Now with respect to the meetings that you did

7 have with General Gvero at that time and the meetings that you would have

8 had later with General Simic, I think you mentioned, did any of those

9 meetings serve as a basis for any of the opinions that are contained in

10 your statement?

11 A. Well, yes. I think all those sort of meetings add to your

12 general sum of knowledge. Perhaps I could also say, and I will try and

13 be brief, I mentioned earlier that I had been the colonel running the

14 high commander staff course at the British army staff college, and

15 amongst other things was therefore responsible for campaign planning and

16 the teaching of campaign planning. I was particularly interested during

17 the course of 1995 to see how the course of the war on the ground in

18 Bosnia changed. From 1992 to early 1995, by and large, territory held by

19 one side or another didn't really change hands. But in spring and early

20 summer 1995, a major operation in the south and west of Bosnia swept the

21 Croat and Muslim forces up through into the Krajina and then sort of

22 hooked across, began to threaten Banja Luka. And it was interesting to

23 me to see how fairly complex campaign had been put together. To be short

24 about it, I then decided while I was in country, between October 1995 and

25 April 1996, as a kind of side line to other things that I was doing, to

Page 19118

1 conduct a bit of a study into how this campaign came about and came to be

2 constructed, and I set out with one of my staff officers to interview all

3 the commanders on the three sides, to ask them what had happened in the

4 year before. And I discussed it with General Dudakovic,

5 General Glasnovic of the Croatian side, and, again, General Talic was

6 reluctant to talk to me, but the two liaison officers that I met again

7 came to my headquarters in Sipovo and one evening they became very frank

8 about the way that they had conducted their part of the operation. And

9 as a result of that, I was able to put together the three accounts and

10 come up with what was to me a fairly interesting explanation as to how

11 these military operations had been developed.

12 And if I appear to be digressing, I apologise, but it's

13 indicative of a growing picture of understanding of how the war was

14 conducted, how the various armies conducted themselves, remembering that

15 the three competent armies were all commanded by professional officers

16 who pretty much without exception had had their origins in the JNA. And

17 one of the things that I recall most clearly was a commanders' conference

18 which we had in late December, I think it was, in 1995, which was the

19 first time we had brought senior commanders of the three armies together.

20 And after their initial suspicion of each other, they greeted each other

21 like the old comrades that they were, because in the main they had been

22 at the staff college together, and it was very interesting to see that

23 reunion across the divide. Again, I apologise if I appear to digress,

24 but I do so to show that one had quite an interest and developed that

25 interest professionally into how the three armies had had their origins

Page 19119

1 and drew my own conclusions about that. I'm sorry if I've digressed too

2 far, indulging myself, and I apologise.

3 Q. I'd like to take you --

4 JUDGE ORIE: If you do not mind it's not digression but rather

5 speed of speech which is of concern to me at this moment --

6 THE WITNESS: Sorry.

7 JUDGE ORIE: But perhaps the --

8 THE WITNESS: It's my enthusiasm.

9 JUDGE ORIE: The two go hand in hand.

10 THE WITNESS: My enthusiasm overtaking. I apologise.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

12 MR. IVETIC:

13 Q. I want to take a look at something else that you've highlighted

14 in paragraph 6 of your statement that you have reviewed and that those

15 are memoirs.

16 MR. IVETIC: I'd like to call up 1D1450 in e-court. And once

17 that comes up, I would be asking for page 7 of the same to be displayed.

18 And that should correlate to page 15 of the ICJ document.

19 Q. If we could focus just above the middle of the page, I think

20 you'll see there that Ms. Korner has asked you about the number of

21 memoirs that you have read, and your answer is as follows:

22 "General Dannatt: Indeed it is so. People such as

23 General Sir Michael Rose, General Sir Rupert Smith,

24 Mr. Richard Holbrooke, all have committed their near contemporaneous

25 records into book form. I certainly have all those books and others.

Page 19120

1 One finds that the colour in those books amplifies the facts that I have

2 picked up from the trial documents that I've studied."

3 Does this testimony from the ICJ case accurately identify the

4 memoirs that you reference in paragraph 6 of your statement in this case?

5 A. Yes, and time has moved on and I've read other accounts. I think

6 we all, who have had some involvement in the events in the Balkans in the

7 1990s, have continued to take quite a professional interest, and

8 therefore a number of books and memoirs that I read. And, yes, I sweep

9 all that comment into paragraph 6 when I say I have read a large number

10 of memoirs written about the period.

11 Q. Is it your position that these memoirs are corroborative or

12 supportive of your conclusions as to the JNA, the VRS, as contained in

13 your statement?

14 A. I think they are corroborative. I think as I said in the ICJ

15 transcript, what is the expression that I use here? One finds that the

16 colour in those books amplifies the facts that I picked up from the trial

17 documents that I've studied. I think everything -- everything sits in a

18 context and documents are quite dry, documents are quite narrow, but when

19 you've got a broad understanding of the context and the background into

20 which they sit, then they make rather more sense. I think that is the

21 point that I'm trying to make, and I think it's a -- it's a fair point.

22 Q. Could you remind us if the late Mr. Holbrooke, if he held any

23 military rank or had any military experience?

24 A. I can't remember. I suspect someone of his generation probably

25 had some -- I will slow down -- probably had some military experience

Page 19121

1 going back to the Vietnam era, but I don't recall. But I don't think you

2 would disagree with me that he had a very interesting insight on

3 developments, the conclusion of the war in Bosnia and was a significant

4 factor in driving towards what became the Dayton peace agreement. So

5 I think his opinions and his views are of relevance and certainly of

6 interest.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dannatt, may I invite you to stick to the

8 question? I mean, the question was not whether it would be interesting

9 to read Mr. Holbrooke's book. The question simply was whether he held

10 any military rank or had any military experience. The first four words

11 would have done. You can't remember.

12 THE WITNESS: Fine.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

14 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. Did you have occasion to review the books or memoirs of any

16 former JNA officers for purposes of the study of the command doctrine and

17 structure of the JNA or the VRS or the All People's Defence that you

18 undertook for this case?

19 A. In the interests of brevity, no.

20 Q. Do you have any knowledge of any books written by

21 General Branko Mamula, Dr. Momcilo Lazovic or

22 Dr. Milenko Stezevic [phoen] on the topic?

23 A. Well, pursuant to my last answer, the answer again is no.

24 Q. Okay. In terms of the documentation that was made available to

25 you by the Prosecution for review and upon which you have relied for your

Page 19122

1 opinions, did those documents include the strategy of All

2 People's Defence and Self-Protection of the SFRY which is 65 ter number

3 17295 in this case?

4 A. I'm -- I don't know whether something is going to come up on the

5 screen but I'm certainly conversant with that, and in the break I was

6 reflecting on -- I will be brief -- on part of our last conversation.

7 When we talked about military doctrine, and I talked about doctrine being

8 a way an army thinks, I think the concept of All People's Defence, total

9 National Defence, is what I would describe as a strategy rather than a

10 doctrine. It was what was formulated in the early 1940s and was the

11 strategy that drove the JNA through to its dissolution in the early

12 1990s. There we are. It's on the screen in front of me. It calls

13 itself a strategy which is why I make the distinction between a strategy

14 and a doctrine. The language is quite loose at times when people

15 describe military matters.

16 Q. Okay.

17 MR. IVETIC: If we can call up 65 ter number 17293, and that

18 would be the 1983 JNA textbook on command and control.

19 Q. And I'm going to ask you again: Would this have been something

20 that you had access to and reviewed for purposes of your expertise in

21 this case?

22 A. May I wait till it comes on the screen?

23 Q. If we can go maybe to the second page in English, we will see the

24 substantive text. Do you recall dealing with this book, sir?

25 A. I don't think I recall seeing this book, no.

Page 19123

1 MR. IVETIC: If we could look at 65 ter number 25695.

2 Q. While we wait for it I can introduce it as the 1985 rules of

3 service of the armed services. And again I'll ask you was this a

4 publication that you recall having had been made available to you and

5 upon which you relied for your work in this case?

6 A. I'll be absolutely honest, I can't remember, but I looked at a

7 number of documents going back into -- well, during the course of

8 existence of the JNA because of their relevance to working out the

9 origins of the Bosnian Serb Army. So whether I did or whether I didn't,

10 I can't remember, and it may be that you're going to offer me two or

11 three other documents. I can't recall. But I formed a good

12 understanding of the origin of the VRS as being based in the JNA and its

13 various regulations and documentary origins.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, you're on your feet.

15 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, perhaps I can assist Mr. Ivetic. He's

16 inquiring about documents that General Dannatt had access to but did not

17 cite in the report. If I can draw his attention to an e-mail sent by the

18 Prosecution on the 5th of July, 2012, we provided a list of all of those

19 documents.

20 MR. IVETIC: That will short circuit at least a few questions --

21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

22 MR. IVETIC: -- and we can move on, and I thank Mr. Groome for

23 that information.

24 Q. Now, did have you occasion to perform any research or review into

25 the military education regime that was in existence in the SFRY prior to

Page 19124

1 1992 for its military officers?

2 A. I didn't make a particular study into that. No, I did not make a

3 particular study into that.

4 Q. You mentioned in the direct examination that officers were sent

5 for training to the Soviet Union. Did you happen to know as part of your

6 expertise and as part of your research that, in fact, Yugoslav officers

7 were also sent for training to the United States of America; for

8 instance, General Kadijevic, who was the Yugoslav minister of defence in

9 1991 and 1992, completed courses at the US army command and General Staff

10 college while a colonel?

11 A. That doesn't surprise me, and it relates to an earlier part of

12 this morning's conversation, whereas we all know that the former

13 Yugoslavia had a rather -- no, not rather, had a unique position in that

14 it was not totally in the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet bloc but its

15 origins were of Soviet-type thinking, but it had developed itself into

16 probably the most open of the communist countries. And we all found it

17 very interesting as a result of that.

18 JUDGE ORIE: You say you're not surprised that Mr. Kadijevic may

19 have been trained in the US but you apparently do not know it.

20 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I don't know that for sure. But it

21 doesn't -- as I said, it does not surprise me.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now could you tell us if you say officers were

23 sent for training to the Soviet Union, was that in larger numbers or was

24 that one or two or three, or were they sent by the hundreds or?

25 Mr. Groome.

Page 19125

1 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, could I please have a reference to

2 where that was said this morning? I'm having trouble finding that.

3 MR. IVETIC: I believe he mentioned sending to Moscow rather than

4 the Soviet Union. I can --

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: No, he said to Russia.

6 MR. IVETIC: To Russia, okay.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Perhaps that helps to find the respective

8 portion.

9 MR. IVETIC: I suspected -- I thank Your Honour for having the

10 attention to detail that I sometimes lack.

11 THE WITNESS: To answer your specific question, sir, I don't know

12 the numbers. But I'm aware that a number of people did go and study in

13 Russian academies.

14 JUDGE ORIE: I'm asking it because the question more or less

15 suggests they were not only sent to Russia but also to the US, or at

16 least they were trained there. And, therefore, my question, Mr. Ivetic,

17 as you may understand is what was the proportion? Was it a regular thing

18 to send them either west or east? That's something that came to my mind,

19 and if either of the parties would have any information about it, then of

20 course it would assist me and perhaps my colleagues.

21 THE WITNESS: If I'm allowed to offer a view, the preponderance

22 of people going to foreign academies would have gone east rather than

23 west. Because the command and control style of the JNA and the VRS was

24 based on the centralised command and control which is the one that

25 characterised Warsaw Pact and eastern armies. If a large number had gone

Page 19126

1 to the United States military academy, one would have seen the JNA over

2 time or the VRS moving towards espousing the western approach of

3 Auftragstaktik, the indirect approach which I've discussed earlier. But

4 the overriding doctrine, military thought, is the one of centralised

5 command and control which is characterised by eastern armies and the

6 former Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.

8 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

9 Q. If I could move to another topic also returning to your statement

10 P2629 marked for identification, page 2 in English and page 1 through 2

11 in the Serbian, paragraph 5. And while we wait for that, sir, I can

12 introduce it by saying this is in relation to the site visits that you

13 undertook of locations in Bosnia where you were accompanied by

14 Investigator Ruez and Prosecutor Cayley of the Prosecution. And I'd like

15 to ask you when visiting these sites, did either Ruez or Cayley provide

16 details to you about what they believed had happened at these locations?

17 A. Short answer to that is yes.

18 Q. Okay. Did you rely upon Cayley and Ruez's representations as

19 being authoritative as to what had happened at these locations?

20 A. In the main, I would say yes as well, but having gone to those

21 locations, one used one's own judgement based on one's own observations

22 of the buildings, of the burial sites, of the reburial sites, and I think

23 it was perfectly reasonable to reach conclusions about what may or may

24 not have happened there. But, yes, in the main, the information given to

25 me, particularly by Jean-Rene Ruez, the French investigator, who had

Page 19127

1 spent a lot of time and had gone into some great detail very much formed

2 my opinions, I think not surprisingly.

3 Q. Did you consider whether the information given to you by

4 Mr. Jean-Rene Ruez was biased or unbiased before allowing it to very much

5 form your opinions?

6 A. I don't think I would regard it as biased. The facts, as they

7 seemed to reveal themselves, rather pointed to a certain set of

8 conclusions. After all, we had upwards of 8.000 Muslim men and boys who

9 had been killed, who had been buried, in many cases exhumed and reburied,

10 in an area that was controlled by the Bosnian Serb population. So

11 I think I was probably invited and capable of drawing my own deductions

12 as to who may or may not have been responsible in general terms. Who was

13 specifically responsible is, of course, not for me to say.

14 Q. Okay.

15 MR. IVETIC: If we could turn to 1D1448 in e-court.

16 Q. And this will again be excerpts from your autobiography that

17 we've previously dealt with. While we wait for that, sir, perhaps I can

18 ask you some general questions. First of all, is this book -- does this

19 book contain only your own words or was it ghost written or assisted to

20 you, written by someone else either in whole or in part?

21 A. Contrary to popular expectation and common practice, I wrote that

22 book completely. Thank you.

23 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, if we can turn to page 16 in the part in

24 e-court, that will correlate to pages 258 through 259 in the -- at least

25 the Corgi paperback edition of your book. And I'd like to go through

Page 19128

1 with you what begins on the last paragraph of the left column and

2 finishes up on the right column. And it touches upon a topic that you've

3 already touched upon, how it was that you came to be retained as an

4 expert, and then it gives some further details I would like to ask you

5 questions about. So please follow along with me:

6 "General Sir Richard Wheeler, Chief of the General Staff, rang me

7 to ask whether I would be prepared to go to the International

8 Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague to give evidence

9 as an expert witness in a trial relating to the Srebrenica massacre in

10 1995. I said that of course I would do this and soon found myself making

11 a series of visits to both Bosnia and the Netherlands to prepare my

12 evidence. The accused was General Radovan Krstic, who in July 1995 had

13 been commanding the Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army. It was alleged

14 that his troops had carried out the massacre of nearly 8.000 Muslim men

15 and boys around Srebrenica in the middle of July 1995. It was quite

16 clear from the material I reviewed that the intent behind the massacre

17 had come from the top and that Krstic's direct orders had been received

18 from General Ratko Mladic himself. The issue before the Court was the

19 extent of Krstic's personal involvement. To prepare for the case, I not

20 only had extensive discussions with the Prosecution team in The Hague but

21 visited most of the execution and burial sites with the remarkable French

22 gendarmerie officer, Jean-Rene Ruez. He had spent years investigating

23 the massacre and was very close to all the issues."

24 First of all, sir, does this accurately reflect how it came to

25 pass that you were contacted to be an expert witness for the Krstic case?

Page 19129

1 A. Yes, that's pretty much what I said earlier on today.

2 Q. Yes. And one part you did not mention earlier today was that the

3 reviewed material that convinced you that the intent behind the massacre

4 was direct orders from General Mladic, was this a predetermination that

5 you had arrived at before being retained as an expert for purposes of the

6 trial in the Mladic case?

7 A. I'm just reflecting on the question. And I would just look again

8 at the words that I've got there.

9 That was my personal opinion, and I think the transcript of my

10 evidence in the Krstic case does not include me voicing my own opinion,

11 but I'm entitled to reach an opinion, even if I choose not to express it.

12 I expressed it in a book, but then a book is a book, it is not a

13 submission to a Court and it's not delivered on oath.

14 Q. Could you please identify for us what were these direct orders

15 that you say Krstic received from Mladic for a massacre? Are they

16 written down somewhere?

17 A. No. I don't think they are written down. And I think I'm

18 giving -- I think I'm now discussing my own opinion, an opinion expressed

19 in a book and not an opinion expressed in court, and I think I'm entitled

20 to my own view. You or General Mladic can take a contrary view to my

21 opinion.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dannatt, may I -- you are engaging in a debate

23 rather than that you're answering questions. If it is your view that

24 your personal opinions, even if expressed publicly, are irrelevant for

25 cross-examination, then I'm afraid that you're wrong. Mr. Ivetic is