1 Tuesday, 4 July 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I greet

8 you all. It's case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are today Tuesday, the 4th of

10 July. I'd like to greet all the people present in the courtroom; the

11 representatives from the Prosecution, the Defence counsel, the accused,

12 Mr. Coric who is back again today, and I should also like to welcome all

13 the people working in the courtroom. We have an hour and a half now and

14 we will pursue the examination-in-chief until our next break, and without

15 more ado, I shall turn the floor over to Mr. Scott.

16 WITNESS: JOSIP MANOLIC [Resumed]

17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Examination by Mr. Scott: [Continued]

19 MR. SCOTT: Good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours.

20 Q. And good morning, Mr. Manolic.

21 A. Thank you. Good morning.

22 Q. Is your voice okay?

23 A. It's okay. Thank you.

24 Q. Sir, I would like to start this morning by taking you to the book

25 -- your book, which I believe you have with you. If it will assist you

1 we can put it on the screen. I understand you have a copy of your book

2 with you. It's Exhibit P 09673.

3 MR. SCOTT: And, Your Honour, for purposes of the English

4 translation, you should have a bundle of materials that was given to you.

5 I'm going to start with the excerpt that is titled at the top of the page

6 "Key to breaking up: policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina." I do not

7 believe it's in the large bundles, I'm told by my case manager, but they

8 were handed out to the Chamber a few minutes ago. And it is the first

9 bundle -- first piece of it we'll be talking about is, again, on the top

10 of the page, it says: "3. Key to breaking up: policy towards

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina," and it corresponds to pages 317 to 321 of the

12 Croatian-language book.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please put it on the

14 monitor so I don't have to search through the book now.

15 Q. Either way, whatever is best for you, sir. If you could put up,

16 please, page 317, then, of Exhibit P 09673. Although I'm not sure,

17 Mr. Manolic, whether it won't be easier for you ultimately to use your

18 book, but it's up to you. We're starting at page 317 of the B/C/S

19 material.

20 Sir, on that page under that heading that I've just referred to

21 several times, it says this: "In his 22 April, 1994, interview to Globus,

22 Manolic explained once again - but this time in more detail than ever -

23 what were the main differences between him and President Tudjman with

24 regard to policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina."

25 Further on, the next two paragraphs -- at the end of the next

1 paragraph, it says: "My supporters -" that is yours, Mr. Manolic - "My

2 supporters, as it is known, were opting for an alliance with Muslims and

3 for integral Bosnia and Herzegovina within the borders defined after World

4 War II. Tudjman and Milosevic, however, agreed on division of Bosnia and

5 Herzegovina.

6 "Everything that followed after negotiations took place -- which

7 took place in Karadjordjevo in March of 1991 showed clearly that Tudjman

8 and Milosevic agreed on partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina ..."

9 Now, with that in mind, sir, and looking back at the first

10 paragraph that I directed your attention to, where it says the main

11 differences between you and President Tudjman with regard to the policy

12 towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, can you tell us, sir, again, what were the

13 main differences between you and President Tudjman on this policy?

14 A. First of all, I adhered to the results of the referendum which was

15 held, in favour of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was a legal

16 referendum, and the entire people voted, both the Croat people and the

17 Muslim people. Starting from this, I constantly advocated the standpoint

18 that there are no realistic possibilities of dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina,

19 especially not when tensions escalated at the point in time when the

20 republic Herceg-Bosna was established. It's impossible for there to be

21 two states on a single territory, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an

22 integral state and, within that state, a new republic. This was

23 illogical, it was impossible, it was not viable. It could have been

24 viable for a brief period of time until a new solution was found.

25 President Tudjman wanted to annex Western Herzegovina to Croatia.

1 This was a wish. It was the request of those seven or eight

2 municipalities, the names of which we read out yesterday. The people who

3 lived in those areas felt that their future and their security could be

4 found within the borders of the Republic of Croatia. However, wishes are

5 one thing and realistic possibilities of realising your desire are

6 something else, and there were no realistic preconditions for realising

7 that wish. Therefore, this was in dispute between me and President

8 Tudjman, and we never agreed on it until the very last day, until the

9 Washington agreements were signed which put an end to this dilemma and

10 created the federation of Croats and Muslims in that area.

11 Q. All right, sir. Continuing down the same page beyond where we've

12 read already, it says: "Most certainly subjects of the Karadjordjevo

13 talks were changes of internal borders and increase of Croat and Serbian

14 state territories ..."

15 Can you tell us what was -- what was your understanding, what was

16 being discussed in terms of not internal borders but the increase of Croat

17 state territory? How was that going to be done and where was that going

18 to be done?

19 A. It's impossible to increase the territory of any state without

20 entering onto the territory of another state. The same situation obtained

21 here. It was impossible to increase the territory of Croatia or to

22 thicken the crescent, the croissant, without impinging upon the

23 neighbouring state. There are only two ways of achieving something like

24 this; either through agreements or by force. There weren't very many

25 conditions for the forcible solution, although there was violence, of

1 course.

2 Q. In the next paragraph, it says: "Tudjman wanted to incorporate

3 West Herzegovina into Croatia. He counted also on some other parts of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the most important issue was the annexation of

5 Herzegovina."

6 Why was the annexation of Herzegovina the most important part?

7 A. This was ethnically the purest Croatian territory. It was

8 inhabited by ethnic Croats, and it is territorially adjacent to the

9 Republic of Croatia, so it was most natural to annex that part, but as we

10 know, this never happened.

11 Q. In the next paragraph you refer to talks in Graz between Mate

12 Boban and Radovan Karadzic in 1992. At the end of that paragraph you say,

13 that these "... interests can be adjusted only to the detriment of

14 Bosniaks and central government in Sarajevo." Why could those interests

15 only be adjusted to the detriment of Bosniaks and the Central Bosnian

16 government?

17 A. Because the two sides, the Serbs with Karadzic at their head and

18 the Croats with Mate Boban at the head, and they had a written agreement -

19 the results show this - they agreed on spheres of interest in that area,

20 and this impinged on the central issue of the existence of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent and sovereign state.

22 Q. If you could continue down. Skip one paragraph, please, until you

23 find this language -- in the English excerpt, Your Honours and for the

24 courtroom, I'm turning to page 2 of the English translation of that

25 excerpt, second paragraph: "According to this, the official state policy

1 -- the official Croatian policy wanted to make the government in Sarajevo

2 weaker, and this can be proved without problem. Even before the conflict

3 between Muslims and Croats began, a decision on pulling out all Croat

4 ministers from the central government was adopted by Zagreb."

5 Can you please tell the Judges more about how these ministers were

6 pulled out of the government.

7 A. I think this was a mistake, made by President Tudjman first of

8 all. He agreed on this thesis of withdrawal. We as the Croatian state

9 had recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state. It was our

10 neighbouring state. So it was not logical that this government

11 representing Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state, that one should

12 withdraw one's ministers, Croats, from that government. This means

13 opening up space for the aggressor, the enemy, which was the greatest

14 Serbian policy of Karadzic.

15 The defenders of Bosnia-Herzegovina would find it very difficult

16 to defend it. There was no reason not to adhere the results of the

17 referendum about the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the decision made

18 by the Croatian government to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign

19 state in the area. So this decision on withdrawing ministers ran counter

20 to these two decisions, and as we have seen, it was not a good decision.

21 Q. Now, further on --

22 A. It was -- the result of that withdrawal was weakening the central

23 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this helped the Greater Serbian

24 aggressor; that is Karadzic. That was a mistake that President Tudjman

25 made.

1 Q. Now --

2 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, I'm sorry to interrupt. We've had a

3 technical problem with LiveNote on the Defence side since the beginning of

4 the session, and we had hoped that it would be solved within a few

5 minutes, and we wanted to continue, but, Your Honour, it's getting more

6 and more difficult because there are certain passages that we need to

7 follow in LiveNote and I wonder if we can get some information perhaps

8 about that.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Is it only your screen that's a

10 problem? This will be seen to in a few minutes.

11 MR. MURPHY: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.

12 MR. SCOTT:

13 Q. Sir, just further, a bit down that same page, you refer to this

14 happening a second time. You say, "The second time, the decision to

15 withdraw Croat ministers was adopted." Do you recall approximately when

16 that occurred and why that was done?

17 A. I think this was when there was already a conflict between the

18 Croats and the Muslims, an armed conflict in that area. Mr. Boban and

19 Herceg-Bosna defended this by saying that the Croatian ministers could not

20 be in the central government as long as there was a war between the

21 Muslims and the Croats, and the Muslims were in fact holding the central

22 power in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, this withdrawal was not

23 realistic, and it was not in the interest of the Croatian people, because

24 weakening the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina at that point

25 in the face of the main aggressor was also weakening the overall Croatian

1 position in relation to that aggressor. There was an aggression not only

2 against Bosnia-Herzegovina but also against Croatia, and the aggressor was

3 one and the same.

4 Q. Sir, if I could ask you to turn several pages in your book until

5 you find the paragraph that starts: "It is obvious that the main

6 idea ..." And for the English readers, I'm now -- we're going to page 4

7 of that same excerpt.

8 So if you can find, sir -- or it can be put on the screen, either

9 way. If you can find a page or two down from where we were, where it

10 says, "It is obvious that the main idea ..." Do you have that?

11 A. [No interpretation].

12 Q. Can you see it, sir? Page 320 of your book, apparently.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. It says: "It is obvious that the main idea of the Croatian state

15 policy was brought down to a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina

16 independently from any other circumstances. Annexation of Herzegovina to

17 Croatia was really the guiding idea of the Croatian state policy in the

18 last two years."

19 Now, with that in mind, could I ask you to skip a paragraph and go

20 down one paragraph, where it says, "Actually, main goal of Tudjman's

21 policy was the realisation of the Banovina Croatia borders."

22 Do you see that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And was that in fact the policy of Tudjman and Susak and Boban?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. I don't think that Susak and Boban did nothing without the

2 knowledge of President Tudjman as regards their activities. Gojko Susak -

3 and you have something I said about it in the text - said that the HDZ of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was the party through which this policy was

5 being implemented, was only a branch of the HDZ of the Republic of

6 Croatia, and this is what was impermissible. This is the link that gave

7 rise to considerable difficulties for us in defending our standpoint that

8 we did not - we as Croatia - did not participate in the war in

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But these elements indicate that, contrary to this,

10 the overall policy was being prosecuted by Croatia from Zagreb with

11 respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Herceg-Bosna as a republic. Its

12 existence and its establishment would not have happened had it not been in

13 line with the ideas of President Tudjman, Gojko Susak, and the others who

14 supported them. And in Zagreb, we can see Gojko Susak, the minister of

15 defence of the Republic of Croatia, Vice Vukojevic, who was working on the

16 same plan and who was more influential in the legislative sphere, and Mr.

17 Pasalic, who joined the same line.

18 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the main implementers of this policy were

19 Boban, Kordic, and the third echelon, including the accused here.

20 Q. At the bottom of that page, sir, in the next paragraph, you go on

21 to say that you had initially shown some constraint in criticising

22 President Tudjman directly, but then at the end of that paragraph you said

23 that there was no reason any longer to do that. You make reference to the

24 -- apparently a speech by President Tudjman at the Deputies Club, HDZ

25 Deputies Club. Can you tell us what you can recall about the speech by

1 Mr. Tudjman in which you say here, "The president took complete

2 responsibility for policy towards BiH"?

3 A. Yes. Until that point in time, we had pointed out that Gojko

4 Susak and, as we called it, the Herzegovina lobby, were the main exponents

5 of this policy of Herceg-Bosna, the conflict with the Muslims, the

6 weakening of the central government, and the setting of demands for the

7 partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, in a speech of his President

8 Tudjman made to the Deputies Club in the Croatian parliament - and this is

9 where we definitely parted ways - he said that the policy being

10 implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina and towards Bosnia and Herzegovina

11 was his policy. He took on himself this responsibility by saying it was

12 his policy. Gojko Susak, as the minister of defence, was said by Tudjman

13 to be a good minister because he was implementing Tudjman's policy. And

14 this is evidence of who was responsible for what was happening in that

15 area at that time.

16 In my public speeches, I should say, throughout this period I

17 tried to bypass President Tudjman as the one who was responsible for this

18 policy which I felt was disastrous, catastrophic for the Croatian state as

19 a whole. I tried to give him room for manoeuvre. He, as the president of

20 Croatia, as the commander-in-chief of the Croatian army, could always

21 represent things differently than what was actually happening. And you

22 will find this in all the transcripts and in my book. And I wish to

23 emphasise the positive elements in searching for a solution. More than

24 once, especially after the Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreement, I emphasised

25 those elements which could have produced positive results in resolving the

1 problem we were facing in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 Q. Let me stop you there, sir, just in terms of -- for the record,

3 when you make reference to Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreement, can you give us

4 a bit more information about which agreement you're talking about and the

5 approximate date?

6 A. This agreement which I mentioned was reached later on in 1994 when

7 a definite solution was sought before the Washington Agreement. So it was

8 the end of 1993, sometime in September, in that period.

9 Q. If I next ask you, sir, to go to page 246 of your book. And for

10 the courtroom and the English version excerpt, it is the one that says --

11 starts with "6. Policy regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina."

12 On that page, if you start with page 246 of your book and if you

13 go down about to the fourth paragraph, can you find a passage, please, sir

14 -- also fourth paragraph on the English version: "Firstly, it was

15 concluded that the question regarding the creation of Herceg-Bosna, as a

16 state in a state, had no basis." It's on page 247, third paragraph of

17 your book.

18 And can you tell the Judges, please, a bit more about why the

19 creation of Herceg-Bosna as a state in a skate had no basis?

20 A. There was no theoretical possibility, nor was there any practical

21 possibility. If we were going to create a separate state within a state,

22 this would bring us into conflict with the legal and constitutional order

23 of that state. That same constitutional order established the external

24 borders but also the internal order. So of course such a policy would

25 come into conflict with this.

1 I always pointed out that this was an unrealistic policy which

2 would do no good either to the Croatian state or to the Croatian people in

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The biggest mistake that was made when Herceg-Bosna

4 was established as a republic was that the Croatian population in Bosnia

5 and Herzegovina was split up. The Croats living in Central Bosnia, in

6 Bosnian Posavina, those Croats were, in a way, cut off from Herceg-Bosna

7 as a state and an entity, so that this segment, by separating itself out,

8 weakened the entire Croatian body in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatian

9 Catholic clergy and many other opposition parties opposed such a policy,

10 because it's well known that the area of Banja Luka and Bosanska Posavina

11 had about 150.000 Catholics, parishioners in that area. And when Bishop

12 Komarica protested against this division because of this policy, and we

13 also have to say because of the Greater Serbian aggression, but also

14 because of Boban's policy who was calling upon the Croats from that area

15 to come to the Adriatic, to come Istria, to find a new home there, this

16 was the biggest mistake that was made in relation to the Croatian people

17 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also I think it weakened the position of the

18 Croatian state in relation to the aggressor and in view of the subsequent

19 development of events in the area which is still being resolved.

20 Q. In that same paragraph, sir, you mention, several lines down,

21 "Some moves of certain people showed that a separate state was really

22 being created in Herceg-Bosna."

23 Can you give us any examples of the moves? You say "some moves,"

24 example of the moves that showed that? And when you say "certain people,"

25 if you can identify any people, the persons that you would include in that

1 group.

2 A. It is widely known that the people through whom such policy was

3 pursued were Boban, whom I mentioned, Kordic, and people from that

4 establishment. Those were the people who were the proponents of that

5 policy at the time.

6 I think that we also have to compare this to the period when

7 Kljuic was president of the HDZ, and then Brkic, who served in that office

8 for a brief period of time. They opposed such policy precisely because of

9 the element that I motioned, because such policy split apart the interests

10 of Croatian people in that territory.

11 When I criticised Susak by telling him that he pursued an

12 erroneous policy and that such policy took into account only the interests

13 of Croats in Herzegovina, whereas my policy was a policy which took into

14 account the entirety of interests of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

15 this is where we differed mainly.

16 Q. All right. Sir, if you could go to page 249 of your book, second

17 paragraph on that page, and the third page of this particular excerpt in

18 the English translation. It says: "Herzegovina does not at all suit at

19 least one of these three sides, and that is the Muslims, who are in the

20 majority in this country, 44 per cent. The annihilation is something the

21 Serbian radicals want, thus achieving the plan of 'Greater Serbia,' but I

22 can't claim that on the Croatian side there aren't those who see the

23 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the solution either."

24 And then if you go down, you'll see further you just made

25 reference, which I was going to ask you, but you talk about Kljuic and

1 Brkic. Do you see that in your book on that page? The next -- middle of

2 the following paragraph, sir, do you see the names Kljuic and Brkic?

3 A. Yes. I said that in Croatian politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina

4 there must be room for the thoughts of Kljuic and Brkic and Boban. I

5 meant to say that we should take into account what Kljuic thought that was

6 in the interest of the entire Croatian people, and this was also the

7 position taken by Kljuic. This is why they were against very firmly

8 defined borders between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. And you can

9 see this in one portion of the Boban-Karadzic agreement reached in Graz.

10 You see that there is something quite dishonest that the Serbs forced

11 Boban to accept, because they stepped aside from the ethnic principle.

12 There were no Serbs living in that area. However, they wanted to gain the

13 territory in that corridor for themselves. And this was impermissible,

14 because if you adhere to one principle in your policies, then you have to

15 comply with that principle in your policy as a whole in all of the

16 territories to which your policy applies.

17 Q. In the one paragraph down below -- skip a paragraph, I believe,

18 after the references to Kljuic and Brkic, and you see this passage,

19 please: "The most Zagreb can do is to advocate a change in the policy

20 that has resulted in the fatal consequences for the Croatian nation in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina."

22 Again, sir, could you please tell the Judges -- describe the

23 policy -- describe the policy that resulted in the fatal -- in fatal

24 consequences for the Croatian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 A. First of all, the armed conflict with the Muslims. What happened

1 there was that there was an erroneous assessment of the Herzegovina lobby

2 in the first place. I can say that, because President Tudjman had some

3 dilemmas concerning that problem, namely that the Croatian forces would be

4 able to defeat the enemy in armed conflict very soon and then pave the way

5 for their policies. However, that didn't happen.

6 What happened was that the opposing side, the Muslim side, which

7 proposed the central government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, continually

8 became stronger. It had a huge human potential that it used throughout

9 the war, and its potential increased during the war. It was only

10 handicapped by the fact that on one hand it was surrounded by Croatian

11 policies, and on the other hand it was surrounded by Serbian policies,

12 which didn't allow it to reach the full potential or to achieve the full

13 potential in terms of armament that would supply all of the human

14 resources that the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina had at its

15 disposal. So this is where they made a mistake. It was an erroneous

16 assessment concerning the ratio of forces that existed in that territory,

17 and that opened the way for the armed conflict with the Muslims.

18 Q. Sir, a moment ago you used the term "Herzegovina lobby," which I'm

19 not sure that phrase or term has been used before in the trial. Can you

20 tell the Judges, when you say "Herzegovina lobby," what is that and who

21 comprised it?

22 A. Just like all lobbies, in theoretical sense it means that all

23 people supporting the same ideas join forces in order to defend the ideas

24 and goals that they're going to try to achieve. This was the Herzegovina

25 lobby, and in Croatian political scene that included those people that I

1 mentioned. Those are the people who accepted that the conflict with the

2 Muslims was a good solution and would further the policy that they

3 created. Those people included Boban, Kordic, and others, other leaders

4 at the time.

5 Naturally, they had support in certain municipalities, in the

6 grassroots. So not only at the top within the HVO and Croatian army. No,

7 they also had their supporters in municipalities, that is to say in the

8 field, but it also had some opponents, because otherwise it would have

9 been impossible for the Croatian civil party to be established, and it was

10 established in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11 Q. Sir, could I next ask you please to turn to page 262 of your book.

12 And for those using the English translation, it is in the excerpt that

13 starts on the top of the first page, "2. The Croatian-Muslim war in

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina." Excerpt titled, "2. The Croatian-Muslim war in

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina."

16 On page 262 of your book, sir, if you see this. You make

17 references at the end of the paragraph to "... the architects and

18 organisers of this for the Croatian fate almost suicidal war."

19 And when you say architects and organisers of this, do you have in

20 mind the same people you've been telling us about this morning or do you

21 want to add or say anything more about the architects and organisers of

22 this?

23 A. I think that this refers to the same people who were the

24 proponents of this policy and its architects, its authors. Their main

25 mistake was that they made an erroneous judgement about the balance of

1 forces, and as a result of that they entered into an armed conflict with

2 the Muslims. And this is where all the tension arose.

3 The defenders of this policy kept saying that it wasn't us who

4 started this conflict, it was the Muslims, the opposite side. And it is

5 very difficult now to establish who started it first. It is clear why

6 this conflict arose. It is clear now what led to it, but who fired the

7 first bullet, was it the Muslims against Croats, or was it vice versa?

8 It's hard to say.

9 Q. When you said just now it is clear why this conflict arose, that

10 is regardless of, as you say, who fired the first bullet, it is clear why

11 this conflict arose, can you give us more information about that? In what

12 way is it clear?

13 A. It's clear based on everything that led to it, all the

14 preparations. It was clear based on the agreement reached between Boban

15 and Karadzic, because if you enter into negotiations with an aggressor,

16 somebody who was an aggressor until just recently prior to that, this

17 means that this was a radical change that took place, that they made an

18 erroneous judgement as to the balance of forces, and the conflict with

19 Muslims broke out. The front against the aggression wasn't completely

20 closed either. It was still smouldering. There were still UNPA zones

21 existing in Croatia where the Serbs were dominant.

22 Q. Sir, you mentioned in the immediate following passage or two, you

23 mentioned the concentration camps for Muslims on the territory of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. During this time, sir, did you condemn the existence,

25 operation of those concentration camps?

1 A. When we refer to fatal mistakes that were done, that we, then -- I

2 firstly am referring to the armed conflict. That was the starting point.

3 And then the camps, prisons, and torture facilities were just what led

4 after that first initial mistake, what resulted after that first initial

5 mistake.

6 There were several of us within the Croatian Assembly which

7 consistently opposed that policy and the resulting mistakes. It wasn't a

8 sin that we discussed it. What was the sin were the goals of the

9 conversation led by President Tudjman and the others. This is what was

10 criminal, and this is what produced the consequences that we discuss to

11 this day; problems that were created in the past and that we continue to

12 discuss to this day, including before this International Court.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like

15 to correct Mr. Scott, who in his question said: "You spoke of

16 concentration camps at the time." And then what Mr. Manolic said in that

17 interview does not refer to concentration camps at all. It was the

18 journalist who mentioned concentration camps in his question. I would

19 like to clarify that.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. That's correct, Mr. Scott.

21 I noticed that there is the phrase stating "the HVO camps." You said

22 "concentration camps." It was you who said it, and this is where the

23 problem arose, Mr. Scott.

24 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, I don't see -- I don't see the issue, Your

25 Honour. In the book, at least the translation that I have, it says: "In

1 this context, in an interview with Globus on the 10th of September, 1993,

2 Manolic spoke for the first time, although not entirely openly, about the

3 concentration camps for Muslims on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

4 Then he goes on to talk about them, and the next line, couple of

5 lines down, it says: "I am aware of the fact that the HVO camps make the

6 Croats in Bosnia appear evermore like the Serbs."

7 So I'm not sure what the problem is. It clearly identifies

8 concentration camps. Those are Mr. Manolic's words. He clearly says

9 they're HVO camps.

10 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, if I may. I think the point that

11 Mr. Praljak is making is that the word "concentration" does not appear to

12 be in the Croatian version, although it is in the English translation. At

13 least, that's what I'm told.

14 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, if that's issue, I'll be happy to ask the

15 witness if he can clarify from his book.

16 Q. Sir, you've heard, I hope, this exchange in the last moment or

17 two. When you look in the Croatian-language original in your book about

18 that statement, does the word "concentration" -- do the words

19 "concentration camps" occur in your language in that passage?

20 A. First of all, we need to say that the establishment of

21 concentration camps was to an extent a secret. The public wasn't actually

22 informed about the creation of such camps. You must be aware of this.

23 I think that there was a commission of the Red Cross, or perhaps

24 the Red Crescent, which established that there existed an HVO camp within

25 Bosnia. I believe that it was in Dretelj. So I think that we really

1 shouldn't debate whether it was a concentration camp or not. The fact is

2 that people were kept there. Some of them were civilians, and some of

3 them were prisoners. This is what the commission established. And this

4 is what produced the reaction of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior and

5 other institutions aimed at shutting down that concentration camp.

6 I don't know whether I was clear enough.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, in your book you

8 speak of the camps. At the time you were in Zagreb; right?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So what was the information

11 reaching the politicians in Zagreb, politicians such as you, about the

12 existence of prisons in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What information did you have

13 available at the time?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already pointed out that to a

15 certain extent this was secret, and this was not discussed publicly in

16 Zagreb. This is how it was at the time until certain inhumane acts were

17 made public, and the public included the Red Cross and other institutions.

18 And then these institutions reacted by saying that this should be put to

19 an end. This is when President Tudjman spoke out, including others, and

20 they were saying that these camps need to be disbanded.

21 I don't think that it was done. I don't know how long it took for

22 the camps to be disbanded and cleared away. I can't tell you that now.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] President Tudjman, did he have

24 any intelligence services forwarding to him information about what was

25 going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Listen, he was certainly informed,

2 just as it was certain that the minister of defence was in daily contact

3 with Boban and other leaders in Herceg-Bosna. I have no doubt concerning

4 that, and I don't bring that into question at all. If that needs to be

5 proven, then we should be able to prove these elements as well.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It seems that you're trying to

7 say that President Tudjman was informed about the existence of those

8 camps.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Scott, you may

11 continue.

12 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, for the record, I'm advised by

13 Ms. Matacic, who does speak and read Croatian, that indeed in the book the

14 word "concentration" does not appear, and I'm happy to have that corrected

15 to that extent. However, I think the witness has made his position quite

16 clear.

17 Q. Sir, if I could next ask you to move down the page or find where

18 you see the words: "In the 12th of October, 1993, edition of Danas ..."

19 At the bottom of page 262. It says: "... Manolic had the following to

20 say about the responsibility of the Croatian authorities for the war with

21 the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 'I expressed my disagreement with the

22 Croatian policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina by taking a critical stance

23 towards the steps that were taken in the Croatian Community of

24 Herceg-Bosna vis-a-vis the general interest of the Croatian people in BH.

25 I believed, and I still do, that isolating the Herzegovinian Croats

1 weakened the overall Croatian --'" I'm going to suggest that perhaps that

2 word is "corpus. " What's been said is "corps" in English. "'-- in BH

3 and the BH position in the resolution of the crisis as a whole.'"

4 It's not -- at least in translation, sir, in the English, when it

5 says isolating, "that isolating the Herzegovinian Croats weakened the

6 overall Croatian" core, or corpus, what do you mean by "isolating the

7 Herzegovinian Croats" in that context? And maybe it's a translation

8 issue.

9 A. This was not a translation error. Rather, this involves facts.

10 The fact was, or the fact is, that Croats do not only live in Herzegovina.

11 Rather, they live in all other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They're

12 more numerous in some areas than in others, somewhere they constitute

13 minority and somewhere they constitute majority. These are the people who

14 felt most threatened when the conflict between Croats and Muslims broke

15 out, because up until that time, more or less they resisted the Serbian

16 aggression together. They resisted Karadzic together. And following

17 this, their situation became unbearable, if I can put it that way. That

18 was the greatest error Croatia committed in relation to Herceg-Bosna, its

19 functioning, and the fact that it encroached upon the interests of Croats

20 in Bosnia and Herzegovina to some extent.

21 This is why when in one instance I mentioned Kljuic, I also say

22 that there must be some room for the position that Kljuic had concerning

23 that problem, to which President Tudjman said that he said that he was

24 speaking from the shadow of Izetbegovic's influence. However, that wasn't

25 true. That wasn't the case, no. He was simply voicing the thoughts of

1 Croats who lived in certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina where they did

2 not have majority. Those were the enclaves, such as Bosanska Posavina,

3 that had this position, and the position of these people was amplified by

4 Kljuic and, following that, his successor.

5 Q. Now, if I could ask you, sir, to go to page 265 of the book, to

6 the first full paragraph on that page, 265. And for those looking at the

7 English excerpt, top part of page 3 of this particular set.

8 Sir, you here make reference to something you mentioned a few

9 minutes ago. You have that. In reference to an interview that you gave

10 to Globus on the 21st of January, 1994. This is not something you just

11 said today, this is something you said apparently as far ago as January,

12 1994. It says: "Its title is indicating that: 'Mate Boban was calling

13 Croats to move out of Bosnia collectively and go to the islands and to

14 Istria!' It was without doubt that the most severe and the most radical

15 critic of the official Croatian policy regarding the BiH - which

16 particularly stressed the war between Croats and Muslims which culminated

17 at that time."

18 Can you provide the Judges with any additional information as to

19 when it was that Mr. Boban called for people -- Croats to move out of

20 Bosnia and how that, if you know, fit into any sort of policy at the time?

21 A. I think that that started with the Karadzic-Boban agreement. The

22 portion of the agreement which steps aside from the ethnic principle of

23 division within Bosnia-Herzegovina is the essence, is the starting point,

24 if I can say so, of that policy which prompted Boban to make this appeal

25 to these Croats, Croats from the Banja Luka region. It was mostly from

1 that area that the Croats were moved out. That was the greatest tragedy

2 that befell Croats due to this unrealistic policy pursued by Herzegovina

3 lobby within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4 As a politician, I have to say -- I have to wonder what's going

5 on. Is Bosnia and Herzegovina on the verge of a break-up? No. I was

6 stating that it wasn't, that Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state which

7 existed in that territory within the AVNOJ borders, within the borders

8 recognised by the UN, had to continue existing. And this is the case to

9 this day even though it's been more than ten years since that time.

10 As for internal tensions and internal partitions, I think that

11 that will continue to exist for the next ten years.

12 Q. On this very point, sir, in the next paragraph of your book, you

13 say, "In spite of all, I still think that Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot

14 fall apart."

15 Having said that, you then go to the next paragraph and you say:

16 "I am also against talking about an 'expanded Croatia.' There should not

17 be talking about Croatia expanding at the expense of the neighbouring

18 state. That brings us into the position -- in the position of aggressor

19 which, by use of force, wants to take the territory from the others."

20 You said there should not be talk about this. Who was talking

21 about an expanded Croatia?

22 A. Two issues are important here. First of all, why am I saying here

23 that Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot fall apart? Well, first of all,

24 because the strongest ethnic group were the Muslims and they were in

25 favour of that state. They were in favour of an integral

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 The second issue is also important and that is that it was

3 international recognised, which made it more difficult to partition, and

4 it made it more difficult to change the borders that others may have

5 wanted to change in their own interest.

6 Q. And who was it -- who were some of these people who wanted to

7 change borders? You just said now "it made it more difficult to change

8 the borders that others may have wanted to change." Who were the others?

9 A. Well, we've already said that this whole group in Herceg-Bosna

10 wanted to change those borders. We also have to add to this, if you

11 recall, the fact that some 10 municipalities had asked the president for

12 protection, and they wanted to be annexed to Croatia. So on the one hand

13 we have a person who is threatened, who is looking for salvation in those

14 small municipalities. They're looking for salvation by seeking the

15 protection of their mother country, which is called Croatia. But the

16 organisers of Herceg-Bosna, I think they wanted to do this consciously.

17 And what the ultimate consequences would be, that's a question now. There

18 were various kinds of ideas as to what should happen to this Herceg-Bosna,

19 whether it would be annexed to Croatia or whether it would function as a

20 kind of banana republic in the area. But later on, in the Washington

21 Agreements, this led to the current situation, which I feel should be

22 respected. But this cannot be done by those people who are the exponents

23 of a war policy against the Muslims. People like Boban and the others who

24 followed him who were the exponents of a war option cannot do this. This

25 new policy can be waged only by those people who, even when there was an

1 armed conflict with the Muslims, pointed out that there were other

2 options, that agreements could be reached to protect all ethnic groups,

3 whether Croats, Muslims, or Serbs. And I think that such people will come

4 to the fore increasingly.

5 President Tudjman replaced Boban. He told him it's not your

6 fault. In other words, it's somebody else's fault. Whether he was

7 referring to Susak or to himself, I don't know. We can't ask him that any

8 more. But it's a fact that he replaced Mate Boban from the prominent

9 position which carried the war option against the Muslims. This means

10 that it was his assessment also that such a man could be a hindrance in

11 the implementing of the Washington Agreements and co-existence with the

12 Muslims. And what I said to him was don't replace just Boban. Replace

13 everyone who was in favour of that. Not because we should take revenge on

14 those people but because they are incapable of implementing the policy of

15 the Washington Agreements, that is co-existence in a joint federation.

16 The sooner we remove those people, the sooner we will gain the confidence

17 of the Muslims who will then be able to accept cooperation.

18 This doesn't mean that there were not those on the opposite side

19 who were in favour of a war option and that Izetbegovic should not have

20 carried out the same kind of thing on the other side, thereby creating the

21 conditions for a more normal life in the federation, because look at what

22 happened. When the Washington Agreements were formally accepted, the

23 people in favour of the war option kept looking for obstacles, kept

24 looking for reasons not to implement the Washington Agreements. They

25 couldn't agree about who was going to be the chairperson somewhere, then

1 they couldn't agree about the borders of certain cantons. All this was

2 simply their disagreement with the newly arisen situation following the

3 Washington Agreements. The state of Herceg-Bosna and its exponents

4 formally accepted those agreements.

5 I remember Prlic at this meeting while we discussed accepting the

6 Washington Agreements, and in my view he approach the problem

7 constructively, enumerating the points on which one should work in order

8 to implement the Washington Agreements. But not everybody thought in the

9 same way. They were thinking about how to complicate matters and how to

10 not implement the agreements. And then what followed was the Dayton

11 Accord, which was more radical in resolving the problems in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13 Q. Sir, can I ask you next to go to page 267 of your book, second

14 paragraph. And for those following in the English excerpt, it is on page

15 4, the third paragraph on that page.

16 And if you see that, sir, it's the paragraph starting: "The more

17 frequent statements ..." It says: "The more frequent statements by the

18 most responsible people about the military engagement of the Croatian army

19 against Muslims 'in defence of Croatian people' are not realistic. Now

20 that defence is relevant for Central Bosnia, and if it continues that way

21 it will soon be relevant for the Neretva. Politics has to see all the

22 consequences of possible military engagement on the territory of the other

23 sovereign state. The world would see such an engagement as aggression of

24 Croatia against internationally recognised state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 We would get the same treatment as Serbia."

1 Sir, can you tell the Judges what you know about the engagement of

2 military forces of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina during

3 this time and, in particular, in reference to 1993.

4 A. In a conflict there are various ways in which the conflict

5 spreads. First of all, volunteers went, people who had been born there

6 but who lived in Zagreb and other parts of Croatia or the world. This was

7 justified both from the international viewpoint and from the viewpoint of

8 these people who went into a conflict with the Muslims. However, it

9 transpired, because of the strong Muslim potential, that the Croat forces

10 experienced a crisis. They were pushed back.

11 A Muslim woman said to me, "Just a little while longer and we'll

12 push them into the sea." That was in late 1993, early 1994.

13 Then the Croatian leadership, the president and Supreme Commander,

14 was faced with a question of how to help to avoid a military disaster in

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Tudjman, in view of the constitutional

16 solution that exists in Croatia which says that Croatia can use its army

17 in another state only with the approval of the parliament had room for

18 manoeuvre to try to find ways and means of helping the HVO forces in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, who were facing disaster, without coming into conflict

20 with international policy which forbade engagement in another state. Our

21 constitution also forbade it. Therefore, Croatia cannot be accused -- the

22 Croatian state cannot be accused of participating in the war against the

23 Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because that's simply not correct. There

24 was engagement. One can accuse the Supreme Commander. There is some

25 evidence for that. As for the minister of defence, there is a lot of

1 evidence about his involvement. But this was abuse of office. They were

2 abusing their office in order to attain some goals which were not the

3 goals of the Croatian state as a whole or the goals of its constitutional

4 order.

5 Q. All right. Sir, let's be clear on this point, though. Apart from

6 the legality under the Croatian constitution, it is your testimony that

7 the president of the state, the minister of defence of the state, and

8 other people, senior officials of the state, sent elements of the Croatian

9 army into Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

10 A. One should read the transcripts and see the words of President

11 Tudjman and then one will see what his position was and how he defended

12 it. He said quite clearly, "We cannot enter into a conflict with the

13 international community by deploying the Croatian army, but we will help

14 in every way, using every means." And it's well-known how assistance was

15 provided to the HVO and Herceg-Bosna at that point in time.

16 I think that assistance was given in this way, and that's what was

17 most positive in this entire conflict. The position in which the HVO

18 found itself in Bosnia-Herzegovina forced the leadership of Herceg-Bosna,

19 and also President Tudjman and Gojko Susak, to seek solutions through

20 negotiations, by peaceful means. And this led to the adoption of the

21 Washington Agreement as the solution. The Washington Agreement had a very

22 positive provision which said that the federation, or part of the

23 federation, could enter into a -- not a coalition but a confederation with

24 Croatia.

25 All those sinners who had advocated the war option, who had wanted

1 to accede to Croatia, to the mother country, they all found justification

2 in this provision of the Washington Agreement, but it was never

3 implemented. On the contrary, it is absent from the Dayton Accords

4 because it would have caused far more fatal consequences. Not just in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Europe and the world, because worldwide

6 there are problems with various ethnic groups and national groups living

7 on other territories, in Hungary, Romanija, Spain, and so on.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, I would like to say

9 something, if you allow me. I think you're mixing up a few things.

10 The question which was put to you was this: In light of the

11 difficulties experienced by the HVO, aid was provided, and on page 29,

12 line 12, you answered that President Tudjman had said, "We cannot come

13 into conflict -- we cannot have a conflict."

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A legal conflict.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. And therefore, it

16 was necessary to help the HVO in different ways. What I'm interested in

17 is to know, before the Washington Agreement, how did Croatia help the HVO?

18 Either you know or you don't know. If you don't know, you say you don't

19 know. If you know, please tell us, and tell us what kind of information

20 you had at the time.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have some information that I know

22 personally. The issue of weapons, weapons came from Croatian depots

23 through the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia. Funding of

24 that group also went through certain channels. And when I say "channels,"

25 I'm not referring to legal channels. A legal channel would have been if

1 in the budget of the State of Croatia there had been an item "Assistance

2 to Herceg-Bosna," but that wasn't there. But still funds had to be

3 supplied. This channel was the minister of finance and the Croatian

4 banks, together with some prominent institutions or, rather, branch

5 offices that the banks had in Herceg-Bosna.

6 I think one should also say that accepting the Washington

7 Agreement occurred after something we all remember that was said in the

8 Security Council of the United Nations, and this was that elements of the

9 Croatian army are in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This means that the United

10 Nations and the Security Council had information on the basis of which

11 they could say this. President Tudjman and the leadership of Herceg-Bosna

12 were unable to deny it.

13 I don't want to go any further into investigating this.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But you yourself personally in

15 your position, did you know at the time that certain members of the

16 Croatian army were in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Did you know that?

17 A. Legally, one didn't know it. It was kept secret. But there were

18 illegal channels one could find out about. There were no documents about

19 this. There are no such documents in existence.

20 There were three stages: First, volunteers who had been born

21 there; secondly, some parts of Special Purpose Units who were needed to

22 strengthen the HVO were sent there. And when the Security Council

23 discovered this, it must have had a lot of evidence to support such a

24 statement, because it's well-known that there were thousands and thousands

25 of intelligence agents in the area, all sorts of intelligence agents in

1 various battalions - BritBat, the French Battalion - and they all sent

2 intelligence about what was happening in the area. So that it was no

3 secret to them, but it was a secret to our public and media. Not much was

4 said about it.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] At one point you said the

6 minister of defence had, when you talked about Tudjman, had gone beyond

7 his duties. Could you shed some light on this, please, and elaborate on

8 what you have said a while ago; i.e., the position of the minister of

9 defence when you talked about logistical support. You said aid was

10 provided in different ways to the HVO. In what way had the minister of

11 defence gone beyond what was expected of him?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. President Tudjman was the

13 commander-in-chief of the army. The minister of defence was only part of

14 the military sector. I think that very often there was some overlapping

15 or adaptation. The minister of defence might do something that the

16 president might not approve at a certain point in time. And this did

17 happen. We can go into it if needed. So that the relationship between

18 the Supreme Commander and the minister of defence, in formal terms, the

19 minister of defence is appointed by the commander-in-chief, the president

20 of the republic, so he should answer to him, he should be responsible to

21 him.

22 However, very often in my speeches I did not go for the president

23 directly. I went for the minister of defence, because I felt him to be

24 the operative agent of this disastrous policy. It was disastrous for the

25 Croatian people. On the other hand, leaving open the possibility for the

1 president to express his own views, but as we have seen, he did accept

2 responsibility for the policy being implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

3 I can neither help him nor otherwise.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What was the name of the

5 minister of defence? We need to have this in the transcript, please.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The name of the minister of defence

7 was Gojko Susak.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, first of all, you asked him a direct

10 question back on page 31, line 14, if he -- if he personally knew at the

11 time. First I would like a clarification. What time are we speaking

12 about? Secondly, what was his official position? Because if he knew, he

13 was in the government, and again I point to the transcript and perhaps he

14 may be again advised of his rights, because he's incriminating himself if

15 indeed he was part of the government at the time.

16 MR. SCOTT: Well, for the record, Your Honour --

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute, please. This

18 kind of question can be asked during cross-examination. But as far as

19 dates are concerned, at the time, what position did you hold? Were you a

20 Member of Parliament? Were you in the Minister's cabinet? Were you

21 advisor to the president? At the time you knew that aid was being

22 provided, what was your position at the time?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My position was president or Speaker

24 of the Upper House of the Croatian parliament, the House of Counties.

25 This was not an operative office. I was presiding over that house of

1 parliament where legislative activity was discussed. Therefore, I was not

2 in direct contact with any operative matters.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] From when to when, please, were

4 you president of this Upper House? From when to when, please?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From March, 1993, to April, 1994. A

6 year. That was the critical time we are now discussing. But I did

7 participate in politics. Participating in politics through discussions,

8 interviews, and so on is one thing, and direct decision-making on

9 particular issues for which one is responsible is something different.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very briefly, Mr. Praljak,

11 because we need to take a break.

12 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I wish to have a correction

13 entered in the transcript. Mr. Manolic spoke out the name of the minister

14 of defence, Gojko Susak as Susak. I think one should know the first and

15 last name of the minister we're talking about so much. It's Susak, not

16 Susak. Thank you.

17 MR. KARNAVAS: Also, Mr. President, if we could ask whether he was

18 a member of the security council at the time and whether he was

19 participating in any discussions regarding -- where we have presidential

20 transcripts.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] First of all, the Christian name

22 of the minister of defence, Mr. Manolic. What was the Christian name of

23 the minister of defence, please?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The minister of defence was called

25 Gojko Susak. Gojko was his first name and Susak his last name. Is that

1 correct?

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Just one last question

3 relating to what Mr. Karnavas has said. Were you a member of the security

4 council?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Ex officio, as the Speaker of

6 parliament, I was a member of that council, and one can see from the

7 transcript what positions I advocated and what positions were advocated by

8 others, including the president.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Because the president of the

10 Upper House is automatically a security council member?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, automatically. But still he

12 has to be appointed by the president.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And you were appointed by the

14 president, were you?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I was appointed by the

16 president, as were all the other members of that Council for National

17 Security.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's now 10.30. We shall have a

19 20-minute break and resume at ten minutes to 11.00.

20 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

21 --- On resuming at 10.49 a.m.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We have until 12.30.

23 Please go ahead, Mr. Scott.

24 MR. SCOTT:

25 Q. Sir, before we go on to the next document and/or continue in your

1 book, I should say, based on the questions the President has asked, let me

2 go back to the issue of finances and funding. I think the question -- or

3 the answer you gave was specifically in section with military assistance,

4 in particular weapons. Can you provide to the Judges any information you

5 have about how Herceg-Bosna and the HVO in general were funded or

6 financed.

7 A. I don't have direct information concerning that. I can only give

8 you -- or, rather, the direct information can only be provided by the

9 ministers of finance who held office in the Croatian government at the

10 time, and perhaps some bankers through whom these transactions were

11 implemented.

12 Q. Nonetheless, as a senior official of the Croatian government, did

13 you have any understanding as to how such funding or financing was being

14 provided?

15 A. Only illegally. It is certain that one portion of it came from

16 fundraising efforts outside of the country, that is to say Canada,

17 Australia, and so on, but one portion of the aid was provided through

18 Croatian finances.

19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise for

20 interrupting, but the witness mentioned certain officials. Perhaps he

21 could give us names. Say he said minister of finance or other persons

22 that he implicated, could he give names, not just positions.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir, you can find such information.

24 Don't ask me for that. These are --

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, the problem lies in

1 a fact that we are here in verbal proceedings, which is to say that what

2 you say here needs to be supported by the documents. If you don't give us

3 the name of the minister of finance, and if we don't have it in any

4 document, then we may run into a problem. This is why Mr. Kovacic wanted

5 you to give us some names which will be shown on the screen afterwards.

6 Later on, when the Judges work on the judgement, then they can refer to

7 the name of the minister of finance.

8 If you remember the names of any ministers of finance, then please

9 tell us. If you forgot this, then please go ahead.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember the names right

11 now, even though I know all of the people who held that office in various

12 Croatian cabinets throughout that time. But perhaps I would make a

13 mistake if I were to give you a name now, so I'd rather refrain from

14 giving any names. However, this is this is information that can easily be

15 obtained. These are people who legally held offices, and the dates are

16 well known.

17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you, and I

18 apologise, but prior to that the witness mentioned some banks which took

19 part in these operations. There are plenty of banks in Croatia. Could he

20 give us the names of banks?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that these transactions

22 were realised through Privredna Banka --

23 THE INTERPRETER: And the interpreter didn't hear the other name

24 of the bank.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You mentioned two banks; right?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you may continue.

3 MR. SCOTT:

4 Q. Sir, can you assist us? The interpretation, I don't believe, got

5 the name of the second bank. We've got Privredna Bank. Did you mention a

6 second bank?

7 A. Yes; Zagreb Bank.

8 Q. And continuing on the matter of finances for a moment, did you

9 ever obtain any information or do any calculations as to what it cost the

10 Croatian government to support the HVO in the war against the Muslims in

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

12 A. I think that in one of my interviews I gave such an analysis which

13 provided the figures at the time for the HVO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

14 armed forces that were engaged in combat at the time. That was the basis.

15 And I provided the figure at the time. I think it was 1 billion of

16 dollars or something around that figure. This is how much the war in

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina cost us -- or, rather, the HVO cost us that. I

18 obtained this figure through the Ministry of Defence. Assistant minister

19 for mobilisation had all the figures for military formations in

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those of the HVO, not of the Croatian army.

21 Q. Very well.

22 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I'm sorry. [Interpretation] Once

23 again, the same questions, Your Honour. The witness once again mentioned

24 that he obtained this information through assistant minister for

25 mobilisation within the Ministry of Defence. Can he give us the name?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was Ademic [phoen] who was in

2 charge of the lists within the ministry. At the same time, he was in

3 charge of mobilisation of those who were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina but

4 were residing in Zagreb at the time.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Praljak.

6 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, is it Ademic or

7 Ademnic?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Listen, I don't have all of my teeth

9 so you can attribute this to that. It is Adanic.

10 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] All right. So it is Adanic

11 with an N and not Ademic with an M, and he was born in Varazdin, in

12 Northern Croatia.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] And he was within a ministry

15 in Croatia.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me be quite specific now and let

17 me now be a pedant here.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. So it's Mr. Adanic.

19 But please tell us this: You said that he was in charge of the list of

20 Croatians born in Bosnia-Herzegovina. How did he obtain such a list?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think that it was some very

22 accurate list, but this was information that was generally known. One

23 would know that these people were from Herzegovina, that they hailed from

24 there. At the time when we had the HVO crisis, when the HVO was under

25 pressure from the enemy, the mobilisation was conducted in Zagreb and

1 these people were asked to go to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to join the

2 HVO. Some of them - I can't give you the exact figure - responded to the

3 call-up.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you're trying to tell us that

5 the mobilisation was carried out in Zagreb.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, in Zagreb and in Croatia as a

7 whole, if we can say that.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

9 MR. SCOTT:

10 Q. Sir, if I can next ask you to go to page 281 of your book. And

11 for those following in the English excerpts, it is the -- it is -- the

12 next excerpt begins on the first page "11. Beginning of the Parliament

13 Crisis." "11. Beginning of the Parliament Crisis."

14 And again, Mr. Manolic, at page 281 of your book. Sir, did you

15 call at some point for Mr. Susak to be either fired or that he should

16 resign from the Croatian government, given everything you've told us about

17 this morning?

18 A. I think that under normal circumstances, after all the defeats

19 suffered by the HVO in Bosnia and Herzegovina it would have been normal

20 for an architect or the main proponent of that policy to leave office.

21 That was the point that I was making in my interview at the time. What it

22 hinged on then was whether the president would support that or whether the

23 president would replace Speaker of the parliament, or perhaps me, who at

24 the time was the president of the Upper House, and the president opted for

25 the second option, which led to the crisis that I described.

1 Q. So touching back on what we discussed yesterday, sir, what we may

2 come to again toward the end of your testimony, there came a time

3 essentially where you represented -- you represented one point of view and

4 Mr. Susak represented the other point of view, and it was you that was

5 forced out of the government?

6 A. Not -- not the government, rather, the commander-in-chief,

7 President Tudjman. That's the difference. Because the government of

8 Croatia -- rather, the cabinet did not really get involved with the

9 problems of Herceg-Bosna at the time, no. They mostly focused on economic

10 issues and other daily problems that cabinet had to deal with, and in that

11 sense it was the commander-in-chief who was the decision-maker, and he

12 implemented this through the minister of defence. Occasionally some other

13 people would be involved in these matters as well.

14 Q. All right. Sir, continuing again on page 281 of your book, going

15 down into the next paragraph, you seem to make a point of saying this was

16 -- the conflict between you and Mr. Susak was not simply a personal

17 conflict or a personality conflict, some might say, and it goes on to say:

18 "Actually that was a conflict of two totally different and incompatible

19 policies - one which was behind the instigating the war of Croats and

20 Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the line of division of that

21 internationally recognised state --" Would you like a drink of water?

22 Are you okay?

23 A. I feel fine. This is just a type of cough that is typical for the

24 elderly. Would you please repeat your question.

25 Q. Sir, I was reading from the next paragraph of your book, and:

1 "... one was behind instigating the war of Croats and Muslims in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the line of division of that internationally

3 recognised state and connecting of so-called Herceg-Bosna to the Republic

4 of Croatia, and the other which from the beginning of the crisis in BiH

5 insisted on complete territory of Bosnia and union of Croats and Muslims

6 fighting against the aggression of greater -- Great Serbia."

7 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise. Should we

8 clarify something? I think it's high time we clarified something. When

9 the Prosecutor refers to "your book," we need to clarify whether these

10 comments uttered now by the Prosecutor, are they words of Mr. Manolic or

11 the person who edited the book? Because we're not quite sure whether this

12 is said in third person, whether these were the words uttered by

13 Mr. Manolic or not. This is not a book that Mr. Manolic wrote. No. This

14 is a book about Mr. Manolic. And we can see in one portion it says who

15 edited this book containing the interviews of Mr. Manolic, so we need to

16 clarify whether these are the words uttered by Mr. Manolic or by someone

17 else.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that you're not right.

20 These are the interviews that I gave, and they are accompanied by the

21 comments of the person preparing the book or editing the book. And it is

22 quite clear in the text which words should be attributed to the editor and

23 which words should be attributed to me.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you need to make it

25 quite clear which words were uttered by the witness and which words

1 represent the comments of editors or the person preparing this book.

2 Please go ahead.

3 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I -- without reading the Croatian, I'm

4 afraid -- I apologise to the Chamber, but without reading the Croatian I

5 can't readily do that. I'll ask the witness to assist us in that regard,

6 and I'm sure that if counsel thinks something is improper or misleading,

7 I'm sure I'll be corrected.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I think that

9 Mr. Kovacic is about to help you as well.

10 Mr. Kovacic.

11 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think there is some

12 additional information that might be helpful for you. I know that not the

13 entire book was translated, rather, only portions of it, and it seems that

14 this is a selection of various interviews provided by this witness

15 throughout a period of time. So the context is quite important for each

16 of these interviews, and generally we can't establish the temporal

17 context.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir, if I may reply to Mr. Kovacic.

19 It is clear on the face of each interview when it was given, to which

20 magazine and when, and I don't think that there's any confusion at all.

21 The book is quite clear.

22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] If I may reply. I'm not doing this

23 in order to confuse the witness. Mr. Manolic, what you said is quite

24 true. We fully agree on this. However, it is not reflected in the

25 transcript. So based on the transcript, one cannot tell what the witness

1 is talking about, and we are interested in the transcript for the most

2 part.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Scott, when you pose

4 your questions, please try to clarify whether these were the words of the

5 witness or not, and try to give us the date, because this witness seems to

6 have a very good memory, and he should be able to help us with the time.

7 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'll do -- I'll certainly do my best.

8 Again, I have to say, and I apologise, but I -- since I do not speak the

9 -- or read the Croatian language, it's a bit difficult, but I'll try to

10 get the witness to assist us as much as possible. I would like to note

11 for the record, Your Honour, what's been said. This is the book. It was

12 published in 1995, and based on everything that was said yesterday in

13 particular, I can hardly think that it was any surprise that this witness

14 would come -- and this is well known; anybody can buy this in any book

15 store -- at least, could at one time, any book store in Zagreb, and if

16 these witnesses knew -- excuse me, these Defence teams knew since at least

17 March, if not sooner, that this witness was coming, I'd be very surprised

18 if most of them haven't bought this book a long time ago. Be that as it

19 may, Your Honour, I'll do the best I can to assist.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Nozica.

21 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] We are quite grateful to Mr. Scott.

22 I intervene precisely because we have read the book. I just looked at the

23 transcript, and this portion that Mr. Scott attributed to the witness --

24 or, rather, I looked at the translation, and in the translation I was able

25 to see that in the last portion it says that Manolic has uttered words

1 against Mr. Susak. It is quite clear that this was edited by something --

2 someone, that these were not the words uttered by Mr. Manolic, and this is

3 what my intervention pertained to, that we need to be clear whether the

4 words were uttered by Mr. Manolic or the words are somebody else's

5 comment.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Scott, please try to

7 make it clear whether something was stated by the witness or the person

8 working with the witness.

9 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.

10 Q. Mr. Manolic, you've heard the exchange and the statements of

11 counsel in the last few minutes. As I direct you to various parts of your

12 book, passage of the book that everyone in the courtroom knows about and

13 probably has, if you can assist us, please, any points where -- what your

14 words, what might be somebody else's words, or, please, if a certain

15 position has been attributed to you, if you think it's not accurately

16 stated, please say so. Can we agree to that?

17 A. I think we can agree. It is quite clear. There is text preceding

18 each interview where we have the date, the magazine where the interview

19 was published. Following that, there is a short comment by the publisher,

20 and then there is the journalist's question to which I provide my reply.

21 And while we still see the present screen, then let me say this:

22 Yes, this was my response to those who were saying that this hinged on a

23 personal conflict between myself and Mr. Susak as minister of defence. I

24 said to all these people explicitly that this was no personal conflict.

25 Rather, this was a conflict of two policies, and I believe that their

1 policy was detrimental to the interests of Croatia as a state and Croatian

2 people living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I believe I was quite clear

3 there.

4 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, Mr. President, I'm trying to -- in light of

5 what's been said this morning, I'm looking at some of the notes to see how

6 we might gain some time without being too repetitive.

7 Q. If you could go, sir -- sorry, I'll need some assistance.

8 A. Perhaps I can assist you? Perhaps I can help the Defence find

9 their way in my book. If you take page 357. All of you should have that

10 page. It says there published -- the interview was published in Novi List

11 on the 14th of January, 1995. So this pertains to that period of time

12 only. And then you can see in its entirety what I said, what my analysis

13 of events was. I don't think that there should be any confusion.

14 Q. If you can go to page 287 of your book, page 287, second

15 paragraph. And for those following in English, it is the third and last

16 page of that particular excerpt, toward the bottom of the page.

17 And, sir, I'll ask you this, and again I'll ask you if these are

18 your words. There's a section on page that starts, and this goes back to

19 something the President Judge Antonetti was asking about a few minutes

20 ago. It says, "Even the lowest level spies dealing with Herceg-Bosna knew

21 about the camps." Here again, the English says "concentration camps," I

22 don't know if it's in your -- "... knew about the concentration camps from

23 the first day they were set up. How could then Gojko Susak not have

24 known? However, it is not about whether Gojko Susak knew about the

25 concentration camps which indescribably damaged both the Croatian state

1 and the Croatian national interest and which compromised Croats

2 civilisationally, morally and politically as those partly responsible for

3 the war in Bosnia. All that is past now and time should not be wasted on

4 that. I want to ask now who made a political decision for the

5 concentration camps to be set up in Herceg-Bosna? Further on, who made a

6 decision for East Mostar to be under siege for many months? Who made or

7 approved the decision for the old bridge to be destroyed? The bottom line

8 consequence of all these questions is who decided that Croats should wage

9 a war against Muslims?"

10 Now, sir, first off, are those your -- are those your words?

11 Excuse me.

12 A. Yes, entirely my words uttered during that period of time when I

13 gave that interview, when I provided that analysis of events.

14 Q. And did you specifically ever, sir, get any answers to those

15 questions that you just stated here?

16 A. No. Specific answers to this were never provided. I think that

17 the tragedy is that it is this Tribunal which will have to provide answers

18 to these questions.

19 Q. You go on in the next paragraph and you say, "Who, therefore,

20 started the war against the Muslims?" The book goes on to say: "The one

21 who started the war has to be held responsible. The fact is that Minister

22 Susak was the one who was involved most of all in the implementation of

23 the Croatian politics towards Bosnia and Herzegovina."

24 Now, are those your words, and if they're your words or if they're

25 in somebody else's words -- they are your words?

1 A. Yes, yes, my words. No confusion there whatsoever. It is very

2 easy to set aside, to distinguish the comment given by the editor of the

3 book. My words are clearly published. There is no dilemma as to which

4 were my words and which were the -- which are the added commentaries.

5 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. I'm looking just to get the

6 page reference.

7 Q. Going -- Mr. Manolic, if you could direct your attention to page

8 283 of your book, the second paragraph actually beginning on that page,

9 page 283.

10 And for those following in English, this is a separate now

11 excerpt, Your Honour. It starts with -- the first words on the top of the

12 page are, "The reply of President Tudjman ..." That's the first words of

13 that particular excerpt. And if you have that, then I'm going over to the

14 second page of the translation, to the first paragraph starting on the

15 second page of the excerpt.

16 And again, Mr. Manolic, I'm directing you to page 283, the second

17 paragraph on that page. And as soon as I point this out to you, again

18 I'll ask if these are your words. It says: "All those Croatian

19 politicians who not so long ago claimed that the co-existence in the BiH

20 was always a fake, a fake one, can be ashamed today of their statements

21 because those statements were unfounded either in history or in the

22 present BiH."

23 Are those your words?

24 A. Yes. Those are entirely my words. This is my polemic with all

25 those who sought a solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the war option;

1 Karadzic, Mate Boban, and all the others who wanted to solve problems of

2 the internal order of Bosnia and Herzegovina through weapons and war.

3 Q. When you say that they claimed that the co-existence in --

4 A. I think that what follows is also important, because I'm always

5 searching for solutions, for ways out of certain problems. The question

6 to be answered is why people were getting killed. This had to be put to

7 the politicians who accepted war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although what was

8 important now was to search for peaceful solutions, solutions that would

9 be acceptable to everybody in Bosnia-Herzegovina, all the groups there. I

10 think I was quite clear referring to the situation that was developing on

11 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time.

12 Q. When you say in the sentence that I referred you to, that "those

13 who claimed that the co-existence in BiH was always a fake one," what do

14 you mean by that? In what way was co-existence claimed to be fake?

15 A. First of all, in order to lead the people into a military

16 confrontation, something had to be said about the history. They were

17 denying that there had ever been co-existence on that territory, but it is

18 a fact that throughout the 40 years of Tito's Yugoslavia there had been

19 peace among all three ethnic groups which were now in an armed conflict.

20 Q. If I can direct -- sorry. If I can direct your attention,

21 Mr. Manolic, to page 284 of your book, to the third -- the fourth

22 paragraph on that page. Page 284, the fourth paragraph.

23 And to -- in the English excerpt, it is the last page of the --

24 about the middle page [sic] of the last page of that particular excerpt.

25 And again we come back to the issue of the Croatian army

1 participating in Bosnia. Do you see this language, please: "The

2 international community was constantly warning us. A year ago our

3 leadership was told not to interfere in Bosnia with our logistics and our

4 influence. Finally, the entire international community stood up

5 concerning the problems around the Croatian involvement in BiH. The UN

6 was informed earlier but the statement that 'the elements of the Croatian

7 army participate in the war in Bosnia' was issued only at the intervention

8 of the representatives of the BiH government in the UN. This was the

9 final warning which would have been definitely followed by sanctions for

10 the participation in war against the Muslims."

11 Can you tell the Judges generally what role in the politics or the

12 policy of the Croatian government at this time, or at least of Tudjman and

13 Susak, did the threat of sanctions by the international community play, or

14 the UN or other international bodies?

15 A. I think that President Tudjman, as the Supreme Commander, found

16 himself hit by this threat from the Security Council and that this was one

17 of the important elements that led to the acceptance of the Washington

18 Agreement without any objections, because further conflicts would

19 certainly have brought sanctions down upon Croatia. It would have been

20 isolated in the world, and this would have brought into question the

21 sovereignty that Croatia had gained, which was ultimately the goal of

22 President Tudjman, myself, and all the rest of us who had participated in

23 the turnaround in the 1990s in our area.

24 Q. If -- I believe that concludes the material in your book, at least

25 for the Prosecution.

1 If I could ask the registry to please now display for you Exhibit

2 P 09645.

3 MR. SCOTT: And of course -- do you have -- yes. Can the witness

4 be shown that in Croatian, please? It's there. It looks like we just

5 have it flipped around, because we have both versions on our screens.

6 Thank you very much.

7 Sir, if you have that, as just a particular example of the type --

8 the interviews and articles that you gave around this time, this appears

9 to be an article dated the 1st of April, 1994. And directing your

10 attention to about the middle of that page: "According to Manolic, the

11 vital difference between him and Tudjman lies in the strategic policy

12 regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina. As far as the Washington Agreement is

13 concerned, I believe that my option for Bosnia prevailed. It is based on

14 cooperation between Croats and Muslims and on respect for the integrity of

15 Bosnia and Herzegovina."

16 The first question, are those your words when you say "As far as

17 the Washington Agreement is concerned, I believe that my option

18 prevailed"?

19 A. Yes. Those are my words.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. I'm sorry, Ms. Alaburic, I

21 hadn't seen you.

22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Exhibit 9645 is not the

23 original interview published in Globus. It is a -- an article by Tanjug,

24 a Belgrade newspaper agency, which summarises the interview given by the

25 witness, which is allegedly published in Globus. We do not have the

1 original text of the interview in Globus, so we are unable to check how

2 accurate the summary is. The summary was made by a Serbian news agency.

3 Thank you.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mr. Scott, please

5 bear this comment in mind.

6 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. Sir, without -- let me just ask you, does this state for us now,

8 this statement where it says - again, the one that I've read to you - does

9 that accurately state your assessment of the situation that as far as the

10 Washington Agreement is concerned, you believe that your option for Bosnia

11 is the one that actually ultimately prevailed, at least up to the time of

12 Washington?

13 A. Yes. That was my interpretation at that point in time, and you

14 can see that the date of this news item is the 1st of April, which was

15 when my intervention was actually taking place.

16 Q. And for the record, 1st of April, 1994; is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Could I ask the registry to next go to Exhibit P --

19 A. This was the period when the parliamentary crisis broke in the

20 Croatian parliament, and the crisis was a result of the lack of agreement

21 between my policy and the policy of Mr. Mesic and others who disagreed

22 with the policy in question. This was a parliamentary crisis, and the

23 president demanded that Mr. Mesic, the speaker of parliament, be replaced

24 and that I be replaced from my office of Speaker of the House of Counties.

25 The parliamentary opposition parties almost all took our side. The

1 exception was the HSP. All the other opposition parties supported us, and

2 this gave rise to the parliamentary crisis.

3 President Mesic, just like me, had support among members of

4 parliament in both houses, so that it was not a simple matter to resolve,

5 and it was resolved with an agreement made among all the opposition

6 parties and the ruling party headed by President Tudjman. The result was

7 that President Mesic resigned in the House of Deputies and I resigned or,

8 rather, was dismissed from the House of Counties.

9 Q. All right. And now if I could -- thank you for that. If I could

10 ask the registry to please display Exhibit P 09649.

11 Sir, this appears to be again an interview with you in Globus

12 dated the 6th of May, 1994; is that correct? Do you see that?

13 A. Yes. That's correct. This is already the period when I was no

14 longer the president of the House of Counties and President Mesic was no

15 longer the president of parliament, or the Speaker of parliament. This

16 was the period when we founded a separate political party, the Croatian

17 Independent Democrats. We were the opposition to the HDZ and the

18 president of the state.

19 Q. If I can ask you -- it's a fairly long interview, and if I could

20 ask you to go approximately four or five pages into the document, I'm not

21 quite sure where we'll be in the Croatian version, but it will be well

22 into the document. If you can find the point where Mr. Butkovic asked you

23 this question: "Can you estimate how much money Croatia spent on the war

24 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?"

25 And it's the next to the last page of the English version for

1 those looking at the English.

2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I wish to draw the

3 Court's attention to the fact that we are again talking about snippets

4 from the alleged interview. I think we should be provided with the

5 context. You cannot extract a single sentence. It's not realistic.

6 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, in this particular document, you

7 may see from the English version, it's pretty apparent, that the first

8 four or five pages of the document has to do with the -- or at least the

9 first several pages I'm looking at it again now, the adoption of the kuna

10 or -- as currency.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

12 MR. SCOTT: I don't think anyone in the courtroom's going to

13 suggest that that's an issue in the courtroom or relevant to this case at

14 this point in time.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

16 MR. SCOTT:

17 Q. So, sir, if you can find the place where the question was put to

18 you, "Can you estimate how much money Croatia spent on the war in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina?" And I asked you this earlier. You made reference to

20 the fact that you had at one point looked into this and had some

21 information. I think you said it was given in an interview.

22 If you look at these -- your answer, two paragraphs here, is that

23 consistent with the information that you received and provided in the

24 interview in May, 1994? That is in the second paragraph, it's estimated

25 that: "All together, the war with the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina cost

1 the Republic of Croatia at least 3 million Deutschmarks a day! Since the

2 war lasted nearly one year, it can be estimated that the war cost us a

3 total of nearly 1 billion Deutschmarks." Do you see that? It's on the

4 second page of the Croatian-language version, if that assists you.

5 A. What matters is whether I remember it, not whether I found it.

6 The analysis was not done on the basis of exact indicators. It was simply

7 a calculation which is based on the expense of the war. That's what I'm

8 talking about. And it follows on from the analysis I made previously in

9 another interview.

10 Butkovic is now posing the question again, and I cannot tell him

11 the precise figure, just as I cannot tell you the precise figure now. One

12 has to calculate this based on evidence, using financial experts to arrive

13 at a realistic figure as to how much that war cost us.

14 Q. And if I --

15 MR. KOVACIC: I think that -- that -- I'm not crossing the

16 witness, but I think that --

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic.

18 MR. KOVACIC: I'm not trying to cross the witness but I think it

19 would be prudent if the Prosecutor would immediately ask clarification to

20 what soldiers the witness is referring when he is mentioning 63 or 64.000

21 of soldiers. What, fighting in Croatia or in Bosnia? Whose soldiers? It

22 is not visible from the article, at least from this --

23 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, let me just double-check if I can see

24 the ...

25 [Prosecution counsel confer]

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The article refers to

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, it refers to the numbers of the HVO at

3 that point in time. The HVO. Not the Croatian army; the other parts.

4 MR. SCOTT:

5 Q. All right.

6 A. But it doesn't change anything. Don't hold me to 3 billion or 2

7 billion. It doesn't really matter. Whether a subtle financial analysis

8 would yield a figure of 2 billion or 3 billion, it doesn't really change

9 things because the war brought with it financial sacrifices, human

10 sacrifices, sacrifice of human lives, and all other kinds of sacrifices.

11 Q. All right. Just so the record is clear, then, you were talking

12 about the cost to support the HVO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that these are

13 the costs to the government of Croatia; correct?

14 A. Yes. That's the essence. How else? They couldn't use the rocks

15 of Herzegovina to create that kind of funding.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Praljak.

17 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I would like to ask

18 Mr. Manolic not to insult the Herzegovinians.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not insulting anyone.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Please put forward the

21 facts. And what we could get from the rocks of Herzegovina, that's

22 insulting and offensive, and please leave that out.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, please proceed.

24 MR. SCOTT: If I could ask the registry to please show to the

25 witness Exhibit P 00134.

1 And, Your Honours, as we mentioned yesterday, we're prepared to

2 provide a hard copy to the -- this is going to be the -- one of the

3 presidential records, and if it's easier for the witness to follow in hard

4 copy, we're prepared to give him one, with the Court's permission. May

5 we, Your Honour?

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, that's fine.

7 MR. SCOTT:

8 Q. Mr. Manolic, we're going to hand you a hard copy of the following

9 transcript. It's up to you whichever you find to be the most useful, but

10 I think you'd mentioned yesterday at one point, I think, that you thought

11 it might be helpful to have the document.

12 A. I think I would be best assisted if the text were on the monitor,

13 if possible. If not, then I will search for it, but you know what it

14 means to look for something in a hundred pages.

15 Q. I do, Mr. Manolic, in fact. All right. We'll proceed on the

16 basis of what's on the screen, then, and if at some point you think you

17 need to look at something in the hard copy, it will be available to you.

18 If you have the first page of that exhibit, then, sir. Just as a

19 reference point, do you see that this is a record of the meeting of the

20 Croatian Democratic Union Presidency, held at a particular location on the

21 10th of March, 1992, chaired by Franjo Tudjman? Do you see that, sir?

22 A. Yes, I see it. I see it. I don't see the documents, though. It

23 just says chaired by the president, Stipe Mesic away. Zdenka Babic,

24 apologies. So this is who is absent. Perincic --

25 Q. Very well. I was just going to direct you to some specific pages,

1 but in terms of -- before we leave this first page, is it correct, sir,

2 that in addition to Franjo Tudjman being the president of the Republic of

3 Croatia, he was also the president of the HDZ political party in Croatia?

4 A. Yes. That's common knowledge. Throughout this period he was the

5 president of the HDZ, until he died.

6 Q. On the first page, when it continues on, there's a reference to

7 Boban. It says: "Mate Boban, vice-president from Bosnia-Herzegovina -"

8 or at least BH - "is with us, since he is in Zagreb and since we have on

9 the agenda, you have been given the agenda."

10 Then if I can direct your attention to the third page, to the

11 registry's assistance, the third page. And as far as I know, the third

12 page in the English version the third page of the B/C/S version should be

13 the same.

14 They're discussing apparently agenda items and then it says, "No.

15 So then the question of the BH HDZ leadership." And Boban says, "There's

16 the president's resignation. There's the dual information system, and

17 then indisputably bypassing the HDZ." And Tudjman says: "All right, the

18 problem of the BH HDZ leadership."

19 Now, is this a reference -- this is again dated the 10th of March,

20 1992. When it says the president's resignation, is that a reference to

21 Stjepan Kljuic's resignation from the Bosnian party?

22 A. Yes. This is a discussion about the party, and Mate says that the

23 president of the party, Mr. Kljuic, is resigning.

24 MR. SCOTT: If I can then direct everyone's attention well into

25 the document, page 95 of both the original and the English version. Page

1 95.

2 And one of the reasons, Your Honour, the document's been prepared

3 this way is that indeed so we can establish the page correspondence so

4 that the pages with numbers stay the same. That's one of the reasons we

5 have so many pages, blank pages.

6 Q. If you have page 95, sir, and then it says Mr. -- the president --

7 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, if I may suggest that the Prosecutor

8 would refer to ERN numbers. Because I don't know whether you have seen

9 the Croatian copy, Your Honour, but I would like to inform you that

10 actually the pagination system which -- which those people in Tudjman's

11 offices used is very suspectable, and sometimes one cannot control whether

12 there are all the pages or not. So the only way to enable other people in

13 the courtroom to know where to go is to use ERN numbers. I would

14 appreciate it very much, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, very well.

16 MR. KOVACIC: [Previous translation continues] ... I'm sorry.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. Mr. Scott, please

18 give us the page number in Croatian and also page number of the

19 translation. That's quite easy. You said that the English page is 95.

20 That's the translation. Please give us the page number in Croatian.

21 MR. SCOTT: It appears to be --

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is the same.

23 MR. SCOTT: It appears to be -- if you want the ERN number, it is

24 01508959, which is displayed on the screen. If counsel will open up their

25 e-court system, they will find -- and open and follow that document, you

1 will find that page 95 of the English version and page 95 of the B/C/S

2 version are the same. We have it open now, and we have both versions on

3 the screen, and they're both the same, but that is only if they will open

4 up their e-court system and use it.

5 Q. So, sir, if you have the page, the president's talking and then he

6 refers to Boban -- if we can go up on the page, please -- or go down on

7 the page. It's not the same.

8 MR. SCOTT: Apologies, Your Honour, we're having obviously some

9 technical problems. Just to assist us, can the registry again show the

10 very bottom of this page, the one that's being -- okay. Thank you.

11 Apparently, Your Honour, for whatever reason, they're different

12 paginations in different versions, because on one screen that we have open

13 the page is exactly the same, word-for-word, and the one that's on the

14 courtroom screen now it's not the same, so I don't know. We were trying

15 to do that in fact to assist everyone in the courtroom.

16 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may be of assistance. The English version,

17 Your Honour, 95 starts on the last -- the last part of the page that was

18 designated by Mr. Scott. At the very end you'll see. And it goes on to

19 the following page, which would be 01508960 for my colleagues looking in

20 the Croatian version. So ...

21 MR. SCOTT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Karnavas. I appreciate

22 that. Let's see if we can get it sorted out. If you see that language,

23 sir, where it says -- we'll have to -- can you go to the next page, then,

24 in what's on the computer -- the courtroom screen in the Croatian, can you

25 go to the next page, please. Keep going. Down, please.

1 I'm told that it's page 99 in the B/C/S version, Your Honour.

2 It's page 99 on the -- in terms of the images on the screen, it would be

3 page 99. If that doesn't work, then we'll have to go to the hard copy, I

4 guess. Can we -- can you further go down to the bottom of the screen,

5 please.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It would be simpler to put the

7 B/C/S version on the ELMO. Then you can go ahead with your question and

8 then the witness would either confirm it or deny it.

9 MR. SCOTT: We can do that for the time being, Your Honour, and

10 see if we can sort it out. I apologise. We have been trying to avoid

11 this problem, but apparently we haven't got all the bugs worked out.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I assist you? The pages that

13 you are going through now have nothing to do with -- with this process,

14 because this deals with intra-party issues, tasks, who is to do what, and

15 I believe that this is completely irrelevant to the proceedings here.

16 MR. SCOTT:

17 Q. Well, let me show you -- let me direct you to the section, sir,

18 and we can see if it is or not. Could you just confirm that, for

19 instance, Mr. Tudjman is both the president of the state and president of

20 the party at the same time. So if you can see the part where he says:

21 "Mate can inform us briefly. However, as you know, events have unfolded

22 in the BH HDZ in such a way -" and going to the next page - "that Stjepan

23 Kljuic, who - after the mistake with Perinovic - was excellent for that,

24 who managed the election campaign brilliantly, but afterwards, recently,

25 practically disappeared under Alija Izetbegovic's fez and the HDZ

1 practically stopped leading an independent Croatian policy, our policy.

2 This went so far that, just as Alija said that the war in Croatia was not

3 his war, so Stjepan Kljuic told foreign newspapers - I do not know whether

4 he did it here, too - but people told me that he said that we had

5 ourselves to blame for this situation, for the war."

6 And, sir, does this reflect the continuing -- what you've told us

7 all morning so far is the dispute between these different factions, and is

8 this a further reflection of that same dispute, at this particular

9 instance involving Mr. Kljuic? That is, is Mr. Kljuic being one who is

10 not for the Susak-Boban policy?

11 A. I think that this has already been proven, namely that that was

12 the reason. Kljuic did not want to implement the policy which led to the

13 conflict with Muslims. He adhered to the position taken at the referendum

14 where Bosnia and Herzegovina was established as a sovereign, integral

15 state, Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was the essence of the split that

16 they had.

17 What you are now mentioning, I don't see that on the screen, the

18 reference of Mr. Izetbegovic. I think that his statement was incorrectly

19 quoted, namely his statement about this not being our war. This was

20 incorrect, because the rest of that sentence reads: "Our sons should not

21 apply to the Yugoslav army." This is the key point. I think that this

22 lack of accuracy when it comes to Izetbegovic's statement is something

23 that needs to be corrected, regardless of who is to blame for the wrong

24 interpretation.

25 Q. All right. Sir, you anticipated my question in that regard

1 exactly. The Judges have heard various references made in the trial so

2 far to the fact that Mr. Izetbegovic at some point said something to the

3 effect of, "This is not our war." Now, with that in mind, again, I know

4 you just said this but perhaps you can say it a bit even more clearly and

5 amplify on it, what was the actual context in which President Izetbegovic

6 made the statement "This is not our war"? What was the actual context,

7 and what was the full statement that President Tudjman [sic] made, not

8 just the part that's been taken out of context?

9 A. This was not the statement of President Tudjman, rather, that of

10 President Izetbegovic. I think that those who in a way blamed the Muslims

11 for the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina frequently tend to quote

12 this sentence of President Izetbegovic as the president of Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina, and I say that this quotation is incorrect because they

14 failed to mention the rest of that sentence, because he spoke in the

15 context of not sending people from Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Yugoslav

16 People's Army. He wanted them not to respond to the call-up papers. That

17 was the essence of what he was saying. It wasn't meant to represent that

18 he was opposed to the Croatian thesis.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I

21 would like for Mr. Izetbegovic's title to be clarified. He's being

22 referred to as president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. No. He was the president

23 of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he was the first among

24 equals. There were seven of them elected by three peoples to represent

25 them within that body. This is quite different from the title of

1 president of a state.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that this is true. This

3 reflects the reality. This reflects the constitutional position held by

4 President Izetbegovic. But ultimately, this makes no difference.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Manolic, you said

6 something to us which will be further interpreted by the Judges. You said

7 that when Mr. Izetbegovic said, "This is not our war," this sentence

8 needed to be put in the proper context, because he also said within that

9 context that the residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina should not join the

10 Yugoslav army and that that was the gist of what he was saying. These

11 words, "This is not our war," were uttered by him because he did not wish

12 for the soldiers from Bosnia and Herzegovina to be mobilised into that

13 army. That's what you're saying.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that time, it was the enemy army.

15 That's what you need to understand.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Scott.

17 MR. SCOTT:

18 Q. Just to clarify, just to continue on that for a moment, sir. When

19 you say "the enemy army," this was the JNA, this was the army of Milosevic

20 and the Serbs that was conducting various operations around this time. I

21 don't have a specific operation in mind at the moment, but was conducting

22 operations in Bosnia, in Croatia, and what Mr. Izetbegovic was saying was

23 people from Bosnia should not go and join the JNA in its aggressive war

24 against either Croatia or Bosnia or elsewhere, I suppose Slovenia.

25 A. I think that the public is sufficiently informed about the

1 position of the Yugoslav People's Army from 1990 until it fell apart

2 entirely in 1993.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, it is not the public who

4 needs to be informed. Rather, it's the Judges. The Judges need to be

5 informed. Therefore, please answer the question. Please clarify for us.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Yugoslav People's Army, which

7 was created in Tito's period and developed over 40 years, was created in a

8 context where people living in Yugoslavia were equal and it fully

9 represented all of them. However, with the disappearance of Tito and the

10 emergence of chaos in Tito's Yugoslavia, chaos prompted by the policy of

11 Milosevic, this army gradually was transformed into Milosevic's army,

12 regardless of the formal state of affairs where it was responsible to the

13 Presidency of Yugoslavia, whose member Stipe Mesic was until a certain

14 date in 1991.

15 Following that period, that army fully aligned itself with

16 Milosevic. It became an aggressor's army even though it was an

17 aggressor's army even prior to that because it assisted certain Chetnik

18 formations in instigating Serbian rebellion in Croatia. In many instances

19 where our police went to intervene to protect the people, the army would

20 step in as a buffer, as a buffer force between the rebels and our regular

21 Croatian police forces. But whenever the enemy was under pressure,

22 whenever the Chetniks or the rebel Serbs were under pressure, the army

23 would step in and would, in a way, protect them.

24 This is why from the very beginning we treated that army as an

25 aggressor's army which fought against the sovereignty of Croatia. The

1 army played the same role in Bosnia.

2 I hope that I was clear.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. You may

4 continue, Mr. Scott.

5 MR. SCOTT: Thank you.

6 Q. Sir, if you can go -- if we can go to page -- I've been told that

7 hopefully this will work. On the screen, if you go to page 105 of the

8 B/C/S version, it should correspond to page 101 -- 105 of the English on

9 the screen and 105 in the Croatian, I'm told, again are the same.

10 A. I think that you need to clarify that these were the words of

11 Mr. Mate Boban.

12 Q. Yes, I'm going to ask you that. If you go back --

13 A. If that is not clear on its face.

14 Q. Yes. And that's one of the difficulties, of course, of being able

15 to -- just pulling up one page at the time. You can't see that entirely.

16 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour will see from the English version page 99

17 that Mr. Mate Boban starts speaking and he continues speaking for several

18 pages, and on page -- what I understand would be page 101 of your version,

19 Your Honours, we'll try to -- yes. We'll try to straighten this out, but

20 I don't think it will be possible in the time allowing for direct

21 examination. But on page 101, it says: "Luckily, we had a man for

22 financial affairs in the Ministry of the Interior, Bruno Stojic, a devoted

23 man whom they wanted to dismiss in writing because of this, and this man

24 has given us so far in our territory of Herceg-Bosna over 150 new Golf

25 cars, not to mention the weapons, but I can say it because this is -- this

1 is the party."

2 Q. Can you provide any additional information to the Judges,

3 Mr. Manolic, on Mr. Stojic's role in providing 150 new Golf cars and

4 apparently weapons to the HDZ?

5 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, before -- I'm sorry. May I? Before the

6 witness answers that question, would Mr. Scott kindly clarify it so that

7 we know the source of the witness's knowledge, whether he's speaking from

8 personal information or whether it's a matter of speculation derived from

9 whatever Mr. Boban may have said.

10 MR. SCOTT:

11 Q. Well, sir, you were in this meeting, and I'm just asking you,

12 based on what's said here or based on any other conversation you had with

13 Mr. Boban or heard Mr. Boban say around this time, can you provide any

14 additional information about this information attributed or concerning

15 Mr. Stojic? If the answer is no, you cannot, then just say so.

16 A. This is a session of the HDZ to which Boban was invited as the

17 leading man of the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I attended that session

18 as well, so, yes, I heard the words of Mr. Boban personally when he

19 presented a number of accusations against Kljuic and when weaponry and

20 personnel appointments were discussed. However, these were all

21 intra-party affairs and settling of accounts in order to get rid of

22 Kljuic, in order to eliminate him, in a way, from the Presidency and

23 leadership of the party so that one of those other people who would be

24 passionately implementing the central policy could be appointed to that

25 position, this policy that was in fact supporting the conflict with the

1 Muslims, and this is something that Kljuic was against.

2 As for these Golf vehicles and these words, "reliable men," I

3 don't know him at all, I don't know the man, so I can't tell you whether

4 he was talented in financial affairs or not. These are the words uttered

5 by Mr. Boban. How he came up with this figure of 150 Golfs, I don't know.

6 I think it needs to be clarified among these people, among these people

7 who at that time lived in that area and worked there. At the session

8 itself, it was not discussed.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you are confirming to us that

10 Mr. Boban raised this issue of 150 Golfs, but on the other hand, you don't

11 know Mr. Stojic personally, or you didn't know him at the time. So as for

12 the number of 150, you know nothing about it except for what you heard

13 from Mr. Boban.

14 A. Yes. That's the figure I heard then. Nobody gave any comments at

15 the session as to the origin or purpose or anything of the sort. No

16 comments were made.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] These 150 cars which were

18 obviously new needed to be purchased. A Golf is an expensive car. Was it

19 the party who funded this purchase? And, if so, how could they have

20 placed it at the disposal of somebody from the HVO, for example, or any

21 other institution unless it was procured in this way? Who financed this?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All I can tell you is what I heard

23 at this session, I heard with my own ears, and I can tell you that there

24 was no further comment concerning these 150 Golfs. We can only speculate.

25 In Sarajevo there was a plant manufacturing Golf vehicles, so we

1 can perhaps speculate that this was taken from the factory lot in

2 Sarajevo. Now, as to whether somebody paid for them or didn't, I don't

3 know anything about that.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott, please

5 continue.

6 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

7 Could we go then, please, to page -- I'm told in the electronic

8 English version and in the Croatian version it would be page 108.

9 However, for those using the earlier distributed hard copy in the

10 courtroom, in the English it will be page 104. So if you're using the

11 electronic screens, it should be page 108 for both English and Croatian.

12 If you're using the hard copy that was distributed yesterday, it will be

13 page 104.

14 Q. And in that page, sir, there's a reference, if you have it -- I

15 don't know. Are we there? Okay. Yes. Sorry.

16 You see a reference there to Gagro. The sentence, the particular

17 passage, says: "However, among them, the main organiser and present

18 there, was the general secretary of the HDZ. The president of Mostar

19 municipality, the brother of this Gagro, et cetera."

20 Did you know or know of a man named Gagro who was the president of

21 the Mostar municipality at this time, as of at least March, 1992?

22 A. I don't know that man. I know his brother who was our ambassador

23 to France. I don't know what happened to him afterwards. I had no

24 contact with this man, so I can't tell you anything about him.

25 Q. Did you know of his brother, the president of Mostar? Whether you

1 knew him personally, did you know of him and his political stance at that

2 time?

3 A. I think it would amount to speculation if I said anything further

4 about Gagro. I think that there are people who can give you much more

5 accurate information, who have direct knowledge of the fate of Gagro.

6 Q. Thank you very much. If I can ask you to go -- to be shown page

7 110. Again on the electronic -- electronically, it will be page 110. For

8 those using the English hard copy, it will be page 106.

9 Toward the bottom of the page, I believe. Thank you.

10 This is a man named Juric, Perica Juric. Perhaps you can tell the

11 Judges who Juric was at this time and what his position, if any, was as of

12 March, 1992, if you recall.

13 A. Perica Juric was one of the founders of the Croatian Democratic

14 Union in Croatia, and throughout this period, 1990 and 1991, he was in a

15 way in charge of contacts with the HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that's

16 how he came to know a large number of people in the Bosnia-Herzegovina

17 milieu. I think he was very involved with respect to those eight

18 municipalities in Bosanska Posavina where his contacts were intensive, we

19 can say, and the standpoints he arrived at in his contacts with those

20 people in that area, he conveyed to me and to President Tudjman, and he

21 joined in all the discussions. He remained in the HDZ until we left in

22 April, 1994, left the HDZ, and he also joined Mesic's newly founded party,

23 the Croatian Independent Democrats.

24 Q. All right. If you could just then go then back to the passage

25 where it says, "I would be so free as to propose -" this is Mr. Juric

1 talking - "along with the presidents of the Croatian communities,

2 Mr. Boban, Mr. Stanic, Mr. Barac, that is, the presidents of the

3 communities, also Dr. Miljenko Brkic." Is Mr. Brkic, was he the one who

4 became acting president of the HDZ party in Bosnia-Herzegovina after

5 Mr. Kljuic resigned?

6 A. Yes. They -- the top of the Croatian Democratic Union counted on

7 Mr. Brkic as a person who could unite the Croatian corpus in

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not just the Herzegovinians but the rest of the

9 Croatian population who were not living in Herzegovina, but all over

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is why we decided that Miljenko Brkic could be

11 the person to link up the overall Croatian interests in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was an eminent, respectable person in

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I think he is still held in high regard there. He

14 disagreed with the policy inaugurated by Boban, so he, too, was left out

15 of the leadership when Mate Boban took over the duty of president, or the

16 office of president.

17 Q. If we continue over on this passage onto the next page, which will

18 be apparently 111 on the screen and 107 in the English hard copy.

19 Mr. Juric is still speaking, and he says: "I think that this is very

20 important and that together with our three top men the two of them will

21 also ensure this component in our policy. The choice of an acting

22 president is certainly your affair. You shall judge what is the next step

23 to take regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina and, therefore, which of these men

24 you can count on. This is purely operations, operational work which they

25 will have to carry out in politics. Thank you very much.

1 "The President: Does anybody wish to speak?"

2 My question to you about this passage, Mr. Manolic, is why was it

3 that the selection of the president in Bosnia-Herzegovina, why was that a

4 matter for Franjo Tudjman to decide?

5 A. We have to go back again to the genesis of the HDZ of

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was created with the direct support of the HDZ in

7 Croatia. All changes, including formal changes, changes in the statute

8 and platform, were made in cooperation between Croatia and part of

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why Gojko Susak said at one point the HDZ of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina is merely a branch of the Croatian Democratic Union of

11 Croatia. When we say that, merely a branch, then it becomes evident that

12 the overall policy was subject to control and inauguration in the branch.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Manolic.

14 MR. SCOTT: I'm going to end my questions with this particular

15 transcript there, Your Honours, and suggest this might be the time to take

16 the lunch recess.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Pursuant to what you've just

18 said, does this mean that you share Mr. Susak's view on the fact that the

19 HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina is only a branch of the HDZ in Croatia, in

20 Zagreb?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I never shared that entirely,

22 that idea, but with respect to assistance in establishing the party, I

23 know that people from Croatia, who lived in Croatia, participated in the

24 founding Assembly, the constituent Assembly of the HDZ in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that they were later on involved in the work of

1 the HDZ of Herceg-Bosna.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, it's just about time

3 to stop.

4 MR. SCOTT: Yes, I know, Your Honour. If I could just possibly

5 try to clarify this before the break.

6 Q. Sir, this may be similar to an issue we may have been having

7 yesterday. If I could just ask -- if I could just try to clarify the

8 President's question, or your answer.

9 When you say it was your view, are you telling us that it was your

10 view that the party in Bosnia should not be the same as the HDZ party --

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Objection, Your Honour. He should ask him what his

12 view is. What is his view, as opposed to giving him a leading question.

13 What is his view? He can state it clearly.

14 MR. SCOTT: He said, Your Honour, he said at line 10 of page 72,

15 "I never shared that entirely." He didn't say -- that's why I'm asking

16 him to clarify. He said his view is that it wasn't, or that it shouldn't

17 be, and that's my clarification.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So could you please make your

19 point of view clear. You said you have never shared Susak's views on a

20 number of subjects, and particularly as far as the HDZ in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I never entirely accepted that

23 standpoint, and it's not contained in the documents of the statute or the

24 platform, that it's a branch of the HDZ, but in the manner he wanted to

25 influence the work of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he used that

1 expression. My personal opinion is that in a sovereign state, regardless

2 of whether its name is the same as the name of a party in a different

3 state, one party must not impose its policies on another. There can be

4 communication between equal entities on certain questions and issues.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Karnavas. You're on

6 your feet.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, we want a clear and unequivocal

8 statement from the gentleman. He says "not entirely." We're speaking in

9 codes here, very nuancing codes that one would find perhaps in certain

10 political systems. I would like to know what part. If he says, "I never

11 entirely accepted," what part did he accept? So let's be clear and

12 unequivocal. What part did he accept?

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This part which you accepted and

14 a large part which you dismissed relating to the HDZ in

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the fact of the matter was

17 that one had to respect, and in formal and in legal terms it was

18 respected. I don't have the statute of the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina

19 with me, but it was never treated as a branch of the central HDZ, and I

20 agree with this, that it was not a branch of the central HDZ, that it was

21 an independent organisation bearing the same name based on the territory

22 of Bosnia and Herzegovina and active there.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We shall stop there.

24 It's past 12.30. We will have an hour and a half break, and we shall

25 reconvene at 2.00. According to my calculations - but the registrar will

1 have to confirm this - I think the Prosecution has so far used more than

2 four hours. Theoretically, you should have two hours left, no more, no

3 less.

4 Mr. Registrar, could you give me the exactly calculation, please.

5 We shall reconvene again at 2.00.

6 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 2.03 p.m.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing has resumed. The

9 registrar calculated the time. The Prosecution has had four hours and

10 three minutes, so the Prosecution has two hours left. The Bench, the

11 Defence counsel, and Mr. Praljak have taken up one hour. So in future, I

12 will speak less and not infringe on the time of the Prosecution or of the

13 Defence.

14 Mr. Scott, you have the floor.

15 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, we would -- we certainly do not invite

16 the Judges to speak less, because obviously many times the Judges'

17 questions are the best questions, so we hope the Judges will inquire

18 however you see fit to do so.

19 Q. Mr. Manolic, if I could ask the usher to please show you Exhibit

20 P 00312. Exhibit 312. And if you have that, sir, if I could ask you

21 again if we can just start by looking at the first page. This appears to

22 be a record of a meeting, or at the top refers to a trip between the 4th

23 and the 12th of July, 1992, and then specifically the third passage down

24 talks about a meeting: "Mr. Tudjman received us for talks in a villa an

25 on the 5th of July, 1992." Do you see that, sir?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. This makes a reference to a Mr. Brkic being present at this

3 meeting, and do you recall that this is the Mr. Brkic who was in fact

4 named the acting president of the HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina following

5 Mr. Kljuic's resignation?

6 A. Yes. That's the same Brkic. And this is his authentic report

7 which I saw at the time when he was in Zagreb.

8 MR. SCOTT: If I can ask the registry to go to page 3 of the

9 document on the e-court, I believe. No. Yes, page 3 in e-court. For

10 those following in English - and I'll explain why this is the case - it is

11 the first -- first page 2. And the reason why there are multiple pages,

12 two page 1s, two page 2s, Your Honours, is the original document was typed

13 in a very small font which was not followed in the translation, so there

14 are more pages in the translation than there are in the B/C/S original.

15 So they were -- everything that was on page 1 of the Croatian version was

16 still page numbered 1, and that's the reason. But -- so now I'm directing

17 the courtroom's attention to the first page 2. In e-court it is page 3.

18 Q. Starting at the top of the page, and if anyone wants to look back

19 several pages previously, this is President Tudjman speaking. President

20 Tudjman says: "The bringing of King Aleksandar, Mr. Panic, and others

21 means that we must be sensible with respect to Croatia's policy in BH. We

22 must not allow ourselves to be provoked because that's precisely what the

23 enemy wants. We will continue to demand a cantonal arrangement in the

24 areas, in those areas we have defended, where you need to introduce and

25 organise your authority, and you must defend those areas firmly and

1 prevent conflicts with the Muslims. That's not easy, but it is possible

2 with the wise participation of all factors. Now I want to open up a

3 discussion on the continued implementation of Croatian policy in BH."

4 Mr. Brkic says -- he thanks President Tudjman for inviting them.

5 Skipping down a couple of lines, Mr. Brkic says: "Many people are asking

6 if the work of the party has been suspended or not, especially after

7 events in Bugojno and elsewhere. The question is whether a convention

8 should be held or not. What is Herceg-Bosna? What kind of association is

9 it? And the Posavina and Central Bosnia also need to be clarified. What

10 is their relationship with the state as a whole? What is the HVO? This

11 has not been clarified sufficiently. HVO has suspended regular civilian

12 authority and even the HDZ."

13 Sir, in looking at that, you told us yesterday and today about

14 some of your concerns in -- I think this morning you said setting up of a

15 state within a state, and can you tell us whether what Mr. Brkic -- the

16 concerns that Mr. Brkic is indicating or reporting here are that types of

17 things that also concerned you about what was happening in

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Herceg-Bosna and the HVO?

19 A. Yes. This report submitted by Brkic concerns the continuation of

20 the conflict with Mr. Boban or, rather, with his policy. Brkic had a more

21 liberal, more open policy of cooperation with the Muslims in mutual

22 communication with a view to solving numerous problems. That's why Boban

23 was -- was irritated by Mr. Brkic's speech and the policy he advocated.

24 I think that I shared the standpoint of Mr. Brkic and supported

25 him in his standpoints.

1 Brkic is complaining about the violence perpetrated by Boban

2 towards certain cadres in their tasks and the positions they were given

3 and so on.

4 Q. And if I can then direct your attention to the top of the second

5 page 2, or page 4 in the electronic -- in the e-court version. Mr. Brkic

6 is continuing on, and he says: "The HDZ party has adopted conclusions and

7 paid tribute to the HVO for what it has done so far, especially regarding

8 free territories. However, the HDZ does not agree with the suspension of

9 civilian authority. I'm not saying that the HVO should not establish

10 interim authority in some municipalities, especially in those places where

11 there is no authority, but one has to be very careful in consideration of

12 that. By establishing an office in Herceg-Bosna, it provokes a reaction

13 and dilemmas about dual authority and which authority should be obeyed."

14 Excuse me one moment. Forgive me, sir. Going back, directing

15 your attention back to the previous page, Mr. Brkic. Mr. Brkic says -- at

16 one point he says: "The HVO has suspended regular civilian authority and

17 even the HDZ." And the question I was really looking for, I'm sorry, was:

18 Did it come to your attention and was there a time when essentially the

19 HDZ party, the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, became essentially suspended or

20 defunct, largely defunct during the time of the conflict between the

21 Croats and Muslims and it being replaced by the HVO?

22 A. I can't go any further from what Mr. Brkic said, because he was in

23 direct contact in the solving of the problems arising in

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I could only support him and agree with him, but I

25 cannot comment in detail as to what was going on in the area. I think

1 Mr. Brkic would be able to describe this in much greater detail and more

2 specifically.

3 Q. All right. Well, you mentioned a moment ago -- you said that

4 Mr. -- I think you said that Mr. Boban became irritated about the meeting

5 or the comments by Mr. Brkic. Can I ask you to look at the top of page 3

6 -- the first page 3 of the hard copy. And it's page 5 of the e-court

7 versions. And it says, according to Mr. Boban, or Mr. M. Boban: "If I

8 had known that these would be the participants in the meeting and that we

9 would have this kind of a discussion, it is certain that I would not have

10 come because I have far more pressing business."

11 And is that what you're referring to when you say that Mr. Boban

12 was irritated by the issues that Mr. Brkic was raising?

13 A. Yes. Mr. Boban couldn't bear criticism. Mr. Brkic's speech was

14 critical of the existing situation which had been imposed by Boban, in a

15 way, in the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he specifies

16 the points on which he's critical. I think this is a very significant

17 document, that it throws light on the events at the time. So this is all

18 taking place in July, 1992. It's dated the 4th of July.

19 Q. Can I then direct your attention to the next page, the second page

20 3 in the English hard copy, and page 6 in the e-court versions, both

21 Croatian and English in the e-court.

22 About the middle of that page, sir, if you can see, there are some

23 statements or comments attributed to someone named Baric, Mr. V. Baric.

24 Do you remember -- can you tell the Judges, do you recall who Mr. Baric

25 was and any position he held at this time?

1 A. I don't know the gentleman, and I have no recollection of the name

2 or anything associated with it. I think one could clarify this with

3 people who were directly involved in the events.

4 A. All right.

5 Q. And would you -- looking just at Mr. Baric's comments --

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, is it Baric or Barac?

7 MR. SCOTT: I think you're right, Your Honour, I think it's Barac.

8 I probably mispronounced it. Perhaps the witness --

9 Q. Would you say Barac, Mr. Manolic?

10 A. I think it's Barac, yes.

11 Q. Thank you. Looking just at the content of Mr. Barac's comment,

12 would you agree that he too was also expressing concerns about the HVO

13 taking over authority in various places?

14 A. Yes. Brkic's way of thinking and his positions were not isolated.

15 They were simply a reflection of what a broad circle of HDZ people in

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina thought. So this meeting was held to clarify issues

17 and see who was right; whether Brkic and the people advocating his

18 positions were right, or whether Boban was right.

19 Q. All right. And just to finish with this document, then, just so

20 that the statement's in the transcript, what Barac said was: "I think

21 that the very establishment of the HVO was a good thing but in those

22 places in which the Muslims are a majority they do not recognise this

23 because this is a quiet taking over of power. The policy of appointing

24 senior personnel in Zenica is very bad. Almost all ranking officials are

25 Muslims. Relations with other ethnic groups are very poor. There are

1 warnings that a confrontation will occur."

2 I think we can go on, then, to the next -- if I could ask that the

3 witness please be -- go ahead.

4 A. These are the warnings uttered by Barac, and he sent this from the

5 ground, especially in Bosnian Posavina and the region around Tuzla. I

6 think that these warnings were realistic and that they were present

7 throughout the discussion with Boban or, rather, the discussion with the

8 faction which imposed an overall power that the HVO was supposed to take

9 over in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10 MR. SCOTT: Can I ask that the witness next be shown Exhibit

11 P 03112.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, before we get to that, it should be

13 pointed out for the record that on the previous exhibit, 312, Mr. Manolic

14 did in fact speak up at the meeting. He has indicated his positions here

15 today under oath. Perhaps he could elucidate where in the transcript is

16 it that it verifies what he's saying here today about how he was

17 supporting Mr. Brkic. So -- otherwise, we'll have to cover this on

18 cross-examination. But I just point this out for the record.

19 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, I'm living within time limitations

20 as well, and I understand it's there. It is there. The Prosecution has

21 put it into evidence. There's no hiding anything. The Court has exactly

22 what's here, and if the Defence want to question about it further in their

23 time, they can certainly do so.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. It's document number 134.

25 It seems to have been a meeting that was held in the Zagorje villa on the

1 10th of March, 1992.

2 MR. SCOTT: No, Your Honour. I think Mr. Karnavas and I were

3 talking about Exhibit 31 -- P 00312.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: Correct.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Could we have the

6 date and the location of the next document, please.

7 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour, and I should say perhaps for

8 everyone in the courtroom, because perhaps that's what is causing --

9 again, because of time constraints, I am not going to be able to go

10 through all the selected transcripts, so we will skip some, unfortunately,

11 but I hope the Chamber will a chance to look at them in the future in some

12 other context or witness, but we won't have time to go through them all

13 with Mr. Manolic, unfortunately. The next document, Your Honour, was

14 Exhibit 03112. It's dated the 2nd of July, 1993. It is a meeting of the

15 Defence and National Security Council at the presidential palace. And

16 it's -- I believe, Your Honour -- I've been told that the pagination

17 should be consistent in all versions of this document. So page 1 of the

18 hard copy should be the same as the page 1 on the e-court system in both

19 Croatian and English. I hope.

20 Q. Sir, if you can look first of all again, as we normally do, at

21 what would be page 2 of the document. Just to confirm, this is a record

22 of the 14th session of the Defence and National Security Council of the

23 Republic of Croatia, held on 2 July, 1993, at the presidential palace,

24 chaired by Dr. Franjo Tudjman. And do you see that on the list of agenda

25 items, the first agenda item is Croatian policy towards Bosnia and

1 Herzegovina?

2 A. Yes, I remember that session. I think that this record is

3 authentic, and it was -- these are the minutes recorded at that session.

4 Q. Very well, sir. President Tudjman begins speaking on page 2 that

5 we were just looking at, and continues speaking for quite some pages,

6 actually. I don't know how many pages. Never really quite -- quite --

7 for quite some time President Tudjman keeps speaking.

8 Looking at page 3 of the transcript, and if I might be allowed,

9 just in the interest of time, Mr. -- President Tudjman is indicating that

10 he seems to be under a lot of criticism and people are asking him to do

11 different things, and in particular at the bottom of page 3 you find this

12 section: "First of all, criticism came from one opposition party after

13 another, almost all opposition parties. I practically don't know of any

14 opposition party that agreed with our state policy and there were even

15 requests from the moderates, Budisa or Stipac personally, to dissolve, for

16 Tudjman to take steps to abolish the community of Herceg-Bosna ..."

17 And then beginning over to the next page, page 4, first paragraph

18 on that page starts: "But, it was more important that in the ranks of the

19 ruling HDZ, including council members, there was no unanimous support for

20 the policy we implemented, if you like, which I implemented listening to

21 all members of this council and others, but nevertheless I issued the

22 decisions that I thought were in accord with the historic interest of the

23 Croatian people and the Croatian state.

24 "In that sense, it started with Boljkovac's --" excuse me for that

25 -- "interview that explicitly attacked both our policy and people here in

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then there was open disagreement in statements by

2 Stipe Mesic, Jozo Manolic, and finally Franjo Greguric ..." Leading on to

3 certain things, he says there was a split in the HDZ whether Tudjman was

4 going to replace, among others, Boban, Susak, this and that.

5 Do you see those passages, sir?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Looking at this, can you just in your own words tell the Judges

8 what Mr. Tudjman -- President Tudjman was going on about in this -- in

9 this meeting, what these comments were about?

10 A. In this session, President Tudjman actually defended his policies

11 and his position against all criticism coming either from the opposition

12 parties -- he listed all those opposition parties which advocated policies

13 contrary to his. He also wanted to defend himself from the criticism

14 coming from his own party, Croatian Democratic Union, whose president he

15 was. He specifically mentioned Boljkovac as minister of interior. He

16 mentioned me, Mesic, Greguric as well, who at one point was president of

17 the government of Democratic Unity. In fact, he succeeded me in August of

18 1991. Up until the elections of 1992, he was presiding over that cabinet.

19 Also, in one of his interviews, he expressed criticism in relation to the

20 policies of President Tudjman. This, in a way, was consistent with my

21 position and that of Mesic, except that he was much more moderate than I

22 was or that then Mesic was, even though Mesic had fewer public appearances

23 at the time than I did. He appeared on television less frequently than I

24 did.

25 He was especially irritated by my position, my standpoint during

1 that period of time. Within the HDZ, one has to bear in mind that I was

2 one of the founders of the HDZ, and I think that it is precisely this

3 criticism which hurt him most.

4 In this session where we constituted a minority, you can see that

5 he invited not only members of that council but also a much broader circle

6 of people who were not members, precisely because he wanted to recruit

7 support for his views and thus promote the criticism aimed at me and

8 others.

9 Q. Okay. If I can direct your attention, please, to page number 8.

10 And just to confirm, this is again still President Tudjman talking. As I

11 say, he talks for quite some time.

12 If you see this portion, please, in the bottom half -- bottom half

13 of the page?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. "There are two main factions in the HDZ. One wants to link up

16 with all democratic forces in Croatia, and it is oriented toward the real

17 needs of the people. The other is working on the creation of hard-line

18 government. I fully belong to the former."

19 Now, my question to you, sir, is Mr. -- or President Tudjman says

20 he belongs to the former, but based upon your experience and observations

21 at the time, which of those two groups would you put President Tudjman in?

22 A. At the time, I believed, and I still continue to think so, that he

23 belonged to the hard-liners, to that faction. It would have been

24 difficult to explain him belonging to the first faction, because then at

25 least he would have had the support of some of the opposition parties

1 active in Croatia. And also, he would not have come into conflict with

2 us, because I advocated a more democratic standpoint in relation to both

3 the issues arising with Bosnia and Herzegovina and also internal issues.

4 However, for the public, it was more acceptable for him to state publicly,

5 "I belong to the more liberal, democratic faction."

6 Q. If I can direct your attention, please, to page 11. So toward the

7 end of his speech -- just looking again to see if anyone has spoken up to

8 this time. I don't think so. On page 11, President Tudjman continues:

9 "Gentlemen, as you see, we partly discussed it before. All of this

10 culminates in the claim that the Croatian policy we implemented, I

11 implemented, is totally wrong and almost as some say disastrous for the

12 Croatian people.

13 "And now I'm going to read you a document I have received. My

14 policy, the Croatian policy, which is not only mine, but I must say that I

15 am the most responsible for its creation, I implemented clearly and in

16 full or partial agreement with all of you, but we have come to a bursting

17 point at a critical moment, to the point of whether such Croatia will

18 survive, whether the HDZ will survive, et cetera. I implemented this

19 policy on the basis of my own assessments and your assessments if they

20 agreed, et cetera."

21 You made reference earlier today that there came a point in time

22 where you became -- you said you directed your criticisms to Susak and

23 less directed at President Tudjman, but statements like this, did it

24 become clear to you over time that this was indeed his personal -- not

25 only Susak's but his personal policy?

1 A. Yes. There is a certain phenomenon called opportunism in

2 politics, which is to say you that attack certain people and you keep

3 silent about certain other people because you don't want to focus on them.

4 So in a number of my appearances all the way up until late 1993, I

5 attempted to create this space for manoeuvres, for the president so that

6 he could have public appearances, give his views, and also say, "These

7 steps were taken by such-and-such person but not by myself." However, in

8 1994, following the conflict he had and following the speech he gave in

9 the parliament, he said that he took over full responsibility for the

10 policy with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This completely reduced my

11 space for manoeuvres. I could do nothing more than that. We put our

12 cards open on the table and that was the end of any discussion.

13 Q. Then, sir, for the next several pages do you recall -- sorry, go

14 ahead.

15 A. You are mentioning a document that I received. I think that this

16 is the document from Hogg, foreign affairs minister of England. Is that

17 what you have in mind? And this document was several pages long. In the

18 session, he read out this document which was supposed to justify his

19 policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, it was to

20 discipline us who were against such policy, because he needed this

21 international support to shut us up and also to weave his internal policy

22 into the international position, and this is why this letter that came

23 from England was so useful for him.

24 Immediately following this, I personally started doubting the

25 authenticity of that letter, because it seemed to me that such a

1 confidential document as it appeared to be based on its contents, one

2 would expect that this was -- there was some kind of foul play involved,

3 but I couldn't really go into any further details.

4 Could we perhaps read that letter now, or if others have it, then

5 there is no need to read it.

6 Q. Mr. Manolic, you have indeed anticipated my -- some of my

7 questions. Mr. Tudjman goes -- President Tudjman goes on to read the

8 letter actually in the transcript, which is -- starts at page -- for the

9 content of the letter -- well, let's say it starts at page 12 and then

10 goes on for several pages. And for the record, this was a letter

11 allegedly written by Douglas Hogg to Prime Minister John Major at the

12 time, allegedly.

13 What did you understand President Tudjman's reason for reading

14 this letter? You've said some -- you've mentioned something, but was he

15 trying to use this letter to justify his policy?

16 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, first of all, the answer -- the

17 question has been answered already, and the gentleman indicated that he

18 wished to have the letter read. Now, this is in open court. The public

19 is following it. I believe that the public is entitled to the reading of

20 the letter, because from there on Mr. Manolic then comments in this very

21 same meeting regarding the letter and the attacks or alleged attacks

22 against him. So I think it's important for the letter to be read. And

23 again, I believe Mr. Manolic has answered the question that was -- that's

24 being posed now by the Prosecutor.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. This is a three-page

1 letter. Read it very quickly into the transcript, Mr. Scott, please.

2 MR. SCOTT: Can it not count against my time, Your Honour?

3 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll yield my time, Your Honour. I'll yield my

4 time.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No, no. It will be on

6 Mr. Karnavas's time.

7 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] I would just like to add

9 something. Your Honours, in the Croatian transcript it says that it is

10 written by the British Prime Minister to the minister of foreign affairs,

11 and not vice versa. I think that that's quite important.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. It's a letter from

13 John Major that is sent to the minister of foreign affairs.

14 MR. SCOTT: That's correct, Your Honour, and I apologise if I

15 misspoke. It is allegedly from John Major to Mr. Hogg. In reading this

16 letter in public, Your Honour, I believe that I should state that it is

17 the position of the British government this is a complete fabrication, but

18 I will read it.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me. Excuse me. Now the Prosecution is

20 testifying on behalf of the Queen, you know, and the -- the United

21 Kingdom.

22 MR. SCOTT: It's my privilege to do so.

23 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, I object to that. They can bring somebody

24 from the Foreign Ministry to do so and there is language in here where

25 even Mr. Tudjman is saying he's questioning the authenticity of it. So

1 let's be fair. And he knows that. But he's not here on behalf of the

2 United Kingdom.

3 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I think in this --

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

5 MR. SCOTT: -- it's important. Mr. Karnavas is very anxious for

6 me --

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. Mr. Tudjman had no doubts

8 about the letter. You stated it wrongly.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please read the letter and then

10 we'll see how things stand.

11 MR. SCOTT: "Dear Douglas, Thank you for your detailed report on

12 both the current and past situation in the region of Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina in the former Yugoslavia. As you know well from previous

14 discussions both within the government's cabinet and on other occasions,

15 Her Majesty's government have not changed their stand on any of the

16 following political questions:

17 "First, we do not agree, either now or in future, to arm or train

18 the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina with military equipment. Second, we

19 shall continue helping the enforcement and forceful implementation of the

20 United Nations embargo in that region although we are well aware that

21 Greece, Russia, and Bulgaria are supplying arms and training to Serbia,

22 while Germany, Austria, Slovenia, and the Vatican are undertaking similar

23 efforts on behalf of the Croatian and HVO forces within the region.

24 "It is of paramount importance that such efforts by Islamic

25 countries and groups are not successful on behalf of the Muslims within

1 the region.

2 "To this end and until the final resolution of the situation on

3 the ground, that is until the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its

4 destruction as a possible Islamic state in Europe, which will not be

5 tolerated, we shall continue pursuing such policy.

6 "Further, the mistake of training and arming of the Afghan

7 fighters against the forces of the former USSR and their becoming

8 so-called Islamic fighters now in other parts of the world and in

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina will not --"

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: Slowly.

11 MR. SCOTT: Sorry. "... in other parts of the world and in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be repeated with the Muslim population in

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14 "This could lead to serious problems in future among the Muslim

15 immigrant population in the European Community and North America. Please

16 see the enclosed paper from the United States entitled 'Iran's European

17 Springboard?', dated 1 September, 1992. Unfortunately, I do not have this

18 paper, but it is certainly in accord with everything that has been said.

19 "These criteria are becoming more and more relevant with common

20 sense, and therefore special attention by our security services must be

21 placed on the Muslim communities in the Western countries, especially here

22 in the United Kingdom.

23 "Third, until the situation in the former Yugoslavia is settled,

24 we must at all cost make sure that no state deemed Muslim is allowed any

25 say on the West policy actions in this area, particularly not Turkey.

1 "It is therefore necessary to continue with the himba -" which

2 someone has indicated means sham, perhaps means sham - "of the Vance-Owen

3 peace talks in order to delay any such possible actions until Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina no longer exist as a viable state and until its Muslim

5 population is totally removed from its land. Continue with the himba,

6 some of those present did not know what himba means: hypocritical,

7 pretended, et cetera.

8 "Although this may seem like a hard-line policy, I must insist,

9 with you and with those that create the policy in the Ministry of Foreign

10 Affairs and in the army forces, that this is in fact a realistic policy

11 that is in the best interest of a stable Europe in the future whose value

12 system must remain based on a Christian civilisation and ethic.

13 "This opinion, I must inform you, exists in any other European and

14 North American government, and therefore we will not intervene in this

15 region to save the Muslim population or push for the lifting of the arms

16 embargo imposed against them.

17 "The Muslims in the West must be made to see that they cannot

18 oppose our views in the world, in the new world order, and that the

19 inaction of the so-called Muslim governments in the world, which are not

20 doing anything to oppose the destruction of the Muslims in Bosnia and

21 Herzegovina and which are not implementing their own promises to do

22 something by January --" excuse me -- "15 January, 1993, given, I guess,

23 at the Islamic Conference, the Organisation of Islamic Countries.

24 "If the West does not save the Muslims, the Muslims in the West are

25 totally powerless to oppose us because we control their governments,

1 although I know that you do not think completely like ... or the minister

2 of defence about this question, it is important in this matter that all of

3 us have a united front against those in the parliament and in the country

4 who have a different view, particularly after the former Prime Minister

5 strongly attacked such a policy. I expect from all those who serve this

6 government to submit themselves to cabinet responsibility.

7 "Sincerely yours, John Major."

8 Your Honour, before I leave the letter, I am going to ask this: I

9 am going to ask the Defence at some point to advise the Chamber whether

10 anyone suggests that this is a true and authentic letter so that we will

11 indeed call witnesses from the British government to indicate the contrary

12 if anyone actually suggests this is a true letter.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, may I remind the Trial Chamber that

14 the burden of proof is on the Prosecution, not on the Defence. Now, the

15 Prosecution is introducing all of these transcripts. They're cherry

16 picking as to what portions they like or what portions they find authentic

17 and what portions they don't find authentic. I'm merely stating that this

18 was in the transcript. The Trial Chamber is free to conclude whether this

19 is an accurate and true letter, but -- but in all fairness and in keeping

20 with the principle of completion, I think that the gentleman - that is

21 Mr. Manolic - should be allowed to read off what his response was with

22 respect to this particular letter, the policies expressed by the UK, if

23 indeed they were the UK policies, and of course his response to any

24 attacks that Izetbegovic -- that Tudjman had against him in regards to

25 some public statements that he might have made, including I believe he had

1 indicated that his telephone had been tapped. It's all in the same

2 transcript. That was the whole point of it.

3 So it's not up to me to determine whether this was an authentic or

4 inauthentic --

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Manolic, the

6 Prosecutor has just read out the letter written by the British Prime

7 Minister to the minister of foreign affairs. Did you attend this meeting,

8 and do you remember in any way whether the contents of this letter was

9 disclosed to the people who attended the meeting?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's correct. This letter

11 that the Prosecutor just read out was read out in its entirety directly by

12 President Tudjman in that session. He read it out personally.

13 I gave you the reasons. I can't further dwell on them. However,

14 I had suspicions about the authenticity of that letter. Why would a Prime

15 Minister from an important European country write to his foreign minister

16 about a problem that didn't fully add up, that wasn't fully consistent

17 with the problems that the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina had? That's

18 why I suspected that this was not really an authentic letter written by

19 the Prime Minister.

20 Another thing that I wanted to say is that letters of such a

21 nature wouldn't really reach such an audience as we were, namely the

22 president of Croatia, which was known to have an anti-Muslim position.

23 Why was this done? First of all, he wanted to discipline us, and

24 he also wanted to receive, through this letter, support for his

25 anti-Muslim policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Murphy, very briefly so that

2 we don't waste too much time.

3 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, leaving aside the propriety of Mr. Scott

4 representing the Queen, especially on the 4th of July, I think it would be

5 of help to the Trial Chamber to know whether or not the letter was read

6 during this meeting in English and was then translated, perhaps, and has

7 now been translated back into English from Croatian, or whether a Croatian

8 translation of the letter was read during the meeting.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, President Tudjman

10 read this letter out in English or in B/C/S?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] President Tudjman spoke English. He

12 read this out in Croatian, because most of us did not have a command of

13 the English language. I believe that that is why he read out a

14 translation into Croatian. It was literally as it reads here. He had the

15 text already translated into Croatian when he was reading it out. He

16 wasn't doing a sight translation at the session itself.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Scott, please

18 proceed.

19 MR. SCOTT:

20 Q. If then I could direct your attention to -- well, before we do

21 that, I'm going to go out of order, but in line with a question that

22 Mr. Karnavas has raised, let's go straight to your -- when you make some

23 statements. If you go to page 22 of the transcript. Hopefully we'll have

24 time to come back. Page 22.

25 Josip Manolic, and you start out by saying - and we really have

1 jumped over a few things so it's not entirely in context - the criticisms

2 that have been directed at you during this meeting already, and you say:

3 "First, when you speak as the head of state, I'd like you to distinguish

4 between the opposition and us who are sitting here, in both public

5 appearances and consequences."

6 And then he goes on. I'm going to skip down several lines, and in

7 the following paragraph, he says: "Another thing, about my statement. I

8 do not in the least intend to defend what I said, but my aim was to defend

9 the policy that you inaugurated, because I started from the position that

10 Herceg-Bosna existed and was created as a barrier to aggression and that

11 was true. There were individual mistakes in its implementation ..."

12 Now, did you make those statements, sir? And if there's anything

13 you want to explain further or say more about that.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: If we could read the following part. Read the

15 whole sentence. Go on.

16 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, this is not cross-exam. Why do I have to

17 do it and use my time instead of having Mr. Karnavas do it during

18 cross-examination?

19 MR. KARNAVAS: That's my whole point, Your Honour; because it's a

20 complete sentence. We don't stop in the middle of a thought.

21 MR. SCOTT: Does anyone in the courtroom not see what's on the

22 rest of the page?

23 MR. KARNAVAS: The audience doesn't, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Is there anybody in

25 the courtroom who doesn't see what is on the rest of the page?

1 Very well. The witness cannot be asked to read the whole page on

2 the screen, only what is important has to be pointed out. If you wish to

3 put a question in connection with something in the text, this can be done

4 during cross-examination. Otherwise, if we ask the witness about

5 everything, we will stay in this courtroom for 25 years.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will not live to see that.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: Don't worry. You won't take that long.

8 But there is a comma, Your Honour. The sentence goes on. I mean,

9 we're making light of the matter, but there is a comma and the sentence

10 goes on. Obviously, the gentleman should be given an opportunity because

11 I believe the rest of the sentence is important. I don't mean to be

12 obstructing the process.

13 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I will read the statement. Out of

14 accommodation to Mr. Karnavas and as the agreeable Prosecutor that I

15 always am, I would be happy to read the rest of the statement which

16 everyone in the courtroom has already seen by now in any event, and then

17 the witness can state his views.

18 "There were individual mistakes in its implementation, I reduced

19 the problem to individual mistakes, so that the general line can be

20 defended. From beginning to end it was my idea."

21 Q. And can you tell us sir, now -- if Mr. Karnavas is satisfied, can

22 you tell us anything else you want to tell us about that statement or what

23 your position was during this meeting in response to the criticisms

24 directed at you by President Tudjman.

25 A. I think if you look at my words in this text it is quite clear

1 what points we agree on and what points we disagree on. This is my

2 personal standpoint in relation to his policy and the policy being

3 implemented towards Herceg-Bosna. I don't want to comment on myself. You

4 don't have to read it out for my sake because I remember this text quite

5 well.

6 Q. When it says, "From beginning to end, it was my idea," what was

7 your idea, sir, from beginning to end?

8 A. It means what I said. And thirdly, I think that there's something

9 quite important here. I am defending the interview given by Mr. Greguric,

10 which was also under attack because it presented a different opinion or an

11 opinion contrary to the policy implemented by President Tudjman.

12 Q. If I can direct your attention over to the following page, 23. At

13 the -- toward the bottom of that page and what you indicated as your

14 fourth point, there's a paragraph that starts with the word "Fourth," and

15 just in connection with the letter, the alleged letter from John Major, do

16 you see in that letter by the -- in that paragraph, toward the end of that

17 paragraph, you say, "I will be against such English policy"?

18 A. I don't really want to comment on that either, because I stated my

19 position quite clearly. If the letter were true, it would not correspond

20 to a good solution for the problems on the territory of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22 Q. That is if the letter were true and, as someone said a few moments

23 ago, if it was presented as an anti-Muslim letter, sir, you were saying

24 that you would not have any part of it?

25 MR. KARNAVAS: Objection. Objection. It assumes facts not in

1 evidence. And I think if we're going to go that route, we should read his

2 entire answer to this question, because he starts off with -- and I don't

3 want to go into it, but I think we need to start with, "I agree that the

4 policy adopted by the state ..." that whole section in order to give a

5 context rather than the Prosecutor implying what he thought at the time.

6 I think it's quite clear over here.

7 MR. SCOTT: Well, I'm not convinced by Mr. Karnavas.

8 Q. But did you say, sir -- as you in the part that I just read you

9 to, direct your attention to in the section saying "Fourth," does it say,

10 "I will be against such English policy"? Were those your words?

11 MR. KARNAVAS: You have to read the -- the entire previous part,

12 Your Honour. You just can't read one section of it; otherwise, how do we

13 know what's talking about? I know that we can read it, but we're asking

14 the gentleman to now speculate.

15 MR. SCOTT: No, I'm not, Your Honour. The witness has said he

16 knows this transcript and meeting quite well and he can say what's on the

17 page. And Mr. Karnavas can come back and ask all the questions that he

18 wants if he chooses to use his time that way.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm being forced to use my time that way. That's

20 my only point, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, it appears that in

22 this document you are expressing a certain opinion, and your opinion is

23 expressed as a response to what was read out to you and presented as a

24 letter from the British Prime Minister. Based on what it says here, it

25 would appear that you were opposing the French and British policies in

1 this area.

2 Tell us why you were opposed to these policies on the territory of

3 the former Yugoslavia if, of course, you recall what you said at that

4 meeting.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, this is contrary to

6 the standpoints I expressed in relation to the referendum and an integral

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina where there were 44 per

8 cent Muslims. When the census was taken, that was the figure.

9 Secondly, the policy pursued by England and France might have

10 favoured the Serbs, the Serbian policy at certain points in time, but they

11 were not that until the end. The Washington agreements also expressed the

12 opinions of English and French policy. So that actually goes to deny the

13 contents of this letter that the English policy would be what is stated

14 here. And there was a lady, a former Prime Minister, who was not

15 advocating this standpoint mentioned in the letter.

16 And today I'm still against such a policy, because the problems in

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be resolved by liquidating the Muslim ethnic

18 group in the area. Any policy, regardless of whose it was, has to take

19 that into account or we will go back to the Middle Ages when there were

20 events taking place in the world where entire ethnic groups and nations

21 were wiped out. I don't think that Europe can do that now.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Scott.

23 MR. SCOTT:

24 Q. Sir, we're finishing on this page, on this topic, and hopefully

25 going back to some other entries. On this point, though, there is this

1 continuing dialogue then between -- or some dialogue again between you and

2 President Tudjman, and if I can direct your attention to page 24, the

3 bottom of page 24, continuing over to the top of page 25. I suppose

4 "Joza" is a familiar form or affectionate form of Josip, perhaps, and

5 President Tudjman says, on the bottom of that page: "Now, Joza, you said

6 that the policy nevertheless, that the Croatian policy in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina had not -- had to not only pay attention to

8 Herceg-Bosna and Boban but also to Kljuic and Brkic, Kljuic who

9 disappeared under Alija's fez and, excuse me, you also said that you

10 bugged it and he repeats this today."

11 So is this in fact the statement, sir, continued to be your

12 position, the one you've already told us about yesterday and today, that

13 people like Kljuic and Brkic had to be fully considered in deciding what

14 the appropriate policy would be?

15 A. Yes. When I say Kljuic and Brkic, this should be taken

16 symbolically, because they were advocating the interests of Central Bosnia

17 and other areas, too, not only those areas where there was an ethnically

18 pure situation, meaning Herzegovina. Boban failed to understand this. He

19 was pushing his own line, the line of Herceg-Bosna, to have it established

20 in the area. He was not taking into account what would happen to all the

21 others. That's when the conflict arose. And it was only the Washington

22 Agreement that managed to put an end to that conflict successfully. This

23 was not done consistently to the end, but it did stop the bloodshed, which

24 I think is the biggest result that the Croats gained and the Muslims as

25 well.

1 But I do have to lay stress on the Croats, because they were in

2 the most dire situation at the time in military terms. You may disagree

3 with this, Mr. Praljak, but the facts show that you were in the most dire

4 military crisis at the moment the Washington Agreement was signed. You

5 have the right to your opinion, just as everybody else does.

6 Q. On that very point, sir, if I can direct your attention now to

7 page 17. President Tudjman speaking. "Gentlemen, I ordered - how long

8 ago was it, when I called Defence Minister Susak and the chief of staff,

9 General Bobetko, and told them - to take all steps for us to keep the

10 areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina designated as Croatian according to the

11 Vance-Owen Plan, that."

12 And skipping to the bottom of that page: "So, gentlemen, the

13 minister of defence and the chief of staff, please take measures. I

14 already ordered them, to prevent this, to secure the Croatian interest in

15 the military sense there, everything that is needed. But then again, of

16 course, do not give it openly."

17 And did you understand, sir, this is around -- this is July -- the

18 2nd of July, 1993. What did you understand to happen about the presence

19 of elements of the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina around this

20 time?

21 A. It is evident here that President Tudjman found himself in a

22 quandary. On the one hand, he wanted to help as much as possible by all

23 means, and he took certain measures. I don't know what measures he took

24 precisely, whether only military or other measures, and he ordered the

25 chief of the General Staff, so I assume it was military measures. But

1 then in his second sentence you see where the danger is, because he says,

2 "Don't give assistance openly." He was afraid of pressure which might be

3 exerted on him from the outside were he to engage militarily in

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 Q. Well, let's skip the next paragraph, although there's some --

6 let's skip the next paragraph. "So please in the military sense and in

7 all government departments you are to pay attention to the fact that this

8 is about -- that in Bosnia-Herzegovina we must secure our interest in

9 every respect."

10 And then if I can direct your attention for -- on that point, to

11 page 54. President Tudjman: "Anyone else? All right, gentlemen, let's

12 finish.

13 "With regard to sanctions, I do not think that in such a situation

14 they pose a serious threat."

15 He goes on to say: "I think this threat is even smaller today.

16 But we must be careful not to give any direct cause to Serbs as an excuse

17 for their policy. Clearly we must not do this. But at the same time we

18 must take steps to protect Croatian interest in the territorial sense too.

19 And, you too, please, Minister Susak, General Bobetko, see about this and

20 meet with Herceg-Bosna leaders there, with General Praljak, Petkovic, and

21 Ambassador Sancevic and their leaders there, with Boban and Prlic, to

22 discuss exactly what should be done. But it goes without saying, do not

23 lead the operation in such a way as to make a direct involvement."

24 Do you see that, sir?

25 A. Yes. This runs throughout the text: Let's go into action. Let's

1 help Herceg-Bosna, but not so that it can be noticed and observed by

2 external elements. This is the danger he keeps pointing out. He was a

3 realistic politician, and he knew that the imposition of sanctions because

4 of involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina would mean sanctions against Croatia.

5 It would mean the isolation of Croatia. It would bring into question the

6 very survival of Croatia as an independent and sovereign state.

7 That's why he keeps stressing this "Don't let it be known in

8 public. Don't let it be registered." But you will recall that the UN

9 Security Council did register this with their famous sentence, "Elements

10 of the Croatian army are in Bosnia-Herzegovina." This could not be denied

11 in discussions among us, nor could it be denied in public, and least of

12 all could it be denied in the reports being handed round in the Security

13 Council and the UN. That was the difficulty in implementing this state

14 policy. It wasn't so simple.

15 Q. And if I could ask the usher to please now take us to Exhibit

16 P 08012.

17 You have that, sir. Is this the record of a meeting, looking at

18 the -- page 2 of the document. I hope this will be -- the page 2s will be

19 the same in all versions, electronic and hard copy, I hope. Page 2, do

20 you see that this is a record of a meeting on the 27th [sic] session of

21 the Council for Defence and National Security, held on the 4th of March,

22 1994, chaired by President Tudjman?

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There is an error here. It's

24 not 27 but 37.

25 MR. SCOTT: My apology, Your Honour, you're absolutely right.

1 Q. 37th, session, sir. Do you see that?

2 A. Yes. I remember this session. It was devoted to the

3 pre-agreement for the Washington Agreements, discussing the particular

4 paragraphs of the Washington Agreement. We were taking our positions as

5 regards accepting these documents.

6 I have to point out that the definition provided by the Security

7 Council pre-dated this, and it was a form of pressure on President Tudjman

8 to get him to accept the Washington Agreement without any objections. And

9 if we want to be totally objective, this was the positive side of the

10 authoritarian nature of President Tudjman which predominated both in

11 Croatian politics and the politics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nobody could

12 find the strength to oppose it.

13 This group in Bosnia-Herzegovina was unable to resist this policy

14 although it represented a 180-degree turn-around, because up to that point

15 they had been waging war against the Muslims, and now they would be in a

16 federation with those same Muslims, in peacetime. But there was no

17 resistance. Even those who favoured the war option agreed because of the

18 authority of President Tudjman. So they did not resist this policy but

19 accepted it.

20 Q. Very well. Can you tell the Judges a bit more, just in terms of

21 setting the scene, if you will. By the 4th of March, 1994, the Washington

22 Agreement was, if not entirely we would say a fait accompli, the writing

23 was on the wall so to speak; is that correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And if we look still on this -- sorry.

1 A. The Washington Agreement was signed somewhat later. These things,

2 however, represented preliminary material. They were discussed

3 previously, and I think that it was at the session that they were

4 discussed.

5 Q. And still on the second page but looking at the agenda items, the

6 agenda item 1 is "Preliminary agreement on forming Croat-Muslim federation

7 in BH and confederation with Croatia." And then at the bottom of the page

8 -- yes.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. At the bottom of the page, it says -- let's -- "We move to the

11 first item," and then going over to the top of page 3, it also mentions,

12 by the way, that Mr. Prlic was also present at this meeting, which I

13 believe you mentioned earlier; is that correct? Earlier today.

14 A. Yes. Yes.

15 Q. Let me direct your attention to page 4.

16 A. I think that during this session it wasn't just the council

17 members. I think that there was broader attendance there and that certain

18 officials from Herceg-Bosna were also invited. I can't remember everyone

19 who attended, but I remember Prlic, who also took part in the discussion.

20 Q. All right. If we go to page 4, then. Starting about the middle

21 -- a little above the middle of the page: "That's what I've been talking

22 about in a message yesterday, and if somebody doesn't understand, I say

23 why did we create Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna? Then I'll say it again

24 so we could achieve the results of this politics. If we didn't have and

25 don't have now the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna, we wouldn't have the

1 Croat-Muslim federation in Bosnia. That is, we wouldn't have the

2 confederation of that Croat-Muslim Bosnia with Croatia.

3 "In other words, we'll have in the sphere of Croatia, I did not

4 say two Croatias, but we will have at least --" excuse me -- "we'll have

5 at least half of Bosnia. And then those with big mouths or those who do

6 not understand that I was the one who advocated division of Bosnia, can

7 draw their own conclusion now that West is not only executing but even

8 forcing us to accept division of Bosnia. Only, for reasons of their own,

9 they impose on us union with Muslims ..."

10 Can you tell the Judges, in this -- in this meeting, did President

11 Tudjman essentially say -- try to say that the Washington Agreement was

12 the best that could be done, that a lot had been accomplished? Because we

13 really -- the Trial Judges will have the entire transcript, which is here,

14 but do you recall that that is a large part of what President Tudjman was

15 doing in this meeting, and that is selling the Washington Agreement?

16 A. I think that in this case, when you read his entire statement,

17 you'll see that this was his defence of the policies towards Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina and Herceg-Bosna. He doesn't want to accept this as a

19 complete U-turn in relation to the previous preparations for the

20 Washington Agreement, because this inaugurated peace and up until that

21 time we had war. He was unable to accept that, because if he accepted

22 that, later in the text you will see the statement given by Susak, "How

23 are we going to justify the victims or, rather, the sacrifices that we

24 suffered in that war?" This is the negative side of that policy, because

25 at that point in time they had to acknowledge, they had to realise that

1 this wasn't a U-turn but, rather, a continuity of the policy that they

2 have pursued so far. To call it a U-turn would have been impossible

3 because otherwise they couldn't justify all the sacrifices that were

4 incurred in the conflict with the Muslims.

5 Q. Sir, in the interests of time, I'd like to direct you to page 42

6 of the document where you express your views on this agreement, the

7 Washington Agreement. For the record, what happens in large part of this

8 meeting after Mr. Tudjman -- President Tudjman talks is that there seems

9 to be -- everyone goes around the table and expresses their view, and you

10 -- it gets to you on page 42, and starting there: "Josip Manolic: I

11 think that the agreement is ideal from the point of view of interest of

12 Croatia, primarily the Croatian state, but it will liberate us and it has

13 already liberated us. I think that the example that Gojko presented now

14 shows that if it were not for the agreement, we would be under blockade.

15 That's why it is ideal, primarily from the point of view of Croatian state

16 and Croats and its interest in whole BH, and as such, I believe we should

17 welcome it.

18 "It's another question if the agreement could have been reached

19 earlier, and if we could have solved this nightmare, and unannounced

20 blockade and pressures of embargo earlier. I think that we should leave

21 it to history and instead face the future in implementing this agreement.

22 I think that credits for this agreement don't go to only one side, but all

23 three sides that were involved in this. Why credits?"

24 And Tudjman says: "Which three sides?

25 "Manolic: Well, Americans, Muslims, that is Bosniaks, and us.

1 Because if our interest had not matched the American interest, world

2 interest, we would still be living miserably in war in a hopeless

3 situation in which we found ourselves. If it had not coincided with the

4 interest of Muslims, they certainly would not have agreed to it ..."

5 Sir, can you tell the Judges, did you find essentially the

6 Washington Agreement to be -- to put into effect a -- what you and Stipe

7 Mesic, for example, had been advocating for some time?

8 A. Yes. I can say so with full confidence that the Washington

9 Agreement was fully consistent with our efforts up until that time, first

10 to avoid any conflict with the Muslims, then once it arose we wanted to

11 put an end to it, and we wanted that to be discontinued. You see -- and

12 there were no efforts invested either by the Croatian side or the Muslim

13 side to put an end to this conflict earlier. International community had

14 to get involved, the United States and other countries who took part in

15 designing of the Washington Agreement.

16 However, this also illustrates the persistence, just what

17 persistence was applied, although it is completely illogical, because this

18 clearly was a discontinuation with the policy pursued so far in relation

19 to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is where he and I started debating, and I

20 think that I was right at the time.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It's 3.30. We shall

22 have a break now and resume at ten minutes to 4.00.

23 --- Recess taken at 3.30 p.m.

24 --- On resuming at 3.51 p.m.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you have the floor.

1 MR. SCOTT:

2 Q. Sir, if I can direct your attention, please, to page 55 of this

3 same record, which is again, for the record, it's P 08012. And at this

4 page -- at this point Mr. -- or President Tudjman comes back into the

5 discussion, says: "Anyone else? (No.) Okay, let's finish this item.

6 "Before my closing argument, a short recap on the discussion. I

7 think it's clear from the whole discussion that everybody agrees this is

8 useful for a Croatian nation --" again, we're talking about the Washington

9 Agreement here -- "... useful for the Croatian nation, Croatian state,

10 Zubak even used triumph of our politics. But also I agree that we should

11 not use such an approach that would insist only on that. But at the same

12 time we should affirm that this is the result of consistency of our

13 politics. On the subject of that, hardly anyone has. Obviously Mesic and

14 Manolic have a little different judgement. Isn't it, Stipe Mesic, that

15 our politics paid attention on external and internal limits but our

16 politics led active politics which led to that."

17 And then goes on, among other things, and says, "I was the one who

18 mainly initiated the suggestion of Cutileiro's canton solution ..."

19 And he refers, going on to the next page, at 56, "Thus, Joza

20 Manolic, we should talk about past, and not ...

21 "Josip Manolic: I did not say that ...

22 "President: No, no, but you think that we could have avoided the

23 conflict, that it's our mistake, as you publicly said several times that

24 it was a mistake of politics that conflict with Muslims in Herceg-Bosna

25 happened - which is not true. And I, although I was determined, to remove

1 Boban from the political scene exactly in order to come to that, but not

2 because I would believe that Boban was guilty and that, as some of you

3 said, the very idea of talking about adjoining of Herceg-Bosna would be

4 wrong, but things have developed in such a way so that Serbia joins, and

5 the West allows establishment of Muslim state. It is clear that adjoining

6 Herceg-Bosna to Croatia should have been prepared."

7 Skipping one paragraph, and then I'll just have a question for

8 you, and it's in light of what you said a few minutes ago: "Thus it is

9 not a turn, but consistency of our politics ..."

10 Sir, can you further respond to this passage in terms of what you

11 said earlier today about whether this involved consistency, as President

12 Tudjman claimed, or I think you said a U-turn.

13 A. Yes. I think that anyone observing the events in Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina, especially in Herceg-Bosna, and anyone observing the policy

15 of Croatia, specifically that of the president, would notice the

16 discontinuity in this policy, this U-turn. However, he could not admit,

17 he could not accept that this was a U-turn. Rather, he termed it

18 something that was consistent with his previous policies, because had he

19 accepted that this was a U-turn, then -- then he would have had to

20 confront what I was saying all along, that there should have been no

21 conflict between the Croats and the Muslims in territory of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So he would have had to accept that or not accept

23 that.

24 I stated at the time at the meeting, and also later, that there

25 should have been no conflict between the Croats and the Muslims. There

1 should have been no victims, no sacrifices, and there should have been no

2 difficulties which were inherent in that conflict. There would have been

3 no problems. And there were a lot of problems that accompanied that

4 situation, that accompanied Bosnia and Herzegovina and was a bit similar

5 with the aggression used by Serbia in order to resolve the issues in

6 Bosnia and Herzegovina that wasn't nice, that wasn't acceptable, but it

7 was a fact. There should have been no conflict, and since there should

8 have been no conflict, there should have been also no consequences

9 resulting from that conflict.

10 So even the opposition parties which were created in

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, created by Croats such as Komsic's civil party and

12 some other political parties -- I think that even Kljuic established his

13 political party. And all of these parties were opposed to the policy

14 pursued by Mate Boban and later on by his successors, all the way up until

15 the Washington Agreement.

16 You see, he didn't want to admit. He didn't want to admit to

17 Komsic either that he had advanced a proper policy. No. He's saying here

18 that even Komsic was going along with the HDZ policy too. However,

19 it's hard to justify it, hard in the face of all the things that had

20 happened.

21 Q. Just for clarification in the transcript, sir, on page 111, line

22 18 -- starting on line 17, it says: "He didn't want to admit to Komsic

23 either that he had advanced a proper policy." Did you say had advanced a

24 proper policy or an improper policy?

25 A. I think that Komsic was looking for a solution roughly along the

1 same terms or along the same line as Kljuic and his successor later on,

2 and -- however, it can't be denied, it can't be said that Komsic didn't

3 want to pursue a policy that would be in the interests of Croats in the

4 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though I think that later on

5 everybody supported the Washington Agreement, which is quite significant,

6 significant because President Tudjman also supported them and in a way

7 promoted or, rather, supported it and in a way promoted it.

8 Q. All right. If we can then go, sir -- I think the final transcript

9 that we'll have a chance to look at is Exhibit P 01325. P 01325.

10 Sir, if you look at the second page of the document. Can you

11 confirm that this is a meeting of the Republic of Croatia Defence and

12 Security Council held on the 27th of January, 1993, chaired by President

13 Tudjman?

14 A. Yes. These are the minutes from the session chaired by President

15 Tudjman on the 27th of January, 1993.

16 Q. In this transcript, sir, and we're only going to have time to

17 refer to a few bits of it, it refers to, at the bottom of page 2 and

18 continuing on, a letter that had come to President Tudjman from Jadranko

19 Prlic about developments in Bosnia at this time, around the second half of

20 January, 1993.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Before we get to that, Mr. President, could we

22 establish whether the gentleman was present or not? It appears his name

23 is missing from the minutes of the first page, so perhaps he can tell us

24 whether he was at that particular meeting.

25 MR. SCOTT:

1 Q. Sir, can you tell us whether you recall being present at this

2 meeting?

3 A. Yes. I attended the meeting.

4 Q. All right. And --

5 A. Even though some people who were not members of the council were

6 also invited to that meeting.

7 Q. All right. If I can just direct your attention then on to page 5,

8 after Mr. -- the letter from Prlic is read. And Susak speaks and says:

9 "Mr. President, I had a report this morning at 1130 hours, sent from

10 Busovaca by Kordic and Bruno Stojic. They had cut off the

11 Kiseljak-Busovaca road in the village of Kacuni. There have been no other

12 developments so far."

13 And to page 7, middle of page 7, please. Susak talking again. He

14 says: "We have the report of General Praljak and Stojic according to

15 which Alija does not have control over these units."

16 And then on page 8, Susak says: "I do not know when you spoke

17 with Boban, but I talked with him around 1100 hours this morning.

18 "President: No, I spoke with him tonight."

19 And one more entry before I ask you a couple of questions about

20 this. Over on page 9, Susak again: "They are running out of materiel up

21 there and it's difficult to deliver it. They're lacking materiel.

22 Praljak and Stojic are organising in the south everything in their power.

23 The general and I have done here everything that we could. We shall

24 monitor the situation."

25 Sir, can you tell us --

1 A. I think it would be good to pay attention to the date, the 27th of

2 January, I believe. This was the period of time when these Croatian

3 forces of the HVO found themselves in a very difficult military situation

4 and when, in a way, they needed to be supported more strongly for them to

5 be able to persevere in certain portions of the front. This is precisely

6 why Susak speaks of this. Not of the difficulties but, rather, of ways

7 and means of helping these units which were located in the areas where the

8 HVO positions were threatened.

9 In addition to this, there are different assessments provided by

10 individuals and the leadership of the party, but I think that in that

11 meeting the difficulties were discussed at length, the difficulties in

12 which the HVO in Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself.

13 Q. Sir, if I can direct you to one more entry on the -- page 12,

14 toward the bottom of that page. Mate Granic was at that time the minister

15 of foreign affairs for the Republic of Croatia?

16 A. Yes. Mr. Granic was the minister of foreign affairs of the

17 Republic of Croatia.

18 Q. And Mr. Granic says: "Mr. President, in line with your

19 yesterday's talks with Ms. Ogata, I have spoken with Mr. Prlic and before

20 that with Minister Susak about how to deal with international humanitarian

21 organisations for the time being."

22 Did you, sir -- the President of the -- of this trial asked

23 earlier, either yesterday or today, whether information reports were

24 coming back to Zagreb. The type of information that's being reported back

25 here from -- letter from Prlic, reports from Stojic and Praljak, is that

1 consistent with what you found to be the case, that Mr. Susak and

2 President Tudjman were frequently briefed and informed on what was

3 happening in Bosnia on a day-to-day basis?

4 A. Yes. From the formal, legal point of view, this was a different

5 state. However, practically speaking, there was no border there. There

6 existed a direct contact between the minister of defence and the president

7 as commander-in-chief with those units or, rather, with the leadership of

8 Herceg-Bosna, its president, and other officials. I think that when it

9 comes to the intensity of the contact and problems, people who were direct

10 participants would be better placed to tell you more about this.

11 I didn't know how the letter by Prlic reached the president,

12 whether it went through the regular channels of communication between the

13 leadership of Herceg-Bosna and the leadership in Zagreb.

14 Q. Mr. Manolic, I thank you very much on behalf of the Prosecution

15 for your testimony.

16 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, that concludes our time. I would like

17 the record to reflect that I think we've used a little over five hours of

18 our time, which means that we have come in considerably less than the

19 estimate. I do want the record to reflect, though, that in order to do

20 that, there's a number of exhibits that we have not been able to cover,

21 and I know there's frequent statements about the amount of time available

22 in the trial, Your Honour, and I just want the record to show that the

23 Prosecution is also affected by time limits and has tried to live within

24 those time limits, and where we can, do better than the time estimates

25 that we have given to the Chamber.

1 Thank you very much.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Scott. Can you

3 tell us what are the numbers of the documents you wish to tender into

4 evidence?

5 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, if you would -- sorry. If you would

6 allow me, because again we have skipped, even in the course of this

7 afternoon, various exhibits, if I could be allowed to go back through

8 those and give those to you in the morning, I would appreciate it, the

9 final list.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, I would ask also if we could have an

12 accounting of the pages, the number of pages of all of the documents being

13 tendered, in light of the comment that I just heard from Mr. Scott,

14 because I think this goes to the time limitation, because as I noted, he's

15 picking and choosing, and we have to go through all of these documents, so

16 that's why time limitations are not realistic in certain -- with certain

17 witnesses.

18 Also, we are not preventing the Prosecution from putting on his or

19 her case. They can do so. They can take all the time they want.

20 Now, having said that, I believe it's Mr. Praljak who would lead

21 the cross-examination, Your Honour. And I can also state with some degree

22 of certainty that the Defence has not been able to come to any real

23 agreement as to the amount of time necessary, how we're going to divide

24 the amount of time, because we all have our respective clients and our

25 respective defences. Having said that, we're going to try to be as

1 efficient as possible, and I believe Mr. Praljak will start off first.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I can say without much

3 hesitation that the Defence has managed to agree on how to use our time,

4 yes, but I wish to know how much time will be used by whom. So please

5 tell us, Mr. Karnavas, how much time you envisage using for the defence of

6 your client, Mr. Prlic.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, that's a very difficult question to answer,

8 and here's why: Mr. Praljak is going to go first, with Mr. Kovacic

9 following. Depending on the areas that they're going to cover, then I

10 would be able to give you an estimation. I mean, this is how it is,

11 unfortunately. But I have spoken with some of my colleagues to divide

12 parts of the topics so we don't cross over.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Ibrisimovic, you have

14 the floor.

15 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, with reference to

16 the documents, Mr. Scott mentioned he would not present all the documents

17 he intended to use with this witness but possibly these documents would be

18 presented through another witness. Respecting the principle that

19 documents are tendered through witness testimony, we feel that at this

20 point those documents can only be marked for reference, for

21 identification.

22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would just like to

23 add something for Your Honour's information. Over the weekend when

24 preparing for this witness, we had quite a lot of communication and each

25 team has its own ideas and its own objectives in this cross-examination.

1 However, we were unable to completely define all the topics that the four

2 defence teams will deal with because each team feels they have quite a lot

3 to cover. Mr. Praljak and I have a large area to cover, and for this

4 reason it's very difficult for us to say how much time we will need.

5 Having heard this witness, Your Honour, you yourself can see that

6 this is a very important part of the indictment, the theory of joint

7 criminal enterprise. A lot of details have been referred to. A lot of

8 material has been dealt with. I can only say that our questions will be

9 relevant and they will not be repetitive, because even though we have not

10 managed to fully define our respective areas of examination, if one

11 Defence counsel puts a question that others had intended to put, they will

12 certainly strike that question off their list of questions.

13 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, by your leave, I wish to

14 say something for clarification. We now have an hour. We will begin, but

15 in the morning, before the beginning of the day's session, we will give

16 you complete information as to how much time each team will need. We

17 didn't know how much time Mr. Scott would use until the end of the day and

18 what documents he would tender into evidence, which is why we could not

19 reach a precise agreement.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Scott. I was just

21 about to ask you something. We have here all these documents, and with

22 the exception of the book written by the witness, they are all minutes

23 from sessions attended by the witness. He recognised these minutes, he

24 stated that he attended those meetings and sessions, and on the basis of

25 this, you can ask that they be received into evidence unless among these

1 minutes there are some you intend to introduce through another person who

2 attended these sessions.

3 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, thank you for that. Yes, in fact I think

4 the witness would confirm -- I suppose I should have done that, but again

5 I was trying to use time very, very efficiently -- that the witness can

6 confirm that as to the documents -- transcripts that were marked for this

7 witness, the ones, whether we've gotten to them or not, these are all

8 meetings that he attended and participated in, and I believe he would be

9 able to say -- I'm confident he would say that. I suppose if the -- if we

10 were to go through those and do that, each one with him, we can do that.

11 I can offer -- I can make an offer of proof to the Court that would be his

12 evidence. That's point -- that's one point, Your Honour.

13 I was also going to make another point but I think you raised a

14 more important point first. If the Chamber wants me to go back through

15 all the -- the additional remaining transcripts and have him confirm his

16 involvement in these various meetings, we can do that.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I can do that, but I think it

18 would be best if you were to go in order. For example, take document 37,

19 the session of the 8th of June, 1991. Were you there? Yes. Second,

20 session 68 of the 12th of November, 1991. The witness will say, "I was

21 there," or, "I wasn't there." You can deal with it very quickly. So I

22 will ask you to do so now, and after that we will give the floor to

23 Mr. Praljak.

24 MR. SCOTT: Very well, Your Honour. If I can just get some

25 assistance from the ...

1 Q. Sir, can you confirm -- you heard the discussions, I think, between

2 the counsel and the Chamber in the last few minutes. You've looked

3 specifically at -- and I'm sorry I didn't keep a separate list of these

4 with me. You looked at a transcript of a meeting dated the 8th of June,

5 1991, which you specifically gave evidence on. You also gave specific

6 evidence on a meeting on the 12th of November, 1991. I believe you also

7 gave evidence on Exhibit P 00134, a transcript of the 10th of March, 1992.

8 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, Your Honour. To be honest, I wasn't prepared

9 to do this in a systematic way.

10 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may be of some assistance, Your Honour. I

11 assume the Prosecution intends to introduce all of the documents they

12 indicated they would go through with this particular witness. It might

13 save some time if, perhaps overnight, they could come up with a list. You

14 know, that would save some time. We can get into the cross-examination.

15 I'm perfectly willing to accept the offer of proof made by the

16 Prosecution, but I do agree with the record.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If the list is presented

18 tomorrow, all right. That will be submitted tomorrow. It's sufficient

19 for you to take the list you have already handed us and simply update it,

20 and say which were the sessions which he attended, plus the book. The

21 Defence will also be ready, and we will then save time.

22 If you recall, we have stated previously that as a rule, exhibits

23 are tendered through witnesses. If these are minutes from a session that

24 the witness attended, there is no reason not to receive it into evidence.

25 I will now give the floor to Mr. Praljak, but let me first say

1 something to Mr. Manolic.

2 Mr. Manolic, we are now entering the stage of cross-examination.

3 Generally speaking, cross-examination is very difficult. The questions

4 put to you might be irritating to you, but please try to remain calm and

5 answer the questions calmly, even if they irritate you. If you have the

6 impression that the question was put to you in an aggressive manner, don't

7 get excited. Remain calm. This is not an arena, and it is not gladiators

8 who are participating in these proceedings. Everybody has to remain calm.

9 Every question that is put is put for a reason. It's up to you to answer

10 each question.

11 Mr. Praljak, you have understood me. I believe I can count on you

12 to respect all this. Just please tell us how much time you envisage you

13 need.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour --

15 Mr. President, there are two kinds of examination and two kinds of

16 witnesses. One kind is a simple mathematical process. The witness says

17 one thing, you answer, he replies.

18 The testimony of Mr. Manolic, who was for a long time on intimate

19 terms with President Tudjman and the second-ranking man in Croatia, has

20 opened up a whole range of issues. Translated into physics, this is like

21 saying solve the quantum problem of the law of gravitation. This,

22 unfortunately, is not simple. Endeavouring for months to understand what

23 would be the relevant questions in these proceedings, I attempted to save

24 time, because I had a constant feeling of guilt, fearing that I was

25 abusing the patience of the Court and the witness but also concerned for

1 my right to my defence and my dignity, which I have not abandoned.

2 As Mr. Manolic has put forward a number of theses about politics,

3 about the link between politics and crimes, about the functioning of power

4 and government, about stories and rumours that went round and so on, I

5 cannot at this point in time tell you how long it will take me to put the

6 questions to which I must receive the answer. If one question alone is

7 not sufficient, I need to get an answer.

8 Anyway, as Mr. Manolic and I have known each other for a long

9 time, we were in politics together from 1989, I can put a very relevant

10 question. Does Mr. Manolic know, has he heard, was he informed, and let

11 me tell you that over a long period during the war Mr. Manolic was at the

12 head of all the intelligence services in the Republic of Croatia.

13 Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:

14 Q. Is this correct, Mr. Manolic?

15 A. Tell me from when to when.

16 Q. When you stopped being the Prime Minister of the Republic of

17 Croatia until you became the Speaker of the House of Counties, you were

18 the chief of all the intelligence services. You were in the office for

19 the protection of the constitutional order.

20 A. That's right.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. Continue, please.

22 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

23 Q. My question is the following: Did Mr. Manolic, as the best

24 informed person, along with President Tudjman, ever anywhere hear that

25 Slobodan Praljak, as a volunteer and a commander in Sunja in political

1 life, as the commander of the HVO, as the assistant minister of defence of

2 the Republic of Croatia, ever by word or deed, by intention or any public

3 act or speech, do anything anywhere at any time that would be contrary to

4 any law or any ethical and moral norm? Because then Mr. Manolic could

5 tell Their Honours it happened here at such-and-such a place, at

6 such-and-such a time, in such-and-such a manner. If his answer, however,

7 was no, then I could sit down. But we would not then be resolving

8 everything that has been said here about politics, about the functioning

9 of government, about the conditions in which all this took place.

10 We are talking here with Mr. Manolic as if we were in a test tube,

11 as if there were no people being killed, wounded, no refugees, no fear, no

12 pain, no desperation, no hatred. Everything is peaceful, quiet. We are

13 in the corridors, and yet I'm putting the following question: In this

14 huge game of great minds, meetings, conclusions, the question remains of

15 my mother living in Mostar, asking, "Who is going to protect me? Will the

16 same fate befall me that befell those people in Vukovar? Will I be

17 killed? Will my throat be slit? Will I be expelled from my home?" There

18 were tens of thousands of people putting the same questions.

19 In the introductory part here --

20 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'm going to object at this point. This

21 has gone on long enough. This is not the time for opening speeches or

22 closing arguments. I think cross-examination should begin. The Chamber

23 has asked Mr. Praljak to put a question and I think he should put a

24 question.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Praljak, go

1 ahead. Please start your questioning of the witness.

2 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I will, and it will go on

3 until we finish.

4 Q. With respect to the transcripts, Mr. Manolic, when meetings were

5 held in President Tudjman's office, meetings of the Defence and National

6 Security Council, was the purpose of these meetings to put forward all

7 theses, to have a free discussion? Was this treated as a conversation

8 similar to conversations that take place in one's home, among one's

9 friends, in a cafe, in the street? Is the conversation free and people

10 put forward even theses they don't abide by simply to see what can be put

11 on the table? Was it like this?

12 A. No, I don't think so. When you look at the minutes, you will see

13 that the meetings lasted from one to two hours at the most. You are

14 limited in time, and you were also limited by the agenda. One did not

15 stray beyond the agenda. So your idea about a drawing room discussion

16 where one can discuss all kinds of matters, from virginity to crime, that

17 doesn't hold water. My answer is no.

18 Q. My question was not about straying beyond the agenda. What I said

19 was that the items on the agenda could be discussed much more freely just

20 as in the cabinets and behind closed doors in all governments and all

21 states, discussions are much freer than the public statements made later

22 by any of the participants of the meeting; is that correct?

23 A. No, that's not correct either, because at that point in time when

24 minutes were taken, or the transcript as we call it now, the intention of

25 the transcript was not to be made public. It was intended for that circle

1 to note down the standpoints and ideas presented. We don't need to

2 discuss this at length. You can see it in the very text of the

3 transcript. Beyond that, I couldn't go. You can say whatever you like.

4 Q. Mr. Manolic, you told me quite correctly that these transcripts

5 were not intended to be made public.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. The transcripts were not later given to the participants in the

8 meeting for them to read through, correct, or authorise? Yes or no.

9 A. No. I and not only I but none of the participants ever saw the

10 transcripts that we have available now. None of us ever authorised those

11 transcripts.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Do you mean to say that there

14 was a stenographer taking minutes, just like the court reporter here, who

15 types out everything that was said in the room where the session was held?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can't go into the

17 technology, but I assume that a lot of this was recorded on an audio

18 recording and then transcribed from the tape and copied, transformed into

19 a text. But I can say neither yes nor no because I can't go into the

20 technical aspect.

21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Did every participant in every meeting know that he was being

23 recorded or not?

24 A. I think everybody knew.

25 Q. Do you think or do you know?

1 A. I think, because I didn't ask any of the participants whether they

2 knew they were being recorded or not.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 A. The president sometimes said, "Be serious. This is going to be

5 recorded." But people knew more or less, and I don't think you can see

6 that in the transcripts.

7 Q. Thank you very much. Was it the custom among journalists or other

8 people to draw a sharp distinction between speech, which includes

9 gestures, mind, body language, tone of voice, laughter and so on, and what

10 is transcribed of all this? Is there a significant difference between the

11 spoken and written word, or can there be a significant difference?

12 A. In theory, yes, but at these sessions this did not happen.

13 Q. Have you dealt with communications, language and speech, in order

14 to be able to say so clearly that there is a theoretical difference but it

15 didn't happen there?

16 A. No, it didn't happen there. I'm testifying to what happened. I'm

17 not testifying about the philosophical discussion of what could or could

18 not have happened in theory. We have to be practical now.

19 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Manolic, may I ask both of you gentlemen,

20 please, you are speaking in your mother tongue, and you have to think

21 about the interpreters. And first of all, both of you should slow down

22 and bit, and secondly, please wait until the interpreters will finish with

23 your statements and then of course to start and reply, to put the question

24 and reply. But please be aware of the fact that for you it is very easy

25 to talk in your mother tongue, but it is not easy for the interpreters to

1 translate it. I would like very much to thank you for following this

2 advice.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, you have the floor.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you for cautioning us.

5 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Why call each theoretical dispute - I'm now quoting your words -

7 philosophising? Because philosophising means search for truth. I'm

8 asking you, Mr. Manolic, is it true that everywhere in the world, when one

9 wants to use a document which was secretly recorded, that this document is

10 then given to somebody to confirm it, to authorise it? I'm saying this,

11 that there is a significant difference between oral communication and

12 written communication. Oral communication containing also gestures and

13 all other body language. Do you agree with me?

14 A. Yes, I agree with you that there may be a difference there. I

15 fully agree with you there.

16 Q. [No interpretation].

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In line with what Mr. Praljak

18 has talked about, Mr. Praljak mentioned a secret recording. When you met,

19 was the person taking the minutes physically present or were you recorded

20 with audiotapes and you did not know that this recording was taking place,

21 or was there a stenographer in the room and present together with

22 Mr. Tudjman and all the other people whose names were on the list?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't tell you that with full

24 certainty, but I can tell you with full certainty that I saw no person

25 taking minutes there in the room or sitting at the table, which means that

1 there was a recording equipment and that the personnel doing that was in

2 another room. I can tell you that with full certainty. But it seems to

3 me that Mr. Praljak would like to draw this conclusion. Namely, he wants

4 to question the authenticity of these transcripts and to which extent they

5 properly may be used in such trials.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's not what my question is

7 about. Since yesterday, we've been spending a lot of time looking at

8 these documents and what has been said in the presence of Mr. -- of

9 President Tudjman. When you were asked -- my question is: Did you know

10 that what you were saying was being recorded? You were at the head of the

11 intelligence service, so you must have known something about this. So

12 when you addressed President Tudjman or spoke before him, did you know

13 that what you were saying was being recorded?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I never wondered about that,

15 nor did I ever ask the president whether that was being recorded or not.

16 That was his own matter and that of his inner circle, the technical

17 personnel that he had arranged this with. I wasn't interested in it.

18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Mr. Manolic, it doesn't matter whether you were interested in this

20 or not. I'm putting forward a claim here that you can deny if you wish

21 without wondering about the objective of my claim.

22 Except when President Tudjman explicitly stated that the meeting

23 was recorded, in all other cases those attending meetings, including

24 myself, didn't know that the meeting was recorded. Is that correct or

25 not?

1 A. No, nobody knew about this. That's the essence.

2 Q. Well, this is what we're trying to establish here. People didn't

3 know unless it was explicitly stated that any meeting was recorded. Thank

4 you very much.

5 Mr. Manolic, I'm now putting questions, and we need to move at a

6 certain pace.

7 The principle of volition means that occasionally our emotions,

8 which may arise, that we may sometimes keep them to ourselves and control

9 them. For example, in the middle of the attack on Croatia, Croatia is on

10 fire, and then a decision is taken within the Security Council to impose

11 embargo and to deny a right to an entire nation. Then under those

12 circumstances I will fully acknowledge before this Trial Chamber that very

13 passionate emotions may rise within me, emotions in relation to big powers

14 such as France, the United States, China, Russia, and so on, because I

15 think that it's unfair, I think that it's improper. I think that it's

16 uncivilised. I think that it's contrary to all proper norms to deny a

17 nation a right to self-defence and to allow somebody to go ahead killing

18 them.

19 Please let me put my question.

20 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry, I object.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

22 MR. SCOTT: There is no question here. Once again we're back to

23 making speeches.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, please avoid

25 lengthy speeches. This is in your own interest.

1 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] In my view, it is essential

2 to establish whether I, under those circumstances -- when I'm in a room

3 with my wife, when I know that I am not recorded, whether I under such

4 circumstances may utter words, and these were not publicly uttered, may

5 utter words which then --

6 MR. SCOTT: [Previous translation continues] ...

7 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] -- may be used in court

8 against me.

9 MR. SCOTT: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Praljak's

10 views whether it's essential or not. He's not making those judgements.

11 If he'd like to put a question to the witness, he can do so.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, if I may, if I may be of some

13 assistance. I think this is very relevant, you know, to what Mr. Praljak

14 is trying to achieve, and that is if no one knew that they were being tape

15 recorded, then obviously they would not be guarded in what they were

16 saying.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] All right. We have

19 concluded with this. We may move on. Actually, I can round up my

20 question.

21 Q. Under those circumstances, when a lot of blood was shed, Croatia

22 was on fire, can a man control his emotions under such circumstances? Is

23 a man entitled to such emotions, and do they represent a crime? Did you

24 experience such emotions yourself?

25 A. Listen, as regards those sanctions that were imposed against

1 Croatia at the time, I can agree with you, but that's not what we're

2 discussing here now. We're not discussing whether it was justified for

3 sanctions to be imposed against Croatia at that time. I don't think that

4 this is the matter that is relevant here. And I think that you used up

5 some half an hour, and we could have concluded this very quickly, just yes

6 or no.

7 Q. Mr. Manolic, I'm not your student.

8 A. I'm not your student either.

9 Q. I'm not your party student. Please allow me to defend myself to

10 the best of my abilities. I'm not attending a party school in Kumrovec

11 now, a party school of the League of Communists, therefore I ask that you

12 answer my questions. This is your role at this moment.

13 In the book that I'm holding here, there are 227 documents,

14 documents of President Tudjman, Croatian government, Croatian parliament,

15 signed by them during these events, mostly pertaining to

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mr. Karnavas and his Defence team have all of these

17 documents in English. I will very quickly get to the questions.

18 On the 27th of February, 1991 - 27th of February - a declaration

19 was adopted on the state sovereignty and indivisibility of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Are you aware of this?

21 A. Yes, I believe such a document exists.

22 Q. This declaration was adopted because the representatives of the

23 Muslim nation in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and representatives of

24 the Croatian nation in that Assembly voted for this declaration. Is that

25 correct?

1 A. Mr. Praljak, I as a witness before this Tribunal cannot go into

2 what was going on in certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I can only

3 testify about the events in which I personally participated. I can only

4 describe to you what was happening there at the time where I was. Now

5 you're trying to draw me into Bosnia-Herzegovina. I only visited that

6 region once or twice, when I went to Sarajevo. Nor did I participate in

7 various discussions about these problems. Therefore, please spare me,

8 because the only answer I can give you is no.

9 Q. I'm confused now.

10 A. So am I.

11 Q. You came here to testify, and you have been testifying the whole

12 time about the relationship between the Croatian policy, or, rather, the

13 involvement of Croatia in the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So how, then,

14 can you claim that you know nothing about that, you have no idea, you

15 didn't visit the region at the time, and generally you're not interested?

16 A. There is no reason for me to know about the documents adopted by

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina in any of its bodies. That's not what I'm testifying

18 about. I'm testifying about the material contained in this book and I'm

19 also testifying about the transcripts and their contents.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic. Mr. Manolic,

21 please look at the Bench when you answer the question. So please listen

22 to the question and look at us when you answer.

23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

24 Q. I cannot but tell you that this declaration for which the Croats

25 voted, there were 44 representatives of the HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

1 and you accuse the HDZ of working in order to break this country apart.

2 So I'm asking you now whether this document says the following: "The

3 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sovereign unitary indivisible

4 democratic state of all citizens residing therein.

5 Item 2: "The borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not subject to

6 change."

7 And only towards the end do they mention the rights of the people,

8 which is a bit strange. And you never heard of this document; correct?

9 A. Yes. Nor do I wish to go into this document.

10 Q. On the 29th of June, 1991, President Alija Izetbegovic, when

11 discussing the future of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

12 came up with the six items. Are you aware of this document?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Do you know that at the time Mr. Izetbegovic asked the US

15 Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker, and now I'm quoting: For the

16 international community to focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina, because a civil

17 war, which is a realistic threat, would be sure to break out first in this

18 republic. Baker agreed with that. This is what Izetbegovic added.

19 Are you aware of this?

20 A. Mr. Praljak, this question was never discussed at the meetings of

21 Defence and National Security Council where I was present, so once again

22 my answer is no.

23 Q. Thank you. On the 7th of July, 1991, the Brioni Declaration was

24 adopted, which reads as follows: "The participants of the third round of

25 negotiations between the delegation of the European Community and the

1 Yugoslav representatives adopted a document on peaceful resolution of the

2 crisis."

3 And then further on it says: "The peoples of Yugoslavia are the

4 only ones who can decide on their own future. The negotiations must start

5 urgently, no later than the 1st of August, 1991. All aspects of the

6 future of Yugoslavia without any preconditions and based on the principles

7 contained in the final document from Helsinki and in the Paris Charter and

8 so on need to be implied."

9 Brioni is located in Croatia. Are you aware of this document?

10 A. Yes. I know that this meeting was held. I personally didn't

11 participate in the meeting.

12 Q. But at that point in time you were the Prime Minister.

13 A. Could you give me the time frame, please?

14 Q. The 7th of July, 1991.

15 A. The 7th of July. Yes, you're right.

16 Q. So you as Prime Minister, in a situation where the fate of the

17 people whom you are leading is being discussed.

18 A. I've answered your question. I told you that I was aware of the

19 meeting and of what transpired there. That's what I replied. What else

20 do you want?

21 Q. Thank you very much. In The Hague, the place where we are now, on

22 the 6th of August, 1991, the European Community adopted a Declaration on

23 Yugoslavia. This was the declaration of the ministers of 12 States. At

24 the time, the EC had only 12 members. So they, the 12, urgently demand

25 the Presidency of Yugoslavia to organise a conference on the future of

1 Yugoslavia. They were prepared to organise such a conference themselves.

2 Such negotiations ought to be based on the principle that any changes of

3 internal or external borders are not acceptable and that the rights of

4 minorities need to be guaranteed in all republics. Are you familiar with

5 this document?

6 A. No. This document was not presented at the sessions which I

7 attended.

8 Q. That's quite sufficient. Thank you.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You said a while ago that at the

10 time you were Prime Minister a meeting is convened in The Hague and a

11 declaration is made by the ministers of the EC, which at the time

12 comprised 12 Member States. The declaration is about Yugoslavia on a

13 future conference on Yugoslavia to be held in the future, and you're

14 telling us that you did not know about this?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is one to be informed and quite

16 different to participate. I did not take part in that. I think that this

17 resolution was treated in Yugoslavia or, rather, was treated by the

18 Presidency of Yugoslavia. They discussed it. If you give me the date,

19 then I will be able to give you this more accurately.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

21 Q. It's the 6th of August, 1991. Mr. Manolic, I'm asking you now,

22 were you aware of this document at the time?

23 A. Yes, at that time I was aware of the document.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 A. And I think that our minister participated in some way in all

1 this, but afterwards it was not raised in the sessions in which I

2 participated.

3 Q. My second question: Did Mr. Franjo Tudjman, the president of the

4 Croatian state, take an active part in the creation of each one of these

5 documents?

6 A. Yes, I think he participated quite intensively in all these

7 documents.

8 Q. Thank you very much.

9 A. But that doesn't mean --

10 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Manolic. Please be correct towards me.

11 A. Certainly.

12 Q. Answer my question without adding anything. You have explained

13 everything you had to explain when Mr. Scott was putting questions to you.

14 I am asking you questions in the way you wanted them asked, whether you

15 knew something, whether you didn't. As to what somebody else was doing or

16 thinking or what you thought they were doing or thinking is not relevant

17 here. The Court is here to establish facts, and we shall keep opinions

18 for some other time and place. Thank you.

19 Are you aware that on the 2nd of August, 1991, the Serb-Muslim

20 historical agreement was signed in Belgrade between Muhamed Filipovic and

21 Radovan Karadzic? In this agreement, the Serbs and the Muslims discussed

22 without the Croats and tried to agree on their co-existence. Do you know

23 of this agreement?

24 A. No. I've only heard that there was such an agreement.

25 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 5 of this agreement, it says: "We

1 express our interest for the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina to live with

2 us in full equality, and we invite them to accede to this agreement

3 regardless of the position of the Republic of Croatia within or without

4 Yugoslavia. The Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina are a fully equal

5 nation."

6 Mr. Manolic, if you were a Croat from Bosnia-Herzegovina, would

7 you consider such an agreement to be a kind of treason towards the Croats

8 who are being offered some solutions in Article 5 after all the

9 discussions had taken place?

10 A. We never discussed that agreement.

11 Q. Thank you. On the 8th of October, 1991, the parliament of the

12 Republic of Croatia adopted a decision on severing state and legal links

13 with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. You know about this

14 document?

15 A. Yes. I took part in that.

16 Q. I will read to you points 4, 5, and 6. "4. The Republic of

17 Croatia recognises the independence and sovereignty of the other republics

18 of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia based on the

19 principle of reciprocity and is ready, with those republics with which it

20 is not engaged in an armed conflict, to establish and develop friendly,

21 political, economic, cultural, and other relations.

22 "5. The Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent state

23 guaranteeing and ensuring fundamental human rights and the rights of

24 national minorities guaranteed explicitly by the general declaration of

25 the United Nations the final document of the Helsinki Conference, the

1 documents of the OSCE and the Paris Charter as part of the European

2 integration processes is ready to enter into interstate and regional

3 democratic associations with other countries.

4 "6. The Republic of Croatia will continue the process of

5 establishing mutual rights and obligations in relation to the other

6 republics of the former SFRY and the former federation."

7 That's what it says here. Could something like this have been

8 adopted without the express support of Franjo Tudjman?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 A. But you are reading a declaration to me which has nothing to do

12 with these proceedings.

13 Q. Mr. Manolic, please.

14 A. Thank you.

15 Q. You told the Court and all of us today a number of incredible

16 things about me, logical absurdities, showing ignorance, and I have the

17 right to read 227 documents which were created under the leadership and

18 influence and political power of Franjo Tudjman, who you say was at the

19 head of a criminal organisation.

20 A. That is not true.

21 Q. Please. I will go through them and thereby demonstrate that the

22 continuity of such a policy can be seen in every document everywhere

23 within the framework of the actual circumstances prevailing at the time.

24 With people who are suffering and being killed, with a state organisation

25 that was falling apart, taking the only possible course.

1 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Praljak, I would like to interrupt you here,

2 and I apologise for it. You just stated here on lines 21 and 22 that --

3 it was your question directed to the witness: "You told the Court and all

4 of us today a number of incredible things about me, logical absurdities

5 showing ignorance," et cetera. So frankly, in my view it would be a

6 better way of asking questions if you would refer back to those "number of

7 incredible things about me." If you really felt that way, please ask

8 concrete questions from the witness, from Mr. Manolic. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour.

10 This is because Mr. Manolic is interrupting me, trying to explain to me

11 what I'm supposed to do. I will not do this again.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's not correct.

13 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

14 Q. On the 8th of November [as interpreted], 1991, the parliament of

15 the Republic of Croatia adopted conclusions about the aggression on the

16 Republic of Croatia.

17 "4. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro are invited

18 not to allow the use of their state territory for the waging of a war

19 against the Republic of Croatia.

20 "5. All States, especially Member States of the European

21 Community and the United Nations are invited to establish diplomatic

22 relations with the Republic of Croatia. The Republic of Croatia will

23 continue participating in the work of the conference on Yugoslavia in The

24 Hague organised by the Member State of the European Community."

25 Tomorrow I will show you a map showing all the places in the

1 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from which the territory of the

2 Republic of Croatia was attacked. Do you know this?

3 A. That has nothing to do with it.

4 Q. Please, Mr. Manolic, answer.

5 A. I did not follow the military operations in detail, so please

6 don't draw me into individual events.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, you say that that

8 has nothing to do with it. Mr. Praljak is putting questions to you

9 because it is important to him. We, the Judges, don't see what his idea

10 is yet, but he certainly has a line of questioning. If it has nothing to

11 do with it, Mr. Praljak will have wasted a lot of time. However, we wish

12 to think that it does have a reason.

13 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] May I correct the transcript. The

14 document in line 21, page 139, it says the 8th of November. It was

15 actually the 8th of October, and Mr. Praljak did say the 8th of October.

16 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Manolic, this was adopted by the Croatian parliament of which

18 you were a member. It was not fabricated by Praljak. The parliament

19 said, "We are being attacked from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

20 from the territory of Montenegro." Mr. Manolic, the Prime Minister cannot

21 tell me before the Court that his country, in Dubrovnik, in Zadar, in

22 Sibenik, in Slavonski Brod and in the area of Vukovar was being attacked

23 from Bosnia-Herzegovina. You don't know this.

24 A. Yes, I do know this, but why do you need to start showing me all

25 these documents?

1 Q. Mr. Manolic --

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The accused is asking you

3 whether Croatia was being attacked from the territory of Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina. Please answer that it was or that it wasn't.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So it was attacked.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But he forgot to mention Serbia.

8 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

9 Q. I haven't forgotten Serbia, but we are dealing with

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina now.

11 Did you, as the Prime Minister of a country that was under attack,

12 with a third of its territory under occupation, hundreds of thousands of

13 people expelled from their homes, did you send a letter to

14 Mr. Izetbegovic, the president of the Presidency of the state from whose

15 territory the attacks were being launched, to ask him what he had

16 undertaken, what he was about to undertake or intended to undertake to

17 prevent this?

18 A. You've got your dates confused now. If you say that was the 8th

19 of October, at that time I was not the Prime Minister, so it was not

20 within my purview to communicate with the president of the Presidency of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I assume that President Tudjman certainly

22 communicated that to him, but it's only an assumption on my part. I

23 cannot be certain.

24 Q. Please --

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] When the attack occurred, didn't

1 the security council convene to see whether an official letter would be

2 sent from the Republic of Croatia to President Izetbegovic?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think this can be found in

4 the transcripts nor do I remember our discussing this. This was something

5 for the minister of defence and the General Staff to deal with, and also

6 the president as the Supreme Commander.

7 I wish Mr. Praljak would ask me those things that he has

8 characterised as absurd or impossible.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Praljak, please

10 go on. We have five minutes left.

11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Mr. Manolic is saying that the attack from one country on another

13 is a matter for the General Staff and the generals and not a matter for

14 the parliament or the cabinet. If the generals were to act on their own

15 initiative to prevent the murders of several hundred civilians in

16 Slavonski Brod and 27 children - and I showed Their Honours this - if they

17 had sent the army out on their own initiative to prevent this massacre,

18 then we would be speaking about the Croatian army in another state, the

19 rights and legitimacy of the government in Sarajevo. And all this is all

20 right, but the parents of those children would also require answers from

21 those talking about legitimacy. Is what I'm saying correct or not?

22 A. Well, you're acting as if you were at a political rally where one

23 has to speak of threats to the state and so on. You're not mentioning the

24 institution which was supposed to respond.

25 Q. Just a minute, Mr. Manolic. You were the second ranking man in

1 the state, on intimate terms with the top man in the state. You were a

2 friend who visited him in his home. So in God's name, how did you react

3 to all this? Did you call up the cabinet as a Member of Parliament? Did

4 you ask that something be done? What did you do?

5 A. At that time I was neither in the government nor was I in the

6 parliament. I was in a bureaucratic position, collecting information and

7 supplying the president with that information. He and the other

8 institutions that were supposed to respond did respond.

9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I am finished

10 for today, but I will continue.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Praljak, you

12 said you would continue. Please tell us, how much time will you need

13 tomorrow? You said, "I will continue." How much time do you need for

14 this? Because you're referring to 227 documents. I hope you're not going

15 to read 227 documents, because we'd have to be here for the next 25 years

16 if you did this. How much time do you intend to use tomorrow?

17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Praljak.

18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I don't know how these 227

19 documents, which go to deny the claims by the Prosecutor and all the

20 witnesses -- I don't intend to read them out, but I want to have them at

21 the disposal of the Court in English and French, because I'm fully

22 convinced that, based on these documents, Your Honours will reach the

23 decision I expect. So how can these documents be introduced?

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Kovacic, there

25 will be 227 documents tendered into evidence for the Defence of

1 Mr. Praljak. Please draw up a list. I think that you have agreed with

2 Mr. Praljak to draw up such a list, unless you are having a problem.

3 Please tell us, Mr. Kovacic.

4 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours. There is no

5 problem. The plan is for all the documents. There may be some which are

6 not strictly necessary, but they almost all are. They are in this book

7 which is a good practical thing, exercise.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Then the best thing

9 would be to tender the book into evidence.

10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Yes. That's the idea. Of course,

11 the question of translation remains, but we will deal with that.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It's 20 past 5.00.

13 We shall continue at 9.00 tomorrow, sir. As I said yesterday, in the

14 meantime you must not have contact with anyone. I wish you all a good

15 evening, and I will see you tomorrow.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.18 p.m.,

17 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 5th day

18 of July, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.

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