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International Tribunal for the  
Prosecution of Persons  
Responsible for Serious Violations of  
International Humanitarian Law  
Committed in the Territory of  
Former Yugoslavia since 1991

Case No. IT-04-81-PT  
Date: 5 February 2008

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**IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER**

**Before:** Judge Patrick Robinson, Presiding  
Judge Krister Thelin  
Judge Frank Höpfel

**Registrar:** Mr. Hans Holthuis

**THE PROSECUTOR**

v.

**MOMČILO PERIŠIĆ**

**PUBLIC**

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**PROSECUTION FILING OF REVISED SECOND AMENDED  
INDICTMENT WITH ANNEX A**

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**The Office of the Prosecutor:**

Mr. Mark B. Harmon

**Counsel for the Accused:**

Mr. James Castle

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

**Case No. IT-04-81-PT**

**THE PROSECUTOR**

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**PROSECUTION FILING OF REVISED SECOND AMENDED INDICTMENT  
WITH ANNEX A**

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1. On 13 September 2007, the Prosecution filed a Second Amended Indictment.<sup>1</sup>
2. In its decision of 17 January 2008, the Trial Chamber accepted all amendments described in the Second Amended Indictment with the exception of a proposed amendment to paragraph 30 of the indictment. The Chamber ordered the Prosecution to file a Revised Second Amended Indictment incorporating these amendments which, once filed, will be the operative indictment in this case.<sup>2</sup>
3. In accordance with the Trial Chamber's decision, the Prosecution herewith files a Revised Second Amended Indictment, attached as Annex A.

Word Count: 138

  
Mark B. Harmon  
Senior Trial Attorney

Dated this 5th day of February 2008  
At The Hague, The Netherlands

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<sup>1</sup> *Prosecutor v Momčilo Perišić*, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Prosecution's Filing of Second Amended Indictment, 13 September 2007.

<sup>2</sup> *Prosecutor v Momčilo Perišić*, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Filing of Second Amended Indictment, 17 January 2008, para. 25.

**Annex A**

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No. IT-04-81-PT

THE PROSECUTOR  
OF THE TRIBUNAL

AGAINST

MOMČILO PERIŠIĆ

SECOND AMENDED INDICTMENT

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, pursuant to her authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia charges:

**MOMČILO PERIŠIĆ**

With **CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY** and **VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR** as set forth below:

**THE ACCUSED**

1. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** (son of Srećko PERIŠIĆ) was born on 22 May 1944 in Koštunići, in Serbia, in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). He joined the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and graduated from the Ground Forces Military Academy in 1966. When the conflict in the former Yugoslavia began **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was the commander of the JNA Artillery School Centre in Zadar. In January 1992, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was appointed the commander of the newly established 13<sup>th</sup> Corps (Bileća Corps) of the JNA which had a command post in the Mostar region of the SFRY. In May 1992, after it formally withdrew from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) the JNA was renamed the Yugoslav Army (VJ). In June 1992, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was appointed Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the 3rd Army based in Niš. He became its Commander in April 1993.

Position and Authority of Accused

2. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** became the Chief of General Staff of the VJ on or about 26 August 1993 and held this position until 24 November 1998. He was the most senior officer in the VJ and had overall authority and responsibility for its functioning. Under Yugoslav law he was subordinate only to the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the FRY Supreme Defence Council (SDC) which was comprised of the President of the FRY, and the presidents of the two constituent republics of Serbia and Montenegro.
3. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ's** authority over the VJ included authority over its military and civilian personnel within the policies and limitations set by the SDC. His authority over personnel included the *de jure* and *de facto* authority to:
  - a. make and implement decisions for the VJ General Staff and all subordinate units;
  - b. issue orders, instructions, directives and to ensure implementation of these orders, instructions and directives;
  - c. transfer and second VJ personnel to the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) and the Army of the Serbian Krajina (SVK) *via* the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff for short temporary assignments or longer indefinite periods.
4. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**, within the policies and limits set by the SDC, had the authority to direct the use and disposition of the material assets of the VJ including: ammunition, weapons and weapons systems, fuel, food, medical supplies, medical facilities, education, spare parts, clothing, and military housing.
5. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** exercised this military authority through the General Staff of the VJ, the highest professional and staff organ for the preparation and use of the Army in times of peace and war. He sometimes exercised this authority in coordination and consultation with senior members of the VRS and the SVK.
6. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was responsible for ordering, supervising, monitoring and disciplining all personnel and units that comprised the VJ serving within and without the boundaries of the FRY, which included:
  - a. All VJ personnel who were seconded to the VRS and the SVK, *via* the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff, were personnel the VJ continued to remunerate and personnel over whom it retained its authority to

make final determinations regarding their promotions and termination of service. Despite delegating daily operational control of these officers **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** still had had the authority and material ability to discipline and punish these officers as described in paragraph 37 of this indictment.

- b. All members of the VJ serving in regular units of the VJ who were sent on assignments outside of the FRY or engaged in activities within Yugoslavia in support of the SVK and VRS.
  - c. All VRS and SVK military personnel who began their military service in these armies but who, after receiving officer training from and commissioning in the VJ were thereafter remunerated and promoted within the VJ and regulated through the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres.
7. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** had a superior-subordinate relationship with former members of the JNA that joined the newly formed SVK and VRS and who became officers in the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff and who the VJ continued to remunerate for their service in the SVK and VRS and retain its authority to make final determinations regarding their promotion and termination of service.

## INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

### Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal

8. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** is individually criminally responsible for the crimes referred to in Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal as described in this indictment, in whose planning, preparation, or execution he aided and abetted. During his tenure as Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** exercised his authority, pursuant to the policies and limitations set by the SDC, to provide substantial military assistance to the VRS which he knew was used, in significant part, in the commission of the crimes described in this indictment.
9. Such assistance included continuing the practice of providing the majority of senior officers in the VRS as well as supplying large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and other logistical materials necessary for the commission of crimes. The provision of this assistance was both substantial and significant and remained largely uninterrupted during the period of time that **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was the Chief of the General Staff. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** gave this assistance with the knowledge that a significant part of that assistance

was being used in the commission of crimes. Such assistance was provided covertly and in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions that were issued, in part, because such assistance was being used in the commission of crimes. Such assistance was provided despite official representations by the FRY government that it was not militarily involved in the conflicts in the Republic of Croatia (Croatia) or BiH. In some instances such assistance consisted of sending regular VJ troops stationed in the FRY into BiH. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** provided this assistance through acts performed directly by him and by acts performed by his subordinates. The personnel and logistical assistance provided to the VRS contributed substantially and materially to their capacity to commit crimes

#### Provision of the Officer Corps of the SVK and the VRS

10. The VJ, under the command of **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**, continued the policy of the SDC and its individual members to provide and finance the majority of officers comprising the officer corps of the VRS and the SVK. This provision of the officer corps of the VRS and the SVK included the regulation of their service, their remuneration (including post adjustments for combat duty while serving in the VRS and SVK), their benefits, and their promotions.
11. The provision of VJ officers was done secretly to hide the involvement of the VJ and the FRY government in the conflicts in Croatia and BiH in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. In November 1993, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** personally established special purpose personnel centres within the General Staff of the VJ to disguise the provision and payment of these officers. These centres were known as the "30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre" for VJ members serving in the VRS and the "40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre" for VJ members serving in the SVK.
12. The primary function of these special purpose personnel centres was to remunerate and regulate the service of the large number of former JNA officers who served in the armies of the VRS and the SVK as well as the large number of VJ officers who were seconded to the armies of the VRS and the SVK. These centres bore the burden of the administration and regulation of much of the SVK's and VRS's military and civilian personnel.
13. The VJ officers that were sent to the SVK and the VRS were selected according to criteria which was, in part, established by **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**. Many of the officers were selected because they were born in either BiH or Croatia. Some were selected in order to influence the composition and character of those armies. Some who volunteered were permitted to go without resigning from the VJ and continued to be paid as officers in the

VJ. Many who were reluctant to go were induced with incentives such as Yugoslav citizenship or coerced with the threat of punitive measures such as forcible early retirement from the VJ. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** personally issued orders requiring his subordinates to transfer to the VRS and the SVK.

14. The co-ordination between the VJ and the VRS was so close that the political leaders of the Republika Srpska and General Ratko Mladić could request that particular VJ officers be placed under their operational command or be retired *via* the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre.
15. VJ officers serving in the SVK and the VRS did so for short-term temporary assignments or long-term indefinite periods. Some officers were required to obtain certification that they had completed their service in units outside Yugoslavia before returning to the VJ. VJ officers serving in the VRS retained their VJ identification cards and were not issued VRS identification documents until after the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.
16. In some instances, soldiers who began their military service in the VRS and SVK were sent to the FRY to be trained as officers by the VJ. Upon their commissioning they were accepted into the VJ as officers assigned to the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff which would henceforth regulate their service, remunerate them and make final determinations on future promotions.
17. In some instances, officers were permitted to return to their original posts in the VJ at their request. At the end of the conflict, Ratko Mladić made arrangements with **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** for the transfer of many of the senior VRS officers serving under his command *via* the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre back to regular units in the VJ.

#### Promotion of Yugoslav Army officers serving in the SVK and the VRS

18. The VJ administered the continued training and promotion of officers serving in the SVK and the VRS. The promotion of these seconded personnel contributed to the morale of the officer corps serving outside the regular VJ and furthered the development of the respective officer corps of the VRS and SVK.
19. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** regularly received recommendations for the promotion of VJ officers serving in the SVK and the VRS. In most instances, these recommendations came from senior officers who themselves were members of the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff and who had operational control of the seconded VJ officers. On occasion, senior political leaders or political entities within the Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina promoted senior VJ officers serving in their armies. In many

cases, these officers were nominally promoted in the SVK and VRS and could be addressed by the higher rank by other members of their force before a final determination was made on their promotion in the VJ. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** would make a final determination on these recommendations for all ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and below.

20. In the case of officers being promoted to the rank of General, Yugoslav law required the SDC president to make a determination upon the proposal of the VJ Chief of the General Staff. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** would advise the SDC, that he either supported or opposed these recommendations. In most cases, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** proposed that these recommendations be adopted by the SDC; in some cases he recommended that certain officers not be promoted or he requested that the decision be postponed to give him time to evaluate the suitability of a particular officer. The SDC, in most cases, adopted **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ's** proposal and either accepted, rejected or postponed the proposed promotion.
21. This secret process was commonly referred to by members of the VJ, SVK and the VRS as "verification". All matters related to the regulation of their service were decided pursuant to the applicable laws of the VJ. All appeals of such decisions could only be heard in the Supreme Military Court in Belgrade pursuant to Yugoslav military law. The service of most senior officers in the VRS and SVK was regulated in this manner and is described in detail in Schedule E of this indictment. Some of these assigned officers exercised their authority in the commission of crimes as described in this indictment.
22. Two successive Ministers of Defence of the Republika Srpska received their pay and their benefits from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff. Key members of the VRS Main Staff and all Corps commanders of the VRS received their remuneration from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff which also regulated their service.
23. Similarly, key members of the SVK Main Staff and other senior officers including its Commander received their pay and their benefits from the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff which also regulated their service.

#### Provision of Material and Logistical Assistance to the SVK and the VRS

24. During his tenure as Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** continued to implement the policy of the SDC and its members to provide large quantities of weapons, ammunition, materials and other logistical support necessary for the commission of crimes. The provision of this assistance was both substantial and significant and was

given irrespective of whether or not the assistance was to be used in lawful combat or in the commission of crimes. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** provided this assistance through acts performed directly by himself and by acts performed by his subordinates.

25. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was personally aware of specific requests made by the SVK and the VRS. In some instances, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** responded to direct requests from Ratko Mladić for logistical assistance and arranged meetings between Mladić and other members of the FRY government to discuss his military requirements. Assistance to the VRS and the SVK was so well integrated into the VJ budgetary system that a joint balance sheet was maintained for materials allocated to the VJ, VRS and the SVK.
26. The VJ provided largely uninterrupted material and logistical support including weapons, ammunition and other combat equipment. The VJ provided and maintained an air defence system that was unified and integrated with the VRS. In 1994, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** personally proposed the provision of an air defence weapons system to the VRS.
27. The VJ provided and maintained an integrated communications systems allowing senior officers of the three armies to readily communicate with each other. The VJ facilitated the supply of raw materials to weapons and munitions factories in the Republika Srpska and provided testing facilities when necessary. The VJ provided the VRS and the SVK with spare parts for military equipment and the technicians necessary to maintain and repair such military equipment. The VJ performed maintenance on VRS equipment at its own facilities and sent some of its equipment to the RS for maintenance and repairs.
28. The VJ provided large quantities of fuel to the VRS and the SVK for military purposes. The VJ provided medical supplies, treatment, and facilities for wounded and the injured VRS personnel including hospitalisation in VJ military hospitals. The VJ provided education and training to personnel of the VRS and the SVK. The VJ provided foodstuffs for the combat troops of the VRS. The VJ provided military clothing for the combat troops of the VRS and the SVK. The VJ provided assistance to the families of personnel serving in the VRS and the SVK. The VJ paid the salaries of the civilian staff working in the VRS and SVK.

#### Environment of Impunity

29. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** had a professional military obligation to ensure that discipline was maintained by his subordinates who were engaged in combat activities in the VRS and the SVK. He had the legal and professional duty to take all necessary measures to prevent or

punish the commission of crimes by his subordinates in the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff.

30. As the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ from 26 August 1993 and continuing during the period of this indictment, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was aware that some of his subordinates, serving in the SVK and the VRS, had repeatedly committed violations of international criminal law. During this period, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** failed to take any measures to prevent the commission of these crimes, and knowing of their commission, failed to take any measures to punish the perpetrators.
31. Subordinates of **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** were aware that he did not take measures to prevent and to punish the crimes being committed by some of his subordinates. His consistent and prolonged pattern of failing to prevent, investigate and punish breaches of international criminal law by VJ personnel serving in the SVK and the VRS created an environment of impunity in which his subordinates believed they could commit those crimes without fear of sanction. The creation of this environment of impunity amounted to aiding and abetting by facilitating and encouraging the commission of the crimes alleged in this indictment.

#### Knowledge

32. During the period relevant to this indictment **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** had actual knowledge that the personnel and the logistical assistance he provided to the VRS was being used, in significant part, to perpetrate crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica including unlawful killings and forcible transfers. He was personally aware of the extreme nationalistic character of many members of the VRS and their propensity to engage in persecutory conduct. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was aware of the VRS's co-operation with and use of paramilitary forces. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was personally aware of allegations of particular crimes and allegations against specific officers. He was regularly copied on daily situation reports from the VRS and had direct communications with VRS officers including Ratko Mladić.
33. During the time relevant to this indictment the VJ maintained its own intelligence apparatus that was actively engaged in gathering information about what was transpiring in the conflicts in BiH and Croatia. This apparatus provided **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** with regular timely reports of events. The VJ General Staff also received intelligence reports from VRS intelligence organs. Other factors which served to place **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**

on notice of the crimes that were being committed by VJ personnel or with VJ material and logistical assistance included:

- a. Reports from VJ officers sent to the SVK and the VRS.
- b. FRY government officials had regular contact with Bosnian Serb leaders
- c. During the period relevant to this indictment there were numerous media reports and reports from non-governmental organisations alleging criminal conduct.
- d. Beginning in 1994, the ICTY began issuing a series of indictments describing allegations of serious criminal acts committed, in some instances, by personnel assigned to the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff.

Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal

34. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was Chief of the General Staff of the VJ from 26 August 1993 until 24 November 1998 and, subject to the authority of the SDC, exercised effective control over the VJ (*de jure* and *de facto*). As such, in his capacity as a superior officer, and pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal, he bears individual criminal responsibility throughout this time for failing to prevent or punish the unlawful acts of his subordinates in the VJ as described in this Indictment.

35. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**'s subordinates, under international law, include those personnel over whom he had a material ability to prevent and punish the commission of crimes. They included, but were not limited to:

- a. All VJ personnel that were assigned or seconded to the VRS and the SVK *via* the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff whether or not daily operational control of the personnel was delegated or transferred to the commanders of these other armies and for whom the VJ continued to remunerate and retain its right to make final determinations regarding their promotions and the termination of their service.
- b. Former members of the JNA that joined the newly formed SVK and VRS and who became officers in the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff and whom the VJ continued to remunerate for their service in the SVK and VRS and retain its authority to make final determinations regarding their promotions and termination of service. Such superior relationship existed

because of **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**'s material ability to prevent or punish their criminal conduct as described in paragraph 37 of this indictment. His material ability to prevent and punish criminal conduct by these officers was parallel and concurrent to the material ability held by the Commanders of the VRS and SVK who had operational control of these officers and who also had a superior-subordinate relationship with these officers.

- c. All members of the VJ serving in regular units of the VJ who were sent on assignments outside of the FRY or engaged in activities within the FRY in support of the SVK and VRS.
- d. All VRS and SVK military personnel who began their military service in these armies but who, after receiving officer training from and commissioning in the VJ, were thereafter remunerated and promoted within the VJ and regulated by the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres.

36. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** had an affirmative duty to monitor the activities of his subordinates assigned to serve in the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff and investigate allegations of misconduct and criminal acts against them of which he became aware and adopt necessary and effective measures to prevent the commission of the crimes. Despite being aware of allegations of serious crimes being committed by members of the VRS and the SVK, no investigations were conducted at the instance of **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** to determine if members of the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres bore responsibility for these crimes.

37. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** as the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ had the authority, the responsibility and the material ability to employ disciplinary mechanisms that were available to him that included, but were not limited to:

- a. Initiating investigations by VJ military prosecutors.
- b. Denying promotions to, demoting or terminating the service of officers up to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
- c. Making appropriate recommendations to the SDC for officers holding the rank of General including denial of promotion, demotion, or termination of service.
- d. Issuing orders to VJ personnel assigned to the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres specifically prohibiting criminal conduct such as attacks on civilians and

persecution and affirming their legal and professional obligation to observe international humanitarian law.

- e. Implementing non-judicial mechanisms for investigating allegations of criminal conduct including requiring VJ officers serving in the SVK and VRS to appear before the VJ General Staff and the SDC to report and respond to allegations of misconduct.
- f. Recalling VJ seconded officers from the SVK and VRS when he became aware they might have engaged in criminal conduct or were likely to be engaged in such conduct in the future.

38. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** failed to employ any of the above disciplinary or preventative mechanisms despite having personal knowledge of allegations of criminal behaviour regarding particular events and specific members of the 30<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centres of the VJ General Staff. He exercised his authority selectively, for example, when subordinates gave VJ supplies to the VRS outside the parameters of his orders; or when officers serving in the SVK lost territory in Western Slavonia to Croatian forces.

39. VJ officers serving in the VRS and RSK were, on some occasions, promoted or retired under favourable conditions in the VJ after allegations of serious misconduct by them became public knowledge. Some of these officers included, but were not limited to:

- a. General Milan Čeleketić, Commander of the SVK. Six weeks after the shelling of Zagreb, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** opposed his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General, not because of this crime but because he held him responsible for the loss of Serb-held territories in Western Slavonia.
- b. General Ratko Mladić, Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS. He was promoted in the VJ on 24 June 1994 to the rank of Colonel General.
- c. General Stanislav Galić, Commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. He was retired from the VJ in 1996.
- d. General Dragomir Milošević, Commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. He was promoted in the VJ in December 1995.
- e. General Radislav Krstić, Commander of the Drina Corps. He was promoted in the VJ in December 1995.

- f. Colonel Vinko Pandurević, Commander of the Zvornik Brigade. Pandurević was extraordinarily promoted in the VJ in December 1995.
- g. Lieutenant Colonel Dragan Obrenović, Deputy Commander of the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade. Obrenović was extraordinarily promoted in the VJ in December 1995.

## THE CHARGES

### SARAJEVO

#### COUNTS 1 TO 4

#### MURDER, INHUMANE ACTS AND ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

40. Between August 1993 and November 1995, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** aided and abetted the planning, preparation, or execution of a military campaign of artillery and mortar shelling and sniping onto civilian areas of Sarajevo and upon its civilian population, killing and wounding thousands of civilians.
41. In this time period, the commanders of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the VRS, General Stanislav Galić (10 September 1992 to 10 August 1994) and General Dragomir Milošević (10 August 1994 to November 1995) and their superior General Ratko Mladić, continued an extensive shelling and sniping attack on Sarajevo, mostly from positions in the hills surrounding the city.
42. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps conducted a protracted campaign of shelling and sniping upon Sarajevo during which civilians were either specifically targeted or were the subject of reckless fire into areas where civilians were known to have been. Specific instances of shelling are set forth in Schedule A of this indictment. Specific instances of sniping are set forth in Schedule B of this indictment
43. These crimes were, in part, planned, instigated, ordered, committed and aided by members of the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff including but not limited to General Ratko Mladić, Commander of the VRS; General Stanislav Galić, Commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps (until August 1994); General Dragomir Milošević, Commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps (after August 1994); and Major General Veljko Stojanović, Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Sarajevo Motorised Mechanised Brigade. As members of the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ these and other officers involved in the crimes

received all of their remuneration from the VJ. The ranks they held and which allowed them to hold the positions of authority necessary to plan, instigate, order, commit and otherwise aid and abet the above crimes were verified and regulated by the VJ.

44. General **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**, aided and abetted crimes which included unlawful killings, inhumane acts and attacks on a civilian population with the knowledge that the assistance he provided would be used in the commission of these crimes. His specific acts of assistance consisted of:

- a. Exercising his authority as Chief of the General Staff of the VJ to provide and pay the senior officers responsible for the crimes committed during the siege of Sarajevo.
- b. Exercising his authority to provide a substantial amount of the weapons, ammunition and logistical support used by the VRS, which was used, in part, to perpetrate the crimes committed during the siege of Sarajevo.
- c. Failing to exercise his authority and responsibility to prevent and punish criminal conduct and uphold military discipline thereby creating an environment of impunity among members of the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff assigned to duties in BiH.
- d. Exercising his authority to deploy regular VJ troops in support of the siege of Sarajevo during the "Pancir-2" operation between December 1993 and February 1994.

45. The subordinates of **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** who participated in the perpetration of crimes in Sarajevo included Ratko Mladić, Stanislav Galić, Dragomir Milošević, Veljko Stojanović, other officers of the Main Staff of the VRS and senior officers of the constituent subordinate units of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps who served in the VRS *via* the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** had reason to know that they had participated in the perpetration of the crimes in Sarajevo based on the following facts:

- a. The crimes involved numerous individual criminal acts that were perpetrated over an extended period of time in the capital of BiH.
- b. The crimes received widespread attention from the media, intergovernmental organisations, international negotiators, and non-governmental organisations, many of which based their reports on first-hand accounts of the crimes.

- c. The large amount of logistical support that was necessary for the commission of these crimes was provided by the VJ.
- d. The VJ had an effective intelligence gathering apparatus that provided **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** with regular contemporaneous information about what occurred in BiH.

46. Despite these facts, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**, as described in paragraphs 34-39 of this Indictment, failed to initiate an inquiry into what role members of the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff may have played in the commission of these crimes and he failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish his subordinates for the commission thereof.

By his acts and omissions in relation to the crimes perpetrated in Sarajevo as described in paragraphs 40 – 46 and in Schedules A and B of this indictment, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** committed:

Count 1: Murder, a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**, punishable under Articles 5(a) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 2: Murder, a **VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR**, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 3: Inhumane acts (injuring and wounding civilians), a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**, punishable under Articles 5(i) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 4: Attacks on civilians, a **VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR**, as recognised by Article 51 (2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

**ZAGREB**  
**COUNTS 5 TO 8**  
**MURDER, INHUMANE ACTS AND ATTACKS ON**  
**CIVILIANS**

47. On 2 May 1995 and 3 May 1995 Milan Martić planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation, and execution of the shelling of civilian areas in the city of Zagreb and upon its civilian population.
48. On 1 May 1995 the Croatian Army (HV) launched an attack against the SVK in Western Slavonia, commonly referred to as Operation Flash. As a result of the attack the SVK was forced to withdraw from the area of Western Slavonia across the Sava River into the Serbian held part of BiH. In retaliation, Milan Martić, President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Supreme Commander of the SVK ordered the shelling of three Croatian cities: Zagreb, Sisak and Karlovac.
49. On 2 May 1995, at approximately 10:25 hours, on the order of Milan Martić, General Čeleketić of the SVK ordered his subordinates to fire an Orkan Multiple Barrel Rocket Launcher fitted with "cluster bomb" warheads from the area of Petrova Gora into the central part of Zagreb and the airport (Pleso). These rockets impacted in several locations within the central commercial district of Zagreb, primarily the areas of Stara Vlačka Street, Josip Juraj Strossmayer Square and Križanićeva Street. During this unlawful attack, at least five civilians were killed and at least 146 civilians wounded.
50. On 3 May 1995, at approximately 12:10 hours on the orders of Milan Martić, the Orkan Multiple Barrel Rocket Launcher fitted with "cluster bomb" warheads was once again fired from the area of Petrova Gora into the centre of Zagreb. Rockets impacted in the areas of Klaićeva Street, Medulićeva Street, Ilica Street and near the Croatian National Theatre. This unlawful attack caused the death of two civilians and wounded forty-eight others. The names of those civilians that were killed are listed in Schedule C of this indictment.
51. The shelling was not justified by military necessity. The affected locations were either specifically targeted or the result of reckless fire into areas where civilians were known to have been.
52. The crimes described above were, in part, committed and aided and abetted by members of the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ including, but not limited to, General Čeleketić. As members of the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ these and other officers involved in the

crimes received all of their remuneration from the VJ. The ranks they held and which allowed them to hold the positions of authority necessary to plan, instigate, order, commit and otherwise aid and abet the above crimes were verified and regulated by the VJ.

53. The subordinates of **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** who participated in the perpetration of crimes in Zagreb included Milan Čeleketić and other senior officers of the SVK who served in the SVK *via* the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** had reason to know that they had participated in the perpetration of the crimes in Zagreb based on the following facts:

- a. The crimes involved a notorious act of shelling civilian areas of Zagreb, the capital of Croatia.
- b. The crimes received widespread attention from the media, intergovernmental organisations, international negotiators, and non-governmental organisations, many of which based their reports on first-hand accounts of the crimes.
- c. The VJ had an effective intelligence gathering apparatus that provided **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** with regular contemporaneous information about what occurred in Croatia.

54. Despite these facts, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**, as described in paragraphs 34-39 of this Indictment, failed to initiate an inquiry into what role members of the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ may have played in the commission of these crimes and he failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish his subordinates for the commission thereof.

By his omissions in relation to the crimes perpetrated in Zagreb as described in paragraphs 47 to 54 and in Schedule C of this indictment, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** committed:

Count 5: Murder, a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**, punishable under Articles 5(a) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 6: Murder, a **VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR**, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 7: Inhumane acts (injuring and wounding civilians), a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**, punishable under Articles 5(i) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 8: Attacks on civilians, a **VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR**, as recognised by Article 51 (2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

**SREBRENICA  
COUNTS 9 TO 13  
PERSECUTION, MURDER, EXTERMINATION AND  
INHUMANE ACTS**

55. On 8 April 1993 the International Court of Justice issued an order to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take all immediate measures within its power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide in BiH. On 16 April 1993, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 819 which reaffirmed the order of the International Court of Justice as well as the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of BiH. In Resolution 819 the Security Council recognising that the continued Bosnian Serb military operations against Srebrenica and in Eastern Bosnia involved unlawful attacks on civilians made several demands. The Security Council demanded that the attacks stop and further that “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
56. On 8 March 1995, Radovan Karadžić, as the Supreme Commander of the VRS, issued Operational Directive 7, which directed the VRS to eliminate the Muslim enclaves of

Srebrenica and Žepa, in furtherance of the “six strategic objectives” of 12 May 1992 which included the establishment of state borders separating the Serbian people from the other two ethnic communities. On 6 July 1995, the VRS and other Bosnia Serb forces under the command and control of General Ratko Mladić attacked the Srebrenica enclave. The attack on the enclave continued until 11 July 1995, when General Ratko Mladić and the VRS and other Bosnia Serb forces under Mladić’s command and control entered Srebrenica. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** knew an attack was planned and was aware of the “six strategic objectives”. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** also knew that some members of the VRS would engage in criminal conduct against the Bosnian Muslim civilian population of Srebrenica after its capture; criminal conduct which would include persecution, forcible transfers and killings.

57. Between 12 July and about 20 July 1995, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were captured by, or surrendered to, Bosnia Serb forces under the command and control of General Ratko Mladić. Thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners captured in the area around Srebrenica were summarily executed from 13 July to 19 July 1995 and thereafter many were buried in mass graves. During the executions some of the prisoners suffered serious injuries and wounds but managed to survive. From about 1 August 1995 through 1 November 1995, VRS units under the command and control of General Ratko Mladić participated in an organised and comprehensive effort to conceal the killings by reburying, in isolated locations, bodies exhumed from their original mass graves. These killings are summarised in Schedule D of this indictment. From July 1995 onwards, thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilian women, children and elderly men were forcibly transferred by the VRS from Potočari and other areas surrounding Srebrenica to Kladanj and other non-Serb areas of BiH.
58. The crimes described above were, in part, planned, instigated, ordered, committed and aided by members of the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ including, but not limited to: General Ratko Mladić, Commander of the VRS; General Milenko Živanović, Commander of the Drina Corps until 20:00 hours on 13 July 1995; General Radislav Krstić, Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander up until 20:00 hours 13 July 1995 and thereafter Commander of the Drina Corps; Colonel Ljubiša Beara, Chief of Security of the VRS Main Staff; Colonel Vujadin Popović, Assistant Commander for Security of the Drina Corps; Colonel Vidoje Blagojević, Commander of the Bratunac Brigade; Colonel Vinko Pandurević Commander of the Zvornik Brigade; Dragan Jokić, Chief of Engineering of Zvornik Brigade; Lieutenant Colonel Dragan Obrenović, Deputy Commander and Chief of

Staff of Zvornik Brigade; 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Drago Nikolić, Chief of Security of 1<sup>st</sup> Zvornik Infantry Brigade; and various other individuals and elements of military units including, but not limited to: 10<sup>th</sup> Sabotage Detachment, 65<sup>th</sup> Protection Regiment, Bratunac Brigade, Zvornik Brigade, Vlasenica Brigade, and 5<sup>th</sup> Engineering Battalion.

59. The officers enumerated above, as members of the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff, received all of their remuneration from the VJ. The ranks they held and which allowed them to hold the positions of authority necessary to plan, instigate, order, commit and otherwise aid and abet the above crimes were verified and regulated by the VJ.

60. General **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**, aided and abetted crimes which included unlawful killings, inhumane acts and forcible transfers with the knowledge that the assistance he provided would be used in the commission of these crimes. These crimes were perpetrated with the intent to discriminate against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica on political, racial or religious grounds and **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** was aware of the discriminatory intent of the perpetrators. His specific acts of assistance consisted of:

- a. Exercising his authority as Chief of the General Staff of the VJ to provide and pay the senior officers responsible for the forcible transfers, inhumane treatment and killings at Srebrenica.
- b. Exercising his authority to provide a substantial amount of the weapons, ammunition and logistical support used by the VRS, which was used, in part, to perpetrate the crimes described above.
- c. Permitting officers from the Užice Corps of the VJ to assist in the planning and preparation of the takeover of the enclave of Srebrenica.
- d. Exercising his authority on or about 13 July 1995 to order approximately 30 VJ officers to report to the VRS Main Staff for assignments in BiH including the Srebrenica area.
- e. Exercising his authority to provide covert training to the members of the 10<sup>th</sup> Sabotage Detachment in Yugoslavia (December 1994) and in the Republika Srpska (March – April 1995) and whose members directly participated in many of the killings.
- f. Exercising his authority to secure the border between Serbia and Bosnia in the area of Srebrenica to prevent Srebrenica Muslims from escaping into Serbia and to return those who had crossed the border.

- g. Failing to exercise his authority and responsibility to prevent and punish criminal conduct and uphold military discipline thereby creating an environment of impunity among members of the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ assigned to duties in BiH.
61. The subordinates of **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** who participated in the perpetration of crimes in Srebrenica included Ratko Mladić, Radislav Krstić, Milenko Živanović, Ljubiša Beara, Vujadin Popović, Vidoje Blagojević, Vinko Pandurević, Dragan Jokić, Dragan Obrenović, Drago Nikolić, other officers of the Main Staff of the VRS and other senior officers of its constituent subordinate units who served in the VRS *via* the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** had reason to know that they had participated in the perpetration of crimes in Srebrenica based on the following facts:
- a. The crimes resulted in the murder of over 7,000 men and boys, the forcible transfer of approximately 25,000 people and was the most notorious crime committed during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
  - b. The crimes were committed in areas that were adjacent to the border with the FRY.
  - c. The crimes were committed after the take-over of Srebrenica, an enclave designated a “safe area” by the United Nations Security Council on 16 April 1993.
  - d. The crimes received widespread attention from the media, intergovernmental organisations, international negotiators, and non-governmental organisations.
  - e. **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** had prior knowledge of the VRS’s propensity to commit crimes in furtherance of the “six strategic objectives.”
  - f. The VJ had an effective intelligence gathering apparatus that provided **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** with regular contemporaneous information about what occurred in BiH.
62. Despite these facts, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ**, as described in paragraphs 34-39 of this Indictment, failed to initiate an inquiry into what role members of the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ may have played in the commission of these crimes and he failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish his subordinates for the commission thereof.

By his acts and omissions in relation to the crimes involving forcible transfers and killings perpetrated in Srebrenica as described in paragraphs 55 to 62 and in Schedule D of this indictment, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** committed:

Count 9: Murder, a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**, punishable under Articles 5(a) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 10: Murder, a **VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR**, as recognized by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 11: Inhumane acts (inflicting serious injuries, wounding, forcible transfer), a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**, punishable under Articles 5(i) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.


Count 12: Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**, including Murder, Cruel and Inhumane Treatment and Forcible Transfer, punishable under Articles 5(h) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.


Count 13: Extermination, a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**, punishable under Articles 5(b) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

## **GENERAL ALLEGATIONS**

63. During 1990 and 1991 increasing nationalism and ethnic tension were marked by political, police and military leaders taking definitive steps that would result in the disintegration of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the separation of four of its six constituent republics. This disintegration involved a series of armed conflicts extending for a period of nine years.

64. Conflict in Croatia erupted and intensified throughout the spring of 1991. In March 1992 armed conflict commenced in BiH. At all times relevant to this indictment, a state of armed conflict existed in Croatia and BiH.
65. The European Community formally recognised the sovereignty of Croatia on 15 January 1992 and the sovereignty of BiH on 7 April 1992. The United States formally recognised the sovereignty of Croatia and BiH on 7 April 1992. On 27 April 1992 the republics of Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and declared itself the Successor State of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 22 May 1992 Croatia and BiH became members of the United Nations.
66. All acts and omissions alleged in this indictment occurred on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
67. At all times relevant to this indictment the Accused, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** and other personnel of the VJ, VRS and SVK were required to abide by the laws and customs governing the conduct of armed conflicts, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto. All acts and omissions charged in this indictment were committed against persons protected under the Geneva Conventions.
68. All acts and omissions charged in this indictment as Crimes against Humanity were part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the Croat, Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilian populations within areas of Croatia and BiH.

  
Serge Brammertz  
Prosecutor



Dated this 5<sup>th</sup> day of February 2008  
At The Hague  
The Netherlands

**SCHEDULE A**  
**SHELLING OF THE CITY OF SARAJEVO**

- | <b>No</b> | <b>Incident</b>  |
|-----------|--|
| 1.)       | <b>22 January 1994:</b> Three mortar shells landed in the area of Alipašino Polje, the first in a park behind, and the second and third in front of residential apartment buildings at 3, Geteova Street (previously Centinjska Street) and at 4, Bosanka Street (previously Klara Cetkin Street), where children were playing. The second and third shells killed six children under the age of 15 years and wounded one adult and at least three such children. The origin of fire was from VRS-held territory approximately to the west.  |
| 2.)       | <b>4 February 1994:</b> A salvo of three 120 mm mortar shells hit civilians in the Dobrinja residential area. The first landed in front of an apartment building at Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. The second and third landed among persons trading at a market in an open area to the rear of the apartment buildings at Mihajla Pupina Street and Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. Eight people, including 1 child under the age of 15 years, were killed and at least 18 people, including 2 such children, were wounded. The origin of fire was from VRS-held territory, approximately to the east. |
| 3.)       | <b>5 February 1994:</b> A 120 mm mortar shell hit a crowded open air market called "Markale" situated in a civilian area of Old Town Sarajevo, killing at least 60 people and wounding over 140 people. The origin of fire was VRS-held territory approximately to the north/north-east.   |
| 4.)       | <b>22 December 1994:</b> Two 76 mm shells in quick succession hit a flea market in the old commercial quarter of Baščaršija in Old Town. Two persons were killed and seven were injured. The origin of fire was Trebević, VRS positions.   |
| 5.)       | <b>24 May 1995:</b> A missile projectile landed and exploded on the asphalt of Safeta Zajke street, killing two and injuring five people. The projectile came from the south east, direction Lukavica.   |
| 6.)       | <b>24 May 1995:</b> A modified airbomb landed at Majdanska Street. Two civilians were killed and at least six were wounded. The origin of fire was determined as coming from the south-east, the VRS territory of Pavlovac.  |
| 7.)       | <b>18 June 1995:</b> A 120 mm mortar shell struck civilians at a water distribution centre in  |

**No****Incident**

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Marka Oreškovića Street, Dobrinja. Seven persons were killed and twelve injured. The origin of fire was Nedžarići, VRS territory.

- 8.) **1 July 1995:** At about 2130 hours, a rocket projectile with a concussion warhead exploded in Bunički Potok street. Thirteen people were injured. The projectile came from Ilidža.
- 9.) **28 August 1995:** A 120 mm mortar shell landed in Mula-Mustafe Bašeskije Street outside the entrance to the City Market. At least 35 persons were killed and 78 were injured. The origin of fire was Trebević, VRS territory.

**SCHEDULE B**  
**SNIPING OF THE CITY OF SARAJEVO**

- | No  | Incident  |
|-----|---|
| 1.) | <b>3 September 1993:</b> Nafa Tarić, a woman aged 35 years, and her daughter Elma Tarić, aged 8 years, were shot by a single bullet while walking together in Ivana Krndelja Street in the centre of Sarajevo. The bullet wounded the mother in her left thigh and wounded the daughter on her right hand and in her abdomen.   |
| 2.) | <b>2 November 1993:</b> Two men were wounded by a burst of gunfire while they were working clearing rubbish along Braće Ribara Street, presently Porodice Ribar Street, in the Hrasno area of Sarajevo. Ramiz Velić, aged 50 years, was wounded in his left forearm, and Milan Ristić, aged 56 years, was wounded in his right arm and both legs.   |
| 3.) | <b>6 January 1994:</b> Sanija Dževlan, a woman aged 32 years, was shot and wounded in her buttocks while riding a bicycle across a bridge in Nikole Demonja Street, Dobrinja.   |
| 4.) | <b>19 June 1994:</b> Witness B-1173, a woman aged 31 years, and her son, aged 4 years, were lightly wounded in their legs by a shot that penetrated a crowded tram in which they were travelling. The tram was travelling west on Zmaja od Bosne Street towards Alipašino Polje. Witness B-1174, a man aged 36 years, sustained a slight leg wound and Witness B-1175, a woman aged 23 years, was wounded in her left armpit in the same attack. The tram was near the Holiday Inn hotel at the time of the incident. |
| 5.) | <b>26 June 1994:</b> Sanela Muratović, a girl aged 16 years, was shot and wounded in her right shoulder while walking with a girlfriend on Đure Jakšića Street, presently Adija Mulabegovića, in the west end of Sarajevo.  |
| 6.) | <b>22 July 1994:</b> Witness B-1177, a boy aged 13 years, was shot and wounded in his abdomen while window-shopping with his mother and sister in Miljenka Cvitkovića Street, presently Ferde Hauptmana, in the Čengić Vila area of Sarajevo.   |
| 7.) | <b>8 November 1994:</b> Fata Guta, a woman aged 54 years, was shot and wounded in the hand while she was going with jerri-cans to collect water from the Moščanica spring in Gazin Han, to the east of Sarajevo.  |
| 8.) | <b>23 November 1994:</b> Hafiza Karačić, a woman aged 31 years and Sabina Šabanić, a woman aged 26 years, were both wounded in the right shoulder when the tram they  |

No	Incident
	were travelling on came under fire on Zmaj od Bosne, between the Technical School and Marshal Tito Barracks.
9.)	<b>10 December 1994:</b> Derviša Selmanović, a woman aged 49 years, was shot and wounded in the right knee while she was gathering firewood in the backyard of a house in Sedrenik Street, in the north east end of Sarajevo.
10.)	<b>27 February 1995:</b> Senad Kesmer, a man aged 31 years, Alma Čehagić, a woman aged 19 years, Alija Holjan, a man aged 55 years, and others, were shot and wounded while travelling in a westbound tram on Zmaj od Bosne. The tram was near the Tito barracks at the time.
11.)	<b>3 March 1995:</b> Azem Agović, a man aged 46 years and Alen Gičević, a man aged 33 years, were shot and wounded while travelling in an eastbound tram on Zmaj od Bosne. The tram was near the Holiday Inn at the time.
12.)	<b>3 May 1995:</b> Šemša Čovrk, a woman aged 27 years, was shot and wounded in the abdomen while walking on Josipa Kraša Street in Novi Grad.

**SCHEDULE C**  
**SHELLING OF CITY OF ZAGREB**

<b>No</b>	<b>Incident</b>
1.)	<b>2 May 1995:</b> At approximately 10:25 hours rockets armed with cluster bombs were fired from the area of Petrova Gora into the centre of Zagreb and its airport. This attack killed at least five civilians and injured at least one hundred and forty-six civilians. The deceased were: Ivan Brodač (aka Ivan Brodar), Damir Dračić, Ivanka Kovač, Stjepan Krhen, Ana Mutevelić.
2.)	<b>3 May 1995:</b> At approximately 12:10 hours rockets armed with cluster bombs were fired from the area of Petrova Gora into the centre of Zagreb. This attack killed at least one civilian and wounded at least forty-eight others. The deceased were: Ivan Markulin and Luka Skračić.

**SCHEDULE D**  
**SREBRENICA KILLINGS**  
**Incident (Srebrenica)**

No

1) **Opportunistic Killings in Potočari:**

VRS and MUP officers and soldiers committed a number of opportunistic killings of the Bosnian Muslims in Potočari on 12 and 13 July 1995. These Bosnian Muslims were taken prisoner in Potočari before being killed. Momir Nikolić a VRS officer personally supervised the handling of prisoners in Potočari and was present and on duty in Potočari during this period, along with members of the Drina Corps, the Bratunac Brigade, and the MUP. The opportunistic killings in Potočari resulted in the following:

- 1.1) **12 July 1995:** The bodies of nine Bosnian Muslim men who had been shot, were found in the woods near the UN Compound on the Budak side of the main road.
- 1.2) **12 July 1995:** The bodies of nine or ten Bosnian Muslim males were found about seven hundred metres from the UN Compound behind the White House in a creek.
- 1.3) **13 July 1995:** The bodies of six Bosnian Muslim women and five Bosnian Muslim men were found in a stream near the UN Compound in Potočari.
- 1.4) **13 July 1995:** One Bosnian Muslim man was taken behind a building near the "White House" and summarily executed.

**12 – 17 July 1995:** Between 12 July and about 17 July 1995, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the column of men escaping the Srebrenica enclave were captured by, or surrendered to, VRS and MUP forces. About one-third of the men in the column referred to in paragraphs 1.4, 3.2, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1 and 5.2 of Schedule D who attempted to flee the enclave were Bosnian Muslim soldiers from the 28<sup>th</sup> Division, although not all of the soldiers were armed. Momir Nikolić was present along the Bratunac/Milići road on 13 July 1995 and was involved in the capture and detention of Bosnian Muslim prisoners in that area. Apart from those prisoners transported directly to execution sites, the prisoners captured from the column on 13 July 1995 were taken to the same temporary detention sites in and around Bratunac as those men separated from Potočari.

2) **Opportunistic Killings in Bratunac:**

VRS and MUP officers and soldiers committed a number of opportunistic killings of

No

**Incident (Srebrenica)**

Bosnian Muslim prisoners temporarily detained in Bratunac in schools, buildings, and vehicles parked along the road. These opportunistic killings occurred between 12 July and about 15 July 1995 in several different locations in Bratunac, namely:

- 2.1) **12 – 13 July 1995:** Beginning at approximately 22:00 hours and continuing through 13 July, more than 50 Bosnian Muslim men were taken from a hangar behind the Vuk Karadžić elementary school in Bratunac and summarily executed.
- 2.2) **13 July 1995:** In the evening, a Bosnian Muslim man who was mentally retarded was taken off a bus parked in front of the Vuk Karadžić elementary school in Bratunac and summarily executed.
- 2.3) **13 July 1995:** During the day, one Bosnian Muslim man was beaten about the head with a rifle at the Vuk Karadžić School and was subsequently taken away and summarily executed. Numerous other Bosnian Muslim men detained at the Vuk Karadžić elementary school were also summarily executed during the day of 13 July.
- 2.4) **13 – 15 July 1995:** Between the evening of 13 July and the morning of 15 July, Bosnian Muslim males were frequently and consistently taken from the Vuk Karadžić elementary school and summarily executed.
- 2.5) Those Bosnian Muslim prisoners who survived their temporary detention in Bratunac were transported to the Zvornik area between 13 and 15 July 1995 for further detention and execution. Members of the Bratunac Brigade Military Police Platoon under the command and control of Vidoje Blagojević and under the direction of Momir Nikolić participated in guarding the prisoners and escorting them to holding and execution sites in the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility. Momir Nikolić directed and coordinated the Bratunac Brigade Military Police Platoon regarding issues relating to the transportation, detention and execution of prisoners under the authority of Vidoje Blagojević the Brigade Commander. As Deputy Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, Dragan Obrenović was responsible for scouting and identifying sites for such detention and execution, as well as undertaking preparations for the intake of thousands of prisoners into his brigade zone of responsibility.

3) **Organised Mass Executions:**

Over a seven-day period from 12 July until about 19 July 1995, VRS and MUP forces

No

**Incident (Srebrenica)**

participated in a planned and organised mass execution and burial of thousands of captured Bosnian Muslim men from the Srebrenica enclave. This wide-scale and organised killing operation occurred in several different locations in and around Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Zvornik, including the following:

- 3.1) **12 July 1995, Potočari:** In between the Zinc Factory and “Alija’s” house, VRS and/or MUP soldiers summarily executed, by decapitation, approximately eighty to one hundred Bosnian Muslim men. The bodies were then taken away on a truck.
- 3.2) **13 July 1995, Jadar River:** At approximately 11:00 hours, a small squad of soldiers consisting of at least one Bratunac police officer (Bratunac MUP), working with individuals and units of the VRS and/or MUP, captured approximately 16 Bosnian Muslim men from the column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave, transported them from Konjević Polje to an isolated area on the bank of the Jadar River and summarily executed 15 of them. One individual was wounded and managed to escape.
- 3.3) **13 July 1995 date Cerska Valley:** In the early afternoon hours, VRS and/or MUP soldiers transported about 150 Bosnian Muslim men to an area along a dirt road in the Cerska Valley about three (3) kilometres from Konjević Polje, summarily executed them and, using heavy equipment, covered them with dirt.
- 3.4) **13 July 1995, Kravica Warehouse:** In the early evening hours, VRS and/or MUP soldiers summarily executed over 1,000 Bosnian Muslim men detained in a large warehouse in the village of Kravica. The soldiers used automatic weapons, hand grenades, and other weaponry to kill the Bosnian Muslims inside the warehouse. Between 14 and 16 July 1995, heavy equipment arrived and removed the victims’ bodies to two large mass graves located in the nearby villages of Glogova and Ravnice. Zvornik Brigade Engineering Company troops under the direction of Dragan Jokić participated in this body removal and burial operation.
- 3.5) **14 July 1995, Orahovac (near Lažete):** In the late evening hours of 13 July and during the day of 14 July 1995, VRS personnel from the Military Police Platoon of the Bratunac Brigade working together with other individuals and units transported hundreds of Bosnian Muslim males from in and around Bratunac to the Grbavci School in the village of Orahovac. These Bosnian Muslim men had been captured from the

No

**Incident (Srebrenica)**

column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave or separated in Potočari. On 14 July 1995, VRS personnel including members of the Military Police Company of the Zvornik Brigade under the command and control of Dragan Obrenović guarded and blindfolded the Bosnian Muslim males detained at the Grbavci School. In the early afternoon of 14 July 1995, VRS personnel transported these Bosnian Muslim males from the school at Grbavci to a nearby field, where VRS personnel including members of the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade under the command and control of Dragan Obrenović ordered the prisoners off the trucks and summarily executed them with automatic weapons. Approximately 1,000 Bosnian Muslim males were killed. On 14 and 15 July 1995, VRS members of the Zvornik Brigade Engineering Company under the direction of Dragan Jokić used heavy equipment to bury the victims in mass graves at the execution site, while the executions continued.

- 3.6) **14 July 1995, The Petkovci School:** VRS and/or MUP personnel transported at least 1,000 Bosnian Muslim males from detention sites in and around Bratunac to the school at Petkovci. These Bosnian Muslim men had been captured from the column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave or separated in Potočari. On 14 July 1995 and the early morning hours of 15 July 1995, VRS and/or MUP personnel struck, beat, assaulted and shot with automatic weapons Bosnian Muslim males being detained at the school. Dragan Obrenović, as Deputy Commander commanding the Zvornik Brigade in the absence of the Commander, exercised command, control, and co-ordination duties associated with the detention of prisoners at the Petkovci School.
- 3.7) **14 July 1995, The "Dam" near Petkovci:** On or about the evening of 14 July 1995 and the early morning hours of 15 July 1995, VRS personnel from the Zvornik Brigade under the command and control of Dragan Obrenović, including drivers and trucks from the 6th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade, transported the surviving members of the group of at least 1,000 Bosnian Muslim males from the school at Petkovci to an area below the Dam near Petkovci. They were assembled below the Dam and summarily executed by VRS or MUP soldiers with automatic weapons. In the morning of 15 July 1995, VRS personnel from the Engineering Company of the Zvornik Brigade, working under the direction of Dragan Jokić and together with other individuals and units, used excavators and other heavy equipment to bury the victims while the executions continued.

- | No    | Incident (Srebrenica)  |
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| 3.8)  | <p><b>14 – 15 July 1995, Pilica School:</b> VRS and/or MUP personnel transported approximately 1,200 Bosnian Muslim males from detention sites in Bratunac to the school at Pilica. These Bosnian Muslim men had been captured from the column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave or separated in Potočari. On or about 14 and 15 July 1995, VRS military personnel shot and killed some of the Bosnian Muslim males who had arrived, or were being detained, at the school.</p>  |
| 3.9)  | <p><b>16 July 1995, Branjevo Military Farm:</b> On 14 July 1995, Bosnian Muslim prisoners from Bratunac were bussed to a school in the village of Pilica and detained there until 16 July 1995 when they were taken out of the school and loaded onto busses with their hands tied behind their backs. They were then driven to the Branjevo Military Farm where groups of 10 were lined up and shot. Between 1,000 and 1,200 men were killed in the course of that day at this execution site. Members of the VRS were engaged in guarding the Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the buses that took them to the Branjevo Military Farm and Zvornik Brigade equipment was used for activities relating to the burial of the victims. The Drina Corps Assistant Commander for Security, Colonel Vujadin Popović, was involved in organising fuel to transport the Bosnian Muslim prisoners to the execution site at Branjevo Military Farm and Drina Corps personnel and assets facilitated the executions. Participants in the execution included members of the VRS 10<sup>th</sup> Sabotage Detachment (a Main Staff subordinate unit).</p> |
| 3.10) | <p><b>16 July 1995, Pilica Cultural Centre:</b> VRS personnel from the Bratunac Brigade under the command and control of Vidoje Blagojević travelled a short distance to the village of Pilica and worked with other VRS and/or MUP personnel to summarily execute, with automatic weapons, approximately 500 men inside the Pilica Cultural Centre. These Bosnian Muslim men had been captured from the column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave or separated in Potočari. On 17 July 1995, VRS personnel from the “R” Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade under the authority of Dragan Obrenović in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade retrieved the bodies of the victims from the Pilica Cultural Centre and transported them to the Branjevo Military Farm. On 17 July 1995, the Engineering Company of the Zvornik Brigade, under the authority of Dragan Obrenović in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade and the direction of Dragan Jokić, participated in the burial of the victims of the Pilica School executions in a mass grave at the Branjevo Military Farm.</p>          |

No	Incident (Srebrenica)
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3.11) **16 July 1995, Kozluk:** On or before 16 July 1995, VRS and/or MUP soldiers, working together with other individuals and units, transported about 500 Bosnian Muslim males to an isolated place near Kozluk, in the Zvornik Brigade zone of responsibility, and summarily executed them with automatic weapons. These Bosnian Muslim men had been captured from the column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave or separated in Potočari. On 16 July 1995, VRS soldiers from the Engineering Company of the Zvornik Brigade, under the authority of Dragan Obrenović in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade and the direction of Dragan Jokić, and together with other individuals and units, buried the victims of the executions in a mass grave nearby.

4) **Opportunistic Killings in the Bratunac Brigade and Zvornik Brigade Zones:**

During and after the campaign of organised executions, the opportunistic killing of captured Bosnian Muslim men from the Srebrenica enclave by VRS and MUP personnel continued to occur through about 1 November 1995 in the zones of responsibility of both the Bratunac Brigade and the Zvornik Brigade. The opportunistic killings in the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigade zones include the following:

**Bratunac Brigade Zone:**

4.1) **13 – 27 July 1995, Nova Kasaba:** At sometime from 13 July through 27 July 1995 VRS and/or MUP personnel captured and executed 33 Bosnian Muslim men from the column fleeing the Srebrenica enclave. At least 26 of the victims were summarily executed after having been placed in two recently dug graves. Twenty-seven of the 33 men had their hands tied behind their backs when they were executed. These graves were located near the village of Nova Kasaba.

4.2) **17 – 27 July 1995, Glogova:** At sometime from 17 July through 27 July 1995, VRS and/or MUP soldiers captured 12 Bosnian Muslim men from the column, tied them together in six pairs, shot each of them in the head, and buried them in a mass grave near the village of Glogova.

4.3) **13 – 14 July 1995, Kravica Market:** During the night between 13 July and 14 July near a supermarket in Kravica, a VRS or MUP soldier placed his rifle barrel into the mouth of a Bosnian Muslim prisoner and summarily executed the man. Also during

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**No****Incident (Srebrenica)**

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this period, VRS and/or MUP soldiers struck, beat with rifle butts, and summarily executed Bosnian Muslim prisoners who were detained on trucks near the supermarket. All of these prisoners had been captured from the column of men retreating from the Srebrenica enclave or separated at Potočari.

**5) Zvornik Brigade Zone**

- 5.1) **19 July 1995, Nezuk:** VRS personnel from the 16<sup>th</sup> Brigade of the 1<sup>st</sup> Krajina Corps, re-subordinated to the command of the Zvornik Brigade under the direction of Dragan Obrenović in his capacity as Chief of Staff and pursuant to his direct leadership, captured at least 10 Bosnian Muslim males from the column and with automatic weapons, summarily executed them at a place near Nezuk.
- 5.2) **18 July – 1 November 1995:** From about 18 July through about 1 November, additional members of the Bosnian Muslim column were captured or killed in the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigade zone by VRS and MUP forces.

## SCHEDULE E

### SENIOR YUGOSLAV ARMY PERSONNEL IN THE 30<sup>TH</sup> AND 40<sup>TH</sup> PERSONNEL CENTRES OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY GENERAL STAFF WHO SERVED IN THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA AND THE SERBIAN KRAJINA

#### Ministers of Defence of the Republika Srpska:

1. Some Ministers of the Republika Srpska Ministry of Defence received their pay and their benefits from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, which also regulated their service.
  - a. Major General Bogdan Subotić (April 1992 – January 1993). In October of 1993 Subotić was considered for a promotion to Major General in the VJ. No decision was taken pending a report from General Mladić. Subotić's retirement from the VJ was considered in 1995 before he was officially retired from the VJ on 3 January 1996.
  - b. Major General Dušan Kovačević (January 1993 – August 1994). In October of 1993 Kovačević was considered for a promotion to Major General in the VJ. No decision was taken pending a report from General Mladić. Kovačević's retirement from the VJ was contemplated in 1995 before he was officially retired from the VJ on 3 January 1996.

#### Officer Corps of the Army of Republika Srpska

2. Key members of the VRS Main Staff including its Chief of Staff received their pay and their benefits from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army General Staff which also regulated their service.

#### Commander of the Main Staff:

- a. General Colonel Ratko Mladić. General Mladić was promoted to the rank of General Colonel in the VJ on 24 June 1994. During the period relevant to this indictment he could be reached through a Belgrade telephone number. On 16 June 2001, Mladić was removed from the records of the VJ professional soldiers. On 7 March 2002, the professional military service of Mladić ceased for service requirements, and he was discharged from professional military service as of 28 February 2002.

Chief of the Main Staff:

- b. Lieutenant Colonel General Manojlo Milovanović. In 1994, General Milovanović was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in the VRS. A final decision on the promotion was postponed until December 1995 when he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in the VJ. He would later become the Republika Srpska Minister of Defence.

Chief of Operations and Training:

- c. Major General Radivoje Miletić. In June 1995, a proposal to promote Miletić the rank of Major General in the VJ was approved.
  - d. Lieutenant Colonel General Bogdan Sladojević (operations officer, July 1995). Sladojević's military service was terminated in March 2002. The RS Presidential decree announcing the termination referred to the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army General Staff and his acquired pension rights.
3. The VRS Main Staff was divided into six primary departments. The heads of all of these departments received their pay and their benefits from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army General Staff which also regulated their service.

Department for Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence:

- a. Major General Jovan Marić. In 1994, Marić was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. The VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion at that time. In June 1995, he was promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ.

Department for Security and Intelligence Affairs:

- b. Major General Zdravko Tolimir. In 1994, Tolimir was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. The VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion at that time. In June 1995, he was promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ.
- c. Lieutenant Colonel Dragomir Keserović. (Chief of Police Section, Security Administration, February 1995 to October 1995). In March 2002 his military service was terminated. The RS Presidential decree announcing the termination makes reference to the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre and acquired pension rights.

Department for Moral, Religion and Legal Affairs:

- d. Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero. In 1994, Gvero was nominally promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in the VRS. The VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion at that time. In June 1995 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in the VJ. In 1997 he retired from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ.

Department for Mobilisation and Personnel Affairs:

- e. Colonel Mićo Grubor (May 1992 to May 1994). In 1994, Grubor was promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. The VJ considered retiring Colonel Grubor at this higher position but postponed a final decision at the time. In 1995 the proposal to promote Grubor to the same rank he nominally held in the VRS was rejected.
- f. Beginning in June 1994 Major General Petar Skrbić assumed Grubor's duties. In December 1995 Skrbić was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ.

Department for Rear Services:

- g. Lieutenant Colonel General Đorđe Đukić. In 1994 Đukić was nominally promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in the VRS. The VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion. In 1995, Đukić was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General. During the period relevant to this indictment General Đukić possessed a valid VJ identification card and could be contacted through a Belgrade telephone number.

Department for Development and Finance:

- h. Major General Stevan Tomić. In 1994, Tomić was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. The VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion at this time. In 1995, the proposal to promote Tomić to the rank of Major General was rejected in 1995 because of his membership in the Serbian Democratic Party.
4. Combat troops of the VRS were organised into six primary corps and the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence. The Commanders of all of these formations received their pay and their benefits from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, which also regulated their service.

1<sup>st</sup> Krajina Corps

- a. Lieutenant Colonel General Momir Talić. In 1993, Talić was nominally promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in the VRS. In October 1993 the VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion pending a report from General Mladić. In November 1993, after PERIŠIĆ received a report from Mladić, Talić was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in the VJ. During the period relevant to this indictment General Talić could be contacted *via* a Belgrade phone number.
- b. The Chief of Staff of the 1<sup>st</sup> Krajina Corps was Lieutenant Colonel General Boško Kelečević. In 1993, Kelečević was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. In October 1993, the VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion pending a report from General Mladić. In November 1993, after PERIŠIĆ received a report from Mladić, Kelečević was promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ. In 1995, Kelečević was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in the VJ. He was ultimately retired by the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre in March of 1997.

2nd Krajina Corps

- a. Major General Grujo Borić. In 1993 Borić was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. In October 1993, the VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion pending a report from General Mladić. In November 1993, after PERIŠIĆ received a report from Mladić, Borić was promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ. In March 1997 Borić was retired by the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre.
- b. The Chief of Staff of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Krajina Corps was Colonel Mićo Vlajsavljević. In 1994 Vlajsavljević was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. The VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion and ultimately rejected his promotion to the rank of Major General in the VJ.

East Bosnia Corps

- a. Major General Novica Simić. In 1993, Simić was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. In October 1993, the VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion pending a report from General Mladić. In November 1993, after PERIŠIĆ received a report from Mladić, Simić was promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ. In March 2002 his military

service was terminated. The Republika Srpska Presidential decree announcing the termination makes reference to the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre and acquired pension rights.

- b. The Chief of Staff of the East Bosnia Corps was Major General Budimir Gavrić. In 1994 Gavrić was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. The VJ postponed a decision on this promotion and initially rejected it because of Gavrić's affiliation with the SDS. In December 1995 Gavrić's promotion to Major General in the VJ was ultimately approved. He was retired from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre in 1996.

#### Sarajevo Romanija Corps

- a. Major General Stanislav Galić (September 1992 to August 1994). In 1993 Galić was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. In October 1993 the VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion pending a report from General Mladić. In November 1993, after PERIŠIĆ received a report from Mladić, Galić was promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ. In September 1994, General Galić was retired at the request of General Mladić. The terms of Galić's retirement were the subject of some controversy being ultimately resolved by a Presidential decree of the FRY in 1994.
- b. Major General Dragomir Milošević (from August 1994). In 1994, Milošević was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. At that time the VJ postponed making a final determination on this promotion. Milošević's promotion was initially rejected in the VJ because of his affiliation with the SDS but was ultimately confirmed in December 1995. In 1996, the decision was taken to place him at the disposal of the VJ in order to keep control over him. He was finally retired from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre in December 1996.
- c. Lieutenant Colonel General Vlado Lizdek. (1<sup>st</sup> Romanija Infantry Brigade Commander, April 1993 to 1995). In March 2002 his military service was terminated. The Republika Srpska Presidential decree announcing the termination makes reference to the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre and acquired pension rights.
- d. Major General Veljko Stojanović. (1<sup>st</sup> Sarajevo Motorised (Mechanised) Brigade Commander, May 1992 - 1996). In March 2002 his military service

was terminated. The Republika Srpska decree announcing the termination makes reference to the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre and acquired pension rights.

#### Herzegovina Corps

- a. Major General Radovan Grubac. In 1993, Grubac was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. In October 1993, the VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion pending a report from General Mladić. In November 1993, after PERIŠIĆ received a report from Mladić, Grubac was promoted to Major General in the VJ.
- b. The Chief of Staff of the Herzegovina Corps was Colonel Vlado Spremo. In 1994 Spremo was retired from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre at the request of General Mladić.

#### Drina Corps

- a. Major General Milenko Živanović, Commander. The order relieving Živanović as commander stated: "Major General Radislav Krstić, father's name Milorad, assumed the post of Corps Commander, and Major General Milenko Živanović, the previous Corps Commander, was appointed to new duties in the VJ-VRS."
- b. Major General Radislav Krstić. On 3 March 1995 the Yugoslav Army issued General Krstić identification documents identifying him as a member of the Yugoslav Army. General Krstić was assigned as the commander of the Drina Corps from 13 July 1995. During the period relevant to this indictment General Krstić could be reached through a Belgrade telephone number. General Krstić was promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ in December 1995, some five months after the massacres of the men from Srebrenica became widely known.
- c. The Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps from November 1992 to September 1994 was Colonel Milutin Skočajić. In 1994, the promotion of Skočajić to the rank of Major General was considered and no decision was taken. His promotion in the VJ was ultimately rejected in 1995.
- d. Lieutenant Colonel General Svetozar Andrić. General Andrić was assigned as the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps from 13 July 1995. In March 2002 his military service was terminated. The Republika Srpska Presidential decree

announcing the termination makes reference to the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre and acquired pension rights.

- e. Colonel Vujadin Popović, Assistant Commander for Security. At the beginning of the war in Bosnia Popović was an active military officer serving in the former JNA in Knin. In 1994, he was promoted by Lieutenant Colonel PERIŠIĆ to the rank of Major in the VJ. The promotion order stated that it was effective from 18 July 1993. At the time of the massacres in Srebrenica, in July 1995, Popović held the position of Assistant Commander for Security in the VRS Drina Corps Command.
- f. Colonel Vinko Pandurević. Pandurević, Commander of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade (December 1992 - November 1996). Personnel records show that Pandurević was administered through the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre. Pandurević was extraordinarily promoted to the rank of Colonel in the VRS in December 1995, some five months after the massacres of the men from Srebrenica became widely known. The order specifically notes that Pandurević was serving at the 30<sup>th</sup> personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff.
- g. Lieutenant Colonel Dragan Obrenović. Obrenović, Chief of Staff of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade (June 1992 to November 1996). Personnel records show that Obrenović was administered through the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre. In January 1994 Obrenović, on duty at the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre, is promoted to the rank of Captain 1<sup>st</sup> Class by the order of the VJ Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel General Momčilo PERIŠIĆ. Obrenović was extraordinarily promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the VRS in December 1995, some five months after the massacres of the men from Srebrenica became widely known. The order specifically notes that Obrenović was serving at the 30<sup>th</sup> personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff.
- h. Major Dragan Jokić. As Chief of Engineering of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade Major Jokić was a member of the Brigade Staff, and was the advisor to the Brigade Commander and Chief of Staff/Deputy Commander for matters relating to Engineering Services, such as defence works, mining activities, road construction and excavation projects. He was also responsible for planning, directing, organising and monitoring the activities of the Zvornik Brigade Engineering Company, and was empowered to issue orders to the Engineering

Company which implemented the directives of the Brigade Commander and or Chief of Staff/Deputy Commander. In April 1995, Dragan Jokić was promoted to the rank of Major by the order of the GŠ VJ 30th Personnel Centre.

- i. 2nd Lieutenant Drago Nikolić. As Chief of Security of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade 2nd Lieutenant Nikolić was responsible for monitoring enemy activities within and against the Zvornik Brigade units and for proposing to the Brigade Commander and Deputy Commander measures by which to counter security threats posed by the enemy. This included identifying traitors or other security threats inside Zvornik Brigade units, as well as dealing with enemy threats from outside, such as sabotage, surveillance, and intervention activities of the enemy. He was also responsible for managing the Military Police Company of the Zvornik Brigade, and proposing ways to utilise members of the Company. In April 1995, Drago Nikolić was promoted to the rank of Warrant Officer by the order of the GŠ VJ 30th Personnel Centre.
- j. Colonel Vidoje Blagojević. As Commander of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade Colonel Blagojević was responsible for planning, directing, and monitoring the activities of all the subordinate formations of his Brigade, in accordance with the directives received from his higher command at the Corps and Main Staff levels. In June 1995, Vidoje Blagojević was promoted to the rank of Colonel by the order of the GŠ VJ 30th Personnel Centre

#### Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence

- a. Major General Živomir Ninković. In 1993 Ninković was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the Air Force. In October 1993 the VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion pending a report from General Mladić. In November 1993, after PERIŠIĆ received a report from Mladić, was promoted to Major General in the VJ.
- b. The Chief of Staff of Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence was Major General Božo Novak. In 1994, Novak was nominally promoted to the rank of Major General in the VRS. The VJ postponed a final decision on the promotion but ultimately approved it in June 1995. In September 1996, it was decided by the VJ that Novak be recalled and placed at the disposal of the VJ. He was later retired from the 30<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre at the end of 1996.

Officer Corps of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina

5. Key members of the SVK Main Staff including its Commander received their pay and their benefits from the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army General Staff which also regulated their service.

Commander of the SVK:

- a. Major General Mile Novaković, Commander of the SVK (May 1992 – February 1994). In October 1993 the VJ postponed a decision on a proposal to promote Novaković to the rank of Major General in the VJ. In November 1993 he was promoted to that rank. On 10 February 1995, **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** approved a decision granting Novaković enhanced benefits for serving under “harsh” conditions in Croatia. On 14 February 1995, the SVK sent a proposal to the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ Main Staff with respect to the promotion of Novaković and 37 other officers.
- b. General Milan Čeleketić, Commander of the SVK (February 1994 – May 1995). In February of 1994, Milan Martić, then the President of the RSK promoted him to the rank of Major General and appointed him as Commander of the SVK Main Staff. In March 1994, PERIŠIĆ received this as a proposal for promotion in the VJ. PERIŠIĆ decided not to promote Čeleketić at that time, but to observe him in his new post as Commander before deciding whether to recommend or oppose his promotion in the VJ. On 5 May 1994, the **Momčilo PERIŠIĆ** approved a decision granting Čeleketić enhanced benefits for service under “harsh” conditions. In June 1994 Čeleketić was promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ. The promotion was not made public in order to disguise his relationship to the VJ. PERIŠIĆ once again approved enhanced pay and benefits for Čeleketić on 10 February 1995. In March 1995, Čeleketić was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General by a Presidential decree of the RSK and subsequently by an act of the RSK Assembly in May of 1995. In June of 1995 PERIŠIĆ considered the proposal to promote Čeleketić to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in the VJ. PERIŠIĆ rejected this proposal because he held Čeleketić responsible for the loss of territory in the RSK. In October 1995, Čeleketić was retired from 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army.

- c. Lieutenant Colonel General Mile Mrkšić, Commander of the SVK (May – August 1995). In June 1994 Mrkšić was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in the VJ and was assigned as Assistant Chief of the VJ General Staff for Ground Forces. In February 1995, Mrkšić was initially appointed as Military Adviser to the Commander of the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre, a decision which was rescinded a short time later and he was instead appointed as an adviser to the Federal Minister of Defence. On 18 May 1995 he was appointed as Chief of the Main Staff of the SVK. In October 1995 Mrkšić was retired from the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army.

#### Chief of Staff of the Main Staff

- a. Major General Borislav Đukić, Chief of the Main Staff (May 1992 – February 1994). In October 1993, the VJ postponed a decision on a proposal to promote Đukić to the rank of Major General in the VJ. In November 1993 he was promoted to that rank. On 10 June 1994 General PERIŠIĆ took a decision regulating the status of Đukić in the VJ. In September 1994, Đukić was retired from the VJ because he was no longer needed for the requirements of the service.
- b. Major General Dušan Lončar, Chief of the Main Staff (April 1994). On 12 April 1994 at the Supreme Defence Council Session of the Republic of Srpska Krajina, a proposal was adopted to reassign Colonel Dušan (Mitar) Lončar to the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre and appoint him as the Chief of Staff of the SVK Main Staff. On 5 May 1994 and 6 December 1994 General PERIŠIĆ took decisions granting General Lončar enhanced pay for his service in the SVK. On 10 December 1994 General Čeleketić sent a letter to General PERIŠIĆ requesting him to issue orders on the appointment of a number of SVK officers from the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre, including Lončar. In June of 1995, PERIŠIĆ considered the proposal to promote Lončar to the rank of Major General in the VJ. PERIŠIĆ rejected this proposal because he held Lončar responsible for recent losses in the territory of the RSK.
6. The SVK Main Staff was divided into several departments. Among the heads of these departments were key officers who received their pay and their benefits from the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army General Staff which also regulated their service.

Assistant Commander for Security:

- a. Lieutenant Colonel Dragan Šarac. On 30 June 1994, General Čeleketić addressed a report to the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ Main Staff concerning and referencing “VJ Lt. Col. Dragan Šarac.

Assistant Commander for Intelligence & Security

- b. Lieutenant Colonel Dušan Smiljanić. On 6 December 1994 the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ Main Staff issued a decision granting Lieutenant Colonel Smiljanić enhanced pay for serving under “harsh” conditions in Croatia. On 25 December 1994 General Čeleketić issued a document certifying that Smiljanić served as a member of the Yugoslav Army in units performing combat activities in Knin from 15 October 1993 to 27 December 1994.

Chief of Intelligence

- c. Colonel Rade Orlić (June 1994 – December 1994). Colonel Orlić was ordered to transfer from his unit in the VJ to the SVK on three separate occasions. During his service in the SVK he remained within the VJ chain of command.

Assistant Commander for Moral, Religion and Legal Issues

- d. Colonel Kosta Novaković. In his autobiography Colonel Novaković stated that he served in the Serbian Army of the Krajina Main Staff and his permanent address was Military Post 4001, Belgrade.

Assistant Commander for Logistics

- e. Major General Mirko Bjelanović. In December 1993 General PERIŠIĆ transferred Bjelanović from his position as a Navy Major General to the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre for service in the Krajina. In October 1995, Bjelanović was retired from 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army.

Chief of Technical Services

- f. Colonel Ilija Sladaković. On 14 February 1995 the SVK requested that the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ Main Staff take decisions on the proposed promotion of 37 professional officers including Sladaković.
7. The combat troops of the SVK were divided into six corps. The Commanders of all of these corps received their pay and their benefits from the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the Yugoslav Army General Staff which also regulated their service.

11<sup>th</sup> Eastern Slavonian Corps

- a. Colonel Stoja Spanović was the Chief of Staff. On 5 July 1994 Major General Milan Čeleketić signed a letter to the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff proposing that a number of professional soldiers in the SVK be promoted. Colonel Spanović was one of those persons proposed for promotion and for appointment as Chief of Staff.

18<sup>th</sup> Western Slavonian Corps

- b. Colonel Lazar Babić, Commander. On 10 December 1994 Čeleketić sent a letter to the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff proposing that Colonel Babić be promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ. During the course of a battle General PERIŠIĆ called Babić three times to give him tactical advice on fighting the battle.

39<sup>th</sup> Banija Corps

- c. Colonel Žarko Gačić, Commander. On 10 December 1994 Čeleketić sent a letter to the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff proposing that Colonel Gačić be promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ.

21<sup>st</sup> Kordun Corps

- d. Colonel Veljko Bosanac, Commander. On 10 December 1994 Čeleketić sent a letter to the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff proposing that Colonel Bosanac be promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ.

7<sup>th</sup> Knin Corps

- e. Colonel Milan Đilas, Commander (1993). On 14 February 1995 the SVK addressed a letter to the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff requesting the promotion of 37 officers. Colonel Đilas's name was included in this request.
- f. Colonel Boro Poznanović, Commander (1994). On 10 December 1994 Čeleketić sent a letter to the 40<sup>th</sup> Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff proposing that Colonel Poznanović be promoted to the rank of Major General in the VJ.

15<sup>th</sup> Lika Corps

- g. Colonel Stevo Ševo, Commander (1994). On 18 April 1994 Martić sent a confidential order to the VJ noting that Colonel Ševo should be appointed commander of the Lika Corps.