111108ED

Page 14731

1 accepts that there may be reasons to hear part of your evidence in

2 private session, that is not to be known to the public, and that is if

3 the questions or the answers would reveal the identity of a BIA source,

4 the identity of a BIA operative, or a location used by the security

5 services.

6 So if we come to that point, the parties are already alert on

7 that, but you could be alert on it as well. In addition to that, if

8 there are really sensitive issues in the relations between the Serbian

9 secret services and any foreign secret services, the parties may apply

10 for going into private session. If you feel that there's anything really

11 sensitive about that which directly affects concretely state security

12 interests then we could consider to go into private session for those

13 purposes.

14 You'll first be examined by Mr. Jordash. Mr. Jordash is counsel

15 for Mr. Stanisic.

16 Mr. Jordash, please proceed.

17 WITNESS: VLADO DRAGICEVIC

18 [Witness answered through interpreter]

19 Examination by Mr. Jordash:

20 Q. Good afternoon.

21 A. Good afternoon.

22 Q. Please give your full name on date of birth for the Court,

23 please.

24 A. My name is Vlado Dragicevic. I was born on the 1st of October,

25 1949, in Belgrade.

Page 14732

1 MR. JORDASH: Could I ask, please, for 1D05257 to be brought up

2 to the screen. I have a hard copy for the witness who has indicated he

3 prefers if possible to see the hard copy.

4 Q. What is going to be handed to you now is a document which is a

5 statement and I want you to look at it and confirm whether that's a

6 statement which is your statement.

7 MR. JORDASH: May I just have a moment, please.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's the statement.

9 MR. JORDASH: For the record, this is the same statement that was

10 disclosed to the Prosecution. It hasn't changed.

11 Q. Do you recognise your signature on the document? Does this --

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Do you recall being interviewed on the dates indicated, 3rd of

14 June, the 28th of September, 19th and 30th of October, and the 2nd of

15 November, 2011?

16 A. That's right. These are the dates.

17 Q. And if you just quickly open the statement, is that the statement

18 that you've seen before and confirmed with your signature?

19 A. Yes, that's my statement and this is my signature.

20 Q. And the content of the statement, is it in accordance with the

21 truth?

22 A. Yes, it is. It is truthful.

23 Q. And have you had an opportunity to review the statement and make

24 any clarifications and corrections that you wanted to make?

25 A. Yes, I have.

Page 14733

1 Q. And if you were asked the same questions concerning the same

2 subjects, would you provide in substance the same answers?

3 A. Yes.

4 MR. JORDASH: May I tender the statement, please.

5 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.

6 Madam Registrar, the --

7 THE REGISTRAR: The number would be D466, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

9 Now, there's one matter, Mr. Jordash, I take it that the witness

10 has signed also page 22 in English - perhaps he could have a look at it -

11 where he says: "I do not agree with my statement being given to anyone

12 other than the parties," which of course where you earlier said he is not

13 asking for any protective measures, it's a kind of non-disclosure claim.

14 And, Mr. Dragicevic, the hearings are public here. We were

15 informed that you do not seek any protective measures for yourself. We

16 have decided on any protective measures requested by the Republic of

17 Serbia and informed you about that. So, therefore, if this document is

18 admitted, it will be a public document. There's no problem despite your

19 statement on page 22nd -- the 22nd page that you do not agree with the

20 statement being given because it will be public, unless we decide

21 otherwise, but then we'd like to know exactly why you would object to

22 make this a public document?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no reason

24 whatsoever to object to this.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Then it -- then D466 is admitted into evidence.

Page 14734

1 Please proceed.

2 MR. JORDASH: Could we have, please, on the screen 1D05258. And

3 we have a hard copy for the witness.

4 Q. This, as you'll see, Mr. Dragicevic, is a table, a list of

5 documents to the left and the right-hand column, a comment column. Do

6 you recall when you came to The Hague being given a number of documents

7 to review, this chart, and asked to place your comments in the chart

8 having reviewed the documents?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10 Q. Do you recognise the signature and the date on the front page?

11 A. Yes, that's my signature.

12 Q. Did you complete this chart and then put your signature on each

13 page?

14 A. Yes, I filled it in and placed my signature.

15 Q. Were your comments in accordance with the truth?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Were you given an opportunity to review your comments to make any

18 clarifications or corrections you wanted to make?

19 A. Yes, I was.

20 Q. And if you were shown the document and asked to make comments

21 again, you'd make in substance the same comments?

22 A. Yes.

23 MR. JORDASH: May I tender this chart with the documents. There

24 are a number of documents where there's still objections. Perhaps if the

25 chart could be tendered and the document MFI'd for the moment.

Page 14735

1 MR. FARR: No objection to that approach, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, MFI number would be?

3 THE REGISTRAR: The number for the chart would be D467,

4 Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: And this MFI'd. Any need to have it under seal,

6 Mr. Jordash?

7 MR. JORDASH: No, I don't think so.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Then it will be MFI'd as a public document. Now, as

9 far as the signatures are you said at the bottom of every page.

10 MR. JORDASH: I'm hoping there are signatures on every page.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I'm a bit --

12 MR. JORDASH: It's the right-hand corner.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did sign it.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, just see whether we have it. I see page

15 1 out of 10 is one version in e-court, whereas I have another one which

16 says page 1 of 11. That is the --

17 MR. JORDASH: One is B/C/S, I think, Your Honour, one is English,

18 and the one on the right is the English and the witness signed the one on

19 the right.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

21 MR. JORDASH: He speaks English well.

22 JUDGE ORIE: It is the English one which is signed and has one

23 page less. Yes, that's fine with me.

24 Please proceed.

25 MR. JORDASH: May I ask if Your Honours have been given the list

Page 14736

1 of names with numbers? Perhaps the witness could also be given a copy.

2 Q. What is going to be handed to you, Mr. Dragicevic, is a sheet of

3 paper with the names of certain individuals who will appear in your

4 evidence and whose identity should be kept from the public. So when

5 referring to those names, would you please refer to the numbers.

6 MR. JORDASH: I think we can be probably exclude Number 13 from

7 that. I don't think there's any need for him to not be mentioned in

8 public.

9 Q. You follow me?

10 A. Yes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, are you going to file the list of names

12 as a confidential exhibit?

13 MR. JORDASH: Yes, please, yes. We haven't uploaded it yet.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Otherwise we don't know what Number 1 or 10 or 7 has

15 done without knowing who it is. Is it uploaded?

16 MR. JORDASH: No, it's not.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please take care that it will be uploaded

18 so that a number can be assigned and that it will be admitted as a

19 confidential exhibit.

20 Please proceed.

21 MR. JORDASH:

22 Q. Now, Mr. Witness, I want to take you through your statement and

23 some of the exhibits to elaborate and clarify some issues. There is no

24 need to repeat the content of these documents because all are now before

25 the Court. You follow me?

Page 14737

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Let's go straight to your statement D466 and paragraph number 3.

3 There you are discussing attending a conference in London in 1991

4 or 1992 with Assistant Minister Kertes and upon your return being fired

5 by Minister Bulatovic having been accused of not seeking permission from

6 the minister to go to London. What was the situation in relation to that

7 visit to London? Who invited you to go and for what reason?

8 A. Sometime in 1991 and 1992 a conference was organised in London in

9 relation to the situation in the then Yugoslavia. At the time I was head

10 of the department for international co-operation and all contacts with

11 foreign services in the federal Secretariat of the Interior. At the

12 time, Mr. Mihalj Kertes was assistant minister of the interior, later to

13 become the customs director. He invited me to accompany him to London.

14 More to the point, he told me that I should get ready at once and be at

15 the airport in two hours' time in order to fly to London. I did as much.

16 However, as we returned to Belgrade, I received a letter informing me

17 that I had been relieved of all of my duties.

18 Q. What did Kertes want you to do in London?

19 A. I was merely told I should accompany him to London. I understood

20 it as a security detail. I was supposed to provide security for him

21 during the London trip. Nothing more.

22 Q. Did you do --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Could all unnecessary microphones please be

24 turned off. Thank you.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did.

Page 14738

1 MR. JORDASH:

2 Q. Was there any protocol in place which said you should have sought

3 permission from the minister?

4 A. No, there was no such protocol, there was no reason why assistant

5 minister's order would be called into question. This never crossed my

6 mind.

7 Q. Do you know if there was any ulterior reason why Bulatovic fired

8 you?

9 A. No. I was told that I should have applied to the minister

10 directly for a permission to go on that trip.

11 Q. Moving to paragraph 5, you started working for the DB of Serbia

12 as a special advisor. What was envisaged in that role as special

13 advisor?

14 A. The role of the special advisor was an official act whereby

15 members of a service would be ranked. Specifically I advised the head of

16 service about contacts with foreign security services and received

17 guidance from him on what I was to do next.

18 Q. Had Mr. Stanisic had such advice previous to your employment?

19 A. Which employment do you mean? I don't understand.

20 Q. Your employment as a special advisor. Had Mr. Stanisic been

21 receiving advice concerning contact with foreign security services up

22 until that point?

23 A. To answer the question, I need to explain the structure that was

24 in place at the time. Contacts with foreign intelligence services were

25 maintained only by the federal security service. The republican security

Page 14739

1 services were not entitled to maintain these contacts.

2 Q. And what was the change at this point in time? Was there a

3 change at this point in time?

4 A. The change occurred when I became a member of the State Security

5 Service of the Republic of Serbia.

6 Q. Do you know if this was a change which was occurring in other

7 republican services?

8 A. I suppose so since other republican services created their own

9 respective services whereas the federal service virtually ceased to

10 exist.

11 Q. Moving to paragraph 8 of your statement wherein you are

12 discussing the take-over of the federal SUP and you note six lines down

13 in the English that you had received information or the Serbian DB

14 received information from the federal MUP premises which was information

15 about the leaders of the other republics including Tudjman and

16 Izetbegovic, and you note that you did not use that information [As read]

17 "... because we did not think it was the way in which it should be used.

18 We did not think it was appropriate to act in that manner. Stanisic

19 mentioned it several times and meetings with representatives of foreign

20 services."

21 Why was it considered by Stanisic and the service to be

22 inappropriate?

23 A. When the state security of the Republic of Serbia took over the

24 building of the federal SUP, naturally we obtained documents and

25 information related to certain individuals and leaders of the former

Page 14740

1 republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As you put

2 it, and as I said in my statement, at every meeting with representatives

3 of foreign intelligence services when they put questions related to the

4 take-over of the building of the federal SUP, Mr. Stanisic always

5 insisted on the fact that we were in possession of the documentation but

6 believed that this was not a way of going about publishing the documents,

7 or going public with the documents, as that would not have been deemed

8 appropriate towards the said individuals. We kept the documentation

9 undisclosed.

10 Q. The question -- just listen and answer directly to the question.

11 The question was, why was it considered inappropriate?

12 A. We considered it inappropriate because it had do with individual

13 leaders and their character. They were leaders of the newly-established

14 republics. We personally thought that this was no way of going about

15 things, i.e., disclosing the documents at that point in time.

16 Q. Apart from the service, do you know if they were disclosed to

17 anyone outside of the service?

18 A. I'm not aware of that.

19 MR. JORDASH: Moving to paragraph 11, please.

20 Q. Paragraph 11 you testify to the movement of employees to the DB

21 of Serbia and the fact that no one was fired from the federal SUP. And

22 you testify to one of the heads of the administrations being a Croat,

23 Zlatko Radnic. Do you see that?

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could all the unnecessary microphones please be

25 switched off. Thank you.

Page 14741

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

2 MR. JORDASH:

3 Q. What was Zlatko Radnic's role in the Serbian DB from 1992?

4 A. Zlatko Radnic was head of the administration charged with the

5 protection of individuals and institutions of special significance.

6 Q. And how long did he continue in that post?

7 A. He continued in that post up until 1999 when both of us were

8 removed from our positions pursuant to a decision of the then head of the

9 DB, Radomir Markovic.

10 Q. Were questions ever raised about Radnic's continued employment in

11 the DB?

12 A. You mean after 1999?

13 Q. No, I mean from 1992 onwards, whether there were questions raised

14 by any authority about the continuation of a Croat's employment in the

15 DB?

16 A. As far as I remember, the then director Janackovic who kept

17 exerting pressure on Mr. Stanisic wanted Zlatko Radnic to be removed from

18 his position and membership of the State Security Service of Serbia being

19 a Croat.

20 Q. We can turn to it, but there is a document 1D02591, which

21 describes a visit by yourself and Stanisic and Loncar and a Zlatko Radnic

22 in 1996 to see the CIA in America. Do you recall that?

23 A. Yes, I do. It was our first visit to the CIA in the

24 United States. The delegation was composed of Mr. Jovica Stanisic as the

25 head of SDB of Serbia, Mr. Borislav Loncar head of analytics,

Page 14742

1 Mr. Zlatko Radnic as head of the administration for the protection of

2 individuals --

3 Q. Sorry to interrupt. We are going to come back to that visit in

4 more detail a bit later, but the question I want to ask you now is

5 whether that is the same Zlatko Radnic as we've been talking about, the

6 Croat who was the head of the administration for security of VIPs?

7 A. Yes, you are right. That's the man.

8 Q. Thank you. We'll come back to that in a moment. Let's go back

9 to your statement, paragraph 12. Paragraph 12, just to situate

10 ourselves, is dealing with a period from October 1992, and your job as

11 the head of the administration for international co-operation with the --

12 within the Serbian DB and the primary duties you had there. Can I just

13 ask a few questions to try to clarify what the situation was in relation

14 to Serbia's position within the international community at that point in

15 time.

16 Were there any economic sanctions imposed at that point on the

17 FRY?

18 A. Yes, there were.

19 Q. And in relation to ambassadors from the international community

20 from western countries, were there any international ambassadors in the

21 FRY at that point?

22 A. Yes, there were. Though, with your permission, I'd like to say

23 that some of the functions were delegated to the rank of a charge

24 d'affaires rather than an ambassador.

25 Q. Who was that?

Page 14743

1 A. These reflected political views on the part of the some of the

2 states and where sanctions are involved, the levels represented in the

3 embassies get relegated to a level below so you no longer have an

4 ambassador in place but rather a charge d'affaires, so that would be the

5 next in line.

6 Q. Do you know at what point the Contact Group consisting of a

7 number of countries was formed?

8 A. Well, I suppose that it was in 1992, though I'm not positive

9 about it.

10 Q. Let's go back to your statement. You testified to your primary

11 duties as the head of the administration for international co-operation

12 being to meet with representatives of foreign services, mainly on their

13 request, and to submit reports on those meetings. Which services were

14 you meeting in late 1992 and onwards?

15 A. In late 1992 there were significantly fewer representatives

16 compared to the earlier period. However, from 1992 onwards, we managed

17 to obtain the presence of more of them and have contact with close to 60

18 representatives of foreign intelligence services of various countries.

19 Q. Could you name those that were considered to you and the service

20 to be important, or particularly important, I should say?

21 A. Well, we considered to be particularly important our contacts

22 with representatives of the US, France, the Russian Federation, Germany,

23 and we tried in every possible way to establish contact and renew our

24 formerly good co-operation with the countries in the immediate area, and

25 of course with China too.

Page 14744

1 Q. And when you say "we tried in every possible way" at what point

2 in time did those efforts begin and how long did they continue through

3 the 1990s?

4 A. Well, in the early 1990s, the situation was very bad. At one

5 point I wondered what the point of my job was since I was unable to

6 appropriately respond to requests put forth by some representatives of

7 foreign intelligence services. Working as I was for the federal SUP at

8 the time, I wasn't able to provide them with information that they were

9 interested in.

10 Q. And what about when you started working for the Serbian DB, were

11 you able to begin that work at that point, or when?

12 A. At that point we had already started with some of our activities

13 aimed at developing co-operation. Of course, this was not a process that

14 could be completed overnight. Still, in the course of several years, I

15 can safely say that we restored the level of co-operation we had before

16 and were able to develop solid relations with various services.

17 Q. And we'll come to some specifics shortly, but in a general sense,

18 what was the point from your perspective of that co-operation? What was

19 it designed to achieve?

20 A. The objectives of co-operation depend on the situation of a given

21 country. For us it was a rather distinct moment of confusion where

22 issues of vital interest had to be resolved first. The throughput of

23 information had to be made possible, especially information relating to

24 the situation on the field. And we had to introduce peace and stability

25 in the Balkans.

Page 14745

1 At the same time there was a political purpose to these meetings

2 as well. Political messages can be passed along between two countries

3 through their respective intelligence services. This is a way of

4 establishing good contacts and resolving a great many issues among

5 countries, and improving their relations in general.

6 Q. Again in a general sense, what were the foreign intelligence

7 services interested in? What was it that they, from what you could see,

8 hoped to achieve through meeting representatives of the Serbian DB?

9 A. Well, first of all, the purpose of these meetings was their

10 desire to become acquainted with the situation in the crisis area as well

11 as with the situation in Serbia itself. In addition, they thought it

12 their vital interest issues such as fights against international

13 terrorism, organised crime, fire-arms smuggling, and these were the

14 issues that they were particularly interested in. I would like, first

15 and foremost, to underline the importance of the struggle against

16 international terrorism because all the countries, globally speaking,

17 were interested in that a particular issue.

18 Q. And in relation to events within the former Yugoslavia, were they

19 interested in those, and if so, could you discern a purpose for that, why

20 they were interested?

21 A. Yes, they were interested, but primarily with a view to

22 introducing and bringing peace and stability to the war-torn areas. As

23 well as with a view to implementing the agreements that had been set up

24 by the international community.

25 Q. And were you given instructions from Stanisic in relation to that

Page 14746

1 subject?

2 A. My duties as the head of the administration for international

3 co-operation involved my obligation to report Mr. Stanisic, who was my

4 immediate superior, about every contact that I made. And I always

5 consulted with him when I had a conversation or a meeting with someone.

6 Q. And how did you decide what information you should provide in

7 relation to the objective concerning peace and stability in the war-torn

8 areas?

9 A. In such situations it was up to my personal assessment. If I

10 decided that I wouldn't be able to do something on my own, I would then

11 consult Mr. Stanisic and he would give me instructions and guidance and I

12 would act accordingly in my communications with representatives of

13 foreign intelligence services.

14 Q. Looking at paragraph 12 again, and the second part of the

15 paragraph, you confirm that reports were written on all of the meetings

16 and those materials should exist in the department of analytics. And

17 that you know that the defence for Mr. Stanisic requested that it be

18 provided with materials and that a response was received that the BIA did

19 not possess such materials.

20 Do you know of any reason why those materials should not be with

21 BIA?

22 A. After every conversation I would compile an Official Note which I

23 submitted to Mr. Stanisic as my immediate superior. Therefore, all the

24 documents that I drafted, and I can categorically state because I was the

25 head of the administration and for the most part I worked independently,

Page 14747

1 are in the analytics department of the incumbent security and information

2 agency. If you allow me, I would like to note that after the 5th of

3 October, I began working for the BIA and up until 2003 I was the chief,

4 the chef de cabinet of the chief of the national security. Therefore, I

5 know for sure that this documentation still exists.

6 Now, why it wasn't made accessible to me, I don't think this is a

7 proper place to discuss that.

8 Q. Let me just ask you something about what you just said, you said

9 that you would like to note that after the 5th of October, you began

10 working for BIA. Which year, please?

11 A. I'm referring to the events that were called the revolution in

12 Serbia which took place on the 5th of October, 2000.

13 Q. Sorry, can I just press you on what your answer that you do not

14 think this is a proper place to discuss why documentation was not made

15 accessible to you. Why is that?

16 A. I said that because I feel really ashamed for not having received

17 from my country and my state what I needed and what I wanted to receive.

18 Q. Okay. Thank you. Let's move on in the statement to paragraph

19 15.

20 JUDGE ORIE: The question was whether you have an explanation why

21 it was not made available to you. I appreciate that you feel quite

22 unhappy and, even as you said, ashamed for it, but what caused it, do you

23 know? Because it's not only you that has not given access to it, but

24 also the Stanisic Defence. That's the issue which is important for this

25 Chamber. So do you know of any reason why you or Mr. Jordash would have

Page 14748

1 had -- would have not been granted access to those materials?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't give you the true reason

3 and I wouldn't like to speculate. Now, in the response received by the

4 security information agency, they say that they didn't have the documents

5 that was being required. I retired in 2003 and I left these documents

6 behind and I know that these documents exist. If it was destroyed, that

7 would constitute a criminal offence. This is all that I can say about

8 the matter.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.

10 MR. JORDASH:

11 Q. One clarification, if I may. Why would it constitute a criminal

12 offence? What are the rules concerning destruction of these types of

13 documents within the Serbian DB or the BIA?

14 A. The reason is that such documents mustn't be destroyed. The

15 usual practice is that if a decision about the destruction of documents

16 is to be taken, can only happen after many years. I think that some

17 files can be opened and some documents destroyed, for example, after 50

18 years.

19 Q. Thank you. Now, paragraph 15 you testify to a co-operation --

20 sorry, the signing of co-operation protocols. Are you able to indicate

21 when the protocol was signed with the American service, approximately?

22 A. Roughly speaking, I can say that this took place in 1996.

23 Q. And the Russian and the Chinese, please?

24 A. [In English] With -- [Interpretation] Sorry. As for the Chinese

25 intelligence service, we had a rather peculiar situation because contacts

Page 14749

1 with their service go back to the 1980s. A protocol was signed at the

2 time between the former Yugoslavia and their intelligence services. It

3 might as well be the oldest protocol of the kind that our service had.

4 As for the service of the Russian Federation, I think the same applies to

5 them as well, that it took part -- it happened in 1995 or 1996. I cannot

6 be sure. With Croatia in 1996 as well, with the Egyptian service and the

7 German service and some other services as well.

8 Q. Okay. Just very briefly, what is generally contained in a

9 co-operation protocol?

10 A. In principle a protocol on co-operation contains guide-lines

11 governing co-operation between two services and also obligations of the

12 both sides with regard to the agreements reached. And it mainly referred

13 to the issues that I already mentioned, such as the combat against the

14 international terrorism, arms smuggling, technical co-operation,

15 training, or inter-training between the services. And mutual visits and

16 exchange of information that are of interest for the both services.

17 Q. I want to move on to the co-operation of the Serbian DB with the

18 American intelligence agency, the CIA.

19 MR. JORDASH: I don't know if this is the right time but I'm

20 moving on to a slightly different subject.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps we first take a break, but before

22 doing so, first of all, Mr. Jordash, I'd like to remind you that the

23 summary of 92 ter witnesses has to be prepared, has to be read into the

24 record.

25 MR. JORDASH: I do apologise very much so.

Page 14750

1 JUDGE ORIE: If you please could take care that it would be

2 produced and read as quickly as possible.

3 Then as far as the documents contained in the chart are

4 concerned, many of which have not been assigned numbers, Madam Registrar

5 has provisionally reserved and also provisionally assigned numbers D468

6 up to and including D508 to those documents and is quite willing, I

7 think, to inform you what numbers are provisionally assigned to what

8 documents exactly. There are some which have already received exhibit

9 numbers or MFI numbers but for the others, numbers have been reserved.

10 We'll take a break and we'll resume at 4.00.

11 [The witness stands down]

12 --- Recess taken at 3.31 p.m.

13 --- On resuming at 4.05 p.m.

14 JUDGE ORIE: I would have expected the witness to be in already,

15 but ...

16 [The witness takes the stand]

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, if you are ready, please proceed.

18 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.

19 Q. Let's return to your statement, Mr. Dragicevic, D466. And I want

20 to ask you about the contacts between the service and the American

21 service. And you've indicated in your statement that you met,

22 Number 1 --

23 MR. JORDASH: Let's go to paragraph 18.

24 Q. Now, paragraph 18 you -- when do you think you personally first

25 met Number 1?

Page 14751

1 A. I met Number 1 in 1991 when I was still a member of the federal

2 service.

3 Q. And were those meetings from intelligence gathering, intelligence

4 giving objective useful?

5 A. Yes. Gentleman Number 1 was an official representative of the

6 Central Intelligence Agency of the US and his task was in the course of

7 the contacts with myself, or rather, the federal service to attempt and

8 exchange useful information that would be beneficial to both services.

9 Q. And moving into 1992, did those contacts when you were working

10 for the federal service remain useful?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, at some point in time you introduced Number 1 to

13 Mr. Stanisic. What was the purpose of that?

14 A. Given that number 1 was an official representative of the

15 American intelligence service, the only address where he could come and

16 gather information that he was interested in was the federal service of

17 the day in Yugoslavia. However, you have to bear in mind the fact that

18 the disintegration of Yugoslavia was already underway and that we in the

19 federal service were in a position in which we no longer received the

20 information that we had previously been receiving from the State Security

21 Services of other Yugoslav Republics. We were virtually reduced to a

22 mere existence. I personally, as the head of the administration for

23 contacts with foreign intelligence services, was not able anymore to give

24 answers to certain questions that Number 1 had and we reached a point

25 when our contacts became pointless and meaningless.

Page 14752

1 Without wishing to sever contacts with the US service though and

2 at the request of Number 1, to enable him to contact representatives of

3 the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia, I complied with

4 that.

5 Q. Can I just return to the subject of co-operation protocols.

6 You've testified that the co-operation protocol with the United States

7 service was not signed until 1996. Were you, therefore, operating

8 without a co-operation protocol between 1992 and 1996?

9 A. An official protocol on co-operation between the two services did

10 not exist. However, there were oral agreements on the basis of which the

11 US service officially deployed their representative to the Embassy of the

12 United States in Belgrade.

13 Q. Does the term --

14 MR. JORDASH: Sorry.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, from the statement, we briefly

16 discussed during the break the line of the examination. We found that

17 much of it is found in the statement. Perhaps not exactly in the same

18 words, but the gist of it appears in the statement and we also wondered

19 whether all the details which are added, whether they are really of such

20 importance and relevance that we couldn't live without them. Here, for

21 example, if there's no protocol, if the protocol is only signed until

22 1996 and if you find in the statement that apparently there's a lot of

23 co-operation and contacts, et cetera, then of course I could guess that

24 the witness would say that there was no official protocol before 1996

25 because he said it was only signed in 1996.

Page 14753

1 Now, whether it -- when you worked together, of course, there

2 must be some kind of an understanding or agreement. Now -- so that apart

3 from -- of course we find already that there was a developed co-operation

4 and, I would say, it's common knowledge that secret services will work

5 together up to the point where they consider it useful to work together

6 and there were other areas where they might not want to work together at

7 all, so that's a kind of common understanding. So we are wondering what

8 it is specifically that you are seeking to establish apart from a

9 positive approach by Mr. Stanisic and his service in their co-operation

10 with other countries at that period in time. If we are missing

11 something, please tell us, but that's what we understand already on the

12 basis of the statement.

13 MR. JORDASH: All I'm trying to do is establish the extent of

14 that co-operation and in particular the extent of the co-operation with

15 the Contact Group at an early stage when others and other governmental

16 entities were not engaged in such co-operative lines of work.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Please consider my observations just made and ask

18 yourself to what extent what you apparently want to establish, whether

19 that basically, if not yet in the statement at least on the basis of the

20 many many questions you have added to that and whether there's any more

21 efficient way to find out whether we understood it and whether we can

22 proceed to the next subject. Please proceed.

23 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, I'll move swiftly.

24 Q. Just one question on that subject, Mr. Dragicevic. Was there a

25 process of accreditation?

Page 14754

1 A. Yes, there was a system of accreditation and Number 1 was an

2 officially-accredited representative of the US intelligence service

3 stationed in their embassy to Belgrade.

4 Q. Were there agencies from the Contact Groups accredited in 1992 or

5 thereabouts?

6 A. Yes, more or less at that time with slight variations.

7 Q. Paragraph 21 of your statement, you testified that there were

8 other unofficial meetings of which -- this is meetings between the

9 service, the State Security of Serbia and the CIA and particularly

10 Number 1, which were not -- which Milosevic was not privy to. Why was

11 that?

12 A. Well, you need to understand that in contacts between two

13 services there are often meetings pertaining to exclusively professional

14 matters about which a president of the state does not need to be briefed

15 and informed on a daily basis. That is not a proper way and that was not

16 the practice.

17 Mr. Milosevic or President Milosevic was informed about all the

18 crucial points of such contacts and he endorsed them.

19 Q. Was Number 1 interested in Milosevic's activities in relation to

20 Croatia and Bosnia, and was information provided about those?

21 A. Of course. Certain things that were vitally important were

22 conveyed to President Milosevic and the political leadership in the form

23 of a report or information, and that's the usual practice.

24 Q. What I'm asking about is what information was provided to

25 Number 1? Was Number 1 interested in Milosevic's activities?

Page 14762

1 were taken hostage, privates and officers. Most of them came from the

2 French Battalion, British Battalion, Ukrainian Battalion, and all of them

3 were lined up as human shields next to military installations of the

4 Army of Republika Srpska in case NATO forces should strike.

5 Q. How do you know that Stanisic proposed negotiations to Sokolovic?

6 A. I know that because Stanisic told me to get ready for that trip.

7 After the negotiations were held with Minister Sokolovic and in a

8 situation where nobody was able to find any sort of solution to the

9 situation in that country, Mr. Stanisic, at his own initiative and in

10 consultation with Minister Sokolovic and after consultations with

11 Mr. Milosevic, decided to take these steps. Mr. Milosevic told him that

12 he could go ahead with it although the impression gained was that he was

13 highly skeptical of us being able to be successful in that at all.

14 Q. You note in this chart that the political leadership of Serbia

15 including Milosevic had no contact with the RS leadership because of the

16 sanctions. How do you know this?

17 A. At the time the then Republic of Yugoslavia in August of 1994

18 imposed sanctions on Republika Srpska. During that period there were no

19 contacts to speak of, we could say that they were non-existent. What

20 further aggravated the fact was that the political and military

21 leaderships of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina drew

22 up a joint plan to begin the process of unifying the

23 Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska. The assessment our

24 service had was that things had gotten out of control, primarily out of

25 political control. We were fully aware of the fact that the hostage

Page 14763

1 crisis involving the UN personnel was damaging not only for the Serbs in

2 Bosnia but also for the Serbs in the Krajina and then the

3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in general.

4 Q. Your first visit to speak to Krajisnik and Karadzic, what was the

5 nature of the discussions and what was their response?

6 A. As far as I remember, the first trip was to Bijeljina where

7 Mr. Stanisic met up with Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik. Those were the

8 first discussions that took place on the issue of the hostage crisis. On

9 our arrival in Bijeljina in addition to Mr. Karadzic and Krajisnik, we

10 saw the leaders of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, Mr. Babic and

11 Mr. Martic.

12 Q. What was the discussions you had with Krajisnik and Krajisnik?

13 We'll come to Babic and Martic in a moment. What was the discussion and

14 what was their response?

15 A. Mr. Stanisic tried to explain to them the negative aspects behind

16 the operation undertaken by the VRS in respect of the hostages and the

17 repercussions that such an operation could have in terms of the

18 international community, as well as the possible NATO strike against

19 Republika Srpska with a view to liberating the hostages involved.

20 Q. And their response? You said in the comment chart that Karadzic

21 demanded material support. What was that he was demanding?

22 A. The discussions were very difficult and painstaking and

23 Mr. Karadzic asked for logistical support that could be forthcoming from

24 the Republic of Serbia. Of course, we could not promise any such

25 support.

Page 14764

1 Q. What kind of logistical support was he looking for?

2 A. I can't tell you at this stage because I simply can't remember

3 what it involved. I wasn't present during all the conversations they

4 had.

5 Q. And the same question in relation to Babic and Martic. What was

6 in brief the nature of the discussions and their response?

7 A. As for Babic and Martic and the idea to unify the

8 Republic of the Serbian Krajina with the Republika Srpska, Mr. Stanisic

9 did all in his power to explain to them in political, diplomatic and

10 security-related terms that to make such a move would be tantamount to

11 madness.

12 Q. What was the view that Stanisic expressed concerning why that

13 would be tantamount to madness?

14 A. Well, politically speaking, the entire idea would lead to ruin

15 and would be an entrapment for Mr. Karadzic and Republika Srpska

16 leadership. It would also go against all the agreements reached with the

17 international community and would constitute a sort of provocation in the

18 face of everything that had been agreed upon by that time.

19 Q. In brief, what was your understanding of what had been agreed

20 with the international community at that point?

21 A. My understanding of the agreement reached with the international

22 community was that the aim was to stop all hostilities, introduce peace,

23 and find a political settlement. The unification of these two regions

24 would call all of this into question.

25 Q. How many times do you recall did you and Mr. Stanisic return to

Page 14765

1 Republika Srpska during this crisis?

2 A. As far as I can remember, we first visited Bijeljina, then we

3 went to Pale where we talked with Mr. Krajisnik and then we went back to

4 Belgrade. After that we went to have talks with General Mladic, and

5 after that we went straight to Pale where we had a meeting with the

6 entire political leadership of Republika Srpska. To our enormous

7 surprise, we found there the Greek minister of the interior and the Greek

8 minister of defence.

9 Q. Let me return to General Mladic. What was the discussion had

10 with Mladic and what was his response?

11 A. I wasn't present during the conversation between Mr. Stanisic and

12 Mr. Mladic, but I would say that Mr. Stanisic was guided by the same

13 principles which were unconditional release of the hostages and I think

14 that he did his best trying to convince Mladic what adverse effects

15 everything that they were doing would have.

16 Q. At that point in time, how certain were you and Stanisic as to

17 who was responsible for the seizure of the UN personnel? Sorry, I think

18 I might have mumbled. What I want to ask is this: At that point in

19 time, how certain were you and Stanisic as to who was responsible for the

20 seizure of the UN personnel?

21 A. Well, the taking of UN personnel hostage was solely the

22 responsibility of the Army of Republika Srpska, i.e., General Mladic

23 himself.

24 Q. Were you able to gather any insight into the relationship between

25 Karadzic and Mladic at that point in time?

Page 14766

1 A. I have no direct knowledge about this, although I can say that I

2 heard stories about the rift between Karadzic and Krajisnik on the one

3 hand and Mladic as the top military man on the other hand.

4 MR. JORDASH: Could I please have on the screen 1D05235.

5 Q. And this is a report of the Secretary-General pursuant to

6 Security Council Resolutions 982 and 987. I just want to ask you about

7 an aspect of it.

8 MR. JORDASH: There isn't a B/C/S translation of this but we will

9 have one produced or certainly the sections, Your Honour, as soon as

10 possible. Can we go to paragraph 30, please.

11 Q. Are you familiar -- you've seen this United Nations report; is

12 that correct?

13 A. I saw this document for the first time during my consultations

14 with the Defence team.

15 Q. Unfortunately it's not very clear. I want to ask you about

16 paragraph 30 which deals with the no-fly zone and if you read that to

17 yourself. If I can just pick out sections.

18 [As read] "Resolution 781 of 1992 declared a ban on all military

19 flights in the air-space of Bosnia and Herzegovina and mandated UNPROFOR

20 to monitor compliance with it and to ensure that the purposes of flights

21 to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina were consistent with Security Council

22 resolutions."

23 And then paragraph 31 it's noted there that UNPROFOR's role as

24 regards to this part of its mandate is confined --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Could I just check whether I do have it under my

Page 14767

1 e-court but I can't reproduce it on my screen courtroom message channel 1

2 English. It's not there. Perhaps it's because only -- there's only

3 one -- it looks as if the English text is on channel 2 B/C/S although it

4 is English. There we are. Thank you. Yes, you were reading from which

5 paragraph, Mr. Jordash?

6 MR. JORDASH: Paragraph 31.

7 JUDGE ORIE: 31. Yes.

8 MR. JORDASH:

9 Q. [As read] "UNPROFOR's role as regards this part of its mandate is

10 confined to ground monitoring as selected airfields in the area" --

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, you are reading.

12 MR. JORDASH: Sorry.

13 Q. [As read] "All action related to enforcement is undertaken by

14 NATO. Despite a large number of violations by helicopters carrying

15 personnel, "flying trucks", the no-fly zone has been largely successful

16 in discouraging the use of the air-space of Bosnia and Herzegovina for

17 combat purposes. A recent exception, however, included several sorties

18 flown by the Croatian air force to Bosnian air-space to bomb positions in

19 Sector West in Croatia."

20 JUDGE ORIE: What you read "included," it reads in my text

21 "involved".

22 MR. JORDASH: Involved, sorry, yes, my mistake.

23 Q. Were you aware of this no-fly zone at the time you went to

24 Bosnia?

25 A. Yes, we knew that a no-fly zone that been declared and that

Page 14768

1 precipitated everything that happened afterwards.

2 Q. This is a slight tangent but relevant, I hope. There's been

3 evidence in this case that the DB were, despite this no-fly zone, flying

4 thousands of combat, reconnaissance, transport, and humanitarian flights

5 into Bosnia or within Bosnia. Is that something you can testify to? Do

6 you know about that?

7 A. Unfortunately, I know nothing about this.

8 Q. Just so you are provided with the full information, I took that

9 evidence from Mr. Simatovic's speech at Kula which you attended in 1996

10 where Mr. Simatovic claimed that the DB had been operating thousands of

11 combat and so on flights. Do you recall that speech?

12 A. I really cannot recall his speech in its entirety at this point

13 in time. I truly cannot.

14 Q. Fair enough. Let's move on to -- I'll move back to the hostage

15 crisis.

16 MR. JORDASH: Could we have P48.18 on the screen. And it should

17 be a chart item number 19.

18 Q. You've seen this document, Mr. Dragicevic?

19 MR. JORDASH: Sorry, I don't think it is chart number 19. Let's

20 just have a look at the document for now.

21 Q. Do you recognise the document, Mr. Witness?

22 A. Yes, I saw it here when I came here and when I had my contacts

23 with the Defence team.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MR. JORDASH: Number 12 in the chart.

Page 14769

1 Q. I just want to ask you about page 2 and a view -- sorry, not a

2 view. A record of a conversation, it seems, between Kirudja and

3 Stanisic. Do you remember know who Kirudja was? Do you know him at the

4 time or know of him at the time?

5 A. I heard of him at the time. I did not attend these meetings and

6 I presumed inferring from the first sentence that they took place on the

7 premises of the Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska, not on our

8 premises.

9 Q. Now, Kirudja writes at paragraph 3 that:

10 [As read] "Stanisic put the decision he had to make in a broader

11 context, one which involves President Milosevic. The negotiations with

12 US representative Frasure he said remain at a stage favourable for a

13 break-through agreement. It would be a pity if something were to happen

14 at this stage and derail the progress so made as well as the chances of

15 re-establishing a cease-fire in BiH."

16 Do you know who Frasure was?

17 A. [In English] Yes, I know.

18 Q. Who was that?

19 A. [Interpretation] He was a US representative involved in the

20 negotiations concerning the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least I

21 understood that much.

22 Q. The view expressed by Stanisic, or should I say the perspective

23 that he expressed to Kirudja that the resolution of the hostage crisis

24 was critical for the re-establishment of a cease-fire in Bosnia and

25 Herzegovina, was that a view you ever discussed with Stanisic?

Page 14770

1 A. Well, I talked to him as much as I had an opportunity to do so.

2 The events evolved very speedily and whatever we discussed happened while

3 we were on the road. As I said, I didn't attend these meetings.

4 Therefore, I cannot give you any specific comments in that respect.

5 Q. Let me ask you again about this Security Council report and just

6 one small aspect of it.

7 MR. JORDASH: Can we return to the report 1D05235. I think it's

8 1D05235. We had it on the screen earlier. Sorry, 5235. Apologies. And

9 paragraph, please, 74. Actually, 72.

10 Q. And what you'll see in front of you at 72 is a number of options

11 being discussed at the Security Council level, certainly in this report

12 to the Security Council, in response to the hostage crisis.

13 MR. JORDASH: I think if we go to the next page.

14 Q. And I want to ask you about option A, whether you were aware that

15 this was an option which was at least under some kind of discussion at

16 the UN level?

17 A. No, I wasn't.

18 Q. Okay. Let's leave it at that then. If we can move to how you

19 and the service were able to locate the hostages. You made mention in

20 the comments chart that the UN did not provide you with information.

21 Where did the information come from? How were you able to locate the

22 hostages?

23 A. [In English] According to the talks with representatives, the

24 leadership of Republika Srpska, we came to the conclusion and with the

25 help of the Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska members of UN

Page 14771

1 forces were picked up and distributed in several locations, several ways.

2 I started to, sorry -- [Interpretation] They were moved to several

3 locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and from there they were moved further on

4 to the Republic of Serbia.

5 Q. In the same comment, Your Honours, item 2, you note that you had

6 "unconfirmed information that Mladic had ordered to kill us." Where was

7 that information from and who was he purportedly going to kill?

8 A. This was unofficial and unconfirmed information that we received

9 when we went to General Mladic's HQ in Han Pijesak where we had these

10 talks. There were three of us there at the time, Stanisic, Simatovic,

11 and myself, but I cannot confirm any of this because I have no formal

12 evidence or any official document to support it.

13 MR. JORDASH: Can I just take instructions, please.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.

15 [Defence counsel and accused Stanisic confer]

16 MR. JORDASH: Please could we have, if I may, a video, P49. It's

17 a -- only a few minutes long, if we may play it just to try to situate

18 when these conversations took place. It's Mr. Stanisic speaking at

19 different times during the hostage crisis, and I want to try to have you

20 clarify when this might -- these conversations or these speeches took

21 place.

22 [Video-clip played]

23 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Journalist: The hostages long

24 before next weekend.

25 Translator: Do you expect that other United Nations

Page 14772

1 representatives would be released by next week?

2 Jovica Stanisic: I already said that we hoped that everyone

3 would be released very soon.

4 Journalist: What was the arrangement? What did the Bosnian

5 Serbs get in exchange for releasing these hostages?

6 Jovica Stanisic: I think that we, of course, cannot answer this

7 question.

8 Translator: I think that we can't answer that question now."

9 MR. JORDASH:

10 Q. Were you anywhere in the vicinity during this speech?

11 A. I was the translator.

12 Q. Do you recall when this speech approximately was in the

13 month-long crisis?

14 A. This speech was delivered after our meeting at Pale. That was

15 towards the end of May, and I believe that it was actually the 1st of

16 June. In fact, it was the end of May and the first official reports in

17 the media appeared on the 1st of June.

18 MR. JORDASH: And can we go now to 001503, please.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. Jordash --

20 [Video-clip played]

21 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any dispute about the timing of what is

22 seen on this video?

23 MR. FARR: Your Honour, we wouldn't dispute the timing that the

24 witness has just indicated, no.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but apparently we are now seeking times where

Page 14773

1 there seems to be no dispute. You seem to be happy with the answers, but

2 of course I do not know, but why not then explore that at an earlier

3 stage and I think as a matter of fact if someone is interviewed and says,

4 well, we expect them to be released within a couple of days, then of

5 course on the basis of what is known from the time, it shouldn't be that

6 difficult to seek agreement on when this approximately was and if it was

7 one or two days earlier or later, I still wonder what exactly the

8 relevance of that is.

9 MR. JORDASH: I'll move on then to the final video, if I may.

10 This is the video which the Karadzic speaking after the --

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and it resolves -- the answers of the witness

12 will resolve any matter which is in dispute?

13 MR. JORDASH: It may help to -- I don't think it will resolve the

14 dispute but it will certainly, I hope, buttress our position on it.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's see what the video tell us and what the

16 witness tells us. Please proceed.

17 MR. JORDASH: 65 ter 1D05255 for the transcript and for the video

18 it's V000-0491.

19 [Video-clip played]

20 "Interviewer: Earlier today John Simpson who is in the Bosnian

21 capital, Pale, Bosnian Serb capital, spoke to Radovan Karadzic, leader of

22 the Bosnian Serbs, his first British television interview since the

23 hostage crisis. John Simpson asked Mr. Karadzic if the Bosnian Serbs

24 would now give up land for a Bosnian Muslim state.

25 Mr. Karadzic: We Serbs do not oppose Muslims to have their own

Page 14774

1 state. Either as alone or together with Croats, and we do not oppose

2 them to have a viable state, no matter how many percentages it would be.

3 We would either talk about two viable states or three viable states and

4 then percentage should be a result of those rather than a condition to

5 the talks.

6 Interviewer: Can I turn to the question of your relations with

7 your previously friendly or semi-friendly neighbour to the north, the

8 Republic of Yugoslavia of Serbia. The relationship with

9 President Milosevic is clearly not a good one now, is it? He puts

10 intense pressure on you, and you really have nothing you can do, surely,

11 except accept that pressure and do what he want

12 Karadzic: Relation is not so good, although it has improved a

13 little bit because of these UN war prisoners, but still we have a

14 blockade on Drina River and still we do not have a good relationship as

15 we should have because we are the same nation.

16 Interviewer: Nevertheless, they managed to persuade you, in

17 inverted commas, to release the hostages that you took, the UN people,

18 how did they do that?

19 Karadzic: Not by threats or by pressure. By suggestions and by

20 incentives, and that's why we have accepted the suggestions of

21 President Milosevic. If anyone threatened us or pressed us, we would

22 fight because you know, the small nations also have pride and dignity,

23 and the smaller nation, the bigger pride.

24 Interviewer: In hindsight, though, surely, it was a terrible

25 mistake to have allowed your people to have captured UN soldiers, for the

Page 14775

1 world to have seen them chained up, to see masked men holding guns at

2 their heads, that was a terrible thing, wasn't it? Wasn't that an awful

3 mistake?

4 Karadzic: Well, one mistake causes another mistake. One drastic

5 move causes another drastic reaction. You have to realise that that was

6 a reaction, not action, and we felt hopeless and helpless and we had to

7 do something very drastic in order to prevent further strikes and in

8 order to show to the international community that we are cornered and

9 that we, being cornered, are ready to defend ourselves by all means.

10 Interviewer: Because many people in Serbia, for instance, in

11 Belgrade, thought that it was perhaps the action of individual commanders

12 in the field and that you hadn't necessarily given the orders yourself to

13 take UN people hostage.

14 Karadzic: I back always my military commanders.

15 Interviewer: That sound as if it was their idea rather than

16 yours.

17 Karadzic: No, no. We function as a state and I am commander in

18 chief, supreme commander and everything that my army do, I do back.

19 MR. JORDASH: Pause there, please.

20 Q. So just a couple of questions on the video. You heard Karadzic

21 saying that the relationship with the -- with Serbia was not good. Did

22 you see anything during your negotiations to indicate differently?

23 A. The only thing I can say is that relations were very tense during

24 negotiations and the entire action. It only goes to show the extent of

25 effort we invested into seeing this through to the end and how successful

Page 14776

1 we were.

2 Q. And the interviewer appears to pick up on some ambiguity in what

3 Karadzic is saying concerning whether he ordered the arrest of the UN

4 hostages or whether it was individual commanders on the ground. By the

5 end of the hostage crisis had you, from your observations, formed a final

6 view?

7 A. At the time I was not in a position to draw any conclusions, but

8 if you ask me about my personal opinion, let me say that when the first

9 group of hostages were released, the minister of foreign affairs of

10 Republika Srpska, Mr. Buha, apologised to the UN personnel for the

11 treatment they were accorded, and said that they were compelled to do

12 what they did in order to protect their people from further NATO strikes.

13 We could hear Mr. Karadzic say the same thing here in this footage. Let

14 me repeat that I am in no position to speculate as to who was the person

15 who issued the order.

16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the last thing the

17 witness said.

18 MR. JORDASH:

19 Q. What was the last sentence you just said, please?

20 A. I suppose it was a mutual agreement between the top political

21 leadership and military leadership. Besides, that was what Mr. Buha

22 himself had said.

23 MR. JORDASH: Could I, if I may, I did say it was the last video.

24 Can I show one last video which is only about 10 or 15 seconds long. And

25 it's V -- sorry. Oh, it's a minute and a half. 1D05254, please, and the

Page 14777

1 video is V000-4741. It's Mr. Stanisic speaking again.

2 [Video-clip played]

3 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Gentlemen, officers and soldiers of

4 the United Nations peacekeeping forces in this area, I have been

5 authorised by our government to say the following: Recently our

6 president sent an appeal to the government of Republika Srpska asking for

7 your release. The leadership of Republika Srpska in response to this

8 appeal and the initiative of the president of the Republic of Serbia

9 decided to release you as a sign of goodwill and readiness to solve the

10 crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina in a peaceful and political way.

11 If you allow me, I will take on responsibility for you, or rather, the

12 responsibility will be taken over by the security forces of the Republic

13 of Serbia, with full respect for your dignity and soldierly honour, I

14 will take you to the Republic of Serbia, that's to say the Federal

15 Republic of Yugoslavia, and hand you over to your United Nations command.

16 That's to say, representatives of your government."

17 MR. JORDASH:

18 Q. The only question I want to ask is in relation to what

19 Mr. Stanisic said about all respect for their dignity and their soldierly

20 honour. Did you see during that month Mr. Stanisic display any other

21 attitude towards the UN hostages?

22 A. No, never. He regarded them as members of the United Nations who

23 had been deployed there to exercise the duties conferred upon them in

24 that peacekeeping operation. He viewed them primarily as members of the

25 armies of their respective countries who found themselves in a position

Page 14778

1 where they were viewed by the entire world chained to posts without their

2 uniforms, and he expressed his intention to have them released and taken

3 back to their respective units to do what they we were sent there to do

4 under full military gear and therefore he regarded them as soldiers who

5 were performing their military duties.

6 MR. JORDASH: And may we have 1D05248 on screen.

7 Q. And it's with regard to paragraph 43 of your statement.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, can I ask one clarifying question.

9 In relation to your last answer, witness, you said Mr. Stanisic

10 viewed them primarily as members of the armies of their respective

11 countries. Does that mean that he did not view them as members of the

12 United Nations forces?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps I misspoke. They were

14 members of the military formations of their countries but were deployed

15 on an honourable mission as representatives of the international

16 community bound by the orders and decisions of the United Nations. He

17 regarded them as such and not as foreign soldiers in an alien territory.

18 They were there to introduce peace and not as occupying forces.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Although his last words were that he would --

20 let me check that carefully. He said: "... and hand you over to your

21 United Nations command, that is to say, representatives of your

22 governments." I'm trying to understand what that addition means,

23 apparently not handing them over to the United Nations command but to

24 representatives of their government. And that also in relation to

25 your -- that part of your answer, that he viewed them primarily as

Page 14779

1 members of the armies of their respective countries.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When he said representatives of

3 governments, I believe that Mr. Stanisic primarily had in mind

4 representatives of embassies of certain countries who were there as well.

5 That's how I understood the additional part where he mentions

6 representatives of governments.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Jordash. I'm also looking at

8 the clock. I do not know.

9 MR. JORDASH: I've probably got about 10 to 15 minutes left.

10 That's all.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see that. I'm also looking at Mr. Stanisic.

12 He might prefer a break at this moment or would Mr. Stanisic prefer the

13 10 or 15 remaining minutes and then have a break and then have another 45

14 minutes for the last?

15 MR. JORDASH: I think a break.

16 JUDGE ORIE: A break would be preferable. Then we first take a

17 break, we resume at 6.00 and we expect you to finish by 6.15.

18 --- Recess taken at 5.31 p.m.

19 --- On resuming at 6.02 p.m.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, please proceed.

21 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.

22 Q. Let's just finish in the next 10 to 15 minutes, Mr. Dragicevic,

23 and then I'll sit down for others to question you.

24 The document on the screen you deal with at paragraph 43 of your

25 statement and you say there that you visited Pale for the last time in

Page 14780

1 early July of 1995 and handed over this message; is that correct?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. Were you present when President Chirac and Chirkin [phoen]

4 provided that message?

5 A. No, I wasn't.

6 Q. Did you discuss the message then with Mr. Stanisic? Where did

7 you come by the information that this had come from -- directly from

8 those two?

9 A. I learned it from Mr. Stanisic on our way to Pale.

10 Q. Were you there when it was read out by Karadzic's spokesman,

11 Samotica [phoen]?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. As far as you are aware, did the Contact Group plan and the

14 negotiations resume following the resolution of the hostage crisis?

15 A. Well, that's precisely what the message is about, i.e., that the

16 resumption of peace negotiations with the Contact Group would be agreed

17 to as the starting position with an addition to the effect that the VRS

18 should open up all the roads for unhindered passage of humanitarian

19 convoys.

20 Q. Did that happen?

21 A. I believe so.

22 Q. Now, just returning to the subject of Mr. Stanisic's speech and

23 view concerning whether the hostages were UN personnel or representatives

24 of their respective countries, are you able to testify as to whether

25 Mr. Stanisic received any award from the United Nations themselves?

Page 14781

1 A. I'm truly not aware of it.

2 Q. Okay. But you are aware that he received awards from, as we see

3 from your statement, the French; is that correct?

4 A. Yes. He received a medal from the head of the French

5 intelligence service, Mr. Dewatre.

6 Q. Were you there at that point in time when he received the medal?

7 A. Yes, I was on an official visit to Paris and the French

8 intelligence service together with Mr. Stanisic.

9 Q. And the purpose of that visit?

10 A. Well, I think the visit came about primarily thanks to the role

11 Mr. Stanisic played in having the UN personnel hostages released because

12 most of the UN personnel were French. At the same time, specific

13 conditions were put in place for co-operation between the DGSE, the

14 French intelligence service, and DST, the French counter-intelligence

15 service, since both these services had common priorities. When I say

16 "common priorities" I mean first of all fight against radical Islam and

17 terrorism in general.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Could all unnecessary microphones please be

19 switched off. Thank you.

20 MR. JORDASH: Let me just ask you about paragraph 56 of your

21 statement, D466, please.

22 Q. While that's coming up on the screen, you make the comment there

23 that the SDB of Serbia had better relations with the US, French, and

24 Chinese services than with the services of the RSK and the RS. Which

25 period are you referring to when you make that comment?

Page 14782

1 A. I meant the period shortly before the hostage crisis.

2 Q. Thank you. Then moving on to paragraph 65, and whilst that's

3 coming up, could you just explain why you came to the conclusion or what

4 was your source of information concerning the fact that the SDB of Serbia

5 had better relations with the foreign services than those in Croatia and

6 Bosnia?

7 A. For the simple reason that most of the contacts were maintained

8 with these services rather than those from Croatia or Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina.

10 Q. Now, at paragraph 65 you mention briefly there the SDB of Serbia

11 helping to establish a check-point in the Republika Srpska. When was

12 that and what was the check-point? Perhaps I should say what was the

13 check-point? What assistance was given and what was the nature of the

14 check-point?

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Apologies.

25 MR. JORDASH:

Page 14783

1 Q. Continue, Mr. Witness, with your account, but with using numbers,

2 please.

3 A. Should I repeat what I said? In 1996, Number 11 paid a visit and

4 the main subject of discussion was the protection of international

5 forces, the IFOR, in Bosnia, as well as an active participation in the

6 overall protection of these forces in 1996 and 1997. In order for this

7 to come to fruition, the SDB of Serbia helped establish a specific

8 check-point of that agency in Republika Srpska, or a specific point from

9 where they would be able to more effectively cover the area in

10 co-operation with our service.

11 Q. Was anybody on the -- sorry, let me start that again.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, I think the witness mainly repeated

13 what is already in the statement and therefore what you specifically

14 asked, what assistance was given, that's already in the statement, unless

15 you had something else on your mind, the witness repeated that, and then

16 what was the nature of the check-point.

17 Could you tell us what the nature of the check-point was and also

18 answer the first question, when it was in 1996 that 11 visited Belgrade?

19 Perhaps first the last question. A month?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't recall the month. I know

21 it was in 1996.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Any season? Spring, summer? If you don't

23 remember --

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think it was summer already.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Summer 1996. And then what was the check-point

Page 14784

1 exactly?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't tell you anything specific

3 about the point because I visited the location only once. I didn't go

4 there again because the nature of my work did not take me there. I

5 didn't have anything to do with it.

6 JUDGE ORIE: What exactly was checked at that point?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Again, I can't answer the question

8 because I simply didn't know.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Next question, please, Mr. Jordash.

10 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.

11 Q. Did this have anything to do with Number 10?

12 A. Yes, number 10 was present there as well.

13 Q. Do you know in which capacity he was there?

14 A. I think he was the official leader of that group for Bosnia.

15 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you about two other things, very quick

16 things.

17 MR. JORDASH: First of all, could we have on the screen 1D05247,

18 and it's a document which records a visit to the USA intelligence

19 community, Belgrade, 7th of March, 1996.

20 Q. Do you recall this visit?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 MR. JORDASH: Could we have page 17 -- 16, I beg your pardon, of

23 the English. Not sure of the B/C/S. Let's go to the English.

24 Q. The bit I'm interested in is the assessment of the -- of the

25 visit, taking into consideration all elements of the visit of the RDB

Page 14789

1 the -- I'm just trying to find that's where we find Mr. Stanisic's

2 initials?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you are absolutely right. You

4 can see my names and then the initials, yes, you are right.

5 JUDGE ORIE: The initials of Mr. Stanisic?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I give now an opportunity to the

8 Simatovic Defence, Mr. Petrovic, to cross-examine you.

9 Mr. Petrovic, are you ready.

10 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I am, Your Honours. Thank

11 you.

12 Cross-examination by Mr. Petrovic:

13 Q. Thank you, Your Honours. Good evening Mr. Dragicevic.

14 A. Good evening.

15 Q. I have a few questions only for you on behalf of

16 Mr. Stanisic's [as interpreted] Defence. First of all, let us clarify

17 one thing that you talked about a while ago with my colleague Jordash --

18 JUDGE ORIE: I do not know whether it was only a mistake in the

19 translation or the transcription, but I take it that you are asking

20 questions on behalf of Mr. Simatovic, his Defence.

21 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, yes, of course. I

22 think I said as much and it must have been a mistake in the transcript.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

24 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 Q. Mr. Dragicevic, a while ago when you spoke with Mr. Jordash about

Page 14790

1 the year 1996 and the establishing of a point in Republika Srpska, in the

2 translation that we have, we have the term "check-point" appearing.

3 Would you agree with me that this was actually an intelligence point that

4 was set up by this American agency in Republika Srpska rather than a

5 check-point of sorts in a specific location?

6 A. Well, the word "check" in itself implies something being checked.

7 Therefore, I would agree with the first part of your question that it was

8 an intelligence point.

9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Dragicevic. Hopefully this is clear now.

10 Mr. Dragicevic, judging by your statement it seems that you were

11 for a period of time the special advisor to the chief of the department;

12 is that correct?

13 A. Yes, it is.

14 Q. Is it correct that according to the job classification in the

15 state security department, there were six positions of special advisors

16 to the chief of the department?

17 A. I really cannot confirm that. I cannot remember.

18 Q. Can you confirm that there were more than one special advisor?

19 A. Yes, yes, there were several of them.

20 Q. It is true that each of those special advisors had his own domain

21 from the scope of responsibility of the department?

22 A. Yes, each of them had their specific duties and responsibilities.

23 Q. Is it correct that a special advisor was not permitted to become

24 directly involved of the work of the chiefs of administration in the

25 state security department?

Page 14791

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Mr. Witness, can you tell us if you know when and how the

3 9th Administration was formed of which you became a head at a certain

4 point in time?

5 A. The 9th Administration was set up as an administration for

6 international co-operation. I was at its head and initially I was the

7 only member of the staff of that administration.

8 Q. Can you tell us when the administration was set up and how on the

9 basis of which document, if you know, of course?

10 A. I don't know on the basis of which document, but I know that it

11 happened in 1992.

12 Q. If you don't know on the basis of which document it was set up,

13 do you know then who was it whether it be an individual or an organ who

14 adopted such a document to serve as the basis?

15 A. Well, the chief of the department is directly responsible for

16 such issues. It is his decision which is then forwarded to competent

17 organs who issue proper decisions.

18 Q. Mr. Witness, for a long time you worked at the service and your

19 appointment to the position of the head of the department from the

20 position of a special advisor, can we qualify it as promotion or is it

21 stagnation or what kind of a career move was that?

22 A. Well, I never considered that to be degradation.

23 Q. Can we then understand it to be a promotion?

24 A. Well, I was a special advisor and head of the administration at

25 the same time.

Page 14792

1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Dragicevic. Let us first go back to something

2 that you mentioned today when you answered the questions by my learned

3 friend, Mr. Jordash. You spoke about the exchange of information with

4 various services, notably that of the US, Russia and others. I'm

5 interested in hearing whether that was the exchange of intelligence

6 information that your department had acquired?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So are we talking about the information and data that were mainly

9 obtained by the 2nd Administration of the department?

10 A. Yes, for the most part it was.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Witness. Mr. Dragicevic, in your statement, which

12 is D466, in paragraph 80 when you spoke about Mr. Simatovic you mentioned

13 that Simatovic was the head of a section that was dealing with foreign

14 countries. Do you perhaps know whether this refers to a section in the

15 Belgrade AOS centre that was dealing with the American intelligence

16 service? In other words, are you aware of that fact?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. If you know, can you please tell us what kind of section are we

19 talking about? What is this AOS section doing?

20 A. That is a section that is dealing with the American service.

21 Q. Can you tell us specifically in what sense, with the American

22 service agents or those who were working on the ground? Can you give us

23 a description of what they operated on?

24 A. They were mainly involved in counter-intelligence work covering

25 possible activities of the American service in the territory of the

Page 14793

1 Republic of Serbia.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the speakers please

3 pause between questions and answer.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dragicevic, could you also please make a small

5 pause between question and answer, otherwise the interpreters have

6 difficulties in following.

7 Please proceed.

8 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

9 Q. Was AOS dealing with American citizens who were, for whatever

10 reason, of interest for the service without knowing whether they were,

11 indeed, members of the American security service or not?

12 A. Well, I don't know any specifics but it is quite natural that in

13 the course of counter-intelligence activities you have to focus on other

14 people as well, not only members of the intelligence agencies.

15 Q. Mr. Witness, just a few more questions. Do you know that

16 Mr. Stanisic -- sorry, Mr. Simatovic, in May 1993 was appointed special

17 advisor to the chief of the department? Were you aware of that fact?

18 A. Believe me, I really cannot confirm that. I don't know.

19 Q. Mr. Dragicevic, do you know that Mr. Simatovic had never been

20 appointed chief of the 2nd Administration in the department?

21 A. No, I'm not aware of that.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrovic, you use the acronym AOS and at least I

23 do not find it in paragraph 80. Could you briefly tell me what you refer

24 to?

25 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I can, Your Honour. In

Page 14794

1 paragraph 80 the witness states that Simatovic was the chief of a

2 department and he dealt with western countries. I put to the witness

3 that this was AOS, that the title of the department Mr. Simatovic worked

4 for was AOS. This is not contained in the statement, rather there is

5 just a vague sentence that I wanted to clarify with the witness. And AOS

6 is short for American intelligence service, in Serbian, of course.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The last line would have answered my question,

8 Mr. Petrovic. I just wanted to know what it was, AOS. Thank you.

9 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. Mr. Dragicevic, one more question. A moment ago you said that

11 when the 9th Administration was formed, you were there as the only staff

12 member. How long did it take for the administration to be structured in

13 terms of personnel and work?

14 A. I was there on my own for about a year. After that I tried to

15 find individuals who would be suited to do the job. The main obstacle

16 lay in the lack of knowledge of foreign languages because using

17 interpreters in day-to-day communications proved risky at times.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please focus on the question. How long

19 did it take for that administration to be operational as far as personnel

20 and work is concerned?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me repeat that I was there on

22 my own for a year and it took me another two years.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

24 Please proceed.

25 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 14795

1 Q. Mr. Dragicevic, were precisely these personnel issues the reason

2 why for awhile you were both a special advisor and head of the

3 9th Administration? In other words, you seem to be wearing two hats

4 whereas in fact you only performed one of these two roles; right?

5 A. Yes.

6 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Dragicevic. I

7 have no further questions.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Petrovic.

9 Mr. Farr, is it you who will cross-examine the witness?

10 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dragicevic, you'll now be cross-examined by

12 Mr. Farr. Mr. Farr is counsel for the Prosecution.

13 Please proceed.

14 Cross-examination by Mr. Farr:

15 Q. Good evening, Mr. Dragicevic. Can you hear me clearly?

16 A. Good evening. Yes, I can.

17 Q. To start with, can you please tell us when you first became aware

18 of the existence of a DB special unit?

19 A. I learned of the existence of a DB special unit in 1995 when

20 preparations were underway for such a unit to be set up.

21 Q. Can you tell us specifically when in 1995 and how you became

22 aware that a unit was being set up?

23 A. I think it was in late 1995. I learned about it from my

24 colleagues who were there with me. I don't know how else to describe it

25 to you. I wasn't able to find out anything in specific -- anything

Page 14796

1 specific since I wasn't involved in these duties.

2 Q. In paragraph 76 of your statement you indicated that you never

3 discussed the JSO or any other unit with Mr. Stanisic. Did you ever

4 discuss the JSO or any other DB unit with Mr. Simatovic?

5 A. Neither with Mr. Simatovic, nor with Mr. Stanisic. Let me

6 repeat, our duties and tasks were strictly defined.

7 Q. Did you ever have any information that led you to believe that

8 Mr. Simatovic was a member of the DB special unit?

9 A. No.

10 Q. As far as you know, did the DB special unit exist at the time of

11 the hostage crisis in May and June of 1995?

12 A. To the best of my knowledge, the special unit was set up in 1996.

13 Everything that happened before that period were preparations to

14 establish the unit.

15 Q. What was the name of the unit at the time you learned about it?

16 A. It was not a proper unit as yet. There were preparations to set

17 up a unit that was to be called a unit for special operations.

18 Q. So you were only ever aware of the unit under the name unit for

19 special operations or JSO; is that correct?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. And who do you know to have been the commander of that unit?

22 A. The commander of the JSO unit was Mr. Milorad Lukovic.

23 Q. Okay. I would like to turn to your work history now.

24 In paragraph 2 of your statement you say in 1990 you became the

25 head of administration for international co-operation of the federal

Page 14797

1 service. And you go on to say that according to the rules then in force,

2 only the federal service was entitled to maintain contacts with foreign

3 services and that republic services could not do that. Is it correct

4 that this changed with respect to Serbia from a legal standpoint in

5 approximately November 1992 with the issuance of rules amending the rules

6 on the internal organisation of the State Security Service and from that

7 time on the Serbian DB could maintain, legally, contacts with foreign

8 services?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. At paragraph 3 of your statement you describe your trip to the

11 London Conference with Kertes and you indicate that you were fired from

12 the federal service by Minister Bulatovic upon your return. Is it

13 correct that the London Conference occurred in August of 1992?

14 A. I can't state with any certainty which month it was in 1992, but

15 I was there with Mr. Kertes.

16 Q. You say in the same paragraph, and you told us earlier that the

17 reason you were fired is that you -- well, the reason given for your

18 dismissal was that you hadn't sought permission from the minister. Is

19 that the only reason that you were dismissed?

20 A. I didn't try to investigate if that was the only reason or not.

21 I was officially informed that I was supposed to seek permission from the

22 federal minister for my trip to London with Mr. Kertes.

23 Q. Were there any public allegations against you of misconduct while

24 you were attending the London Conference that you were aware of?

25 A. Yes.

Page 14798

1 Q. What were the allegations?

2 A. The allegations were published by the media to the effect that as

3 a professional I accompanied Mr. Kertes to London --

4 JUDGE ORIE: It seems that you want to intervene or object.

5 MR. JORDASH: No, no, neither, I do apologise. May Mr. Stanisic

6 be excused for two minutes. Sorry.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course, we have only 10 minutes left --

8 MR. JORDASH: I think, yes, please.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Please.

10 Please continue your answer, witness.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The media stated that I accompanied

12 Mr. Kertes to London as a professional who had the task of placing

13 wire-taps or bugs, listening devices into the conference room, the room

14 where the conference was held.

15 MR. FARR:

16 Q. As far as you know, did those allegations have any role in your

17 dismissal?

18 A. They may have been used to that end but they could not have had

19 anything to do with it. What was at play was a total anarchy or

20 dissolution within the federal service.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you the following, Mr. Dragicevic:

22 Earlier you were asked whether not having the permission to go to London

23 was the only reason, you say "I didn't try to investigate it." You also

24 testified that there was no -- it was not required to seek the

25 permission, you were not aware of any rule.

Page 14799

1 Now, if I'm fired on having done something which is not against

2 the rules, I would immediately ask myself is that the real reason. Now,

3 apparently you are telling us now about allegations, et cetera,

4 et cetera, I would have expected you to include that in the first answer

5 whether there were any other than the formal reasons, you told us this

6 was the formal reason, apparently that you thought that there may have

7 been other matters, I would have expected you answering the question in

8 accordance with the whole truth, to immediately raise that issue and say

9 it was published or in the media it was said that, and apparently you

10 have thought about that as a possible reason for being fired.

11 You may proceed, Mr. Farr.

12 MR. FARR:

13 Q. Sir, what's your response to those allegations that you've just

14 described?

15 A. I was not given any sort of opportunity to respond to these

16 allegations or to appeal the decision that the federal service issued me

17 with.

18 Q. What I am asking is what is your response today? Do you say that

19 these allegations were true, do you say they were false?

20 A. The allegations were completely untrue. I'm a person who studied

21 the English language and literature as well as law and I have no

22 propensity for anything electronic or any interest in it, so these

23 allegations were quite ridiculous. And if I may add, to manage to place

24 listening devices in a conference room which, as we all know full well,

25 is always screened for anything of the sort prior to the opening of the

Page 14800

1 conference, is quite strange.

2 Q. Moving on to your new job at the Serbian DB, in paragraph 4 of

3 your witness statement you indicated that you knew Mr. Stanisic "from

4 before." How did you know Mr. Stanisic from before?

5 A. Mr. Stanisic became employed in the State Security Service of the

6 Republic of Serbia a year after my employment there started and we knew

7 each other even from before that period.

8 THE INTERPRETER: We know each other from that period,

9 interpreter's correction.

10 MR. FARR:

11 Q. And when was that period exactly?

12 A. That was 1975 when I started working in the State Security

13 Service of the Republic of Serbia. After a certain period, I took up

14 studying law at the university in Belgrade. I was studying part-time and

15 the service banned me from continuing my studies there. I was very

16 unhappy with IT and I left the service in 1979.

17 Q. Did you know Mr. Stanisic on a continuous basis from 1975 until

18 the time he gave you the job in 1991 or 1992?

19 A. When I left the service in 1979 I became the manager of the

20 publishing house called the Yugoslav Review and then I would see

21 Mr. Stanisic after that on occasion.

22 Q. Is it fair to say that you remained friends during that period?

23 A. In my view a person can be considered lucky and happy if he or

24 she has one or two friends and Mr. Stanisic was to me a colleague with

25 whom I used to work.

Page 14801

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, I am looking at the clock, we are two

2 minutes away from adjournment. Would this be a suitable moment?

3 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour, that's fine.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

5 Then I have one matter to be put on the record before we adjourn,

6 which is the following: That 65 ter document 6291 tendered by the

7 Prosecution on the 20th of October, 2011, and admitted provisionally

8 under seal was by mistake assigned number P3039, a number which was

9 already assigned on that same day to document 65 ter 6301. Therefore,

10 now 65 ter 6291 has been assigned in e-court number P3042. This is

11 hereby on the record.

12 Mr. Jordash, the list of names with the numbers is uploaded in

13 e-court I do understand. Could we perhaps tomorrow in the event that you

14 tendered documents and I think there are a lot which may not have been

15 tendered, I'm not quite certain, I rather not do it now, it being 7.00

16 and caring about my reputation with the interpreters, transcribers,

17 et cetera, but first thing tomorrow morning if you prepare it well, it

18 will not take much time.

19 Then, Mr. Dragicevic, I would like to instruct you that you

20 should not speak with anyone or communicate in any other way with anyone

21 about your testimony, whether that's testimony you've given today or

22 whether that's testimony still to be given tomorrow. And when I say

23 tomorrow, Mr. Farr, could you give us an estimate on how much time you

24 really would need?

25 MR. FARR: Your Honour, my initial estimate is 4 hours. Of

Page 14802

1 course I'm conscious that the Chamber always pays careful attention to

2 the way in which things proceed, but ...

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if you could shorten that, of course, without

4 loss of quality, that of course would be appreciated.

5 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at

7 9.00 because we adjourn until Wednesday, the 9th of November at 9.00 in

8 the morning in this same Courtroom II.

9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.

10 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 9th day of

11 November, 2011 at 9.00 a.m.