1 Thursday, 16 November 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp, I gather it's been agreed that a witness

6 will be interposed.

7 MR. STAMP: Indeed, Your Honour, this is Dr. Antonio Alonso.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, please bring in Dr. Alonso.

9 MR. STAMP: And while he's brought, I'll indicate that he's a DNA

10 expert. He will be testifying in relation to the identification of the

11 bodies found at Batajnica, and particularly relevant to paragraphs 75(d),

12 77, and Schedule D of the indictment.

13 [The witness entered court]

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Dr. Alonso. Would you please make

15 the solemn declaration by reading aloud the document which will now be

16 placed before you.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

18 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.

20 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

21 JUDGE BONOMY: I think both microphones should be in the usual

22 place for the witness and not for the interpreter; and if the second one

23 causes a problem, then I rely on the interpreter to deal with that

24 problem.

25 Mr. Stamp.

1 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 WITNESS: ANTONIO ALONSO

3 [Witness answered through interpreter]

4 Examination by Mr. Stamp:

5 Q. Good morning, Dr. Alonso.

6 A. Good morning.

7 Q. Could you please state your name and profession.

8 A. My name is Antonio Alonso, and I am at the National Institute of

9 Toxicology and Forensic Sciences in Madrid, Spain.

10 Q. And what is your profession and what do you do there?

11 A. I am an expert in genetic identification in the forensic field.

12 Q. And how long have you been working in that field?

13 A. I've been working at the biology services for the past 22 years.

14 MR. STAMP: Now, Mr. President, Your Honours, the CV for Dr.

15 Alonso is P2501 which we wish to tender. It is pretty extensive and it

16 speaks for itself, so we will not go through it.

17 Q. Dr. Alonso --

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we admit the CV of the Doctor. Thank you.

19 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.

20 Q. Doctor, did you receive from Dr. Dusan Dunjic of the Belgrade

21 Institute for Forensic Sciences both samples in respect to human remains

22 that were found according to what you were told at a place called

23 Batajnica in Serbia?

24 A. Yes, that is so. Our institute received, in the course of 2001,

25 56 remains of bones for genetic analysis.

1 Q. And did you receive from the International Commission for Missing

2 Persons, and also from the ICTY, blood reference samples of family members

3 of persons who were said to have been missing from a place called Suva

4 Reka or killed in a place called Suva Reka in 1999?

5 A. Yes, that is so. My apologies for coughing. We received 13 blood

6 samples from those two organisations that you mentioned, and indeed these

7 were samples from people who were family members of people who disappeared

8 in Suva Reka.

9 Q. And, Doctor, I understand that you performed analyses of the

10 material that you received and provided four reports in respect to the

11 results of those analyses. The last report dated the 13th of June, 2006,

12 I understand is a sort of compendium or a summary of the findings in the

13 previous three reports and also describes application of later technology

14 to the analyses of the samples that you received. Is that correct?

15 A. Yes. It is this last report which is a compendium of all the

16 analyses carried out previously, and it also contains analysis with new

17 DNA markers. I would like to make it very clear at this point that in

18 this analysis, we have used three types of DNA. One DNA, which we give 50

19 percent, depending on whether it is the father or the mother, and which we

20 pass on to our children and at a 50 percent basis as well.

21 This DNA has been used to prove most of the identifications we

22 conducted, but in addition to that we've used two other types of DNA. One

23 type of DNA that only mothers pass on to their children, and that is

24 called mitochondrial DNA, and therefore is shared by all the siblings,

25 children, produced by that same mother. And then the last form of

1 analysis we conducted is DNA from the I [as interpreted] chromosome passed

2 by males on to their male descendents. Therefore we have used three

3 genetic analysis tools for all the remains where identification or

4 compatibility was involved as per the reference samples they were being

5 compared to.

6 Q. Thank you very much, Doctor. I see that it says with respect to

7 the last method of analysis that you used DNA from the I chromosome. Is

8 that the I or the Y chromosome?

9 A. I'm referring to the Y chromosome, sir.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 MR. STAMP: The last report, Your Honour, of the 17th of November

12 is P2486 which you can obviously see. Unless necessary, I don't think

13 there's any need to tender the previous two, three, reports; they are

14 summarised in.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Sir, thank you. P2486 will be admitted. Thank

16 you.

17 MR. STAMP:

18 Q. Doctor, on the 13th of June this year, did you also provide some

19 responses in writing to some questions that had been submitted to you by

20 the ICTY in respect to your report?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And therein you explained various aspects of the report?

23 A. In the report we were being asked as to what the functions of our

24 institute were, in other words, the place where we conducted the analysis.

25 We responded that the official centre of the Spanish Ministry of Justice

1 for conducting forensic science analysis and toxicology analysis. More

2 specifically, the biology service, where I am employed and where these

3 analyses were conducted, conducts the general functions of assisting the

4 Ministry of Justice and, more specifically, it is the official entity at

5 the Ministry of Justice for forensic genetics.

6 In the report we provide answers to other questions, such as the

7 quality guarantees applicable to the analysis we conduct at the biology

8 service, and the answers in this respect provide the proficiency tests

9 conducted on an annual basis at our centre. And we also speak about our

10 own development of research techniques in this particular field.

11 Now, as to the questions about the methods we used and whether

12 these methods are in keeping with the latest scientific developments, our

13 answer is positive. Yes. We've used state-of-the-art technology, and

14 throughout the world at present there is major standardisation in the DNA

15 analysis methods that we use in forensics. So a method used by our

16 laboratory is a method that can be reproduced at a second analysis

17 conducted by any other centre, and that's a very important type of

18 guarantee in this field. Another thing we were being asked --

19 Q. Before you continue. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but just to

20 facilitate the Court --

21 MR. STAMP: May I just indicate that that is P2487.

22 Q. Could you continue with your explanation, Doctor.

23 A. Other questions that we were being asked were whether the results

24 of the statistic valuation of analysis could vary significantly on the

25 basis of different populations; more specifically, if it were an Albanian

1 population. There's many theoretical answers that can be provided to this

2 question, but the most adequate answer is the one we provided, which is to

3 re-calculate the analysis results on the basis of an Albanian population

4 using a study that was published in the Forensic Science International

5 magazine.

6 And we saw that the results did not vary significantly. They

7 are very similar, and they are within the values that can be expected

8 within the father-son, mother-son, or father-mother-son parameters that

9 we've previously seen.

10 Q. Thank you, Doctor. That --

11 MR. STAMP: The response, as I indicated is P2487, which we also

12 ask be received in evidence as an addendum to the main report.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah. That will be received in evidence, Mr.

14 Stamp.

15 MR. STAMP:

16 Q. If we could have a look at the report, Doctor, of the 17th of

17 November.

18 MR. STAMP: That is P2486, Your Honours.

19 Q. Can you tell us how many positive findings of identification did

20 you make in respect to the material that you received and analysed.

21 A. Yes. There is a total of 21 identifications, 19 of which are on

22 the basis of DNA analysis, with 50 percent; and 50 [as interpreted]

23 regions of this DNA which provide 50 percent and which are based on a

24 father-son, mother-son, or a father-mother-son type of relationship.

25 19 of these identifications out of 21 are given in the report as

1 scientifically proven. And there are two of these identifications,

2 however, which are based on the analyse of mitochondrial and chromosome Y

3 analysis, which have a lower discriminating ability, and we thus call

4 these identifications preliminary identifications. Therefore, 19

5 identifications are proven and two identifications are of a preliminary

6 nature.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp, I think there's a make in the transcript

8 at line 18 on page 6, and I have a feeling that should be 15 regions

9 rather than 50.

10 Doctor, you've been interpreting as saying that 19 of these were

11 on the basis of DNA analysis with 50 percent and 50 regions of this DNA.

12 Now, is that accurate?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, these are based on 15 DNA

14 regions, each of which are inherited 50 percent from one or the other

15 parent.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: That clarifies it. Thank you.

17 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

18 Q. Doctor, we don't have time to go through all the results. I'd

19 like to go through a couple of them with you.

20 MR. STAMP: The results, Your Honour, are in the English

21 translation of this report at page 4, and it's really under the heading

22 "Results."

23 Q. You used the term in respect to these results that you cannot rule

24 out the possibility that the bone sample Ba-32 comes from Berisha Nebi,

25 Sofije, the biological mother of Kuqui (Vesel) Dashurije. You also tell

1 us in your previous answer that you regard the identifications as proven.

2 In that context, can you explain the expression, "cannot rule out the

3 possibility."

4 A. In each of these 19 cases, after conducting a reference of the

5 reference samples and analysing the genetic profile of the bone remains,

6 and after conducting a blind analysis of one against all the others,

7 initially - because of course at the beginning we don't know which sample

8 belongs to whom - after all that we obtain a series of compatibility.

9 Now, as per your question, sir, the answer is that 50 percent of

10 those bone remains in the Ba-32 sample are under reference number 5. That

11 means we cannot exclude the women from which these remains come from, that

12 is to say the mother, reference number 5. What is the degree of

13 probability with which we can make such a statement? Well, what we do is

14 assess how many more times how more probable this observed genetic

15 compatibility is in the two regions and between these two samples if we

16 consider that the parental relationship, paternity in this case, is maybe

17 not this relationship; in other words, any other mother within that same

18 population.

19 So when we conduct this calculation, we obtain what we call the

20 likelihood index or the likelihood ratio, in English, and that is a figure

21 which tells us how reliable our results are. Now, if it's easier for the

22 Tribunal to understand the probability data in terms of percentages, I

23 could then say that a LR of 1.000 is equivalent to 99.9 percent. A

24 likelihood ratio of a 10.000 would be the equivalent of 99.99 percent.

25 100.000 would be 99.999 percent. That is to say that all of the results

1 are above 99.9 percent likelihood, and I would add that these calculations

2 are conducted only with that DNA which is provided on a 50 percent basis.

3 We have not included here subsequent checking of all the cases

4 with DNA from mitochondrial or chromosome Y DNA with different markers, as

5 I said before. But in any case we have verified that when we have a

6 mother and their daughter they have the same mitochondrial DNA. And when

7 we have a father bone among the reference samples and a son among the

8 reference samples, they also share the same Y chromosome.

9 Q. Thank you. I would like you to look at just two others of the

10 results. If you look at page 5 of the report, the last two results on

11 that page in which you speak of Redon Nexhat. Before I have the question

12 may I ask something. Generally speaking, in your report, you use the

13 surname first, followed by the father's name in brackets, and followed by

14 the given name of the person whom you refer.

15 A. In most of the cases, we have used that format for names; however,

16 not always. In the samples we received, we noticed that this particular

17 format for the name was not always used. In other words, father's

18 surname, then name, and so forth. In some occasions the reference samples

19 we received contained the individual's first name and then the family

20 name.

21 And that is why sometimes, since we're not familiar with the

22 surnames or with the order in which they should be provided, what we did

23 is transcribe the information as we received it. So that is why I think

24 regarding your question in some cases we have name and surname of the

25 father -- name of the father, but sometimes we're missing the surname.

1 Q. Very well. So in respect to the penultimate result on page 5,

2 I'll just read the findings: "So we cannot rule out the possibility that

3 Ba-46 could come from Redon Nexhat, Shyhrete Berisha's biological son."

4 Can you comment on that in respect to what you just said.

5 Let me put this way. Having come to the Tribunal, yesterday, did

6 you have a look again at the family tree; and having done so, could you --

7 would you like to make any correction in respect to the finding in respect

8 to Redon Nexhat.

9 A. Not as regards to identification, nor the data obtained. We

10 obtained compatibility between these remains in comparison to the Shyhrete

11 Berisha data. So Ba-46 can be considered to come from someone who can be

12 considered as the biological son of Shyhrete Berisha. And that is the

13 reference that we have called BS, B as in boy and S as in sample.

14 Q. You received for the purpose of your analysis a family tree in

15 respect to the blood reference samples that you were given?

16 MR. STAMP: That, Your Honour, is P2500.

17 Could that be put on the ELMO, please -- sorry, the e-court, could

18 we call it up on the e-court, P2500.

19 And if we go to the next page. The next one, please. Thank you.

20 Q. You see the family tree there. You see to the right of the family

21 tree in the second -- let's say the second row you see Nexhat and Shyhrete

22 as a couple. And you see below them, Majlinda, daughter; Herolinda,

23 daughter, Altin, son; Redon, son. Please say, "yes" or "no."

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Having regard to that, if we look again at the report in respect

1 to your finding at 75, would you agree with me that Nexhat in respect to

2 the finding for Redon and Majlinda and Herolinda refer to the father of

3 these persons?

4 A. We have not obtained any samples, both samples, for males that are

5 compatible with this individual; however, we consider on the basis of the

6 information that he is the father.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, I'm -- certainly did not understand that.

9 MR. STAMP: Very well.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: You can -- the --

11 MR. STAMP: When --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: On your family tree, Redon is -- he's not

13 represented -- I see, he's not son -- there's a missing line, is there?

14 MR. STAMP: There's a line -- there ought to be a line from

15 Nexhat-Shyhrete, as a couple, to the children, but it's based on the

16 family tree. The four persons below those persons are the children of

17 Nexhat and Shyhrete.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: And one of them is Redon?

19 MR. STAMP: One of them is Redon.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: And is that the person who is identified in the

21 paragraph you've been looking at?

22 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: That's what the paragraph says. What's incorrect?

24 MR. STAMP: The paragraph does not identify him as Redon Berisha,

25 as in the other findings where it gives the surname, followed by the

1 father's name in brackets, followed by the first name.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: So it should be Redon Nexhat Berisha?

3 MR. STAMP: Yes, it should be Berisha Nexhat Redon.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

5 MR. STAMP: To clarify further, Your Honours, if I may. The same

6 would apply to the last paragraph of that page, the other two siblings,

7 Majlinda and Herolinda are referred to.

8 Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours. I have nothing further in

9 chief.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Stamp.

11 Doctor, I have one question. The two identifications that were of

12 a preliminary nature, what does that mean?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From our standpoint, since these

14 identifications are based on DNA regions that allow us to obtain

15 information on the maternal or paternal lines of descendents, the

16 discrimination power that they have is not equal to that of the other

17 markers. In other terms, at present it is very easy to prove a father-son

18 or mother-son relationship through markings that are provided on a 50

19 percent basis. But it is more difficult to prove that two people are

20 siblings and share the same father or same mother.

21 And that's what we have here. We have a reference sample, and we

22 have a bone remains sample, which are compatible in terms of siblings on

23 the basis of chromosome Y and mitochondrial analysis. However,

24 statistically, this does not have a definitive value, and it is called

25 preliminary proof. There is compatibility on the maternal line. There is

1 compatibility on the paternal line, but we need to take into account that

2 most of the people who disappeared are members of the same family. If you

3 look at the appendices in the end and look at the Y chromosome we've

4 obtained, you will see there are very few compared to what one might

5 expect in unrelated population.

6 And these two mean that the value of these markers is lower when

7 conducting a statistical assessment of this compatibility between the

8 population. All of this, according to the standards of identification in

9 the forensic field, point at the fact that these samples supposedly belong

10 to these same individuals, but new reference samples would be necessary to

11 be able to confirm that. What samples? Well, we would need the father's

12 or the son's, because then we could analyse this other DNA which would

13 give us the higher discrimination ability. I hope I've answered your

14 question, sir.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Doctor, on the basis of the restricted information

16 you have in these two cases, are you able to give a likelihood ratio for

17 identification of the two persons?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. If one looks or assesses these

19 DNA profiles on a database containing Y chromosome and mitochondrial

20 information, we would be at a likelihood ratio located between 100 and

21 1.000, 100 and 1.000.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: And tell me how that converts to percentage

23 likelihood terms.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we have a value of 100, we're

25 talking about 99.0 percentage; and if we have 1.000, we're talking about

1 99.9. I would again state that from our standpoint these two

2 identifications should not be considered as proven until new analysis are

3 conducted. From our standpoint, there is no certainty because the

4 possibility of their existing another individual in the population

5 unrelated to the person we're now analysing is relatively high.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: It will be my lack of understanding, Doctor, but

7 I'm not following this part of it. You've given us an indication that the

8 likelihood of identification in the other 19 cases is at least 99.9

9 percent. Is that right?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the other cases, the level is at

11 least above 99.9 percent in all of the cases. And in many cases the

12 number of 9s after the comma is even higher, which gives us even higher

13 certainty.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: In the two we are discussing at the moment, are you

15 saying there is a 99 percent likelihood that they are the persons referred

16 to, and that there's only a 1 percent possibility that they are not?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. But even if the figures are

18 such and appear to give certainty, we know that they do not give full

19 certainty. And that is why generally it is preferred to present data by

20 referring to a hypothesis where maybe it is not the person. Let me help

21 you understand. All of the members of the family --

22 JUDGE BONOMY: No. No, carry on. I was going to say something

23 else. I'll say it when you're finished. Thank you.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All of the members of a same family,

25 all siblings, all uncles, or aunts who share the same maternal line share

1 the same mitochondrial DNA, which is what we've used in these last two

2 cases. Therefore, we cannot differentiate amongst them; they are the

3 same. In other words, this DNA allows for the differentiation of family

4 lines rather than individuals, and this is where the limitation lies.

5 There is less variability as to these types of DNA, and that is why its

6 discrimination power or ability is lower.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: But in this case, the DNA you're using is from bone

8 fragments. Is that correct?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: So it's rather different from blood which may pass

11 -- even though a person has not died, we've got a fragment of bone which

12 makes at least makes it clear we've got a deceased body; and we would then

13 be able to look at other evidence pointing to the circumstances in which

14 certain people may have died, which we can take along with your analysis

15 and perhaps come to a more definitive conclusion than you're able to do

16 scientifically?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Probably other data arising from the

18 investigation can help to increase or decrease the uncertainty around

19 these two cases.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

21 Now, Mr. Stamp.

22 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: How does the family tree become established in the

24 course of the case?

25 MR. STAMP: Become established, you mean what's the basis of it?

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, the relationships. Are these --

2 MR. STAMP: The --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there evidence already of all these

4 relationships?

5 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour. The family tree here that was sent

6 was something that was compiled by ICTY investigators.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah.

8 MR. STAMP: The witness, Shyhrete Berisha, provided a family tree

9 in evidence, which I think is substantial, at least to the extent it is

10 relevant substantial to the evidence that is provided.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: So we now have all the evidence to establish the

12 relationships, do we?

13 MR. STAMP: Indeed. And in respect to the -- what he described as

14 preliminary findings, the additional samples were analysed by another DNA

15 facility.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: So that evidence is yet to come?

17 MR. STAMP: That is correct, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, of these 21 victims, how many are specified in

19 a schedule?

20 MR. STAMP: 15 of them, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: That is Schedule D?

22 MR. STAMP: Schedule D.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: And what is to happen with the others that have now

24 been identified, but don't appear in the schedule?

25 MR. STAMP: The Prosecution -- the Prosecution is considering and

1 indeed intends to make an appropriate application in respect to

2 correlating the evidence and the schedules, which we hope to do when some

3 more of the evidence is in.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Stamp.

5 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, we will proceed in the follow order:

8 General Lukic, General Lazarevic, General Pavkovic, General Ojdanic, Mr.

9 Sainovic, and Mr. Milutinovic.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

11 Mr. Lukic.

12 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

13 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Dr. Alonso. My name is Branko

15 Lukic. I appear on behalf of General Sreten Lukic before this Tribunal.

16 I have a few questions only, and I believe we can wrap up in ten to 15

17 minutes. If, during my cross-examination, you wish to consult your notes,

18 please feel free to whenever you deem it necessary. My cross-examination

19 will not deal itself with the essence, the gist, of your findings; rather,

20 what I will try to gain from you is the data on the dynamics of the work

21 done, since during this trial there were some issues that were discussed

22 which you may not have touched upon. May we begin?

23 Your biology department of the Institute of Toxicology in Madrid

24 and yourself were tasked to conduct a DNA analysis in order to identify

25 human remains, that is bones, for which it was presumed belonged to 56

1 different bodies. Is that correct?

2 A. Yes, that is right. Maybe the number of bodies was not 56 but 59.

3 56 is what we received, but in any case I agree.

4 Q. Thank you. Who was it who estimated that these remains belonged

5 to 56 or 59 bodies?

6 A. We had 56 sets of remains that had been previously analysed by

7 anthropological means. When we conducted our own analysis of these

8 remains, what we saw was that there were only 41 genetic profiles. As the

9 discrimination power of these analyses is high, we can consider that among

10 these remains there were only 41 people represented and, more

11 specifically, there were ten people who had double samples and two people

12 who presented triplicate samples.

13 That's the data that I can provide by way of an answer. Now, as

14 to the supposition of the total number of victims, that is not a figure

15 that we provide. It is the person conducting the investigation, in this

16 case the General Medicine Institute of Belgrade. And I suppose, and I

17 repeat in supposition, they came to this figure on the basis of the number

18 of people who had disappeared, and that's how they came up with 59

19 victims.

20 Q. You don't know whether, in Batajnica, whole bodies were found or

21 just pieces or parts of bodies. Is that correct?

22 A. That is right. I did not know. We received samples from a

23 diathesis of a long bone for each of those samples. That's all we know.

24 Q. Thank you. Professor Dr. Dusan Dunjic, who is the director for

25 the Forensic Medicine in Belgrade, transported those bones to your

1 institute. Is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Do you remember when Professor Dunjic brought those remains to

4 your institute?

5 A. I believe I recall, but let me confirm that it was 22nd of

6 November of 2001. Let me check. Just a second, please. I don't have the

7 date available to me here, but I think it was 22 November 2001.

8 Q. As for the remains brought by Professor Dunjic, were they properly

9 packaged? Were they properly preserved in that sense?

10 A. Yes. As I said to you before, these were sections from the

11 diathesis of the long bone. Each of the bones was in a container, in a

12 hermetically sealed jar and each of them contained a single and distinct

13 identification label.

14 Q. Therefore, we may conclude that the cooperation you received on

15 the part of Dr. Dunjic was at a professional level?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Your preliminary report was drafted on the 15th of November, 2002

18 [as interpreted]. Is that correct?

19 A. That is so.

20 Q. When did you send that preliminary report to The Hague Tribunal?

21 A. On the date that you said is the date when the report was mailed,

22 both to Professor Dunjic and to The Hague Tribunal on the 15th of

23 February, 2002.

24 Q. Thank you. And an identification process is a long and

25 complicated one. Would you agree with me, if I said that?

1 A. Yes.

2 MR. LUKIC: Only for the transcript, Your Honour, I can see that

3 on the page 19 line 5, it was either misspoken by me or wrongly entered.

4 It should be 15th of February, 2000.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: The witness has clarified it already. Thank you,

6 Mr. Lukic.

7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Dr. Alonso, the preliminary report dated 15th of February, isn't

9 the only report you drafted concerning this issue. Is that correct?

10 A. No. It's not the only report. It's the first report concerning

11 this group of samples.

12 Q. Your additional reports were submitted on the 4th of July, 2004;

13 on the 10th of December, 2002; and the 17th of November, 2004?

14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The first date should

15 have been 2002.

16 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Which also shows that it was a long and complicated process?

19 A. Yes. Due to the complexity arising from the number of individuals

20 and to the fact that they were related; that's what provided the greatest

21 complexity from a technical standpoint as regards the analysis that we

22 needed to conduct.

23 Q. The reason I'm asking all this was because of the following

24 question. Is it correct that the repatriation of the bodies, that is the

25 handing over of the bodies to their families, could have only been done

1 after the identification performed by you?

2 A. I suppose so, but I cannot say. I cannot say whether there are

3 other samples from these same bodies being analysed in other laboratories.

4 I don't know what other types of analysis, in addition to the ones that

5 were requested from our own genetic analysis centre, are being requested

6 or conducted, either topological analysis or other types analysis. So I'm

7 afraid I cannot respond reliably to your question.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Doctor, were you ever asked to have regard to the

9 need to repatriate the bodies in prioritising your work?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, at no moment.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

12 Mr. Lukic.

13 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Q. [Interpretation] Would it be correct if I said the Belgrade

15 experts had an additional task when identifying bodies by using your

16 results. This was another long procedure?

17 A. I do not know the use to which our report results were put to --

18 by our colleagues in Belgrade. As regards the identification of the

19 bodies, as I said, I don't know what the condition of the bodies was,

20 whether they were full, complete bodies and had been submitted to

21 anthropological analysis, I know nothing of all of these aspects, sir.

22 All I can tell you is about the analysis we conducted scientifically on

23 small bone samples that we received from these alleged victims.

24 Q. Thank you, Doctor. This exhausts my questions, and I thank you

25 for your answers.

1 A. Thank you.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.

3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No questions, Your Honour.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic.

5 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] No questions.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.

7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No questions, Your Honour.

8 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No questions.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: We have no questions for this witness.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp.

12 MR. STAMP: Just one question.

13 Re-examination by Mr. Stamp:

14 Q. You said about other analyses might have been done by other

15 institutions. Do you know if the ICMP did any analysis with respect to

16 DNA samples from human remains?

17 A. I do not know; however, in our last report we requested of the

18 Tribunal that in the appendix containing the results of the DNA analysis

19 provided in this lab report, we asked, if possible, for ICMP to be

20 informed, because just as we identified 19 people plus two with a lesser

21 probability, there's other remains that continue to remain anonymous. And

22 if they were cross-checked against the International Commission for

23 Missing Persons database, that might allow for establishment of

24 coincidental compatibility providing for a greater number of

25 identifications.

1 But I do not know whether other analyses have been conducted on

2 these remains. I think that would be positive for the process, and I

3 think it would be good for the people concerned for these profiles to be

4 cross-checked with the family databases that ICMP has.

5 Q. Thank you very much, Doctor.

6 MR. STAMP: I have nothing further, Mr. President, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Stamp.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Dr. Alonso, that completes your evidence; thank you

10 very much for coming to the Tribunal to give it, and you've now free to

11 leave.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

13 [The witness withdrew]

14 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer].

15 JUDGE BONOMY: We now have to break so that the arrangements for

16 the continued evidence of Mr. Tanic can be put in place. That will be a

17 20-minute break until 10.20. Unless I hear to the contrary that this is

18 not convenient for parties and, in particular, the interpreters, we would

19 then sit from 10.20 to 11.50 and from 12.20 till 1.45. So we will resume

20 at 10.20 and we will resume in closed session.

21 --- Recess taken at 10.00 a.m.

22 [Closed session]

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 [Open session]

4 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 Good morning, Mr. Tanic. The delay this resuming your evidence

7 was caused by interposing another witness, and it was convenient to

8 everyone and to the Court to do that. So I'm sorry you've been further

9 inconvenienced, but hopefully we'll manage to get to the end of your

10 evidence now quite quickly. The cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman will

11 continue, and, as before, the solemn declaration continues to apply to

12 your evidence.

13 Mr. Ackerman.

14 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour. I should tell you that in

15 accordance with -- with our not particularly satisfactory conversation at

16 the end of yesterday's session, at least I felt I may have gone a little

17 overboard with you. I'm sorry about that. But I have dramatically cut

18 back the questions I'm going to ask today and without I think interfering

19 with the things I want to do. That happens when you have time for

20 preparation that you can reflect on what you want to ask and take the time

21 to be better prepared and therefore move more efficiently.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: The Bench is grateful for that, Mr. Ackerman.

23 WITNESS: RATOMIR TANIC [Resumed]

24 [Witness answered through interpreter]

25 Cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman: [Continued]

1 Q. Mr. Tanic, I'm now going to refer to paragraph 98 of your

2 statement. You speak about information on the commission of crimes by the

3 UCK, and you say:

4 "In the autumn of 1999, one Western country asked me to assist in

5 handling this information -- in handing this information and evidence over

6 to the ICTY through unofficial channels."

7 What western country was it that asked you to do that?

8 A. United Kingdom, and this refers to crimes against the Serbs,

9 particularly those committed by the Haradinaj brothers.

10 Q. All right. And who was it you spoke to from the United Kingdom

11 that asked you to do this, if you can tell us?

12 A. A high representative of the British intelligence service.

13 Q. And I assume that's a name that you really aren't permitted to

14 divulge?

15 A. Exactly.

16 Q. All right. I'm prepared to respect that. Did you hand such

17 information over to the ICTY before you were arrested?

18 A. I was never arrested. I was kidnapped and tortured. This

19 information I forwarded to the SDB. They started to collect documentation

20 on the crimes committed by Agim Ceku and the Haradinaj brothers. After

21 that the kidnapping of me and wife, the torture occurred; and after that,

22 I discontinued work on that. Work on that was continued through Mr.

23 Mijatovic, and he delivered that material to the ICTY after the year 2000.

24 We're referring to crimes against the Serbs.

25 Q. So the answer is you didn't deliver any information to the ICTY,

1 as a result of that request?

2 A. About the crimes against the Serbs, that information, or the

3 information they requested for the material on the crimes to be prepared?

4 Q. I'm only talking about the information you talked about when you

5 said a western country asked you to turn information over to the ICTY.

6 The answer is you didn't turn any over as a result of that request, you

7 personally? I think that's your answer. If you can just say "yes," we

8 can go on.

9 A. Now, this is an unfair question. The foreign service asked from

10 our service to prepare material on the crimes against the Serbs to be

11 forwarded to the ICTY. And the information about that I forwarded to the

12 ICTY before being kidnapped, just information, not the materials because I

13 had not received them. And our SDB was in the process of collecting the

14 material and information about that and were later handed over to the

15 ICTY; not through me, but through Mr. Zoran Mijatovic.

16 Q. And can you tell us what -- what are the unofficial channels that

17 you can hand information to the ICTY, as opposed to official channels,

18 what would be the unofficial channels that you speak of?

19 A. Could you wait for me to read this paragraph out because there

20 seems to be a bit of confusion regarding the question.

21 Q. It's a sentence that starts with the words: "In the autumn of

22 1999, one Western country ..."

23 A. I found it. Thank you. Yes. Thank you. I don't know which

24 channels they would use to hand the material over to the ICTY, so I don't

25 know what are these unofficial channels. The point here is is that it was

1 requested from our security service to prepare these materials. This was

2 requested from me by that foreign country so that they could forward it --

3 Q. You've answered the question, but let me -- let me suggest to you

4 "unofficial channels" were your words, not mine. So what did you mean

5 when you said, "unofficial channels of the ICTY"? Just tell us what you

6 mean.

7 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I don't think he said unofficial

8 channels of the ICTY. He's referring to unofficial channels of Serbia to

9 give the material to the ICTY.

10 MR. ACKERMAN: I'm grateful for Mr. Hannis helping me with the

11 possible answer, but that isn't what he said. It can be interpreted that

12 way.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. It can be interpreted in various ways, so

14 please carry on, Mr. Ackerman.

15 MR. ACKERMAN:

16 Q. What did you mean by "unofficial channels"?

17 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour. Maybe it

18 would be easier for Mr. Tanic to have a copy in English because of

19 different references; 166, 167, et cetera. Maybe this would facilitate

20 translation as well.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Well --

22 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] It will speed up matters.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's not a matter that I can interfere in

24 through your good offices, Mr. Fila. It's Mr. Ackerman who's conducting

25 this cross-examination, and it's for him to decide what's the best way to

1 do it. And I would be surprised if English -- an English copy was really

2 what was best in these circumstances, since the witness -- well, perhaps

3 it was only an English copy that was signed, was it? Mr. Ackerman, was it

4 only an English copy that was signed initially?

5 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, he gave his original statement

6 in English. His statement was given in English, so it might be helpful.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

8 MR. ACKERMAN: Anything that would speed up his answers would be

9 helpful. I thought I had made some progress. I thought I had made

10 process in trying to move rapidly.

11 Q. See if you can give us an answer just as briefly as possible about

12 what you meant when you used the words "unofficial channels."

13 A. Unofficial channels would be personal contacts, because

14 Milosevic's regime did not want to cooperate officially with the ICTY, not

15 even when it concerned Serbian victims. But which personal contacts those

16 would be, I don't know. But I know that unofficial channels would be

17 personal contacts. It was explained later in this sentence, "since

18 Milosevic was not willing to hand it over officially."

19 Q. You've answered the question, I appreciate it. When I -- just a

20 moment ago, in one of my questions, I asked if you handed this information

21 over before you were arrested, and you quarrelled with that. And said you

22 were not arrested, but you were kidnapped. If you look at the last

23 sentence of that paragraph, 98, talking about information you were

24 collecting for your book and so forth, you said this in your statement:

25 "I was accused of collecting this information because I'm a spy

1 for Western countries."

2 So the people that arrested you suspected you of being a spy, and

3 you were arrested on suspicion of being a spy. That's not a kidnapping,

4 it's an arrest. And it's a perfectly valid arrest if they had

5 information, and they did, that you were giving information to foreign

6 sources. And when they said to you, you were being arrested because of

7 suspicion of being a spy, it was an arrest, wasn't it?

8 MR. HANNIS: Well, I object, Your Honour. There's nothing -- I

9 haven't seen the foundation for where they said they were arresting him

10 for being a spy. Can we have a citation to that.

11 MR. ACKERMAN: The last sentence of paragraph 98, Mr. Hannis.

12 MR. HANNIS: I read that, but I don't see that that supports your

13 question the way it was phrased.

14 I'm sorry, Your Honour.

15 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, the alternative is that it's an admission he

16 was a spy. You can have it either way. I'll take it either way.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: The question is admissible in my view.

18 Mr. Tanic, would you answer the question, please.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't say I was officially

20 charged. They accused me during beating me that -- and accused me of

21 being a spy for western powers. But collection of information about Serb

22 victims of crimes in Kosovo can hardly be called a spying for western

23 country. Had I really been a spy, I would have been charged, indicted,

24 but no indictment was issued.

25 And don't be surprised one day that different intelligence

1 services that cooperate among themselves and including our intelligence

2 service cooperated through me. Mr. Ackerman, I was never arrested, I was

3 never indicted for espionage, I was never convicted, I was never a spy. I

4 performed intelligence dimension matters of political problems.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 Mr. Ackerman.

7 MR. ACKERMAN:

8 Q. Well, I put this to you: In your quest for asylum status, if you

9 had said, I was arrested for being a spy, you wouldn't have been able to

10 gain asylum. You had to say, I was kidnapped and beaten, and there's a

11 threat against my life; and, therefore, I'm seeking asylum. And that's in

12 fact what happened; you made that up to get asylum, didn't you?

13 A. Yes, it did occur. I was kidnapped. I was beaten up, together

14 with my wife. That was probably an attempted murder, and this was

15 confirmed in the book, quoted by your Defence team.

16 Q. All right. I want to go on to something else now. In paragraph

17 113 of your statement, you talk about a statement -- you talk about

18 Milosevic issuing orders that the army basically hide from NATO to avoid

19 casualties. Do you remember that in your statement?

20 A. Paragraph 113, you say?

21 Q. Well, I think that information begins -- let me find it. It's

22 paragraph 110:

23 "Under Milosevic's orders, the army's main strategy was to hide

24 from NATO attacks."

25 And I want to ask you about your statement then in paragraph 113,

1 where you say:

2 "As soon as NATO saw troop movements on the ground, they were sure

3 to target."

4 How is it, if you know, NATO would see troop movements on the

5 ground?

6 A. Very easily through technical means, through reconnaissance.

7 Q. All right. I want to go to paragraph 116 now and 117. And you've

8 already talked about these things and I just have a very brief question to

9 ask you. You talked about getting information from western sources that

10 Zastava, which is a military and car factory, would be targeted by NATO

11 and that the RTS building would be targeted by NATO.

12 And I have just, like, maybe two questions about that. First of

13 all, this information was information that you received actually during

14 the bombing, wasn't it?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And you say that you personally, paragraph 117:

17 "I personally passed on to Milosevic information I'd received from

18 my Western contacts that RTS was a target." Where was that you personally

19 passed that on to him? Where were you, where was he?

20 A. I cannot name those sources. I cannot divulge them.

21 Q. I didn't ask you about any sources. That's apparently a

22 translation problem. What I asked you was: When you personally told

23 Milosevic about this, where were you and where was he?

24 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, he says he personally passed it on, that

25 may not mean the same thing as told him.

1 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I wonder if Mr. Hannis could avoid

2 assisting the witness.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah.

4 Mr. Hannis, I don't think that was a really very helpful

5 intervention in the circumstances. This is a cross-examination where

6 particular points can be put directly to the witness, and there's nothing

7 wrong with the question that's being asked there.

8 Mr. Ackerman.

9 MR. ACKERMAN:

10 Q. I'm going to ask it again. When you say you personally told

11 Milosevic about this, my question is: Where were you and where was he?

12 A. I said that I personally relayed this information, not handed it

13 over. Transfer of information was done through communication means of the

14 SDB. It says I transferred and not handed over.

15 Q. And you know, do you, that this was actually transferred, that

16 Milosevic actually received this information?

17 A. Absolutely. And there was information from other sources. I

18 wasn't the sole source of information.

19 Q. And because of your vast experience in the intelligence business,

20 you know, don't you, that one of the most closely held and closely guarded

21 secrets are targeting information during bombing. That information is not

22 even given to pilots until briefings right before take-off. You know

23 that, don't you?

24 A. That is not correct, Mr. Ackerman. During NATO bombing, a certain

25 leak of information was permitted for the reason to leave some rule for an

1 honourable way out. There was some other considerations, but I cannot now

2 dwell on intelligence procedures, state secrets of certain countries.

3 It's too much of a burden for me.

4 I can tell you that Mr. Milosevic had information on targets, and

5 you may invite Serbia's intelligence service representatives to provide

6 you documentation. On that, I was one of the sources; I wasn't the sole

7 source.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, at the beginning of that paragraph, 117,

9 the phrase used is:

10 "I personally passed on to Milosevic information that I had

11 received." What do you mean "personally passed on to Milosevic?"

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I mean that I personally was the

13 source, and I passed it on through the previously established

14 communication means that were known to be leading to him.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: So what you in fact did was pass information to the

16 SDB. Is that correct?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the SDB controlled those means

18 of communication.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: And we had some evidence about this when Mr. Fila

20 was cross-examining you, but I certainly until now would have read that

21 as if you had a personal, direct contact with Milosevic over this. That's

22 how it reads. And it's helpful to have it clarified. Thank you.

23 Mr. Ackerman.

24 MR. ACKERMAN:

25 Q. Mr. Tanic, be careful how you answer this question; think

1 carefully. Do you know if General Clark or General Short knew that

2 targeting information was being passed to you and then to the Serbian

3 government?

4 A. Absolutely, I have no idea what General Clark knew at all.

5 Q. How about General Short, do you think General Short knew this

6 information was being passed to you and through you to the Serbian

7 government?

8 A. No. No, absolutely. How could I know what they knew.

9 Q. All right. So since you don't know that, then I need you to tell

10 me who passed this information to you.

11 A. Are you trying to drive a wedge between me and the west? This

12 source is fully protected.

13 Q. No. I'm trying to represent my client and to test your

14 credibility. And one of the ways we test your credibility is for you to

15 tell us who told you something that you claim you heard so that we can ask

16 that person if you're telling the truth. So tell me who told you this.

17 A. I cannot say that, absolutely cannot.

18 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I think under Rule 90 that you have

19 the power to compel him to answer and I ask you to do that.

20 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honour, if you do, I ask that you consider

21 that being done in private session.

22 MR. ACKERMAN: To which I would have no objection.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: I would, though, Mr. Hannis, welcome some more

24 guidance on this. I think this particular matter is one where the witness

25 has also declined to identify the person in the SDB to whom he gave the

1 information.

2 I think in the cross-examination by Mr. Fila, he said it was done

3 through an arranged means of communication by code, but wouldn't say to

4 whom it was given. And so we have an absence of identification of both

5 where the information came from and how it was relayed to its destination.

6 Now, in view of the sensitivity of this matter, to continue this

7 debate, we will go into private session.

8 [Private session]

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21 [Open session]

22 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

24 MR. ACKERMAN:

25 Q. Sir, in the transcript of your transcript from the 10th of

1 November at page 6300, you were talking about that meeting in New York and

2 the document that resulted therefrom. And you were asked about the

3 signatures on that document, and you answered this:

4 "There were no signatures, no documents, because, as I said, the

5 negotiations were discreet."

6 Now, isn't it the truth with regard to that document that it bears

7 no signatures because there was no agreement at that time?

8 A. The agreement was reached on the things specified. I don't know

9 why there are no signatures, though. There may be another piece of paper

10 with the signatures, but you should ask the state department that. As I

11 said, I wasn't in New York, but I was familiar with the preparations of

12 that meeting.

13 Q. Well, I think what you told us, or at least what I understood from

14 what you told us, that there were no signatures on the document because it

15 was a discreet meeting. Isn't that what you said?

16 A. Yes. It was a complicated stop-and-go negotiating procedure.

17 Various means were used; meetings, round-tables, private meetings. There

18 was a lot of change of position, testing the other side, as there always

19 is in such situations. Second of all, there was a grave problem of

20 whether Mihajlovic was to go there with full Milosevic's authority or not.

21 There was some controversial information on that. Agani was there as

22 well. He kept changing his position as well --

23 Q. I think you've answered my question --

24 A. This is a very complicated issue.

25 Q. -- as well as you can. You're going on to a bunch of stuff I

1 didn't ask. You must know, as an international diplomat and negotiator,

2 that discreet secret agreements are signed all the time and kept secret.

3 You know that, don't you?

4 A. It is often so, not always though.

5 Q. That's good enough. That's good enough. Now, all of these

6 negotiations that you claim to have been having with the Albanian

7 representatives were called by you discreet negotiations. These were

8 secret negotiations, weren't they?

9 A. Partially they were public, partially semi-secret, partially

10 secret. We used various negotiating means and ways, but we tried to keep

11 it discreet, and yet some leaks were allowed. Sometimes we would have a

12 public round-table; but then during the breaks, there would be meetings

13 which were negotiating in the very narrow sense. Therefore, it would have

14 been done within a public forum, but as to what would happen subsequently

15 was not. Otherwise, I was never an international diplomat. I never

16 called myself that.

17 Q. All right. Let's go now to another issue. At page 6304 and 6305

18 of your testimony on the 10th of November, you're talking about the

19 time-period between 1997 and 1998. And you're talking about the KLA, and

20 what you said was this:

21 "At the time the Albanians didn't have a KLA. They weren't

22 organised. They existed mostly abroad; however, at that point Milosevic

23 decided to give up on the political process and started provoking

24 incidents and conflicts in Kosovo together with his associates."

25 Now, first, I'd like you to have a look at an exhibit, P705, and I

1 want to look at page 3 of that exhibit. And there is a box on page 3 of

2 that exhibit that we should be able to find. And not reading Serbian, I'm

3 not sure if it's on the screen or not. But there is a box where you're

4 quoted as saying this, and this article is dated 31 January 1997, very

5 early in 1997. You're quoted as saying this:

6 "The Albanians must themselves find a way to stop terrorist

7 actions in Kosovo in order to contribute towards the trust-building

8 process."

9 Now, if what you said is correct, that at that time the Albanians

10 didn't have a KLA, who was it that was carrying out these terrorist

11 actions in Kosovo that you talk about in January of 1997?

12 A. First of all, the 10th of November, when was that stated? What

13 year? When did I say that? Here or --

14 Q. Page 6305 in your testimony here on the 10th of November.

15 A. It must have been a wrong use of words. There were terrorists,

16 but the KLA was not organised as it was at a later stage. There were

17 terrorist activities at first carried out by some local terrorists with

18 the odd member of the KLA here and there.

19 But this is not true for 1997. If I said that, then I must have

20 misspoken. In any case I wanted to say that the KLA was not organised as

21 it became at a later stage. There were some terrorist activities by KLA

22 members in 1997, though.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues]... But after telling us that

24 they weren't. Let's look at page 6329, this question:

25 "All right. Let me move on to another topic. In 1997/1998, did

1 you become aware of any international offers to Serbia to help deal with

2 the problem of Albanian terrorist or the UCK? First of all, yes or no."

3 You said: "Yes, but before 1997," therefore in this period but

4 before 1997 as well. Now, you tell us there wasn't any KLA there in 1997

5 and 1998; and then you say there were offers to deal with the UCK before

6 1997. How can that be?

7 A. I misspoke when interpreting this. Albanian terrorists, there

8 have always been Albanian terrorists down there in Kosovo. But in 1997

9 they were not as highly organised as they were after Milosevic started

10 provoking incidents and when he gave them political legitimacy. But there

11 were terrorist activities far before that, as early as 1994, 1995. We

12 wanted to negotiate seriously, and we wanted to ask the Albanian side to

13 get rid of terrorists.

14 Rugova and Agani were not happy for having terrorists. At first

15 the KLA was a weakling. It was no match for the Serbian police, special

16 forces, or the military. Perhaps I didn't put it in the best wording, but

17 everyone knows that there was terrorism there. The KLA, in early 1997,

18 was poorly organised, and the Serbian police could have dealt with them

19 with no problems whatsoever.

20 Q. [Previous translation continues]... And what you call

21 misspeaking, I call dancing around the truth, as we talked about

22 yesterday. And I suggest, again, that you just make up answers because

23 you think they sound good. Now I'm going on to another subject here.

24 You're talking --

25 A. Can I name the people, the diplomatic representatives of the west,

1 or rather, their countries through which we received the offer?

2 Q. No, I haven't asked you that.

3 A. Of course.

4 Q. The Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement in 1998. You're speaking about

5 that at page 6320 of your testimony on 10 November. You say this:

6 "But yes, the agreement with Holbrooke is almost identical to the

7 spirit of these agreements. Holbrooke was naturally familiar with the

8 ways negotiations were going. We had, naturally, contact with the

9 American ambassador. When I say 'we,' I mean Mihajlovic, myself. We also

10 had contact with state department representatives."

11 Now, when did these contacts occur? We're talking about the time

12 of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, aren't we?

13 A. All the while during the negotiations in 1994, 1995 -- no, 1995,

14 1996, 1997, all the time we had contact with the American charge d'affaire

15 who was there standing in for the ambassador and with the state department

16 representatives.

17 Q. No. No, you're not listening to my question. You know that I'm

18 not talking about 1994 and 1995. I'm talking about the time of the

19 Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement in 1998. And what I want you to tell me is

20 who was the American ambassador that you had contact with at that time,

21 who? Tell me the ambassador's name.

22 A. It is clearly stated here that Holbrooke was familiar with the way

23 the negotiations were being conducted and that we had contact. There is

24 no mention of 1998, although we did have contact in 1998. But at that

25 stage, we were no longer involved in the negotiating process. I clearly

1 stated that I was there from 1994/1995 until --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, stop. Your words were put to you: "We

3 had, naturally, contact with the American ambassador." Tell us who that

4 ambassador was. Simple question.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I have to recall, since it

6 escapes me for the moment. I know I spoke to Chris Hill's brother, who

7 was charge d'affaire of the American embassy at the time. Well, I really

8 can't remember.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.

10 MR. ACKERMAN:

11 Q. This was testimony you gave, what, four or five days ago and now

12 you don't know who it was you were talking about, when you said you had

13 contact with the American ambassador?

14 A. I forgot what the man's name is. I didn't mention him four or

15 five days ago either. It is not in my memory anymore.

16 Q. This was the American ambassador to what? Yugoslavia?

17 A. It was the American charge d'affaire, since the US lowered its

18 diplomatic -- the level of its diplomatic presence. But he stood in as

19 ambassador.

20 Q. But you understand that you used the word "American ambassador."

21 Now, this was the charge d'affaire in Belgrade; is that who you're talking

22 about, the American?

23 A. Yes. But he performed the role of ambassador; however, he was a

24 charge d'affaire. It is a standard diplomatic manoeuvre --

25 Q. I just want to make it clear that it was the charge d'affaire in

1 Belgrade that you're referring to when you talk about contacts with the

2 American ambassador. That's who it was that you claim to have contact

3 with during the time of the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement. Now, isn't

4 that true?

5 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, that's not clear that it's necessarily

6 during that time. He said they -- Holbrooke was naturally familiar with

7 the way negotiations were going --

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand the point you're making, Mr. Hannis.

9 I think that's right, Mr. Ackerman, without going into more

10 detail. You can't say it's necessarily at the same time, unless you

11 pin-point the negotiations to the same time.

12 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, line 10 on page 6320 is talking about

13 the agreement with Holbrooke. It's the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, but it's his negotiations --

15 you've got to tie-in his negotiations to be sure we're talking about the

16 same time-scale, and it's not clear in my mind that that is so. It may

17 well be, but it is not clear in my mind that that is the case.

18 MR. ACKERMAN: I want to go on, Your Honour, because I've got

19 enough to deal with.

20 Q. On page 6315 on 10 November, you were asked this question, and

21 this has to do with the Milosevic statement about less than one million

22 Albanians in Kosovo. The question was:

23 "Let me ask you if you can explain for us a little bit about the

24 significance of that. What difference does it make whether there were one

25 million or one million and a half or 800.000? Why was that important?"

1 Your answer was this:

2 "Well, let me first say that I couldn't understand that either

3 initially; and then I was provided with some explanations, according to

4 which, if they represent less than 10 percent, they can't be considered as

5 a constituent people who would have the right to substantial autonomy."

6 Now, when you say you were provided with some explanations about

7 that, who was it that provided you with those explanations?

8 A. Several associates of Milosevic's; Ratko Markovic, among others.

9 I discussed this with Stambuk as well. I think that one from Seselj's

10 party mentioned that, and suddenly this figure started appearing. I was

11 confused by the matter whether they were this figure or that. I believe

12 that somebody from the Seselj's party took part in a radio panel or

13 debate, manager of his party in the Belgrade area. But let Seselj decide.

14 Ratko Markovic was the person with whom I discussed this matter.

15 I asked him about that. He didn't -- I cannot say that he explained at a

16 level of a doctrine; he tried to explain it. I'm not sure whether he was

17 certain of that either. Mihajlovic also mentioned that to me. They were

18 trying to use that contacts around Milosevic to lower the number of

19 Albanians to reduce their requests and demands.

20 Q. [Previous translation continues]... My only question was who you

21 got the explanations from. Did anybody explain it to you as if it was the

22 law? Did a lawyer tell you, Yes, yes, that's correct, that's the law, or

23 did you not have that kind of an explanation? And just say "yes" or "no."

24 We don't need to have another speech I don't think.

25 A. No. No, I did not receive such an explanation by law, on the law.

1 Q. That's fine. The -- the party that you belonged to, that you told

2 us had six or seven seats in the Assembly and was part of the government,

3 there came a time in 1997 when there were new elections, didn't there?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And after those 1997 elections, how many seats did your party

6 have?

7 A. We left the government that -- I don't remember the number of

8 seats. We were not part of the single-ballot ticket with them, and this

9 is the option that we took to leave the government. There were several

10 elections around that time; I'm not sure which you refer to. I know that

11 in the latter part of 1997/beginning of 1998, we had distanced from

12 Milosevic's policies for reasons that I'd already explained.

13 Q. My question just -- you were, you know, a major mover in this

14 party. You were -- you said you were a big star. Doesn't the big star

15 know how many seats you had in 1997 -- in 1997?

16 JUDGE BONOMY: It sounds as though we need to know the date of the

17 election you're referring to, Mr. Ackerman.

18 MR. ACKERMAN: [Microphone not activated].

19 23 September 1997, 28 September 1997 -- 28 September 1997.

20 Q. These were the elections for the Republic Assembly. How many

21 seats did your party gain as a result of those elections?

22 A. I really absolutely do not remember that. Maybe we had no seats.

23 Really, I did not follow what was going on in the Assembly. I was part of

24 the office of the chairman, of the president. I was dealing with Kosovo,

25 with doctrinary matters. I was never an MP. I never was interested in

1 internal party affairs of that character. This was within the purview of

2 other people, and I really cannot remember.

3 Q. Well, your guess is consistent with my information, that you had

4 no seats. And what you've told this Court about leaving the government

5 was you left the government because you were persuaded that Milosevic was

6 not accepting a political solution, even though you were presenting one

7 and you were disgusted and so you left the coalition.

8 You actually left the coalition because you had no seats in the

9 government [as interpreted] anymore and you couldn't be in the coalition.

10 That's the truth, isn't it?

11 A. This is completely incorrect. We decided not to run on a joint

12 ticket with SPS, JUL, and New Democracy, as before, and since we had

13 decided not to join the joint ticket, which means -- that means we had

14 abandoned the ruling coalition and by doing that we abandoned the

15 government and everything else.

16 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours.

17 I'm sorry, John.

18 The transcript intervention, it's 51, 8, it says "seats in the

19 government," actually the question was seats in the parliament.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

21 Mr. Ackerman.

22 MR. ACKERMAN:

23 Q. I want to go on to your testimony in the Milosevic case page 5171,

24 line 23, a question by Judge May. What was -- and there had apparently

25 just been a video-clip played in court.

1 "What was said on that clip, Mr. Tanic, so that you can deal with

2 this. What was said was that you were not a participant, you were a mere

3 observer, like anybody else in Serbia. What is your answer to that?"

4 Your answer is this:

5 "That is absolutely untrue, and I will later submit documents

6 showing that it's not true. I can also provide at least ten names of

7 domestic figures and international figures who can confirm that I did take

8 part in that."

9 My only question is: Since the 21st of May, 2003 [sic], have you

10 submitted these documents and the names of these persons to the

11 Prosecution?

12 A. The OTP did not request that. They may submit it whenever they

13 wish, because it transpires that this was incorrect. The OTP had press

14 articles that would testify that I was not just a mere observer. If you

15 need additional documents, I can do it but not during this trial.

16 Q. I think you've answered my question. And let me ask you another

17 question now. Since you didn't submit those documents that you told you'd

18 submit to the OTP, did you submit any documents to Judge May? Because you

19 said: "I will submit documents." So did you, to Judge May?

20 A. [No interpretation]

21 Q. Your Honour, I'm getting no translation.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: The English translation has disappeared.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do we have a translation now?

24 MR. ACKERMAN:

25 Q. Sir, the question I asked you was very simple: Did you submit

1 documents to Judge May, yes or no?

2 A. Two photographs were handed over to Judge May; one with

3 Milutinovic, one with Milosevic. They were my photographs, and nobody

4 else requested to do -- me to do anything. I will hand over such

5 documents if requested; no problem.

6 Q. That's all right. That's all I wanted to know. Now, when you

7 were having your initial meetings with the Office of the Prosecutor, I

8 want to refer to your testimony about that and specifically to the

9 presence of one or more agents of the British secret service who may have

10 been there. And I think we've now established that it was just one. And

11 in that testimony - and it was page 46 in the draft transcript, I don't

12 have the number of the final transcript - you said this:

13 "A person from the British security service was there for several

14 reasons: First, to verify my identity and then at meetings regarding

15 protection."

16 Now, what kind of meetings were you having regarding protection

17 back when you were giving your statement to the OTP on 21 June 1999?

18 A. First of all, it wasn't the OTP, but the investigation department

19 of The Hague Tribunal, which is probably part of the OTP; and secondly,

20 such meetings always have security considerations. You never know what

21 can be seen, heard, whether the interpreter is reliable or not - and no

22 offence meant to the interpreters here. Such meetings are always tricky

23 from the security standpoint, as has been demonstrated later on.

24 Q. There's apparently been an error in translation because I didn't

25 ask you about security. You said that at that time the British security

1 service agent was there for meetings regarding protection, meetings

2 regarding protection. My question is: What meetings regarding protection

3 were going on on 21 May 2002? What were those meetings about?

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we've moved dates now. You're not wanting

5 information about 21 June 1999, which was the original question.

6 MR. ACKERMAN: I just misspoke. It was 21 June 1999 when he was

7 giving the interview. That's the date I'm talking about.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, if something would have been

9 leaked from that meeting, if -- I would be subject to persecution. Well,

10 you know, leaks are possible, and at that time one could lose their head

11 in Serbia because of cooperating with the ICTY. And this is still valid.

12 Of course, I was concerned with possible leaks that would jeopardise my

13 life, but I don't believe that there were any leaks because of the

14 Tribunal.

15 MR. ACKERMAN:

16 Q. Well, isn't it true that what you're saying there is that at that

17 time you were having initial meetings regarding the possibility of you

18 going into the witness protection programme; that's what you mean,

19 "meetings regarding protection," don't you?

20 A. Oh, no, Mr. Ackerman. At that time we did not discuss witness

21 protection programme. We even did not discuss testimony. It was people

22 from the investigations department who conducted some preliminary talks

23 with me to see how I could contribute to the investigation.

24 We did not discuss witness protection programme, protective

25 mechanisms. I discussed with the British a situation what would happen if

1 information were to be leaked. And at that time, and still today, one can

2 lose their head if cooperating with the ICTY in Serbia.

3 Q. When you testified in Milosevic on the 21st of May, 2002, for some

4 reason Mr. Milosevic asked you about that.

5 "Is it the position that you'll be given a new identity," this

6 is page 5210, line 5, "a new position in another country? I don't want

7 the details, but just whether that fact is true or not."

8 Your answer at that time was: "That is absolutely untrue. A new

9 identity abroad, I never discussed that with anybody, nor would I accept

10 it. I have no reason to ask for a new identity. Protection is one

11 matter; a new identity is another matter."

12 That's what you said in 2002, wasn't it?

13 A. Yes. This refers to the initial talks with the Tribunal. Later

14 on it transpires that the level of problem was much higher, and then I

15 decided to accept witness protection programme and new identity.

16 Initially I did not insist on that.

17 You can check it with the OTP. There were no arrangements tit for

18 tat with the OTP to the effect that they would give me a new identity in

19 consideration for my statement. This all happened after I'd been

20 abducted, tortured, and after it transpired that there were additional

21 problems in Hungary --

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Stop, please.

23 Mr. Ackerman.

24 MR. ACKERMAN:

25 Q. You've given your answer. Thank you. Another issue now. During

1 your testimony here, you have taken the position that in March of 1999, as

2 the NATO bombing came close and Rambouillet concluded, that in the

3 Assembly right before the war that Milosevic and his associates misled the

4 Assembly about the nature of the diplomatic situation that existed at that

5 moment. And you said at page 6394 of your 13 November testimony:

6 "Since he presented this as a military ultimatum, the proposal was

7 rejected and Holbrooke went home with Serbia's decision to go into war.

8 It was made based on wrong interpretation and wrong information, and Mr.

9 Milutinovic participated in that because it was not correct that NATO

10 insisted on its own flag and its own mandate. It was always under the

11 mandate of the Security Council and the UN flag, plus the Pristina Corps,

12 which were allowed to stay in Kosovo in the field."

13 Now, that's your testimony, and let me just ask you if it's -- if

14 this is not the case. At the end of Rambouillet, NATO presented a plan

15 for ending hostilities in Kosovo which would be safe-guarded by its

16 forces. Once the Albanian leadership had accepted it, NATO's proposal

17 essentially became an ultimatum to Belgrade. Now, that's the truth, isn't

18 it? That's what really happened?

19 MR. ACKERMAN: And the -- usher, can we please bring up P474,

20 which we'll have to look at in a moment.

21 Q. Sir, you're not answering my question. Could you do that, please.

22 A. And I said, and I categorically repeat, that there was always a

23 possibility for the NATO mandate to be converted into a UN Security

24 Council mandate, and it wasn't such a big problem as presented by

25 Milosevic, Milutinovic, and other associates. Rambouillet agreement was

1 as it was because our delegation was not cooperative during the meeting.

2 Had international participation been accepted during that meeting

3 and had we said only under the UN Security Council mandate, then that

4 would have been resolved in that way. And this is internationally

5 verifiable. But when our side never accepted anything, never accepted the

6 troops, then --

7 Q. Let's look now at the exhibit. Let's look at page 23 of the

8 English and page 65 of the B/C/S of the document that's before you right

9 now. And what I want you to look for is Appendix B. This is the

10 Rambouillet agreement, the final draft, the final draft. Not a

11 preliminary draft, as you said the other day, but this is the final draft.

12 And if you look you'll see Appendix B on your screen?

13 MR. ACKERMAN: And if we can go down to paragraph 4 under there,

14 and that's probably a page or two further along on the B/C/S version. It

15 will be the next page no doubt. We're looking for after paragraph (H),

16 then we'll find a number 4 on the B/C/S, please. On the B/C/S, please.

17 We have to go to the next page.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: The English was okay, I think.

19 MR. ACKERMAN: Yeah, the English was fine.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Now we've lost it.

21 MR. ACKERMAN:

22 Q. Now, I think - although I don't read B/C/S - that what you see

23 there is reference to NATO military personnel wearing uniforms, NATO

24 personnel possessing and carrying arms; in other words, all NATO. There's

25 nothing there about UN or UN flag.

1 And now if we look at paragraph 8, that paragraph says, and we'll

2 get to it here at a minute. We're at 6. We just have to go to the next

3 page to get to 8 in the B/C/S and the English. We have it in the English.

4 Now if we can get paragraph 8 in B/C/S we'd be there.

5 Paragraph 8 says - there it is - "NATO personnel shall enjoy

6 together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and

7 unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic

8 of Yugoslavia, including associated air space and territorial waters.

9 This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac,

10 manoeuvre, billet, and utilisation of any areas or facilities as required

11 for support, training, and operations."

12 All NATO, no UN; correct?

13 A. That is correct, but this is the final draft. I am talking you

14 about the options existing during the negotiations, and that option was

15 not taken by Milosevic's regime. They didn't say, Okay, we accept the

16 troops but under a UN flag, and that problem would have been resolved.

17 The final draft and final agreement refers to NATO, yes, and this is what

18 Milosevic's regime wanted. I have to answer your question. I know this

19 final agreement. I'm aware of it.

20 But still there was a chance - and you can verify it with

21 Holbrooke - to say at the Assembly that we accept the troops but we don't

22 accept NATO troops, let it be under UN Security Council's mandate. And

23 then there was a great deal of chance to change that at the very last day,

24 but nobody took a constructive view in the parliamentary debate.

25 Everybody harped on the troops. Nobody said, Okay, let's be constructive

1 and let's change the mandate.

2 Q. You told us all of this. And the other day what you told us when

3 you were asked about this you said, "Well, that was the preliminary

4 agreement not the final agreement." Now we're talking about the final

5 agreement, and your position is that the Assembly was misled about the

6 contents of this final agreement by people saying that it had to do with

7 NATO troops and not UN troops. And what I'm trying to show you is that

8 this final agreement had to do only with NATO troops, had to do only with

9 NATO occupation of Serbia.

10 And if you look at paragraph 21, it authorises NATO to detain

11 persons. And then finally, if you look at chapter 8, article 1, paragraph

12 1 -- paragraph 3, it says that that situation will prevail for three

13 years. So when people are telling the Assembly that this is a major

14 surrender of sovereignty to NATO, they were telling the Assembly the

15 truth, in spite of what you say. Isn't that true?

16 A. No. They did not inform them about possible options existing

17 during negotiations and on the very last day of negotiations. Simply,

18 they did not inform them about all the options. Of course the last and

19 final draft refers to NATO, NATO, NATO. But I categorically maintain -

20 and this is verifiable through much more important people in the

21 diplomatic circles in the west than I am - that there was still

22 possibility for the NATO flag and NATO troops to be under UN flag.

23 Why did -- why did NATO, after winning the war, accept the UN

24 Security Council's mandate? As a victorious party, they accepted the UN

25 Security Council mandate. Why wouldn't they then do so before the war?

1 I'm telling you this, and you may lead witnesses who may prove or disprove

2 this. Well, this final draft is the result of the very hard core stance

3 of the Milosevic regime, and Milosevic's regime's wish was to provoke a

4 conflict.

5 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Six times. Now, it's the

6 case, isn't it, that the decision of the National Assembly on 23 March

7 1999, when boiled down to an official decision, provided that the Assembly

8 would not accept the presence of foreign military troops in Kosovo; and

9 provided that, upon signing of a political agreement agreed to and

10 accepted by representatives of all national communities living in Kosovo

11 and Metohija, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia is ready to

12 discuss the size and character of the international presence in Kosovo and

13 Metohija for implementation of the agreement.

14 Now, that was the decision, not a rejection, but an invitation to

15 discuss international presence in Kosovo, wasn't it?

16 A. You know what? Now we are interpreting things. To send such a

17 decision after missing ten chances for an agreement and on the 11th

18 occasion, now you want to discuss and negotiate -- well, the Americans and

19 the Brits would say, Too little too late. There were ten missed chances

20 before that. You can discuss this with people who are much more

21 meritorious about this than I am, and they will confirm this. I did not

22 take place in parliamentary or assembly debate, nor in Rambouillet.

23 Rambouillet was too late. I am telling you an agreement was possible in

24 1997, and this should have been done then.

25 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Told us. And I'm trying to

1 finish and I'm almost done. I've just got two or three questions to ask

2 you, and I think we can get through it quickly, maybe we can. But I'm

3 going to try. You've told us --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: You've already had 40 minutes more than anyone

5 else. I'm sorry to have to get into this kind of situation, but you were

6 much longer than you indicated yesterday in what you describe as not your

7 best moment. So I wonder how necessary it all is, Mr. Ackerman. But,

8 please, try and finish and then we'll have the break.

9 MR. ACKERMAN:

10 Q. You told us in your testimony that you were detailed by the SDB

11 with the consent of Milosevic during the bombing to engage in negotiations

12 to try to find a solution to stop the bombing and to stop the war. My

13 only question is: Why would Milosevic send you off to talk to low-level

14 diplomats, when he could simply pick up the phone and talk to Holbrooke or

15 Albright or Clark or anyone else to negotiate this himself? Why would he

16 send you, someone with little skill, little ability, in this regard?

17 MR. HANNIS: I object to the form of that question, Your Honour,

18 little skill, little ability, where is the foundation for that?

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.

20 MR. ACKERMAN: I'll leave off that part.

21 Q. Why would he send you?

22 JUDGE BONOMY: That might be a question for us at the end of the

23 day, Mr. Ackerman, I suspect.

24 MR. ACKERMAN: I'll skip that, Your Honour, because I want to

25 finish, and I want to finish right now.

1 Q. Mr. Tanic, your basic thesis is that you and persons you dealt

2 with on the Albanian side worked out a settlement of the Kosovo crisis,

3 which should have been acceptable to Milosevic, but that Milosevic really

4 wanted war and so rejected all your efforts.

5 Now, I suggest to you that the fundamental flaw in this thesis is

6 that you had no contacts with the KLA, you had no agreement with the KLA

7 for any of your proposals, and the KLA was not about to settle for

8 anything less than full independence. And that's the situation that

9 existed. Your negotiations with persons in the Albanian government were

10 useless because you didn't negotiate with the KLA. You had no agreement

11 with them. That's true, isn't it?

12 A. At the time while we were negotiating, the KLA were a minor

13 political force, a minor terrorist organisation. And political leaders of

14 the Albanians in Kosovo wanted to get rid of them. Of course KLA was a

15 threat to the normal politicians in Kosovo, such as Agani and Rugova. KLA

16 was not included in the negotiations because the KLA was minor. Their

17 leaders were abroad, like bouncers or body-guards at disco clubs. In

18 1995, 1996, 1997, Albanian terrorism did exist.

19 It was a tragic phenomenon, but the KLA personnel were not the

20 leading political force in Kosovo, which were -- they were converted into

21 my Milosevic later on. They did not have any legitimacy during our

22 negotiations. When KLA started and when Milosevic established contacts

23 with them, we knew that this would fall through. Milosevic had two or

24 three years to resolve the Kosovo problem after Dayton Accords. He did

25 not do so. KLA outsmarted us and that was the end of it.

1 Q. All right. And my final question: It's your contention that the

2 obstacle to settlement, at the time the problem existed, was the

3 intransigence of Milosevic and his associates. Milosevic is dead. He's

4 been out of power for seven years. Why is there still a problem?

5 A. With regard to the first part of your question, read page 239 from

6 the book that the Defence purports to use against me --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, please answer the question. Don't

8 divert attention from the question.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I apologise. Now it

10 is a problem. It's practically an unresolvable problem for two reasons.

11 The first reason is that Serbia lost the war with the NATO pact, which it

12 never should have gone into it; and the second reason is that civilian

13 natives among Kosovo Albanians gave KLA political legitimacy, which the

14 KLA would not have received had this problem been done in peaceful and

15 diplomatic means and not through terrorism. Now Albanian independence is

16 a sure thing. But it wasn't down to Mil --

17 MR. ACKERMAN:

18 Q. Do you have something else to say that is an answer to my

19 question? Because I don't want to cut you off, and I want to give you a

20 fair opportunity to answer the question. So if you have something else to

21 say, go ahead and say it.

22 A. Yes. I just wanted to supplement with -- by your leave and by the

23 Court's leave. It wasn't the problem in Milosevic, but Milosevic's

24 belligerent policies. One of their leaders, Veton Surroi, when I told

25 him --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: That's not answering this question, is it? You're

2 being asked why it's still a problem, not why it was a problem when

3 Milosevic was there.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because the KLA had gained political

5 legitimacy due to such Serbian policies. Now they are running the show in

6 Kosovo --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: You've answered that already.

8 Mr. Ackerman.

9 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I've completed my questions and I want

10 to express my gratitude to the Chamber for giving me the time to complete

11 my cross-examination. And I promise you, I'll make it up to you in some

12 way.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.

14 Mr. Tanic, I wonder if you can briefly answer the question that

15 Mr. Ackerman departed from, which was: Why do you think you were sent to

16 negotiate, rather than Milosevic just directly deal with the leaders, the

17 powerful leaders, of the west, with whom he could have reached agreement?

18 Is there a short answer you can give us to that?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that time whoever could establish

20 contacts did so. I wasn't the only one doing so with regard to Milosevic.

21 I don't know, Your Honour. He was a strange person. He never resolved

22 matters that would be to the benefit of Serbia or himself. He was

23 obsessed with belligerent policies, and I am flabbergasted that he did not

24 pick up the phone. Why would Lilic go, as I learned later? I or somebody

25 else?

1 He could have picked up the phone and resolved that. He could

2 have picked up the phone, and he would have pre-empted Kosovo conflict,

3 the war with NATO. Mr. Milosevic was that kind of a person and some of

4 his associates. When steeped in belligerent policies, they completely

5 lose sight of self-preservation mechanisms for them and their country. I

6 was really aghast that he would engage in such policies which ended up in

7 tragedy for his own people, let alone other peoples. I was really

8 flabbergasted.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

10 Mr. Visnjic, do you have questions?

11 MR. VISNJIC: No questions, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

13 So we will resume with Mr. Lukic when we return.

14 Could you leave now please with the usher, Mr. -- Oh, sorry, we'll

15 go into closed session for that purpose and you can leave the courtroom.

16 And we'll be resuming at 25 minutes past 12.00.

17 [Closed session]

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 [Open session]

1 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic.

3 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:

5 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Lukic please wait. The blinds are

6 producing far too strong a sound to be able to interpret.

7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. I will try to put concise questions to you and I would like to

9 hear the same answers, if I may; and the people that we cannot name will

10 be referred to in initials as (redacted). Is that possible?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. In the addendum you stated that your main contact was (redacted); and when

13 decisions needed to be made, you met with Zoran Mijatovic. Is that

14 correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did I understand properly that only the two, these two SDB

17 members, that they were the only two people that you had physical contact

18 with as regards your contacts with the SDB?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Therefore, there was some other people you had contacts with?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can you tell us their names? Or if you prefer, we may move into

23 private session.

24 A. I don't think there is any need for it. On two occasions I was

25 able to contact Mr. Stanisic, but I can't say that such contacts were of

1 the working nature. I contacted some other people as well. May I

2 continue?

3 JUDGE BONOMY: We're going to just momentarily go into private

4 session.

5 [Private session]

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 [Open session]

8 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic.

10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I presume I need to continue with my

12 answer?

13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Yes, please.

15 A. I had contacts with the person for whom I am uncertain of his

16 identity as well, but this was one of the top people. It was during the

17 war; and, unfortunately, through the beatings and the torture I underwent,

18 I contacted with Zivaljevic, Goran Zivaljevic. He was in charge of the

19 operation. He belonged to the service, and this is how we met. This is a

20 contact as well, I guess, because he also had a couple of interesting

21 things to say during the torture.

22 Q. Therefore, these are all the people that you had contact with from

23 the SDB. Is that correct?

24 A. Yes, but un -- but the focus should remain with my contacts with

25 Mr. Mijatovic and the two aforementioned persons. These contacts were

1 regular. They lasted for years, whereas the other contacts appeared

2 irregularly, as far as I can recall. I hope you will not hold me to my

3 word on this.

4 Q. As far as you said, there were no working contacts with Jovica

5 Stanisic. You had no working with contact with Zivanovic?

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Zivaljevic.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for Mr. Stanisic, there was a

8 short working contact. It was very brief. We exchanged a couple of

9 sentences. We didn't sit down and discuss matters. I used to do that

10 with Mr. Mijatovic.

11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. On how many occasions did you have contact with Mr. Stanisic?

13 A. On two or three occasions, I believe. I think I mentioned that in

14 the statement, and I don't find it to be particularly relevant.

15 Q. Thank you. Am I correct in saying that you were an operational

16 contact of number 1, who was an SDB operative?

17 A. Yes. He was my operational contact with Mijatovic and Stanisic,

18 of course; so it went both ways.

19 Q. Can you tell us precisely during what time did you have

20 operational contact with number 1, in what period?

21 A. With some interruption, about two -- 20 or 25 years with

22 interruptions, because he would go down to Kosovo and come back; and then

23 when he was absent, number 2 was the operational contact with the top of

24 the service.

25 Q. When did you cooperate with number 1 the last time, if you can

1 remember?

2 A. I think it was after he returned from Kosovo. I believe it was in

3 1998. It seems there were some problems subsequently, as I heard, and

4 then number 2 was in charge of that operational contact. But please,

5 don't hold me to it when I talk about 1998. I think it was 1998.

6 Q. Did number 1 work as an operative, or did he conduct analysis?

7 A. At first he was an operative, and later I believe he was

8 promoted. And he became an analyst; however, the operational contact with

9 me remained since we knew each other for many years.

10 Q. The interruption of cooperation with number 1, was it

11 preconditioned by Mijatovic leaving the service?

12 A. I wouldn't link the two. My impression was -- well, I can't

13 really explain. I think there was some problems with number 1 as far as I

14 could hear, and then the contact was transferred to number 2. Whether it

15 had to do with Mijatovic or something personally connected to number 1 and

16 Kosovo, I couldn't say.

17 Q. While Jovica Stanisic was in the service, and of course Mijatovic

18 just under him, and then further down number 1, as far as I understand

19 there were no obstacles to having any type of contact; however, after

20 Stanisic and Mijatovic left, did you have contact with the top of the SDB,

21 for example, with Rade Markovic?

22 A. First of all, Mijatovic left after Stanisic had left. So he

23 stayed a few months longer. My contact with Mijatovic was resumed, it

24 went on; and once he left, for a while there was an interruption. And

25 then when there was the NATO intervention, then the contacts were renewed

1 via number 2, who told me that he was given a clear mandate by the top of

2 the SDB for what we were doing. And I hope that he would confirm my

3 words. Directly with Mr. Rade Markovic, well, I never met him.

4 Q. When Mijatovic left, who replaced him, and did you have any

5 contact with that person?

6 A. I don't know who replaced Mijatovic. As I said, there was an

7 interruption, and I kept seeing number 2 on occasion, to sit down and have

8 coffee. But our positions differed, and then our contacts were

9 re-established once the war began; and then number 2 told me that the top

10 of the service, irrespective of our different positions, they wanted to

11 renew contact with me so that I could be tasked with certain duties that

12 may contribute to ...

13 Q. Can you tell me when the cooperation, the institutional

14 cooperation, was interrupted?

15 A. It is difficult for me to recall because it was a brief

16 interruption. Mijatovic remained a few months after Stanisic. I think

17 Stanisic left in November and Mijatovic stayed until new year 1998, and

18 then in March of that year there was the war. So the interruption was

19 brief.

20 Q. Could you please focus now on the mission we mentioned and the

21 helicopter. It is the mission in which Stanisic participated as well, and

22 it was in January/February 1998. Did I understand correctly that the

23 report of that mission contained conclusions, one of them being that the

24 reserve police force, that is the public security, was disbanded; that

25 there were criminals among their ranks who overdid things; and that the

1 SDB was involved in smuggling drugs. Is that your testimony?

2 A. I didn't say that it is in the official report. In the official

3 report, you cannot find that. I've heard about the mission from Mr.

4 Perisic, just to be clear. Could you please turn off your microphone.

5 First of all, I heard about the mission from Mr. Perisic. I heard

6 through Stanisic for some efforts by the -- of some efforts by the service

7 to work on things, but at that time already there were rumours that the

8 SDB was guilty of this and that; that instead of controlling the border

9 they were smuggling drugs. As for the police being disbanded, I don't

10 know whether it was entered into any official documents, but I believe

11 that was one of the conclusions.

12 Q. It seemed illogical to me to see that Jovica Stanisic, who headed

13 the SDB, would write a report in which he would state that his service was

14 involved in smuggling drugs. I believe you've responded to that, of

15 course, by saying that such a report was never actually compiled.

16 A. I apologise. I will wait for the interpretation. Of course Mr.

17 Stanisic wouldn't put that in a report, particularly since it was

18 incorrect. As I was told by Perisic and as far as I could hear,

19 concerning the political exchanges that were going on, it came from

20 Sainovic and his associates that the SDB was guilty of this and that…

21 and also from Minic, etc… and that inter alia, they were engaged in smuggling

22 drugs and all that. Simply, the SDB was a good target at the time concerning

23 the situation in Kosovo.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Page 72, line 11, instead of "Stanisic," it

25 should read "Sainovic."

1 Q. MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] You talk about the commission founded

2 by Milosevic on Monday, the 13th of November, 2006 --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Page 72, line 11? Is that --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Line 14, Your Honours, instead of line 11. It

5 should read "Sainovic" instead of "Stanisic."

6 MR. LUKIC: That's what the witness said, according to my

7 recollection.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, you say: As I was told by Perisic and

9 as far as could hear concerning the political exchanges that were going

10 on, it came from," someone, "and his associates that the SDB was guilty of

11 this and that, including smuggling drugs."

12 Who was the person you referred to in that answer?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I was told by Perisic, but I also

14 heard that from Mihajlovic and Mijatovic --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: No, who did Perisic refer to? Somebody and his

16 associates. Who was the somebody?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He told me and the other people did,

18 too, but this is within a long period of time.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: For some reason you're not following this. You

20 said: "As I was told by Perisic and as far as I could hear, it came

21 from," and there's a name there, "and his associates that the SDB was

22 guilty of smuggling drugs."

23 Now, who was the person that was referred to there?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The interpretation was not

25 completely correct, but I had Mijatovic in mind as someone who told me --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Lukic says you said, "Sainovic."

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, yes. Yes, that's correct. I

3 did mention. That is correct.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. That's fine. Let's move on.

5 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, in line 11 I saw name Stanisic not

6 Sainovic. You referred to line 11 --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: No, line 14 you said. Line 11 was the one

8 initially you sought to change and then you corrected that to line 14. Do

9 you want to change line 11 or line 14?

10 MR. LUKIC: I didn't say this. I didn't say this.

11 THE INTERPRETER: It was an interpreter's correction, Your Honour,

12 not Mr. Lukic's.

13 MR. LUKIC: At that moment witness said "Stanisic" and it was 11

14 -- line 11 was "Stanisic." You pointed line 11, and I confirm that it

15 should be Stanisic in line 11.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, look at page 72, line 17. You sought to

17 correct line 11. And when I went to deal with that you said --

18 MR. LUKIC: I didn't say this. I think that it was or your line

19 or -- but this is not my words.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: No. The question, page 72, line 11, instead of

21 "Stanisic," it should read "Sainovic."

22 MR. LUKIC: I didn't say that.

23 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I think what happened is the interpreter

24 indicated that they had incorrectly interpreted what Mr. --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, start again, Mr. Lukic. I'm not going back

1 over this. If you want the answer clarified, you need to get it from the

2 witness again.

3 MR. LUKIC: I didn't ask for this clarification at all, Your

4 Honour, so I'll just move on.

5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Tanic, I just asked you about the 13th of

6 November, 2006, on this trial that you stated that the state commission

7 was established towards the end of 1997 or the end of 1998. Is that

8 correct?

9 A. According to my memory, it is correct. Maybe my memory plays

10 tricks on me.

11 Q. Who did you tell -- who told you about the establishment of this

12 commission?

13 A. It was discussed in Belgrade among political and intelligence

14 circles. I spoke to seven, eight, or five, six, maybe eight, nine persons

15 about that. I cannot pin-point who told me that, whether I heard it from

16 Mihajlovic or through my intelligence contacts.

17 Q. In paragraph 82 of your statement you say that: "Most of my

18 information on the work of the state commission comes from Perisic."

19 A. One thing is to establish a commission; operation is quite another

20 matter.

21 Q. I do agree. Was Perisic member of that state commission?

22 A. I did not meddle with military police and intelligence composition

23 of that commission. I was entered in the political side of that

24 commission.

25 Q. Was Perisic member of that commission, do you know?

1 A. He should have been.

2 Q. Now I'd like to ask you - and I'll give you reference in the

3 transcript, 6383, paragraph 86 of your statement and 6383 from the

4 transcript. It concerns a telephone conversation that you mentioned

5 between Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Lukic. And you were questioned by my

6 colleague Fila about that. Unfortunately, I will have to re-visit this

7 issue. First of all, I would like to ask you about the facts. In your

8 statement, your original statement, you said:

9 "From my Western sources, it was confirmed that there were at

10 least one taped conversation." In supplementary information that we

11 received from the OTP concerning your proofing on the 5th of November,

12 2006, you correct that and now we have before us an information whereby

13 you say: "My Western sources and from the SDB confirmed this taped

14 conversation between Sainovic and Lukic from early 1999."

15 Later on we established - and as you claim - that information

16 really came both from the west and from the SDB, and you later stated that

17 you heard this conversation. What happened before and what after? Did

18 you first receive information from the west, or did you receive

19 information from the SDB? Can you recall that?

20 A. Very slippery slope. I believe that the first the information

21 came from the west, but I think so. Let it be reflected in the transcript

22 that is my opinion. I didn't say that I listened to the whole tape. I

23 just heard it. Whether it was a part of the tape or the whole tape, I

24 really cannot tell.

25 Q. I have to ask you: How did it transpire that in the statement

1 that you gave on several occasions -- on seven occasions did you speak to

2 the OTP and you provided specific information about this case, but in none

3 of the seven occasions that you had conversation with the OTP you

4 mentioned this, that you personally heard that tape and you failed to

5 mention that you received that information from the SDB. Do you have an

6 explanation for this, please?

7 A. First of all, I have great problems with this tape because I heard

8 it under circumstances which are extremely unusual, and I could not verify

9 that tape. And this is why, most probably, I did not mention it. I've

10 heard and seen many things throughout the years that I could not verify,

11 and I failed to mention those things that I could not verify in any way.

12 Q. You did not mention this in Milosevic's trial either in the way

13 that you mentioned it in November this year. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes, that's correct. I just mentioned to the OTP that I heard it,

15 but I never really dwelled on it. If I were to try to reproduce

16 everything I heard or saw, then this would resemble a science fiction

17 story, you know.

18 Q. Thank you. Although you already stated that you could not, but is

19 it true that you cannot tell us this western source who gave you this

20 information?

21 A. I cannot tell you, but I may supplement my earlier answer and what

22 jogged my memory and prompted me to mention this tape --

23 Q. No, no, no. We've moved on to this issue of the western source.

24 What did you hear from that western source about the date when this tape

25 was taken, recorded?

1 A. We did not enter into that because there are many tapes, many

2 recordings. I dislike tapes, electronic surveillance, wire-tapping. I'm

3 not an expert in that anyway.

4 Q. Was there anybody else --

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a second, Mr. Lukic.

6 You were going to say something else about what had jogged your

7 memory. Could you tell us what that was, please.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Simply, it slipped my mind. It is

9 not true that this tape was not referred to in Milosevic's trial. Now I

10 remember that I did mention it. It slipped my mind that this tape or

11 parts of that tape were publicly disclosed. But I don't know who gave

12 what to whom.

13 At any rate, after a while, after hearing parts or the whole tape,

14 I could hear something similar or read in one of the Belgrade media

15 outlets, and this gave me a jolt, so to speak. And since it referred

16 Racak, I did mention this tape in Milosevic's trial.

17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt. You did mention the tape but you didn't

19 mention that you heard it, and you received it from the SDB as an

20 information. You still refer to it as an information received from

21 western sources.

22 A. Judge May rejected that, because he characterised that as a public

23 source after it had been published and not something that I learned.

24 Q. Well, then could you tell us whether on the Milosevic trial it was

25 said and proven where that tape was published so that we can really try to

1 find it, please.

2 A. Bench did not enter into this, Mr. May's Bench, because the tape

3 was mentioned in relation to with Racak. And since this was a public

4 source, as far as I can remember, he rejected any discussion about that.

5 Let's take a look at the notes or the transcript, and now may I answer the

6 question of His Honour.

7 By sorting out my memories in preparation for this trial, I

8 remembered that it was published somewhere; and then having realised that

9 I tried to say, Let's sort this thing out, try to see where it was

10 published. Because I'm not testifying here to sling mud, but to establish

11 the truth.

12 Q. Have you -- have we clarified this thing? Did you find where it

13 was published, please?

14 A. I believe it was on B92. The translation is incorrect. I said I

15 believe it was B92. It should state, I think it was 92. It could be

16 something else altogether.

17 Q. You think, but you never personally heard this on B92. Is that

18 correct, or not?

19 A. I read the transcript in the papers or in the press-clipping

20 published by B92. And I thought to myself, What's this? This is

21 something that I had occasion to hear previously. Could you switch your

22 mikes off while I'm talking? My microphone is not -- there's a feedback.

23 Now it's better.

24 Q. You do not remember where -- when was it that you read it on B92

25 site, or do you?

1 A. I cannot remember. I cannot be very precise about it, and I don't

2 want this lacuna in my memory to bring about more aggro.

3 Q. Okay. Was anybody else present on the moment when you received

4 that information from a western source?

5 A. No. We personally spoke, the two of us, about the parallel chain

6 of command which is something which was discussed, and western source said

7 that there were certain recordings. And we did not explore that further.

8 I'm not an expert in wire-tapping. I never dealt with that, and I don't

9 put much store in it. I was wire-tapped on several occasions, and these

10 tapes did not prove to be of much use for those who were taping them --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's just stick to the questions, Mr. Tanic.

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Well, let us move on. Do you know when did this conversation

14 between Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Lukic did take place, the one that we are

15 referring to here?

16 A. As far as I could hear, the conversation concerned Racak [Realtime

17 transcript read in error "Vracar"]. Let's try to remind ourselves when --

18 no, it's not "Vracar."

19 Q. No. It's going to be corrected in the transcript. I meant Racak.

20 When did you hear this conversation?

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's -- let's stop --

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. You may use your notes?

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's stop again. I'm sorry I don't have an

25 override button for this type of evidence, that's why I have to raise my

1 voice to try and interrupt.

2 It says there: "No. It's going to be corrected in the

3 transcript. I meant Racak."

4 Now, was that not part of the answer? It's labelled as a

5 question, but is that not part of the answer?

6 MR. LUKIC: No. It was my, actually, question. I said it would

7 be corrected because the witness meant Racak not Vracar. Because he

8 intervened --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.

10 MR. LUKIC: May I proceed, Your Honour?

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please.

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 Q. So can we go back - and you may consult your notes if you have

14 them with you. Could you remember when did you hear this conversation?

15 A. I don't have any notes with me. As far as I can remember, it was

16 immediately before -- no, between my two trips during wartime, as far as

17 my memory serves me. So much later than Racak.

18 Q. Well, could you tell us who enabled you to hear this conversation?

19 ?

20 A. As I already stated, I cannot name that person for several

21 reasons. I can state my reasons again in public session. That person may

22 feel threatened. They may be really threatened. My answer would be

23 negative. Another reason: I cannot verify it. I did not tape that

24 conversation. I was not part of that tape being produced. I cannot

25 verify the voices --

1 Q. Yes. Let's move on because of lack of time. So it's neither

2 number 1 nor number 2, neither Jovica Stanisic, nor Mijatovic, none of

3 those persons?

4 A. No, no.

5 Q. So if you were -- so the person that you had not cooperated

6 previously made it possible for you to hear that tape, is it true or not?

7 A. Well, you can -- you can't put it this way that we had not

8 cooperated. I cooperated with the top brass of both services, with one

9 echelon in peacetime and with other people in wartime. But I don't have

10 personal knowledge about that person. I don't know him. I hadn't worked

11 with him. The circumstances were such that -- that there was no doubt as

12 to whether he was a high official in the service or not.

13 Q. Could you tell us how come that a person with whom you had not

14 cooperated would made -- make you privy to information that may jeopardise

15 him if it were correct?

16 A. You know very well the intelligence community. There were ploys,

17 counter-ploys, information, misinformation. That person knew who I was.

18 I'm not an unknown person to the intelligence apparatus. Maybe they

19 wanted to do something else with that tape.

20 Q. Could it be possible that that person wanted to play a trick on

21 you?

22 A. You know what? Since I have some indications that that person was

23 involved in the kidnapping of me and my wife, the torture and the

24 attempted murder of me and my wife, I had now reason to believe that that

25 person wanted me, at the time, to know something; and maybe later on that

1 person was repentant. And this is why I was -- I had reservations about

2 that tape. But why I believe it, because it conforms to some other

3 information obtained from some other forces when it came to excessive use

4 of force in Kosovo.

5 Q. Could you tell us in what building on what address did you hear

6 this tape?

7 A. If I may, I would like to explain that in private session, if

8 possible.

9 MR. LUKIC: [Previous translation continues]... Your Honour.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we'll go into private session to hear this to

11 protect the identity of the individual involved.

12 [Private session]

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 [Open session]

14 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. The SDB employee, did he have to ask for authorisation from his

18 superiors to as to be able to share that information with you?

19 A. Mr. Lukic, it was wartime. There were special police members and

20 JSO members among his security. I don't think he asked for anything; but

21 at that time of course, I cannot fully reconstruct the processes and

22 methods used because it involved people I didn't know. These were no

23 longer Mijatovic and Stanisic --

24 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... Mr. Lukic.

25 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. Sometimes both His Honour and myself may appear rough, but we are

2 pressed with time. And there is a real danger of not finishing today --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, this has got to the stage where I would

4 interrupt these, even if we had appear eternity to take the evidence

5 because the witness is constantly not confining himself to the questions

6 that are asked.

7 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, I agree, but I'm trying to soothe it

8 down.

9 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Tanic, did you listen to any other previously

10 intercepted conversations; and if so, could you tell us where, with whom,

11 and what conversations?

12 A. No, I never listened to such tapes.

13 Q. [Microphone not activated]

14 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Lukic's microphone is not on.

15 MR. LUKIC: Sorry.

16 Q. [Interpretation] I will have to repeat, since my microphone was

17 off.

18 After that, did you ever listen to any intercepts; and if so,

19 when, with whom, and who was involved?

20 A. No. I was only able to listen to my own intercepts of my own

21 conversations.

22 Q. Do you remember which media was used? Was it a tape-player, a

23 computer, a CD player?

24 A. The tape was transferred. That's why I believe I only listened to

25 parts of it. It was transferred to a regular tape. That's why I thought

1 it was not the original tape, because they probably look different.

2 Q. Let us conclude on this topic, since we are unable to hear from

3 you who gave you that opportunity to listen. You also told us that you

4 didn't listen to the entire conversation. You didn't hear the beginning

5 of it when the two collocutors introduced themselves. You didn't

6 recognise the voices of Mr. Lukic and Mr. Sainovic. And am I correct in

7 saying that you learned about the identity of people involved from someone

8 else. Someone else told you who the people were?

9 A. Yes, that is correct. Now you understand why I -- why I had

10 reservations about it.

11 Q. Thank you. Can we please focus on paragraph 102 of your

12 statement, the incident in Prekaze. In the transcript, it is page 6372.

13 When talking about the operation in Prekaze you say that in early 1998,

14 you learned via your SDB contacts about the operation -- of the operation.

15 Can you tell us who provided that information to you?

16 A. Yes, from Mr. Mijatovic. He conveyed that information to me. He

17 said that because of two terrorists, half of the village was destroyed.

18 Q. When did you learn of this operation?

19 A. I can't be precise as to the date. It was immediately after ...

20 Q. You learned that from Mr. Mijatovic. Was he there on the spot

21 during the operation?

22 A. I don't know. I suppose an operative must have been there.

23 Q. Did you know that in the course of this trial we saw some

24 photographs gained from foreign sources, in which we can see that not

25 only -- not only that the village was [as interpreted] destroyed, but

1 even the Jashari house was fairly intact. Therefore, the information you

2 received that half of the village was destroyed, would you accept that it

3 was not correct? I mean the operation when the Jasharis were attacked and

4 when an attempt to arrest them was made.

5 A. That was colloquially speaking that half of the village was

6 destroyed. No one really meant it. I wasn't down there, and I never said

7 I was.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I take it that the question was: Not only that the

9 village was not destroyed.

10 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, I was just warned by Mr. Ackerman.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

12 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Tanic, according to an OTP statement of a

14 witness, the pseudonym of whom is K64 and he's yet to testify, did you

15 know that the operation was headed by Jovica Stanisic himself?

16 A. Mr. Lukic, I clearly stated that this was not my direct knowledge.

17 As to whether Mr. Stanisic was in charge of the operation, I don't know.

18 I received the information I shared with you, and I conveyed it as such.

19 Q. Thank you. To move on to the Decani incident, which took place

20 after the Prekaze incident, and you mentioned that in paragraph 97. It is

21 mentioned in the transcript at page 6360. There you state in April 1998

22 in Decani, the reserve police forces were sent there as well as

23 paramilitary forces and a brigade of the VJ. You said you were told that

24 by number 1. When did you hear that from him?

25 A. Shortly afterwards. He returned from Kosovo. He was on short

1 leave. We met, so it must have been shortly afterwards. He said he was

2 present.

3 Q. Did he say that this operation was headed by Jovica Stanisic as

4 well?

5 A. He didn't say that. He didn't mention it.

6 Q. Did you know that on that occasion it didn't concern the

7 neutralisation of several snipers, but rather to lift the blockade of the

8 Pec-Djakovica road, including the obstacle set at Decani, because that

9 communication was under KLA control at the time? Did anyone tell you

10 that?

11 A. He mentioned the snipers. But since I took no part in the combat

12 down there and I wasn't much interested in it, that's how I took the

13 information he told me.

14 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 103 you say: "The special police

15 behaviour and the anti-terrorist unit's behaviour, as well as the security

16 units and combined military and police units and the JSO, their behaviour

17 and their conduct is regulated by rules of service."

18 Can you tell us which rules of service regulate that?

19 A. The rules of service of the Ministry of the Interior on the use of

20 such units.

21 Q. The whole of the MUP? The rules pertaining to the State Security

22 Service or the public security service?

23 A. I cannot be precise as to that. I think it is the rules of

24 service of the MUP, but I really cannot say anything.

25 Q. Do the rules regulate the use of combined military/police units?

1 A. It cannot be regulated that way, and I don't think the translation

2 in the statement was correct since the JSO was not a special police of

3 the -- unit of the police, but rather of the State Security Service. They

4 were commanded by the SDB. Military police units and then the JSO in the

5 same paragraph, it doesn't quite tally.

6 Q. Therefore, that part of the statement is incorrect. Let us move

7 on then. Paragraph 103, you state --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Lukic should be warned to read slowly when

9 reading texts.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, you're being asked when you're reading

11 to read more slowly, please.

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] We have to backtrack a little. I

13 apologise.

14 Q. In paragraph 103 you state: "The rules of service, or rather, the

15 rules of procedure are considered to be a state secret." Which rules of

16 procedure did you have in mind in this case?

17 A. The rules of procedure on use of special forces of the MUP and the

18 rules of engagement when combatting terrorism. These are the rules of

19 procedure of the MUP. You're asking me to recollect things in which I'm

20 not expert. I cannot be as specific as I can be when talking about

21 intelligence and politics.

22 Q. When did you see these rules of procedure?

23 A. While we were in government, while we were part of the coalition,

24 at a certain point I was able to read a few things regarding the use of

25 special forces. It was a photocopy that I read, and first and foremost I

1 mentioned that in the context of distinguishing between civilians and

2 terrorists. That's why I was interested in it. I wasn't much interested

3 in the rules of procedure of use of special units. It is not within my

4 scope of interest.

5 Q. Can you tell us who made it possible for you to see these rules,

6 because they are a state secret?

7 A. I can't recall. You're asking me about things which were of

8 tangential nature. This was based on the experience of other people.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... At the moment.

10 Mr. Lukic.

11 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Q. [Interpretation] You also state -- well, do you remember what the

13 book looked like, the book containing the rules? What colour was it?

14 A. I said I was given a photocopy of certain pages. I -- it was not

15 a thick book.

16 Q. Therefore you didn't see the whole book?

17 A. No.

18 Q. You also say that special forces had to abide by these rules in

19 paragraph 104 of your statement. Otherwise, for any infractions one can

20 be given a jail sentence of up to ten years. Which law foresees this

21 prison sentence of ten years, do you know?

22 A. I don't. That information is something that I was given.

23 Q. Okay. Thanks. Then next you say: "Our law is quite strict on

24 it, although it is not in the rules of procedure in exceptional cases when

25 a commander has lost control and endangers his unit, he may even be

1 executed by his colleagues and superiors."

2 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Lukic should be reminded to read slowly for

3 the interpreters to be able to locate the passage.

4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation].

5 Q. Can you tell us where that information came from? Is that in any

6 piece of legislation?

7 A. That was my understanding gained through my conversations with

8 several people when it comes to combat activities, conditions, and the

9 threatening of lives -- or risk the lives of one's own men.

10 Q. Can you tell us who told you that?

11 A. I can't recall. One of the SDB people with whom I cooperated. I

12 clearly said that there is a possibility of being executed; I didn't say

13 that there will be executions. This was simply an impression I had.

14 Q. Okay. Thank you. You also described in paragraph 105 rules of

15 procedure and the procedure whereby anti-terrorist units should act. In

16 these rules that you saw, does it really stand that when terrorists are

17 targeted and when special units act against terrorists, that they are

18 bound to fire in the air a warning shot, that they should use gas, rubber

19 bullets? Did it really stand in the rules that you purport to have read?

20 ?

21 A. It didn't stand in the rules, but these were applied as far as I

22 could understand. I understood that civilians should be separated from

23 terrorists by some means, use of rubber bullets, warning shots. This is

24 something which was not prescribed by rules, but mechanisms of separating

25 civilians from terrorists. That was in the rules. I used those rules

1 just once and it's very awkward for me to have to answer questions about

2 those.

3 Q. Yes, we do understand that. But in paragraph 105 of your

4 statement it says that these rules prescribe and a reader may gain an

5 impression that this is prescribed by such rules. Now we can agree that

6 this is not what the rules prescribe, then we can move on.

7 A. I really cannot recollect. I believe that these rules prescribe

8 this or that, but I'm not sure -- I'm certain that they do not prescribe

9 the exact technical means, rubber bullets, tear gas, et cetera. But I --

10 this is my recollection of these rules.

11 Q. When terrorists intervene in a plane full of civilians then such

12 measures would be used. Would we agree that they would have no obligation

13 to separate the civilians from the terrorists because this is impossible

14 and in such situations it is presumed that there civilian casualties, but

15 the terrorists are to blame and not the special police units that are

16 intervening. Is that right?

17 A. My conviction is that what happened down on the ground in Kosovo

18 is not the same as a plane full of civilians. My belief is that civilians

19 can be separated primarily by waiting for the terrorists to be exhausted.

20 Q. Another thing I'd like to ask you is as we saw you were abducted

21 by members of the JSO, and that's a unit under the purview of the sector

22 of state security. Is that correct? Let's not bicker about whether it

23 was an arrest, a kidnapping, et cetera.

24 A. Yes, that is correct.

25 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Tanic. I have no further questions for

1 you?

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.

3 Mr. Bakrac.

4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I need five

5 minutes, maybe less.

6 Cross-examination by Mr. Bakrac:

7 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Tanic, my name is Mihajlo Bakrac, counsel --

8 one of the counsel for General Lazarevic. I have practically one

9 question. During your examination-in-chief and during cross-examination

10 and just now, you spoke about the alleged state commission and you were

11 asked about its membership.

12 Is it true that previously you stated that General Lazarevic was

13 not a member of the state commission?

14 A. Really, I cannot recall now because I was interested in the

15 political part of those affairs. I cannot recall whether I stated that

16 Lazarevic was or was not a member. I cannot recall. I never dealt with

17 the full membership of that commission whenever I was discussing that with

18 the Prosecution, because I always maintained that I am not an expert in

19 military and police affairs, just the political dimension of this affair

20 and intelligence dimension of the political dimension of the affairs.

21 Q. May I -- if it will jog your memory, I will read to -- your

22 statement from 1998/1999. "Lazarevic did not have a complete picture of

23 what was going on because he was not a member of that commission." Do you

24 recall now? This is paragraph 86.

25 A. Most probably I stated that because it was written down. I cannot

1 say that I did not.

2 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Tanic.

3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] And, Your Honours, I do not have any

4 further questions.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Bakrac.

6 Mr. Hannis.

7 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I'm in a difficult position. This

8 witness was scheduled to fly on an early-morning flight. I don't think I

9 can get him done in the remaining ten minutes.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, well --

11 MR. HANNIS: And I know the Court suggested that they may have

12 questions after you've heard all the examination. If that's true, what I

13 would propose is -- is if we have to keep him here to finish him, I would

14 rather stop now and be more focused tomorrow morning than to try and do

15 ten minutes now when I'm not going to get him completed anyway.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, thank you.

17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, my note at the moment is there were two

19 matters -- two identities that the witness refused to give and explained

20 why. One was the person who gave access to the tape that's been the

21 subject of recent cross-examination, and the other was the person who told

22 him to go abroad during the war for discussions. Was there any other

23 issue left outstanding in your cross-examination?

24 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No. The thing is that I wanted to

25 obtain names of persons so that I could conduct my investigation to see

1 whether this was as explained or not. No other. I believe that he named

2 an insufficient number of people, and that is all for me, Your Honours.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, I take it you wish to press both of these, do

4 you?

5 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes. I told the Court that I proceeded

6 as far as I could, and then it was up to you to take the torch on.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

8 Now, Mr. Tanic, was the person who told you to go abroad during

9 the war for the discussions you had, the same person as the person who

10 gave you access to the Sainovic-Lukic conversation?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: So there are two persons involved.

13 Now, Mr. Ackerman, is there an identity that you still seek to

14 obtain?

15 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, Your Honour, only the -- the NATO diplomat,

16 and I think you know the issue.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Hannis, we would welcome some guidance as

18 far as you can give it, and you can do that tomorrow also, in relation to

19 these three issues. Because depending on the importance, it may not

20 simply be a question of weight. There can be circumstances in which we

21 would have to leave out of account the evidence surrounding the subject

22 matter that these various issues arise in.

23 And we may take a different view in relation to each one. But the

24 first decision we have to take is whether to insist on the witness's --

25 the personnel being identified. And on that, I think you will be able to

1 give us some more guidance, having reflected on it overnight and having

2 had a chance to look at your position in general.

3 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: So we'll adjourn until tomorrow at 9.00.

5 We need to go into closed session for the witness to leave.

6 I'm afraid your return to your home will be delayed, Mr. Tanic.

7 You will require to return tomorrow for your evidence to be completed;

8 that will be at 9.00 tomorrow. Meanwhile, no discussion, again, with

9 anyone about your evidence, even though you're so far through it, it's

10 even more important now that there should be no such discussion.

11 [Closed session]

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.42 p.m.,

17 to be reconvened on Friday, the 17th day of

18 November, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.

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