1 Thursday, 25 July 2002

2 --- Upon commencing resuming at 12.33 p.m.

3 [Open session]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 [The witness entered court]

6 WITNESS: RADOMIR MARKOVIC [Resumed]

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

9 MR. NICE: We're coming to meetings, briefings and recordings on

10 Kosovo.

11 Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

12 Q. When you were head of the RDB, what was the rate of meetings with

13 your colleagues in the public security department, what frequency?

14 A. There were regular meetings with the Minister of the Interior.

15 They were held on Tuesdays, every Tuesday. This meeting would be attended

16 by all the supervisors from the state security -- from the state security

17 sector. It was the head and the deputy head and all the supervisors from

18 the public security sector. I also held meetings at the state security

19 sector, but these were not regular staff meetings, senior staff meetings

20 but when necessary, once in every fifteen days. Perhaps it could be put

21 that way.

22 Q. Did you ever brief either the Prime Minister of the Serbian

23 government Mr. Marjanovic, or the president of the Republic, Milan

24 Milutinovic?

25 A. I did. When necessary, if the subject matter involved would

1 require direct information, they would invite me to come and I would come

2 and inform them.

3 Q. You told us yesterday of the occasions when you also dealt with

4 particular issues with the accused. When you had meetings with the

5 accused, was it alone or was there any other of the named people present?

6 A. No. The meetings with Slobodan Milosevic were always in the

7 presence of the Minister of the Interior and the leadership of the

8 Ministry of the Interior or in the presence of his other senior staff

9 members, perhaps the president of the Republic might attend this meeting

10 or other leaders he might invite.

11 Q. I turn to reportings on Kosovo. How frequent were reports from

12 Kosovo received? How frequently?

13 A. Reporting from Kosovo was on a daily basis. That is to say every

14 day during the day from Kosovo a report would arrive, and the analytical

15 service would process it and then send it on further to the addressees

16 that were to receive this kind of information on a compulsory basis.

17 Q. Who were those addressees, please?

18 A. The head of state, the president of the Republic, the federal

19 Minister of the Interior, the republican Minister of the Interior, the

20 Prime Minister, and when he was appointed as head of the political body in

21 Kosovo, then Sainovic as well.

22 Q. What level of confidentiality or secrecy was attached to these

23 reports?

24 A. These reports were state secrets.

25 Q. Were the reports supposed to be retained by those to whom they

1 were addressed or were they supposed to be returned once read?

2 A. The instruction was that they should be returned. Along with the

3 envelope that accompanied that document was an envelope in which the same

4 document was supposed to be returned.

5 Q. Did any of the recipients in fact return their reports or not?

6 A. Milan Milutinovic, president of the Republic, would return the

7 reports.

8 Q. The others, including those sent to the accused, were retained,

9 were they?

10 A. I assume they were destroyed, because this other instruction was

11 that they were supposed to be destroyed.

12 Q. Let's turn to the structure of the MUP briefly. In the 1990s, was

13 the Serbian MUP divided into various secretariats?

14 A. Yes. The secretariats primarily existed in major towns in Serbia.

15 Q. How many of them were there?

16 A. I don't know exactly how many there were, but at any rate, in

17 bigger towns.

18 Q. Were there units called special anti-terrorist units, SAJ?

19 A. Yes, there were such units. There were three units. One was in

20 Kosovo, one was in Novi Sad in Vojvodina, and one was in Belgrade

21 respectively.

22 Q. And to whom were they subordinated?

23 A. They were subordinated to the Minister of the Interior. The

24 republican Minister of the Interior.

25 Q. Which branch of the Ministry of the Interior?

1 A. Public security.

2 Q. When you became head of the RDB, the structure was presumably as

3 left behind by Mr. Stanisic.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Did he have and leave behind a number of assistants?

6 A. Yes. He had assistants. Some of them stayed behind to continue

7 doing the work they did, and some of them were retired, because some of

8 them had already been retired previously.

9 Q. Can you just tell us about one or two of them? Was there a man

10 Franko Simatovic?

11 A. Yes. Franko Simatovic was not one of the assistants then. He

12 became an assistant minister later. He was one of the leading persons

13 there, but I don't know exactly what his rank was. Was he advisor,

14 special advisor, or something like that.

15 Q. What were his responsibilities?

16 A. When I came to head the state security sector, he was in charge of

17 coordination with the JSO units.

18 Q. And as to its organisational structure, did the RDB have offices

19 in other cities and towns? And give us an idea of where.

20 A. Also in all bigger towns in Serbia there were centres of the state

21 security, not to mention all of them. Nis, Kragujevac, Novi Sad. For the

22 most part, in bigger towns.

23 Q. To whom did those other RDB offices report? Where did they

24 report?

25 A. The RDB offices reported to the appropriate administrations in the

1 state security sector according to the line of work they were engaged in.

2 Q. That's in Belgrade?

3 A. In Belgrade.

4 Q. Thus the intelligence department operating in Pristina would be

5 reporting back to Belgrade. Would that be correct?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. I turn to how, at least in part, the RDB was funded. Was its

8 budget met in part or in whole by the state in an ordinary way, coming

9 from state funds, or was there another method by which it was funded?

10 A. The state security sector is financed from a budget designated by

11 the Government of Serbia. However, this budget was never sufficient to

12 meet all the needs of the service, nor was the budget itself always

13 accomplished 100 per cent. I believe the actual rate was 50 per cent for

14 every year.

15 Q. Where did the balance of money come from that funded the RDB to

16 the extent that it was funded?

17 A. To meet needs such as purchase of equipment, purchase of equipment

18 for helicopters, of special units or the unit for special operations,

19 funds were obtained from the federal customs administration.

20 Q. I'd like you to give us some detail of how this funding occurred.

21 Who was the director of the federal customs administration?

22 A. The director of the FCA was Mihalj Kertes.

23 Q. When money came from the FCA, who organised it in the first place?

24 Who gave the instructions?

25 A. In order to get such funds approval was required. This approval

1 for allocating funding for the state security or the army of Yugoslavia or

2 I don't know who else, had to be obtained by Mihalj Kertes from Slobodan

3 Milosevic.

4 Q. And you explained it wasn't just the RDB that was being funded in

5 this way but that money was going to other departments as well, including

6 the army, correct?

7 A. Both the army and the state security.

8 Q. When approval was given and money was to be transferred from the

9 FCA, how did it actually happen?

10 A. Employees of the state security sector in charge of finances went

11 to the FCA, took the money back to the Ministry of the Interior, to the

12 department in charge of finances and purchases. All further affairs

13 related to payment and supply would be taken over by the appropriate

14 department of finance of the Ministry of the Interior because the state

15 security sector did not have any structure necessary to make such

16 payments. I suppose the further work went through the banks which

17 affected such payments.

18 Q. Let's go back to receipt of the money. You say the money came,

19 was handed to employees of the RDB. Did it come in the form of a banker's

20 draft or did it come in the form of cash or what?

21 A. In cash.

22 Q. Did come in national currency or in foreign currency?

23 A. In foreign currency, because statements had to be effected abroad,

24 and the equipment that we needed had to be imported.

25 Q. And after this cash had been received from the FCA and taken to

1 your building, was it then paid into a bank?

2 A. No. It was first handed over to the Ministry of the Interior, as

3 I have told you, to the department in charge of finance, and then I

4 suppose it was placed in a bank because that was the only way you could

5 effect a payment.

6 Q. Which bank was used for effecting payments for goods supplied to

7 the RDB?

8 A. RDB, the state security sector, purchased such equipment only

9 twice, and I believe Beobanka was used both times.

10 Q. Beobanka is also Beogradska bank; is that right?

11 A. There are two Beobanka banks. I believe this one was Beobanka,

12 not Beogradska bank. It was led by Mrs. Vucic.

13 Q. You speak of the occasions when to your knowledge money was used

14 in this way. What, if any, contacts did you have with the accused about

15 the passage of this money on these occasions?

16 A. I had to approach him with regard to the needs of the RDB for

17 equipment, but first I had to address the head of the RDB since the

18 funding required surpassed our budget and we had to look for money

19 elsewhere if we wanted to get this equipment for helicopters, to keep them

20 airworthy. So I had to address President Slobodan Milosevic, and an

21 agreement was reached with him to obtain this money from the Federal

22 Customs Administration.

23 Q. You've spoken of Mihalj Kertes. Did you ever have meetings with

24 him?

25 A. Yes. After that, I would meet up with him, and he told me he got

1 the necessary approval and that the funding required would be passed on to

2 the Ministry of the Interior.

3 Q. Did you ever have a meeting where both Kertes and the accused were

4 present at the time?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Did you ever have a meeting where there was a telephone contact

7 between those two of which you were a witness?

8 A. Yes. On one occasion when this matter was discussed, Slobodan

9 Milosevic called Mihalj Kertes and told him about the needs of the

10 Ministry of the Interior and asked him if he could do anything to meet

11 those needs.

12 Q. In due course, was Kertes decorated with a medal related to all of

13 these activities?

14 A. He was decorated, although I don't know if it was for those

15 activities or any other activities, but he was decorated during the tenure

16 of Jovica Stanisic.

17 Q. Yes. And do you know -- do you know yourself in respect of what

18 that medal came?

19 A. No. I can't possibly know that because it was Stanisic who

20 decorated him. I suppose for merits before the state security sector,

21 because he received this decoration on behalf of the state security

22 sector.

23 Q. Do you know anything about the funding of the -- of any training

24 facility in Kula?

25 A. Yes. Part of the funds for the construction of the Kula training

1 centre was also obtained from the FCA.

2 Q. Thank you. Now, you have, I think, made a couple of statements

3 about these financial matters to an investigating judge; is that correct?

4 A. Yes. I have talked to investigating Judge Cavlina about this.

5 Q. These statements are included in the material relied upon as

6 supporting material for the expert report of Morten Torkildsen who will,

7 in due course, be a witness in the case. I propose to ask this witness to

8 look at them briefly to confirm their accuracy. It being, perhaps,

9 desirable to do that where that is a possibility in respect of the

10 supporting material. Can we look at them, please? The original coming.

11 I handed in the wrong one.

12 If the original can be briefly laid on the overhead projector so

13 that those viewing can see what it is. And if the witness can then have

14 the version in Serbian and the English version thereafter placed on the

15 ELMO. So first of all the original so that we can see what it is. And we

16 can see that it's a signed document. Thank you very much. And if we can

17 now place the English version on the overhead projector.

18 You can see, Mr. Markovic, that this is a statement setting out at

19 the beginning your details, and it reads: "With regards to my --" I'm

20 following it in the English.

21 "With regards to my role in using foreign currency and dinar funds

22 of the Federal Customs Administration and my alleged decisive influence

23 over the then director Mihalj Kertes, I would like to point out that it is

24 a case of incorrect and untrue interpretation. I did not have, neither

25 could I have of such an influence on Kertes having in mind the

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1 widely-known fact that Mihalj Kertes, together with Nikola Sainovic,

2 Nebojsa Pavkovic, Vlajko Stojilkovic used to be the closest associate of

3 the former president of FRY Slobodan Milosevic. It is true that at the

4 time when I was head of the RDB we received certain foreign currency and

5 dinar funds from SUC. However, those funds were requested by and granted

6 to RDB on the basis of operative needs or technical supplies, purchasing

7 equipment or rockets for our helicopter unit. The procedure for getting

8 the above-mentioned funds for purchasing equipment for RDB was set up

9 earlier. Namely, on the basis of requests of particular organisational

10 units of RDB, usually the Special Operations Unit (JSO) I would inform

11 Milosevic about the problems and requests during our direct and regular

12 work contacts. Using the RDB budget in MUP could usually solve the

13 problems. Slobodan Milosevic would afterwards in direct contact with

14 Kertes order him to meet our requests and what happened afterwards

15 depended on the current SUC resources. Technically the agreements would

16 be carried out in the usual manner. The actual paying for the needed

17 equipment and supplies was carried out via Beogradska Bank and other banks

18 that I was not familiar with. After Milosevic had issued orders to

19 Kertes, I would get in touch with Kertes and discuss the realisation. It

20 was usually carried out by Marjan Zovic and Rasha Kandic from RDB.

21 However, I would like to point out that SUC did not provide foreign

22 currency and dinar funds only to RDB. This was also a regular practice

23 with the Public Security Sector (RJB) and that is easy to check in the

24 financial transitions of MUP. People in charge of financial transactions

25 sector of MUP and General Zekovic, who was their superior should also have

1 knowledge of this. Concerning the allegation that I had a privileged

2 position with Milosevic family, I would like to point out that it's a case

3 of wrong interpretation, of regular and normal communication of the head

4 of RDB and the president of the state. I had considerable problems,

5 especially with Mirjana Markovic, due to my opinion and reactions to the

6 influence that political factors had on the work of RDB. If I had been,

7 as it has often been said, one of the people that the Milosevic family

8 trusts the most, I would not only hold the position that I did, but would

9 also be the Minister of Interior. Additionally, it was not me who gave

10 Uros Suvakovic a job in RDB. On the contrary, he was appointed an advisor

11 in RDB following the direct orders and the decision of the then Minister

12 Vlajko Stojilkovic, despite my opposing to that, which is something that

13 my associates from that period know of. As an illustration of my

14 behaviour and the line of action of the then influential political factor

15 JUL, I would like to mention the problem which additionally complicated my

16 position with the Milosevic family. Namely, CRDB Novi Sad, in the process

17 of shedding light on some illegal activities and instances of

18 mismanagement, and with relation to an anonymous letter concerning the

19 crime committed in Nis (Oil Industry of Serbia) and the role of Zivko

20 Soklovacki, obtained some records and evidence incriminating against the

21 Soklovacki brothers while doing interior decoration of the new business

22 premises."

23 And, Your Honour, it goes on on those matters and I don't think

24 it's necessary to cover them. But Mr. Markovic, in relation to the

25 matters dealing with finance, is what you set out in the statement there

1 accurate?

2 A. Yes.

3 MR. NICE: May that perhaps rather than being subsumed within the

4 exhibit of Mr. Torkildsen to come, may this be a separate exhibit.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 277.

6 MR. NICE: Could the witness have the next statement, please.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Last Exhibit will be numbered 278 instead of 277.

8 MR. NICE: We will take this one more shortly. Could you just lay

9 the original on the overhead projector so that we can see the sort of

10 document it is. First sheet and second sheet. We can see on the third

11 sheet that it's signed and is in Cyrillic. Thank you very much. I think

12 the signature is on the third sheet, but if we could now go to the English

13 version, please, Mr. Usher. And we can see from the top of the first page

14 that this is compiled on the 22nd of May of 2001 before the investigating

15 judge of the District Court of Belgrade. And if we go to the second page,

16 please, and the foot of that page, we can see a paragraph beginning.

17 Q. As far as I recall, it says:

18 "... I only spoke to President Slobodan Milosevic on two

19 occasions as chief of the SDB. The first time I told him we needed to

20 secure foreign currency reserves to provide the SDB with the equipment it

21 needed - guns for the DB helicopters. This was not to secure helicopters

22 (they had been procured previously) but to provide equipment for the

23 helicopters."

24 Q. You go on then to deal with that. The next paragraph starts

25 with: "I did not see this foreign currency, but as far as I know it went

1 to a bank..."

2 The next paragraph says: "I really could not be certain what

3 amount of foreign currency we are talking about. I do know that it was a

4 considerable sum."

5 And then the last paragraph: "I spoke to President Milosevic for

6 the second time at the beginning of 1999 to secure foreign currency for

7 the procurement of the special vehicles for the special operations units

8 of the DB Department. Once more I cannot remember the exact amount of

9 money but it was a considerable sum." And you deal with details of that.

10 MR. NICE: May that be produced, please, as an exhibit?

11 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 279.

12 MR. NICE:

13 Q. And so far as that statement is concerned, when you read it was it

14 accurate as to your financial dealings with Kertes and with the accused?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Before we move on, Kula, the training facility at Kula, who was

17 trained at Kula?

18 A. Kula was a centre of the special unit of the RDB which is called

19 the Unit for Special Operations, JSO. And the training was provided for

20 people who worked in the state security sector.

21 Q. Take paragraph 9 ahead of paragraph 8. You've told us already of

22 the name of Mrs. Borka Vucic. Can you tell us a little bit about her and

23 her authority or influence? Who was she?

24 A. She was the director - I believe I already said that - of Beobanka

25 or Beogradska Banka. I'm not ceratin about that. She was an expert in

1 her line of work. She had many years of experience in banking and was

2 very knowledgeable?

3 A. Were you able to assess the degree to which she was used more

4 generally than just for the RDB for the transfer of funds?

5 A. No. I don't know that. All I know is that on one of these

6 occasions that I mentioned, the funding went through her bank.

7 Q. As to the accused, did he express any views or make known any

8 views he had about her and whether she should be used for these

9 transactions?

10 A. I know that they knew each other, that they had known each other

11 for a long time and cooperated for a long time and that Slobodan Milosevic

12 had great confidence in Mrs. Vucic. And I suppose that is the reason for

13 his proposal to go through her bank. But this was handled by the Ministry

14 of the Interior, that is, their finance department. Such a request could

15 not have been addressed to the RDB. It had to be addressed to the

16 Ministry of the Interior.

17 Q. Did the accused say anything to you about which bank you should

18 use or anything to you about Mrs. Vucic?

19 A. No. I believe it was only the bank that was mentioned. And we

20 all knew Mrs. Vucic. She had been there for many years at the head of

21 that bank. And it was common knowledge. You didn't have to know her

22 personally.

23 Q. Paragraph 10. Slobodan Rajh, except that I think the

24 pronunciation is wrong. Can you tell us about him, please?

25 A. I never met that man personally, but I heard that it was through

1 him that equipment was purchased for the state security sector starting

2 from the tenure of Jovica Stanisic, and the final transaction involved the

3 purchase of vehicles at the time when I was already heading that sector.

4 Q. What goods did you understand he to have been involved in buying?

5 A. Technical equipment, technical supplies necessary for our work,

6 the work of the state security sector. I know specifically about

7 vehicles, jeeps. But I suppose that during the term of office of Jovica

8 Stanisic, he supplied other equipment for the RDB, because I already found

9 in our sector vehicles bought in Israel, and he had very good connections

10 in Israel.

11 Q. Was there a helicopter purchased, to your knowledge, involving

12 this man?

13 A. Yes. He was a mediator in the purchase of helicopters. I believe

14 that helicopter was called Sikorsky.

15 Q. And by whom was that used, that helicopter?

16 A. That helicopter wasn't used a lot. President Milosevic used it

17 once or twice. Otherwise, it wasn't used at all.

18 Q. You spoke of business dealings in Israel. How connected, well or

19 otherwise, was Slobodan Rajh with business entities of one kind or another

20 in Israel?

21 A. I don't know about that. I don't know, because all these

22 purchases were made before I took over the post of the head of the state

23 security sector. All I know from speaking to my associates is that these

24 transactions were handled through him, with his mediation. I don't think

25 that he was the only one.

1 Q. There were, nevertheless, purchases made in or through Israel; is

2 that correct?

3 A. I don't know whether it was only through Israel. All I can say is

4 that the equipment I have seen was equipment from Israel, but we had other

5 equipment from the US and from Europe.

6 Q. Come back to Slobodan Rajh in just a second, but another person,

7 the accused's brother, Borislav, who was at one time the FRY's ambassador

8 to Russia, what part did he play, if any, in the purchasing of equipment?

9 A. From what I heard, he was an intermediary in the purchase of

10 Russian-made helicopters. So I was told to use his services, considering

11 that he had connections in Russia, for the purpose of further purchases of

12 helicopters and spare parts for them.

13 Q. Were you creating a new relationship or was this building on a

14 relationship that you understood Mr. Stanisic had had before you with the

15 accused's brother?

16 A. It was all based on this old relationship. He had already been

17 engaged in this business for a while, and I was told that this could be

18 continued because, as our ambassador to Russia, he had good connections in

19 that country.

20 Q. Back to Slobodan Rajh just briefly. Was there another man you can

21 help us with called Franko Simatovic? We've mentioned him already. And

22 if so, was he known to or friendly with Slobodan Rajh?

23 A. Yes. They knew each other well, but I don't know what kind of

24 relationship they had.

25 Q. Let's turn to Simatovic himself. When you took over as head, what

1 position did Simatovic hold?

2 A. Simatovic was coordinator between the head of the state security

3 sector and the commander of the JSO special unit. I don't know whether he

4 had any other special position, but at any rate, that is the work that he

5 was involved in.

6 Q. You say "coordinator." Who was in command, if not him, of the JSO

7 or was it him?

8 A. The commander of the JSO was Lukovic.

9 Q. Where did Simatovic fit in in relation to Lukovic really?

10 A. He was between him and the head of the state security sector,

11 Jovica Stanisic.

12 Q. What action did you take in respect of Mr. Simatovic when you took

13 over?

14 A. In view of the fact that the Special Operations Unit had sustained

15 major changes, that is to say that it was decreased by two-thirds in terms

16 of the manpower that was in this unit, it also underwent changes in terms

17 of the arms and equipment it had. There was no need to have this position

18 of coordinator any longer between the commander of the unit and the head

19 of the state security sector. I appointed Mr. Simatovic my assistant for

20 operative matters.

21 Q. Turn to the relationship of the MUP and the VJ. Did there come a

22 time when one was subordinated to the other?

23 A. Yes. That was -- there was this resubordination act that was

24 passed by the army and it contained the following elements: that all

25 forces and all members of the Ministry of the Interior should be

1 resubordinated to the command of the army of Yugoslavia.

2 Q. When did this come about? Who issued the order? How was it

3 passed down?

4 A. I think that this order was issued in 1999, and I assume that it

5 was issued by the chief of General Staff, because I did not see it

6 personally, this order. I had it communicated to me by Vlajko

7 Stojiljkovic, Minister of the Interior.

8 Q. Having learnt of this order, did you speak to someone about it?

9 A. Yes. I did speak to the Minister of the Interior, and I also

10 spoke to Slobodan Milosevic. I asked about the authenticity of this

11 enactment and how we should function in this way, the Ministry of the

12 Interior, and the Minister said this was an order that had to be obeyed,

13 and all of us were prepared to carry it out.

14 Q. You spoke to the accused about it. What did he say about it?

15 A. He said that this was an order that was issued by the command of

16 the army, that is to say, the chief of General Staff, and that he thought

17 that that was indispensable at that moment. He was not duty-bound to give

18 me any detailed explanations. I was simply a bit surprised by this order,

19 such an order, and I simply did not see how the service, the sector, would

20 function under such conditions. I wanted to check. I did not get any

21 detailed explanations. I just -- I was just told that such a command had

22 to be carried out.

23 Q. Did the accused give you any explanation of why, what its purpose

24 was?

25 A. No. He gave no explanation to me personally. The Minister of the

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1 Interior gave me an explanation. He said that the point of this order was

2 to have a single command in Kosovo.

3 Q. When, according to your memory, did this order come in relation to

4 the beginning of the NATO bombing?

5 A. At any rate, before the bombing started.

6 MR. NICE: May the witness see another exhibit, please? 1953.

7 If we can -- the usual format. Put the original on the overhead

8 projector first, the first sheet, so that we can see what it appears to

9 be. You can see the date the 8th of May of 1999. And then if we turn to

10 the second sheet of the original, we can see a stamp and a signature.

11 Pavkovic. And then if we can look at the English version, please, on the

12 overhead projector, front page. We will take it quite briefly because it

13 exemplifies the point being made by the witness.

14 Q. This is an order or a command dated the 8th of May of 1999, and

15 it's concerned with the deployment of army and MUP forces in combat

16 control on the territory of -- combat and control of the territory, and

17 it's an order. It's marked as going to General Lukic, Pristina MUP,

18 personally, and it reads so far as material: "As a result of the

19 deployment of VJ and MUP forces, Shiptar Albanian terrorist forces in

20 Kosovo and Metohija have been overpowered and significant losses have been

21 inflicted on them. By making use of rugged terrain in the eastern and

22 central part of Kosovo and Metohija, remaining groups of Shiptar terrorist

23 forces continue to conduct periodic raids and ambushes.

24 "In order to prevent further activities ... and completely destroy

25 armed terrorist groups ... I hereby order," and then a series of orders.

1 For example, at numbers 3 and 4 references to the MUP, and in number 2 the

2 VJ. And if we turn over the page then without troubling the detail, we see

3 that it's signed by Colonel General Nebojsa Pavkovic.

4 Does that command structure revealed in that document,

5 Mr. Markovic, accord with the order that you have told us about?

6 A. This was signed by Nebojsa Pavkovic, I assume as commander of the

7 3rd Army. I don't know whether at that time he was also the chief of the

8 General Staff. I assume he was not chief of General Staff then. I assume

9 that this is an order that he had to get as well. But it does pertain to

10 Kosovo.

11 MR. NICE: May this be given an exhibit number, please?

12 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 280.

13 MR. NICE:

14 Q. Now, the subordination of MUP forces to the VJ of which you've

15 spoken, how wide-ranging was it over the territory? Was it just in Kosovo

16 or elsewhere? What was the position?

17 A. It pertained to the entire country. However, as far as I know,

18 this did not fully occur everywhere. I think that most of this was

19 carried out in Kosovo, less in Serbia. I mean, in this part outside

20 Kosovo, that is, that this was not carried out fully.

21 Q. Can you help us next, please, with the degree to which the accused

22 was briefed about MUP and VJ activity and by whom? What reporting, to

23 your knowledge, did the late Stojiljkovic give?

24 A. It was the duty of the Minister of the Interior to keep the

25 president of the country informed on a daily basis. President Milosevic

1 got daily reports from the state security sector. The same kind of report

2 was received from the public security sector. I'm not sure whether it was

3 on a daily basis, but it was certainly related to a particular subject

4 matter that is within the scope of work of the public security sector of

5 the Ministry of the Interior. The president also received information

6 from the military structures, but I don't know. I did not get these

7 reports, and I do not know what they contained.

8 Q. There came a time when Sreten Lukic became head of the for Kosovo

9 MUP; is that right?

10 A. Yes. General Lukic was appointed Chief of Staff in Kosovo.

11 Q. What was his reporting pattern of behaviour?

12 A. He had a line of reporting through the public security, that is to

13 say to Vlastimir Djordjevic, head of the public security sector. That's

14 who he submitted his reports to. The head of the public security sector

15 was duty-bound to submit reports to Vlajko Stojiljkovic, Minister of the

16 Interior, and then he sent these reports further, if necessary, and as

17 deemed necessary, depending who it would be sent to.

18 Q. Were there any personal briefings in Belgrade to your knowledge by

19 Lukic or Pavkovic?

20 A. Yes. From time to time, perhaps once a month, they would come

21 from Kosovo and they would personally brief the Minister and President

22 Milosevic.

23 Q. Were you ever summoned by the accused to give personal briefings

24 supplementary to what he may have been receiving elsewhere?

25 A. Very seldom. Only in respect of the information he received from

1 the state security sector. If something was not fully explained or if he

2 required more in-depth information, President Milosevic would call me and

3 then I would add to this either in writing or verbally depending on what

4 he would insist upon and depending on the urgency of the matter involved.

5 Q. Look at one more exhibit at this stage, please. Mr. Markovic, I

6 don't think you've had an advance opportunity of looking at this document,

7 so take a little more time with it. And while you are, perhaps the usher

8 would be good enough to put the front page of the original on the overhead

9 projector so that we can again see what it is. It's a document dated the

10 27th. It's a little hard to see, but I think it's clear that it's March

11 of 1999. It comes from Pristina. And if you will come back to the front

12 page in a minute.

13 The -- if you go to the last page of the original, please,

14 Mr. Usher, which is about seven pages on, you will see a signature there,

15 and it's probably just possible to make out the word, typed words "Sreten

16 Lukic" above the signature. If you come back to the front page while the

17 witness is considering the document.

18 I'm grateful to Mr. Saxon for pointing out that, I think, there is

19 a error in the translation. We can see from the original -- that's

20 perfect -- that the dates covered are the 26th of March to the 27th March.

21 Probably calculate that for ourselves even if we can't read the Cyrillic.

22 We can see above that a distribution list, and with that one

23 possible error in translation corrected, can we now look at the front page

24 of the English version, please?

25 Mr. Markovic, I'm sorry to have taken you by surprise, to some

1 degree by surprise with this document, having reviewed and you don't need

2 to trouble with the detail of the contents, does this appear to be a

3 report of the Ministry of the Interior dated the 27th of March of 1999

4 from and signed by Sreten Lukic? And we see that the reporting chain is

5 up to Belgrade, to the Minister and then to various others including the

6 head of the RJB public security Djordjevic and to yourself and to others?

7 A. Yes. These are the reports that were coming in from Kosovo.

8 Q. And we see that this one is a summary of events and occurrences of

9 importance between two days. Thank you very much.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 281.

11 MR. NICE:

12 Q. Some help next with the scope of armour and armed vehicles

13 available to the RDB. What sort of equipment did you have and maintain?

14 A. I found equipment that was in line with military standards for the

15 most part in the JSO. However, since it was not necessary, in my opinion,

16 for the state security sector to have such a unit, I transformed the unit

17 into a special unit, that is to say with the kind of purpose that these

18 units of the public security sector have. That is why the equipment that

19 did not fit into the functioning of this type of unit was handed over to

20 the army of Yugoslavia. And the manpower that was not altogether required

21 for further work in this special unit were dismissed or, rather, these

22 were persons who were under contract. So their contracts were terminated.

23 They were not permanent employees. The facilities in Kula were built for

24 training special units. Not only that special unit but all special units

25 of the Ministry of the Interior. The armaments and equipment that the

1 unit had was standard equipment for anti-terrorist units, that is to say

2 fast, mobile vehicles, jeeps, armoured, and we adjusted this to the needs

3 of that unit, and also standard weapons for anti-terrorist units,

4 firearms.

5 Q. Thank you. The next topic is something called the joint command.

6 Is that a description that -- or description of a body that you can help

7 us with, please?

8 A. Joint command in Kosovo, you mean?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. A joint command did exist or, rather, this staff in Kosovo existed

11 that was headed by the general that you saw in this report, Sreten Lukic

12 from the public security. And he also had associates of his who were in

13 the Ministry of the Interior. And also the head of the public security of

14 the secretariat in Pristina was part of that staff, and also the head of

15 the state security sector in Pristina.

16 Q. Can you give us the names of the various people who formed this

17 body?

18 A. I cannot. I cannot recall any one of their names. But I did look

19 at a document where these names were contained, and they approximately do

20 correspond to the names of the persons who made up this staff. The

21 composition of this staff changed. There was a period during which people

22 had to work in Kosovo, and then they would be replaced by others.

23 Q. The -- what was the scope of authority of this joint command,

24 please?

25 A. Well, the staff was in charge of all the units of the Ministry of

1 the Interior that were in Kosovo. That is to say that it looked to

2 day-to-day matters and resolved situations that required rapid action, as

3 it were.

4 Q. By whom was the joint command appointed?

5 A. It was appointed by the Minister of the Interior.

6 Q. In addition to the joint command, was there a political grouping,

7 a political body?

8 A. Yes, there was a political body. This body consisted of Nikola

9 Sainovic, Zoran Matkovic, and Andjelkovic. I can't remember his first

10 name.

11 Q. And by whom was that political body appointed?

12 A. I don't know exactly who appointed this political body because I

13 did not see any decisions in writing on their appointment.

14 Q. How did the political body that included Sainovic and Andjelkovic

15 react with or interact with the joint command itself?

16 A. Well, that political body had the function of coordinating between

17 the command of the army of Yugoslavia and the members of the army of

18 Yugoslavia and the members of the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia or,

19 rather, the leaders of that joint command in Kosovo.

20 Q. So it's probably obvious from your last answer. We went through

21 the personalities on the joint command at something of a speed. Was the

22 VJ represented? Was the army represented on the joint command?

23 A. Yes. The army of Yugoslavia was represented on the command.

24 Q. Look at another document now, please.

25 MR. NICE: The regular format, please. If you can put the

1 original on the overhead projector so that we can see what it is.

2 Q. And we see a document with clear date, the 7th of July of 1998.

3 You can see it's got a command number on the right-hand side. If we turn

4 over to the second sheet it's signed document, the second sheet not being

5 entirely clear. I think it's colonel Dragan Zivanovic.

6 So if we now look at the English version, please, front page only,

7 first page only. This is headed as a "Command of the 125 Motorised

8 Brigade," 7th the of July, 1998, and is: "Ban on operations without the

9 knowledge and approval of the Joint Command for KiM, Strictly

10 Confidential ... with the aim of increasing efficiency in carrying out

11 tasks, better organisation and cooperation with units in the zone of

12 responsibility," et cetera.

13 "Order," and then there are various orders that follow. The

14 first is: "Prohibit the execution of operations by units and formations

15 without the approval of the Joint Command ... and my own approval."

16 Well, now, Mr. Markovic, does this order dated July 1998, coming

17 from a colonel in the circumstances set out accord with your understanding

18 of the scope of authority of the joint command?

19 A. I see this as an order that was issued by the command, that is to

20 say the staff in Kosovo, and that relates to other units in Kosovo. That

21 is to say that they are being directed to coordinate and that they will be

22 getting orders from the centre. I am not sure that this is a document

23 that was adopted at the time when this political body existed. I think it

24 was adopted before that.

25 JUDGE MAY: We will have an exhibit number for that.

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1 And, Mr. Nice, it's time it adjourn if that's a convenient moment.

2 MR. NICE: Certainly.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 282.

4 JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now.

5 Mr. Markovic, would you please be back at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

7 to be reconvened on Friday, the 26th day

8 of July, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.

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