131203ED

Page 20192

1 portion.

2 Our intent was to take a similar approach to the one that we did

3 with Dean Manning's report in that we did not redact the entire report.

4 We allowed it -- we didn't darken it out so that it could be viewed for

5 evaluation of professionalism, credibility, all of those things, but made

6 it clear that we were only relying on those paragraphs, so we'll abide by

7 the Court's direction either way.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Bibles.

9 If there's nothing else, is the Defence ready to continue its

10 cross-examination, Mr. Stojanovic, of Mr. Treanor?

11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Treanor can be escorted into the courtroom.

13 [The witness takes the stand]

14 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Treanor.

15 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated.

17 Mr. Treanor, I remind you that you're still bound by the solemn

18 declaration you have given at the beginning of your testimony.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic will now continue his

21 cross-examination.

22 Please proceed, Mr. Stojanovic.

23 WITNESS: PATRICK TREANOR [Resumed]

24 Cross-examination by Mr. Stojanovic: [Continued]

25 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Professor.

Page 20193

1 A. Good morning.

2 Q. Yesterday we stopped while we were discussing the mandate and the

3 authorities of the National Security Council. Let's take a look at

4 P3003, in e-court, paragraph 267.

5 Would you please clarify certain things written in that

6 paragraph.

7 While waiting for the page to be retrieved, let me remind you

8 that you discussed that the National Security Council comprised of --

9 inter alia, one military personnel, who was, at the time, carrying out

10 the duties of the minister of defence.

11 Let me now focus your attention to a portion of your report where

12 you state, it will be third sentence in this paragraph:

13 "On the 15th of April, the security -- National Security Council

14 appointed Bogdan Subotic, member of the SNB, minister of defence, as

15 acting commander of the TO. On the 22nd of April, the SNB decided that

16 Radovan Karadzic should co-ordinate commanding the TO forces."

17 My question to you is: Until what time the command and control

18 of the TO worked in the territories under the control of the Assembly of

19 the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

20 A. I'm not sure what you mean by "under the control of the

21 assembly." The assembly, as we've seen yesterday, basically converted

22 the -- the TO into the army of the Serbian republic on the 12th of May,

23 1992.

24 Q. Was the command over the Territorial Defence from the 15th of

25 April to the 12th of May was in the hands of General Bogdan Subotic as

Page 20194

1 member of the National Security Council?

2 A. That's my impression from the documentation I've seen, yes.

3 Q. Could you agree with me that, in practical terms, until the 12th

4 of May, 1992, General Ratko Mladic had no command authority in the

5 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

6 A. Well, at a certain point in time, I -- I believe in early May, he

7 was appointed the deputy commander of the 5th Military District. I

8 believe that's mentioned in -- in the addendum, the exact dates. So I

9 believe that that was his first entry, so to speak, into the Bosnian

10 scene.

11 Q. Would you agree that that military district was under the control

12 of the Yugoslav People's Army as the federal army?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Can we agree, then, that until the 12th of May, 1992,

15 General Ratko Mladic had no authority concerning the Territorial Defence

16 which is discussed in your -- in paragraph 267 of your report?

17 A. Well, the -- the Territorial Defence, within the framework of

18 the -- the Yugoslav defence system, could co-operate and indeed operate

19 under the command of the JNA, and indeed I believe JNA units could

20 theoretically operate under the command of TO commander depending on the

21 situations in any particular region. I won't go into the background of

22 their defence doctrine. And I believe that at the beginning of

23 April 1992, Dr. Karadzic as president of the National Security Council

24 gave a directive, and I believe one of the points in that directive was

25 related to the co-operation, if not subordination, of TO units to JNA

Page 20195

1 units in Bosnian.

2 Q. Could you please tell us whether in your report you established

3 whether the moment when General Mladic is given specific duties in the

4 JNA within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina? When was that moment?

5 A. Well, again, I -- I believe it is mentioned in the -- at least in

6 the addendum, the date of his appointment. I -- I -- I don't -- I can't

7 remember the date offhand, and I don't know exactly where it is in the

8 report -- in the addendum.

9 Q. Did you, at any point in time - and we -- this date was the 9th

10 of May 1992 until the 12th of May 1992, when he was formally appointed as

11 commander of the Main Staff of the VRS. Did you mentioned, noticed, or

12 found any document in your analysis which would reflect General Mladic's

13 superior position over the Territorial Defence units as commanded by

14 General Subotic at the time?

15 A. I can't recall any such document.

16 Q. Let's take a look at the last sentence of your report where you

17 state -- I mean your -- this paragraph of your report, where you state:

18 "On the 13th of July," therefore after the VRS had been

19 established and the -- and the Assembly of the Serbian people in

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina had been established, "Presidency decided to place the

21 reserve police under the unified civilian military command which was

22 controlled by the Presidency as the Supreme Commander of the army."

23 Professor, what do you mean by civilian military command with

24 respect to reserve police?

25 A. I'm sorry, could you direct me to a particular paragraph? I

Page 20196

1 thought we were discussing paragraph 267, but I ... oh, yes, I see it

2 now, 267. It's not the last sentence. Yes, yes --

3 Q. It's the last sentence of paragraph 267.

4 A. Well, that's been -- in my addition, it's the second-to-last

5 sentence. I see it now.

6 Well, that wording comes from the decree. I -- I -- they mean

7 what -- they mean what they mean. I haven't added any meaning to that.

8 If you're asking me what does that mean, I would say that that means

9 the -- under the command of the Presidency, who was -- which was in

10 charge of civilian affairs as well as military affairs. Under the terms

11 of the defence law, the president of the republic during an imminent

12 threat of war was in command of the police forces and was always in

13 command of the military forces so that -- that's the unified civilian

14 military command, I believe.

15 Q. Yesterday we agreed that on the 15th of April, the decision was

16 taken to declare imminent threat of war and it was established --

17 published in the Official Gazette on the 15th of May, 1992. Would such

18 wording reflect that, since 12th of May 1992, the Presidency was the only

19 body authorised to command reserve police?

20 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles.

21 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I would object as to the question.

22 Actually, the transcript from yesterday at T 20185, line 19, involved the

23 issue of the 15th of April 1992 declaration which -- and Dr. Treanor was

24 asked:

25 [As read] "When was the decision on proclaiming an immediate

Page 20197

1 threat of war issued?"

2 His answer was:

3 [As read] "It was issued on the 15th of April, 1992."

4 Mr. Stojanovic responded:

5 [As read] "Professor, the decision was made one month later in

6 May 1992. Was this a mistake or do you have some specific knowledge

7 regarding when it was published as opposed to when it was made? When did

8 it enter into force?"

9 And the witness -- Dr. Treanor answered:

10 [As read] "Well, my recollection is that it was -- the decision

11 was taken on the 15th of April and entered into force on that date. It

12 was published in the Official Gazette, so it would be easy to consult

13 that."

14 That seems to be a different conversation than is reflected in

15 the form of the question.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, Ms. Bibles took you to that portion

17 of yesterday's transcript where the witness said we can verify when it

18 was published in the Official Gazette and that he apparently did not

19 agree with the suggestion that it was only on the 15th of May but he left

20 that open.

21 Now, in your question, you presented as an agreed fact. That

22 means you and the witness that it was on the 15th of May. Could you

23 either rephrase your question or explain why you diverted from

24 yesterday's transcript.

25 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I fully accept

Page 20198

1 that portion of what the witness said yesterday. The decision on

2 declaring an imminent threat of war was taken by the Presidency of the

3 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 15th of April, 1992, and it

4 was published and confirmed by the Assembly of the Serbian people in BH

5 by publication in Official Gazette number 6, 12th to 17th of May 1992.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Then the proper way of phrasing the question would

7 have been that you agreed yesterday on the decision to be taken on the

8 15th of April and that the Defence's position is that that was published

9 on the 15th of May. That would have been the proper phrasing of the

10 question.

11 I think the witness has not answered any question yet.

12 Could you please repeat or pose the question in relation to this

13 decision and its date of publication, Mr. Stojanovic.

14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I shall, Your Honours, with your

15 leave. Let's take 65 ter 0712 -- 07212, because I don't believe that

16 this is contentious.

17 Q. Professor, let's go -- we will get back to this question but let

18 us first clarify this point beyond doubt.

19 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, a portion of the

20 English translation of this decision has been blackened out. This

21 decision concerning the declaration of an imminent threat of war.

22 Q. But let me ask you, Professor, shall we agree that the decision

23 on declaring an imminent threat of war was taken by the Presidency of the

24 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 15th of April, 1992? And

25 that it was ratified by the Assembly of the Serbian People of

Page 20199

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina on a session on the 12th of May, 1992, and published

2 in the Official Gazette, number 6, for the period 12th to 17th May, 1992?

3 A. I -- I can't read the -- the English because it's not there, and

4 I -- I can't read the Serbian because it's too small. But I'll take your

5 word for it.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So there's no agreement -- is there any --

7 Ms. Bibles, is there any dispute about the -- the publication date?

8 MS. BIBLES: As to the publication date, no. The effective date

9 of the declaration is different.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we see the top of the B/C/S page and ...

11 there we see a date of 12th to 17th May 1992. Whatever that means.

12 Perhaps we can see the next page in English. Especially the top

13 of the page. No, there's no date.

14 JUDGE ORIE: What I see -- Mr. Stojanovic, is it your position

15 that the decision preceding the decision 143, as we can see it on our

16 screens, that that is the decision by which the imminent threat of war

17 was declared?

18 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honours.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Now, in the B/C/S, we can see that decision number

20 142 - I'm -- cannot read it but at least it reads "odluka" which I

21 understand is decision. Reference is made to both the 15th of April and

22 a little bit further down, the 12th of May.

23 Is that what you are referring to?

24 And perhaps we could enlarge it for Mr. Treanor, the original in

25 B/C/S. Could we first go to the left of that page so that we can see

Page 20200

1 what it is. 141. Then, again, to the right of that page.

2 Can you read this, Mr. Treanor?

3 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can now, Your Honour. Thank you.

4 JUDGE ORIE: 142. Could you tell us whether this is the decision

5 that you were referring to.

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Does it have the date of the decision as the 15th of

8 April under number 03-11/92?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, it does.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Does it say below that that it is published on the

11 12th of May, with a reference to that same number, and, again, the date

12 of the 15th of April, 1992?

13 THE WITNESS: Well, it -- it says that on 12th of May the -- the

14 Assembly of the Serbian People confirmed that decision.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And it was published in the 12th to 17th of

16 May, 1992, number 6 Official Gazette.

17 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles.

19 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, to assist this process, perhaps if we

20 went to 65 ter 19144, I believe we would find the accurate English

21 transcript for this declaration. And I -- I throw that out to assist

22 counsel in getting a clear record on this point.

23 JUDGE ORIE: We could have a look at it, although it seems

24 that -- that there's no disagreement about the matter.

25 One second, please.

Page 20201

1 Yes, there it seems to be --

2 Mr. Stojanovic, next time it would save a lot of time if you

3 would choose the 65 ter number which specifically addresses this decision

4 we find under number 142 in the Official Gazette of the 12th to 17th of

5 May, 1992.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could we zoom in, please, on that translation.

7 Thank you.

8 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you for your assistance.

9 Q. Professor, let us now have a look at the following document.

10 It's a 65 ter document, 02462.

11 These are the minutes from the 24th Session of the Presidency of

12 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The date is 6th of

13 August, 1992. And let's have a look at page 2. It's page 2 in both the

14 B/C/S version and in the English version. And on that page we can see

15 the conclusions. And it says that:

16 [As read] "The Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina," and the date is 6th of August, "states in its conclusions

18 we will activate the work of the commission for investigating war crimes

19 committed against the Serbian people even if it is necessary to replace

20 the members of the commission."

21 And now have a look at the second paragraph or the next

22 paragraph where it says that:

23 [As read] "We'll consider the attitude adopted towards prisoners

24 of war who are in prisons in Serbian territory. The prisoners should be

25 categorised into three's groups: Those who were captured at the front

Page 20202

1 line, those who armed and assisted TO actions, the actions of the TO of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and those who assisted and financed Alija's army. It

3 was pointed out that we should abide by international conventions when

4 treating prisoners of war, when dealing with prisoners of war."

5 And then in the final sentence, it is says:

6 [As read] "To this end, we suggest the prisoners of war be

7 treated in a totally humane manner because they in prisons, not in

8 concentration camps. They are being provided with food, clothes,

9 hygiene, they're being protected at our expense in war time."

10 So the Presidency says:

11 [As read] "An order will be issued -- the Ministry of Interior of

12 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be ordered to examine

13 its municipal branches -- through its municipal branches the behaviour of

14 all civilian authorities and individuals guarding prisoners of war. The

15 information will be passed to the MUP which will pass it on to the

16 Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

17 This is the Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina.

19 Professor, if we have a look at these minutes from the session of

20 the Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who was in

21 charge of these facilities which were used to detain prisoners in the

22 territory of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at that point in

23 time? Who supervised these facilities and who was in charge of them?

24 JUDGE ORIE: These are two questions. Could you please make a

25 distinction between who was in charge and who supervised facilities.

Page 20203

1 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. First I will ask you who was responsible for the overall

3 procedure that had to do with prisoners of war? I'm referring to the

4 supervision of these prisoners of war.

5 A. Well, I think that is a -- a complex issue. I'm under the

6 impression on the basis of orders that Minister of Defence Bogdan Subotic

7 issued pursuant, I believe, to instructions from the Presidency in May or

8 June 1992 which were published in the gazette, that prisoners of war were

9 subject to the Ministry of Defence. However, there were people in

10 detention who were held by civilian authorities or, indeed, perhaps even

11 by private individuals, people who had no -- no official position as

12 well. And I believe the -- the last paragraph of this, the instruction

13 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, relates to that, to look into these

14 people that were being held by civilian authorities and individuals.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I hear that your typing is going through

16 the microphone of Mr. Stojanovic, and we see that you're busy and

17 zealous. That's great. But perhaps you could organise it in such a way

18 that it doesn't reach our ears. We'll only read your writings at a later

19 stage.

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could we perhaps see the first page of the

21 English translation of this document. Thank you.

22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 Your Honours, could this document be admitted into evidence.

24 It's a 65 ter document; 02462 is the number.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

Page 20204

1 THE REGISTRAR: Document 02462 receives number D443,

2 Your Honours.

3 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.

4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. And, finally, could

5 we have a look at the 65 ter document 02461.

6 Q. Professor, it is a session of the Presidency of the

7 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was held one day earlier, on

8 the 5th of August, 1992. And I'm interested in the first page. Please

9 have a look at the fifth paragraph under item 1 where it says that the

10 Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 5th of

11 August, 1992, examined the following. And here it says as far as certain

12 military formations are concerned, and in brackets says brigades, which

13 are in the territory of Banja Luka but are not under military command,

14 they should be placed under unified military command and they should be

15 withdrawn from Banja Luka.

16 Professor, in the course of your work, did you have any contact

17 with --

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry, Mr. Stojanovic. Can you tell us where

19 you are reading exactly? You said fifth paragraph under item 1. I'm not

20 quite sure what -- where that is.

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it's the sixth paragraph, but the

22 paragraphs start in -- in a different way.

23 But can we zoom in on the English translation. The

24 paragraph starts with: "Regarding individual military units ..."

25 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Paragraph 6, I think that is

Page 20205

1 correct.

2 Q. In the original text, that's what I'm reading from:

3 [As read] "As far as individual military formations are

4 concerned, (brigades) which are in the territory of Banja Luka but are

5 not under military command, they should be placed under unified military

6 command and withdrawn from Banja Luka. They should be withdrawn from

7 Banja Luka."

8 The question is whether you, in the course of your work and when

9 analysing the work of the Presidency, found out anything about what is at

10 stake here. Which military formations were not placed under military

11 command in Banja Luka? And the date was the 5th of August 1992; I'd like

12 to remind you of that fact.

13 A. I'm sorry, but I really can't recall anything about -- further

14 about that circumstance.

15 Q. Professor, did you have any information obtained from the

16 documents that you examined which indicated that certain paramilitary

17 formations existed in the territory of Krajina and in the Banja Luka

18 surroundings and were not under the immediate control of the VRS in the

19 middle of 1992?

20 A. Well, I -- I certainly do recall documents discussing the issue

21 of so-called paramilitary organisations or units; but, again, I'm sorry,

22 I really can't recall anything related to Banja Luka, in particular.

23 Q. Thank you, Professor.

24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the 65 ter document 02461

25 please be admitted into evidence.

Page 20217

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And was acted upon --

2 THE WITNESS: Yes.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

4 No further questions.

5 Mr. Treanor, this concludes your testimony. I'd like to thank

6 you very much for coming to this -- to -- to the two courtrooms and

7 having answered all the questions that were put to you by the parties and

8 by the Bench, and I wish you a safe return home again.

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. It's always a pleasure to

10 assist the Court.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.

12 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

13 [The witness withdrew]

14 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, would you take care to upload the --

15 both the Treanor reports after having been redacted by this Friday.

16 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honour. And, Your Honour, the courtroom

17 is filling up on our side. May I be excused?

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you are excused.

19 Before we'll invite the Prosecution to call its next witness, I'd

20 like to deal with a few matters, a few procedural matters. One is

21 directly linked to the next witness.

22 In relation to the documents to be used with

23 Expert Witness Theunens, the Chamber would like to, once again, address

24 the matter of documents to be used with Expert Witness Theunens.

25 In the latest exhibit list for this witness, the Prosecution

Page 20218

1 indicates that it intends to use approximately 20 documents during the

2 examination.

3 However, in a submission of the 23rd of September of this year,

4 the Prosecution requested the Chamber to pre-assign exhibit numbers for

5 895 documents that it, at the time, intended to use with the witness.

6 On the 25th of the September, the Chamber denied this request and

7 asked the Prosecution to review the exhibit list in light of the

8 Chamber's guidance of the 29th of October, 2012. This guidance can be

9 found on transcript pages 4138 and 4139.

10 On the 9th of October, 2013, the Prosecution informally

11 communicated that although it had proposed to tender about 500 documents

12 with "the remaining expert witnesses," it now intended to tender these

13 documents in a bar table motion. On the 17th of October of this year,

14 the Chamber addressed this matter, and in this respect, I refer the

15 parties to transcript pages 18022 through 18025, and I will not repeat

16 the Chamber's statement now.

17 The Chamber notes that on the 31st of October, 2013, the

18 Prosecution submitted a bar table motion including, inter alia, 434

19 military/residual documents. The Chamber understands that a large part

20 of these documents are, in fact, documents underlying the Theunens's

21 report, and therefore documents that the Prosecution initially intended

22 to tendered with this witness.

23 In accordance with the guidance given on the 17th of October,

24 2013, the Chamber strongly urges the Prosecution to tender those -- these

25 documents during the examination of Witness Theunens, provided that, as

Page 20219

1 the guidance reads, they concern, and I quote "matters of central

2 importance to its case which are likely to be controversial and which

3 require further explanation, clarification, or illustration in terms of

4 how the expert witness reached his or her conclusions or opinions."

5 Further, if the Defence challenges Witness Theunens's

6 conclusions, and the Defence is under an obligation to do so, and the

7 Chamber expects it to do be done during cross-examination of the witness,

8 the Chamber then expects the Prosecution to tender the related documents

9 immediately. Meaning, if challenged through cross-examination, in

10 re-examination. And earlier, the Prosecution said that it might need

11 further time to know exactly what to tender. If there's any need for

12 such additional time, then the Prosecution can address the Chamber.

13 The Chamber hereby instructs the Prosecution to review the bar

14 table motion of the 31st of October, 2013, within one week from the last

15 day of Witness Theunens's testimony. It should exclude from the motion

16 those documents that have been tendered through this witness and file a

17 notification to this extent.

18 This is the further guidance by the Chamber.

19 Mr. Weber, I see that you're on your feet and are dying to say

20 something.

21 MR. WEBER: First of all, good morning, Your Honours.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Weber.

23 MR. WEBER: Just on a couple of points that the Chamber raised.

24 Thank you, we understand the comments that the Chamber provided.

25 I would just note though that our recent notification, we

Page 20220

1 indicated that the Prosecution may use any documents that are referenced

2 in the Theunens report and then added the additional 20 or so that you

3 said are not referenced in the Theunens report. So it wasn't our intent,

4 nor do I believe does our recent notice indicate, that we are limiting it

5 to just 20 documents. We --

6 JUDGE ORIE: If you slow down a bit, then our transcriber would

7 appreciate that I take it.

8 MR. WEBER: So of course we will endeavour to use documents that

9 underlie the report during the course of the examination.

10 The second note, and this is just something for the Chamber's

11 consideration, but it has also struck me during the course of my

12 preparations: The Chamber's guidance or inclination that was expressed

13 on the 25th of September, 2013, instructed the Prosecution to lead any

14 relevant matters from part 1 of the report. Now, in actuality part 1 of

15 the report constitutes a very much lower quantity of documents than part

16 2 of the report, which is actually quite heavy in terms of the quantity

17 of documents.

18 Many of the documents that overlap, as Your Honour has observed,

19 with the recent bar table motion come from part 2 of the report. So

20 there's a -- a logistical time element where in preparations it's also

21 been something that has quite struck me that the Chamber's guidance in

22 one way is asking me to present evidence related to part 1 and, of

23 course, Your Honours, I'm willing and happy to do so, and yet in another

24 way, the Chamber's guidance is restricting the amount of documents that

25 can be tendered with respect to another thing. And as we've said

Page 20221

1 multiple times through submissions, these documents are quite relevant to

2 our case. So I appreciate Your Honours' guidance and I understand it,

3 and I'd also -- we'll see as it progresses through the examination, but

4 I'd kindly request if maybe the Chamber could also consider that aspect

5 of the circumstances that we face.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, you said that you have multiple times

7 submitted that these documents are quite relevant to your case. I

8 understand that because they're underlying the report of Mr. Theunens and

9 what Mr. Theunens says about them is relevant.

10 Now, the issue is where do we rely on Mr. Theunens having

11 reviewed material which is footnoted and rely on Mr. Theunens's

12 observations and conclusions, and where there is a challenge to this

13 footnote material, the underlying documents, to justify the conclusions.

14 If there's no such challenge, we just are satisfied with the

15 report. If there is a challenge, and, again, I repeat, that, of course,

16 the Defence, when the witness is here, should put those documents to the

17 witness, should challenge that these documents - at least if that's their

18 position - if they challenge the conclusions, then, of course, it becomes

19 more important for the Chamber to form its own opinion to what extent

20 those underlying documents justify the conclusions drawn.

21 That is the issue. So that they are relevant is fully

22 understood. That relevance appears from the reports. To look into

23 further detail in those materials becomes important once there is a

24 challenge by the Defence.

25 That is the basic thought behind the Chamber's -- behind the

Page 20222

1 Chamber's guidance.

2 Now, if you intend to say that they're relevant, these documents,

3 beyond what is found in the report, then there is the more reason to put

4 them to Mr. Theunens because otherwise we would not know, where

5 Mr. Theunens used those documents, why they are relevant in other

6 aspects. In another respect, that is the reason why we urged you that if

7 it needs further explanation or if you consider them to be relevant for

8 the report -- beyond the report of Mr. Theunens, to -- to explain that

9 because we are not aware of it. We see the same documents underlying the

10 Theunens report appearing in the bar table submission, where we earlier

11 said, we do not -- it's our guidance not to tender underlying documents

12 where the Theunens reports deal with the materials in those underlying

13 documents.

14 MR. WEBER: Thank you, Your Honour. I understand the Chamber's

15 position. The Prosecution does have some additional views on that, but I

16 believe that I understand your position to the extent that if I need to

17 revisit it during the course of the testimony and how time develops, if

18 the Chamber would indulge me at that time to maybe make some additional

19 comments on this.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll then hear from you.

21 Then a matter unrelated -- yes, Mr. Ivetic.

22 MR. IVETIC: Just a point of clarification so I can understand

23 the procedure precisely.

24 Originally you had said if the Defence challenges conclusions,

25 the Prosecution should tender the relevant documents in re-direct

Page 20223

1 examination. But now at temporary transcript page 32, there seems to be

2 an indication that the Defence has to -- has to put those documents to

3 the witness and tender the documents. Is it on the Defence or on the

4 Prosecution to tender the documents if they're used?

5 JUDGE ORIE: What should be done, if you raise the issue, whether

6 Mr. Theunens does draw conclusions which cannot be based on the

7 underlying documents, then if you tender them in order to demonstrate why

8 the conclusions are not justified on the basis of those documents, of

9 course, then there's no need for the Prosecution to do it any further.

10 If you just, without tendering the documents, put questions to

11 Mr. Theunens which clearly come down to a challenge of his conclusions,

12 then, of course, the Prosecution, being aware of that, is -- I wouldn't

13 say invited, but would have to consider whether to tender the underlying

14 documents so as for the Chamber, later, to rely upon in assessing whether

15 the conclusions were justified or were not justified.

16 So it depends a bit on the practice the Defence will develop in

17 challenging the conclusions of Mr. Theunens. If that includes the

18 tendering -- I mean, important is that if you challenge the conclusions

19 that you put to Mr. Theunens on what that challenge is based. And I

20 would say that in 80 per cent of the cases, you would need to put the

21 document to the witness, which, I then take it, it is in the interests of

22 the Defence, then, to have that document to be admitted into evidence.

23 So it is a practicality rather than a matter of principle.

24 MR. IVETIC: Thank you for that, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Then there are a few other matters -- one second,

Page 20224

1 please.

2 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 JUDGE ORIE: I have two other matters which the Chamber would

5 like to raise before we are running out of time later today or in the

6 days to come.

7 The first one is the Chamber's thoughts on the further scheduling

8 of this case, a matter which was raised also by the Defence.

9 Having received and considered the submissions from the parties

10 last week, the Chamber would like to share with the parties its initial

11 assessment of the further scheduling in this case.

12 The Prosecution's last witness will be heard this and probably

13 next week. The Defence indicated that it would need six months from this

14 point in time -- and, of course, all this on the assumption that if a

15 98 bis motion would be filed, that it would be denied so as to -- because

16 otherwise there's no need to present a Defence case at all. Six months,

17 as said, was needed.

18 Considering that there is still a number of unknown factors such

19 as when the Chamber will deliver its last evidentiary decision in the

20 Prosecution's case, and the possible re-opening of the Prosecution's

21 case, but, apart from that, as matters stand now, the Chamber is inclined

22 to set the start of the presentation of any Defence evidence at the 13th

23 of May, 2014.

24 The Chamber will issue a Scheduling Order in due course with its

25 final decision on when any Defence evidence shall be presented.

Page 20227

1 gallery.

2 [The witness entered court]

3 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Theunens.

4 Before you give evidence, the Rules require that you make a

5 solemn declaration. The text is handed out to you.

6 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please make that solemn declaration.

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours.

9 I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth,

10 and nothing but the truth.

11 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS

12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please be seated, Mr. Theunens.

13 Mr. Theunens, you'll first be examined by Mr. Weber. Mr. Weber

14 is, as you know already very likely, he's counsel for the Prosecution.

15 Mr. Weber, you may proceed.

16 MR. WEBER: Thank you, Your Honours.

17 Examination by Mr. Weber:

18 Q. Could you please state your full name for the Trial Chamber.

19 A. Your Honours, my name is Reynaud Theunens.

20 MR. WEBER: At this time, could the Prosecution please have

21 65 ter 03975.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this is Exhibit P2368, under seal.

23 I apologise. It's 039.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Now -- I'm now wondering what will appear on our

25 screens.

Page 20228

1 Madam Registrar, was -- what appears on our screen now is a

2 curriculum vitae and that's the -- so, therefore, it's not an exhibit

3 under seal but that was an error.

4 Yes. Exceptionally, Madam Registrar made an error. We'll remind

5 that because it hardly ever happens. It most likely is not going to

6 happen again.

7 Mr. Weber.

8 MR. WEBER:

9 Q. Mr. Theunens, this is the --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel kindly speak into the

11 microphone.

12 MR. WEBER:

13 Q. Mr. Theunens, there is the curriculum vitae that you provided the

14 Office of the Prosecutor; correct?

15 A. Yes, Your Honours. I mean, I can add it's old because it doesn't

16 include my current occupations.

17 Q. If I could just ask you to look under section 2, it indicates

18 that you received a bachelor degree in social and military sciences at

19 the Royal Academy in Brussels. Could you please briefly tell us what

20 this degree entails.

21 A. Yeah, actually, I mean, I'm a bit surprised we used this CV

22 because at that time, this was in the transformation, what I have is

23 [French spoken], which is actually equal to a masters degree, and I think

24 I corrected that in the subsequent CVs I handed over to the ICTY.

25 But any way to answer the question, I attended military academy

Page 20229

1 in Brussels in the All Arms Division, and after that I went six months to

2 armoured school, and through that I became a professional officer in the

3 Belgian military.

4 Q. Under section 4, you indicate --

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, before we continue with this one, are

6 there other differences? Because it might have been better to use the

7 most recent and corrected one.

8 MR. WEBER: Not that I'm aware of and this is the one that we

9 have in our possession. I was just going to ask him at the end just to

10 update his current position which is the only thing that I am aware is

11 missing from this.

12 THE WITNESS: Yeah, but also the translation of the degree. I

13 mean, in the English there's a difference between a bachelor and a

14 masters obviously.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, the Chamber would prefer to check that

16 you verify that and that we hear the evidence of Mr. Theunens even in the

17 absence of having looked at his CV in further detail at this very moment.

18 You could still revisit any updated or old CVs once you have verified

19 which is the most adequate one to be used.

20 MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honour. If I can continue with asking the

21 questions based on the information in front of us.

22 Q. Under section 4 of this CV, you indicate that between

23 September 1992 and June 2001, you were employed by the Belgian Ministry

24 of Defence, military intelligence and security service. Could you please

25 describe what your duties were during this time.

Page 20230

1 A. Well, my duties are as described in the CV. I mean, to summarise

2 I worked as an analyst on the Balkans that focussed on monitoring and

3 analysing and preparing assessments on the political and military

4 developments in the Balkans at that time. That was focused on areas

5 where Belgian troops deployed, i.e., Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, but

6 obviously it also included monitoring these events in other parts of the

7 Balkans, i.e., Serbia and Montenegro and to a much lesser extent FYROM

8 Macedonia.

9 Q. Did you participate in UN peacekeeping operations in the former

10 Yugoslavia?

11 A. Yes, I did, Your Honours. To summarise the CV, between December

12 1994 and May 1999 I spent approximately 25 months in the Balkans. First

13 of all, November 1994 till October 1995 as a military information officer

14 in the UNPROFOR/UNPF headquarters in Zagreb. And then subsequently from

15 June 1996, I think, until May 1997, as a military information officer in

16 the UNTAES headquarters in Vukovar. And my last assignment was from

17 December 1998 till, I think it was again, May 1999 as a chief of a

18 national intelligence cell in the SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo.

19 Q. According to your CV, you worked as part of the military analyst

20 team of the Office of the Prosecutor from 2001 onwards. During this

21 time, did your research an analysis cover the activities of various

22 military and paramilitary formations that were involved in the conflict

23 in the former Yugoslavia?

24 A. That -- that is correct, Your Honours, and I left the OTP in

25 April 2009.

Page 20231

1 Q. Since April 2009, how have you been employed?

2 A. Your Honours, since April -- actually, end of April 2009, I'm

3 chief of the joint mission analysis centre in the United Nations interim

4 force in Lebanon.

5 Q. And could you please generally tell us what your duties entail in

6 your current position.

7 A. Your Honours, I am in charge of what is called integrated team,

8 i.e., consisting of military and civilian personnel, who -- whose task it

9 is to monitor and analyse developments within the area of responsibility

10 of -- of UNIFIL as well as Lebanon as well as the region developments

11 that may be relevant for mandate implementation, and the mandate being

12 determined by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 of

13 August 2006.

14 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, the Prosecution will come back to the CV

15 issue later during the examination. However, at this time, could the

16 Prosecution please have 65 ter 28612.

17 Q. Mr. Theunens, did you author the report before you which is

18 entitled: "Ratko Mladic and the JNA 2nd MD-VRS (1992-1995)," which is

19 dated September 2012?

20 A. Yes, I did, Your Honours.

21 Q. Do you have a copy of your own report with you here today?

22 A. Yes. Yes, Your Honours, I have it in front of me.

23 Q. Have you placed tabs and made highlights in your copy of the

24 report?

25 A. Yes, Your Honours, I did, just to facilitate my testimony, i.e.,

Page 20232

1 to identify specific parts in an easier fashion.

2 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have page 15 of both

3 versions of this report.

4 Q. I would like to direct your attention to paragraphs 3 and 4 of

5 the scope and methodology section of your report. In these paragraphs,

6 you refer to the intelligence cycle method of analysis. Could you please

7 explain to the Trial Chamber what this analysis entails.

8 A. I mean, just a small correction: The intelligence cycle is more

9 like a research method, and analysis is a step or a phase in the

10 intelligence cycle. But basically the intelligence cycle consists of

11 four discreet phases, they are discreet because they influence each

12 other. You start with direction, i.e., have you to identify what do I

13 want to research. Based on that, you will gather information, the

14 so-called collection phase. It's not sufficient just to gather

15 information, but then have you to process that. Process is actually in

16 the -- in the terminology of the intelligence cycle consists of

17 transforming information into intelligence whereby the big difference, I

18 would say, between information and intelligence is you have subjected to

19 your judgement.

20 And the last phase of the intelligence a cycle consists of

21 dissemination; i.e., you are going to make the findings or the product of

22 your analysis available, and in this particular case that consists of a

23 report.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.

25 MR. IVETIC: Just one moment.

Page 20233

1 While I do not objection to the witness having a copy of his

2 report, even if it is tabbed and highlighted, I note from here I see some

3 Post-It notes with some notes written on them. I would be interested to

4 find out what that is and if the witness is relying on the same. I think

5 I'm entitled to see it.

6 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, we'll --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens.

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours. I have one Post-It where I talk

9 about -- I mean, these are just -- I call it cheat sheets, but I can

10 remove them if you want. I have one with dates where I have the dates of

11 General Mladic's main military assignments since 1991. This is this one.

12 There's one where I write down what situational awareness is, I can

13 remove that. And then there is one where I have the

14 distinction between -- sorry, in the command process and mainly the

15 planning phase of the JNA or the SFRY armed forces, command forces, the

16 distinction between the full procedure and the shortened procedure.

17 But I have -- I mean, if Mr. Ivetic has a problem with these things, I

18 can easily remove them.

19 JUDGE ORIE: There are two options. Either you remove them or

20 you share the content with Mr. Ivetic as he asked.

21 THE WITNESS: I can do both, actually. I mean, I need to remove

22 them to share them with him, so.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, if you are comfortable with that,

24 then --

25 THE WITNESS: No problem.

Page 20234

1 JUDGE ORIE: -- we can do that and taking a break at the same

2 time.

3 Therefore, I would suggest that you give your Post-It notes to

4 the usher who would then give them to Mr. Ivetic. I hope they're not in

5 Flemish.

6 THE WITNESS: No, no, they're in English, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE ORIE: We'll take a break, after you have been escorted out

8 of the courtroom.

9 No loud speaking. Mr. Mladic, no loud speaking, under no

10 circumstances. That's the rule.

11 [The witness stands down]

12 JUDGE ORIE: We will take a break, and we will resume at ten

13 minutes past midday.

14 --- Recess taken at 11.51 a.m.

15 --- On resuming at 12.15 p.m.

16 JUDGE ORIE: While we're waiting for the witness to be brought

17 in, the 20 -- approximately 20 documents still to be tendered from the

18 bar table in relation to Witness Treanor, could that be tendered as soon

19 as possible. I noticed that the Defence, of course, has an opportunity

20 to -- to add something to the table you are presenting. At the same

21 time, it's the experience that often we found empty boxes there.

22 So, therefore, we should avoid that we suffer any further delays

23 in knowing what 20 documents or approximately 20 documents you would like

24 to tender.

25 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, would it be convenient for the Court if

Page 20235

1 it had Ms. Bibles here at the start of the next session this afternoon?

2 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if it's filed this week, the Chamber will be

3 happy. If that's not possible, then we'd like to hear why it is not

4 possible.

5 MR. GROOME: Okay.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

7 [The witness takes the stand]

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, I see on the transcript that already

9 before you started speaking there is a little warning. If you could keep

10 that in mind.

11 Please proceed.

12 MR. WEBER:

13 Q. Mr. Theunens, you just discussed the intelligence cycle

14 methodology. Through the application of this methodology, how were you

15 able to determine the reliability of information in documents?

16 A. Your Honours, I was able to establish the reliability of

17 information contained in documents by looking at different versions or

18 different -- yeah, documents discussing the same event or similar events

19 in order to establish what happened. Or -- to establish the facts

20 related to a specific event or a specific issue or a specific situation.

21 And then, of course, this is also linked. You have on the one hand the

22 reliability of the source -- of the information -- yeah, you confused me

23 because in the methodology you talk about the -- the reliability of the

24 source and the credibility of the information. So that's why I started

25 off wrongly.

Page 20236

1 So you -- these are two different issues. In a nutshell, a

2 reliable source can provide information of low credibility and

3 vice versa. At face value it's, of course, difficult to say this is a

4 reliable source or not or this information is credible or not. What you

5 basically do, you look for corroboration. You look at the nature of the

6 source, what is its relation with the event, what is the distance, does

7 the source have a specific reputation. And then for the -- for the --

8 the -- the -- actual information, yeah, you look for other accounts or

9 other -- or other sources that provide information on the event, and then

10 you try to come to a common version. And I apologise for the length of

11 the answer, but I was confused in the beginning.

12 MR. WEBER: If we could please scroll down on the page that is on

13 the screen before us. And if we could please magnify the footnotes.

14 Q. In footnote 3 on this page, it indicates that you've testified

15 and applied the intelligence cycle methodology in all of the reports

16 admitted in seven previous cases.

17 Since the completion of the report for this case, did you testify

18 as an expert witness on an eighth occasion in the Hadzic case?

19 A. That is correct, Your Honours.

20 Q. In paragraph 1 of this section which is on a previous page, you

21 describe the scope of the report and indicate the report is an analysis

22 of the role of Ratko Mladic as the deputy commander of the JNA

23 2nd Military District and commander of the VRS between early 1992 and

24 November 1995.

25 What types of materials did you rely upon to reach your

Page 20237

1 conclusions as to Ratko Mladic's role?

2 A. Your Honours, the -- the -- the -- the materials I have used for

3 this report I describe in detail in paragraph 4 of the scope of the

4 report, but just to summarise, I -- I -- I considered main what I would

5 call primary source, i.e., documents that were issued by the

6 organisations, if I can call it that way, General Mladic belonged to

7 during the relevant time-period. And obviously, I mean, this is the JNA,

8 JNA 2nd Military District, command documents and reporting documents, the

9 same for the VRS, and obviously in order to be able to understand them

10 and to -- to -- to -- to see how he was exercising his authority, as that

11 was one of the purposes of the report, I also looked at the doctrinal

12 framework, i.e., what was the doctrine of these organisations, the JNA,

13 the SFRY armed forces, the VRS, and that also involved looking at

14 applicable legislation. For example, the constitution of the SFRY, of

15 the FRY, of the SRBiH, and subsequently RS and other legislation that was

16 relevant from a military point of view in order to understand how

17 General Mladic exercised his authority in the positions he held in these

18 two organisations, 2nd Military District and the VRS, and also what I

19 call his situational awareness.

20 Q. If I could just interrupt you right there, Mr. Theunens.

21 In paragraph 2 of the same section, you describe the two parts of

22 the report. I will ask you some more detailed questions about part 1

23 later today. However, at this time, could you please generally tell us

24 why your analysis in part 1 is relevant to your conclusions concerning

25 Ratko Mladic's role as commander of the VRS?

Page 20238

1 A. Your Honours, I -- I believe I just -- I -- explained that in the

2 sense that even if the VRS is officially created on the 12th of May, it

3 is based on something that existed already and that something was

4 organised and regulated in a particular manner. And in order to

5 understand -- yeah, not only how the VRS would be organised and function,

6 it wouldn't be sufficient to just have a few documents of the 2nd

7 Military District but in my view it was essential to also look at what I

8 call the doctrinal framework and the applicable legislation as I

9 explained earlier, because, for example, when we talk somewhere about an

10 operational group, well, I believe it would be helpful to explain what is

11 an operational group. If we talk about a volunteer, I believed it would

12 be helpful to explain, for example, the -- the legal conditions under

13 which volunteers could join the armed forces. If we talk about orders

14 that the VRS or General Mladic may have issued in relation to

15 implementing the international laws of war, I believed it would be useful

16 to look at the applicable --

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. -- Mr. --

18 Mr. Theunens, you are going, by far, too swiftly.

19 And I see that parts of your testimony will be lost if you

20 continue at that speed, which I like to prevent to happen.

21 Please proceed. Mr. Weber will give you the right example.

22 THE WITNESS: Mm-hm.

23 MR. WEBER: I hope so, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, could you also check whether what we see

25 on the transcript is one, but also listening to the other channels, there

Page 20239

1 may be a serious problem there as well. So it's not only the transcript

2 but also the other booth.

3 Please proceed.

4 MR. WEBER:

5 Q. Could you please just further explain, I believe that -- I don't

6 know if you were going to cover this in your answer that you just stated.

7 But why was the JNA's -- your analysis of the JNA's role in the conflict

8 in Croatia relevant to your analysis of Ratko Mladic?

9 A. Your Honours, this analysis was relevant in my view because when

10 you compare the two situations, i.e., on one hand, Croatia and, on the

11 other hand, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the analysis I conducted allows to

12 identify patterns not only in the way how the JNA, or subsequently the

13 VRS, are being used, but also in relation to General Mladic, how he

14 exercises his authority and -- and -- yeah, how he ensures his

15 situational awareness. And I think that this continuity again in the

16 context of my analysis is important.

17 Q. You include summaries and introductory overviews at the beginning

18 of each section of the different parts of your report. Do these

19 summaries and overviews contain your analytical conclusions based on your

20 review of available documentary material?

21 A. Yes, it -- yes, Your Honours, they do.

22 MR. WEBER: At this time, Your Honour, the Prosecution requests

23 that 65 ter 28612 be marked for identification.

24 MR. IVETIC: I anticipate we will be making submissions after the

25 witness's testimony from both sides, so I have no objection to it being

Page 20240

1 marked for identification and reserve my arguments to the end.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, the number under which it would be

3 marked would be.

4 THE REGISTRAR: Document 28612 receives number P3029,

5 Your Honours.

6 JUDGE ORIE: And is marked for identification.

7 MR. WEBER:

8 Q. Mr. Theunens, today I'm going to start by asking you a few

9 general questions about Ratko Mladic and his style of command. I will

10 then cover the topic of command and control discussed in part 1 of your

11 report. After we address these matters, we will go through more specific

12 topics an examples in documents. With this understanding, I would like

13 to start by asking: Based on your review, could you please tell us

14 whether Ratko Mladic was an active and involved military commander?

15 A. Yes, Your Honours. Based on the review of the documents, those

16 included in the report and also others, I would describe General Mladic

17 as a very involved and a very active commander, who intervenes

18 immediately when he feels or when he has the impressions that -- or maybe

19 the chain of command has not been respected or when he believes that he

20 has not been adequately informed by subordinates, and there are also

21 numerous examples that instead of staying in the -- of staying in the

22 headquarters, he moves to the area where the combat operations are being

23 conducted not just by conducting visits but also by having forward

24 command post established. And then the documents, I mean the VRS

25 documents, show that he is actually actively leading these combat

Page 20241

1 operations, and there are several examples of that as included in the

2 report.

3 Q. Overall, would you consider Ratko Mladic to be a well-informed

4 commander between 1991 and through 1995?

5 A. Your Honours, I have less documents available for the time-period

6 prior to the establishment of the VRS, but -- i.e., prior to -- and also

7 General Mladic taking up the position of commander of the Main Staff of

8 the VRS of the 12th of May, but for sure after 12th of May 1995 -- 1992,

9 excuse me, until, say, November 1995, I would consider General Mladic as

10 very well-informed.

11 Q. Throughout part 1 of your report, you provide a detailed analysis

12 of command and control doctrine as applied in the SFRY armed forces. In

13 part 2 of your report, on pages 43, 66 to 67, and 163, among other, you

14 conclude that command and control in the VRS is based on the same

15 principles that apply to the SFRY armed forces. How did you reach this

16 conclusion?

17 A. Your Honours, I reached this conclusions by A, comparing the

18 applicable legislation and regulations and; B, by analysing the various

19 combat documents, be it command document or reporting documents, which

20 often refer these -- the three principles of command and control.

21 Q. For the record, the application of the SFRY doctrine by the VRS

22 has also been mentioned by Witness Manojlo Milovanovic at page 16929 to

23 30 and Witness Dannatt at page 19138.

24 On pages 36 to 40 of part 1, you explain the command structure of

25 the JNA. In part 2 of your report, you discuss the structure of the VRS

Page 20242

1 and you conclude on page 73 of part 2 that Ratko Mladic possessed the

2 authority to order changes in the organisational structure of the VRS.

3 Did Ratko Mladic organise the VRS and use a command structure

4 similar to that of the JNA?

5 A. Yes, Your Honours, he did. There were, of course, some minor

6 changes in relation to the structure in a sense that, whereas in a JNA

7 unit you would have an assistant commander for political guidance, that

8 person would be called assistant commander for religious and morale

9 guidance in the VRS. And obviously whereas the JNA -- I mean, in the

10 time of the SFRY armed forces there were two components - i.e., the JNA

11 and the TO - when the VRS is established, the self-created Bosnian Serb

12 TO in Bosnia-Herzegovina is integrated into the VRS. So once the VRS is

13 fully organised, there is no Bosnian Serb TO anymore. But otherwise,

14 there is a high degree of similarity both I would say at the staff level

15 as well as at unit level in the -- in the structures of these two armed

16 forces.

17 Q. For the most part, did the VRS Main Staff's sectors fulfil

18 similar duties as those organs in the JNA?

19 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I'm concerned that we're having

20 leading question after leading question.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.

22 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, this question is not leading. I'm just

23 asking him if the VRS staff sectors fulfilled the same functions as in

24 the former JNA. I'm asking him to explain, if he can.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Well, to say that there's no leading element in it

Page 20243

1 at all would not be right, Mr. Weber.

2 Could you try to -- having established that the structures were

3 very similar, although it's small adaptations or small corrections,

4 perhaps you could you can ask then whether the organs in the JNA and in

5 the VRS Main Staff in their duties would show a similarity or not

6 similarly. It's a matter of carefully phrasing. So if you would keep

7 that in mind, you may proceed.

8 MR. WEBER: Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. Mr. Theunens, did you just hear the Chamber's question?

10 A. I did, Your Honours. I already addressed the -- the -- the issue

11 of -- of -- of political guidance versus morale and religious guidance.

12 In addition, I also noted that whereas in the JNA or the SFRY armed force

13 there was a separate security administration, and the functions of

14 security intelligence indeed were separated. In the VRS Main Staff and

15 the subordinate staffs, intelligence security are handled by one sector.

16 So they are not separate but they are handled by one -- under the same

17 sector.

18 Q. Starting on page 12 to page 46 of part 1 of your report, you

19 discuss command and control as defined by the JNA military lexicon, the

20 JNA text on command and control, the All People's Defence law, and other

21 military regulations. For us, right now, could you please tell us how

22 does the SFRY armed forces define command and control?

23 A. Well, I will paraphrase the definition as it is provided in the

24 corps regulation which states that command and control are conscious and

25 organised activities of the commander in order to use the available

Page 20244

1 means, be it personnel or resources, in the most effective manner to

2 achieve the set goal. And these elements, i.e., conscious and organised,

3 it is done by a commander, I mean, a single commander who has the

4 exclusive right to command and control, and the use of resources, be it

5 personnel or materiel, these elements we find in all references or

6 definitions of command and control in SFRY armed forces doctrine.

7 Q. Could you please explain to us whether or not the command process

8 is continuous?

9 A. It is continuous because obviously it will start sometime, i.e.,

10 when the unit starts, but once you have a unit, you have a commander, and

11 in simple terms anything that happens in the military happens on orders.

12 There may be -- there is something like initiative, but that has to be

13 consistent with what is called in NATO the commander's intent. But

14 otherwise, everything happens on orders. The commander issues orders and

15 these go down through the chain of command, and the commander has to

16 inform himself about the degree of implementation of these orders, and

17 then, based on -- on his judgement, comparing the set task with the way

18 in which it has been implemented, he can issue additional orders for

19 corrective action or for small amendments. But this is a continuous

20 cycle because, I mean, units are continuously acting, be it conducting

21 operations or maintenance or training or any other activity personnel,

22 military personnel is involved in.

23 Q. Can a military commander exercise command without control?

24 A. Your Honours, both SFRY armed forces or JNA regulations, as well

25 as I copied US and UK regulations, emphasise that command and control are

Page 20245

1 part of one and the same activity. You cannot exercise command without

2 having control. So even if from maybe a semantic point of view one would

3 be able to make a distinction between the two, from a practical military

4 point of view they are part of one and the same activity by the

5 commander.

6 Q. You just mentioned US --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.

8 MR. IVETIC: If I may, Your Honours, I notice the witness keeps

9 flipping back to a page that has more writing on it, and I'd like to see

10 that page.

11 THE WITNESS: You know, you can --

12 JUDGE ORIE: No, Mr. Theunens. I think there were short

13 annotations. If there's anything specifically which -- we're not going

14 to give it right away to Mr. Ivetic.

15 If you could explain what kind of assistance you find in your

16 notes, then ...

17 THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, I use colours.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

19 THE WITNESS: And if the Trial Chamber is assisted by that, I can

20 explain the -- the choice of colours to highlight certain elements. And

21 then sometimes when I have like an article of -- of -- I mean, I'm trying

22 to look at the page -- page with a lot of annotations. Okay. There is

23 on page 12 of part 1 a title called: "Command and Control over the SFRY

24 Armed Forces." I have added in handwriting within, i.e., the reference

25 to the corps definition, that can be found on page 22.

Page 20246

1 I have --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Page reference therefore.

3 THE WITNESS: Yeah, it's just for references. I mean -- a lot of

4 page numbers, because I don't know this by heart, you know. When I

5 worked here, I was fairly confident that I could find anything in my

6 report, but the past four years have I been working on quite different

7 matters. And even if I had a couple of days here to prepare myself, it

8 is more challenging than it used to be to find --

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, satisfied?

10 MR. IVETIC: I am now satisfied.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

12 MR. WEBER: And, Your Honour, just quickly, I do have a clean

13 copy of the report if that is [Overlapping speakers] necessary, and also

14 I did discuss --

15 JUDGE ORIE: There's no need to provide the witness with a clean

16 copy. The markings he made, Mr. Ivetic accepts them as being useful to

17 be used during the examination of the witness, and we leave it like that.

18 MR. IVETIC: I have been asked to convey a message from my client

19 also. When dealing with portions of this rather lengthy report, if they

20 could mention the page or paragraph number so they can be found in the

21 B/C/S version of the same. So far, we've been using English page

22 numbers.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. There's, of course, one issue about what

24 should be elicited viva voce and where we rely on the report, especially

25 on part 1.

Page 20247

1 Mr. Weber, you often introduce questions by look at this and this

2 portion of the first part of the report where, of course, that is not the

3 primary basis for eliciting the evidence.

4 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I'm just trying to provide transcript

5 references so we can later associate and locate where the information is.

6 And then I'm asking an additional question or questions based on the

7 subject matter that is discussed on those pages. I, of course, can

8 provide the e-court pages of both versions during any question.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if you would. To the extent you are able to

10 meet the request, please do so.

11 MR. WEBER:

12 Q. Mr. Theunens, I'm going to go back to the question I was about to

13 ask you.

14 You just mentioned US and UK regulations --

15 A. Mm-hm.

16 Q. -- do these regulations use a similar or different definition of

17 command and control to that of the SFRY armed forces?

18 A. Your Honour, these -- these definitions are included in pages 23

19 and subsequent in part 1 of the report, English version. And they have

20 very similar to -- or I would almost say identical to the definitions

21 used in SFRY armed forces doctrinal documents regulations.

22 Q. On pages 33 to 36 of part 1, available in e-court on English

23 pages 68 to 71, and in B/C/S, on those same pages, you discuss how

24 command and control process -- or excuse me, the command process and

25 control is implemented through the functions of planning, organising,

Page 20248

1 giving orders, co-ordination, and control, with inspection in

2 parenthesis. I would like to briefly focus with you on this last

3 function.

4 Could you please tell us what is the control inspection function

5 and how this is important to the exercise of command?

6 A. Yes, Your Honours. I just want to highlight that the use of the

7 word "control" in this context is not to be confounded with the use of

8 control in the context of command and control. And in B/C/S, the

9 difference is very clear. The kind of control we are talking about now

10 is called is "inspekcija" and other one is "rukovodjenje."

11 But to answer the question, as I mentioned earlier it is not

12 enough to issue an order. The commander also has to verify the degree of

13 implementation of the order, and through inspection, as the -- as the

14 text says, he can get an insight into the -- the status and degree of

15 accomplishment of the tasks he has set in his order. And, again, I mean,

16 the doctrine states these are continuous activities, and he basically, as

17 I also said, you compare the set task with the actual result --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, should not speak aloud. It's the second

19 or the third time today I have to remind him of that, and that is

20 sufficient.

21 Please proceed.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I cannot follow.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Then through counsel you can --

24 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, Mr. Mladic is complaining that he's

25 unable to follow the witness since again there has been no reference to

Page 20249

1 page numbers in the B/C/S. And with the speed of the testimony, he is

2 barely able to listen and to try to locate the sections of the report

3 that might relate to the same discussion.

4 JUDGE ORIE: But paragraph numbers are used repeatedly, I think.

5 Let me.

6 MR. IVETIC: Yes. And they repeat throughout the report. I

7 believe even page numbers in the different sections also recycle so that

8 there are several page 12s, et cetera.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, could you please keep in mind to be as

10 clear as possible in your reference to portions of the report.

11 MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honour, I will continue to now refer to the

12 e-court pages.

13 Q. On page 243 of part 2 of your report, which is in e-court English

14 page 459 and B/C/S page 456, you conclude:

15 "Ratko Mladic is systematically informed of the activities of his

16 subordinate units and commands through regular operational reporting. He

17 regularly visits and inspects commands and units, meets with commanders

18 and, et cetera."

19 You've commented on this already. How did this further

20 General Mladic's ability to exercise control over his subordinates?

21 A. Excuse me, Your Honours, you mean control in the sense of the

22 inspection function of command and control?

23 Q. In carrying out the inspection function of command and control,

24 how did this then more relate to his ability to exercise control in the

25 sense of command and control? If that helps clarify.

Page 20250

1 A. I'm not -- I think I understand the question in the sense that by

2 inspecting the units, and he can compare the task he has set with the

3 actual situation on the ground, and that allows him to issue additional

4 instructions to subordinate commanders if he -- if he feels as a

5 commander that such additional orders are needed. And we have examples

6 of that.

7 So it is the regular implementation I would say of the command

8 and control process as it is described in doctrine. Maybe with a

9 difference that compared to -- to other commanding officers I have looked

10 into during my time at ICTY, General Mladic was very active in that

11 field. I mean, there's a whole range of visits and other meetings he

12 conducts throughout the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina with units -- of

13 units on the battle-field.

14 Q. On pages 31 to 33 of part 1, available in e-court in English on

15 pages 66 to 68 and in B/C/S also on those same page, 66 to 68, you

16 enumerate the seven principles of command and control. I would like to

17 focus with you on three of these principles as they have been mentioned

18 on numerous occasions during these proceedings but not fully defined.

19 Could you please tell us what does the principle of single authority

20 entail?

21 A. Your Honour, single authority means that there is only one

22 commander whereas the -- who has the exclusive right to issue orders and

23 to whom the status of implementation of these orders has to be reported.

24 Q. For the record, the principle of single authority has been

25 mentioned during these proceedings at transcript pages 3174, 5017 to 18,

Page 20251

1 5127, 12579, 12811, 15679 --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.

3 MR. WEBER: Page --

4 JUDGE ORIE: Could you check on the transcript whether all the

5 pages you mentioned appear already. If not, to repeat if there's

6 anything missing. And then slowly continue.

7 MR. WEBER: Continuing. Page 17277, 17417, and page 19062.

8 Q. Turning to the next principle: What is the importance of the

9 principle of subordination?

10 A. Subordination, Your Honours, means the obligation to implement

11 the decision of a superior, and, as the regulations say, in an exact and

12 timely manner.

13 Q. For the record, the principle of subordination has been mentioned

14 at transcript pages 2888 to 89, 2894, 4212, 5068, 11137, 11633, 11715,

15 12579, among other -- numerous other references.

16 Continuing. Lastly, what is the principle of unity?

17 A. Unity, and I'm referring for this and the previous definitions to

18 the 1983 [Realtime transcript read in error "1993"] JNA textbook on

19 command and control, means that the defence of the country is integral

20 and indivisible. And in practical terms, it means there is consistency

21 between the orders of the Supreme Command, and those I mean directives,

22 instructions, or other orders of the Supreme Command on one hand, and

23 then orders and commands on the lowest level. Consistency in the

24 contents and the overall purpose of these orders.

25 Q. For the record, the principle of unity has been mentioned at

Page 20252

1 transcript pages 2983, 3122, 3131, 4772, 5017 to 18, and 12883.

2 A. And if you allow me just to small correction, it should be the

3 1983 JNA textbook on command and control. Not 1993.

4 Q. Thank you. How does the application of these principles ensure

5 that operations are conducted in accordance with commander's intended

6 outcome?

7 A. Well, I mean, in practical term there is only -- there will be

8 only one commander who can issue orders based on the singleness, the

9 principle of singleness of command and control or single authority.

10 Subordinates are obliged to implement these orders in a timely and exact

11 manner. And throughout the chain of command, because, of course, the

12 commander, he cannot issue orders to each individual soldier because

13 through the principle of subordination a chain of command is established,

14 and then -- I mean, all these orders would be consistent with -- with the

15 commander's intent through the principle of unified command and control,

16 and all the levels in the command and control system or in the chain of

17 command are organised in a manner that allows for the implementation or

18 the abidance by the three principles.

19 Q. Since you've just mentioned a couple of different types of

20 documents, I'd like to turn quickly with you, on pages 43 to 46 of part

21 1, which can be found in e-court in the English version and B/C/S version

22 on pages 78 to 81.

23 In your report on these page, you explain a different type of

24 combat documents. Did the combat documents -- types of combat documents

25 issued by or sent to Ratko Mladic and the VRS Main Staff, were they done

Page 20253

1 in a similar manner or not as described by the SFRY military doctrine?

2 A. Indeed, Your Honours. For the two categories of combat document,

3 i.e., first, command documents; and, secondly, reporting documents, we

4 see the same types of documents on one hand in the SFRY armed forces and

5 on the other hand in the VRS and for command documents the same

6 hierarchy, and I guess you will come back to that, but that's explained

7 in [indiscernible] pages of my report.

8 Q. Just to break the two types of combat documents and discuss them

9 a little further, what are the purpose of the command documents, like a

10 directive or an order?

11 A. Mm-hm. Command documents are issued to -- to -- yeah. To -- I

12 want to say to issue commands but that would be too simple, but they are

13 issued by the superior to issue tasks to the subordinates, and depending

14 on the nature of these tasks, different categories exist. I mean, the

15 highest level are the directives, subsequently we have instructions, then

16 we have orders, and the lowest level of command document is a command.

17 Q. What are the purpose of notification documents, like reports?

18 A. Reports are intended to inform the commander of the degree of

19 implementation of the set task. As -- again, this refers also to the --

20 to the control or the inspection function of -- of command and control,

21 and the commander needs to know to what extent his tasks have been

22 implemented, or he also needs to be informed of any other event or

23 development that can be relevant for the tasks he has set.

24 Q. On page 46 of part 1 of your report, which can be found in both

25 versions in e-court at page 81, you explain the SFRY doctrine which

Page 20254

1 requires a commander to "at all times know the status, position, and

2 capabilities of his units two levels down." Could you please explain why

3 such a requirement exists.

4 A. Your Honours, this -- this requirement follows from military

5 structure and the hierarchy of units, i.e., starting from the top from

6 the level of the VRS Main Staff. The commander of the VRS Main Staff

7 will issue orders or will give tasks to his corps. Now, these corps,

8 they consist of brigades, and it's actually the brigades -- it are

9 actually the brigades of these corps that will do the task because the

10 corps, it is just a staff and its subordinate units.

11 So in order for the commander of the Main Staff to set the tasks

12 of the corps, he needs to know the status of the units in the corps that

13 will implement these tasks and these are the brigades. And the same

14 system cascades down then because the brigade commander, on the basis

15 of -- excuse me, corps commander on the basis of the orders from the

16 commander of the Main Staff will issue tasks to -- to the brigade

17 commanders, whereby, the corps commander needs to know the status of the

18 battalions of these brigades. And then we go from brigade to battalion,

19 and battalion to company. And this is how the system works.

20 Q. If could you please in a little bit more detail explain how the

21 regular reporting procedures of the VRS ensured that Ratko Mladic

22 received information from at least two levels below him.

23 A. Well, Your Honours, we look into the -- I mean, the regular and

24 irregular reporting by the corps. There was daily reporting between

25 May 1992 and -- and, say, November 1995, from the subordinate units to

Page 20255

1 the superior units. The Main Staff, i.e., General Mladic, issued orders

2 to the subordinate units to submit their daily reports or their regular

3 reports in a timely fashion. I have seen a document where -- in which he

4 issues instructions to subordinate commanders to call him, so that's an

5 oral reporting. And there were also -- I mean, there were also

6 procedures for irregular reporting in case of an unusual event where an

7 urgent response was required as opposed to waiting for the dead-line set

8 for the regular reporting.

9 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have Exhibit P3011, page

10 17 of the B/C/S and page 24 of the English translation.

11 Q. The document that will be coming up before you is the SRBiH Law

12 on Army dated 1 June 1992. You reference this document over 35 times

13 throughout your report in relation to multiple topics. Today, I would

14 like to focus with you on Article 173 which, I believe, in the English

15 version, is at the bottom of the left column, continuing onto the top of

16 the right column.

17 MR. WEBER: If we could please zoom out the English version to

18 see the full article.

19 Q. Does this article incorporate the command and control principles

20 of single authority, unity, and subordination?

21 A. It does, Your Honours.

22 Q. We see that this is in chapter 11 of the Law on the Army,

23 entitled: "Command." What does this indicate about how the VRS decided

24 to incorporate these principles as part of their structure?

25 A. Well, it shows that the VRS applied the same principles in

Page 20256

1 relation to command and control as the JNA, and I would say that these

2 are -- these are universal principles. They applied to each armed force.

3 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have page 2 of both

4 versions of this document.

5 Q. I would like to briefly ask you about Article 10 under the

6 chapter for replenishment of the army. Does this article bestow any

7 authority to Ratko Mladic?

8 A. In -- indeed, Your Honours, Article 10 explains the duties of the

9 commander of the Main Staff. And they are enumerated there. There's

10 also a reference in another article that the supreme commander can

11 delegate certain authorities to the commander of the Main Staff. So I

12 would say have you to look at Article 10 in conjunction with Article 174

13 of the -- this law.

14 Q. We've mentioned five functions of the command process already in

15 your report. Do the powers in this article that is before us relate to

16 any of those five functions?

17 A. Yes, they do, Your Honours. Most obviously you have planning and

18 organising, but that will, of course, also imply co-ordination, command,

19 and an inspection, as usual.

20 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I'm about do start on another rather

21 lengthy document. If we could take the break at this time.

22 JUDGE ORIE: We can take a break now.

23 Could we first ask the witness to be escorted out of the

24 courtroom.

25 [The witness stands down]

Page 20260

1 [The witness takes the stand]

2 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed, Mr. Weber.

3 MR. WEBER: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Could the Prosecution please have P338, page 8 of the B/C/S and

5 page 7 of the English.

6 Q. While this document is coming up, Mr. Theunens, could you please

7 generally describe the scope and purpose of the 1992 combat readiness

8 report that was completed in April 1993?

9 A. Your Honours, the VRS analysis of the combat readiness covering

10 1992 provides a detailed insight in the way how the VRS was established,

11 as well as is how -- I mean, for the different aspects of the armed

12 forces, and in addition, it also provides a detailed analysis

13 on obviously the combat readiness, the current state of the armed forces,

14 and how they have been operating so far.

15 Q. Before you is the first section of the 1992 combat readiness

16 report. I would like to direct your attention to the fourth

17 paragraph from the top of this page. The one that begins with the

18 reference to the fact: "We have carried out individual and concerted

19 battle operations according to a single design and plan ..."

20 Based on your review of materials, what was the overall single

21 strategic plan that was implemented by Ratko Mladic and the VRS in 1992?

22 A. Your Honours, based on -- on the review of the document I had

23 available to me, I considered the six strategic goals as the main

24 political or strategic guidance determining the operations of the VRS not

25 only in 1992 but until the end of the conflict.

Page 20261

1 Q. The remainder of this paragraph discusses the temporary grouping

2 of forces into operational groups, tactical groups, and combat groups.

3 This is something that you deal with on pages 57 and 60 of Part 1 in your

4 report. For the record, if you can just please define for us what an

5 operational group is first.

6 A. Your Honours, an operational group is an ad hoc formation that

7 can consist of several brigades operating under a single and unified

8 command, that conduct operations in a specific area during a specific

9 time-period. The relevance of the establishment of an ad hoc formation

10 relies or resides in the fact that an operational group will include

11 units of different backgrounds, i.e., different JNA units. You can have

12 brigades from different corps. But in the context that we're talking

13 here, and mainly what we saw in Croatia, operational groups allowed to

14 establish single command and control over JNA units, local Serb TO units,

15 units of the TO Serbia, local Serb police units, as well as

16 volunteers/paramilitaries.

17 Q. Could you please explain to what you say a tactical group is?

18 A. Your Honours, a tactical group applies the same principles.

19 However, on a lower level, i.e., a tactical group would consist of -- of

20 battalion-level units. And, again, there is some room for maneuver

21 because on one hand there is the doctrine, but on the other hand there

22 are the examples that we see during the conflict in Croatia in the

23 latter. But on the other hand, there are the examples we see during the

24 conflict in Croatia during the latter half of 1991 where the JNA

25 establishes, I mean, regularly establishes operational groups, tactical

Page 20262

1 groups, as well as assault detachments.

2 Q. I'd like to turn your attention to how the VRS used OGs and TGs,

3 and I would just note for you on page 43 of Part 2 of your report, you

4 conclude:

5 "Throughout the conflict the VRS established OG and TG in order

6 to ensure single unified and uninterrupted command and control over all

7 forces conducting combat operations."

8 Could you please more specifically explain how the VRS used these

9 formations to ensure single authority and unified command.

10 A. Well, Your Honours, whenever the commander saw a need to

11 establish such a temporary formation, because he may have received units

12 belonging to different establishment units or there could be cases where

13 units of the police were involved, then he could decide to establish such

14 an ad hoc temporary formation, and then we would have to have look at the

15 specific orders as well as, I mean, command documents and reporting

16 documents to see where such OGs or TGs operated and how they functioned.

17 Q. Returning to the combat analysis report that's before you and

18 directing your attention to the next paragraph which is the fifth from

19 the top, it refers to how unity was achieved by following well-known

20 principles that had a crucial bearing on command and control in the VRS.

21 Does this paragraph again confirm that the VRS was in fact using

22 the SFRY principles of command and control which you discuss throughout

23 Part 1 of your report?

24 A. Yes, Your Honours. These principles are the same as those listed

25 or identified by SFRY armed forces doctrine.

Page 20263

1 Q. There's a reference in this document to the principle of

2 operational ability and security.

3 A. Mm-hm.

4 Q. If you could please assist us and explain what that principle is.

5 A. For the sake of time I just paraphrase them, but operability or

6 operational ability means that the system has to be adopted to the

7 specific conditions, because when combat operations are being conducted,

8 there may be a high tempo with -- with swift changes in who controls

9 which area. Units may change and so on, so the command and control

10 system has to be able to manage those changes. And security is what we

11 would call now operational security, i.e., that confidentiality of

12 information is maintained and that, for example, adequate communication

13 systems are available to -- to -- to achieve that.

14 Q. If we could please scroll down on the page before us.

15 In the following paragraph, which is the fourth -- or excuse me,

16 the second from the bottom, there's reference to offensive and defensive

17 actions. In preceding paragraph, we saw reference to how the VRS carried

18 out its operations pursuant to a single design and plan. Based on these

19 references, at this time could you please explain to us the difference

20 between strategy and tactics?

21 A. You mean in the context of how the VRS operated?

22 Q. I guess maybe let's break it down a little bit more. In general,

23 could you explain to us, first, what is strategy; and then, secondly,

24 what are tactics.

25 A. Your Honours, strategy refers to, I would say, the general

Page 20264

1 political guidance on how -- excuse me, on which goals the armed forces

2 should pursue. And then tactics, I mean, is at the other end because we

3 do not discuss at the operational level, but tactics are the basic

4 principles as to how armed force act. I mean, various concepts, type of

5 operations they undertake or actions they undertake in the framework of

6 this overall strategy.

7 Q. At what level of command are strategic decisions made in the VRS?

8 A. At -- Your Honours, at the level of -- of the Main Staff? You

9 can find in my report, I have the -- the -- the SFRY armed forces had the

10 definitions for the levels of command: The strategic level, the

11 operational level, the tactical. And there it sets the strategic level

12 includes the main -- excuse me, the Supreme Command and the staff of the

13 Supreme Command. And you will see that in the analysis of the combat

14 readiness report, there is an entry stating that the Main Staff operated

15 as the staff of the Supreme Command. So this illustrates that strategic

16 decisions are taken by the Main Staff on the basis of the political

17 guidance given by the Supreme Command.

18 Q. You just made a reference as to where we could find something in

19 your report. If there's any way could you tell us where that is, and

20 then if you could just help us by explaining maybe in a little more

21 detail how the SFRY armed forces define the strategic level --

22 A. Mm-hm --

23 Q. -- then the operational level and then so forth.

24 A. Yes, Your Honours. It's on English page 15. I don't have B/C/S

25 references. And this is taken from a 1983 JNA manual for the work of

Page 20265

1 commands and staffs. It's footnote 35 of Part 1 of the report.

2 And I think it is pretty obvious, but the levels are defined.

3 There have been changed over time; for example, I think the operational

4 level makes mention here of armies but armies were replaced by

5 Military District at the end -- Military Districts at the end of the

6 1980s and the division is clear.

7 Q. I appreciate it might be clear on the page, Mr. Theunens, but

8 actually could you please first explain under the 1983 JNA manual what --

9 what the strategic level is and what their responsibilities are?

10 A. I will repeat myself to a certain extent but --

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, were you informed by the Prosecution

12 about the discussion the Chamber had with the Prosecution about how to

13 present your evidence?

14 THE WITNESS: I -- you mean the discussions in

15 September Your Honours or --

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. About the length of your explanations and that

17 the Chamber urged the Prosecution to elicit as much as possible viva voce

18 evidence. Therefore, if you say, I repeat myself, what we are seeking is

19 a condensed evidence --

20 THE WITNESS: Mm-hm.

21 JUDGE ORIE: -- and that is the reason why Mr. Weber now and then

22 will ask questions where you may be surprised because they're already in

23 your report. But the level of detail of the report is such that the

24 Chamber, especially if it is about the general overview rather than the

25 events on the ground, is seeking to have condensed, succinct evidence.

Page 20266

1 So don't worry if you repeat yourself but then -- in approximately

2 perhaps 10 per cent of the time or the number of words to be used for it.

3 THE WITNESS: I -- I understand, Your Honours, and your

4 clarification is -- is very helpful.

5 Strategic level is the Supreme Command and that was in the time

6 of SFRY, the SFRY Presidency. And, of course, that also then includes

7 the Supreme Command staff which at the time was the SSNO, the Secretariat

8 for All People's Defence. The operational level is the military command

9 level below the Supreme Command Staff. At that time in 1983 were armies

10 but those are in fact the Military Districts.

11 And, of course, it also includes the corps commands as well as

12 equivalent TO commands, i.e., republican and provincial TO command. And

13 then the tactical level is anything below so from the division downwards.

14 MR. WEBER:

15 Q. You've already mentioned in the VRS at what level the strategic

16 decisions were made. Could you tell us now at what level of command

17 would the operational and tactical decisions made in the VRS -- what

18 levels, plural.

19 A. Well, the Main Staff and obviously the commander of the

20 Main Staff is responsible for translating political guidance military

21 goals or military tasks, and this is the strategic/operational level.

22 For me, the corps command also includes the operational level,

23 but I think it's a matter of semantics, and anything below the corps,

24 i.e., brigades, battalions, and equivalent units, up to the squad level

25 is the tactical level.

Page 20267

1 Q. Thank you for those explanations.

2 Could the Prosecution please have the next page of Exhibit P338.

3 In the first full paragraph from the top of this page, the report

4 describes how decisions were made on the engagement of VRS forces at

5 Main Staff meetings headed, as a rule, by the commander, with the active

6 participation of other officers.

7 In the course of this explanation, there's reference to the

8 so-called full method and other methods.

9 First, could you please explain what the full method is,

10 according to SFRY military doctrine.

11 A. Your Honours, the -- the full method for the implementation of

12 command and control process -- or the command process which means that

13 all staff sections, so not only the commander and the assistant

14 commanders but also the members of the staff, are consulted in order to

15 transform the task received from the Superior Command into orders for the

16 subordinate units.

17 The commander will consult with everybody but, of course, he has

18 the -- the freedom, as he is the commander, to decide himself to what

19 extent he will make use of the result of these consultations and how -- I

20 mean, the actual, his decision, will be. Or what his decision will be.

21 Q. There is also reference to another method, the fast-track method.

22 Could you please explain this method to us. How it differs from the full

23 method.

24 A. Yeah, what is here described, Your Honours, as fast-track method

25 is in the doctrine described as the shortened method. And it means that

Page 20268

1 the commander will only consult with his assistant commanders, or even he

2 will not consult, and then he comes to a decision.

3 The -- the -- the reasons -- I mean, the main criteria for the

4 choice -- for choosing are obviously the available time. If the

5 commander has a lot of time available, then he will most likely choose

6 for the full method. If there is not a lot of time available, and by

7 "time available," I mean, okay, between receiving the task from the

8 superior command and the moment he and his units have to be ready to

9 implement that task. So if there's not enough time available, then he

10 will choose for the shortened method. Or the fast-track method, sorry.

11 Q. If we could please scroll down on this page.

12 In the second paragraph from the bottom, there's a discussion of

13 command posts and the development of their infrastructure. If I could

14 just refer you to pages 42 and 43 of Part 1 of your report, where you

15 describe command posts, their purpose, and the various types.

16 Could we just please just go step by step with this. Could you

17 first explain under JNA doctrine what are the purpose of command posts?

18 A. Your Honours, the -- a command post is the geographic location

19 from where command and control are exercised. Or, sorry, "exercises" is

20 a French word. Are implemented. I'm sorry.

21 Q. Just, Mr. Theunens, go ahead. And if you have to give more

22 complete explanations, I -- I see that there's are number of other items

23 that you might think are clear on this page. But do command posts

24 consist under the -- of appropriate communications centres?

25 A. Yes, they do, Your Honours. Because, as I said, command posts

Page 20269

1 are the geographic location from where command and control are exercised.

2 We have seen the seven principles of command and control. Continuity is

3 one of these principles, so the location and the facilities available at

4 that location for the command post must allow to implement uninterrupted

5 command and control.

6 Command and control involves that orders are issued but also that

7 reports are received. And this done through communication assets, which

8 can be couriers but, I mean, as we see from the documents, telex, for

9 example, telephone, and in those times -- I mean, telex and telephone in

10 those times were -- are the main communication assets, together with

11 radios.

12 What -- what is important -- what I consider important in the

13 context of the report is the concept of a forward command post --

14 Q. Mr. Theunens, sorry to interrupt you. I'm going to have to go

15 step by step through each of these.

16 A. Okay.

17 Q. I know it's written there, but ...

18 You -- you discuss the different -- six different types of

19 command posts. If we could just go one by one, and I note these

20 descriptions are straightforward, but if could you please include a short

21 but comprehensive explanation on them.

22 What ask a basic command post?

23 A. Well, usually in military documents, the basic command post is

24 identified as the command post, i.e., the location from where command and

25 control are implemented. Whether it's during an exercise or during

Page 20270

1 combat operations.

2 Q. Okay. I'm sorry, I'm just going to have go through this a little

3 bit more with you.

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. At what levels of command are basic command posts established?

6 A. I mean, they're established at -- at all levels. Obviously a

7 platoon will not have a command post because a platoon is -- I mean, in

8 the kind of operations we're talking about, be it infantry, or armour,

9 they -- if they have -- the commander will be in his vehicle or on the

10 terrain and that's from where he and maybe an assistant with a radio will

11 exercise command and control.

12 A company may have several vehicles. And then, when we go

13 higher, indeed, a corps -- I'm jumping a few levels. But from brigade,

14 division, corps, they will have fixed command posts which can be located

15 in buildings or in tents or in -- in trucks. I mean, any facility that

16 allows to -- that to exercise command and control.

17 Q. I'm sorry, just to finish off this definition, is it -- is it

18 accurate that according to the JNA doctrine that the location of the

19 command post is placed to ensure successful command and control without

20 frequent change of position?

21 A. Yes, indeed. And I should have said that. It's always a

22 challenge between finding a location that is close enough to where the

23 action takes place but, at the same time, it has to be secure. And if we

24 are involved in mobile operations, then the command post may have to

25 change from time to time, not just because of the range of the radios

Page 20271

1 or -- or of communication lines but also of security. If you're too

2 close to the confrontation line, then you expose yourself. And this is

3 one of the reasons why, in highly mobile operations, forward command

4 posts with be established. And that's --

5 Q. We'll come to that.

6 A. Okay. Mm-hm.

7 Q. The second one that you have in your report here is a logistics

8 command post. Could you please tell us what this is.

9 A. It's -- we apply the same principles, Your Honours, but it is

10 to -- to -- to organise. I mean, to command and control logistic

11 support, be it supply, maintenance, evacuation of casualties, and so on.

12 And this is usually separated from the command post which deals mainly

13 with operational issues.

14 Q. Just to proceed maybe a little bit more quickly for the end of

15 the day.

16 Is it correct that logistics command posts are set up by commands

17 of a higher level than those of basic command posts?

18 A. I -- I -- it's not entirely correct. I mean, I cannot say in the

19 JNA I -- at what level logistic command posts were set up. I mean, from

20 my own experience, in -- in -- in our armed forces -- a battalion doesn't

21 have a separate logistic command post, but all the logistic report will

22 be separate. More in the rear, because -- I mean, they're more

23 vulnerable, and there is no requirement for them to be close to the

24 confrontation line. And it's -- it's a huge thing because if you have a

25 mechanized unit, I mean, spare starts, ammunition and all those things

Page 20272

1 take a lot of space. So, for a battalion, what we call it the trains. I

2 don't know how it was called in the JNA because I didn't look so much in

3 that aspect of logistic support. But, for sure, I would say from a

4 brigade level and corps looking at the sheer size of the infrastructure

5 that is needed, and I think that is it also illustrated when you look at,

6 for example, the statements of General Mladic in relation to consumption

7 of ammunition and the support required from VJ, there --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. --

9 THE WITNESS: Yeah. I'm sorry, Your Honours.

10 There, obviously you will have a separate logistics command post

11 to manage and -- I mean, to command and control basically those aspects.

12 MR. WEBER:

13 Q. Could you please explain to us what is a forward command post or

14 IKM?

15 A. Forward command posts are established when there are operational

16 requirements to do so, i.e., when there is a highly mobile operation,

17 and/or when it is difficult to exercise command and control from the

18 regular command post because of the terrain, because of other factors.

19 Forward command posts are much smaller and they really include the

20 essential parts of the command posts in order conduct the operations.

21 Q. At what level of commands are forward command posts established?

22 A. I would say, for sure, starting at the level of brigade and then

23 upwards. Brigade, division, and corps.

24 Q. Did -- during the course of VRS operations, did the Main Staff,

25 and in particular, Mr. Mladic, set up Main Staff forward command posts?

Page 20273

1 A. Indeed, for a number of -- what I considered key operations,

2 forward command posts were set up. They could have been set up by the

3 Main Staff or by the units conducting the operations obviously on the

4 orders of the Main Staff, and General Mladic would exercise command and

5 control from these forward command posts.

6 Q. I'm going to skip the reserve command posts and go onto the

7 command posts referred on page 43 of Part 1 of your report.

8 Could you please tell us what a joint command post is.

9 A. Yeah, I mean, this is the doctrine as it is stated there. It is

10 when there are both JNA and TO operating.

11 Now, when I look at the practical situation, as it was in

12 Croatia, given the -- or -- Croatia. Or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Given the

13 developments in relation to the TO, there was -- no such joint command

14 posts were established for the operations I have reviewed. There were

15 just the command posts which were mainly manned by JNA personnel.

16 Q. Just briefly, could you tell us what a false command post is.

17 A. Yeah. I mean, the doctrine says it is part of operational

18 camouflage activity, i.e., it's deception. It is to deceive the enemy

19 about the location of the command post.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, perhaps this is two examples.

21 Is there any false command post actively involved in this case?

22 For the previous one, the witness told us that no joint command posts

23 were established.

24 Of course, we are aware of command posts. We are aware of

25 forward command posts because that's part of the evidence. Why do we

Page 20274

1 have to know what kind of command posts could have been used in other

2 circumstances elsewhere?

3 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I'd say the fact that joint command

4 posts were not necessary and were not needed is relevant to the fact that

5 the VRS didn't need to set up such command posts. And we will return to

6 some examples and concepts related to this later on when discussing the

7 examples. I wasn't just -- I was asking particularly for the reason, the

8 fact that the VRS did not use them.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

10 And the false command posts, same?

11 MR. WEBER: There may be reference to them. But I -- I -- that's

12 why I asked briefly, just for completion. I will keep it in mind. I

13 understand what Your Honour is saying.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.

15 MR. WEBER:

16 Q. I would now like to ask you a little bit about the SFRY doctrine

17 of All People's Defence or ONO. This is discussed throughout Part 1 of

18 your report on numerous pages. I'll try to direct you to the -- to

19 specific ones as they come up.

20 Could you please tell us what the SFRY doctrine of All People's

21 Defence is.

22 A. Your Honour, this doctrine means that all available resources, be

23 it human or materiel, are used in defence -- to defend the country

24 against an aggressor.

25 Q. In the former Yugoslavia, where does the concept of All People's

Page 20275

1 Defence originate from?

2 A. It was introduced in 1969, Your Honours.

3 Q. How? Mr. Theunens, I know this is in your report, but if could

4 you please specify as much information as possible.

5 A. Yeah, I think -- I mean, then I haven't seen the documents from

6 1969. But given the other documents, that is when, based on the --

7 how -- the then-President Tito and other senior officials saw the

8 situation in -- in the countries surrounding Yugoslavia, that they

9 considered it important to introduce this doctrine. And then after that,

10 obviously subsequent doctrinal documents are developed, and we see the

11 establishment of -- of -- of TO units on the various levels by republic,

12 by -- and later on also for the autonomous provinces when those are

13 created and that cascades down to -- to the lower level, in order to,

14 indeed, allow the population, in addition to materiel resources, to

15 participate in the defence the country. In addition to the -- the usual

16 armed forces, if I can express myself that way, which was the Yugoslav

17 People's Army.

18 Q. How does the All People's Defence doctrine incorporate the

19 command and control principles of single authority and unity?

20 A. It does, Your Honours, by explaining, for example, when I cited

21 earlier the definition of command and control as it is mentioned in the

22 1990 corps regulation, it states that when JNA and TO are active in the

23 same area that then command and control is in the hands of the commander

24 of the operations, i.e., there will always be one commander.

25 Again, for what we saw during the conflict in Croatia and

Page 20276

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the establishment of the VRS, it is the JNA

2 officer who is in command of operations. Remember what I said about OGs

3 involving TO. But theoretically there can be situations where a TO

4 commander can be in command of JNA forces.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, I'm looking at the clock.

6 MR. WEBER: Whenever it's good for Your Honour.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yeah. It's quarter part 2.00.

8 MR. WEBER: Okay.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, we'd like to see you back on Thursday,

10 so we're not sitting tomorrow. We'll not finish on Thursday. But, just,

11 that's the first day when we'd like to see you back at 9.30 in the

12 morning, in this same courtroom, II.

13 You may follow the usher.

14 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, yes, and I would like to instruct you that you

16 should not speak or communicate in whatever way, with whomever, about

17 your testimony, whether already given, or still to be given.

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours, I understand.

19 [The witness withdrew]

20 JUDGE ORIE: We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume, Thursday,

21 the 5th of December, 9.30 in the morning, in this same courtroom, II.

22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.16 p.m.,

23 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 5th day of

24 December, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.