090929ED

Page 9181

1 27th, 28th, was a convoy with food coming from Belgrade through Zvornik

2 into Srebrenica. And it came about because of the pressure which had

3 been put on the Bosnian Serbs in order to allow that humanitarian aid

4 through into Srebrenica.

5 Q. Okay. What type of pressure are you describing?

6 A. This is the -- firstly, the meetings and the requests which

7 General Morillon had been making of the Bosnian Serb leadership, and

8 secondly, there was intense international pressure as well and intense

9 media interest around the world during that time about the situation and

10 events in and around the enclaves, particularly around Srebrenica.

11 Q. Okay. I'll take the international pressure and the media

12 interest in turn. In regards to the international pressure, what was

13 going on at the end of March 1993?

14 A. In terms of international pressure, bearing in mind that I was in

15 Belgrade or in Srebrenica, I was only aware of newspaper reports and only

16 a few because as you can imagine I had an awful lot on my hands. The

17 details you would need to look into international media. I'm not able to

18 report about those myself. What I do know is that in Belgrade the

19 French ambassador, the UK ambassador, and the US ambassador were making

20 representations to the government in Belgrade to request the

21 government in Belgrade to exercise all influence they could possibly do

22 on the Bosnian Serbs in order to encourage the Bosnian Serbs to allow

23 these humanitarian aid convoys through.

24 Q. Thank you. How long had there been attempts to get that convoy

25 through?

Page 9182

1 A. I believe that the convoy which went through on the 27th, 28th

2 went through fairly quickly and easily unlike the convoy which went

3 through around the 13th of -- no, around the 18th or so of March, which

4 had been held up in Zvornik for, I believe, something like two or three

5 weeks.

6 Q. Now, you indicated that there was also media interest in the

7 events in Srebrenica. What was being covered and what media outlets were

8 covering it?

9 A. I can only say that I myself saw several newspapers, things like

10 the London Times, the -- an American newspaper, I can't remember which,

11 and I saw some press summaries which had been compiled by the

12 French embassy in Belgrade. It was not something that I was paying a lot

13 of attention to at that time.

14 Q. Inside of Bosnia and Herzegovina command were media reports being

15 monitored?

16 A. Yes, they were.

17 Q. How were they being monitored?

18 A. There was a small team of, I forget what they were called, press

19 information or P info. And when we arrived in Bosnia in October 1992,

20 they monitored the international media. But in about January or

21 February, they also hired some local people, in other words, who spoke

22 Serbo-Croat in order to be able to monitor local media. By local media

23 what I mean is media inside Bosnia-Herzegovina and media from -- this is

24 print media, and radio media from Belgrade and from Zagreb.

25 Q. Was the Srebrenica enclave being covered in the international and

Page 9183

1 local media?

2 A. It was.

3 Q. Okay. And actually, upon reviewing your transcript from

4 yesterday, I was actually referring to the convoy that you've just

5 previously spoke of on the 18th of March. So if we can back up in time a

6 bit.

7 You were indicating yesterday that the -- that was the third

8 specific time that aid had arrived to Srebrenica. Can you please

9 describe the incidents surrounding that aid?

10 A. That was the second time that aid got in. The first time was the

11 beginning of December 1992. The second time was around the

12 18th of March. And then the third time was around the 27th or the

13 28th of March.

14 Q. For clarity of the record, you had indicated that the airdrops

15 were in reference to the second time?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. In regards to that March 18th aid, how did that come about?

18 A. That came about because General Morillon went to the front line

19 at the Yellow Bridge from Srebrenica in order to continue his

20 negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs, and on the way to the Yellow Bridge,

21 I received -- I gained intermittent radio contact with the convoy which

22 was blocked in Zvornik. The convoy had been reported having been there

23 for a number of weeks, and was continuously being -- being blocked.

24 General -- this was the first time we had -- the Bosnian Muslims

25 in Srebrenica had allowed us to go down to the Yellow Bridge with two

Page 9184

1 vehicles, the Canadian armoured personnel carrier of which I mentioned

2 yesterday, and a jeep. When we arrived at the confrontation line at the

3 Yellow Bridge, General Morillon said, Right, Pyers, you stay here and

4 keep the front line open, and I will take the jeep and go to Zvornik and

5 try and unblock the convoy and come back.

6 When -- General Morillon then disappeared off down the road. I

7 should also say that the excuse of "there is fighting going on," was very

8 often used by all sides in order to justify the blocking of humanitarian

9 aid convoys.

10 Q. You indicated in that answer that that was the first time that

11 you were able to leave the enclave. What do you mean by that?

12 A. The rest of our party was being detained in the enclave by the

13 Muslim -- by the Bosnian Muslims and was being prevented from leaving the

14 enclave.

15 Q. What were the Muslims' concerns?

16 A. The Muslims' concerns were that there were many thousands of

17 starving refugees in the enclave that they were being -- that food was

18 being prevented from getting through, and that they had many people dying

19 of injuries from the fighting and people dying of starvation. And they

20 wanted to draw world attention to the plight of the people in Srebrenica.

21 And it was for that purpose that they had prevented General Morillon and

22 the UN party in Srebrenica from leaving Srebrenica when we tried to leave

23 Srebrenica on the 11th or the 12th of March.

24 Q. You indicated that there were many people that were dying from

25 the fighting. What do you mean by that?

Page 9185

1 A. The -- there was quite heavy fighting going on around the --

2 around the pocket. And in the building opposite the PTT building, which

3 is where the Bosnian Muslims had put General Morillon and the UN party,

4 this building was the Srebrenica hospital. And around that time, between

5 10 and 20 people were dying every night from wounds received in fighting.

6 And we would see the graves being dug every morning in the cemetery which

7 was a little bit further down the road.

8 Q. Are we talking about combatants, civilians, a combination?

9 A. I don't know, because in that part of the world just about

10 everybody had items of military clothing.

11 Q. Okay. Now, you were describing the hospital directly in front of

12 the PTT building. Was there any other feature about that building that

13 was of note to you?

14 A. When we arrived in Srebrenica, opposite the PTT building at the

15 foot of the little slope which came down from the hospital was a pile of

16 rubbish, which was covered with snow when we arrived, it was very cold --

17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me once again would I ask Ms. Carter to

18 control her witness. The question was:

19 "Was there any other feature about that building that was of note

20 to you?"

21 He is discussing something which is not the building.

22 THE WITNESS: May I continue?

23 MS. CARTER:

24 Q. I'll rephrase the question.

25 Was there any feature near the building in front of you that was

Page 9186

1 of note to you?

2 A. Yes. This pile of rubbish which I was telling you about. When

3 the sun started shining, sometimes it started warming up that pile, and

4 it was a pile of human remains cut off arms, legs, hands, fingers,

5 et cetera. Refuse from this hospital which the hospital staff had --

6 were simply dumping in this pile.

7 Q. How did this pile of human remains strike you?

8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Objection, relevance.

9 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, the conditions in which

10 the Muslim population were living in in Srebrenica is relevant as well as

11 the fact that it's these conditions that were -- or why the Muslim

12 population was trying to bring international attention on their plight.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Maybe ask -- phrase the question to elicit that

14 very information you have just said.

15 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.

16 Q. Sir, what type of conditions were the Muslim populations living

17 in in Srebrenica?

18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I'm going to object to that question as

19 being asked and answered. We heard about that yesterday. Extensively.

20 MS. CARTER: I will rephrase a third time.

21 Q. Sir, what was significant about the pile of human remains?

22 A. The significance was that the population in Srebrenica, the

23 people in Srebrenica had given up hope and basic human decency and basic

24 human respect and basic hygiene. They just weren't bothering with any

25 more. You looked in their eyes, and they were dead.

Page 9187

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may just ask, where did these pieces of human

2 remains come from?

3 THE WITNESS: They came, I presume, from the hospital which was

4 just up the hill. By just up the hill, I mean about 10 metres up the

5 slope. And that -- when Larry Hollingsworth from UNHCR who was in

6 Srebrenica with us realised what this was, he berated the Srebrenica war

7 committee and shamed them into cleaning this up and clearing this up, and

8 it was off-cuts from the hospital.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: When you say the Srebrenica war committee, of

10 which army?

11 THE WITNESS: This is the mayor of Srebrenica and the senior

12 elected officials of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: What was observable around this pile of human

14 remains? What could you observe with your senses around this pile?

15 THE WITNESS: When the sun was shining on it, it stank.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: And when the sun was not shining?

17 THE WITNESS: Night snow fell and then it was just a pile -- it

18 looked like another pile of rubbish.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, you may proceed, ma'am.

20 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Q. Sir, at the time that you were being held in Srebrenica, did you

22 or members of your team have contact with the civilian population?

23 A. Yes, we did.

24 Q. You indicated that one of the -- or, a concern was international

25 attention. Was that the sole concern of the civilian population?

Page 9188

1 A. The biggest concern of the civilian population was simply

2 survival and getting food. Getting international attention was merely a

3 means to the end of getting food and surviving, no longer being attacked,

4 and having a future.

5 Q. When you spoke with the civilian population, did you have

6 conversations in regards to UN presence -- excuse me, specifically

7 UNPROFOR presence in other villages?

8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm going to object to the question on the

9 grounds of relevance.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: I just don't understand the question, but I don't

11 think it is irrelevant. But if you can make it clear. I don't know what

12 you are trying to ask the witness here, ma'am. Look at what you've asked

13 on the screen.

14 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour, the specific question, if I were

15 to put the piece of information that will tie it together would be a

16 leading question, so I'm attempting to step by step ask the question.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: But what you have just asked, I don't understand

18 what you are saying.

19 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.

20 Q. Did the civilian population describe incidences where UNPROFOR

21 was present in other villages?

22 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm sorry, there are two problems with the

23 question. I maintain my relevance objection, and secondly, the civilian

24 population is -- will become ultimately unsourced hearsay. Who did he

25 speak to? When? What about? These are really relatively basic ways of

Page 9189

1 asking questions and proceeding especially when you are dealing with the

2 issue of hearsay which is what we are dealing with right now. And

3 Ms. Carter is seeking to elicit unsourced hearsay about something which

4 she believes is relatively critical, and the answer which she may well

5 obtain as it relates to a civilian population disallows the Defence to

6 engage in any meaningful cross-examination with regard to testing the

7 information that the witness claims he heard in the absence of having

8 some way of identifying the authors of the information apart from a

9 civilian population.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.

11 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, it's impossible to ask

12 who was making a statement until we determine what the statement was. We

13 have determined that the witness has in fact been speaking with the

14 Muslim population. We are now trying to elicit what they were speaking

15 to them about. And only then can you determine individually the

16 conversations that were being had, thus the Defence's objection is

17 premature.

18 Further, the Defence is assuming that he will not be able to

19 cross-examine on these points. This is not an appropriate objection to

20 be made during the Prosecution's case. He can test his theories. He can

21 ask his questions during his own case. However, given the behaviour and

22 the objections that have been made over the past two days, Defence

23 counsel seeks to place his own case in the context of the Prosecution's

24 examination-in-chief.

25 MR. GUY-SMITH: First of all, I don't believe that the objection

Page 9190

1 that I've made has been dealt with. Second of all, I don't seek to place

2 my own case in the context of the Prosecution's examination-in-chief.

3 What I do seek to have occur here is for there to be some sense of order

4 with regard to the way in which evidence is taken. And if we do not have

5 identifiable authors of information, there is no way that we can

6 cross-examine that information.

7 Now, I believe that Ms. Carter is putting the horse before the

8 cart. Who did you talk to? When did you talk to them? How many trials

9 have we been in with those questions that are asked.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, we don't have to give a class on

11 how to lead. The objection is overruled. It's premature. Obviously at

12 the time when the witness is not able to tell us who he talked to, that's

13 the time when you can rise. And at this stage we do know that in this

14 Tribunal hearsay evidence is admissible. However, I still say -- and

15 therefore, the objection is overruled at this stage as premature.

16 Madam Carter, the question as phrased, I don't know what you are

17 saying. If we can go back to it. You'll have to think of rephrasing it

18 in such a way that it is intelligible not only to the witness and you

19 yourself but also to the Court.

20 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.

21 Q. Sir, were UNPROFOR members or troops present in other villages

22 around the enclaves?

23 A. The only UNPROFOR members who were in some of the villages in the

24 enclave were the UN military observers who I mentioned yesterday.

25 Q. Okay. What occurred when the UN military observers left the

Page 9191

1 villages?

2 A. When the UN military observers left the villages -- when they

3 left the villages they were no longer in a position to observe what was

4 going on in the villages, so I'm puzzled by the question.

5 Q. What did -- when you were discussing matters with the population

6 inside of Srebrenica, what did they tell you occurred when the UNMOs left

7 the villages?

8 A. I'm sorry, I don't follow the question because I did not hear

9 anything or any statements about what happened before or after the UNMOs.

10 What happened was that the UNMOs reported to me what they had observed or

11 what they had been told when they were visiting.

12 Secondly, is that the villagers -- sorry, the refugees in

13 Srebrenica told me through Mihailov, General Morillon's body-guard, what

14 they had been experiencing, and we went through the pattern yesterday.

15 One thing which did happen, and it's not about the villages, is that we

16 were told that --

17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Then it's non-responsive to the question.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Carry on, Mr. Tucker, please. Just finish off

19 what you were saying.

20 THE WITNESS: Was that we had been in Konjevic Polje, if you

21 recall, about five days previously. We were told that after

22 General Morillon had left Konjevic Polje, that it had been heavily

23 shelled and attacked and had been seized by the Bosnian Serbs. The

24 inference being that whenever General Morillon or the UN visibly left an

25 area, that it was then heavily shelled.

Page 9192

1 MS. CARTER:

2 Q. Thank you, sir. At the point in time that General Morillon and

3 yourself were allowed to leave Srebrenica, where did you go?

4 A. The first place we went to was to Zvornik. And after Zvornik we

5 went through to Tuzla and then back to Zvornik and then back to

6 Srebrenica.

7 Q. Okay. When you came back to Srebrenica, what happened?

8 A. We tried to get back into Srebrenica, but we were stopped at the

9 bridge over the Drina River at Bratunac, and we ended up having to sleep

10 in our jeep by the side of the road. The next morning we were still

11 being refused permission to go back into Srebrenica, and that was the day

12 when the helicopter evacuation of injured out of Srebrenica took place.

13 Q. Can you please describe what -- the helicopter evacuation that

14 took place, how did that transpire?

15 A. One of the issues which I described yesterday was that the

16 Bosnian Serbs insisted on inspecting and questioning every man of combat

17 age in order to assess whether or not they were war criminals, as they

18 described, guilty of the attacks on Bosnian Serb villages in January of

19 that year. And that made it impossible to evacuate wounded from the

20 Srebrenica pocket. Therefore, General Morillon arranged for helicopters,

21 UN helicopters, to fly from Tuzla to Srebrenica in order to evacuate

22 these heavily injured people, mainly coming from the hospital which I

23 referred to about ten minutes ago.

24 When the helicopters -- we actually saw the helicopters because

25 we were stuck at this bridge. We actually saw the helicopters flying up

Page 9193

1 the valley to Srebrenica. And when the helicopters landed, the landing

2 site was shelled by artillery, and two United Nations personnel, Canadian

3 soldiers were injured, and a number of Bosnian Muslims were killed.

4 Q. At any point in time was that shelling investigated?

5 A. Yes. I personally went to the landing grounds when I got back

6 into Srebrenica after being in Belgrade, in other words, around the

7 27th, 28th of March, and went to --

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: This is how long after this shelling?

9 THE WITNESS: About four days. And I went to look at the -- the

10 shell craters in order to see if I could establish anything about the

11 shell craters.

12 Q. Were you able to establish anything about the shell craters?

13 A. Firstly, people who had trained in artillery can, by looking at

14 what's called "splash marks" of an artillery crater, can identify within

15 a few degrees the direction from which the shell had come. Secondly, the

16 size of the shell crater can give an indication of the type of shell

17 which had been fired. And --

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Tucker, we have to cut you short. The

19 question was:

20 "Were you able to establish anything about the shell crater?"

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, the shell had been fired from the direction of

22 Bratunac, in other words, from the direction which the shortest distance

23 from there to the Drina River and Serbia proper. Secondly, that the size

24 of the shell holes was some of the largest I had seen in the whole time

25 that I was in Bosnia. When I stood in the shell hole, my head was about

Page 9194

1 a metre below ground level. The hole was that large. And this was

2 frozen ground. So it was a very high, very large calibre artillery gun

3 which had fired that shell, and that shell had come from the direction of

4 Bratunac.

5 MS. CARTER:

6 Q. After reviewing the shell crater, did you do further

7 investigation in regards to the origin of that shell?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Do you have any indication or any belief based on your

10 investigation as to which side fired that shell?

11 A. My belief, I say again my belief is that it was fired by a heavy

12 calibre artillery gun of at least 155 millimetre calibre. I never saw

13 such guns in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. My belief was that it was

14 fired from north of the Drina River.

15 Q. What led to that belief?

16 A. The fact that I had not seen such heavy calibre artillery guns

17 ever deployed in -- by the Bosnian Serb military.

18 Q. Sir, was this the sole incident that -- where you had indication

19 that Serbia proper was involved in artillery fire?

20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I'm going to object. Now we are elevating

21 a belief based upon a limited examination into an indication.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think, the witness said it came from north of

23 the Drina. I don't remember him mentioning Serbia specifically. I may

24 be wrong.

25 MS. CARTER:

Page 9195

1 Q. Sir, which side of the Drina River do you believe that this was

2 fired from?

3 A. From the Serbia proper side.

4 Q. And which military do you believe fired this artillery round?

5 A. The Serb -- sorry, the army headquartered in Belgrade.

6 Q. Is this the sole incident where you had indication that

7 Serbia proper was using artillery?

8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Same objection.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, it's the same sole incident that he had the

10 belief.

11 MR. GUY-SMITH: If it's a belief, it's different than an

12 indication. They are very different words. They have very different

13 meaning.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter, do you have any response to the

15 objection?

16 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, I would ask for a

17 specific legal objection as often happens, a specific --

18 MR. GUY-SMITH: The specific legal objection is that the question

19 as framed is one, leading, and two, it assumes a fact which is not in

20 evidence. Which is the issue of an indication. An indication is not a

21 belief. An indication is potentially something upon which an objective

22 determination can be made. This gentleman has discussed his beliefs.

23 There's not been a discussion about objective determinations. His

24 beliefs he is entitled to, and I have no objection to him testifying

25 about his beliefs. Whether they are true or not is another matter, but I

Page 9196

1 have no objection to him testifying about his beliefs.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Carter.

3 MS. CARTER: I will rephrase the question.

4 Q. Sir, outside of this 155 millimetre shell, were there any similar

5 incidents?

6 A. Yes, I am aware of one other situation. The UN had a team of UN

7 military observers who were accommodated in the Hotel Yugoslavia which is

8 in Serbia proper just over the river, over the Drina River from Zvornik.

9 And about 5 kilometres north up the river from Zvornik. They reported to

10 me that they had frequently seen artillery guns in position on the proper

11 Serb -- Serbia proper side of the Drina River with their gun barrels

12 pointed roughly west. In other words, towards Tuzla. That is a report

13 -- a factual report which were made. They also reported hearing

14 artillery being fired from that area, but they never actually saw

15 artillery being fired, nor did they obviously see in which direction

16 actual firing was taking place.

17 It is from those two reports, it is my belief that those guns

18 were being fired into Bosnia-Herzegovina, into the Tuzla area, because I

19 can think of no other logical reason for guns in that location being

20 fired. There were no training areas in that location. That is my

21 belief.

22 Q. Were the UNMOs the only persons reporting firing from Serb side

23 into Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24 A. There were reports from peasants who we spoke with in the

25 Srebrenica enclave who also reported hearing guns being fired from the

Page 9197

1 northern side of the Drina River, in other words, from Serbia proper.

2 Q. Thank you, sir. Moving back to the convoy that you were trying

3 to bring into Srebrenica, we last left you sleeping in your trucks

4 because you were not being allowed through. What happened the following

5 morning?

6 A. We went back to Zvornik because we had been prevented from

7 getting back into Srebrenica.

8 Q. What happened in Zvornik?

9 A. We met with more Bosnian Serb military and authorities in order

10 to continue to remonstrate about why we were not being allowed through.

11 And I believe that was the time when, if you recall I mentioned

12 yesterday, being put into Major Pandurevic's office and seeing the map on

13 the wall.

14 Q. Once you left Zvornik, where did you go next?

15 A. Then I believe we went to Belgrade, that was when we were taken

16 to the -- taken across the bridge back to the Serbia proper side of the

17 river, and met by a cavalcade of police cars from Serbia proper who then

18 escorted us up to Belgrade in order to meet with Milosevic.

19 Q. And are the meetings -- this meeting with Milosevic, are these

20 the meetings you described yesterday first with Milosevic second with

21 Mladic?

22 A. Yes, that is correct.

23 Q. After those meetings, what happened next?

24 A. Then we went back to Zvornik and back into Srebrenica. That was

25 the time when I carried out the investigation of the artillery shells at

Page 9198

1 the football field in Srebrenica that I described a few minutes ago.

2 Q. When you arrived back in Srebrenica, how were you received?

3 A. We were received a very -- we were given a tremendous welcome and

4 we were very gratefully received, and people again had hope in their --

5 in their eyes. It was an extraordinary -- it was an extraordinary

6 return.

7 Q. When you say you were gratefully received, can you please

8 describe the scene.

9 A. There were large numbers of people gathered outside the PTT

10 building, which is the building where we had been accommodated. And they

11 cheered and were extremely happy to see us -- to see us come back and

12 declared Morillon the saviour of Srebrenica, et cetera, et cetera.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just for the sake of clarity for the Chamber, who

14 are these people? Were these people Bosnian Serb soldiers who had been

15 blocking you as you tried to get into Srebrenica before, or were these

16 people the villagers that had held you hostage because they wanted to

17 draw attention to the international community?

18 THE WITNESS: These people were the refugees who were camped out

19 in the outdoors outside and around the PTT building and in all open

20 spaces in Srebrenica.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Now, initially you had been refused passage

22 out of Srebrenica because they wanted to draw international attention.

23 What was the reason for this change of attitude towards you?

24 THE WITNESS: The change of attitude came about because

25 General Morillon had demonstrated to these people that when he had

Page 9199

1 promised that he would come back that he had indeed come back because

2 they were also very anxious that when Morillon left, as he had done at

3 Konjevic Polje as I described a few minutes ago, that they would then be

4 shelled, and that shelling had not taken place. And that he had come

5 back and that he had managed to get humanitarian aid convoys in which had

6 been blocked for many months, and they were extremely relieved and --

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: You say that in the time between the landing of

8 the helicopters and your return from Belgrade, that is in the four days,

9 humanitarian aid had come in?

10 THE WITNESS: Yes, if I may, sir, if I could just go back through

11 the chronology. We arrived in Srebrenica around the 11th, 12th of March.

12 We were then blocked for about three, four days, and we were only allowed

13 to go down to the Yellow Bridge, just General Morillon and myself. Then

14 eventually they allowed us to go down with two vehicles and Morillon

15 collected this first convoy to get into Srebrenica while we were there,

16 which came in around the 18th or so.

17 When that convoy came back into Srebrenica, it was the first time

18 that General Morillon had effectively delivered aid to the pocket. We

19 were then -- went out of the pocket to Zvornik, to Tuzla, back to

20 Zvornik, back to Srebrenica, back to Zvornik, back to Tuzla, then back to

21 Zvornik, and up to Belgrade. While we were in Belgrade, another convoy

22 got in and this was around the --

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, that's what I wanted to ask. Thank you

24 so much.

25 Yes, Madam Carter.

Page 9200

1 MS. CARTER:

2 Q. Going back to the differentiation of how you were received versus

3 how you left, at page 14, line 3, you indicated that the -- the people

4 inside of Srebrenica had given up hope. How do you know that the people

5 of Srebrenica had given up hope?

6 A. I don't know that the people of Srebrenica had given up hope. I

7 have a belief from looking at their faces and from seeing the -- that

8 pile of human remains from the hungry and starvation that there was from

9 the appalling conditions that they were living in, from the fact that

10 they were making no efforts to improve their position, however bad it

11 was, they were not organising themselves in order to do anything. They

12 were just passive. And that's not the behaviour of -- because you would

13 always, even in the worst of conditions, do something. These people were

14 just not doing anything. They were not even sharing the -- inside

15 Srebrenica there were three basic groups of people. There were the

16 refugees --

17 Q. Sir, let me actually pause there and move to the pile of bodies

18 that you just referenced in your statement. How close to Srebrenica's

19 main street was this pile of human remains?

20 A. It was not a pile of bodies. It was a pile of bits and off-cuts

21 of human bodies. It was at the side of the street. In other words, the

22 equivalent would be it was on the pavement.

23 Q. Okay. Meaning specifically, if you can lay out the geography of

24 Srebrenica, was this on a main thoroughfare, a side-street, where was

25 this pile of bodies? I'm sorry, pile of body parts.

Page 9201

1 A. It was on the main street through Srebrenica, the road which

2 passed immediately outside the PTT building and went up to the centre of

3 the town. It was on the road which lay between the PTT building and the

4 Srebrenica hospital.

5 Q. Okay. Were the refugees that you described, were they passing

6 this pile?

7 A. The refugees were not moving up and down in large numbers. The

8 refugees were just squatting around it and there were refugees squatting

9 next to this pile because they had nowhere else to go, they had nowhere

10 else to live. They were just squatting.

11 Q. You've described what you saw in regards to the lack of hope.

12 Were you discussing the situation of the refugees with them?

13 A. Yes. We were asking them why they were not doing anything and

14 their responses varied from "what's the point?" to "they'll kill us

15 anyway," to "what can we do?" to "we have got nothing," to "the locals in

16 Srebrenica" -- in other words the original population in Srebrenica --

17 "aren't doing anything to help," and "whenever we go into one of their

18 gardens ..." or whatever, "... they kick us out," et cetera.

19 Q. All right. Now, you said you received a -- almost a hero's

20 welcome when you returned back to Srebrenica. What did General Morillon

21 do once he arrived back in Srebrenica?

22 A. We started setting up home in the PTT building in order to -- by

23 "setting up home" what I mean is that initially we had been quartered in

24 the PTT building by the Srebrenica war committee and effectively were

25 kind of being held prisoner there. When General Morillon came back after

Page 9202

1 the first visit to the front line and he had proved to the refugees that

2 he was trustworthy and that he had adhered to his promise, that had he

3 come back and he had not deserted them, then the Muslims removed the

4 guards around the PTT building and we moved our luggage and our rucksacks

5 and our sleeping bags and our equipment out of the vehicle, out of our

6 vehicles, and into the building as a demonstration of intent to stay.

7 Q. At any point in time during the week that this convoy was being

8 established and brought in, did General Morillon make any statements to

9 the people in Srebrenica?

10 A. Yes, he made a statement to the assembled crowd who were

11 surrounding the PTT building. He made the statement from a window of the

12 PTT building, and he described the effort he was making to try and

13 provide relief to the enclave, the effort he was making to get

14 humanitarian aid through. And at the end of it he declared Srebrenica to

15 be under the protection of the United Nations.

16 Q. Was General Morillon's statement in regards to the protection of

17 Srebrenica by the UN ever memorialised?

18 A. Yes, I drafted the statement, it is in my notebook, and he read

19 it out from my notebook and -- sentence by sentence, and Mihailov

20 translated it in Serbo-Croat sentence by sentence so that the population

21 could understand it. And General Morillon added in his own handwriting a

22 sentence at the end. And then he verbally said the final statement about

23 the United Nations -- about Srebrenica now being under the protection of

24 the United Nations. He added verbally because I had not written that

25 down.

Page 9203

1 Q. Was General Morillon's speech ever broadcast or discussed outside

2 of Srebrenica?

3 A. Yes, it was. There were several journalists present who reported

4 it, and I understand that afterwards, that the speech received very

5 prominent attention around the world and very particularly his final

6 sentence about Srebrenica now being under the protection of the

7 United Nations.

8 MS. CARTER: May I have one moment to discuss with counsel.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may.

10 [Prosecution counsel confer]

11 MS. CARTER: I'd like to call up 65 ter 9216.

12 Q. Sir, do you recognise the document in front of you?

13 A. Yes, it's a document that I saw after I got back to -- back to

14 Sarajevo.

15 Q. Who is -- you've indicated that the headquarters for BH command

16 was in Kiseljak and that you had been reporting in to them. Is this

17 report consistent with the practice of reporting?

18 A. What happened is that I would from Srebrenica report on a regular

19 basis, sometimes every two hours, sometimes every six hours, certainly at

20 least once a day by radio, by HF radio from wherever I was to an HF radio

21 in Kiseljak and provide a report. That didn't always work because the HF

22 communications were sometimes difficult. We also sometimes used the

23 American TacSat radio which I referred to yesterday.

24 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. Now, the information that is

25 contained in regards to the Srebrenica evacuation, who would have

Page 9204

1 provided this information to the headquarters?

2 A. Myself.

3 MS. CARTER: We can move to page 2.

4 Q. Sir, who would have been providing the information that led to

5 the assessments that are listed on paragraphs 8 and 9 and then on the

6 third page at 10 and 11? Who would have provided that information?

7 A. The underlying information came from myself, from a report which

8 I radioed through. I must emphasise that of course the reports which I

9 radioed through to Kiseljak were always approved by General Morillon. I

10 did not send them just because I wrote them.

11 Q. And I'd like to move to the third page in regards -- and focusing

12 on paragraph 11. Was it the assessment of you and Morillon that:

13 "If free passage with transport cannot be arranged for the

14 refugees in the Srebrenica pocket within the next 7 to 14 days,

15 indications are that the Serbs will carry out a genocidal cleansing of

16 the entire enclave, resulting in the potential death of up to 80.000

17 human beings. In any case, there's little hope that current efforts to

18 get the Serbs to halt their attack will be successful. They are unlikely

19 to stop this offensive until the enclave is cleared one way or another."

20 A. The essence of the message is what I radioed through to Kiseljak.

21 However, I do not recall using the language "genocidal cleansing."

22 Q. What did you believe was happening in the enclaves?

23 A. We believe that the enclaves -- the Bosnian Serbs had decided to

24 sort out the enclaves once and for all and were bent on removing them

25 from the map.

Page 9205

1 MS. CARTER: I'd like to tender 65 ter 9216 into evidence.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before we do that, can we have a look at the first

3 page, please. Sir, can you explain to us that date at the top of the

4 document. I see it's 202355A March 23.

5 A. That means -- the date is the 20th of March. The 2355 is the

6 time that report was filed. And Alpha is the time zone in which the

7 report was filed. Time zone Alpha is the time zone that we are in here

8 today; it's one hour ahead of GMT.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Now, you were asked -- you have just

10 told us that you don't recall using the language "genocidal cleansing."

11 What language do you recall using?

12 THE WITNESS: By memory I say that if the Serbs continue their

13 actions, Bosnian Serbs continue their actions, it will have the most dire

14 consequences for the population and refugees of the Srebrenica pocket.

15 JUDGE MOLOTO: You also used a few minutes ago that they will

16 remove them from the map. What did you mean by "remove them from the

17 map"?

18 THE WITNESS: What I'm trying to describe is that they would

19 capture the pocket and that the population would then be removed. Now,

20 I'm speaking about beliefs, sir, because this is something that was

21 conjecture.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: You were making a prediction, yes.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, because this is conjecture. Based on past and

24 experience and knowledge, that would be partially the transportation of

25 people and pushing them over the front line into the Bosnian Muslim area,

Page 9206

1 and it would be partially killing.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Partially killing -- Can the owner of that phone

3 please switch it off. Thank you.

4 Thank you.

5 Madam Carter, you may proceed.

6 MS. CARTER: Sir, may I have 65 ter 9216 admitted into evidence.

7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Before the Chamber admits it into evidence, it

8 should be noted that the translation in B/C/S indicates a date of

9 March 1999. It should probably be corrected for purposes of the record.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith. Madam Carter, will you

11 see to it. Can we control our phones, please. Can you see to it that

12 that translation is correct.

13 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll MFI it for purposes until it is so

15 corrected.

16 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: 9216 is admitted into evidence and marked for

18 identification. May it please be given an exhibit number.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours, this document shall be

20 admitted into evidence under Exhibit P2694 marked for identification.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

22 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, this is the end of my

23 examination-in-chief. However, I would now seek to move into private

24 session briefly.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry, ma'am, can you do that after the break?

Page 9213

1 [Open session]

2 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.

5 Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

6 Q. Sir, let me start with -- I'll just ask you a question as a

7 matter of courtesy. I've called you the witness; I've called you

8 Mr. Tucker; I've called you Colonel Tucker; and I'm not sure precisely

9 what you would like to be called or if you have any preferences. And I

10 would like to take care of that matter first of all so that as we begin

11 this conversation or dialogue we are in a position to at least be dealing

12 with each other politely.

13 A. Colonel Tucker would be the correct appelation. Thank you, sir.

14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well, then, Colonel Tucker.

15 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry, Colonel Tucker, I've been calling you

16 Mr. Tucker all the time. I'll make a note of that.

17 MR. GUY-SMITH:

18 Q. Before we start with some more substantive matters, I'd like to

19 just address two specific issues that have been raised earlier in

20 conversation just to get some clarification so I know of what I speak.

21 You have brought with you a number of documents which I believe

22 are fairly characterised as being notes that you took during the period

23 of time that you were in the region in 1992 and 1993; is that correct?

24 A. That is correct, sir.

25 Q. You also have supplied to the Prosecution, and I don't know

Page 9214

1 whether this is in addition or independently of those notes that you have

2 brought with you, notes that you took in that same period of time; is

3 that correct, sir?

4 A. No, the only copies that I have made available to the ICTY is

5 those notes that you just mentioned. I have myself not made any other

6 documents or copies of documents available to either the ICTY or the

7 Prosecution.

8 Q. Okay. So then I'm comfortable in my assertion that the notes

9 that you brought with you are notes that you previously have provided to

10 the Prosecution in this case?

11 A. Whether those notes have been made available to this Prosecution,

12 I cannot be sure. I have given evidence in a number of --

13 Q. That's correct, you have.

14 A. -- Prosecutions here, and I've made those notes available. And

15 they were copied and numbers were recorded for each page that was copied

16 on previous trials. Whether they have been passed to the Prosecution or

17 not is obviously beyond my knowledge.

18 Q. With regard to the notes that you have previously provided, those

19 are the notes that you provided, I believe, in the Galic trial, number

20 one.

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. In the Oric trial, number two.

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And then also in some other proceeding, if I'm not mistaken, or

25 is that the extent of it?

Page 9215

1 A. There were -- there was another trial which people asked me

2 about, but I believe I was not able to really support it.

3 Q. Now, with regard to the notes that you took, as I understand your

4 testimony, you were the assistant to General Morillon; correct?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. You were the assistant to General Morillon for a number of

7 reasons, not the least of which is that you also are, from what I

8 understand at least, bilingual and maybe more than that, and you speak

9 French?

10 A. I speak English, French, German, and Dutch.

11 Q. Well, you have me at an advantage.

12 With regard to your position as an assistant to General Morillon,

13 you took notes, obviously among other things, of meetings that

14 General Morillon was involved in; correct?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And you've told us that you've -- you've told us as a matter of

17 fact you took notes for a myriad number of meetings in your testimony the

18 other day.

19 Now, with regard to the information that is contained in your

20 notes, if I understood your testimony correctly - and I may be making an

21 assumption, and that's why I want to make sure that I'm correct

22 here - when General Morillon was speaking with somebody, for example,

23 General Mladic, he was not speaking the same language as General Mladic,

24 was he?

25 A. No, General Morillon invariably spoke English and there was

Page 9216

1 always an interpreter who was actually translating across. And one of

2 the reasons that General Morillon selected Mihailov to be his body-guard

3 was in order to get independent feed-back as to the accuracy of the

4 translations that were being made because we had some experiences where

5 interpreters had taken liberties with what was being translated.

6 Q. Understood. And so the gentleman who was General Morillon's

7 body-guard, Mihailov, was your fail-safe mechanism for purposes of

8 ensuring that the information that was occurring -- that was being

9 transmitted as between General Morillon and others - and for the moment

10 let's use General Mladic as an example - was accurate information;

11 correct?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. And then I take it that what occurred was you also conferred with

14 Mihailov during the note-taking process to ensure that the information

15 you were taking down, that you were memorialising, was as accurate as it

16 possibly could be?

17 A. Yes, sir, usually we did that during the breaks. I can only

18 recall one instance when Mihailov during the negotiations coughed loudly

19 to bring to our attention that there was something improper going on.

20 Q. I take it that was cleared up?

21 A. That was cleared up, yes.

22 Q. Whatever it was. Now, is it fair to say that you have relied in

23 the past, in your testimony in the Galic case and your testimony in the

24 Oric case, you have relied on your notes for purposes of refreshing your

25 recollection as to what transpired in meetings?

Page 9217

1 A. That is correct. It is an obvious statement that these meetings

2 were 17 years ago.

3 Q. Of course. And with regard to this specific trial, did you have

4 occasion prior to coming to testify here to run through your notes to get

5 a little -- a freshen up, as it were, so that when you came here you were

6 in an ability as once again to as accurately as possible relate

7 information to the Chamber with regard to your recollection of what

8 occurred during those meetings?

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. And that included obviously, as we've discussed, dates of

11 meetings; right? And it's also included participants in meetings as well

12 as the subject matter; correct?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Now, above and beyond your notes, you've also had occasion to

15 give a number of statements to the Office of the Prosecutor with regard

16 to many, if not all, of the same matters that you've testified to here

17 since yesterday; correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And have you had an opportunity prior to your testimony here

20 today to review those statements as well so that when you came into court

21 you were in a position once again to fully, completely, and as accurately

22 as possible transmit to the Chamber that information that you had

23 available?

24 A. Yes, I was proofed, I believe is the term, on Sunday.

25 Q. When you were proofed, I take it you took a look at your

Page 9218

1 statements because you made more than one?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. And you had occasion to review them?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Did you find it necessary after reviewing your notes and your

6 statements to correct any of your previous memorialisations as they

7 related to date, participants, or subject matter?

8 A. No, not the previous ones.

9 Q. Okay. And that takes care of -- that takes care of one part of

10 my concern because I think what we may have just done is recopied your

11 notes again; I have a sneaking suspicion that may be what occurred,

12 although I'm not positive yet but.

13 With regard to your testimony, you made a statement yesterday

14 that you received intelligence concerning the matter of payment - and you

15 were talking about the payment of salaries. Now, before we go my

16 further, you may have heard me make a distinction earlier today between

17 that of information and that of intelligence. And I'd like to before we

18 go any further discuss that issue, which is as I understand it from a

19 military standpoint, information is precisely that, it's that which is

20 received by anybody, often times by analysts; and that once that

21 information is analysed, that information is what we call intelligence.

22 Is that a fair statement?

23 A. That's fair description.

24 Q. So when we use the term here that we received intelligence,

25 because I think there may be as a matter of fact some disconnect or

Page 9219

1 perhaps decollage between the issue of information and intelligence, that

2 when you were using the term that you received intelligence, are you

3 talking about some form of analytical report, or are you talking about

4 just hard facts that you've received?

5 A. What I'm talking about is intelligence personnel telling me the

6 the information that I described. I did not myself personally see the

7 raw material or even know the source of where that information came from.

8 What's happened was that I was told by intelligence personnel that,

9 et cetera.

10 Q. And when you say you were "told by intelligence personnel," I

11 take it the information you were given was a conclusion, the conclusion

12 being, based upon reports or other sources that we have reviewed and

13 analysed, it is our conclusion that ...

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Whatever it may be?

16 A. Yeah. That is correct.

17 Q. And in this particular situation, so we are clear, you did not

18 see any hard data?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. But you spoke to somebody or some bodies?

21 A. It was in a briefing about the whole of the situation in Bosnia

22 where there were many subjects on the discussion, and this was merely two

23 sentences worth during a much larger briefing.

24 Q. Okay. Can you identify for us when that meeting occurred with

25 any further specificity than that you've given us already?

Page 9220

1 A. It was in -- it was two particular briefings. One would have

2 been around March or -- sorry, not March, April or May 1996. And the

3 second would have been about June, maybe early July 1996.

4 Q. Now, did you -- with regard to the time that you were working,

5 and I apologise, I forgotten --

6 A. It was the permanent joint headquarters, PJHQ which is the UK

7 crisis management headquarters which was set up in April 1996.

8 Q. Very well. When you were working with the crisis management

9 headquarters, if I might, did you once again engage in memorializing your

10 meetings by note-taking?

11 A. I did, but those notes from that time I no longer have.

12 Q. Okay. As you sit here today, are you in a position, I'm asking

13 the question in steps because you may at some point say no to me, are you

14 in a position to identify for us the intelligence officer or officers

15 that you spoke with concerning the matter of the conclusion of payment of

16 salaries being made?

17 A. No, I can't remember their names.

18 Q. And that occurred in 1996?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Some 13 years ago, if my math is correct?

21 A. That's correct, yeah, yeah.

22 Q. Okay. You've told us that you arrived in Sarajevo at the end of

23 October; true?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And as I understand it, you arrived, I believe, on the 25th or

Page 9221

1 the 26th?

2 A. About that, yeah.

3 Q. About that time.

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. And when you say "about that time," give or take a couple of days

6 on either side or give or take a couple of days on the short side meaning

7 before the 25th?

8 A. I would need to check my actual notes, but it was either the

9 25th or the 26th. I don't think it was the 27th.

10 Q. At the time that you arrived, there was at that point in play the

11 issue of Mladic meeting with, if I'm not mistaken, either General Tus or

12 Bobetko concerning a cessation of hostilities agreement; correct?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And to set the stage properly, what had occurred was that a

15 meeting had been requested by Mladic, had been set up in the party to

16 meet General Mladic with regard to cessation of hostilities was Bobetko;

17 correct?

18 A. Mladic originally requested to meet with General Tus, however,

19 unknown to General Mladic, General Tus had retired and his position had

20 been taken over by Bobetko. There was then an argument with Mladic who

21 didn't believe this for a couple of weeks, and believed he was being

22 fobbed off with Bobetko. But then eventually he accepted this and then

23 met with Bobetko.

24 Q. I'm going to spend a moment on the matter of being fobbed off,

25 not because of anything other than, as I understand it from testimony

Page 9222

1 we've heard earlier, like ranks meet like ranks, so that a higher ranking

2 officer is not likely to be meeting with somebody from the other side who

3 is of a lower rank as a general proposition. When folks meet, generals

4 meet generals, colonels meet colonels, majors meet majors? It's somewhat

5 of a, as I understand, the military protocol that exists?

6 A. It was very prevalent there. It wasn't exactly rank meets rank,

7 it's more position meets position. In other words, the commander of one

8 army meets the commander of the other army, the deputy commander, because

9 they weren't necessarily always exactly the same rank.

10 Q. In that regard, for example, although it seems, and I mean this

11 as a compliment, not as anything disparaging, you and Morillon in many

12 senses were kind of joined at the hip in much of what was being done and

13 what was trying to be achieved that a meeting with you and General Mladic

14 would not work?

15 A. No, I was always a servant of General Morillon. The person

16 having the meeting with General Mladic was General Morillon. I never had

17 any meetings other than in a very very few cases in my own right with

18 anybody. As you accurately described yesterday, I was the scrivener.

19 Q. I was not being disparaging there either.

20 A. It's factual.

21 Q. It's often times a very important position to have.

22 Just in passing, with regard to the issue of the importance of

23 rank meeting rank or position meeting position, it was -- one of the

24 things that was readily apparent to you, and by that I mean to

25 General Morillon and you, is that General Mladic, who I believe at one

Page 9223

1 point told that you he was Napoleon of the Balkans; is that correct?

2 A. That is absolutely correct.

3 Q. Was not someone who was going to be meeting with people who he

4 felt were not in a position to respond to his requests, demands,

5 concerns, or whatever else they may be. He was looking for somebody --

6 he was looking not for another Napoleon because you can only have one

7 Napoleon, but he was looking for somebody of high stature; correct?

8 A. Mladic had two motives: One was that he only wanted to meet with

9 people of his own level who would be able to get things done. The second

10 is that he and all the other senior representatives of the

11 Republika Srpska were continually seeking recognition that they existed

12 as an independent entity, and therefore they were very particular that

13 the formalities and the appellations and so on were as if they were

14 recognising the existence of Republika Srpska as an independent entity.

15 Q. Okay. And that was a theme that was not only mentioned by

16 Mladic, but also was mentioned by Karadzic in meetings; correct?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. And one of the things that happened - and once again for the

19 moment I'm just speaking generally with regard to meetings - one of the

20 things that occurred at least on one occasion if not more is that when a

21 specific request for something to occur was asked of Mladic, he would

22 defer to his president?

23 A. That is absolutely correct.

24 Q. And at times when a specific request was asked of Karadzic, he

25 would defer to his assembly?

Page 9224

1 A. That is absolutely correct.

2 Q. And in those situations, they were indicating to you that there

3 was a political process that existed that had to be respected internally;

4 correct?

5 A. They were continually trying to emphasise that fact.

6 Q. And also that there was a relationship between the military

7 component that was headed by General Mladic and the political executive

8 component that was headed by Dr. Karadzic; correct?

9 A. Yes, they tried to maintain that point.

10 Q. Okay. Obviously with regard to meetings that you had with such

11 individual as Mladic and Karadzic, these were of critical importance to

12 note?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Okay. You testified, as I understand it that the first meeting

15 that you had with Mladic, Karadzic, and others was on the

16 27th of October; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. And that was a meeting -- that was a meeting that, as I

19 understand it, not from your testimony yesterday but from your -- from

20 some other documents that I've read, was a meeting that dealt with the

21 issue, among others, that dealt with the issue of cessation of

22 hostilities?

23 A. Yes, it dealt with a whole range of issues, as you can imagine.

24 Q. Okay. Now, the day before on the 26th, you had met with Mladic;

25 correct?

Page 9225

1 A. No, I believe on the 26th, I said 25th, 26th was when we arrived

2 in Sarajevo. And it was the next day that we first met in -- first met

3 with Mladic. Having said that, General Morillon, I believe, had met with

4 Mladic previously in his previous role as deputy command of UNPROFOR in

5 Krajina, but I don't know any details about that.

6 Q. Sorry. With regard to the first time that you met

7 General Mladic, was that in the presence of Karadzic? That was all

8 together; right?

9 A. I believe it was all together. I would need to check my notes.

10 The main thing that I recollect of that meeting was that it was with

11 Mladic in Lukavica and Mladic was being very insistent. He started the

12 meeting off by demanding that all communication to the to him be

13 addressed to Republika Srpska Krajina. General Morillon stated that he

14 had sent a letter to Madam Plavsic in order to try and expedite

15 permission to deploy the Canadian battalion and permission to deploy the

16 French battalion in Petrovac. Mladic told General Morillon that he made

17 a big mistake in approaching, in writing to Madam Plavsic, Madam --

18 Q. If I can interrupt you. And I thank you for your answer because

19 I think it's all quite interesting, but my question was, Was that in the

20 presence of Karadzic?

21 A. I would need to check my notes in order to confirm that precisely

22 on that specific day because as I said, that was 17 years ago.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may interrupt, I am sorry, Mr. Guy-Smith,

24 we've been throwing around dates of 26th, 27th October. Just so that we

25 don't have to look elsewhere in the transcript for the year, can we just

Page 9226

1 give it a year, please.

2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Surely.

3 Q. That would be 1992 that we are referring to; correct?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. I note that you indicated that all communications to him be

6 addressed to the Republika Srpska Krajina, and --

7 A. Not Krajina.

8 Q. -- I think you may have misspoke and you meant the

9 Republika Srpska?

10 A. Yes, General Morillon asked him, What about the Krajina? And

11 Mladic said, That's a separate republic; that's the

12 Republika Srpska Krajina.

13 Q. You'll recall in your testimony yesterday you indicated that in

14 the first meeting that Karadzic was present. And the reason I'm trying

15 to get an understanding of this is that was the meeting in Lukavica?

16 A. The meeting with Mladic on the 27th was in Lukavica. The meeting

17 at which Karadzic was present and Professor Koljevic, the one where I

18 referred to the census map, that took place in Pale.

19 Q. So that would have been the next day, the 28th? Let me see if I

20 can be of some help to you here, and I'm going to read you something and

21 see whether or not this is of any help to you. And I'm reading from the

22 statement that you gave. This is only for purposes of refreshing your

23 recollection. This is the statement that you gave on the 6th and

24 7th of September, 2000; the 27th of July, 2001, and the 5th and

25 6th of March, 2002. And you say:

Page 9227

1 "General Morillon's first appeal to the RS leaders to secure

2 deployment of CanBat was in a form of a letter to Mrs. Plavsic which he

3 wrote on 27 October 1992."

4 Which I think you had just discussed.

5 "At that time we thought she was more influential, and we later

6 found out she was. The same day, I what present at a meeting between

7 General Mladic and General Morillon. This meeting took place in

8 Lukavica. I have some photographs that were taken after its conclusion.

9 This was my first meeting with Mladic. Karadzic was in Geneva."

10 Is that correct?

11 A. Yes, I think that Karadzic was in Geneva for at least ten days or

12 so, and in fact we believed that Mladic took advantage of the fact that

13 Karadzic was in Geneva in order to launch his last attack on Sarajevo in

14 order to try and capture or cut Sarajevo in half.

15 Q. Now, as I understand the first meeting, that meeting dealt with

16 CanBat 2 deployment to the Banja Luka area; correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Mladic informed you that he did not have the authority to agree

19 to this, but he would discuss this with the government?

20 A. I think he said it was a matter for the Bosnian Serb Assembly.

21 Q. Okay. During that meeting, Mladic and Morillon also discussed

22 the issue of freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR convoys

23 generally?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And also was discussed the issue of demilitarisation?

Page 9228

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And when you say that the issue of demilitarisation was

3 discussed, could you please just briefly for the moment, because we will

4 be discussing it later again, touch upon what was discussed with regard

5 to the issue of demilitarisation as it related to this meeting?

6 A. There were two dimensions to demilitarisation. One was Sarajevo

7 itself, and the lifting of the siege. Mladic refused to use the language

8 or accept the language siege or surrounded. What Mladic insisted was

9 that he was merely holding his own terrain and protecting his own people

10 inside his own terrain. He said that if the Muslims were either willing

11 to hand all their weapons to the -- in Sarajevo - this is to the

12 United Nations - or were willing to allow Serb -- Bosnian Serb police

13 into Sarajevo, that then he was willing to allow freedom of movement in

14 and out for all.

15 On the second issue was heavy weapons, and when General Morillon

16 asked Mladic about his heavy weapons and requested Mladic to remove his

17 heavy weapons away from around Sarajevo, Mladic's response was that he

18 was willing to do so providing that the Muslims handed all their weapons

19 over to the United Nations and disarmed. If you want specific detail --

20 Q. No, that's fine for the moment because there's -- as I think we

21 both understand, there's a further discussion, specifically about

22 demilitarisation with Oric when you are in Srebrenica, and there's a

23 further discussion with the war committee about demilitarisation as a

24 manner of solution when you are in Srebrenica.

25 A. That's correct.

Page 9229

1 Q. Which is a different aspect once again to that matter.

2 What you've mentioned here is one of the tensions, I think, that

3 did occur, and the analysis, as I understand it, from a review of your

4 documentation is that Mladic equated his heavy weapon use with the

5 strength of the BiH Army's infantry?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And in a very real sense, what we had occurring at the time was

8 that the Bosnian Serb Army had greater heavy weaponry; correct?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. And the BiH Army had more infantry?

11 A. They had many more people. They were much more populace, but

12 only armed with infantry weapons obviously, and not that many.

13 Q. Now, did you have at that time - I'm talking about the very first

14 meeting - was there any discussion at that time about the concept of

15 Territorial Defence that existed in the former Yugoslavia?

16 A. The -- the thing which I recall Mladic saying was that he was

17 holding his own territory. He demanded that that --

18 Q. Sorry?

19 A. He claimed the territory in order to defend his people. However,

20 he did not at that time, I recall, talk about Territorial Defence or

21 militia or anything like that, that only came up in much later

22 conversation.

23 Q. Before -- okay. Before you came to Sarajevo, were you aware of

24 the -- of the manner in which the former Yugoslavia had determined how to

25 defend itself in case of incursions after World War II? And just briefly

Page 9230

1 here because I don't want to get into a long history discussion, briefly

2 here, Tito had created not only an army, but it created the concept of

3 Territorial Defence where every able-bodied man between a certain ages

4 was available for fighting for the Defence of not only their country, but

5 also their specific region; correct?

6 A. That's absolutely correct. And it's also the context in which

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina was the arms depot of the former Yugoslavia because of

8 its mountainous terrain, in the centre, in the heart of the former

9 Yugoslavia. And it was western intelligence assessments that the vast

10 bulk of the ammunition and equipment which was stockpiled in -- on the

11 ground bunkers and depots was within Bosnia-Herzegovina and that that was

12 one of the reasons why western intelligence assessment was that the

13 Bosnian Serb Army had, and I think one of the quotes was, Had enough

14 ammunition to continue the combat operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the

15 intensity that they were going for a further ten years.

16 Q. Okay. With regard to the issue that you've just raised again

17 which is western intelligence assessments, there once again we are

18 talking about information that has been compiled and analysed upon which

19 conclusions have been drawn, this conclusion being a conclusion with

20 regard to the ability to wage war?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. In that regard, are those reports that you looked at?

23 A. Those were briefings we were given before we deployed into

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 Q. So similar --

Page 9231

1 A. Would have been September 1992.

2 Q. So similar to the other situation, I take it there are no notes,

3 it was oral, and you cannot remember who gave you this information; or am

4 I wrong?

5 A. No, it would have been briefings in Moenchengladbach before we

6 departed and they were intelligence staff officers who participated. And

7 as you can imagine, we were preparing for deployment; there were many

8 things going on. And part of briefings were intelligence briefings and

9 western intelligence was scrambling to pull together as much information

10 as it could obviously prior to --

11 Q. Sorry, the answer to my question would be no notes and no

12 identification of the individuals?

13 A. That's correct, yeah.

14 Q. After the meeting with Mladic concerning cessation of hostilities

15 and other things, but I'm going to focus on the cessation of hostilities

16 because something -- as I understand it, the first meeting occurred,

17 which is that although Mladic had called for the meeting, ultimately what

18 occurred was that Bobetko signed, Mladic did not sign the cessation of

19 hostilities agreement in the first instance?

20 A. The meeting with -- to be clear, this first meeting that I

21 attended with Mladic on the 27th of October, nothing was signed. The

22 meeting that Mladic eventually had with Bobetko was towards the end of

23 November, and at that meeting Bobetko, if I remember, actually at the

24 meeting, actually in a flourish signed the declaration. But Mladic

25 refused to sign and left the meeting not having signed it.

Page 9232

1 Q. Did there come a point in time when Mladic did sign?

2 A. I believe, but again would I need to check. I believe he signed

3 it one or two days later or at a next meeting.

4 Q. Okay. And what is -- for the Chamber's purposes, what is the

5 effect of a signed cessation of hostilities agreement?

6 A. Well --

7 Q. Obviously there are two parts to this. Let me back up because I

8 think your chuckle deals with a certain aspect.

9 If followed, what would have been the effect of cessation

10 hostilities agreement at that time?

11 A. I would assume that once a leader or senior officer has signed a

12 cessation of hostilities, that he would then issue orders within his

13 chain of command in order to order his forces not to carry out conduct --

14 combat activities.

15 Q. Just as a general matter, can you tell the Chamber in your

16 estimation how many cessation of hostilities/cease-fire agreements do you

17 think you brokered during the time that you were there?

18 A. Many. How many? 10, 20, 30, I don't know. There were so many

19 of them, and none them were ever adhered to.

20 Q. When you say "none of them were ever adhered to," would it be

21 fair to say that both parties - and by that I mean the Bosnian Serbs and

22 the Presidency as you called it - broke those cease-fires?

23 A. Yes. All -- in my view all three parties, the Bosnian Muslims,

24 the Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Serbs broke cease-fire agreements

25 when it suited them.

Page 9233

1 Q. Okay. And in regard to the breaking of the cease-fire

2 agreements, I think that you came to a position concerning cease-fire

3 agreements in general. And I'm referring you to some prior testimony in

4 which you stated:

5 "We have been trying to negotiate cease-fire since we had arrived

6 in Bosnia. There was a recurring theme to cease-fires, which was that

7 the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted a cease-fire or cease fires to cover

8 all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in other words they wanted to consolidate

9 their gain and consolidate what they had taken, whereas the Bosniak

10 leadership declared that they wanted cease-fires."

11 And I think that you should have said "they didn't" --

12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.

13 MS. CARTER: If we could please have the source of the quotation.

14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Oh, yes, I apologise. That's page 5795,

15 lines 1 through 9 in IT-03-68-T.

16 "The reality of the way they behaved was that whenever they were

17 under pressure militarily from the Serbs, they wanted local cease-fires,

18 but then contrived to try to break those cease-fires and provoke the

19 Serbs."

20 THE WITNESS: That is correct. What would happen is that the

21 Bosnian Serb intent, as I described from the beginning, as I described

22 General Mladic in his first meeting and in the meeting with Karadzic,

23 they continually tried to emphasise, We want to be our own entity; we

24 want the status quo to be recognised; we want recognition; we are -- we

25 want a cease-fire across the whole front line.

Page 9234

1 The Presidency publicly declared that they wanted a cease-fire as

2 well. The practical reality was that they did not recognise the

3 status quo and wanted to take back territory which had been seized by the

4 Bosnian Serbs and therefore were carrying out local attacks. When those

5 local attacks were eventually repulsed by the Bosnian Serbs because

6 typically it took them a day or 2 to repulse them because the Bosnian

7 Serbs were numerically weak all the way around this very long and tangled

8 front line, the Muslims would usually make initial progress until such

9 time as the Bosnian Serbs had first mustered heavy weapons against them.

10 And secondly, if it was a serious incursion, had managed to move their

11 reserves, their regular forces around in order to push the -- the

12 incursion back in order to re-establish the front line.

13 MR. GUY-SMITH:

14 Q. Okay. So it would be -- and I take it that this is something

15 that you experienced from the time that you first arrived in

16 October of 1992 until you left in 1993?

17 A. Yes, there was another dimension to it, which was that our

18 UN deployment in Bosnia was under Chapter 6. And under the remit to

19 facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need, our mandate

20 was not to engage in the fighting. And it was a constant attempt by the

21 Presidency to try and inveigle the United Nations forces in fighting on

22 their side against the Serbs.

23 Q. Since you've raised that particular matter which is the constant

24 attempt by the Presidency which would be the Bosniak Muslims --

25 A. That's correct.

Page 9235

1 Q. -- to try and inveigle the United Nations forces in fighting on

2 the other side against the Serbs. I would like to discuss with you for a

3 moment an incident concerning mortar fire emanating from the

4 Kosevo Hospital in Sarajevo; do you know what I speak?

5 A. I believe you are referring to an incident when some UN forces,

6 some UN personnel were delivering diesel fuel to the hospital saw a

7 mobile detachment of light mortars who had deployed -- this is Bosniak --

8 Bosnian Muslim military inside Sarajevo who had deployed to the hospital

9 and had fired from the grounds of the hospital at some forces surrounding

10 Sarajevo, and then rapidly withdrew from the hospital. This was in the

11 knowledge that the Bosnian Serbs surrounding Sarajevo had mortar-locating

12 radar, that is radar of which is capable of seeing artillery shells

13 mortar shells in the air, and from that calculating the location from

14 where they had been fired because the Bosnian Serbs then immediately

15 fired counter-battery fire as quickly as they could back at the location

16 from which the outcoming fire had come.

17 However, the location where this fire had come from was obviously

18 Kosevo Hospital, so therefore when the incoming Serb counter-bombardment,

19 as it were, came in, of course, it landed on Kosevo Hospital. And if I

20 remember correctly, a press conference had been arranged by the

21 Presidency at the hospital half an hour later, and effectively the

22 incoming Serb fire landed on the hospital around the time of the start of

23 the press conference.

24 Q. When you say a press conference was called, who called that press

25 conference?

Page 9236

1 A. I don't know the details of who called them --

2 Q. I'm sorry, I meant which -- I was asking a much more general

3 question for the moment. Was that the Presidency that called it or the

4 Bosniak --

5 A. It was somebody on the Presidency side.

6 Q. Now, you had information, if I'm not mistaken, that the head of

7 the hospital was someone who not only supported the general cause of the

8 Presidency, but was, I think, a radical hardliner?

9 A. That, I can't recall.

10 Q. Okay. I'm referring -- quoting, counsel, to IT-98-29-T page

11 10.022. These are questions that are being asked by Judge Nieto-Navia.

12 In relation to what you've told us about firing coming from the

13 surroundings of the Kosevo Hospital, you told us you received information

14 from two sources. Do you recall receiving information from two sources?

15 Firstly a British sergeant and then from journalists?

16 A. I think we may be mixing events up.

17 Q. Oh, well, let's -- if we have more than one incident where

18 there's been firing from the Kosevo Hospital, let's deal with them

19 sequentially.

20 A. We had reports, but unconfirmed, not much more than rumour, that

21 mortars were being fired now and then from Kosevo Hospital. It was only

22 when this -- this British sergeant physically saw it while he was

23 delivering, that we had what we considered to be confirmed proof.

24 And the instance about journalist was a totally second -- that's

25 a totally different event which I believe is the one you may be referring

Page 9237

1 to which is when some mortar rounds were fired at General Morillon's

2 headquarters in Sarajevo, a location confusingly called the "Residency"

3 as opposed to the "Presidency" which is where the government of the

4 Bosnian Muslims was.

5 Q. And with regard to that incident, when General Morillon's -- is

6 that his home or his headquarters?

7 A. His headquarters. Well, it was where we lived as well.

8 Q. Both.

9 A. It was both.

10 Q. Well, with regard to the incident concerning the residency

11 involving the Bosniak side firing, could you tell us what the date was?

12 A. The -- there were two incidents. One was on the

13 24th of December, 1992, and the second was at dawn on Christmas day, the

14 25th of December, 1992.

15 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the Kosevo Hospital matter, Judge

16 Nieto-Navia went on to ask you questions concerning whether or not you

17 knew of any firings or mortars emanating from any other hospitals in

18 Sarajevo, and I believe that you said that you did not, and then you went

19 on to explain that the Kosevo Hospital is somewhat unique. Do you recall

20 why the Kosevo Hospital was unique in regard to the issue of the ability

21 to fire from such an area?

22 A. I don't know about unique, but it looked to me like most other

23 hospitals I know which are some large buildings and in between the

24 buildings you have car parks and open space, and it was in this open

25 space between the buildings that the mortars had been fired from as

Page 9238

1 reported by the British sergeant.

2 Q. Okay. And there was a third thing that I mentioned, which was

3 the issue of the hardliner.

4 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm now referring the Court and counsel to page

5 10.024.

6 Q. You answer as follows to -- this is Judge El Madhi question with

7 regard to other hospitals, I misspoke myself. You say starting at

8 line 4:

9 "I must answer in several steps. The first step is to say that I

10 have no knowledge from such firing from the proximity of other hospitals

11 in Sarajevo."

12 Which we've just discussed.

13 "Secondly, the other hospitals in Sarajevo were very different

14 types of buildings."

15 Which is why I alluded to the fact that the Kosevo was unique.

16 "Kosevo Hospital was the only hospital which was spread out over

17 quite a large area. The other hospitals were solid, single buildings

18 with a building next to it maybe, so they did not lend themselves to the

19 kind of tactic."

20 And I think that's a kind of tactic that you've described that is

21 available where you had a mobile mortar unit. And then you say:

22 "The third thing is that the head of Kosevo Hospital was known to

23 us as a radical hardliner and was someone who we believed would have

24 certainly supported this kind of tactic in the greater interest as he saw

25 it of supporting the Bosniak cause whereas the directors of the other

Page 9239

1 hospitals were, in our view, much more medically focused and refused to

2 have anything to do with the kind of action that the director of the

3 Kosevo Hospital, in our view, participated in."

4 And that was what I was referring to when I mentioned there was a

5 hardliner. Do you, by any chance, recall the name of the director of the

6 Kosevo Hospital?

7 A. Now that you've refreshed my memory on that, I do recollect there

8 was something about the head of the Kosevo Hospital. I can't remember

9 here now what his name is. It's possible that it might be mentioned in

10 my notes, but I would -- I would have no idea where it is without

11 spending a long time trolling through my notes.

12 Q. While we were on the issue of hospitals, one of the other matters

13 brought to your attention was the smuggling of explosives in oxygen

14 bottles to the hospitals; correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, oxygen bottles would be, if I'm not mistaken, certainly a

17 form of humanitarian aid, and certainly something that would be critical

18 and necessary for a functioning of a hospital; correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Would it be appropriate in your view for explosives to be

21 smuggled into a hospital through the use of oxygen bottles which

22 ostensibly are being delivered for purposes of humanitarian aid?

23 A. It would have been a breach of the agreements between the warring

24 factions and with the United Nations to smuggle explosives or weapons of

25 any form hidden inside humanitarian aid.

Page 9240

1 Q. Now, with regard to the issue of explosives being found in a

2 delivery of what is ostensibly humanitarian aid, would that be, in your

3 view, a basis upon which it would be reasonable to search a convoy that

4 is, and I'm using the word "claiming" not in a pejorative sense, but

5 claiming to be delivering solely humanitarian aid, with that as an

6 experience?

7 A. I'm now speaking personally. I would have an understanding for

8 that desire, but I would also maintain that regardless, such searches

9 should not in any way, shape, or form be used in order to prevent

10 humanitarian aid from getting through or getting through at all.

11 Q. I appreciate that, but that's not my question.

12 A. Yes, but it's my point, sir.

13 Q. I understand, but that's not my question, sir. My question is

14 that given that it would be inappropriate to be using humanitarian aid

15 for a military purpose, would it not be reasonable to search the convoy?

16 I'm not getting any further than that at the moment, and we'll have

17 further discussions about convoys and searches and stopping in -- after

18 the break, but would that be an unreasonable thing to do?

19 A. Providing that it did not be used as an excuse to stop the aid

20 getting through.

21 Q. So, if you were aware that a humanitarian aid convoy contained

22 weapons, it is your position - so we're clear - it's your position that

23 the convoy should go through --

24 A. No.

25 Q. -- with the weapons?

Page 9241

1 A. No, it was our position that no weapons should be allowed

2 through, and we -- whenever we became aware or had suspicions that

3 weapons might be hidden in humanitarian aid, we searched them ourselves

4 as well. And on a number of occasions, we found weapons and made the

5 strongest protest to whichever side was responsible for placing those

6 weapons in the humanitarian aid.

7 Q. Okay. Well, as a matter of reality, the strong protests that

8 were made, be they to one side or the other as we've discussed

9 cease-fires, often fell on deaf ears; correct?

10 A. Like most requests for humanity in that part of the word.

11 Q. I see.

12 MR. GUY-SMITH: Would this be an appropriate time?

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: It would indeed be. We'll take a break and come

14 back at half past 12.00. Court adjourned.

15 --- Recess taken at 11.57 a.m.

16 --- On resuming at 12.29 p.m.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.

18 MR. GUY-SMITH: May I proceed?

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought I did say yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: You are welcome.

22 MR. GUY-SMITH:

23 Q. I want to go back now for a moment and deal with some chronology

24 dates if I could. And as I understood it, around the

25 31st of October, 1992, is when the Bosnian Serb army attempted, as you

Page 9242

1 said, to split Sarajevo; correct?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Now, after that time, moving into the month of November, in the

4 month of November, as you recall, were there convoys that went out of

5 Sarajevo for purposes of delivering either people or aid?

6 A. Yes, there were convoys going out of Sarajevo towards Gorazde.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. In -- there were many other convoys that UNHCR were delivering

9 all around Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I do not recollect all of them.

10 Q. Very well. Now, right around that -- right around the

11 4th or 5th of November, do you recall there being negotiations between

12 the Presidency, represented, I would take it by Izetbegovic; Pale

13 represented, I would take it by Mr. Dr. Karadzic; and the Croatian

14 represented by, I'm not sure, concerning convoys of buses of Serbs and

15 Croats, Serbs leaving Sarajevo to Belgrade, Croats leaving Sarajevo to

16 Split?

17 A. Yes, that is correct.

18 Q. Now, was there -- with regard to the representative for the

19 Croatian side, which we've kind of touched upon lightly, but actually

20 they were pretty much of an important consideration at that time, the

21 representative for the Croatian side would that have been Bobetko?

22 A. No, Bobetko was at that time in the Croatian Army General Staff,

23 in other words, based out of Zagreb. The negotiations from the -- the

24 first thing to say is the negotiations for that particular action were

25 conducted between headquarter Sector Sarajevo or through the facilities

Page 9243

1 of headquarter Sector Sarajevo rather than through my own headquarters.

2 Q. I see.

3 A. And they were dealing with -- they were dealing -- headquarter

4 Sector Sarajevo had a Bosnian Serb liaison officer who was based at the

5 Sarajevo PTT building which was the headquarter Sector Sarajevo who had

6 communications through to Lukavica which was the military headquarters

7 there. The Serb -- sorry, the Bosnian Croatian negotiator, I do not know

8 who that was. My guess would be Colonel Siber.

9 Q. Very well. Now, after the negotiations in early November, I

10 believe that there was another meeting that you had around the

11 14th of November, and that was a meeting that you had with General Galic,

12 do you recall that?

13 A. I couldn't here today say, Yes, it was the 14th. But yes there

14 was certainly a meeting with General -- there were a number of meetings

15 that General Morillon had with General Galic around that time.

16 Q. Let me read you from the statement that I've read to you from

17 before and see whether that refreshes your recollection with regard to

18 that which you have said previously concerning the meeting with

19 General Galic on the 14th. This would be page 10:

20 "On 14 November we had a first meeting with

21 General Stanislav Galic in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps headquarters at

22 the Lukavica" -- my apologies, "... barracks outside Sarajevo close to

23 the airport. Galic was not at the level of someone who Morillon would

24 normally meet with."

25 And I think there you are referring to once again the position

Page 9244

1 rank matter that we've discussed previously which is people of -- I am

2 sorry. Military men and women of equal rank in position meet with each

3 not lower or higher?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. "I believe Morillon was trying to get in touch with Mladic about

6 agreement with the deployment of CanBat 2 to the Banja Luka area, but

7 Morillon was having difficulty getting in touch with Mladic."

8 Now, is this the same CanBat 2 discussion that had been going on

9 probably since October?

10 A. Yes, that is correct. And if you recall in March, I referred to

11 a Canadian battalion stuck outside Zvornik; that was that same battalion

12 five months later.

13 Q. When you say there were a Canadian battalion stuck outside of

14 Zvornik, was that close to the Zvornik bridge?

15 A. Yes, as you went across the Zvornik bridge from the Bosnian side

16 and entered the Serbian side, if you turned immediately left, there was a

17 long road and parking area and the Canadian battalion which is lined up

18 row upon row of vehicles with the soldiers just living on the vehicles

19 and in little tents they pitched alongside their vehicles.

20 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could have, I believe it's 1D00-2594, which

21 is an aerial view of a bridge.

22 Q. I'd like you to --

23 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sorry, it's D22. My apologies. Defence 22. I

24 made a mistake.

25 Q. Do you have that in front of you?

Page 9247

1 north is north, south, east, west --

2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, I believe that's right.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: We can assume that.

4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.

5 Q. Now, Mladic, who Morillon was trying to get ahold of with regard

6 to the CanBat deployment issue, was unavailable?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And you learned that Mladic as a matter of fact was engaged in

9 fighting, was he not?

10 A. This was probably in the aftermath of the last attempt to attack

11 Sarajevo.

12 Q. Okay. And is it your understanding that that's where Mladic was

13 on the 14th? Because you say here:

14 "I believe that Mladic was preoccupied dealing with his emergency

15 down in south-east Bosnia where his forces were under sustained attack

16 from the Croats."

17 A. That's a totally different matter. That was the attack in the, I

18 can't remember the name of the place, I have it in my notes, I can point

19 it out on the map.

20 Q. Okay. But with regard to the south-east portion of Bosnia where

21 this attack was occurring, that was -- was that an attack involving only

22 Croatian forces, or was that an attack that was involving a combination

23 of Croatian forces and other forces, if you know?

24 A. We had no personnel in the area in order to verify one thing or

25 the other. What Mladic told us was that it was a combination of Bosnian

Page 9248

1 Croat forces reinforced by Republic of Croatia forces. In other words,

2 forces commanded from Zagreb.

3 Q. Was there -- would that have been -- I'm mentioning an area to

4 you to see if that refreshes your recollection. Would that have been

5 Trevince?

6 A. Trebinje.

7 Q. Trebinje?

8 A. Yes, yes.

9 Q. And now, with regard to that particular battle, if I'm

10 understanding correctly, Mladic was fighting two separate sets of forces

11 at that time. One would have been Croatian forces, and the other would

12 have been the army of the BiH, the Bosnia-Herzegovina forces; is that

13 correct? He was fighting on two front?

14 A. Yes, effectively it was three fronts because --

15 Q. Three fronts.

16 A. -- there were the ABiH, in other words, the

17 Muslim Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then from time to time he was also

18 engaged in fighting with the HVO which was the Croatian -- sorry the

19 Bosnian Croatian military, who at that time were, I believe, commanded by

20 Brigadier General Petkovic. And then thirdly was with the HV who were

21 the army of the Republic of Croatia, in other words, the army commanded

22 and headquartered in Zagreb.

23 Q. And with regard to the information that you had, and I'm going

24 back now to, for a minute, to the issue that he had raised in terms of

25 being not on equal footing in terms of weaponry as opposed to infantry,

Page 9249

1 did you have information with regard to the size of these various forces,

2 and by that I mean the HVO, the Croatian Army, as you've articulated, and

3 the BiH?

4 A. Similarly, we had intelligence assessments which had been

5 prepared prior to our deployment and continued to be developed whilst we

6 were deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that the ABiH had a very large

7 number of people who by definition, because they were Yugoslav, had done

8 national service and therefore knew how to use weapons. All of them,

9 virtually any adult male in Bosnia and Yugoslavia knew how to use small

10 arms. However, they didn't have that many small arms, and they had very

11 very few heavy weapons.

12 The HVO, which is the Croatian militia inside Bosnia, they were

13 by comparison much better equipped, and they were equipped by the HV.

14 And there was a clear communication line up from Split, up from the

15 direction of Split, up into the centre of Bosnia through which the HVO

16 had easy access to whatever equipment the Croatian authorities in Zagreb

17 made available to them.

18 The HV itself, the Republic of Croatia's military forces were

19 even better equipped than the HVO, and were purchasing equipment on the

20 international arms market and were having equipment made available to

21 them from international arms sales.

22 Q. And with regard to the strength of those -- strength of those

23 respective armies in terms of men or fighting soldiers, are you in a

24 position to give us those numbers?

25 A. Well, it's a kind of meaningless question because literally any

Page 9250

1 adult male could pick up a weapon and they all had items of military

2 uniform. And it was often very difficult to identify what's a soldier as

3 in a professional soldier who has been trained versus what is somebody

4 who is actually a civilian, however, who has done military service and

5 actually knows how to use a small arm.

6 Q. I see. Okay. So just in terms of a better understanding of

7 that, with regard to those villages that were under pressure, as you've

8 discussed, can you tell us in those villages how many of the villagers

9 were either directly involved with the ABiH, under let's say for example

10 the authority of Oric who was, I believe, the commander of that -- of the

11 Srebrenica enclave, or who were fellow travellers, by that I mean were

12 sympathetic to the Bosnia cause?

13 A. I would -- and again I'm making estimates. This is not because I

14 have specific information to say. The reality was that inside the

15 Srebrenica enclave, the Muslims had very few small arms. Naser Oric --

16 Q. Sorry, I'm asking you about able-bodied fighting men, not about

17 arms.

18 A. So can you then repeat the question?

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.

20 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I would object. The question as asked

21 is precisely what Colonel Tucker was trying to answer. It's been

22 reformulated now.

23 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, it's not. Can you tell us in those villages

24 how many of the villagers were either directly involved with the ABiH,

25 let's say, for example under the authority of Oric or who were fellow

Page 9251

1 travellers? That has nothing to do with the issue of arms.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which is the distinct from the numerical strength

3 of the HV, HVO, and ABiH.

4 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour, however when it's reformulated

5 he's asking simply about the able bodied fighting men and trying to

6 further limit. I believe that the witness should have the opportunity to

7 answer the first question asked in regards to who was present in the

8 village -- I'm sorry, inside of Srebrenica.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you objecting because of the chronology of the

10 questions, or are you objecting because the question itself is

11 objectionable?

12 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I'm objecting to the fact that the

13 witness is not being able to answer the questions asked.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: But if he is not able to answer the questions

15 asked, then he says, I'm not able to answer. Is that a ground of

16 objection?

17 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, he wasn't -- he did not say that he

18 could not answer the question. He began to answer the question, was cut

19 off by Mr. Gregor Guy-Smith, and then was asked a separate question. And

20 so we're asking for the witness to be able to --

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry. The prior question where he was cut

22 off, okay, can you refer us to the transcript where that happened?

23 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour, it's at 76 starting at

24 page 7 is the initial question -- I'm sorry. No, I'm sorry, that's a

25 repeat. My apologies.

Page 9252

1 The initial question is coming in at page 75 starting at line 15.

2 He begins to answer at line 22, is cut off, and is asked a separate

3 question starting on line 25. I would ask for the witness to be allowed

4 to respond to the question that was asked.

5 MR. GUY-SMITH: With regard to the question that I asked,

6 Colonel Tucker's answer was unresponsive. I'm happy to ask the same

7 question again that I asked on page 75 in its verbatim form.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Just ask it. Could you just ask the

9 question instead of giving just the background information. If we ask

10 short questions and we get short answers, we have our communication much

11 more --

12 MR. GUY-SMITH:

13 Q. You have testified that there were villages under pressure, and

14 you have told us what you learned was the manner of attack by the

15 Bosnian Serb forces; correct?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. With regard to those villages that you've testified to being

18 under pressure, can you tell us how many of the villagers were under the

19 command of the ABiH Army in that area commanded by or Oric, Naser Oric?

20 A. I obviously do not have intelligence as to the numbers, as I was

21 not at those villages. What I can say is that it is my understanding,

22 which was also confirmed by Naser Oric when Morillon spoke with him, that

23 the villages had in them the villagers plus on many occasions refugees

24 who had fled to those villages. However, that there were no combatants

25 in those villages. There was a second group of people who were

Page 9253

1 combatants and who were, as you would describe it, in the chain of

2 command as it were of Naser Oric, and the main determinant was the

3 available of weapons.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: But how many of those combatants were there, that

5 were under Naser Oric?

6 THE WITNESS: I would estimate it was probably several thousand

7 around the perimeter of the Srebrenica enclave. But that's purely a

8 personal estimate. It's not something we ever bothered to try and assess

9 because it was to us meaningless information.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: And in which villages specifically were these

11 people located?

12 THE WITNESS: These people weren't located at villages. These

13 people were located on the front line. And as the front line was moved

14 as it was pressed back, obviously these people withdrew --

15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do I then understand you to be saying that your

16 answer of several thousand combatants under Naser Oric is actually not

17 answering Mr. Guy-Smith's question because now you are telling us of an

18 estimate on the front line, not an estimate of the numbers in the

19 villages?

20 THE WITNESS: The estimate of several thousand is for the entire

21 Srebrenica pocket. I am not in a position to be able to say however many

22 combatants there may or may not have been at any particular village at

23 any particular time.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith. I hope I haven't

25 confused the issue further.

Page 9254

1 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, I don't think you have at all, Your Honour.

2 Q. Do you recall the issue of convoys being sent to Srebrenica on

3 the 17th of November between Morillon and Mladic?

4 A. If I remember --

5 Q. In 1992?

6 A. If I remember correctly, that was when Mladic had told Morillon

7 to provide a route, and he had or his staff had amended the route in

8 order to try to ensure that it bypassed areas of difficulty. And there

9 was a meeting around that time between General Morillon and

10 General Mladic that I recall Mladic frequently getting up and going out

11 of the meeting as he was getting updates from his own staff about the

12 progress of the convoy.

13 Q. And that was a meeting in which you commented, and see whether or

14 not this is accurate, once again referring to your statement, you say at

15 page 11:

16 "Lieutenant-General Mladic barely made any effort to conceal the

17 the fact that nothing could or would happen in Bosnian Serb held BH

18 without his specific approval. It was very apparent that he made all the

19 practical military decisions that mattered."

20 A. Yes, that was very obvious.

21 Q. Okay. With regard to the meeting that Mladic and Morillon had

22 concerning convoys, something I think rather dramatic happened on the

23 17th of November, which is that the UNHCR suspended all deliveries of

24 relief to Eastern Bosnia, both to Bosnian Serbs and other communities.

25 Correct?

Page 9255

1 A. Yes, I remember that, that happening. It was driven by a couple

2 of things.

3 Q. Okay. Before we get to that, to put this into a context, what

4 has occurred is prior to the UNHCR suspending the delivery of

5 humanitarian aid, Mladic has imposed particular conditions upon the

6 convoy being able to travel; correct?

7 A. Yes, he did lay a number of constraints.

8 Q. And then independently in reaction to those constraints, the

9 UNHCR made a determination that they would suspend the delivery of

10 humanitarian aid because in their view it was necessary to have a global

11 assessment of needs as well as a deeper statement of cooperation by

12 authorities at a central and local level; correct?

13 A. That's a loose description.

14 Q. Well, I'm referring to what you said in your statement, and I've

15 actually quoted what you said, which is:

16 "The UNHCR suspend on 17th of November all deliveries of relief

17 to Eastern Bosnia, both to Bosnian Serb and other communities pending a

18 global assessment of needs as well as a deeper statement of cooperation

19 by authorities at a central and local level."

20 A. There was more to it than that.

21 Q. Okay. Now, I want to deal with the issue here of the suspension.

22 Because as I understand it what happened was that a letter was written by

23 the UNHCR which indicated that a suspension would occur.

24 A. Yes, I believe that's correct.

25 Q. And when the letter was written that indicated that a suspension

Page 9256

1 would occur, at that point in time what was your reaction, by "your" I'm

2 talking about Morillon and you obviously, to the independent action of

3 the UNHCR to suspend understanding that they did that, of course, in

4 light of what they understood to be Mladic's demands?

5 A. My recollection is that Morillon was quite upset and quite angry.

6 Q. Did there -- did there come as a result of this suspension a

7 meeting between Morillon and the head of the UNHCR concerning the fact

8 that humanitarian aid was being suspended by the very organisation that

9 should be delivering it?

10 A. Morillon believed that it was his duty to keep trying to get aid

11 going through regardless of whatever the obstacles or difficulties put in

12 their place. UNHCR had the same belief but believed, and again I'm going

13 by recollection from a long time ago, believed that they needed to take

14 this stand temporarily in order to try and achieve the greater objective

15 of getting freedom of movement, et cetera. And there's a disagreement

16 between Morillon and UNHCR about the means to achieve the end, the end

17 being that aid gets through.

18 Q. And so what you have now is you have, as I understand it, three

19 different views of how aid is to get through. You have the Mladic view

20 of how aid is to get through, you have the Morillon view which is aid to

21 get through at any cost, and I'm not -- excuse me, not at any cost, but

22 aid -- get it through?

23 A. Yeah, yeah.

24 Q. And you have the UNHCR view that is that they are -- I'm making

25 an assumption here, that they are an independent organisation and nobody

Page 9257

1 is going to dictate in any fashion whatsoever how humanitarian aid is to

2 be delivered?

3 A. I believe that's a fair summary.

4 Q. Okay. How long did UNHCR suspend the delivery of humanitarian

5 aid as a result of their decision that they needed to take a stand with

6 regard to this issue?

7 A. I can't remember exactly, but what I do know is that before the

8 end of November, humanitarian aid convoys were once again moving.

9 Q. And that is as a matter of fact the convoy that leaves sometime

10 around, I think, the 27th of November?

11 A. That is one particular convoy which went through to -- which

12 eventually didn't succeed in getting through to Srebrenica. What I need

13 to emphasise here is that we've been talking and focusing obviously on

14 convoys to the enclaves, but there are dozens and dozens of other convoys

15 going to other parts of Bosnia, and that we should not lose site of the

16 fact that there are also many other UNHCR activities, not just these

17 particular convoys.

18 Q. You had earlier mentioned, and I just want to grab the point

19 while it's fresh in the mind, you had earlier mentioned that your mandate

20 was a mandate under, I believe, you said Chapter 6?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. And in that regard you were not -- were not to engage in

23 fighting, those are the words that you used, you said as a matter of fact

24 on page 60:

25 "Our mandate was not to engage in the fighting."

Page 9258

1 I wanted to ask you about that, which is, when -- if you are

2 aware of this, when the mandate changed from a Chapter 6 mandate to a

3 Chapter 7 mandate, at that point didn't the mandate remain the same with

4 regard to engaging in the fighting? Didn't the mandate remain as being a

5 peacekeeping mandate as opposed to some other form of mandate which

6 caused a whole series of other confusions ultimately, but from the outset

7 the mandate was never for UNPROFOR to engage in any fighting?

8 A. The key difference is that under Chapter 6 in order to achieve

9 whatever the mandate is in Chapter 6, you are not allowed to use force.

10 Whereas under Chapter 7 the UN force is allowed to use force in order to

11 achieve its mission. And that's the key difference between Chapter 6 and

12 Chapter 7; it's the use of the permissibility of the UN to use force.

13 Q. So, it's your position that the UN can -- an UNPROFOR force can

14 use some form of aggressive action in order to achieve the mandate of

15 delivering of humanitarian aid, is that your position?

16 A. Under Chapter 7, however we were not operating under Chapter 7,

17 we were operating under Chapter 6 which does not permit that.

18 Q. If I were to suggest to you, Colonel Tucker, that that

19 interpretation is a relatively novel one in terms of what we've seen in

20 this trial and that we have heard a fair amount of testimony that the

21 mandate under Chapter 7 was peacekeeping and the only time that

22 aggressive force could be used was in self-Defence, would that -- would

23 you disagree with that interpretation of the mandate under Chapter 7?

24 A. Under Chapter 6, self-Defence was, of course, also permitted; but

25 under Chapter 6 we were not allowed to take any actions on one side or

Page 9259

1 the other.

2 Q. I don't think you've answered my question, sir, my question is --

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.

4 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I believe that asking the witness to

5 explain in expertise on Chapter 7 of the UN mandate is inappropriate. He

6 has described what his personal experiences were under Chapter 6, to go

7 forward and ask him to render opinions on Chapter 7 would go outside the

8 province of this witness.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.

10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I believe that he has made a very clear

11 distinction with regard to what his mandate was under Chapter 6, and he

12 recognizes that he would have had a different ability and a different

13 position under Chapter 7. And it's for that reason that I'm asking that

14 question. Because when he initially answered the question, he mentioned

15 that he did not have the mandate to engage in fighting, which I found to

16 be curious strange since the articulated mandate under Chapter 7 didn't

17 allow for UNPROFOR forces to be allowed in fighting either.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah, I guess, Mr. Guy-Smith, the point here is

19 that --

20 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm sorry.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: I guess the point here is that obviously Mr. --

22 beg your pardon Colonel Tucker is not testifying as an expert on the

23 mandate of the UNPROFOR. That's his understanding.

24 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's all I can do is ask him for his

25 understanding. I'm not asking --

Page 9260

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: And I think he has given it to you, he says under

2 Chapter 7 they can bull-doze to deliver aid. Under Chapter 6 they

3 cannot; they can only defend themselves. So his understanding is that

4 Chapter 7, you can defend yourself, you can bull-doze to open your way

5 for humanitarian aid. Under Chapter 6 --

6 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I guess you can shoot too.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Bull-doze meaning aggression. Under Chapter 6

8 it's only self-defence.

9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's his understanding.

11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. If that's his understanding --

12 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.

13 MR. GUY-SMITH:

14 Q. When you returned to the crisis headquarters, were you made aware

15 of any of the rules of engagement that had been imposed on the UNPROFOR

16 forces during the time in Sarajevo and the region?

17 A. When I was at the crisis management headquarters, that was 1996.

18 That was after the --

19 Q. That's right.

20 A. -- the NATO deployment, which was under totally different rules

21 of engagement. The -- when I was in Bosnia in 1992/1993 we were under

22 Chapter 6 --

23 Q. Sorry, my question is very simply. When you were at the crisis

24 headquarters, were you made aware of the rules of engagement that existed

25 in Sarajevo for UNPROFOR?

Page 9261

1 A. No, it was not part of the -- we were interested in the rules of

2 engagement under which the NATO force, which was deployed to Bosnia, had

3 to operate.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: You know, it will be helpful if you just answer

5 the question and stop there. Don't volunteer information about NATO

6 because that's not the question. The question is about UNPROFOR. You

7 were not given those -- you were not made aware of the rules of

8 engagement?

9 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: No. Thank you.

11 MR. GUY-SMITH:

12 Q. There was a meeting, now I'm back in a meeting with Mladic,

13 Karadzic, and General Morillon, that would have been the

14 27th of November, 1992, in which again the issue of CanBat, the

15 deployment of CanBat came up. Do you recall that?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. In that meeting, Karadzic affirmed the position that Mladic had

18 taken the day before that the question of the deployment of CanBat 2 to

19 Banja Luka was to be discussed at an assembly session; correct?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. And that once he had gotten an answer from his assembly, he would

22 get back to you with regard to that issue?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Now, in that meeting there was a discussion in which Dr. Karadzic

25 and Morillon agreed on the route for the convoy to Srebrenica; correct?

Page 9262

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. Okay. And as a result of that agreement between Morillon and

3 Karadzic, I take it that Morillon then went back to the UNHCR and said,

4 Listen, we have a way of getting humanitarian aid through that area;

5 could you please reconsider your suspension and fire up the trucks?

6 I'm being somewhat colloquial, but I think you get the intent of

7 my question.

8 A. I cannot confirm when UNHCR lifted -- I can't confirm

9 specifically when UNHCR lifted their suspension that you referred to a

10 number of minutes ago. What I can confirm is that a convoy left -- it

11 was a UNHCR convoy and that it eventually got through to Srebrenica.

12 Q. Ultimately Karadzic did get back to you with regard to the issue

13 of deployment of CanBat 2; correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And what occurred was that the assembly did not, as I understand

16 it, approve the deployment of CanBat 2 along the lines that had been

17 discussed and once again placed some other conditions with regard to what

18 government or governments would engage in the transportation of CanBat 2?

19 A. I can't remember here sat now of what the reasons for the -- but

20 I do know that -- I can confirm that the answer was no and some other

21 conditions were laid down.

22 Q. Okay. And is the statement that you -- is the statement that you

23 previously made that, once again referring to the statement that we have

24 been talking about on 28th November, the first UN convoy to reach

25 Srebrenica since the beginning of the war arrived; is that correct?

Page 9263

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And then you go on to say:

3 "The overall impression that we had at this point as a regards

4 the Bosnian Serbs' objective was that they now wanted peace. They

5 thought the war was over and were primarily interested in consolidation

6 and recognition of what they had."

7 Right?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. And that would -- that would fall into line with the discussion

10 that we were having earlier with regard to the issue of cessation of

11 hostilities agreement; right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And that also falls into line with the discussion that we've had

14 concerning how the differing parties, and by that I mean the

15 Bosnian Serbs and the Presidency viewed the issue of cease-fire and

16 peace?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Okay. And I think it would be fair to say obviously that as a

19 result of what happens in the ensuing days, by that I mean within a very

20 short period of time, the Presidency is not of the same mind with regard

21 to the issue of peace because as a matter of fact they once again begin

22 an aggressive action with regard to breaking out of Sarajevo in the early

23 part of December 1992?

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 Q. I keep on having this voice behind me saying 1992, which I think

Page 9264

1 is a good thing. Okay.

2 Now, in terms of what we have now is some humanitarian aid coming

3 through. We've had some success in that regard, which I take it you are

4 pleased with, I mean not totally satisfied, but at least this is a move

5 in the right direction; correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You have a clear impression based upon the meetings that you've

8 had with Mladic and Karadzic that they are interested at that time in

9 reaching a peaceful solution; correct?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. And you have the exact opposite view from the Presidency, which

12 is they are not quite ready for peace because -- go ahead, sorry.

13 A. They were not ready for peace, because the peace that the

14 Bosnian Serbs were trying to impose was seized through force of arms and

15 they did not accept or agree what had been seized through force of arms

16 and were therefore trying to continue and redress the situation.

17 Q. And what's happening with the Croatian contingent now?

18 A. The Croatian contingent are sitting fairly quiet at the moment

19 watching what's going on. There had been some nasty fighting between the

20 Croatian -- sorry, the Bosnian Croats and the Muslim Croats in September

21 and October down in the -- down south of Vitez, but that had stopped by

22 the time of November.

23 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the state of affairs in Sarajevo,

24 which I think you have discussed with us. You've indicated that it was

25 bitterly cold, I believe?

Page 9265

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And that there was difficulty with the delivery in situ of gas

3 and electricity; is that correct?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. With regard to that issue, in the same manner that Bosnian

6 forces -- or I should put it in other terms, let me start over again.

7 In the same manner that there had been aggressive acts by trucks

8 with mortars near Kosevo Hospital, there also was a local decision by

9 Bosniaks in Sarajevo to limit the delivery of electricity and fuel,

10 something which you discussed with Judge Orie as being a predicate to the

11 exploitation of misery. Do you recall this?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to this specific issue?

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we just clear this -- okay. Before we clear

15 it, Madam Carter.

16 MS. CARTER: I would just like that page citation.

17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yeah, it's coming.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: While you are looking for the page citation, did

19 the witness discuss with Judge Orie somewhere in the corridors, or is

20 this a Chamber?

21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Oh it's -- no, I don't think he had a discussion

22 with Judge Orie in the corridors that I would know about. This is

23 something that is discussed in trial.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think. Let's place it on the record that it was

25 a discussion with Judge Orie in court.

Page 9266

1 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's where I was going.

2 Q. I'm referring to IT-98-29-T, and I'll be dealing with a couple of

3 different pages. But with regard to the particular issue that we are

4 discussing right now, that would be page 10.030 where you were asked the

5 following questions by Judge Orie, and the following responses ensued:

6 Judge Orie, starting at line 9:

7 "I'm trying to understand this. The supplies of water,

8 electricity, and gas also served their own population, referring to the

9 Presidency authorities. What was the specific reason why they would play

10 tricks which would result in not restoring the supplies when their own

11 population would suffer from it? Do you have any explanation about

12 that?"

13 And your response, Colonel Tucker:

14 "I do have an explanation and it is as follows: There were

15 elements within the Bosnian leadership who believed that the only way to

16 take back that which had been taken from them by the Bosnian Serbs, that

17 could only happen by either international intervention in Bosnia or by

18 the provision of arms and ammunition to Bosnia, which was not possible at

19 that time because of the arms embargo. Those people believed that the

20 only way to secure such international assistance was to depict the

21 situation in Sarajevo to be so severe that the international community

22 would be willing to intervene. Therefore, it was not in their interest

23 to see any improvement in the situation in Sarajevo. It was not in their

24 interest to see any -- to see the lot of the civilian population improve.

25 To put it bluntly, the more suffering, the better because that played to

Page 9267

1 the television cameras and would ultimately lead to the pressure that

2 they wanted in order to achieve international intervention."

3 Judge Orie:

4 "Would that be, in three words, exploitation of misery?"

5 Your answer, Colonel Tucker:

6 "Could you say that again, sir?"

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Judge Orie:

9 "Would that be, in three words, exploitation of misery?"

10 Answer:

11 "Absolutely, sir."

12 I take it you stand by that?

13 A. That's correct. The only thing I would say is that that was some

14 elements, not all.

15 Q. I understand. I understand. As 1992 went to rest, that's 1992,

16 and 1993 came into the fore, you began to receive some relatively strong

17 complaints from the Bosnian Serbs with regard to attacks on them and

18 attacks on Serbian villagers in the area such as the Srebrenica enclave?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Okay. And those attacks were attacks that were emanating from

21 Naser Oric's command; correct?

22 A. Whether they were originating from Naser Oric's command, I cannot

23 confirm. What I can confirm is that the Bosnian Serbs claimed that these

24 attacks were originating out of the enclaves, and that Naser Oric was in

25 command in the enclaves.

Page 9268

1 Q. And as a matter of fact, one of the things that they were -- was

2 being brought to your attention was a massacre of some Serb civilians, I

3 believe in Kravica?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. Now, shortly thereafter you began to receive information from the

6 Presidency -- before I go there, I take it that with regard to that

7 information did you or Morillon make arrangements in January when you

8 received this information to go to the region to determine the accuracy

9 or the validity of those complaints at that time in January?

10 A. Not in January, because what happened in January is that central

11 Bosnia blew up between the Croats and the Muslims.

12 Q. It did indeed. In February you received some information, I

13 believe from, among others, President Izetbegovic and Ganic with regard

14 to the massacre at Cerska, and that massacre included relatively strong

15 allegations with regards to people being put in houses and burned, the

16 entire village was burned to the ground, that some 700 wounded or more,

17 and I'm not sure about the figure --

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. -- were in that particular village and this needed your

20 attention?

21 A. That's essentially correct.

22 Q. Okay. And President Izetbegovic and Ganic made arrangements with

23 the -- and I'm asking here, the war committee in Srebrenica to

24 facilitate, at least from their standpoint, your entry into Srebrenica;

25 correct?

Page 9269

1 A. I can't confirm whether they made arrangements, with whom they

2 made arrangements. They simply told General Morillon that they would

3 inform the people inside the enclave that General Morillon was going to

4 try and come into the enclave in order to see for himself what the

5 situation was.

6 Q. Okay. Now, by that point in time, by that I mean in

7 February of 1993, had you seen the radio communication centre at the PTT

8 building in Sarajevo?

9 A. I think you mean the radio communication centre in the Presidency

10 building.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 A. To which the answer is yes, I had.

13 Q. Thank you. Now, that particular communication centre was, I

14 think is, as you've perhaps put it previously, well equipped, strong, it

15 may not have been the most up-to-date system, but it was a system that

16 certainly could handle sophisticated communications?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Okay. And that was in Sarajevo?

19 A. In the Presidency building in Sarajevo.

20 Q. When you, and I'm jumping ahead now for a moment, when you got to

21 Srebrenica, there ultimately came a time when you were shown the same

22 kind of radio communication centre that I believe was in -- was it the

23 PTT building of the Srebrenica which was the headquarters of the war

24 committee; correct?

25 A. That's correct. It wasn't the same as the setup in Sarajevo, but

Page 9270

1 it was still a pretty comprehensive setup. It wasn't as large as the one

2 in the Presidency building.

3 Q. And as a matter of fact, what occurred with regard to you

4 becoming aware of that radio communication centre was that when the

5 decision was made for Morillon to make the speech which you alluded to

6 earlier speaking to Ms. Carter, some journalists had indicated to you or

7 told you that this particular radio communication centre existed,

8 something that you did not know beforehand, not information that had been

9 shared with you by either the war committee or Naser Oric; correct?

10 A. Correct. If I remember correctly, the journalists were actually

11 permitted by the war committee to use the radio equipment in order to

12 communicate their dispatches back to Sarajevo for ultimate publication to

13 their newspapers, radios, or whatever.

14 Q. When you decided to go into the Srebrenica area, you made

15 arrangements to get there by way of a helicopter; correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. Now, where did that helicopter leave from and where did it

18 land in the Srebrenica enclave?

19 A. This is a French national helicopter which was assigned to

20 United Nations which took off from Kiseljak and then flew to Tuzla and

21 landed in Tuzla and we got off the helicopter in Tuzla.

22 Q. Now, with regard to the - and I'm not sure what you call them, I

23 guess it would be the coordinates or the route - was there at that time a

24 recognised, I don't know what you call it, air route or air bridge?

25 A. Air corridor.

Page 9271

1 Q. Air corridor, thank you so much. Was there a recognised air

2 corridor into Srebrenica?

3 A. No. There was only an air corridor to Tuzla. Which is why --

4 that's where we were dropped off.

5 Q. Okay. And was that an air corridor that you frequented? That

6 UNPROFOR frequently used?

7 A. No, the first time it was used was when we flew from Kiseljak to

8 Tuzla in order to go into Konjevic Polje. The second time that that air

9 corridor was used was when we went from Kiseljak to Tuzla in order to go

10 into Srebrenica itself. Those were the first and second times that that

11 corridor was used.

12 Q. Now, with regard to the issue, because there two issues we

13 have -- well, there are many issues we have on this trip, but there are

14 two, I think, major issues that have been brought to your attention by

15 the various sides. One is the massacre at Kravica and the other is the

16 massacre at Cerska. Right?

17 A. There are two massacres at Cerska that I mentioned. The first is

18 the allegation by the -- by Izetbegovic and Ganic that people have been

19 locked in houses and the houses burnt down and killed in the houses. The

20 second was an allegation by the Bosnian Serbs that Serbs had been

21 massacred by the Muslims in Cerska?

22 Q. Okay. With regard to -- and I'm now going to jump ahead for a

23 moment. I believe it was on the 22nd of March you attended a funeral,

24 but sometime around the 22nd of March you were shown a series of bodies

25 that were decomposed bodies that the Bosnian Serbs indicated to you were

Page 9272

1 the people who had been massacred; correct?

2 A. We were shown firstly to the site where the excavations were

3 going on and there were forensic investigations going on and we saw these

4 investigations going on, saw a number of decomposing bodies, and we were

5 shown the building in which one of the survivors of the massacre claimed

6 he had seen Bosnian Muslims killing these Bosnian Serb villagers.

7 We were then after that taken to the funeral which was actually

8 in, in fact, it was on the outskirts of Bratunac.

9 Q. And with regard to that particular incident, and by that I mean

10 your viewing of the bodies and your going to the particular crime scenes,

11 you did not make any specific reports with regard to that visit that you

12 made to the crime scene in Kravica because that wasn't your mission or

13 your task; right?

14 A. I did report what had happened, what we had seen, and it was

15 again part of the radio communications that I've described previously.

16 And we indeed reported this to the headquarters, BH command back in

17 Kiseljak.

18 Q. Just so I'm clear, so I understand, with regard to the crime

19 scene that you went to, you made no specific report about that; correct?

20 A. No. I reported that we had been to this scene at Kravica, that

21 the Serbs had made these allegations to us about what had happened, and I

22 repeated those allegations, and they were reported to Kiseljak.

23 Q. Okay. Perhaps you can be of some help to me in that regard.

24 Apart from the first statement that we've been discussing, you also made

25 a statement on the 20th and 21st of September, 2002, and the

Page 9273

1 1st and 2nd of November, 2002, in which you said on page 16 of that

2 statement:

3 "I did not make any specific report with regard to the visit that

4 we made to this crime scene in Kravica. The reason for this was that our

5 mission and task in Bosnia was not to gather evidence, but to ensure

6 humanitarian aid reached those in need and to support all efforts to

7 reduce the bloodshed and prove the safety of the civilian population in

8 the region."

9 You go on to say more, and I want to be fair to you because I can

10 tell you exactly what you said.

11 "Furthermore, in my view there was little substance to record.

12 In general, I sent reports to Kiseljak at least daily and on occasion

13 every two hours. Other than the report, we had visited Kravica, I do not

14 believe I gave any specific details in those reports."

15 So as I understand it, with regard to the issue of there being a

16 specific report concerning the -- what had been characterised as a

17 massacre of Serbian villagers, you did not memorialise that in any

18 fashion at the time of the event other than the oral reporting that you

19 made?

20 A. What I did was, if I remember correctly, was provide a report of

21 what had happened that day. On that day, this visit had taken place and

22 I reported that we had conducted this visit. And that we had been to

23 this -- the scene of this alleged massacre. And that we had seen bodies.

24 What I did not do was try and collect legal evidence as to what had or

25 had not happened because that -- the collection of legal evidence in

Page 9274

1 order to support subsequent prosecution, that's what I meant was not part

2 of my task and objective at the time.

3 Q. Okay. I was trying to understand what you meant when you said

4 you did not make a specific report, you clarified that?

5 A. I did not make a legally --

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: A legal inspection.

7 THE WITNESS: A legal inspection.

8 MR. GUY-SMITH:

9 Q. With regard to the other area that -- the Cerska area, you didn't

10 go to Cerska, did you?

11 A. I went to the outskirts of Cerska, it was Morillon himself who

12 physically went into the village itself.

13 Q. Okay. And before he went into the village, you had, apart from

14 meeting with Izetbegovic and Ganic who had told you about the horrors

15 that had occurred, you also spoke, I believe, with Naser Oric about that

16 when you were in Srebrenica and Oric - would it be fair to say? - echoed

17 the same, which is that people were burned in houses and that there were

18 hundreds, 700 or more, who had been wounded; correct?

19 A. Your mixing up two separate events. The issue of being burnt in

20 houses, Naser Oric echoed. The issue of the claim that there were 700 or

21 so wounded in Konjevic Polje, that was a claim which was made by

22 Izetbegovic and Ganic, which was one of the reasons leading to

23 General Morillon's decision to go there to investigate the actual

24 situation on the grounds himself.

25 Q. Above and beyond Izetbegovic Ganic and Oric, you also had

Page 9275

1 occasion to speak with a Bosniak commander in Tuzla?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Who also gave you that same information?

4 A. Yes, he was also very specific about the accusation of people

5 being burned in houses.

6 Q. Okay. Apart from those individuals who you mentioned, did

7 anybody else on the Bosniak side, which I will call for, as you have, the

8 Presidency side, give you further information concerning the burning of

9 people in houses, or are we left with Izetbegovic, Ganic --

10 A. I think Izetbegovic, Ganic, the Bosniak commander in Tuzla, and

11 Oric.

12 Q. Morillon went to Cerska, he examined the area; correct?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. He made a number of determinations about what occurred, one,

15 there had been heavy fighting; correct?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. Two, the number of wounded was not in the neighbourhood of 700

18 but rather much less?

19 A. That's the number of wounded which we found in Konjevic Polje.

20 It wasn't actually General Morillon who determined that. It was somebody

21 from Medicins Sans Frontieres who went around all the houses in Konjevic

22 Polje in order to triage the injured for evacuation, and it was he who

23 came back and said there are not 700 here, there are about 70 here. 700

24 is a specific number, the 70 is --

25 Q. It was 73 give or take a couple.

Page 9276

1 A. Something like that.

2 Q. And with regard to the issue of people being burned, Morillon

3 said --

4 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I refer the Court and counsel to IT-03-68

5 page 5831, starting at line 15 of your examination by Mr. Di Fazio of the

6 Office of the Prosecutor:

7 "Q. Did he report any bodies in houses that had been burned?

8 "A. General Morillon said that he had unfortunately -- that he

9 was unfortunately familiar with the smell of burnt human flesh and that

10 he had walked around the village and that he had not smelled that smell

11 and that he had not seen anything which indicated that anyone had been

12 burnt or there had been people burnt inside houses."

13 Correct?

14 A. That's correct.

15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Would this be a convenient time?

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: That would be a convenient time. And before we

17 move, let me just indicate that ID00-8093 was not tendered. Was that

18 your intension?

19 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's correct, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Secondly, we obviously haven't

21 finished today. It looks like we had been scheduled to finish today with

22 this witness. We may have difficulties tomorrow with interpreters. We

23 may not be able to sit a full session. How much longer are you likely to

24 be with the witness?

25 MR. GUY-SMITH: I don't believe based upon what I see here that I

Page 9277

1 have any -- that I have -- I don't believe I have much more than a

2 session. I believe I can get it done in a session, I think with a --

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

4 MR. GUY-SMITH: With a bit of thought over the evening. I will

5 do what I can to make sure that my hopes become a reality.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Can we impress on you to do those thoughts

7 tonight.

8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Indeed so.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: We will then adjourn to tomorrow, but before we do

10 so, Colonel Tucker, I must again warn you, it's my duty unfortunately,

11 but I do know you know it you are not supposed to talk to anybody about

12 the case, not even your counsel, until you are excused from the

13 witness-stand.

14 Court stands adjourned to tomorrow 9.00 in the morning,

15 Courtroom II. Court adjourned.

16 [The witness stands down]

17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

18 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day

19 of September, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.