131210ED

Page 20544

1 documents were marked for identification, awaiting further submissions

2 from the Defence. This concerns D416, D423, D431, P2900, and P2923, up

3 to and including P2932.

4 And perhaps the witness could already be escorted into the

5 courtroom.

6 Regarding D416, the Chamber expressed that it's interested the

7 provenance of the document and whether it should be bar tabled. For

8 D423, there was a translation issue the Defence would see to. For D4341,

9 there was no original document available, and the Defence stated that it

10 would sort this out.

11 Regarding P2900 and P2923 up to and including P2932, tendered by

12 the Prosecution, the Defence was granted further time to consider its

13 position, and the Chamber would like to hear from the parties on these

14 matters, and we'd perhaps do that after one of the breaks.

15 [The witness takes the stand]

16 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Theunens.

17 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, I again remind you that you're still

19 bound by the solemn declaration you have given at the beginning of your

20 testimony, and Mr. Ivetic will now continue his cross-examination.

21 Mr. Ivetic please proceed.

22 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]

24 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]

25 Q. Good day, Mr. Theunens.

Page 20545

1 A. Good morning, Mr. Ivetic.

2 Q. I'd like to ask you if you could tell us, did you keep a log of

3 all the documentation and materials that you would have had occasion to

4 look at for purposes of performing your review and analysis and in

5 drafting the report but which you did not cite?

6 A. I have an overview of the search terms I used. I also -- I mean,

7 I stored some of the documents that I didn't use for the -- but I

8 reviewed but I didn't use for the report while I was working on the

9 computer, and perhaps I still have that on a hard drive because I -- I

10 had the habit of storing the work did I during the four visits I made to

11 ICTY in order to compile this report, to store it on a hard drive in

12 order to also work on it while I was in Lebanon.

13 So if you want, I can show that to you, I mean, during the break

14 or something.

15 Q. Okay. Did you occasion to research beyond the documentation that

16 the Prosecution already had in its possession to seek additional

17 documentation by way of Requests for Assistance from any governments or

18 any agencies?

19 A. I did not draft such requests or ask the Office of the Prosecutor

20 to make such requests for this specific report.

21 Q. Now, for purposes of drafting your report in the Mladic case, you

22 have already mentioned some books by General Kadijevic and by Presidency

23 member Jovic as having been looked at by you. Did you have occasion to

24 consult any of the literature out there about the intelligence cycle

25 method of review or speak to any other experts on the topic?

Page 20546

1 A. Your Honours, I have had -- I mean, I attended several training

2 courses where the intelligence cycle was discussed. I also briefly

3 participated in a course at ICTY for criminal analysts, but I was called

4 for other duties. And also something that is not mentioned in my CV, I

5 teach every two, three months at the Centre of Excellence for Standing

6 Police Units in Vicenza, Italy, on intelligence in UN peacekeeping

7 operations, and the issue of the intelligence cycle is -- is part of

8 that. And again, there within the UN, within I would call the community

9 of practices of the -- of chiefs, JMAC [phoen], we discuss these kind of

10 issues because it's obviously also the methodology we use in our work.

11 Q. Did you present either your draft or final report to be reviewed

12 by anyone for purposes of verification or revision? Peer review.

13 A. I think after each visit -- each of the four visits I -- I shared

14 my work or work product and that was a draft in various stages to the --

15 to, I think, Mr. Groome. But I don't remember receiving any feedback

16 except for what I mentioned yesterday, that was I think several months

17 after the entry of the final report into what we call -- I mean, the

18 databases and where he said that he considered the report a fairly or

19 very, sorry, very comprehensive. But I don't recall receiving any other

20 feedback.

21 MR. IVETIC: If we can call up in e-court 1D1497, I'd like to

22 focus a bit on the intelligence cycle as we promised yesterday.

23 Q. Now as you can see, sir, this is an article entitled: "What is

24 Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle," and is a publication by a

25 Arthur Hulnick, and it is within the journal "Intelligence and National

Page 20547

1 Security." First of all, are you familiar with either this journal or

2 this author within the field of intelligence gathering?

3 A. I think I've seen the magazine before, but I'm not familiar with

4 the author, so I'd like to see a CV before reading his article.

5 Q. I don't think they have the CV as part of the article since it's

6 not an expert report.

7 A. But I think usually there is at the end of the article -- I mean,

8 there is this a description of who the author is and what is his

9 practical experience because -- anyway, I let you ask questions.

10 Q. Okay.

11 MR. IVETIC: Now, if we can turn to page 10 of the article and

12 that should correlate to page 967 of the underlying publication. Looks

13 like we need to go one more page in e-court. So I guess I'm off by a

14 page. Yep, that's the page.

15 Q. And I would like to focus on the first full paragraph from the

16 top which reads:

17 "The reality is that policy officials often know what they want

18 to do even before they receive the estimate, and hope that this product

19 will confirm in some way the wisdom of the path they have already chosen.

20 When the estimate conflicts with their views, policy consumers may

21 dismiss it as uninformed, useless, or even obstructionist. When it

22 agrees with what they think they already know, then they may see it as

23 confirming, irrelevant, or again useless. Although one would think that

24 policy makers would want to know when they were heading in the wrong

25 direction, this is not usually the case. Policy consumers do not welcome

Page 20548

1 intelligence that is non-confirming, perhaps because the large egos that

2 brought them into positions of power do not permit admissions of

3 ignorance."

4 First of all, sir, based upon your experiences performing work

5 using the intelligence cycle, do you agree with the statements of this

6 author?

7 A. Your Honours, before answering the question I note that there are

8 no footnotes in -- I mean, the author who I don't know makes a number of

9 assertions. I don't know what they're based on. I mean, when I look

10 further in the article I think it is related to the whole issue of

11 whether or not there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq prior to

12 the intervention, I believe, in 2003 or the invasion. Obviously, I mean,

13 I would -- if you really want to know more about this, I think that one

14 standard work is by a man called, I mean, I forgot his first name but

15 last name is Heuer. It's called "Psychology of Intelligence Analysis."

16 You can find it on the CIA web site. And there it talks about all the

17 difficulties, I mean, an analysts can face, also the flaws analysts can

18 have, and he introduces the concept of intelligence to please; i.e., in

19 some environments or in some situations it may well be the case that

20 intelligence analysts are afraid to, quote/unquote, upset their -- their

21 supervisors or their chiefs or their commanders and then just provide an

22 estimate or analysis that they believe will correspond with the views of

23 their commander.

24 I cannot deny that I -- I think I have met one such person during

25 my military career or during my service in peacekeeping operations, i.e.,

Page 20549

1 a senior official who refused to listen to negative assessments -- or

2 assessments; I mean, predictive analysis that did not correspond with

3 his, I would say, overly optimistic view in relation to further

4 developments of the situation.

5 Most of the people, I mean, almost everybody I worked for, they

6 were interested to know in what was really the situation and what the

7 outlook of the analysts was in order to have a constructive debate. Now

8 irrespective of that and irrespective of that paragraph, it doesn't

9 mention the intelligence cycle let alone put the intelligence cycle into

10 question.

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Theunens, in two ways, can you answer the

12 question put by Mr. Ivetic, please. Do you agree with the author or do

13 you disagree with the author?

14 THE WITNESS: I agree with his observations --

15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

16 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honours, to a certain extent, but

17 he doesn't discuss the intelligence cycle.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you so much.

19 THE WITNESS: It's not a black and white situation.

20 MR. IVETIC: If we could focus on the second-to-last paragraph of

21 the page.

22 Q. It reads as follow, gives some of the details in relation to the

23 weapons of mass destruction analysis that was done in relation to Iraq

24 and it reads as follows:

25 "Accordance to James Risen, intelligence officials in both the

Page 20550

1 collection and analysis arms of CIA, as well as those in other agencies,

2 knew the sources were poor and the conclusions wrong, but they could not

3 fight senior managers who wanted to satisfy the political needs of the

4 White House. Even more corrupting it appears that Secretary of Defence

5 Rumsfeld, fearing that the --"

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You should slow down, Mr. Ivetic.

7 MR. IVETIC:

8 Q. "... fearing that the estimate would not support the already

9 planned invasion of Iraq, sent his own officials, neither of them

10 intelligence officers, to find the correct information. All these steps

11 were perversions of the estimates process."

12 First of all, sir, isn't it clear that we're talking about the

13 intelligence cycle here?

14 A. No, Your Honours, we're talking about, I mean, a political

15 situation where intelligence was -- where attempts were made to use

16 intelligence as evidence. There was -- and I'm sorry to take some time,

17 but I think it's very misleading to use an article that discusses a very

18 specific situation in a very specific political context to put a

19 methodology into question where -- you know, I would invite to you look

20 at how 99 per cent of the armies in the world work, how other

21 organisations work, and they still stick - I mean, and the police and so

22 on - they still stick to the intelligence analysis. It was not the

23 process, the intelligence analysis -- excuse me, the intelligence cycle.

24 It is not the intelligence cycle that is wrong. It is the way how it was

25 misused to create intelligence that would support certain political

Page 20551

1 conclusions.

2 MR. IVETIC: If we could turn to page 20 of this document, and it

3 should correlate to page 978, or if I'm consistent in my error it will be

4 page 21. We'll see when we get there. There we go.

5 Q. I'd like to focus on the bottom of the page which I think

6 addresses your points that you've just made, sir. The author of this

7 article states:

8 "I suspect that, despite my preaching about alternatives to the

9 traditional intelligence cycle, it will continue to be taught both inside

10 government and elsewhere. Nonetheless, it would be encouraging to think

11 that those so deeply wedded to the flawed concept of the intelligence

12 cycle would, in the course of studying this volume, realise that there is

13 an alternative to the traditional view of how intelligence works.

14 Perhaps they might even consider it for discussion. Yet we know that

15 people tend to look for confirming rather than disconfirming data. They

16 will seek to defend the intelligence cycle rather than consider the

17 alternatives. Nonetheless, the intelligence cycle is a flawed vision,

18 and thus poor theory. One need only ask those who have toiled in the

19 fields of intelligence."

20 Do you agree or disagree with Mr. Hulnick's assessment of the

21 intelligence cycle and those who operate under it?

22 A. I mean, as a -- from a generic point of view, I disagree with

23 him. Also because he doesn't propose any alternatives. You know, if he

24 wants to launch a debate, show some alternatives, bring some footnotes.

25 I think he is expressing his personal views. If I have his CV, I could

Page 20552

1 maybe better understand why he has such negative views and why he

2 confuses the intelligence cycle with the way how in a specific situation

3 intelligence, as it has been confirmed -- not confirmed, but as it has

4 been noted by many scholars, intelligence was misused to justify certain

5 political decisions. But to -- I mean, to -- from there to then to start

6 putting into question intelligence cycle is for me a leap where I wonder

7 what is the scientific or academic basis for that.

8 Q. If we could turn to the next page, I think you'll see that this

9 article is based on the concept of end notes as many journals are. Do

10 you recognise, in addition to the many publications by Mr. Hulnick, James

11 Risen, Sherman Kent, Harold Greenberg, are familiar with any of these

12 authors? James Steiner?

13 A. I am familiar with Sherman Kent.

14 Q. James Risen?

15 A. Yeah. I mean, I also see it's very Anglo Saxon. It may be very

16 focused on a typical US situation. You know, I attended a training

17 course in the United States where we had the privilege of being together

18 with professionals from, let's say, the United States, and we could see

19 some cultural differences including some differences to the approach of

20 our work between on one hand people from United States as well as people

21 from the rest of the world.

22 Q. Okay.

23 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, can we tender this article at this

24 time as the next Defence exhibit number.

25 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, the Prosecution would just request more

Page 20553

1 information on who this author is, what his background is. We're

2 searching for it. Can't find it.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.

4 MR. IVETIC: Then I will tender from the bar table, Your Honours,

5 if that's the issue. The Prosecution ask allowed to regularly tender

6 articles and documents without giving explanations of the authors, so I

7 don't know what the -- what the [indiscernible] of the Defence will have

8 to be. If have to make submissions, I'd do them in writing, Your

9 Honours, because I obviously don't at this time have the additional

10 information that the Prosecution is seeking.

11 [Prosecution counsel confer]

12 JUDGE ORIE: The document will be MFI'd awaiting further

13 submissions from the Defence.

14 Madam Registrar --

15 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I believe that we were able to just

16 quickly ascertain that he is a professor at Boston University. In that

17 context if that's acknowledged by the Defence, no objection.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Then the document will be admitted.

19 Madam Registrar, the number would be.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D1497 receives number D449,

21 Your Honours.

22 JUDGE ORIE: D449 is admitted.

23 MR. IVETIC: I'd like to look at another article. If we can have

24 1D1499 in e-court, and this is a publication of an agency of Canada's

25 Department of National Defence, the Defence R&D Canada. Are you familiar

Page 20554

1 with that institution?

2 A. I'm not, Your Honours.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. But -- excuse me, is this an official institution or is this kind

5 of a think-tank or?

6 Q. It's my understanding it's an official institution.

7 A. Okay.

8 Q. The -- are you familiar with the 16th International Command and

9 Control Research and Technology Symposium held in June 2011?

10 A. I'm not, Your Honours.

11 Q. Okay.

12 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to page 4 of this document. Ah. And

13 if we can look at the first paragraph after introduction.

14 Q. "The traditional intelligence cycle is a conceptual model showing

15 how intelligence operations are conducted. It consists of four steps

16 (direction, collection, processing, and dissemination) from defining what

17 the decision-maker needs to know to the reception of the answer that he

18 asked for. During the last decades many criticisms and discussions were

19 addressed towards the intelligence cycle," and then are nine endnotes

20 which you can look at later.

21 But I'd like to focus on what it says here about Gregory F.

22 Treverton in his book "Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of

23 Information" asserts that:

24 "'The changes in the world that are already apparent are more

25 than enough to require a complete reshaping of intelligence and the

Page 20555

1 extension of those changes into the future of the market state will only

2 sharpen that need.'"

3 Are you first of all familiar with Mr. Treverton, and would you

4 agree with the opinion that he has expressed here?

5 A. I am familiar with him, but I don't recall a specific article

6 written by him. I mean, the quotation, it's -- obviously, the way how

7 intelligence has to be done needs to be reviewed in -- in the context

8 also -- I mean, the information revolution, the Internet, and all that --

9 these kind of developments. Yeah, I have no problem with that. And also

10 the market state, that there is more and more private consultancies doing

11 similar work, and then there is a lot of outsourcing and so on. Yeah, it

12 makes sense.

13 Q. If we could -- I think the translation is caught up with us. If

14 we could look at the next author Mark Lowenthal and his book,

15 intelligence: "From Secrets to Policy." And he -- it is stated here:

16 "The intelligence cycle representation misrepresents some aspects

17 and misses many others. First it is it overly simple. Its end to end

18 completeness misses many of the vagaries in the process. It is also

19 oddly uni-dimensional. A policy maker asks questions and after a few

20 steps gets an answer. There is no feedback and the diagram does not

21 convey that the process might not be completed in one cycle."

22 First of all, do you know of Mr. Lowenthal and do you agree or

23 disagree with his comments?

24 A. I do know of Lowenthal and I even read his book, "Intelligence

25 From Security to Policy," even if that is some time ago. But I think

Page 20556

1 have you to be very careful when you read a paragraph. He is talking

2 about the representation of the intelligence cycle; i.e., what you see,

3 the traditional diagram with four boxes and then arrows leading from one

4 box to the other. Obviously, that is -- that if you would confine your

5 understanding or your attempts to understand the intelligence cycle to

6 those four boxes and the arrows, then you will not understand how it

7 works, then will you not understand the methodology.

8 There has to be feedback. That is correct. There has to be --

9 it's not that you get a question from a policy maker or your commander

10 and then you apply the cycle and you run back. No, there is constant

11 interaction. The information that is it being collected will obviously

12 influence your -- the processing, i.e., evaluation -- a colation,

13 evaluation, analysis, integration, interpretation, those four steps will

14 influence collection. And if you go back to the person who gave

15 direction and you say, you know, you asked me to look into this, but,

16 hey, have you seen this and this. Then obviously direction has to change

17 too, and this is how in my career the intelligence cycle was applied and

18 this is what Mr. Lowenthal identifies as feedback.

19 So I do agree with what Lowenthal says because he doesn't attack

20 or put into request the methodology. He puts into question the way how

21 the methodology is represented in a simple diagram and perhaps how it has

22 been applied by some in a bit of, I would say, too narrow -- too narrow

23 manner.

24 Q. If we can look at the last item on the page, it says:

25 "In the publication of the centre of the study of intelligence of

Page 20557

1 the CIA, it is stated that: '... the model omits elements and fails to

2 capture the process accurately' and the traditional intelligence cycle

3 model should either be redesigned to depict accurately the intended goal,

4 or care should be taken to discuss explicitly its limitations whenever it

5 is used."

6 Do you agree or disagree with the same?

7 A. I would like to see the specific context in which these very

8 broad and, I mean, general statements are being made which, in my view,

9 do not put into question the methodology but they put into question how

10 maybe in some countries or by -- some people have applied the

11 methodology.

12 Q. If we can look at page 9 of this article in e-court, which should

13 correlate to page 7 of the underlying article, I'd like to focus on the

14 second bullet point from the top. It relates to endnote 5, and I can

15 tell that you this Canadian agency is citing to Professor Hulnick again

16 for this assertion. And it says:

17 "Intelligence support decision-maker rather than inform him. In

18 5, the author infirm the idea that the decision-makers wait for the

19 delivery of intelligence before making decisions; they rather want

20 intelligence to support them rather than to inform them. He explains

21 that they often have a confirmation bias to some information and they

22 often know what they want to do even before they receive the intelligence

23 estimate, and hope that this product will confirm in some way the wisdom

24 of the path they have already chosen."

25 Do you agree or disagree with this?

Page 20558

1 A. Your Honours, as I mentioned earlier, there are for sure

2 decision-makers who are not waiting for the -- the estimate or the

3 predictive analysis of their intelligence staff but who have already

4 taken their decision, and then will be very selective in -- in using that

5 analysis that have been -- has been provided to them.

6 On the other hand, and again I can talk very long about this, but

7 I don't know whether that is helpful to the Court, there was a very

8 interesting study after the NATO bombing of Serbia and Montenegro in 1999

9 by an investigation commission of the United Kingdom House of Commons

10 where they said, you know, the common view so far was that intelligence

11 has to predict the most likely option. However, this is not the role of

12 intelligence in the current situation. And actually the -- the role of

13 intelligence is now to present all possible options, in particular, the

14 worst case scenario, in order for decision-makers to -- to -- in order to

15 avoid -- excuse me, in order to avoid that decision-makers are surprised.

16 Obviously we are talking about two different types of decision-makers.

17 The one in this paragraph who only -- I mean, who seems to be a bit

18 stubborn, has already made up his or her mind; or on the other hand, the

19 decision-maker who is open for different views. You know, that -- I

20 think that has something -- is more related to the psychology of

21 leadership than to the intelligence cycle. I don't see any -- any --

22 references or any -- any -- criticism there to the intelligence cycle.

23 It is more an issue of the decision -- the process of decision making and

24 how decisions are made.

25 Q. I can tell you sir that the remainder of this article talks about

Page 20559

1 the literature in the community about proposals for changes in the

2 intelligence cycle and the gathering of intelligence. Do you consider

3 that the intelligence cycle methodology is a reliable modus for

4 performing the type of review that did you here in the report that has

5 been labelled as P3029, marked for identification?

6 A. Yes, I do, Your Honours.

7 Q. And do you contend that such a stance is widely accepted in the

8 community of similar practitioners and experts of the intelligence cycle?

9 A. I mean, it's not just an issue of practitioners and what you call

10 experts. It is an issue of what organisations and institutions and --

11 teach to their intelligence analysts -- or I mean to their-intelligence

12 personnel and how these organisations are working where indeed you see

13 debates in relation to the methodology but overall the conclusions are

14 that the intelligence cycle, as such, is not wrong but it's the way how

15 we apply it and, for example, as this article shows in the paragraphs

16 we've seen, how decision-makers are handling intelligence.

17 Q. Okay. I'd like to leave the intelligence cycle now and move to

18 another topic directly to your report.

19 In Part 1 of your report, and it's section 3 of the same, you

20 talk about events in 1991 through 1992 in relation to the conflict in

21 Croatia. This at pages 113 to 181 of the hard copy that you have. I'd

22 like to ask you some stuff -- some questions about some of that.

23 First of all, would you agree that the SFRY armed forces,

24 including the JNA, had an obligation under Article 240 of the SFRY

25 constitution and Article 92 of the 1982 Law of All People's Defence to

Page 20560

1 defend the country from both external and internal aggression?

2 A. Well, the mission of the SFRY armed forces was four-fold: So to

3 defend and protect territorial integrity, sovereignty, social order, and

4 independence of the SFRY. So I give you the literal citation of the

5 article because, of course, the issue of internal aggression, I think

6 there is room for interpretation.

7 Q. So maintaining sovereignty, social order, and independence of

8 SFRY in your opinion does not relate to defending against internal

9 aggression?

10 A. That was not my answer, Your Honours.

11 Q. That's why I'm asking you to clarify it, sir, and answer my

12 question.

13 JUDGE ORIE: What you asked was with a question mark. In

14 interpretation of the answer of the witness, you didn't ask him to

15 explain that. Other phrasing would have certainly assisted the witness

16 in understanding your question.

17 Please proceed.

18 The question now being clear, Mr. Theunens.

19 THE WITNESS: Well, if an internal aggression, quote/unquote,

20 puts into danger -- or endangers, I'm sorry, social order, then the SFRY

21 armed force would say have to intervene on the basis of the instructions

22 they receive from the Supreme Command.

23 MR. IVETIC:

24 Q. And at the time of the secessionist movements of the Slovenes and

25 the Croats in 1991, did the presence of armed Croat and Slovene

Page 20561

1 secessionist groups, in your opinion, constitute a threat to the

2 sovereignty, social order, and independence of the Yugoslav state?

3 A. Well, it was for sure perceived by some as a threat to that.

4 Now, the way how this then was transformed into orders, i.e., how the

5 Supreme Command responded to that, I think there it's not as clear-cut as

6 you would expect from the text of the article of the constitution and the

7 All People's Defence law.

8 Q. Now have you quoted to General Kadijevic's book in your report

9 and in your testimony. In the report, it's at pages 121 through 124 of

10 Part 1. Did you consider looking at books written by other JNA military

11 officers from the time-period to compare to Mr. Kadijevic?

12 A. Your Honour, not for this report but in -- before that, when I

13 was still working here, I looked into the works of General Sekulic, I

14 think it was Milisav Sekulic. He published some books but he also

15 published, I mean, various articles. I think there was -- there is also

16 if -- a general Stojadinovic who has published a number of articles. And

17 I'm not sure about books specifically about the conflict but for sure

18 articles about the conflict. And overall, I think there is -- there

19 is -- my conclusion was that there was quite some degree of consistency

20 between the views of all these generals on one hand but also -- I mean,

21 comparing those views, then, with the actual military documents.

22 Q. Did you analyse other parts of Kadijevic's book dealing with the

23 preparations of the Croats in the period leading up to 1991 for an armed

24 insurgency?

25 A. I read the entire book by General Kadijevic, but I didn't analyse

Page 20562

1 those aspects because I considered that they were outside the scope of

2 this specific report.

3 Q. Did your research reveal that he was schooled at the American --

4 or the US war college?

5 A. Excuse me, I don't understand the question.

6 Q. Did your research reveal that Mr. Kadijevic was schooled at an

7 American institution; specifically, the US war college?

8 A. I have a vague recollection that he was partly trained in the

9 United States, yes.

10 Q. And General Kadijevic himself -- declared himself to be Yugoslav,

11 whereas his parents were of mixed Serb and Croat ethnicity. Did that

12 come up in your research?

13 A. It's possible, but I -- I mean, I don't -- I didn't consider that

14 relevant for the way how he acted as the Chief of Staff of the Supreme

15 Command and also as, obviously, the secretary for All People's Defence in

16 the latter half of 1991.

17 Q. Would you agree in terms of methodology that when one looks at a

18 single source it generally cannot be considered reliable as to describing

19 a situation in its entirety?

20 A. Again, this is a very generic question well, like, I -- I would

21 like to clarify the issue in my answer.

22 In my report, I -- when I talk about General Kadijevic and his

23 book, the section is explicitly titled -- or explicitly refers to his

24 book, so I don't claim that this is how developments went, nor I say that

25 this is how General Kadijevic sees or -- or considers how situation

Page 20563

1 unfolded. I -- I --

2 Q. But you chose to select General Kadijevic's book over any of the

3 others that you read. You decided to present one position.

4 A. I think that's also a misrepresentation. I choice Kadijevic

5 because I have two -- I have his book, and at the same time I have his

6 contemporaneous documents; i.e., the orders and the guide-lines he

7 issues, in particular, during the latter half of 1991. And I could see

8 consistency between the two. I also considered Kadijevic having been the

9 most senior military person in the SFRY at that stage as -- as -- I would

10 say a key player and a key actor in the context of the events we are

11 discussing. So it's -- it's -- it's not of selecting somebody in order

12 to ignore the work of others, but I think as I mentioned Kadijevic was a

13 key player in -- during those times on the military level.

14 Q. Now as for the blockades of JNA barracks and garrisons at various

15 locations in Croatia, and this is something that you discussed last week

16 and which is relevant to your report in Part 1, pages 113 to 181. Were

17 all the -- were all the barracks and garrisons that are blockaded, in

18 fact, pre-existing ones that had existed for years rather than being any

19 type of newly established posts. Is that accurate?

20 A. I don't know, Your Honours, because I haven't conducted a

21 detailed analysis of the blockade of all the barracks.

22 Q. Did your research reveal and is it correct that in 1991 Croatian

23 President Franjo Tudjman announced and called for the armed blockade of

24 these JNA barracks and garrisons?

25 A. Your Honours, I do recall a number of statements by -- and calls

Page 20564

1 by Croatian President Tudjman. I have a vague recollection that he also

2 made such a call in connection to the barracks, but again this was in my

3 view outside the scope of this report, so I have not conducted a detailed

4 analysis of this or an analysis of this in the context of this report.

5 Q. Did your study focus at all on the type and number of Croatian

6 forces that were involved in the blockades of these JNA facilities as

7 well as their armaments?

8 A. No, Your Honours, because that aspect is outside the scope of

9 this report.

10 Q. At the time of the blockades of these JNA units within their

11 barracks and garrisons, would you agree that the JNA soldiers were still

12 mostly conscripts of the various ethnic groups?

13 A. Yes, as a -- I'm sorry, for the transcript. Yes, I would agree.

14 Q. Now I'd like to turn to the Vance Plan. This is something that

15 you raised on the 5th of December at transcript page 20342 and which you

16 also cover in your report in Part 1, pages 175 to 179. Now, in your

17 continued direct examination on the topic, at transcript page 20344

18 through 45, you claim that General Mladic was contravening the

19 demilitarisation provisions of the Vance Plan.

20 Now, I did not note from your oral testimony whether you claim

21 that Mr. Mladic himself had caused for these police units to be

22 established in the first place. Can you confirm for me that

23 General Mladic is not taking any unilateral actions to establish these

24 police units but rather this was done pursuant to an order of the SSNO.

25 And if I can refer you to your own report, page 179, item number 2, and I

Page 20565

1 think in e-court it's page 214. Isn't that correct?

2 A. Yes, it is correct that the SSNO issues a number of orders to,

3 first of all, I mean, to organise and set up RSK TO units and the same

4 for RSK MUP. And I'm just looking at footnote 581. There is also at

5 least one order to transform JNA units in RSK TO units. So it's

6 discussed pages 178, 179 of the report.

7 Q. Could you please remind us who the SSNO is.

8 A. It's the federal secretary for All People's Defence or People's

9 Defence, sorry, and it was at the time army General Veljko Kadijevic, but

10 I understand he was absent at regular intervals for health reasons, so at

11 those instances he was replaced by the chief of the General Staff of the

12 SFRY armed forces, i.e., Lieutenant-General Blagoje Adzic.

13 Q. And during the same time-period is it also correct that the

14 Croatian side was also setting up similar police units and arming them

15 with the weapons of the TO that were in their possession?

16 A. Well, if -- if they do it outside the UNPAs, Your Honours, there

17 is no issue with that. The key issue is that we see that, and that's put

18 in my report, that the Vance Plan foresees demobilization of the armed

19 structures in the UNPAs, their demilitarisation, and then that the

20 weapons should be put in -- in weapons storage sites, and that obviously

21 the only forces that remain in the UNPAs, the only authorised force would

22 be a lightly armed Serbian police force. But we see that from the JNA

23 side or SFRY armed forces side, what remains of them, efforts are made to

24 actually transform other units into police units including giving those

25 police units military-style weapons.

Page 20566

1 Q. Well, now you've mixed terminology, sir. In talking about the

2 Vance Plan you said lightly armed, and now you have said that

3 military-style weapons were given. Isn't it correct that military-style

4 weapons can include so-called light and heavy weapons?

5 A. No. Your Honours, I don't think I mixed anything up. The

6 Vance Plan says that the police can only have -- can only be lightly

7 armed. That is what the Vance Plan says. What is happening in reality

8 or what happened in reality is that the JNA gives them also other weapons

9 or leaves other weapons behind, but they were not to be used by the

10 police obviously. And the police or the MUP, I mean the RSK MUP, did not

11 have such weapons before the JNA gave them to them after the agreement in

12 relation to the Vance Plan.

13 Q. Sir, is it correct -- is it correct that the Vance Plan neither

14 limited the amount of police that could remain nor the quantity of

15 weapons at their disposal, just that they be light rather than heavy

16 weapons. Isn't that accurate?

17 A. Yes. I mean, that's what I said: A lightly armed police force.

18 And I have seen somewhere but I don't have that in the report, that what

19 was meant -- I mean, was meant to consist of side-arms.

20 Q. Okay.

21 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I see we're at the time for the break.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we are.

23 First I would ask that Mr. Theunens is escorted out of the

24 courtroom.

25 [The witness stands down]

Page 20567

1 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break, and we resume at ten minutes to

2 11.00.

3 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

4 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: While the witness is being escorted into the

6 courtroom, I briefly deal with P03019. The Prosecution gives the

7 information that the map currently in e-court is the unmarked version.

8 The version annotated by the witness has been uploaded as doc ID

9 0048-2279-1. And that the Prosecution request that the annotated version

10 replace the one currently in e-court, and that the Prosecution does not

11 rely on the B/C/S text.

12 Madam Registrar, you're hereby instructed to replace the one in

13 e-court by the one I just mentioned.

14 [The witness takes the stand]

15 JUDGE ORIE: Then in relation to P03026, the Prosecution advises

16 that the second page of the document in e-court is the English

17 translation of the B/C/S text on the map, and that the Prosecution does

18 rely on the B/C/S text on the map, and this deals with the questions the

19 Chamber raised in relation to these two documents.

20 Mr. Weber.

21 MR. WEBER: That is correct, Your Honour, and thank you for

22 addressing those matters.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It should be correct because I read your own

24 messages so there --

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: By Janet.

Page 20568

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it is even emphasised that the message came

2 from Ms. Stewart, which makes it even more reliable.

3 Mr. Theunens, we again dealt with matters unrelated to your

4 testimony. Our apologies.

5 Mr. Ivetic, before I invite you to continue, could you give us a

6 time estimate as where we are approximately.

7 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honours. I anticipate, as I've indicated,

8 that I will finish sometime in the next session.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that information. It's appreciated

10 that you're sticking strictly to your time-limits.

11 Please proceed.

12 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I'd like to call up in

13 e-court Exhibit P3055.

14 Q. While we wait for that, I can introduce it as the document that

15 you had looked at in direct examination in relation to the arming or

16 sending of arms and personnel to the RSK MUP. And according to the chart

17 given to us by the Prosecution, this document was seized from the police

18 administration of Sibenik-Knin in Sibenik on 16 January 2004.

19 Can you confirm for us that this is the case or did you not know

20 the origin of the document?

21 A. Your Honour, I -- I cannot testify to the specific origin of this

22 document, but I can confirm that a number of documents concerning RSK MUP

23 or TO were obtained from the Croatian authorities as they had seized them

24 during military operations in the area; for example, the Operation Storm

25 in August 1995. I myself have participated in at least one mission, I

Page 20569

1 that I was in Sisak, to conduct searches in local archives in order

2 identify documents of that type.

3 Q. Did you personally participate in or are you aware of any efforts

4 to contact the official archives of the JNA to provide confirmation that

5 the text of this order is to be found among their records?

6 A. Again, Your Honours, I cannot answer the question for this

7 specific document, but can I -- I can say that, as I mentioned also

8 during the examination, that, for example, when I participate in

9 interviews, documents of this type were used - I mean, interviews of

10 senior JNA officers, witness interviews of senior JNA officers -

11 documents of this type were used. And obviously as part of the

12 methodology, I would also compare not only the -- the layout of the

13 document with documents obtained from -- from other originators but also

14 the contents.

15 Q. Now looking at the text or content of this document, would you

16 agree with me that it calls for records to be kept of the personnel and

17 their personnel weapons that are so transferred to the police?

18 A. It does, Your Honours.

19 Q. Would you agree that the text of this order does not suggest any

20 way that this process should be done secretly or clandestinely?

21 A. I think maybe if we go to -- I don't know whether there's any

22 classification of the document. I mean, it's a telex, so if we go to the

23 end, it could be that on the original B/C/S there is a classification

24 mentioned of the document.

25 MR. IVETIC: If we could scroll down.

Page 20570

1 JUDGE ORIE: Could you look at the top to start with.

2 MR. IVETIC: Oh. Yeah.

3 JUDGE ORIE: In translation it reads: "Strictly confidential

4 number 28-59."

5 MR. IVETIC:

6 Q. Does that change your answer, sir?

7 A. No, I mean, Your Honours answered the question; i.e., it is

8 done -- I mean, the order is strictly confidential so it's not for public

9 domain including the instructions that are given in the document, so you

10 could call it clandestinely if you would use that expression. But again,

11 the information is not for the public domain.

12 Q. But there is no suggestion in the text of the document that this

13 should be down outside of the knowledge of the UN Protection Forces, is

14 there?

15 A. Well, Your Honours, if the UN Protection Forces were to be

16 informed, then they would have received the order. I don't see the

17 UN Protection Forces being mentioned as one of the addressees. I can

18 only see that it's strictly confidential. So the fact that it's strictly

19 confidential I think is sufficient to indicate that the contents is not

20 to be shared with people who have no need to know, and the United Nations

21 Protection Forces are part of the people who have no need to know unless

22 they would identified -- explicitly identified as an addressee.

23 Q. Now, sir, you've probably examined many documents issued by the

24 armed forces during this time-period. Have you ever seen a large number

25 of them be anything other than strictly confidential in nature, according

Page 20571

1 to their heading?

2 A. Well, since they are military documents covering actually combat

3 operations or combat-related activities, it is normal practice that they

4 are classified because you don't want this information to fall in the

5 hands of individuals or people or organisations who have no need to know,

6 so the fact whether there are many documents or few documents does not

7 have any impact on the importance of the classification.

8 Q. Okay.

9 MR. IVETIC: Can we please have up in e-court 65 ter number

10 03981.

11 Q. I can introduce this as a document which you cite in footnote 584

12 of your report in Part 1. Once it comes up, we'll see that it is dated

13 the 3rd of April, 1992, such that it predates the prior document which we

14 were just looking at. It is sent to the 2nd Military District Command --

15 A. Excuse me, the document on the screen is also from the 3rd of

16 April.

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. So you say it predates but it's the same date.

19 Q. I apologise. Same date as the one that we just -- as the

20 preceding document. If we could look at the first paragraph together.

21 "Pursuant to the request submitted by the commands of the

22 TO," and that's explained as Territorial Defence, "units of the Republic

23 of Serbian Krajina, and in order to implement a unified procedure for the

24 transfer of real estate and materiel of JNA, Yugoslav People's Army units

25 to the units and staffs of the TO and the R, Republic of Serbian Krajina

Page 20572

1 police units in the zone of responsibility of the UN Protection Forces in

2 Yugoslavia, we issue the following ..."

3 And then it's a clarification and it gives certain details. Is

4 this the order from the SSNO that we referenced earlier?

5 A. This is indeed an example of an order from the SSNO concerning

6 the -- I mean, assistance to be provided by the JNA to the local Serb TO

7 and also MUP prior to the withdrawal or the official withdrawal of the

8 JNA from the UNPAs.

9 Q. And would you agree and that -- you can have some time to look at

10 the remainder of the text. There's only three paragraphs or four

11 paragraphs of the same. But would you agree that again there is not any

12 element indicating or expressing that these actions should be kept hidden

13 from the UN Protection Forces, is there?

14 A. But, Your Honours, I understand -- I think you don't have a

15 military background because otherwise you wouldn't ask the question. If

16 the document says "military secret, strictly confidential," and the

17 United Nations Protection Force is not explicitly identified as an

18 addressee, well, then any person in the military will understand that

19 this information is not to be shared with members of the United Nations

20 Protection Force, because otherwise they would have been identified as an

21 addressee.

22 Q. Sir, let me go back to what you yourself said as an expert

23 opinion: A subordinate needs to understand his orders that are given to

24 them and how to carry them out. How is a subordinate supposed to know

25 that something is supposed to be kept hidden from the UN Protection

Page 20573

1 Forces if a superior does not indicate in the order keep this secret from

2 the UN Protection Forces?

3 A. No. Mr. Ivetic, look at the classification of the document.

4 Q. And how does -- how does a soldier understand what his

5 obligations are? Would you agree that the document itself does not

6 indicate that any soldier participating in following through this order

7 is supposed to hide these activities from the UN Protection Forces?

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, if you are asking Mr. Theunens whether

9 this document indicates something like, You, soldier, do not share

10 with -- this with the UNPROFOR, then it's clear the document doesn't say

11 that. How to interpret that is a different matter. The witness has

12 given his interpretation.

13 MR. IVETIC: And I'm asking him to explain that in light of his

14 prior testimony, that the subordinate needs to know precisely the orders

15 of his superior. How is this --

16 JUDGE ORIE: One would be inclined to understand that every

17 soldier would know that the document which starts with @military secret,

18 strictly confidential," should not be shared with any outsider. That it

19 would be the common understanding without saying, You, Soldier, don't

20 give it to UNPROFOR, don't give it to NATO, don't give it to the Polish

21 army.

22 MR. IVETIC: But, Your Honour, my point is not about the

23 document. It's about the activities described in the document; the

24 transferring of people and weapons to particular locations. That is not

25 in relation to the document. It's something that can be observed by

Page 20574

1 outside people. And in the military, in every single military that I've

2 ever studied, if there's camouflage that's meant to be applied, it has to

3 be set forth in an order.

4 JUDGE ORIE: So your question then is where, in this order, no

5 specific measures are prescribed for keeping the activities confidential,

6 how does this fit into your position that subordinate military staff

7 should always receive clear instructions as to how to perform their

8 tasks.

9 That's the question then, Mr. Ivetic?

10 MR. IVETIC: Correct. And tagged with his other testimony that

11 this activity was a contravention of the Vance Plan.

12 THE WITNESS: Yeah. Your Honour, starting with the last element,

13 the fact that it is a contravention or actually a circumventing of the

14 demilitarisation clause of the Vance Plan is explained in footnote 587 in

15 Part 2 of the report, which is based on -- which comes from reports by

16 the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council

17 Resolution 743 that explicitly deals with how the UN forces were

18 implementing the Vance Plan.

19 Returning to document. When you look at the bottom at the

20 addressees, it is addressed to the Command of the 1st Military District

21 and the command of the 2nd Military District. It is not addressed to

22 individual soldiers. As you have explained in the beginning, when we

23 reviewed the principles of command and control, the various commanders

24 throughout the chain of command will develop detailed instructions for

25 their subordinate personnel in order to implement this order.

Page 20575

1 MR. IVETIC: Okay. Your Honours, if we can have this document

2 admitted as the next Defence exhibit number.

3 MR. WEBER: No objection. And for the record, the Prosecution

4 received this document from the BiH Ministry of Defence on 1 September,

5 2000.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar the number would be.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Document 03981 receives number D450,

8 Your Honours.

9 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.

10 MR. IVETIC: If we can have a look at 65 ter number 726 in

11 e-court.

12 Q. I think this give us a better picture of where General Mladic

13 stood in relation to the Vance Plan and its success. It is also a

14 document that's on the chart of documents used by you but is identified

15 as not being tendered.

16 If we -- it is dated after the Vance Plan based upon the fact

17 that it references the same.

18 Yes?

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.

20 MR. WEBER: I think if avoided extraneous comments. This was a

21 document that we originally indicated that we would want to have a

22 pre-Chamber guidance, so I just wanted to make it clear.

23 JUDGE ORIE: You made that clear.

24 MR. IVETIC: If we can --

25 Q. For the first paragraph, we see that it's talking about the

Page 20576

1 Vance Plan, the agreement are reached between Mr. Vance and various

2 people on 2nd January 1992.

3 MR. IVETIC: If we could turn to the bottom of the page in

4 Serbian and the top of the next page. And in the bottom the second -- in

5 the English this is the bottom of the second page and bleeds onto the top

6 of the third.

7 THE WITNESS: Could you please remind me of the date of this

8 document, because I haven't been able to see it.

9 MR. IVETIC: Well, if we go back -- if you look at the Serbian

10 original, it dates sometime after the 2nd of January 1992. I agree that

11 there is not a date visible on the document, nor I believe also on -- on

12 the last page there is not a date.

13 A. Mm-hm.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: If you look at this page that we're looking at, in

15 the English they say this agreement came into effect in application at

16 1800 hours local time on the 3rd of January 1992.

17 MR. IVETIC: Correct.

18 Q. So it's clear it dates after that date but the specific date we

19 may not know.

20 If we look at this section now at the bottom of the page in

21 English:

22 "This agreement derives from the proposal of the SFRY, Socialist

23 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Presidency, dated 9 November 1991, to

24 the UN Security Council to urgently send UN peacekeeping forces in order

25 to protect citizens in the Territory of Croatia with Serbian majority,

Page 20577

1 and the condition set for sending peacekeeping forces is absolute and

2 permanent cease-fire.

3 "According to the proposed concept, UN peacekeeping forces would

4 be deployed in areas of administrative borders of Croatia, which are

5 behind the line of contact at the moment of cease-fire; i.e., in the

6 areas of Krajina, Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and Western

7 Slavonia.

8 "These areas would be demilitarised and 'protected United Nations

9 areas' out of range of any armed forces, except the UN forces, which

10 would provide full physical protection of the population together with

11 the local police. Regional and local police forces in these areas would

12 be kept, and weapons of the disbanded paramilitary formations would be

13 turned over to the JNA, Yugoslavs People's Army, or placed in storage in

14 that territory, under joint control of the local authorities and UN

15 forces."

16 Sir, so far, does this accord with your understanding of the

17 so-called Vance Plan? Are we talking about the same plan?

18 A. Yes. I mean, when he -- if he means by disbanded paramilitary

19 formations RSK TO, then indeed this corresponds with the Vance Plan.

20 Q. If we can continue the second-to-last-paragraph on what is page 3

21 of the English:

22 "The existing regional and local organs would be the governing

23 bodies in the freed territories. The UN forces would monitor if citizens

24 are treated equally by the police and their presence and authority of a

25 world organisation would prevent attacks by armed forces and threats to

Page 20578

1 the population in these territories."

2 So far, sir, would you agree with me that there's nothing in this

3 text that we've read thus far can be considered as seeking to have the

4 Vance Plan not honoured or violated by the Serb side?

5 A. That is -- I would agree with that interpretation of this

6 document, yes.

7 Q. If we could turn to the next page in English. And at the top of

8 the next page.

9 MR. IVETIC: Actually, one moment. If we can -- if we could

10 scroll up. I apologise. We have the first half of the page I think is

11 not there, or is this perhaps a different translation. I apologise. If

12 we can go back to the tail-end of the last page. We were missing some

13 text. It's the last paragraph on this page and we'll bleed over onto the

14 next page.

15 Q. Again, this is what General Mladic has written:

16 "Sending of UN peacekeeping forces would ensure permanent

17 cessation of armed conflicts in the territory of Croatia, prevent the

18 spreading of armed conflicts to other areas in Yugoslavia, and offer

19 guarantees to the Serbian people in Croatia that the Ustasha genocide

20 against them would not be repeated. Thus the necessary prerequisites

21 would be created to resolve the Yugoslav crisis by political means in a

22 peaceful and just way, which is in the interest of all our peoples.

23 "In the existing circumstances, any other orientation would

24 obviously lead to war, with unpredictable course, duration, outcome, and

25 consequences, and with real possibility of spreading outside of the area

Page 20579

1 of Yugoslavia, which is the goal of the present government in Croatia,

2 and Germany also aspires to that.

3 "The engagement of UN peacekeeping forces would crucially

4 contribute to the achievement of goals supported by the peoples living in

5 Yugoslavia. It is therefore also in the interest of the JNA.

6 "This is the only possible way to provide the necessary

7 political, diplomatic, economic, and other support to preserve Yugoslavia

8 and prevent the destructive plans of a group of EU countries.

9 "The most important task at this point is to establish peace,

10 consistently observe cease-fire agreements and other obligations assumed

11 in The Hague and Geneva, and make it possible for the UN peacekeeping

12 forces to arrive, so the Yugoslav crisis would be resolved without

13 dictate, threat of sanctions, or further bloodshed."

14 Sir, would you agree with me that General Mladic here seems to be

15 supporting the UN peacekeeping option and the Vance Plan rather than

16 trying to subvert it?

17 A. Yes, Your Honours. But as, I think, throughout my testimony,

18 I've tried to show that one has to be careful in drawing conclusions just

19 focusing on one document. In footnote 585 of Part 1 of the report, you

20 can see a series of documents from the 9th Corps, i.e., signed by

21 General Mladic or a member of the command of the 9th Corps, covering the

22 February to April 1992 time-period which indicate that, notwithstanding

23 these apparently good intentions or positive intentions of General Mladic

24 at the time of this documents -- document, afterwards the 9th Corps

25 indeed transfers weapons, personnel, and so on to the RSK MUP, I mean,

Page 20580

1 RSK TO, RSK MUP, and contributes to circumventing the Vance Plan.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Could we try to -- if I understand you well,

3 Mr. Ivetic, you say this document shows the intentions and is fully in

4 accordance with the Vance Plan.

5 MR. IVETIC: Correct.

6 JUDGE ORIE: The testimony of the witness is what was done in

7 practice is not consistent with the Vance Plan, and therefore may I take

8 it that you consider this document to be incomplete because it doesn't

9 mention the transfer of people and equipment to the MUP? In that

10 respect, that it does not reflect being a report. What actually happened

11 and where the Vance Plan say that the police force should be kept, it

12 was, as I understand you well, enlarged considerably with the assistance

13 of the 9th Corps.

14 That, I think, clearly now before reading the whole of the

15 document again, that is apparently what keeps the Defence and the witness

16 apart.

17 Please proceed.

18 MR. IVETIC: Thank you. Your Honours, then I will not continue

19 reading the document but would rather tender the document at this time so

20 it can be read by the parties and then submissions made.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

22 MR. WEBER: No objection. Prosecution received the document from

23 the Croatian state archives on 20 October 2004.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Document 726 receives number D451, Your Honours.

Page 20581

1 JUDGE ORIE: D451 is admitted.

2 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

3 Q. Now, sir, both in your direct examination and in your written

4 report, you have claimed that General Mladic was involved in crimes in

5 Croatia and Bosnia that resulted from volunteer or paramilitary groups

6 like Arkan that did he nothing to prevent. By way of example, pages 166

7 through 175 of Part 1 of your report deal with this. I would like to

8 take look at some things that I believe demonstrate a different mindset

9 of General Mladic.

10 MR. IVETIC: To do so, I would call up 1D1489, which I introduce

11 as a part of the Karadzic transcript of proceedings. And if we could

12 please have page 61 of the same, that should correlate to transcript page

13 16899 of the underlying transcript.

14 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I think we need to correct the record

15 a little bit because I -- when discussing crimes in the AO of 9th Corps,

16 we spoke about crimes allegedly committed, I mean in Skabrnja and Nadin,

17 which involved, as the documents show, units that were part or operating

18 under the command of the local Serb TO, which in its turn was under the

19 command of the 9th Corps. We didn't discuss the role of Arkan in Croatia

20 or in Bosnia even, even if Arkan is mentioned in my report in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is correct.

22 Q. Isn't Arkan mentioned specifically in relation to the Skabrnja

23 saying that the only -- that there was a reference that some officers of

24 the JNA spoke approvingly of Arkan? Did you not write those words, sir?

25 In the same section.

Page 20582

1 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for the interpreters, please.

2 Thank you very much.

3 MR. IVETIC: I apologise.

4 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, unless you can show me in the report

5 where I did it, but this is not in relation to Skabrnja. This is in

6 relation to Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.

7 MR. IVETIC:

8 Q. So there is mention of Arkan in your report?

9 A. Yes. But what I'm trying to say, it is not in the area of the

10 9th Corps in 1991.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly make pauses between questions and

12 answers, please. Thank you.

13 MR. IVETIC:

14 Q. Okay. In relation to Arkan in the SBWS, and I believe you

15 mention them in your direct examination, I would like to look at what

16 starts at line 2 of this transcript and proceed through line 18. Again,

17 you can follow along while I recite for the record the answers, and then

18 I'll have some additional questions.

19 "Q. And in paragraph 4 of the same page, there's a reference

20 also -- what does he state about the behaviour of Arkan's troops towards

21 local Muslim population in Sanski Most?"

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.

23 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, before we get too far into this, I don't

24 know if Mr. Theunens recalls what the document that's being discussed at

25 this time in the Karadzic testimony. I don't know if it's more practical

Page 20583

1 to just look at the document and to see then if -- if he would testify

2 the same way with the document in front of us, so we can actually see the

3 content. I see by the questions, I suspect that it is a document that's

4 in Mr. Theunens's report. But I'm -- maybe we could at least get a clear

5 reference to what that document is in this case.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.

7 MR. IVETIC: Unfortunately, I'm stuck with the fact that there

8 was a different report in the Karadzic case, so I was hoping that the --

9 that the witness would remember his own testamentary relating to Arkan

10 specifically relating to Mr. Mladic. I didn't think that that would

11 be -- come as a surprise to him, that testimony he had about

12 General Mladic directly relating to Arkan would be known to him since he

13 is an expert.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. We could explore whether the witness knows.

15 If not, you should try to find out, Mr. Ivetic. Apart from that, you

16 referred to the -- Arkan in the SBWS to have been mentioned in the

17 direction, may I take it in this case?

18 MR. IVETIC: In this case, correct.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Would you have a transcript reference for me?

20 MR. IVETIC: I know there was mention of Arkan, I believe, the

21 first day.

22 JUDGE ORIE: That should then be the 3rd of December.

23 MR. IVETIC: I believe so, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Let's have a look whether Arkan is mentioned there.

25 My WordWheel doesn't give Arkan for the 3rd of December. Neither

Page 20584

1 for the 5th.

2 MR. IVETIC: In -- on the 6th of December --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --

4 MR. IVETIC: At the time that Mr. Weber was examining the

5 witness, it was the temporary transcript page 23. There was discussion

6 of the wider Sanski Most area where Arkan and his volunteers were

7 present, among other things, to prevent members of the VRS from

8 abandoning combat positions.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Let's have a look at.

10 MR. IVETIC: Which is precisely --

11 JUDGE ORIE: Temporary transcript page 23, which would then

12 correspond, approximately, which page? 23090. Let's have a look.

13 MR. IVETIC: It was in relation to 65 ter number 64 in this case.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see Arkan.

15 I see Arkan in the Sanski Most area; 1995.

16 MR. IVETIC: Yes.

17 JUDGE ORIE: That's not what you're pointing at, Mr. Ivetic, or

18 do you?

19 MR. IVETIC: The section from the Karadzic case deals with

20 Sanski Most in the quote that I was just about to read.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see the following:

22 "There is information but, again, I haven't found a document

23 about that, but, for example, situation in September 1995 in the wider

24 Sanski Most area that there Arkan and his volunteers are present, among

25 other things, to prevent members of the VRS from abandoning combat

Page 20585

1 positions."

2 That's where I see Arkan, is the only --

3 MR. IVETIC: Yes --

4 JUDGE ORIE: -- reference. Okay.

5 MR. IVETIC: And I'd like to expand on what efforts were made and

6 why the left, which was the discussion that we now have on -- that we

7 could have on the screen if we go back to the Karadzic transcript.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.

9 MR. WEBER: Just so it's clear, that Sanski Most and Arkan in

10 1995 is not the same as his presence in the SBWS earlier on. And I

11 believe that based on this -- the transcript references in -- in

12 reviewing Mr. Theunens's report, that the document being referred to in

13 this case is 65 ter 06764.

14 THE WITNESS: Yes. And you can find it in footnote 1396 in

15 Part 2 of the report.

16 MR. IVETIC:

17 Q. Okay. If we can now then return to the Karadzic transcript, sir,

18 I'd propose to read what you said there and ask some additional comments:

19 "Q. And in paragraph 4 of the same page, there's a reference

20 also -- what does he state about the behaviour of Arkan's troops towards

21 local Muslim population in Sanski Most?

22 "A. Yes, according to General Mladic, Arkan's paramilitary unit,

23 they have arrested all the Muslims in Sanski Most and liquidated a

24 certain number of loyal Muslims, including family members of some VRS

25 servicemen. That's what he writes about the activities about -- of Arkan

Page 20586

1 and his men against Muslims.

2 "Q. And then it is -- basically, he requests the RS -- the

3 president of the RS to -- to revoke his decision to empower Arkan, disarm

4 them, and so on and so forth. And on the next page in English, please,

5 also refers -- requests the MUP to actively stop this. To your

6 knowledge, did the RS president stop Arkan and did the MUP intervene, do

7 you know?

8 "A. No, Your Honours, I don't know. I know that Arkan left --

9 and his men left eventually, but I don't know the circumstances, whether

10 or not this was linked to any instructions issued by Mr. Karadzic. I

11 have not seen any documents on those circumstances."

12 Do you stand by this testimony such that you would repeat the

13 same today?

14 A. It depends, of course, of the question. But what I've -- what I

15 testified in Karadzic is -- is literally, I mean, a literal transcript of

16 the document. In it -- I mean, I still don't know how -- what the

17 circumstances were under which Arkan and his men left the Sanski Most

18 area I guess in the course of September or maybe early October 1995.

19 Q. But can confirm for us that in fact General Mladic spoke out

20 against Arkan, asked the RS president to get rid of Arkan, ask the RS MUP

21 to intervene and handle Arkan? Can you confirm that, sir?

22 A. Yes, indeed, that is what the letter states. I mean, the letter

23 General Arkan sends to Mr. Karadzic as well as to the RS minister of the

24 interior on the 23rd of September 1995, as is discussed in pages 380 to

25 382 of Part 2 two of my report.

Page 20587

1 JUDGE ORIE: To avoid any confusion, I take it that you were

2 referring to General Mladic.

3 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, yes, Your Honours, General Mladic. I'm

4 sorry.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

6 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

7 Q. If we can read the next question and answer which goes from line

8 19 to 12 on the next page --

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.

10 MR. IVETIC: Yes?

11 JUDGE ORIE: Just for my understand, we moved from Arkan in

12 Skabrnja and Nadin not being there, then we moved to the SBWS, and now we

13 move to Sanski Most 1995. And that is finally what is the focus of the

14 relevant questions?

15 MR. IVETIC: If Your Honour will recall, I said in your direct

16 examination and in your report, and then I cited to the places in the

17 report where I found Arkan mentioned. My focus has always been --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And that is only --

19 MR. IVETIC: -- the Sanski Most area.

20 JUDGE ORIE: That is Sanski Most exclusively, so we forget about

21 Skabrnja --

22 MR. IVETIC: Correct.

23 JUDGE ORIE: -- and Nadin. We forget about SBWS. You refer to

24 that after you mentioned the Croatian villages.

25 MR. IVETIC: Correct.

Page 20588

1 JUDGE ORIE: And we now exclusively are dealing with Arkan,

2 Sanski Most, September 1995.

3 MR. IVETIC: Correct.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

5 MR. IVETIC:

6 Q. Starting at line 19:

7 "Q. The view that General Mladic has here on this particular

8 group, paramilitary group, did you see this reflected in other military

9 documentation as well? I mean not just Arkan, but other volunteer and

10 paramilitary groups, do you know whether they also have a quite critical

11 view on those [sic] troops?

12 "A. Yes, Your Honours. There is the report General Tolimir

13 compiles on 28th of July, 1992, on paramilitary groups. In this report,

14 Tolimir, as assistant commander for intelligence and security, shares

15 with President Karadzic as well as General Mladic and other senior

16 military officers, I mean members of the Main Staff, includes a very

17 critical view, a very negative view, of various paramilitary, i.e.,

18 volunteer, groups operating on the territory controlled by the Bosnian

19 Serbs. It talks about their lack of combat value, their -- the fact that

20 they are inclined or prone to commit crimes against Serbs and non-Serbs.

21 And this Tolimir report is then used as a basis for orders issued by the

22 Main Staff to subordinate or remove these volunteers. There's also an

23 order - and I think it's even from earlier, it is from May or June 1992 -

24 by Mr. Karadzic as President of the Presidency of the SRBiH to

25 subordinate these groups to the VRS or have them removed."

Page 20589

1 Q. Do you stand by this testimony as being truthful and accurate as

2 to the matters contained therein?

3 A. Yes, I do Your Honours. And the Tolimir order as well as the --

4 excuse me, the Tolimir report and the subsequent order by General Mladic

5 are mentioned in Part 2 of my report. I was just trying to identify the

6 section.

7 MR. IVETIC: If we could call up Exhibit P501 in e-court.

8 Q. I can introduce this as an order dated 28 July 1992 and is issued

9 for the disarmament of paramilitaries --

10 A. Mm-hm --

11 Q. -- from the Main Staff and General Mladic. Did you have occasion

12 to review this document for purposes of your report?

13 A. Yes, Your Honours. It -- it is discussed in footnote 291 of

14 Part 2 of the report. And prior to that, I have a detailed discussion of

15 the Tolimir report.

16 MR. IVETIC: If we can look at the bottom of page 1 in the

17 English, going onto page -- oops. If we could scroll down. If we can go

18 to page 2 of both versions of the report -- of the document, it is the

19 bottom of page 2 in the English. It's going to be the previous page in

20 the B/C/S. I see we seem to have a problem with the B/C/S.

21 Q. Well, let's see if I can follow along with the English. The

22 order states in number 1:

23 "All paramilitary formations and their leaders, if their

24 intentions truly are honourable, are to place themselves in the service

25 of the just struggle for the survival of the Serbian people, and are to

Page 20590

1 offer to incorporate themselves into regular SRBiH army units, to be

2 deployed in accordance with their military specialities and level of

3 military training."

4 MR. IVETIC: If we can go to the next page.

5 Q. "Individuals and groups which had carried out crimes, looting,

6 and other types of criminal acts are not to be included into units. They

7 are to be disarmed, arrested, and criminal proceedings are to be

8 initiated against them in SRBiH army courts, regardless of their

9 citizenship."

10 Number 3:

11 "Paramilitary formations, groups, and individuals which refuse to

12 be placed under unified SRBiH army command, are to be disarmed and

13 arrested, in co-operation with the MUP, Ministry of Interior, and

14 criminal proceedings are to be initiated against them for crimes

15 committed.

16 "4. Citizens of FR Yugoslavia who accept the unified SRBiH

17 command are to be treated as volunteers and deployed to units at the

18 front. Those who refuse, and have not as yet committed any crimes, are

19 to be disarmed and handed over, under escort, to the relevant FRY

20 military and territorial organs.

21 "5. I forbid all paramilitary formations, groups, and individuals

22 in the SRBiH territory. In the future, criminal proceedings will be

23 conducted against commanders, relevant military and territorial organs,

24 and authorities who allow paramilitary organisation and evasion of

25 recruitment and conscription in accordance with the SRBiH Law on the

Page 20591

1 Army."

2 Sir, do you agree with me that everything in this order by

3 General Mladic is proper and is the type that one would expect of a

4 military commander who is adhering to appropriate conduct of war?

5 A. Your Honours, the order is very clear. Whether it's appropriate

6 or not, that is not up to me to say that. But the order is clear.

7 Now, from an analytical point of view, the next step would then

8 be to look at the degree of implementation of that order, and there I

9 would like to draw the Court's attention to the situation as it was, for

10 example, in Sarajevo which is discussed on pages 177 and following of

11 Part 2 of the report where we still see volunteer groups affiliated with

12 the Serbian radical party being active there. Some of them are

13 regularised by giving them a VRS military post number, but others

14 continue to act as, yeah, almost independent groups.

15 Q. And the incident we just looked at in Sanski Most, where even as

16 of 1995 Arkan's group is there and General Mladic is continuing to beg

17 other authorities to deal with them, wouldn't that show that

18 General Mladic did not have control over these units and an ability to

19 get rid of them?

20 A. No, it doesn't, Your Honours. And I mean, there is more than

21 three years between the two documents we are discussing. We are

22 discussing an order from July 1992 and then a letter from September 1995,

23 whereby I think it's also important to look again at the contents of the

24 letter. General Mladic clearly spoke about loyal Muslims, and that

25 expression, we have also discussed that during my examination, is I think

Page 20592

1 quite important in order to understand his attitude towards non-Serbs.

2 Secondly, the letter of September 1995 also has to be seen in the

3 context of the -- I would say political conflict that opposes

4 General Mladic to President Karadzic at the time.

5 Q. Okay.

6 MR. IVETIC: This is already in evidence so I do not need to

7 tender it. And I see now that we have the B/C/S page that was missing

8 earlier, so I don't have any suggestions as to this document. I'd like

9 to move on.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, within the next two or three minutes, I

11 would like to take a break.

12 MR. IVETIC: Okay. Then why don't we do it now, since I'm about

13 to move to different topic.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could Mr. Theunens be escorted out of the

15 courtroom.

16 [The witness stands down]

17 JUDGE ORIE: Could the parties tell the Chamber when they could

18 provide the further information on the MFI'd documents during the

19 testimony of Mr. Brown.

20 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I've asked Mr. Traldi to be here at the

21 beginning of the next session, if that's convenient with the Court.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I think we'd then start with that after the

23 break. We take the break now. We resume at ten minutes past 12.00.

24 --- Recess taken at 11.50 a.m.

25 --- On resuming at 12.13 p.m.

Page 20603

1 of this decision the newly admitted transcript excerpts along with those

2 previously admitted by the Chamber so that all of the witness's admitted

3 testimony is available under one Rule 65 ter number; and, 3, instructs

4 the Registry to assign an exhibit number to the admitted evidence and

5 inform the parties and the Chamber of the number so assigned.

6 And this concludes the Chamber's decision.

7 Mr. Traldi.

8 MR. TRALDI: Yes, Your Honour. Just I'd request to be excused.

9 JUDGE ORIE: You are excused, Mr. Traldi.

10 MR. TRALDI: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

11 JUDGE ORIE: And the usher is invited to escort the witness into

12 the courtroom.

13 [The witness takes the stand]

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, you may proceed.

15 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Q. Now, sir, I'd like to go onto another topic which you touched

17 upon, the military judicial organs and their functioning. First of all,

18 having studied the normative structures of the VRS and Republika Srpska,

19 can you confirm whether or not the military courts and military

20 prosecutors were subordinated to the Main Staff of the VRS or not?

21 A. I cannot confirm that Your Honours because the documents I have

22 reviewed do not indicate -- do not indicate such a subordination. I can

23 only state that they were established pursuant to an order of

24 Mr. Karadzic.

25 Q. Okay. Did your review reveal that the military courts were under

Page 20604

1 the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska?

2 A. I mean, I'm just going through the -- through my report. You

3 have to be aware there is an order - this is on page 100, and maybe I

4 have to correct my previous answer. Page 100 of Part 2 of the report,

5 there is an order by the RS president, i.e., Mr. Karadzic, to place the

6 military courts, the supreme military court, and the prosecutor's office

7 attached to the Main Staff of the VRS under his direct authority; i.e.,

8 under the authority of Mr. Karadzic. I believe that this is the only

9 document I have reviewed that provides information as to whom these

10 organs are subordinated.

11 Q. Did your -- did your review of the materials indicate whether

12 General Mladic had any power to appoint or promote prosecutors and judges

13 of the military courts?

14 A. Your Honours, I have not seen any documents indicating that

15 General Karadzic appointed prosecutors or judges in the military courts.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, earlier you made Mr. Arkan a general.

17 You're now making Mr. Karadzic a general --

18 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

19 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it that it's --

20 THE WITNESS: General Mladic appointing prosecutors or judges. I

21 apologise.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. My colleague Judge Fluegge says what about

23 promotions? Yes.

24 Please proceed.

25 MR. IVETIC:

Page 20605

1 Q. The next topic I would like to raise with you relates to the

2 Supreme Command which is an organ you discuss in Part 1 page 20 and

3 Part 2 pages 61 through 63 of your report. For the record, can you

4 confirm for us that neither General Mladic, nor his deputy commander, nor

5 any of his assistant commanders from the Main Staff were members of the

6 Supreme Command.

7 A. That is correct. And I have explained that also on page 62 of

8 Part 2. They can, however, attend on invitation.

9 Q. Okay. In relation to the authority to assign army forces to

10 positions within the VRS and to promote or demote the same from command

11 establishment posts, was this a power held in the hands of General Mladic

12 and the Main Staff or was it a power held by the Supreme Command or the

13 Supreme Commander?

14 A. It depends of the -- of the level, Your Honours, and there was

15 also a change in the course of the conflict. But at least initially --

16 or, I mean, upon a certain time, General Mladic had the authority to

17 appoint and demote and to promote officers.

18 Q. If I can direct your attention to Part 3 of your report, pages

19 352 to the end, you detail the tensions between the VRS and

20 General Mladic on the one hand, and the RS president on the other. At

21 page 353, you indicate relations deteriorated in the course of 1994 and

22 that by spring 1995 things get worse such that by April 1995 you describe

23 it as an open conflict.

24 Is it correct that especially during this time-period, the RS

25 president and Supreme Command attempted to bypass General Mladic and

Page 20606

1 issue orders directly to VRS units?

2 A. I think, Your Honours, the conclusion is -- the suggestion is too

3 strong. I have, if I remember well, cited one example where

4 General Mladic intervenes. This has to do with the SRK, then under the

5 command of General Dragomir Milosevic where General Mladic suspects that

6 General Milosevic is about to use, I believe, modified air-bombs in the

7 Sarajevo area without the authorisation, i.e., the order of the

8 General Mladic, and then General Mladic intervenes in order to rectify

9 the situation. So this is an example of where he suspects that

10 General Milosevic gets his orders from somewhere else instead of from

11 General Mladic.

12 Q. Would you agree that your discussion about the situational

13 awareness of General Mladic and the effectiveness of his command and

14 control over the VRS on paper would have to take into account such

15 circumstances of the political leadership and Supreme Command sending

16 orders directly to VRS units?

17 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for the interpreters, please.

18 Thank you.

19 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I don't know what the reference to

20 command and control over the VRS on paper means. I mean, I have not seen

21 a document by General Mladic indicating that he cannot exercise command

22 and control over the VRS, and I mean during the May 1992 to November 1995

23 time-period.

24 Answering the question then. Well, I mean, I have included a

25 section on the discussion -- to discuss these tensions and even on what I

Page 20607

1 call an open conflict, I mean, based on the two and a half hour speech

2 General Mladic gives at an assembly session in spring 1995, and then also

3 the attempts by President Karadzic to change the job title of

4 General Mladic in -- in August 1995, and how then all the corps

5 commanders express their loyalty to General Mladic, and at the end of the

6 story, Mr. Karadzic is forced to withdraw his order on redefining the --

7 the position or the job description of General Mladic.

8 MR. IVETIC:

9 Q. I would like to move to another topic. In your report you have

10 talked of restrictions upon UNPROFOR and actions of the VRS as to

11 UNPROFOR. This is generally in Part 3, contained in pages 295 to 318,

12 and relates also to the so-called hostage crisis in May through

13 June 1995. Based upon your review of documentation, and based upon your

14 own experiences in the field, did you see evidence that UNPROFOR was

15 increasingly siding against the Bosnian Serbs and thus engaging in

16 mission creep to become more in the a way of a combatant party on the

17 ground?

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.

19 MR. WEBER: Just keeping track of the record, there has been two

20 references to Part 3 of the report. However, there are only two parts to

21 the report. I believe that's part 2.

22 MR. IVETIC: Part 2. Part 2.

23 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I did not see such evidence.

24 MR. IVETIC: I would like to look at 65 ter number --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. -- the question was based on your review of

Page 20608

1 documentation and based upon your own experience in the field, so if you

2 said I didn't see such evidence, that -- your own experience is usually

3 not visible. Have you considered that part of the question as well?

4 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, my answer covered both parts of the

5 question.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then that's -- my question has been answered.

7 THE WITNESS: Okay.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

9 MR. IVETIC: If we can call up 1D1495 in e-court.

10 Q. And while we wait for the same, I can introduce it as a

11 declassified US State Department telex dated 28 May 1995.

12 And, sir, I would like to direct your attention to paragraphs 2

13 and 3 on the first page, and once we finish with those, the short

14 conclusion in paragraph 5 which read as follows:

15 "2. We had a short meeting with General Smith on May 28. There

16 was nothing new. He reiterated that the machine is essentially broken,

17 and the bleak alternative is to 'make war' or to become unsustainably

18 weak. To refine the mandate and configuration of UNPROFOR is to avoid

19 the essential '1.000 dollar question.' In fact, a reconfiguration or

20 redeployment simply 'pretends that we are making war' when we are not.

21 "3. Redefinition of the mandate is to continue the 'non-war

22 mode.' There is no really middle ground between war and the abandonment

23 of the UNPROFOR mission. The stark decision remains 'we either fight or

24 we don't.'"

25 MR. IVETIC: And if we could go to the last page.

Page 20609

1 Q. "5. Comment: Smith has been making his case to the UN and others

2 that UNPROFOR is essentially finished. To attempt to walk some middle

3 ground between war and withdrawal is a delusion. End comment."

4 Is such information about the activities of General Smith in

5 campaigning for a move of the UNPROFOR mission to be one of making war,

6 something that you had information on when performing your research for

7 the expert report that you drafted in this case.

8 A. Your Honours, I believe that Mr. Ivetic's proposition is -- is

9 simplistic. You to have look at the context in which General Smith, at

10 least according to this transcript, made certain comments.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Could I stop you for a second.

12 Mr. Ivetic in his question qualified what Mr. Smith did. Let's

13 leave out that qualification and let's focus on what is described in the

14 document. And then, now, the question is whether you considered the

15 activities of General Smith when preparing your report.

16 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I didn't have any information

17 concerning this meeting General Smith, who was the commander -- Force

18 Commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time when I was

19 preparing my report.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Were you aware of information which deals with the

21 position of General Smith in relation to strength, weakness,

22 continuation, or discontinuation of UNPROFOR?

23 THE WITNESS: What I know Your Honours, and at that time I was

24 working as a military information officer in the UNPA headquarters in

25 Zagreb, was that there was a high degree of division within the

Page 20610

1 international community as to what UNPROFOR should do because

2 international community, I mean, was divided and was also losing its

3 patience with the parties in the conflict, and on the ground there were,

4 I would almost call it, surreal scenes where the parties - I mean, the

5 ABiH and the VRS - were fighting each other at times in Sarajevo with UN

6 vehicles. So that -- I mean, there was serious concern about whether the

7 mandate, as it had been defined, was -- could still be implemented, what

8 the support of the international community was for that mandate, and then

9 how the force, UNPROFOR, was to implement that mandate. I'm aware of

10 that.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Did you consider that when writing your report or is

12 this because you specifically refer to your previous position and your

13 awareness of these problems not on documentation? Is it underlying your

14 report this information as well or is it just that you now being asked

15 about it tell us about it, where it played no role in the drafting of

16 your report?

17 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, it -- I didn't refer to this in my

18 report because indeed, as you pointed out, it is not of direct relevance

19 for my report. But, of course, when I discussed hostage crisis, I refer

20 to certain activities that had taken place just prior to the hostage

21 crisis, but I didn't go into specificities as I have discussed now.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I don't think I expressed myself on the direct

23 relevance of it, but apart from that thank you for your answer.

24 Mr. Ivetic may now proceed.

25 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour. The Defence would tender

Page 20611

1 the document into evidence at this time.

2 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, could the Prosecution please have more

3 information on the provenance? We do not find a ERN number that's

4 associated --

5 MR. IVETIC: That's correct.

6 MR. WEBER: -- with anything in our system.

7 MR. IVETIC: The source of the document is the CIA. It's

8 available from the CIA's web site of 300 documents recently disclosed.

9 The date of the disclosure is at the top of the page, March 19th, 2013.

10 JUDGE ORIE: It's on the CIA web side?

11 MR. IVETIC: That's correct.

12 MR. WEBER: Very well. Well, I mean, I --

13 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, the number would be?

14 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D1495 receives number D452,

15 Your Honours.

16 JUDGE ORIE: D452 is admitted into evidence, and the Prosecution

17 has an opportunity to revisit the origin of this document if it wishes to

18 do so.

19 MR. IVETIC: And I can provide the -- the link as soon as I

20 finish with my cross, that would perhaps assist the Prosecution in

21 determining if they have any further submissions.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You may revisit the matter if -- but then

23 let's do it this week and not any later. Or report to the Chamber if you

24 need more time.

25 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

Page 20612

1 MR. IVETIC:

2 Q. I would like to turn to another topic. During your direct

3 examination, specifically at transcript page 20240 through 20241, you

4 testified about General Mladic being out in the field actively leading

5 combat operations and that there are several examples of that as included

6 in your report.

7 I'd like to ask you in this regard if your reference to your

8 report was in relation to Part 2 pages 344 to 352 where you talk about

9 visits and inspections and meetings in the field, or if there are some

10 other part of your report that you claim gives evidence of General Mladic

11 leading combat operations?

12 A. Your Honours, in this context it is also relevant to look at page

13 245 of Part 2, i.e., footnote 925, because there's a whole series of

14 documents there that refer to forward command posts, including some that

15 were -- where General Mladic was -- was present. And I believe also in

16 the section, when I'm talking about the operations in eastern

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina about situation in and around Srebrenica in July 1995,

18 as well as - I'm sorry for the disorder, but also March/April 1994 in the

19 wider area of Gorazde, that there are several documents from the VRS

20 Main Staff as well as from the -- the -- the Drina Corps. And even --

21 for Srebrenica, I think from -- there are notes of the -- the MUP

22 commander in the area all highlighting the -- the role of General Mladic

23 in the operations that the VRS is conducting there.

24 Q. Okay. I'd like to present you --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, let me -- I'm trying to look at 20240.

Page 20613

1 MR. IVETIC: It starts at --

2 JUDGE ORIE: I see it --

3 MR. IVETIC: -- line 15 through line 2 on 20241.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you've seen it. Thank you.

5 Please proceed.

6 MR. IVETIC:

7 Q. I would like to present you with something which General Dannatt

8 testified about in our case which is to be found at transcript page

9 19175, line 8, through 19176, line 4, which went as follows:

10 "Q. Now I'd like to move on to General Mladic's presence on the

11 ground in Srebrenica and the Hotel Fontana that you testified about

12 yesterday. At transcript page 19071 you talked of Mladic keeping close

13 control and issuing directions. I wish to now take a look at part of

14 your testimony from the Krstic case.

15 "Mr. Ivetic: 1D1444, page 71 of the same, which should correlate

16 to transcript page 5713 of underlying document. If we could focus on

17 lines 24 to 25 for the question and then we will have to turn the page

18 for the answer, which is on lines 1 through 4.

19 "Q. Sir, I read:

20 'Judge Riad: But there was no sign of General Mladic giving

21 direct orders to the subordinates of General Krstic?

22 "'A. No, sir. I don't think we've -- I think we've looked at

23 that several times previously, and I can see no evidence of

24 General Mladic giving orders to constituent parts of the Drina Corps and

25 therefore bypassing the normal corps command and control structure. I

Page 20614

1 don't see any evidence of that.'

2 "Do you stand by this testimony as being truthful such that you

3 would so repeat the same today?

4 "A. Absolutely. I don't see any evidence of that. That's not

5 to say it didn't happen. But I don't see and didn't see any evidence of

6 that."

7 Do you agree or disagree with General Sir Richard Dannatt?

8 JUDGE ORIE: Let's make that question quite clear. Is the

9 question whether Mr. Theunens agrees that Mr. Dannatt did not see

10 evidence or that it did not happen? Because MR. Dannatt says it may well

11 have happened but I've not seen the evidence. Now, what precisely is the

12 question?

13 MR. IVETIC: The question is -- well, let me rephrase the

14 question then to make it absolutely clear.

15 Q. Do you agree that there is no evidence of General Mladic giving

16 direct orders to constituent parts of the Drina Corps and therefore

17 bypassing the normal corps command and control structure?

18 A. Your Honours, I have not seen a Drina Corps document or a VRS

19 document that would make that suggestion. However, as I mentioned

20 earlier, there is the report by Ljubisav Borovcanin, who was commander of

21 a special police brigade, and this is footnote 1046 of Part 2 of report

22 who -- who writes in his report that that General Mladic is personally in

23 command of the combat operations in the wider Srebrenica area.

24 Again, this is, when I refer back to my methodology, one

25 observation made by one senior official who was in the Srebrenica area.

Page 20615

1 We would will have to look at more material, which I haven't done, in

2 order to draw a conclusion that would allow to answer your question.

3 Q. That's fair enough. You've mentioned the police. I'd like to

4 now go to my last topic which is in relation to the MUP or the police

5 forces. I believe you have discussed this at, among other places, Part 2

6 pages 35 through 36 and 71 through 72, and you also testified about it

7 during your direct examination at transcript page 20382 in relation to

8 police and VRS activities at Trnovo. I'd like to first ask you: In

9 respect of your review and analysis of JNA and SFRY doctrinal documents,

10 did you have occasion to come across the concept of "co-ordinated action"

11 or as it is called in the B/C/S "sadejstvo" as a recognised method of two

12 units from different formations or organisations operating within the

13 same battle-field or operation such as when MUP or police units operate

14 alongside the army?

15 A. Your Honours --

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is it possible to break this question up? I don't

17 understand the question, Mr. Ivetic. It's so long.

18 MR. IVETIC: Let me start at the beginning.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Maybe -- okay.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. No. Let's -- it -- it -- even -- let me see.

21 MR. IVETIC: I can ask if he's familiar with the concept of

22 "sadejstvo" or co-ordinated action. I think that's --

23 [Overlapping speakers] ...

24 JUDGE ORIE: If you take it step by step, that would be good.

25 MR. IVETIC:

Page 20616

1 Q. Sir, did your research reveal a concept of co-ordinated action or

2 "sadejstvo" in the B/C/S?

3 A. It did, Your Honours, and you can find that in Part 1 of the

4 report, English page 34 and 35, as one of the functions of command and

5 control.

6 Q. Okay. And is co-ordinated action or "sadejstvo" a method by

7 which two units from different organisations can operate within the same

8 battle-field or operation?

9 A. That is correct, Your Honours.

10 Q. Now, do you also agree that "sadejstvo" or co-ordinated action is

11 a different method of operation than resubordination?

12 A. I mean, I'm not sure I understand what you are -- what the

13 question is, and maybe I can clarify it by referring to an extract from

14 the corps of ground forces regulation that I put on English page 35, part

15 1, where I say that the commander is the one who organises the

16 implementation of co-ordination among all participants for the execution

17 of a combat assignment, whereas the Chief of Staff of the corps, I mean,

18 this is when the -- the corps was in command co-ordinates the work of the

19 commands.

20 So this means when unit A and unit B have to co-ordinate their

21 operations, there is no subordination relation between unit A and unit B.

22 However, above these two units there is, of course, a commander who

23 orders and instructs how these two units are to co-ordinate their

24 operations.

25 Q. And do you agree that an analysis of a particular operation must

Page 20617

1 take into account both reviewing to see whether it was co-ordinated

2 action or resubordination that was at play?

3 A. Well, the specific documents, i.e., the orders -- I mean, you

4 have seen all those, the combat documents and the reporting -- I mean,

5 the orders and the reporting documents will show what kind of relation

6 exists between the units that are conducting the operations.

7 Q. And now I'd like to go -- talk about resubordination of the

8 police to army --

9 JUDGE ORIE: Before we do so --

10 MR. IVETIC: Yes --

11 JUDGE ORIE: -- could I ask one question in relation to one of

12 the previous questions.

13 You were asked about General Mladic being in the field commanding

14 operations. You referred to some documents in relation to Srebrenica and

15 Gorazde, I think.

16 Did you consider only documentary evidence in that respect,

17 because the Chamber has seen a video in which General Mladic is walking

18 through the streets - that's at least how it was explained - and giving

19 orders, instructions. Did you consider that as well, or are you familiar

20 with that video?

21 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, if -- if you refer to a video on --

22 on situation in Srebrenica, I am indeed familiar with the video. I

23 didn't use videos because I consider that the primary documents I had

24 were of sufficient, I mean, clarity and value to -- to draw conclusions.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, the Chamber has seen this video, and just

Page 20618

1 on the basis of the assumption that you've seen the same video, would

2 that -- could the Chamber understand such a video as corroboration of

3 what is found in the documentary evidence?

4 THE WITNESS: In -- in my view, yes, Your Honours. I mean, you

5 would have to look at the two and see that they discuss the same events

6 and the same time-frame, and then indeed one would illustrate the other

7 or would corroborate the other.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. No, I just was wondering whether or not you

9 had included that in your conclusions or not and, of course, how the

10 Chamber has to -- to deal with that in an appropriate way.

11 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

12 MR. IVETIC:

13 Q. Sir, do you consider yourself knowledgeable as an expert on the

14 topic of the resubordination of the police to the army?

15 A. Your Honour, I will not go again in the point of expert because I

16 have mentioned that already a few times. But I have looked at all these,

17 I mean, the various VRS and also MUP documents, to see how the units

18 operated, and again they are very straightforward. So I drew certain

19 conclusions on the basis of the documents I reviewed, irrespective of

20 whether those consisted of documents discussing the MUP or the military.

21 There are indeed documents that, I mean, for example, Trnovo, but I don't

22 believe I have discussed that here in detail, but I remember from my

23 report for the Stanisic Simatovic case that indeed MUP units are

24 operating in the wider Trnovo area in, I believe, May and the

25 subsequent -- I mean, May, June, or even July 1995, there and are also

Page 20619

1 some orders in relation to that by General Mladic; for example, on the

2 use of the a helicopter to evacuate injured MUP and I believe it's RSK,

3 MUP RSK members.

4 Q. Based upon your review of the material and knowledge of the same,

5 would you agree that police units resubordinated to the army for purposes

6 of combat retain their police commanders during said combat?

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Ivetic, isn't there an internal contradiction

8 in your question? Police units resubordinated retained their -- the

9 command of their -- their commanders? You've just said they are

10 resubordinated.

11 MR. IVETIC: They are. And that is what is according to the

12 amended Law of the Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska, sir, that their

13 individual unit police commanders remained the same in the -- in the

14 conduct of the combat. And I'm asking the individual if can he confirm

15 that based upon his review of the documentation.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Let me see whether I understand the question.

17 Resubordination - but please correct me when I'm wrong - means

18 that a unit is made part of a military structure and put under the

19 command of the higher unit?

20 THE WITNESS: Mm-hm.

21 JUDGE ORIE: A subordinated or resubordinated unit is still

22 acting under the command of its own commander, although where the unit is

23 subordinated or resubordinated, that commander is also under the command

24 of the higher-up level.

25 Is that a proper understanding of command positions in a

Page 20620

1 subordinated or resubordinated situation?

2 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I don't want to add to the confusion,

3 but looking at SFRY armed forces terminology, the resubordination is only

4 used for establishment units; i.e., for example, if a tank company of a

5 tank battalion that is part of brigade A is resubordinated to an infantry

6 battalion of brigade A. So they have the same establishment unit.

7 In the other case, for example, if a TO unit would be

8 subordinated to a JNA unit, we talk about reattachment. The same would

9 be the situation with a MUP unit that is subordinated to a military unit.

10 In JNA parlance we would use -- we would say that the MUP unit was

11 reattached to the JNA unit.

12 Answering your question, well, the principle of single command

13 and control means that it can only be one commander at a time. So maybe

14 with an example. If, say, a police company, police company A, is to

15 conduct combat operations as being attached to a VRS battalion, call it

16 B, in a specific area: Based on the documents I have seen, all the

17 orders concerning those specific operations come from that VRS battalion

18 commander.

19 Of course, the commander -- I mean, the unit commander, the

20 company commander of the police company who is in the field with his

21 police company, he can he still send reports to his organic MUP battalion

22 or -- or Ministry of Interior authority or commander, but the latter

23 should have no influence on the actual operations that are being

24 conducted by the MUP unit, the MUP company, that has been reattached or

25 as we call it here resubordinated to the VRS infantry battalion.

Page 20621

1 JUDGE ORIE: And the MUP commander under those circumstances

2 would receive his orders, operational orders exclusively from the VRS

3 command which is above him?

4 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours, for the time-period that they

5 are to conduct operations. And you expect that in such a situation there

6 is -- I mean, co-ordination or contact between the higher echelon of the

7 battalion and the higher echelon of the MUP unit because they have to --

8 it's not the battalion that will order the MUP unit to come to that area,

9 like to Trnovo, at a specific date. That has been decided at a higher

10 level.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

12 MR. IVETIC:

13 Q. If we can just clarify, sir, your discussion started off being

14 very precise, and then in answer to the questions of Judge Orie, you

15 averted to saying operations. By "operations" do you specifically mean

16 combat operations?

17 A. Indeed. Or it could also be for an exercise or for training.

18 That -- yes. And again, the combat documents, be it the reporting

19 documents or the command documents, will show very clearly who is in

20 command of what. And for during which time-period. But I gave you the

21 general principles that should be applied.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I am looking at the clock. I'm doing it

23 only four times a day, but.

24 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honours, I have four questions precisely

25 to ask him.

Page 20622

1 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then perhaps we -- we allow you to proceed

2 with those four questions.

3 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

4 Q. Sir, would you agree that after combat is completed and that the

5 police units returned to their police work, they are no longer

6 resubordinated to the army officers?

7 A. I mean, from a generic point of view I would agree, but, you

8 know, we have to look at the specific documents because they will state

9 who is in charge when.

10 Q. Okay. Would you agree that after police forces complete their

11 combat and are no longer at the front lines, they are off duty and no

12 longer performing tasks pursuant to military orders under

13 resubordination?

14 A. I would say it depends of the specific documents. I mean, what

15 is -- when -- [indiscernible].

16 Q. Okay. Fair enough.

17 A. [Overlapping speakers]...

18 Q. What about police forces that frolic and detour from their

19 official assignments to engage in personal crimes of opportunity, would

20 you agree that they would fall under the disciplinary remit of the

21 civilian police organs?

22 A. I mean, I would ask for further clarification. Where are these

23 units? Are they just -- I mean, are they in Belgrade or are they in --

24 on an area where there are military conducting combat operations? I

25 think --

Page 20623

1 Q. So would you agree with me, it depends a lot on the specific

2 facts and circumstances that must be examined carefully?

3 A. The reason why I made the comment is that if they're doing these

4 things while they are conducting operations under the command of a

5 military unit, and again given the 1988 regulations on implementation of

6 the laws of war by the JNA, which were also applied by the VRS, the VRS

7 commander in the area where the MUP units were has the duty to

8 investigate these alleged crimes. As to the enforcement of -- I mean,

9 further enforcement of discipline and justice, this -- this resides then

10 with -- with the -- the police hierarchy. Unless there is a different

11 arrangement between the superior MUP echelon and the superior military

12 echelon, but I haven't seen any documents on that.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one point of clarification.

14 I take the situation where a police company is attached to or

15 subordinated to the VRS. When that takes an end, and if that police

16 company moves out but still is in the zone of responsibility of the

17 previous VRS command over it, if they would commit crimes then, what

18 would be the situation? Because you referred to the duty to investigate.

19 Is -- would that still be the duty for the commander? It's more or less

20 a legal question, as a matter of fact, but if you have any opinion about

21 that.

22 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, from the military point of view,

23 there is no such situation that units are just wondering around. There

24 is one commander and he is responsible for the situation in his zone of

25 operations. And if formally, I mean, based on the documents, the

Page 20624

1 attachment of subordination of that police unit would have finished, then

2 they have to -- they have to leave.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But I do understand that.

4 THE WITNESS: Mm-hm.

5 JUDGE ORIE: At a certain moment, well, let's say at 12.00 at

6 night, the resubordination ends, which means that the police unit would

7 then be under its normal command structures again, which would then tell

8 them come home or go there or go to A, go to B. Now as long as they are

9 still in the zone of responsibility of the previous VRS commander over

10 them, in following their orders to go to A or B but still being in the

11 zone of responsibility of the VRS, which commander would have a duty to

12 investigate, in your view, if the crime is committed after 12.00 but the

13 unit still being in the zone of responsibility of the previous VRS

14 command which existed until 12.00? If you don't have an answer to the

15 question, then please tell us. But you --

16 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I didn't investigate or analyse the

17 MUP here, but again I with give you the military flavour of or the

18 military aspect of the situation, that is: A commander is responsible

19 for what's happening in his zone of responsibility, even if there are

20 units there that are not under his subordination anymore. He has to be

21 familiar with the situation also. So even probably legally it is not his

22 duty to investigate what this police unit that is not under his

23 subordination anymore has allegedly been doing, I mean, military common

24 sense would dictate that he will try to gather information because he

25 will hearing something.