1 Friday, 9 February 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: We need to enter closed session to allow the

6 witness to come into court.

7 [Closed session]

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 [Open session]

12 WITNESS: JOHN CROSLAND [Resumed]

13 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Crosland.

15 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Your cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic will continue.

17 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:

18 Q. Good morning, Colonel.

19 A. Good morning.

20 Q. I would like to try and of move through the questions as quick as

21 possible, but I have been told by the translators that we need to pause

22 between my question and your answers since we both speak many same

23 language and therefore the same interpreter will be interpreting our

24 words. So I apologize to-- for that. I just wanted to bring that to your

25 attention, since I know about it and it's my fault for not trying to

1 pause. I should know better.

2 A. I will try and help you, sir.

3 Q. Now, sir, we left off yesterday just before branching off on to a

4 new topic. That topic I wish to explore briefly with you is some

5 follow-up questions about the KLA or UCK, to elaborate or clarify some

6 points. Now, first of all, you spoke yesterday about some pressure or

7 criticism, I think you called it, that you felt when trying to maintain

8 fair and balanced reporting about some of the crimes and activities of the

9 KLA, such as labelling them as terrorists, and that persons wanted to view

10 the conflict in terms of all black or all white.

11 Am I correct that this was even the case in 1998, particularly

12 late 1998?

13 A. Yes. I think it was, sir, and it didn't affect in particular my

14 reporting. I tried to report the facts as I saw them giving due influence

15 to those points that I thought important. There were, as we discussed

16 yesterday, some external factors which are probably not relevant to this

17 particular Court.

18 Q. Okay. I have just one more question about that particular aspect

19 of it, to -- to check with you with respect to the nature of some of this

20 criticism or pressure. Would you agree with me that despite the questions

21 about the KLA and their reputation, the international community,

22 specifically the American leadership of Bill Clinton, Richard Holbrooke

23 and Madeleine Albright, had decided there was going to be a regime change

24 in Serbia and the KLA was going to be one of the tools to make this

25 happen.

1 And, Colonel, you should not feel bashful about being bluntly

2 honest to me. As an American, I can take criticisms for my fellow

3 co-nationals. But would you agree with me about that statement?

4 A. In my own personal view, and I and not obviously the Ministry of

5 Defence for whom I used to work; that was the view that I thought was

6 relevant at the time and still do.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So I would agree with you, sir, yes.

9 Q. Thank you. Now, with respect to the tacit approval or support

10 that the KLA received from the international community in 1998, once this

11 tacit support was given to the KLA, did you notice that it was followed up

12 with any increased activity or any worsening on the ground in Kosovo and

13 Metohija in late 1998 or early 1999?

14 A. Yes. As I said yesterday, sir, and I've written I believe in this

15 statement, that from the latter part of 1998, we saw a quantum increase in

16 both supplies, materials, and a range of weaponry that certainly added to

17 their ability to take on or to at least engage the Serbian security

18 forces.

19 Q. Thank you. Now, I believe you've already touched upon the fact

20 that the KLA held 50 per cent of the territory, and then I think you later

21 said they technically controlled 70 per cent of the province, and you also

22 went on to describe your knowledge of the number of brave MUP and VJ

23 officers and men who perished in skirmishes.

24 I would like to ask you whether you would agree that there was a

25 great likelihood that any incursion by any Serb -- legitimate Serb

1 security forces onto this 50 or 70 per cent of the territory held by the

2 KLA risked attack from the KLA,; that is to say, that the KLA could attack

3 any patrol that ventured into this territory during the time period that

4 they held it, obviously?

5 A. With respect, sir, it's a very broad question. Up until

6 mid-August, late August when the Serbian security forces started to

7 properly re-engage with the -- the KLA and to start clearing the three of

8 the main axes, I think, in my opinion, that the Serbian forces could have

9 engaged whenever they wished to engage.

10 Now, whether they were ready to engage or not, obviously, I don't

11 know, because I'm not their commander or was party to their chain of

12 command. They certainly had the -- let's put it this way, the physical

13 attributes and capabilities to engage the KLA at a time when the KLA in --

14 in my estimation, was not as substantial as it was in the latter part of

15 1998.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. As I've just said, they got resupplied then, and they had extra

18 capability. As I said yesterday, sir, I don't believe that they ever had

19 the weapon firepower to match the Serbian security forces. The numbers,

20 as we venture to disagree on, is another matter.

21 Q. Fair enough. Would you agree with me that as far as

22 counter-terrorist or anti-terrorist actions are concerned that, based upon

23 your observations, they were -- those actions were carried out only in

24 areas where there was an active presence of -- of terrorist-style attacks

25 by the KLA?

1 A. No, not real little, to be honest. Because the -- the amount of

2 destruction, I would call it, as I've called it in many reports, wanton

3 destruction from burning of houses, petrol stations, other business

4 properties, slaughtering of animals, is not conducive, in my opinion, to

5 trying to gain the hearts and minds of a population that in the beginning,

6 as I said, was probably quite happy for neither force to be in the

7 province.

8 But when villages were consistently damaged and in some cases very

9 badly destroyed, then I believe that the Serbian security forces did cause

10 more people to go at least to -- if not to support but to tacitly support

11 the KLA.

12 Q. Okay. Now, I believe you mentioned --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Could I just briefly ask a supplementary question

14 to that. The specific point in that question was whether you agreed that

15 the actions, albeit excessive actions, were confined to areas where there

16 was terrorist activity.

17 THE WITNESS: Then I must make it clear, Your Honour. I believe,

18 no. Because the destruction was across the -- the area from Kosovska

19 Mitrovica through Pristina down to Urosevac. That was the major area of

20 operations west of that -- east of that area, there were very for apart

21 from the Podujevo salient as it were.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Mr. Ivetic.

23 MR. IVETIC:

24 Q. Now, as far as the activities of the KLA are concerned, did you

25 note a general atmosphere of fear that existed among the non-Albanian

1 population of Kosovo as a result of these activities?

2 A. Yes, I did, sir. As I've said already, the goldfish in the bowl,

3 if I may use that expression, were the Serbian population, many of whom

4 had been in the province for over -- for several centuries. And several

5 of these were isolated villages that were farmers and were getting going

6 about their usual business and had lived happily with the majority of

7 their neighbours, as most of us do, until this political incident

8 happened.

9 Q. And now help me, if you know. I don't know if you -- if you have

10 this information; but according to my information, Kosovo and Metohija had

11 1.428 villages or populated settlements. Do you -- are you able to

12 confirm that information?

13 A. I'm not precisely no, sir. We discussed this yesterday. I saw

14 between 2 and 300 villages that were attacked, but I would -- I would

15 quite easily recognise that that number is a possibility, yep.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Thank you.

18 Q. I'd like to focus, move our discussion to the activities or the

19 area consisting of Pec, Prizren, Decani, and Djakovica. Would you agree

20 that this region was a key area for both sides, due to the fact that many

21 supply routes came through this area?

22 A. Absolutely, sir, yes.

23 Q. Great. And are you familiar with the tactics of the KLA to force

24 persons to be mobilised into their forces, particularly in this area, the

25 Dukagjin operative zone?

1 A. I'm sorry. I don't quite understand your question, sir. But if

2 you mean that the commander of that area was a -- one of the more strident

3 commanders, then I would agree with that, yes.

4 Q. Okay. And did you have knowledge from early 1998 onwards of the

5 KLA killing Albanians perceived to be favourable to the Serbian regime?

6 A. Yes. That was certainly on the intelligence and, as I said, we

7 unfortunately picked up several bodies. Who exactly they were, we

8 didn't -- we don't know, because they were just dumped by the roadside.

9 So we just took them into the various centres for -- for burial or further

10 preparation.

11 Q. And I believe -- you said you picked some up. Was the -- would

12 you estimate -- I think you had estimated in one of your prior statements,

13 I believe the June 2006 statement that you gave to the Prosecutor, I think

14 you estimated that such killings occurred or such bodies would be found

15 approximately once a week?

16 A. That would be roughly correct. I mean, at times there was --

17 there was more; other times there was less. But, yeah, that's a

18 reasonable assessments sir, yeah.

19 Q. All right.

20 A. Thank you.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: I think, Mr. Ivetic, the interpreters are still

22 having a problem because there is no clear pause taking place. Thank you.

23 MR. IVETIC: I will try.

24 Q. Again, I apologise, sir. I'm trying to move faster to get you out

25 of here to your other appointments, but we have to cooperate with everyone

1 here.

2 A. I understand, sir.

3 Q. Thank you. All right. Now, as of July 1st, 1998, during that

4 time period, Malisevo was still a major KLA base. Isn't that accurate?

5 A. Yeah. That's correct, sir, yeah.

6 Q. Thank you. Now, in your June 2006 statement, specifically at

7 paragraph 48, I believe that you stated that during the time period when

8 you were detained in Malisevo, which I believe was also July of 1998 - you

9 can direct me if I'm wrong on that - but at that time that you were

10 detained there, you saw between 150 and 200 KLA soldiers in that -- in

11 that settlement?

12 A. That's what is written in my statement, sir, yes.

13 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, you agreed with my colleague yesterday

14 that it is difficult sometimes to identify terrorists, and you also stated

15 that there were about 400 hard-core KLA fighters, and I respect your

16 honesty on that and your position. But I want to ask you a different

17 question.

18 Given that there were 150 to 200 fighters in Malisevo, given that

19 the KLA technically controlled almost 70 per cent of the territory of the

20 province and, as you said, they also blocked or controlled three out of

21 four of the major transport routes and had headquarters in 24 locations,

22 would you concede that the KLA had more numerous forces, perhaps not

23 hard-core fighters, but nonetheless armed in some fashion so as to be able

24 to accomplish all these factors that we have set forth?

25 A. I can see where you're going, sir. All I would say is that I

1 suspect that when - and I'm not blowing my own trumpet at all - but when I

2 was detained there and brought in, there was a show of force to show that

3 they were larger than was thought. I think it was the first time that any

4 defence attache had gone into the major -- that particular major

5 headquarters.

6 There was about 100, 150 people there. Some were armed. They

7 were in bits and pieces of uniform. So I -- I can understand where you're

8 going that 150 here must mean there's more than 400. Well, we've

9 already -- I think, with respect to the Court, we discussed yesterday that

10 the low hundreds, and that's really where I'm prepared to stick at, at the

11 moment, sir.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Thank you.

14 Q. Thank you. And, again, my pause is not meant to be interpreted --

15 now, I have just a couple questions on the KLA, and then we can move on to

16 other topics that are of greater interest to me.

17 Now, first of all, relating to the time period from January 1st,

18 1998 through the 25th of July, 1998, the information I have is that there

19 were, approximately, 878 terrorist acts committed by the KLA against both

20 civilians and official personnel during that time period, including 210

21 citizens being kidnapped of which included Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians,

22 Roma, Muslims, and even one Bulgarian resident of the province.

23 Did you have information relating to such a -- such a vast number

24 of citizens being kidnapped by the KLA whose fate for the most part

25 remained unknown?

1 A. I think we received, sir, a -- a visual briefing from the Foreign

2 Liaison Service of the VJ, which had a situation map showing the type of

3 instance you are talking about. There wasn't, if I remember rightly, a

4 great deal of detail on the map. And without being rude to the Vojska

5 Jugoslavija, I think some of these incidents may not have been as serious

6 as they have been made out.

7 There were obviously some very serious incidents. Don't get me

8 wrong on that point. But I think the numbers game may have been slightly

9 played up at that particular point, and that's the briefing that I got, if

10 I remember correctly, sir. But I don't wish to underestimate the amount

11 of missing people, which was a continual problem to try and get to -- get

12 to the bottom of on both sides.

13 Q. Thank you, sir. And during that same time period, did you have

14 information that the majority of the killings; again, I have 108 killings

15 during that seven-month time period of which the majority, 66, were

16 civilians and the rest were official personnel. Did you have similar

17 information relating to that?

18 A. The civilian side was, as I said, sir, is always difficult to get

19 to grips with because, unfortunately, these people disappeared into the

20 ground. On security side, one was aware that there were several serious

21 incidents where MUP and particularly in the early days and later on VJ

22 then did have casualties, yes.

23 Q. All right. Thank you. Now I'd like to move to that portion of

24 your evidence and testimony dealing with the Serb security forces. First

25 of all, with respect to the PJP, am I accurate that your information

1 relating to the PJP did not include any review of any official documents

2 relating to their organisation and structure?

3 A. As -- as I said yesterday, sir, I was -- I was accredited to the

4 Vojska Jugoslavija. When it became clear that the MUP were heavily

5 engaged in operations in -- in Kosovo, I then requested information from

6 my own internal sources so that I was better informed about what may be on

7 the ground.

8 Q. All right. Now, I believe you had stated that with respect to the

9 SAJ and the JSO that they numbered about 200 to 300 members each during

10 the time period you were on the ground. What is that based upon? Is that

11 your personal observations or information that you received from these

12 other sources that you have -- that you've already indicated for us?

13 A. It was based on information I received from outside of -- outside

14 of theatre, as it were, and also we used to see the more specialised

15 units, as I mentioned on at least a couple of occasions, going forward to

16 Malisevo when there may have been a hundred or so grouped together.

17 And having had a history in special forces myself, you start

18 getting thousands of people. They aren't very special and, therefore,

19 they tend to be numbers tend to be fewer, better equipped, and asked to do

20 specific jobs rather than ordinary infantry jobs. So I would be surprised

21 if the numbers were very much higher than what I have put in my report,

22 sir.

23 Q. Thank you. And I'd like to move on to some of the other elements

24 or forces that you -- that you testified about. If we could focus for a

25 moment on the forces you identified as Arkan's forces. Did you personally

1 see Arkan's forces in Kosovska Mitrovica or is this also based upon

2 outside of theatre intell or information?

3 A. I used to go up to KiM on several occasions as part of scanning

4 through the entire area and Zvecin and was an area where one was not

5 particularly warmly welcomed, because that was one of the basis that I

6 presume they were working out of. There were other instances where, as I

7 indicated in my report, people who were neither military nor -- or MUP,

8 and, therefore, the assumption based on a fairly thorough knowledge and

9 being down there from day-to-day on a daily basis that they were probably

10 of that persuasion.

11 Q. As far as people of this persuasion, were they attired in

12 uniforms?

13 A. There used to be a variety of dress, if I remember rightly. Some

14 may have been wearing battle fatigues and boots, and then a shirt on top.

15 And sometimes that was uniform; sometimes it wasn't.

16 Q. All right. Now, in your statement, you have -- you have indicated

17 an incident with a photographer, an ITN photographer, I believe. Am I

18 correct this is the only specific instance of a crime or an assault that

19 you witnessed -- that you eyewitnessed these persons of questionable

20 affiliation that you witnessed these persons [Realtime transcript read in

21 error "Americans"] perpetrate during the time you were on the ground?

22 A. As I think I said in the paragraph concerning -- I can't find it

23 now. These persons were either paramilitary or maybe even RDB. I don't

24 know, but that was the only one we physically witnessed. There were

25 various statements from civilians, which one has to give measured weight

1 to, that they'd been assaulted by paramilitaries, et cetera, et cetera;

2 and bearing in mind these are frightened civilians and, therefore, anyone

3 with arms looking slightly rough and hairy, to be blunt, could be classed

4 as paramilitary.

5 Q. Right. Now, I believe yesterday, in response to one of the

6 questions from my colleagues, you stated that you could not specifically

7 recall any incidents where army personnel had bandannas. I'd like to ask

8 you the same question with respect to the police. Am I correct that you

9 cannot specifically recall incidents where you saw clearly identified

10 police personnel wearing bandannas around their heads?

11 A. Sir, there were -- there were incidents. To ask me specifically,

12 I cannot recall precisely. But after operations, men tend to try and

13 relieve the tensions of having gone into battle. And as I've gone into

14 battle on several occasions, one can understand people slightly showing

15 off, if I may put it that way. And there is an adrenaline rush that is a

16 quite natural occurrence post a fairly difficult and demanding situation.

17 So I think some of the lads, I would say, would be wearing this

18 and would be fairly confident of their ability to overcome the objective

19 of what they were going against. And as a former soldier, one request

20 understand that. There just needs to be some discipline as well as a

21 natural exuberance to get rid of the tensions of having been in a conflict

22 situation.

23 Q. Thank you, sir. I have to correct an item in the transcript at

24 page 12, line 8, in my question about "the persons of questionable

25 affiliation that you witnessed," the transcript says, "these Americans

1 perpetrate." I think I said, "these persons," but I won't take it

2 personally. Okay. Thank you, sir.

3 Now, if we can move on. At paragraph 21 of your 92 ter statement,

4 that's the statement that we're dealing with in case, you describe MUP

5 personnel at check-points being frightened of the danger they were exposed

6 to. Would -- at the time -- since we don't have a time reference for this

7 statement, was the danger that you were referring to from the KLA or from

8 NATO?

9 A. Sir, this period, as I said, was in early and late spring 1998. I

10 think this refers to the Drenica area where I toured extensively on a

11 day-to-day basis, and we came across isolated check-points of perhaps

12 five, six, seven, eight MUP scattered around the Drenica area which was,

13 as we all know, one of the key KLA areas.

14 And I used to tour around; and depending on the reception I got,

15 we might have a glass of whisky with people to cheer them up, because it

16 was raining and pretty uncomfortable and they were in isolated positions.

17 And I think, as a soldier, one understands how they feel. So I certainly

18 got the impression that some of the -- some of the MUP quite

19 understandably, and I'm not maligning their military intent.

20 I think anyone who has been in a situation like that if they're

21 not apprehensive and slightly disturbed at the situation they find

22 themselves in, they're not, I would call it, switched on to the situation.

23 So it was a comment on the -- the situation at the time, sir.

24 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to focus upon your observations relating

25 to the Ponosevac settlement that's described at paragraph 34 of your

1 statement in Djakovica municipality in May of 1998, sir?

2 A. Yep.

3 Q. And I would, first of all, ask you do you recall that during the

4 first part of May 1998, there was a police station, a Serbian MUP police

5 station located in Ponosevac that was subject to almost daily attacks by

6 the KLA -- the KLA forces that were surrounding that village?

7 A. Yes, I do, sir. We arrived there right in the middle of one such

8 attack, and I think we even sheltered with the MUP while the attack went

9 on.

10 Q. All right. Now, I would like to then move on to another area at

11 paragraph 41 and 42 of your statement when talking about Junik, Prilep,

12 Rznik, and Glodjane. Am I correct that all of these villages were in KLA

13 strongholds; that is to say, areas that the KLA had held for some time in

14 1998?

15 A. The -- certainly Junik, Glodjane, we know about. Prilep and Rznik

16 were just off the main supply route going from Pec to Gornja Djakovica,

17 and that was a contested area. There was for many months a MUP vehicle

18 check-point there, which was attacked on many occasion, and several MUP I

19 know were killed there. So, yes, it was in the KLA, I wouldn't say

20 control zone. It was a disputed zone between both forces and a

21 particularly difficult place, yes.

22 Q. You've mentioned the police point at Prilep. The -- the police

23 point in Prilep was actually being attacked from the KLA that were based

24 in the village from the east in Rznic. Is that accurate from your

25 recollection?

1 A. Yes, that's correct, sir. I mean, that's back towards our friend

2 Ramush's area, yes.

3 Q. All right. By the way, by any chance were you among the group of

4 military attaches who were in a convoy on June 7, 1998, that was attacked

5 in this region on the road outside of Prilep?

6 A. No. My -- our eldest daughter was being married, so the 6th of

7 January I was back in the United Kingdom. But I know the incident you're

8 referring to. When the MUP helped extract the Canadian defence attache,

9 my -- my replacement and a couple of others, I think, in Gornji Streoc.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, you talked about the station -- the point in

11 Prilep being attacked multiple times. The information I have is that from

12 July 1, 1998 through the 11th of August, 1998, there were a total of 32

13 attacks resulting in seven dead policemen and 19 wounded policemen. In

14 any event, these attacks that -- that you and I have been talking about,

15 do you have information that such attacks were being staged by the KLA

16 from within these so-called Kulas, the walled fortifications or houses?

17 A. Yes. I mean, this is the classical shoot and scoot policy that

18 the KLA began to adapt and were fairly successful at. Because having

19 stood and fought at the Jashari compound in Likosane and Donji Prekaz,

20 they resized that wasn't the tactic to use against very superior forces.

21 And, therefore, any stationary check-point like there was at Prilep along

22 that road from Decani -- Pec-Decani-Djakovica was open to attack, because

23 the MUP had to live in those locations and, therefore, presented targets

24 to snipers, et cetera.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't think that's dealing with the issue. In

1 fact, it sounds as though you're disagreeing with the proposition that

2 Mr. Ivetic put to you. The question was whether they were staging attacks

3 from the Kulas, which is a concept I have difficulty with, and I was going

4 to ask you to explain it further. Can you help?

5 THE WITNESS: Certainly, Your Honour. The Kulas, I think my

6 learned friend is referring to are the big walled enclosures.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand what they are.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Therefore, they were using them as

9 cover to fire at. I mean, we're talking at a range of between 2 and 400

10 metres from the check-point which snipers could move into and then pick

11 off policemen going about their normal duties in what was a very isolated

12 vehicle check-point.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

15 MR. IVETIC:

16 Q. Thank you. Now, if we can move to another area. First of all,

17 you -- you have clarified for us that you did not personally eyewitness

18 the action undertaken to liberate Malisevo from the KLA. Am I -- am I

19 correct then in -- in coming to the conclusion that you -- I'm sorry. I

20 understand there was a translation error in my question. I was talking

21 about the operation to liberate Malisevo from the KLA, not the operation

22 of the KLA to liberate Malisevo. I'm told the B/C/S had a minor tweak in

23 that.

24 Anyway, sir, the question I was posing for you is: Can we

25 conclude that you did not personally eyewitness the commencement of any

1 actions undertaken by the Serbian security forces during the time period

2 that you were on the ground, and we're talking about commencement, the

3 actual first strike, if you will?

4 A. As I said yesterday, sir, we -- we came back out of Malisevo to --

5 to be met at Kijevo, Lapusnik, and to see substantial VJ and MUP forces

6 with tanks deployed, ready. And I think I spoke to I think the gentleman

7 called Legija, that he was the commander of that particular element, and I

8 cannot believe he was just sat on the side of the road, you know, waiting

9 for a picnic. It was quite clear this was an assault force waiting to

10 move into the Malisevo area.

11 Q. All right. Now, you mentioned the gentleman called Legija. Could

12 you -- had you met him before? How did you know his identity? How did

13 you recognise him?

14 A. If I remember correctly, sir, he introduced himself to me and

15 asked who I was.

16 Q. All right.

17 A. So I am duty-bound to tell him who I was and produced my licna

18 karta to verify my identity and that of the French DA as well.

19 Q. Did he introduce himself as Legija, or did he give you a name?

20 A. He just said Legija.

21 Q. All right?

22 A. As far as I am aware, sir.

23 Q. Thank you. You mentioned Kijevo a few moments ago. I'd like to

24 focus on Kijevo for a couple of questions, since I believe in your earlier

25 testimony you had mentioned this area as one where you encountered some

1 armed local defences from that village. And I think that you also said

2 that the village was surrounded by Albanian villages and was of particular

3 interest to the KLA.

4 Can we conclude from that the fact that the KLA actually had

5 Kijevo blockaded and attacked during the time period you are talking

6 about?

7 A. They -- they certainly were around the area, sir. Whether one

8 could say it was a physical blockade, I would suggest that that blockade

9 could be forced if the Serbian security forces had wished to do so, and

10 there was must have been some kind of resupply in because this was quite

11 an isolated area right in the middle of Kosovo itself.

12 Q. Now, allow me to focus your attention specifically to June of

13 1998, to ask if you heard at that time or had information or knowledge of

14 the fact that the village was besieged by four KLA positions that

15 surrounded it such that some 1.400 villagers, the majority of whom were

16 Albanian, the rest Serb and Roma, as well as a police detachment that was

17 in that village were blockaded in the village for the better part of one

18 month, with armed helicopters being utilised to air-drop food, munitions,

19 and supplies, as well as to evacuate -- there were I believe two pregnant

20 women and several wounded during the course of this blockade.

21 Do you recall that particular incident, either hearing about it or

22 witnesses any portion of it?

23 A. During -- you said the month of June, sir.

24 Q. Yes. Yes.

25 A. During the month of June, as I say, I was back in the United

1 Kingdom for our first, senior daughter's wedding. I understand there were

2 some operations in that area, but I was not actually in province at the

3 time.

4 Q. Fair enough.

5 A. But I think what you say, I wouldn't disagree with. There were

6 UCK positions around the area, and it had been and was a bone of

7 contention throughout 1998.

8 Q. Fair enough. Now, the -- probably either the last or the second

9 to last area that I have questions about deal with my client. Now, am I

10 correct that you never had or that you don't recall any specific contact

11 with General Sreten Lukic of the MUP?

12 A. Not as far as I'm aware, sir. I mentioned yesterday that there

13 were the normal national days where senior gentlemen from the MUP were

14 present. But as I mentioned that yesterday, it was a fairly stilted

15 meeting.

16 Q. Thank you. Now, then, perhaps you can help me clear up a matter

17 of apparent confusion. In your June 2006 statement at paragraph 14, when

18 talking about the Glodjane or Radonjic Lake incident where you visits the

19 crime scene of the people alleged to have been killed by the KLA, at that

20 time in that statement -- I take that back. At that time the statement

21 says that you recalled that a lieutenant colonel from Djakovica was in

22 charge of the crime site, possibly Sreten Lukic.

23 Now, is it possible that you only knew the last name of the

24 lieutenant colonel from Djakovica and that someone from the Office of the

25 Prosecutor suggested to you the first name of General Sreten Lukic?

1 A. That's a very interesting question. I don't believe it was

2 General Sreten Lukic, no. I believe the rank on the person's uniform was

3 -- was a lieutenant colonel, as I perceive. If there has been a

4 misnaming of the person concerned, then that is not -- that is not

5 intentional, no. I just believe the gentleman was Lieutenant Colonel

6 Lukic. Whether there was a Sreten Lukic, I don't know.

7 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, when dealing with this Radonjic Lake

8 incident, did you have occasion after the visit to the crime site to go to

9 the Hotel Patrick in Djakovica where the autopsies were being performed on

10 the bodies that were recovered from the crime scene?

11 A. No. I didn't, sir, no.

12 Q. All right. Thank you.

13 A. As I said yesterday, we used to use the hotel as a base on a very

14 open basis.

15 Q. Yes. I do recall that from yesterday. Just one moment, sir. Let

16 me just check one more thing.

17 Well, Colonel, I thank you for your time. I have completed all my

18 questions. Thank you very much for you cooperation and you were answers.

19 A. Thank you, sir.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.

21 Mr. Crosland, I have just one question at this stage. Could you

22 look, please, at paragraph 44 of your statement, and bearing in mind the

23 discussion we had about paragraph 50 and 51, can you tell me if there are

24 inaccuracies in paragraph 44?

25 A. No. No, they're not, sir. All we -- if I may. I took Lord

1 Ashdown around a comprehensive visit all over Kosovo, so in order to --

2 for him to better understand as an envoy for the -- for the Prime

3 Minister, I believe, the entire scene. So although we've concentrated

4 here on saying about Prilep, Rznic, and Suva Reka, because those were some

5 key areas at that particular time, he travelled fairly comprehensively

6 throughout Kosovo, including going down to the Pagarusa valley with the

7 head of the UNHCR at the time to view the IDP situation which is of grave

8 concern.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: But to be absolutely clear about this, you've told

10 us, I think, that he visited on two occasions.

11 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: And I believe you were assisted in your

13 recollection of these as being September and December.

14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: It was also my impression at that point that you

16 were not necessarily with a BBC film crew although he was, but were you

17 actually there along with the BBC film crew?

18 THE WITNESS: The BBC film crew, sir, came specifically with Lord

19 Ashdown.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: And you were there as well, though, while they were

21 working with him.

22 THE WITNESS: We travelled in my -- my vehicle separately, sir.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: And the filming they did was on only one of these

24 two visits; is that correct?

25 THE WITNESS: We filmed -- I can recall very clearly the

1 shell-fire incident from Blace onto Suva Reka villages to the west. We

2 also went to Glodjane to see the site of the massacre that we have been

3 discussing, sir. Whether the BBC came on both trips, I am afraid I can't

4 recall, sir.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: And on one of these trips, there was a homemade

6 video by one of your staff.

7 THE WITNESS: That's right, sir, yes.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Now, Ms. Carter, is any of this film

9 available to the Trial Chamber?

10 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I began searching when this came up

11 previously. I do not see that it's within our -- the MOS team individual

12 exhibit list, but I have heard rumour that there is some sort of BBC

13 footage within the Tribunal. I will continue searching for that.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: You perhaps should review Ashdown's evidence in the

15 Milosevic trial.

16 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: And it may also assist you to review the evidence

18 of General Delic in the Milosevic trial.

19 MS. CARTER: I will make that undertaking, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: We note that we also have power to call for

21 evidence if -- if we consider identified evidence may assist us in

22 determining the issues in the trial.

23 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, our amazing case manager

24 has yet again found an item for us. Apparently, V000-3823 is indicating

25 that it is Lord Paddy Ashdown visit to Kosovo, 1998, BBC news footage.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: But does that have an exhibit number in this trial?

2 MS. CARTER: No.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you. Do you have questions in

4 re-examination.

5 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. The Court has already covered one

6 topic, thus I have only two remaining.

7 Re-examination by Ms. Carter:

8 Q. Colonel Crosland, yesterday, you were shown a document entitled,

9 4D137, and I'd like to bring that onto the screen. This document, if I

10 were -- is it on your screen?

11 A. It's not yet, ma'am, no. Yes.

12 Q. Colonel, yesterday, you were examined by Mr. Ackerman in regards

13 to this document, and the implication was that General Perisic, while

14 telling you one thing, was writing orders saying something different. If

15 I were to hold out to you that this item, rather than being an immediate

16 order, is a document pertaining to a war plan about how something would

17 develop. It is not an executive order to be implemented right away, that

18 the decision to implement such a plan could not come for the General Staff

19 and the Chief of the General Staff bypassing an institution superior to

20 him; that instead to enact an order such as this, the president of the

21 state and the Supreme Defence Council would have to approve.

22 If I were to hold out to you, again, that this was a plan to be

23 implemented -- a contingency plan to be implemented at a later date, do

24 you believe that Perisic was talking out of both sides of his mouth, to

25 use the phrase?

1 A. Forgive me for being a simple soldier. This document - and I

2 apologise sincerely if I'm not answering the question - to me, this

3 document gives firsthand evidence of the chain of command and is exactly

4 what I would have expected to have been produced as a directive prior to

5 an operational order which I think is in one of the annexes, if I remember

6 rightly, by General Samardzic, the commander of the 3rd Army then to be

7 passed down to General -- General Pavkovic, who was then 52 Corps

8 commander in Pristina.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Sorry, ma'am, if I may just say. The interesting thing is that we

11 discussed endlessly, yesterday, why the VJ General Staff were very

12 diffident about saying that there were joint operations, and this document

13 here quite clearly says that the VJ will act in concert with the MUP,

14 which is entirely feasible and understandable. But it took an awfully

15 long time, in fact up till August when General Ojdanic gave the briefing,

16 that it was admitted that there were joint operations.

17 Q. Do you -- as a professional soldier, would it be reasonable for

18 contingency plans to be made for use in the future?

19 A. This, ma'am, is standard -- is standard practice. Obviously, the

20 more contingency plans one has hopefully the better the operations will be

21 carried out with less casualties on both sides. There are situations when

22 you have to react very quickly, and the commanders, the field commanders,

23 may have to make decisions in the best interests of their troops at the

24 time. Whether those are the correct decisions is very easy to make in

25 hindsight.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter, we're alert to the issue that is

2 focused by this document and the way in which evidence of General

3 Vasiljevic touched upon it. But can I ask you if you're then going to

4 deal with 4D140.

5 MS. CARTER: Yes, that is the next document.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: You're going ask questions of it.

7 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

9 MS. CARTER:

10 Q. Colonel Crosland, I'd now like to direct your attention to 4D140,

11 which you intimated in your previous answer, which is an order that would

12 be issued by the 3rd Army command in conjunction with this directive.

13 I would like to point you to page 6 of this document, specifically

14 to the bottom of the page at 5.1. Colonel, in this document it indicates

15 that in the first phase of this engagement, six lines down, that the 37th

16 Motorised Brigade of the 2nd Army would be engaged within this plan.

17 Sir, you indicated, in paragraph 69 of your statement, that you

18 saw a brigade that was at issue shortly before you left Kosovo, that a

19 brigade had entered into Raska at that time. Is that correct?

20 A. That is correct, ma'am, yes.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Please understand that Raska is -- is north of the province of

23 Kosovo and, therefore, not involved in the actual territorial area.

24 Q. So it would make sense that the 37th Motorised Brigade would be

25 noted as a 2nd Army brigade?

1 A. That is correct from the -- from the order of battle, yes.

2 Q. Okay. And would you, again, anticipate that an order of battle

3 would also be drawn up so in the event that a triggering event occurs then

4 all orders can proceed immediately?

5 A. Yes. That would be reasonable contingency planning, ma'am, yes.

6 Q. And you don't object to the drawing up of these plans or think

7 that it's somehow different than normal operating procedure of a military

8 installation; is that correct?

9 A. I'm not quite certain, with respect, ma'am, where you're coming

10 from. And forgive me, I've forgotten of date of this particular -- this

11 is the initial --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: It's the day after the one that you just look at a

13 moment ago.

14 MS. CARTER:

15 Q. It would be the end of July, 1998.

16 A. This then would be then in preparation, as I made clear in my

17 report, that the Serbian security offensive started in late August which

18 would be in time for this order to be carried out.

19 Q. May I bring up P number 2166, Your Honours?

20 JUDGE BONOMY: What is that document? Please don't do that just

21 immediately, because I may have more questions on this one. What is

22 P2166?

23 MS. CARTER: P2166 is the minutes of the meeting of the operations

24 of the interdepartmental staff. What I'm attempting to point out that --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Don't tell me any more about that, but that

1 question is related to the interpretation of these two documents, is it,

2 or is it a separate issue you're moving on to?

3 MS. CARTER: No. It's interpretation of these two documents.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. You may carry on.

5 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Looking to P2166, on page 3, four paragraphs from the bottom.

7 Colonel, in this document, it says, "Pursuant to the decision adopted at

8 the 5th session of the Supreme Defence Council on 9 June 1998, the law on

9 the Yugoslav Army, the Defence Law, and the Rules of Service of the

10 Yugoslav Army, a plan to suppress terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija was

11 drawn up which provided for the engagement of units of the Serbian MUP and

12 the Yugoslav Army."

13 Would you agree with me that at the time of this contingency plan

14 being drawn up, there was already a plan in place and active based on

15 the -- I'm sorry, based on the operation interdepartmental staff minutes?

16 A. That appears to be correct, ma'am, yes.

17 Q. Okay. Now, again, to follow up on this point, I would like show

18 you P940. These are collegium minutes of 21 February, 1999.

19 Looking to page 4, to the middle of the page, beginning with the

20 paragraph that starts "Pursuant to our decisions," in the middle of the

21 page.

22 This -- these collegium minutes were held on 21 February, 1999.

23 They indicate that, "Pursuant to our decisions, the 37th Motorised Brigade

24 from Raska was preparing for the carrying out of tasks according to the

25 plan of the 3rd Army commander for attachment to the Pristina Corps

1 command."

2 Given that the original directive and order, which you had been

3 viewing with Ackerman, indicates that the 37th Motorised Brigade would be

4 activated upon that order, would you agree that it appears that the order

5 becomes active somewhere near 21 February, 1999, where the 37th Motorised

6 Brigade is brought into Raska -- or brought from Raska?

7 A. That -- that appears to be the case, ma'am, yes.

8 Q. And is this also consistent with your paragraph 69 where you

9 indicate seeing another brigade at Raska?

10 A. That -- that appears, as I made clear, that we had found these

11 extra brigades at a time when the KDOM force was under considerable

12 problems with the Ambassador Walker I think had been PNG'd, and so their

13 time on the ground was very limited, and to see a further three brigades

14 joining the force was of concern, as I made clear to the Court yesterday,

15 ma'am, yes.

16 Q. And, temporally, given that the collegium minutes speaking about

17 this activation were on 21 February, 1999, that is also consistent with

18 the time in which you saw this extra brigade at Raska; is that correct?

19 A. That would be within the time frame, ma'am, yes.

20 Q. Now, you said that it was of concern to bring in these three extra

21 brigades based on the firepower that was already available within Kosovo

22 and Metohija; is that correct?

23 A. I did -- I made that statement, ma'am, yes.

24 Q. Okay. I would now like to bring up P2591.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Still on the same subject?

1 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.

2 Q. That is the command of the 37th Motorised Brigade, and it is dated

3 23 April, 1999. I would like to direct you to page 2 of that document,

4 specifically the fourth bullet.

5 Colonel Crosland, in the order -- or the command from the 37th

6 Motorised Brigade, the writer notes that,"Engagement of relatively large

7 forces to fight small terrorist groups using an elephant to kill a fly.

8 Instead of less trained forces for sealing off the area and then sending

9 specially able bodied and well-equipped forces to destroy a terrorist

10 within a closed space, it would have been more effective if a series of

11 low intensity and undoubtedly successful actions were carried out, instead

12 of --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down when reading.

14 MS. CARTER:

15 Q. -- mopping up operations just to take a walk through the area."

16 Colonel Crosland, do you agree with the assessment the 37th Motorised

17 Brigade based on what you saw in Kosovo and Metohija through 1998 and

18 through the time that you were there in 1999 at the run-up of the NATO

19 bombing?

20 A. Yes, ma'am. It's been put far more eloquently than I could have

21 put it. I'm not a staff officer. I'm an operational officer, and that's

22 what I've been saying all the way along at that there were huge and

23 disproportionate forces required to carry out -- they never really, in my

24 opinion, got to grips with a counter-terrorist or counter-insurgency

25 operation, and this paragraph sums it up very eloquently.

1 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Colonel Crosland. That's the last

2 question I have on this topic.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you had he me then by explaining how this

4 demonstrates bypassing the normal chain of command which was the area

5 explored in cross-examination.

6 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour. What was explored on

7 cross-examination based on Mr. Ackerman's questioning was how Perisic

8 could on one hand be indicating to him that he has taken issue with the VJ

9 being engaged within the interior of Kosovo while the same handwriting

10 this order. That is what I was trying to clarify, that there was already

11 an order in place, that Perisic was not doing what was being held out by

12 Mr. Ackerman; and then following through that you can see when the

13 engagement occurs, because that unit comes in according to the minutes of

14 the supreme -- I'm sorry, of the General Staff sometime in February, which

15 is consistent with what Colonel Crosland saw on the ground.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. But the thing I'm really interested in

17 is the evidence if it exists of bypassing the normal chain of command,

18 which is the point that Perisic and his colleague made to Colonel

19 Crosland. He left him certainly with the impression that they considered

20 that that was occurring and that there was a direct route from Milosevic

21 to Pavkovic.

22 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I --

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, where is the tangible evidence of that?

24 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I think --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: I thought it was supposed to exist in some of this

1 documentation, but you concede it's not in this documentation.

2 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I think one can look to -- to the P2166.

3 I'm not sure if you want me to point this out, especially in front of the

4 witness. But even then Colonel Pavkovic is the primary speaker about what

5 is occurring at this time, that he is appearing to take a primary role as

6 opposed to merely the Pristina Corps lieutenant general, as what is

7 noted.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's a matter that will no doubt be

9 explored later. I just wanted to be sure there was nothing else to be

10 drawn through examination of the witness from these documents. So please

11 carry on with the other issues you have to deal with in re-examination.

12 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, at this time we would seek to admit

13 P2591 as well as P940.

14 Q. Colonel Crosland, the last topic that I would like to address with

15 you came up yesterday in your cross-examination with regards to the

16 situation reports and diplomatic telegrams, which were produced by you and

17 by Ambassador Donnelly while on the ground. Can you please explain to the

18 Court what each of these items are, and how you are related to the

19 drafting of each.

20 A. The -- the diplomatic telegrams would be initiated by the

21 ambassador or his deputy, the Deputy Head of Mission, and that states

22 quite clearly on the top of the telegram that it is a diplomatic telegram.

23 Within the diplomatic telegram, the DipTel for short, content of any

24 interests of a military nature would be drafted by myself for inclusion in

25 the -- in the ambassador's telegram. And he, of course, would check to

1 see that I hadn't overstepped the mark in any of my observations. So that

2 is the diplomatic telegram procedure which during 1998 I believe over a

3 thousand were sent.

4 The other telegrams which were initiated as BritMil Belgrade would

5 be drafted and initialed by myself or one of the members of my staff if I

6 was away. They would out of courtesy be reviewed by either the Deputy

7 Head of Mission or the ambassador, because one was working as part of his

8 team as part British embassy in Belgrade. And I was also accredited to

9 the Vojska Jugoslavija and, therefore, had to make certain the comments

10 were appropriate to my position as defence attache.

11 Q. So in the Court reviewing each of these documents, the situation

12 reports, they can take as your direct comment on the situation on the

13 ground; and as to the diplomatic telegrams, anything that is making

14 reference to the military aspects, that would be from your assessment as

15 well; is that correct?

16 A. In essence, that is entirely correct, ma'am. The slightly

17 muddling factor is that because I was down in Kosovo on a very permanent

18 basis, there were comments passed by satellite phone both back to Belgrade

19 and back to -- to London which were of an immediate nature. And,

20 therefore, they may not be properly recorded, but may well have been added

21 to the diplomatic telegrams that went out, as I say, on a very regular

22 basis as the situation became more critical.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: The situation reports that were just referred to,

24 were they submitted unrevised by ambassador or deputy.

25 THE WITNESS: I would say most of the time, Your Honour, they

1 would always be looked at by one or other, either the deputy or the

2 ambassador or the first political officer, yes.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Do they run in your name, though?

4 THE WITNESS: They would go out as a military telegram, yes, sir.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Ms. Carter.

6 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, that completes the two topics in which I

7 had to address with the witness during redirect examination, and I just

8 thank the witness for his time and his service to the Tribunal.

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, ma'am.

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 Questioned by the Court:

12 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Colonel, I have a question for you, please.

13 A. Yes, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE CHOWHAN: You've given us an impression and that's what I

15 understand, that the KLA was something not that huge. It was puny. And

16 the forces that were on the opposite side consisting of VJ and MUP, they

17 were big and colossal and, therefore, was too much force used against the

18 little force in the beginning, which of course grew up and became more

19 organised in later on. What would have been the fate of things if MUP and

20 VJ had not applied so much of force, in your estimation, please? Would

21 the fate of things been different to what there emerged today or what as

22 we see them in tangible shape today? Thank you.

23 A. Thank you, Your Honour. I think the main bone of contention that

24 I have with the actions carried out by the Vojska Jugoslavija and the MUP

25 were, in my opinion, not the correct actions to try and isolate and

1 then -- we will call it fix, fix and find. Now, I don't believe that

2 during the entire 1998, 1999 scenario, the KLA were either properly fixed

3 or properly found. Now, that is a question of tactics.

4 In the experience that I've had in dealing with several

5 counter-insurgency operation, this is a long-term procedure, sir. Several

6 that I've been involved in have taken between six and 12 years to come to

7 a successful conclusion. Now, success depends on which side of the

8 boundary you are.

9 So there was an attempt to try, if I may use a rather drastic

10 analogy, to blast the UK -- or UCK, rather, or KLA out of the territory,

11 which inevitably led to, as I've said many, many times, huge destruction

12 and, and I was told also this, ethnic cleansing. But I think if your

13 house is blown out and you're forced out of it running at gunpoint, I

14 would suggest that is actually a fairly frightening and devastating

15 experience, and I think inevitably - and I did indicate this to the

16 General Staff in the meetings that I had - that this problem was not an

17 easily solvable problem, bearing in mind that we had a completely porous

18 border on the Albanian side through which copious men and materiel,

19 funding, everything that is required for an insurgency operation was

20 extremely difficult if not impossible to stop.

21 So as the insurgency went on and as we have indicated, perhaps the

22 opinion of the international community started to, if I may be so bold -

23 and it's a personal opinion - to get behind this fledgling organisation

24 for whatever reason, this gave heart at a time when it -- certainly in the

25 late autumn, the KLA did suffer pretty severe losses and were pushed back

1 by the MUP and the VJ.

2 We then had the intervention of the ACTORD in October, I think it

3 is, which the VJ and the MUP, as I indicated yesterday, sir, withdrew in

4 good order as -- as ordered. And directly back into that, into the vacuum

5 that was created by them moving back, in came the KLA; and I witnessed

6 that virtually in each combat location that the VJ had just departed from.

7 So you could say that the Vojska Jugoslavija and the MUP forces

8 were probably on a no win situation. Now, that may be being certainly

9 controversial. It may be -- and I don't wish -- and it may also be

10 minimalising the problem. The point I'm trying to make to you, sir, is

11 that a counter-insurgency operation requires good intelligence. It

12 requires a good degree of patience. It requires a hearts and minds policy

13 to win round people. And, as I indicated, the majority of the villagers

14 in the early days really did not want a fertile area like Kosovo to become

15 a battle ground, which unfortunately it did throughout the summer and

16 August and late autumn of 1998 and 1999.

17 So I would make my comment that I believe the wrong type of

18 tactics, albeit in the Balkans, unfortunately we have seen a series of

19 hard actions fought at a long range. It does require soldiers to -- to do

20 patrolling, to occupy the ground, and to dominate the area so that you

21 actually have the intelligence. Again, this is a difficult situation. I

22 mean, it's not unlike when our forces in Northern Ireland, where we were

23 the goldfish in the bowl. And to get intelligence from another nation or

24 another -- another language is extremely difficult. So it is not -- there

25 is no easy quick fix way, and I think the idea of blasting the -- the KLA

1 out of the area, in my opinion, has led to more problems than there are

2 already and currently.

3 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thank you.

4 A. Thank you, sir.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.

6 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I think appropriately Ms. Carter

7 raised some matters with regard to Exhibit P2166 that -- that actually

8 were new matter, and I would like to ask maybe two or three questions

9 taking less than five minutes, if I could be permitted to do so.

10 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, this P2166 was actually

11 used quite extensively in my original examination. I did follow up with

12 regards to the 37th Motorised Brigade. However, I do not believe that I

13 have opened any new issues that were not available to Mr. Ackerman as it

14 was extensively discussed during direct examination.

15 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, I don't agree with that, but --

16 okay.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: You're not prepared to accept his professional

18 judgement of the matter that might assist us, bearing in mind that you

19 will get any opportunity that's necessary to come back? Is it really

20 helping the process to obstruct that?

21 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, if the Prosecution is

22 again allowed to follow up, then, no, I do not. I just believe that he

23 was taking a second bite at the apple.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Mr. Ackerman please continue.

25 MR. ACKERMAN: Can we get P2166 on the screen, please.

1 Further cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman:

2 Q. Colonel, while that's coming up, I think probably the first thing

3 you'll agree with me about is -- is looking at isolated documents without

4 having access to the whole of communications that were going on is

5 sometimes risky in terms of determining what was really happening. That's

6 true, isn't it?

7 A. It's possibly not the right -- the right way of doing things,

8 sir, but we'll try and pull things together.

9 Q. If you'll look at the first page of this document, right at the

10 very last paragraph -- well, first I want you to notice up in the list of

11 persons present that one of the persons present there was General Perisic

12 and another was General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic. Do you see that?

13 A. I do so, yes.

14 Q. Then in the last paragraph, you'll see that Lieutenant General

15 Nebojsa Pavkovic gave a brief report on the implementation of the plan.

16 Now, this is in November of 1998 after the directive of Perisic in July

17 and after the order of Samardzic following up that directive.

18 In November, General Pavkovic is giving a brief report on the

19 implementation of the plan for suppressing terrorism. If we go then to

20 page 2, you will see in the first paragraph that he talks about a plan

21 that was carried out in stages over a period of 45 to 55 days.

22 A. Yes, I see that, sir.

23 Q. And then if you go to the very -- next to the last page, where

24 there is a series of conclusions.

25 A. I haven't yet got that page, sir.

1 Q. Yes. It will be up in a minute.

2 A. Thank you.

3 Q. We're at the bottom of page -- I think it's 15?

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman, it sounds as though this is all

5 material that you would be perfectly capable of making submissions about

6 without simply the witness by the nose through words of the document. The

7 document is now available to us for consideration and interpretation.

8 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, I actually considered that, Your Honour. You

9 may be right. I think -- I think I agree with you.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you want to ask anything further, Ms. Carter?

11 MS. CARTER: No, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. There are one or two outstanding issues

13 about documents and, indeed, the statement itself. Parties have addressed

14 these, I think, adequately. We will make a determination about the

15 outstanding issues and either issue it in writing early next week or state

16 it orally when we next sit, but the position will be clarified by the time

17 we are hearing not the next witness but the one after that.

18 That completes your evidence, Mr. Crosland. Thank you for coming

19 again to the Tribunal to give evidence. I can't say that you're free

20 forever of that responsibility, bearing in mind the other matters in which

21 you are involved.

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: But for the moment you're free to leave. Thank

24 you.

25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: We need to go into closed session for that.

2 [Closed session]

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 [Open session]

14 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Ms. Carter.

16 MS. CARTER: First, as to Exhibit P00683, that is either a

17 situation report or diplomatic telegram. Either way, it was received from

18 the United Kingdom. It appears that the document that we uploaded into

19 e-court actually is the unredacted version of that, and thus the

20 unredacted version needs to be taken under seal. A redacted version will

21 be substituted for the public display striking the receipt -- the receipt

22 list.

23 As to the second issue, it appears Ms. Grogan, again, has located

24 the video that the Court wishes to take under consideration, and that is

25 P00611. The videos are not in e-court. However, copies can be provided

1 to the Court, hard copies specifically can certainly be provided to the

2 Court.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: It's actually now a great pity that the witness has

4 just been released, is it not, when this is an exhibit in the case. We

5 might have been assisted in his evidence on something that I think we are

6 left rather confused about.

7 Is that video available to show just now?

8 MS. CARTER: It appears it would take a few moments, Your Honour.

9 Your Honour, it would certainly be available after the break, if the Court

10 choose to do so.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: The trouble is the witness has a commitment, and

12 I'm inclined to ask him to come back and view it and tell us where it was

13 taken and what's in it, because we can't make an assessment of a video on

14 its own. The trouble is that he has a commitment, and we're doing our

15 best to make sure that he could meet it.

16 I think the thing to do would be for us to adjourn just now and

17 for the witness to be allowed to view the video and then for me to ask him

18 a number of questions in relation to it. And if arising out of that there

19 are questions the parties which to ask, then you would have an opportunity

20 of doing that. But if there is something in there that could assist us,

21 then we would be in dereliction of our responsibilities if we didn't do it

22 when a witness like this is available to us.

23 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, my only comment would be to be open with

24 the Court. When the Colonel left, the intern left with him to say

25 goodbye, so there has been communication between the Prosecution and the

1 witness. So I just want to make an effort of transparency.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. We'll try to intercept him.

3 There is one matter we can deal with. We will probably still can

4 finish before the break and the break will be available for him, and we'll

5 cut it short if necessary -- well, no, we won't. But we'll make sure he

6 leaves on time for his commitment.

7 The Prosecution have made an application for an adjournment of a

8 week. It may be there's no opposition to that. I don't know. I see no

9 one leaping to their feet. But we're not immediately inclined to grant

10 that application, because if K54 is to give evidence and that matter has

11 yet to be resolved, that evidence could be taken at the end of next week.

12 It could be taken on Thursday and Friday.

13 And bearing in mind the developments that indicate the Prosecution

14 case may be concluded in the month of March, we now need to address the

15 issue of the presentation of the Defence case, and we don't want to

16 address that issue without giving the parties an opportunity to comment on

17 how they see the position, before we start making orders. We had in mind

18 to make an order fairly soon, and this has obviously brought the issue to

19 a head. So we also have in mind that we could use Wednesday to discuss

20 how we proceed, and we would make our decision pretty quickly after that

21 on the future of the case.

22 We also hand in mind, and you should have this in your minds when

23 you're considering what submissions to make, we had in mind to have a

24 recess during the first two weeks of April, and that may well fit neatly

25 into the progress of the case now. But you should factor that into any

1 consideration you're making of the appropriate further procedure.

2 We do not think written filings are necessary on this. We think

3 we would consider Wednesday to be a Status Conference.

4 Now, does anyone take issue with that suggested procedure which

5 would leave Monday and Tuesday free so far as you're concerned, but it

6 would enable us also on Monday and Tuesday to deal with one or two

7 outstanding issues and give you decisions on them later next week, too.

8 Mr. Ackerman.

9 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, the only observation I'd make is that

10 there's a contingency with regard to Witness K54, and I understand

11 reserving Thursday and Friday for K54 is appropriate; however, if this

12 decision that K54 is not to be called, then perhaps the Status Conference

13 can be on Friday.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: I think that's a reasonable proposition, so we can

15 be flexible in the arrangements we make.

16 Mr. Fila.

17 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as you can see, we all

18 abided by your request to be efficient. What we have at hand here is that

19 it seems that the part of that week will be lost, and we hear now that

20 we'll probably have to start with our case in April. It is a waste of

21 time for me to sit here and wait for Wednesday to see whether I'd be

22 working on Thursday and Friday. Therefore, I wanted to support what

23 Mr. Ackerman had said. When we have a full week off, we can go to

24 Belgrade. Our witnesses are there.

25 I also have to say that it's not only a problem for Mr. Hannis to

1 chase the witnesses around. This is an issue for us as well, of witnesses

2 refusing to appear. I do not object to his principle of working because I

3 understand I'll be in the same position and I'll be handed red and yellow

4 cards by you as well. That is the problem. I'm sorry, but that's the way

5 it is. Truth may not cannot be pleasant. We would prefer to have a full

6 week off to do be able to leave and do down there; otherwise, what am I to

7 do in The Hague to wait for Wednesday to whether until we'll have the

8 witness on Thursday and Friday?

9 Perhaps your decision -- decision will have to be against that, so

10 as not to waste the entire week. Perhaps I can ask for your indulgence in

11 that.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Can I speak with the interpreters,

14 please. I know it's important to have this break at a quarter to 11.00

15 for half an hour. But I wonder if in the exceptional circumstances it

16 might be possible to continue, to view this video which takes only four

17 minutes, and for me then to ask some questions and allow any further

18 questions that arise, and then to have the break and, if necessary, a

19 longer break. But it would enable us to complete the witness and allow

20 him still to make his connection.

21 THE INTERPRETER: That is fine with the interpreters.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much. We can do that. Will you

23 bring the witness back in, please. We'll go into closed session for that

24 purpose.

25 [Closed session]

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 [Open session]

11 WITNESS: JOHN CROSLAND [Recalled]

12 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: I apologise for the confusion, Mr. Crosland. But

14 in the rush at the end, it came to our attention as soon as you had left

15 that there is available, apparently, part of a BBC video, which has the

16 number P -- is it 166, did you say?

17 MS. CARTER: 611, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: 611. So that is now going to be played on your

19 screen. If you just watch it in silence with the rest of us, I will ask

20 you some questions once it's completed.

21 There's no reason why this can't be broadcast, is there?

22 THE PROSECUTOR: No, Your Honour. It was broadcast on the BBC.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

24 [Videotape played]

25 "[Inaudible] unquestionably an act of criminality for which I have

1 absolutely no doubt individuals in command and the politicians who have

2 allowed it on the Serb side could be indicted as war criminals.

3 [Videotaped played]

4 "When? Which villages?

5 "[Inaudible]

6 "You mean up here, up in the mountains?

7 "These mountains here.

8 "And what happened? When did they [inaudible].

9 "[Inaudible]

10 "Shoot with what, with guns or -- [inaudible]. Mortars.

11 "Machine-guns also.

12 "How long have they been travel?

13 "About five days

14 "What is happening now? Where are they going -- where are they

15 going now?

16 "[Inaudible] The mountains.

17 "Are -- they're telling us this village is under attack next;

18 right?

19 "Until 12.00 they have a deadline [inaudible]

20 "But are they going to now, further on up?

21 "In the mountains. She said -- she told me that [inaudible].

22 "[Inaudible]

23 "Five months."

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE BONOMY: We make it clear at the outset that we will have no

1 regard at all to the comments made by Ashdown in the first segment, and we

2 shall not have regard to the conversation in the second section because

3 it's so unclear and, of course, the first section was simply an assertion

4 of an opinion about which we're not able to explore the basis.

5 Questioned by the Court:

6 JUDGE BONOMY: The way you can help us, Mr. Crosland, is this:

7 There are two episodes there; one showing Lord Ashdown viewing open

8 countryside, and the second one showing him meeting people who bear the

9 appearance of refugees.

10 Did both of these occur on the one visit?

11 A. Thank you, Your Honour. The first video clip of Lord Ashdown was

12 with my binoculars, and that was overlooking the position of Suva Reka at

13 a distance towards -- we were to the west of Suva Reka on the high ground

14 in the area of a village called Studencani. And I was -- had drawn his

15 attention to the fact that artillery fire was coming from the battle group

16 area of -- in the area of Dulje, which is just north of Suva Reka, which

17 was a recognised Vojska Jugoslavija battle group position. And it was

18 directed into the area, and I repeat the area, because I don't have a

19 detailed map here, of the village of Budakovo.

20 And it was quite clear that, as I made clear to Lord Ashdown, you

21 could hear the guns firing, the crump, the shells landing, and then the

22 blast of the shells being fired, what in the military we call crack and

23 thump. And he accepted, and being ex-military himself, that that was a

24 correct assertion by me that artillery was firing into the area of this

25 village, and you could see the houses that were then subsequently alight.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: At one point, there seemed to be quite a widespread

2 area of smoke rising. Was that all the result of action against one

3 village?

4 A. If I remember rightly, Your Honour, that was the action of

5 artillery fire against a number of villages to the north and east of Suva

6 Reka. There were -- Budakovo was one of the main ones, and there were

7 several smaller hamlets in that area which were also receiving attention.

8 The second part of that video, if I remember rightly, was on the

9 same day. We arranged for Lord Ashdown to meet with Mary Morgan, the head

10 of the UNHCR, to do a private visit to the area of the Pagarusa valley,

11 where there were about 40.000 IDPs. Now, whether that was in the Pagarusa

12 valley or whether that was at another site, because there were various --

13 you will appreciate, sir, that these scenes were fairly widespread

14 throughout the area.

15 The Pagarusa visit, I left Lord Ashdown to do the visit entirely

16 by himself so that there was no pressure from my vehicle as the defence

17 attache's vehicle being in that particular part of his programme. So I

18 can't say which -- where exactly that footage was shot. But as I said, it

19 was an all too familiar performance throughout Kosovo during the summer of

20 1998, sir.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: And can you remember whether that was the September

22 or the December visit? Does the weather and the state of the countryside

23 help?

24 A. I am afraid I can't say with any certainty, sir, no. I will have

25 to relook at my statement, sir. I apologise for that.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: You referred to villages from which the smoke was

2 coming, being to the north and east of Suva Reka. You also mentioned that

3 at one stage in your evidence, just now, something occurring to the west

4 of Suva Reka on high ground in the area of Studencani. Could you clarify

5 that for me, please.

6 A. On this particular visit, there was heavy MUP and VJ presence in

7 the town of Suva Reka, which was really the -- the frontier between that

8 particular position and then Dulje, Blace, where the battle group was; so

9 in between was, if you will, KLA territory. And in order to try and get

10 Lord Ashdown in as close as possible, we carried out a cross-country route

11 into the area; otherwise, having driven straight up the main road to Suva

12 Reka, we would have been stopped by a MUP check-point. So to get the best

13 vantage point, I decided to take a cross-country route up into the area of

14 Studencani which overlooked this troubled area.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: So that was your location, west of Suva Reka and

16 toward Studencani?

17 A. Yes. And that is where that initial shot of Paddy Ashdown's

18 forearm with my binoculars was taken.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, does any Defence counsel wish to explore

20 anything in relation to the video? No.

21 Ms. Carter.

22 MS. CARTER: No, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that does now complete your evidence. Thank

24 you for coming back and assisting us further. We'll go into closed

25 session so you can leave.

1 And we will now adjourn and resume at quarter to 12.00.

2 [Closed session]

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 [Open session]

8 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, one question you could perhaps assist

10 us with. Assuming all the witnesses that you intend to lead do actually

11 give evidence, and assuming that there was no evidence led next week, when

12 do you say the Prosecution evidence will be completed?

13 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I think we would finish by the second --

14 or third week in March. Maybe the week of the -- I'm trying to think what

15 that Monday is. The 19th, that week in March.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you also have a rough estimate of how long the

17 evidence of this next witness will take today?

18 MR. HANNIS: This witness today?

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

20 MS. CARTER: An hour.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Dragulev?

22 MS. DRAGULEV: Your Honour, direct examination won't be longer

23 than 30 minutes, I think.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: That would suggest that we can return to the issue

25 of next week at the end of the witness's evidence and use what time we

1 have at that stage, perhaps even to explore one or two other time tabling

2 issues. So we'll proceed now with the evidence of the witness K20, and

3 for that we need to go into closed session.

4 [Closed session]

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11 Pages 10054-10071 redacted. Closed session

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1 (redacted)

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3 (redacted)

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22 [Open session]

23 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, who would like to initiate the debate on the

25 time scale and time lines for the period after the close of the

1 Prosecution evidence?

2 Mr. O'Sullivan.

3 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, Your Honour, we did meet and discuss over

4 the lunch break; and given the fact we had ten or 12 lawyers together

5 discussing the same issues, I think you'll and amazed at the consensus

6 that we've come to in some regards. We say that there are two -- I

7 believe you want to discuss two areas. One is the remainder of the

8 Prosecutor's case and the schedule, thereafter.

9 Our request is that we use this session now for us to speak in

10 turn on some of these points. I'll give you a broad overview of where we

11 stand right now. I think you may see that we would -- we may end up at

12 the end of this session in the position where we'd like to supplement in

13 writing perhaps, to amplify and to show the Chamber why we've taken -- or

14 are taking the positions we are taking. But for now let's just proceed

15 looking at these two areas.

16 For the remainder of the case, we, first of all, support the

17 Prosecutor's motion to adjourn next week. If we look at the proposed

18 witnesses that are scheduled, some of whom have not been decided upon, we

19 see they are very important witnesses. They're big witnesses, including

20 experts. We continue to receive a vast amount of disclosure in relation

21 to many of these witnesses. We just received more CDs again this morning.

22 Time is needed for us for the remainder of this case to be in a

23 position to be effective. So we support the adjournment, and we await

24 Your Honours' decision on the outstanding issues regarding whether or not

25 the contested witnesses can come. So that's all we have to say about that

1 period, I think.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: And do you see the 23rd of March as realistic

3 assessment of when the evidence may conclude?

4 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, we have no reason to doubt that.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, to that extent, it's in your hands. The

6 Prosecution set the timing, but we've been fairly flexible depending on

7 how much you need to spend with witnesses.

8 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, this is probably an area where we haven't

9 had a chance to properly consider that, Your Honour, whether or not that's

10 realistic.

11 As for the matters following the close of the Prosecutor's case,

12 there is of course the timing of two events. That's the 98 bis

13 submissions, your decision on 98 bis, and of course the commencement of

14 Defence cases or perhaps more correctly the filing of our 65 ter

15 submissions following your judgement under Rule 98 bis.

16 Broadly speaking, our position on 98 bis, the Rule provides for

17 oral submissions by the parties, followed by an oral decision by the

18 Chamber. We feel we can be in a position to argue that at the end of that

19 second week in April, after the week -- after the two-week break in April.

20 We will request that we can file written submissions in support of

21 those oral submissions. The Rule does not preclude that. We're thinking

22 of perhaps an aide-memoire or some sort of a skeleton of argument that

23 would assist the Chamber.

24 Following that, your decision will come down under Rule 98 bis.

25 And, thereafter, the time frame we think is reasonable given all the

1 circumstances, and my colleagues will speak more specifically on their

2 individual situations. We feel that a four-month period after the

3 judgement of 98 bis would be reasonable for us to file our 65 ter

4 submission.

5 Those are the broad strokes of -- and the results of our

6 discussion. My colleagues do have specific points they want to raise in

7 relation to some of these matters, and I believe Mr. Ackerman would like

8 to speak first to the Chamber.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: You don't want to take the matter any further and

10 give any indication of the sort of time you envisage for the Defence case

11 or cases?

12 MR. O'SULLIVAN: That really is premature, and I think by the end

13 of the hearing you'll hear what the position of the six Defence teams is.

14 You may get a better flavour for that. I'm not in a position to convey

15 that to you.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Mr. Ackerman.

17 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour. I, of course, associate

18 myself with the remarks of Mr. O'Sullivan, and I'll just amplify maybe

19 very briefly. As to the question you asked Mr. O'Sullivan about do we

20 think that the Prosecutor's estimate of the second or third week of March

21 is realistic, I think it probably is.

22 I think Mr. Hannis made that estimate based on his experience with

23 the length of cross-examination we've done with regard to some of these

24 more difficult witnesses, and I suspect that he has considered that

25 carefully enough that he believes that's a pretty realistic number.

1 It may depend on some outstanding motions regarding certain

2 witnesses there. A witness like General Clark, for instance, is obviously

3 not going to be a one-day witness. He would be here for some time, I

4 would think, if he comes. And so that can certainly affect that ending

5 time. But if we assume that that's correct, and it may very well be and

6 in many ways I hope it is; then it seems that the suggestion that the 98

7 bis arguments take place after that April recess makes a lot of sense,

8 because we would have that time then to fine tune those and make them as

9 cogent as we possibly can.

10 When we get beyond that, things get a little more dicey, and there

11 is not a lot of an ability right now among the Defence teams, as I

12 understand it, to make very good estimates and I'll explain that to you, I

13 think. Your Honours recall that especially for the three newer accused

14 that we were all taking the position rather loudly and vociferously back

15 last spring that we certainly were not prepared to start trial in July

16 when we in fact started trial.

17 And I think Your Honours have probably observed in the

18 occasionally disjointed nature of my cross-examination, at least, that

19 I've been learning this case as I've gone along, and that has -- we've

20 gone at a rate, and I think a rate that -- that with it was a lot of

21 cooperation from -- from the Defence to try to help you get to the

22 position where we've kind of got to now.

23 I think we've been very cooperative in terms of things like that,

24 and we have -- we've not asked, as Your Honour has suggested we could on a

25 number of occasions, for additional time to prepare cross-examination for

1 certain witnesses if we really were not able to be prepared. That's

2 happened almost never. I think maybe once or twice it's happened, but

3 rarely. And so I think we have been quite cooperative in getting to this

4 point. But we paid a price for doing that, and the price we paid for

5 doing that was we didn't have any time to be preparing the Defence case.

6 And just to give you an example of how that plays out, right now I

7 have a very long witness list, and I can't imagine that I would want to

8 call anywhere near the number of people that are on that witness list.

9 But until I can actually go to Serbia and talk to those witnesses and get

10 some idea of -- of why they're on the list and what it is they're to be

11 called for and what use they can be to my defence, I can't make a

12 judgement about that.

13 My guess is given a descent amount of time to do, that a witness

14 list that might 40 people on it now, would wind up with somewhere between

15 five and ten, and a presentation time that might be six weeks, would wind

16 up being a week or two. So I think there's a lot to be gained from

17 allowing a significant preparation time between the close of the

18 Prosecution's case and the beginning of the Defence case.

19 The -- the problem, of course, is we don't know who the rest of

20 the witnesses are going to be for sure, and we don't know exactly how

21 their witnesses are going to turn out. You just take the last witness,

22 Crosland. Before he came here, we had one opinion about how his evidence

23 would play out, and now that he's finished we have a completely different

24 view of how his evidence plays out, and that's going to be true I think of

25 witnesses that continue to come, and that impacts what we might want to do

1 in the Defence cases.

2 What I'm hoping, and I think all the rest of us, too, is that we

3 can with a significant amount of work tend to minimise the amount of time

4 that we'll take to put on the Defence case and streamline it as much as

5 possible, and I know it may sound at first blush to you that a request for

6 a 120-day period in which to do that seems excessive and ridiculous. When

7 you really look at the amount of work that has to be done to try to

8 streamline this and make it work, it's probably not all that out of line.

9 So that would be my suggestions to you at this point.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: You can't assist either on how long you envisage

11 the presentation of Defence cases, bearing in mind that it has to bear a

12 proportionate relationship to the Prosecution case if you feel the need to

13 lead a significant number of witnesses. You can't help us in principle on

14 how we might look at that issue also.

15 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I think I did try to do that. I think

16 what I suggested that if I have enough time to do it, but I can take a

17 list that right now is 40 and turn into five or ten. If it turns into

18 five or ten, then I'm looking at a week or two. I can't speak for the

19 rest of my colleagues. I don't know how much time my other colleagues are

20 going to want to take. But I would be fully comfortable putting on a

21 two-week defence if it's at all realistic, and I think that it might be.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: You see, that's an important factor in looking

23 globally at the length of this trial, and that may well affect our

24 approach to what on the face of it looks like a demand for an awful long

25 time, certainly much more than I ever envisaged between cases.

1 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, I can only tell you this: Based on almost

2 nothing but hunch, any time someone asked me where when case is going to

3 be over, I say it's going to be over by the winter break this year. And I

4 still think that's true and probably will beat that by quite a bit.

5 That's what I think.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Who else wishes to address us from the Defence?

7 Mr. Visnjic.

8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to join

9 the words of my colleagues Mr. O'Sullivan and Mr. Ackerman, and I would

10 like to try and provide you with some more elements that we have taken

11 into account at the present situation.

12 During the Prosecution case, we have all witnessed very frequent

13 situations when Prosecution witnesses' statements are changed at the last

14 moment, and their viva voce testimony in the courtroom to a certain extent

15 differs from what was provided to us in the Prosecution's submissions with

16 regard to Rule 65 ter.

17 From the point of view of my team, we interviewed some of the

18 witnesses in 2002 and 2003. I would like to avoid the situation that the

19 Prosecution has found themselves in; and that is because of the lapse of

20 time between the interviews and the testimony of these witnesses, I'm not

21 able to prepare them enough or at least to bring their testimony in such

22 shape that will allow me for a very brief examination-in-chief according

23 to Rule 94 ter and the other tools at my disposal that will enable me to

24 curtail their testimony in chief as much as possible.

25 On the other hand, I would like to say that we are still to hear

1 some very important Prosecution witnesses which might call for a dozen new

2 Defence witnesses, and I still don't know what these Prosecution witnesses

3 are going to say in the courtroom. And I believe that it is premature for

4 me to give you any serious forecast as to what will happen or instruct my

5 investigators which witnesses to prepare. I'm going to mention just two

6 witnesses that I am quite concerned about when it comes to the length of

7 the Defence case. Those are Philip Coo and Witness who will talk about

8 the justice system, the judiciary. Let me not mention his name.

9 These two witnesses can either broaden or narrow down our list of

10 witnesses, and they can also either broaden or narrow down the list of

11 documents we're going to use in the courtroom.

12 Since I have started talking about documents, I would like to draw

13 your attention to the fact that unlike the Prosecution, we are in a

14 somewhat less favourable situation in our preparations because we will

15 probably be expected to provide all the documents in English at a certain

16 point in time when the Chamber so decides, and I don't think that this

17 will be technically feasible, at least to a large extent. And now we are

18 in a situation that the Prosecution did not have. They would introduce

19 documents, and their translations would follow much later.

20 For example, yesterday, we received documents for blue book

21 translated into Serbian; and should the situation be the other way round,

22 if we are in the same situation, we will not be able to introduce a

23 Serbian document. And we believe that this is a situation that is our

24 weakness, bearing in mind that most of the documents that we're going to

25 present will be in Serbian.

1 I have already asked for some translations. I will continue doing

2 that. But since I am still not aware of what I might need because the

3 Prosecution witnesses have still not appeared, I still don't know how far

4 should I go in requesting translation of documents.

5 I believe that the time my colleague's Mr. Ackerman and

6 Mr. O'Sullivan have asked for will help us curtail the time spent in the

7 courtroom to a large extent, given the degree of preparations that we will

8 have the time to do during that break. Thank you very much.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Visnjic.

10 Mr. Fila.

11 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] First of all, Your Honour, I would like

12 to join the words of my predecessors. I would also like to say something

13 on my part, on my behalf, as I spoke earlier today when I suggested that

14 we shouldn't work next.

15 I don't know if I heard it well when you said that the Trial

16 Chamber is entitled to calling their own witnesses, and I was very happy

17 to hear that. Article 98 of the Rules gives the Trial Chamber proprio

18 motu, the right to call witnesses. If you should apply that Rule, as we

19 do in our system of justice, then we will be able to curtail the

20 proceedings to a large extent.

21 For example, Mr. Crosland, today's witness. He has been referring

22 the sources of two generals who said this or that or the other. If we

23 take it into account that General Perisic is one of the accused, the other

24 one is not accused but nobody's calling him. Then you have given a

25 limited time to witness Stanic [as interpreted], who also gave us a

1 hearsay evidence from the fourth-hand, coming from Stanisic to Milosevic.

2 And all of these people, save for Milosevic, are alive and well. I am

3 apologising for taking your time, and I am talking on my own behalf.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: This is helpful, but the witness you referred to

5 there is recorded in the transcript as "Stanic." It was Tadic, was it?

6 Tanic.

7 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Tanic. Tanic is the name.

8 When Jovica Milosevic fell, there was a new component. Rade

9 Markovic, Zoran Mijatovic, and some others, Radonjic, and so on and so

10 forth, and the name of the third person who was mentioned in a closed

11 session. So we're talking about six more people for us to see whether

12 Tanic really informed the general public that there would be shelling,

13 whether he said it on TV. If there was death penalty, I would ask for a

14 death penalty for that person who learned about that and did not warn the

15 wretched people who were not alarmed.

16 I would also like to remind you of a certain document issued by

17 the Joint Command. There are several documents which are in dispute or

18 not. If the Trial Chamber were to inspect those documents, you will see

19 that there are at least 15 names in those documents. It arises from a

20 statement from -- that we received from the Prosecution that a certain

21 person authored those documents. Out of these 15 people, none were called

22 to this Tribunal. These documents are introduced to other people who

23 don't know anything about those documents, such as General Vasiljevic.

24 What I'm trying to say here is if the Trial Chamber takes an

25 effort and look at the number of witnesses who -- who provided hearsay

1 evidence of something that they heard -- heard from people who are still

2 alive, I know that Serbia cannot deliver General Mladic and others, but

3 there are some other people who are not bound by the secrecy, by the

4 confidentiality. They could be called. And if they come here, if they

5 are called by the Trial Chamber and they say what they say, I don't need

6 witnesses to refute their testimony.

7 In order for me to refute witness Tanic, I have to bring two

8 people; a person whose name I can't mention and Zoran Mijatovic . And

9 both of them want to testify via videolink, and this can only be done if

10 you allow that to happen. Now, how am I supposed to tell you how many

11 witness I'm going to have? If you call any of the witnesses who you

12 mentioned as the sources of hearsay evidence, at least as far as my client

13 is concerned, I don't want to speak on behalf of the others if the others

14 don't like it, I would really be very grateful if you did it.

15 And if that happened, my job would be done. So my job can last

16 between two weeks or two months. I have 20 witnesses at the moment. I

17 can even give you their names, if they don't run away from me as they have

18 a tendency to do. That's why I wanted to go to Belgrade, if you give me

19 the time to go and chase my witnesses. I apologise for the joke.

20 This is what I wanted to say: I'm kindly asking the Trial Chamber

21 on my own behalf, on behalf of the Defence team to look at Article 98 and

22 apply the Rule that you're entitled to apply and call these people because

23 they will have to come. They will not be able to give them any excuses if

24 you call them. And this is what I wanted to tell you.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: What's not clear, Mr. Fila, is how it makes a

1 deference to the length of the case if we call these witnesses rather than

2 you. It comes to the same thing surely.

3 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] In our country, it's not the same. The

4 Trial Chamber is one level. If I call them, they can either say no. If

5 you call them, they have to come. And those that you call will be those

6 that will not have to appear on my list. That's what I'm saying. And if

7 you call them, they will have to come. I'm sorry. I'm being very frank

8 here. Maybe this is not very opportune, but that's the way I am.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: There are two separate issues here. We can issue a

10 subpoena to get them here and you can then lead them as witnesses, or we

11 can issue a subpoena and then we can lead them as witnesses. But

12 either -- either way, they're compelled to come in answer to the Trial

13 Chamber's order.

14 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] That's right, Your Honour, but with

15 your leave I would like to add something. If you're subpoenaed by you,

16 they can be angry with you, but they will not go to Aberdeen to take it

17 out against you. If I call them, if I subpoena them, then, well, they

18 will come to me in Belgrade. This is what I'm saying. And I am usually

19 very sincere in everything I say. It's not very useful all the time, but

20 at the end of the day I believe this is the only way to go.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: You think I need a pseudonym, do you?

22 Have we exhausted the Defence submissions? Mr. Bakrac?

23 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I don't know whether there is a need

24 to hear all of us. I fully second everything that was said by my learned

25 friends. I am astonished at the ability of Mr. Ackerman's team to be able

1 to prepare in 120 days. This only by way of illustration to try and show

2 you indeed how much time we need.

3 The more time we are given in preparing our case the less the case

4 will take. This case -- or, rather, the Prosecution case was foreseen to

5 last for a year. As it turned out, it lasted for nine months. Of course,

6 your role in that was essential, the people on the Bench, as well as on

7 the side of the Prosecutor, but we also gave our own contribution. This

8 was all with the goal of trying to prepare as efficiently as we can for

9 our case. We learned along the way.

10 I've sort of mentioned the 120 days in jest, but I really take

11 this matter seriously. I second the request, because I believe it is

12 essential for all of us. And this does not only apply to these three

13 Defence teams that I have in mind in particular who came in late. The

14 other three teams had a bit more time to prepare. They were in the case

15 before us, but we're in the same boat. Primarily, however, I am speaking

16 on behalf of the three teams who joined the case later.

17 So as not to waste any of your time further, I wish to join

18 everything said by my colleagues. And, of course, I wanted to stress yet

19 again what Mr. Visnjic said. If I have a moment to get some information

20 from Mr. Cvijic. Currently, we are processing 300 documents for

21 translation. It is an important issue, because these documents appear

22 depending on the sequence of witnesses and their testimonies. We procured

23 those documents thinking that we can reply to those testimonies, and it is

24 for our Defence teams only, the 300 documents. You should, I believe,

25 bear that in mind, with all due respect as well, thank you.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Gosh, I thought we had exhausted the Lukic -- there

2 must be on which the Lukic team don't have something to say.

3 MR. IVETIC: I will be brief, Your Honour. Just for the sake of

4 completeness, I agree with the comments of my colleagues especially the

5 last three accused; and just wanted to add that with respect to ours,

6 we'll be filing the written submission with specific details about

7 technicalities. But one thing that we did want to stress is that with

8 our -- we started the trial with 5 per cent of the documents that we knew

9 of that we wanted to have and we're still receiving and going through

10 those. With the pace of the trial, we've not able to process all of

11 those. We also have translation issues, et cetera.

12 The long and short of it is we right now foresee our list as 60

13 witness for the Defence and haven't yet decided whether those will be 92

14 ter or live. That's in flux, and it will change, obviously, given the

15 preparations that we have to undertake. But at this stage, that's what

16 we're looking at and we need to draw Your Honours' attention to the fact

17 that we are in a unique position of being the only police defendants,

18 which I think Your Honours are aware of and I think hopefully we've shown

19 the amount of work that has been necessary to -- to prepare for the

20 Prosecution's case. And we believe that just as diligent work will be

21 required for the Defence case and, of course, the more time we have prior

22 to that commencing, the better chance we have of making it run smoothly

23 and efficiently and ensuring that justice is done for our client in

24 particular and the proceedings, which are important in the greater scheme

25 of things.

1 So that is all. I'm completed and finished.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: You'll bear in mind that while it will be for you

3 to decide how to present your evidence, being realistic, decisions that we

4 may make about the time that's available to you may compel you to tender

5 evidence in writing that in a different situation you might have wanted to

6 present orally. There can't be an open chequebook on this, and we have to

7 find a way of being fair but also being expeditious as you'll appreciate.

8 MR. IVETIC: I agree and I hope we have demonstrated a desire to

9 try and be expeditious and diligent in terms of getting the witnesses for

10 the Prosecution done.

11 I can only say, at this stage, that we hope once Your Honours have

12 the full information, which again several of our colleagues had already

13 discussed preparing a written submission even prior to today and so we're

14 in the process of putting one together and we will I think shortly have

15 something to present all the factors for Your Honours' consideration, that

16 we hope that we'll come up with a fair solution.

17 But there are a lot of factors that need to be taken into account

18 that need to be -- that need to be considered for purposes of making such

19 a penultimate decision.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you envisaging a written submission that

21 actually tells us how long you think the presentation of your defence

22 might take, or are you talking about some other technical detail.

23 MR. IVETIC: Well, we can give estimates but for what weight --

24 how accurate those estimates are going to be - I am speaking now only for

25 my team - we intend to give an estimate of what we believe our Defence

1 case will take, based upon the number of witnesses and the documents that

2 we anticipate utilising. And, again, I presume -- well, I'm not going to

3 speak on behalf of the other teams. But the estimate may change,

4 obviously, just as the estimates by the Prosecution have changed through

5 the course of these proceedings.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: It sounds though as you might -- as though you may

7 be further ahead with your preparation than some of the others.

8 MR. IVETIC: I wish that were the case, Your Honour. Again, this

9 is a wish list, and it's in flux, of the witnesses. Due to the pace of

10 this case, we've actually had to call in at least one of our staff from

11 Belgrade, who has been here full time with us, to try and keep up with

12 this pace, so that we have really been working with a shortened staff in

13 Belgrade, who have been trying to at least track down witnesses and get

14 some preliminary information from them.

15 But we really have not been able to sit down and to begin the

16 intensive preparations that we believe are neglects in order to present a

17 professional be a coherent defence in the manner that our client is

18 entitled to and that indeed justice calls for.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: We would also be taking account of the fact that

20 there will be a summer recess. In the case of this trial, it's likely to

21 be four weeks. We also take account of the fact that the further down the

22 list of defendants you are the more time on the face of it you have to

23 prepare. It may even be that among yourselves you would wish to select an

24 order of presentation of Defence cases. But if you were to depart from

25 the order that we have set up here, your clients would need to

1 specifically approve of the way in which that was done because of the

2 impact that evidence coming in a certain order could have on the

3 respective accused.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

6 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, one of my main concerns, Mr. O'Sullivan

7 mentioned I think four months after the ruling on the 98 bis for filing of

8 their 65 ter list of witnesses and exhibits. My concern is that the

9 amount of time between the filing of their 65 ter documents and the

10 beginning of the case. We were required to file our 65 ters I think on

11 the 10th of May and we started try on the 10th of July.

12 There were two months between the receiving that information and

13 the beginning of trial. We similarly would like to have some amount of

14 time between the beginning of trial-- between the receipt of that

15 information and the beginning of the Defence case to allow us to prepare

16 and have a smooth -- as smooth as possible running of that phase of the

17 case. Thank you.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you help with the length of time you envisaged,

19 if any, that preparing 98 bis submissions might take you? Because yours

20 seems to me the harder job in that context it. All the Defence have to

21 say is there's no evidence on X, Y, and Z, and you've got to find it.

22 I mean, my inclination before listening to this today was have it

23 the day after your evidence finished, because they should know now as

24 we've gone along what there's no evidence on. And my inclination, I may

25 also say, until listening today was it would be entirely oral. It would

1 be done in a fairly summary way.

2 It may be that certain accused here, and I'm trying to be as vague

3 in this statement as possible, have a substantial 98 bis argument. And it

4 may be others have a more or less technical argument about certain aspects

5 of the indictment. But I would have thought that it was impossible for

6 the Defence to be doing an adequate job, and they all appear to me to be

7 doing that. It would be impossible to do that without having a clear

8 notion of what the evidence is capable of proving against your individual

9 clients.

10 Preparation for the defence is another matter. And on that you

11 can take it we have even no preliminary view, and we'll take account of

12 all that's been said. But of course if 98 bis is dealt with quite

13 quickly, then it makes it a bit easier to determine the other periods of

14 time that are necessary.

15 Mr. Ivetic, we're not particularly keen on having written

16 submissions on this, unless you can identify for us that there is a

17 specific benefit to be gained. What is it you feel you haven't had a

18 chance to address?

19 MR. IVETIC: Time frame, and there are some technical issues with

20 respect to support staff, respect to access to electronic materials, and

21 with respect to documents that we have been receiving and submitting for

22 translation and some documents that are still in the process of being

23 received. Just to give a full picture rather than going through all the

24 nitty-gritty here, since we really did not have time to prepare for these

25 arguments today. We had one hour.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: I appreciate that.

2 MR. IVETIC: So we want to be coherent rather than taking up court

3 time going through minutiae. That was the goal.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: But can I take it that you can do this pretty

5 quickly?

6 MR. IVETIC: I think so. I don't see anyone disagreeing. I think

7 we can probably do it over the weekend.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: There may be assistance we can give on the question

9 of translation. I don't know at the moment what the resource problems may

10 amount to, but there's more than one way to skin a cat. And it may be

11 that translation can be outsourced depending on the financial arrangements

12 that can be made.

13 I'm speaking off the top of my head just now, but the way we've

14 made progress in this case has been on occasion to be innovative, rather

15 than hide-bound by UN bureaucracy. And, therefore, if you are to address,

16 as an example, the issue of translation, we'd like you to be positive

17 about it and maybe tell us how the problem can be resolved rather than

18 tell us we're going to be sitting around twiddling our thumbs for a month

19 with no solution.

20 MR. IVETIC: If I can give one example, there are a large number

21 of our documents that the UN translators have refused to translate because

22 they are not legible enough for them. So the solution has been we've

23 seeking to get better copies of those documents, Your Honour. I don't

24 know. They are legible to be B/C/S readers.

25 My staff and myself can read them, but apparently they're not

1 legible enough for the electronic translation system to accept them. So

2 we've had several documents rejected on that score that we're trying to

3 get better copies of. There might be another solution to that, there

4 might be. I don't know. But we've been trying to do what we thought was

5 the reasonable aspect of it.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: We've so far been very fortunate in this case that

7 very considerable efforts have been made by CLSS to favour the progress of

8 this case, but we also recognise that the workload has increased because

9 of the number of ongoing cases. And in that context, it's I think

10 incumbent on all of us to try to work out a way of helping each other to

11 make progress.

12 MR. IVETIC: That's true. And I might add that I know from at

13 least from our experience, CLSS has been working very diligently in terms

14 of translating documents that we needed for cross, so that we have been

15 able to get official translations of documents for cross purposes rather

16 quickly. But, of course, that is taking them away from documents that we

17 would need in the Defence case, which some or the same documents and some

18 are not.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: You'll get no criticism from us for occasionally

20 having reduced the extent to which you require translation of a document a

21 little too far and finding that you have to refer to something

22 untranslated. We'd rather see you do that than have large quantities of

23 material unnecessarily translated, which is a temptation because you may

24 find yourself under pressure to make decisions quickly.

25 MR. IVETIC: That's something we -- we feel on our Defence team

1 very strongly about, because we have been trying to organise documents.

2 And we believe that might end up with groups of documents that are of

3 similar nature, and so we -- one of our proposed solutions might be that

4 we ask to tender exemplars of a particular set translated and then the

5 rest of the documents untranslated that are of the same nature or talk

6 about the same things.

7 So that is something we do have in mind, and we're going to be

8 working with everyone to try and find a solution because we do definitely

9 foresee the need not to overburden the translation system with documents

10 we may not need or that are duplicative of one another.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Where only a very short passage is are involved,

12 then the translation can be done in the court.

13 Now, as far as next week is concerned, and this unprecedented

14 generosity must not be misinterpreted - Mr. Hannis isn't even going to get

15 a yellow card for this one - we will grant the Prosecution motion and

16 adjourn until a week on Monday. I hope -- that's a week when we're

17 sitting 9.00 to 3.30.

18 I hope that we'll get a proposed list of witnesses earlier than

19 Thursday of this coming week, and we will do our best to clear the decks

20 of outstanding motions in the course of next week, and hopefully that will

21 include a decision on the future conduct of the case, which may not be

22 entirely in line with the requests that have been made today. But we will

23 give serious consideration to what's been proposed in the course of the

24 next few days.

25 We will anticipate that any written supplementary submissions that

1 you wish to make will be in our hands by Tuesday.

2 MR. IVETIC: That should be fine, Your Honour. And I think it

3 will probably be a joint submission, so it will be one submission for the

4 Defence.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: And it is not a submission that requires a

6 response. It requires a response. But, obviously, if Mr. Hannis feels

7 the need to respond then he would do so, or at least indicate to us that

8 he intends to do so more or less immediately, because we are liable to

9 make decisions fairly quickly in the course of next week.

10 Mr. Ackerman.

11 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I'm wondering if -- I don't know if

12 this is possible for Mr. Hannis to do, but the efficiency of our use of

13 time next week would be dramatically enhanced if we could get at least an

14 indication of the order in which the rest of the witnesses will be coming,

15 so we'll be -- we can be working on those that will be coming in the first

16 two or three weeks at least as we restart, and I think that would enhance

17 our preparation and enhance the possibility of moving at the speed we want

18 to move.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you can please discuss that when we rise just

20 now, and hopefully Mr. Hannis can accommodate you.

21 So we'll resume on Monday the 19th at 9.00.

22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.37 p.m.,

23 to be reconvened on Monday, the 19th day

24 of February, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.