1 Monday, 29 March 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. Mr. Petrovic, or is it Mr. Rodic has

6 something to raise? Yes.

7 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. I wished,

8 before the evidence continues, to address you with regard to a particular

9 problem.

10 On Friday, when we finished our work, at the very end, at my

11 intervention, you notified the witness that he was not supposed to

12 communicate with anyone until his evidence continued and was brought to an

13 end ultimately. However, the lawyers, Mr. and Mrs. Nikolic, on Friday

14 visited Admiral Jokic. That is one matter I wish to raise.

15 Secondly, during the last three days of the examination-in-chief,

16 although it was said that the presence of the lawyers in the courtroom was

17 only a matter of courtesy, during every break during our working hours,

18 there was communication, brief communication in all fairness, but

19 nevertheless communication between the witness and his lawyers. That is

20 to say, during every break. Also, there was communication during these

21 breaks between the lawyers and our learned friends of the Prosecution.

22 I believe that in this way the evidence is being compromised, the

23 testimony given by Witness Jokic. That was the objection I wished to

24 raise, Your Honours.

25 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Rodic.

1 Ms. Somers.

2 MS. SOMERS: First of all, Your Honour, we take issue with

3 communication about the case. Exchange of pleasantries, I think, is never

4 banned. And my understanding of the admonition that is given to witnesses

5 with regard to communication, the sequestration, the order to sequester,

6 is that they are never to discuss the case with anybody.

7 JUDGE PARKER: They are precisely the words I used on Friday.

8 MS. SOMERS: That is my understanding in virtually every Chamber

9 of the Tribunal. And so, I'm sorry, but I believe this is unfounded. And

10 I -- it would help if the Chamber understands that in all manner and

11 means his -- your admonition of course is respected. At least insofar as

12 my understanding of what the admonition is.

13 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for bringing the matter to our attention,

14 Mr. Rodic. The position of the accused is that he may not discuss his

15 evidence in this case with anyone else. He may speak to you. He may

16 speak to his own lawyer. He may speak to court officers. He may speak to

17 the Prosecutors on other matters. I'm sure as his counsel is present in

18 the Chamber he will have heard what has been said. He will understand

19 that the evidence being given by his client is not to be discussed while

20 his client is in the course of his evidence. And perhaps I could mention

21 that frequent and unnecessary contact between them will only excite the

22 sort of concern that you have expressed. But at the moment, I think the

23 Chamber can proceed on the basis indicated by Ms. Somers, that there may

24 have been social chat or just personal reassurance or other matters that

25 may have been discussed. We will accept the position that the direction

1 given by the Chamber has been observed. Thank you.

2 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I address you just

3 briefly. I understand what you're saying, if these are brief contacts

4 during the workday, during the breaks, for a few minutes, to walk up to

5 the witness, et cetera. However, on Friday, it was a two-hour visit. So

6 I do have justified doubts as to the purpose of that visit. I cannot

7 believe that it was only the family or the weather that were discussed

8 over two hours. And especially in this situation, when such important

9 evidence is being given. That is one problem.

10 And the other one, I wish to say is the following: We're working

11 in a very small courtroom, but we have Admiral Jokic's lawyer sitting very

12 close to us. So it is very hard for us, the Defence counsel, to discuss

13 things amongst ourselves, and also to discuss things with the accused

14 since the witness's lawyer is sitting so close to us. So could that

15 please be redressed as well. Thank you.

16 JUDGE PARKER: It's quite possible, given the recent events that

17 have affected the affairs of the witness, that there may have been reason

18 for a lengthy interview with his lawyers about other matters. So we'll

19 leave that where it is for the moment. We can't change anything that is

20 past. But I think we have made it very clear that there should not be

21 discussion of the evidence as the case continues.

22 I have just looked around the courtroom. I don't see where else

23 it is possible to sit. I'm afraid you will just have to be discreet in

24 your conversations between each other. I'm sorry about that, but we have

25 no control over the fact that this week we must be in this very small

1 courtroom. In the other courtrooms, alternative arrangements are

2 possible. But as you can see, it's pretty much a full house. Almost

3 every seat in the house is taken as it is.

4 Now, Ms. Somers, are you ready for the witness?

5 MS. SOMERS: Yes. We are, Your Honour. Thank you very much.

6 JUDGE PARKER: We will have Admiral Jokic in, please. Could we

7 have the witness in, please.

8 [The witness entered court]

9 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning, Admiral. May I remind you of the

10 affirmation you took at the commencement of your evidence, which still

11 applies.

12 Ms. Somers.

13 MS. SOMERS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

14 WITNESS: MIODRAG JOKIC [Resumed]

15 [Witness answered through interpreter]

16 Examined by Ms. Somers: [Continued]

17 Q. Good morning, Admiral Jokic. I would ask all parties, all persons

18 to please turn their attention to a document which has been

19 supplementarily placed before all of you. It is -- I don't believe it is

20 assigned a number. But it is the agreement for cease-fire of 7 December

21 1991. And it should be on your Sanction screens, and I believe it has

22 been distributed as well, if it will assist. If you just take a very

23 brief look at it, and then I will move on very quickly.

24 Admiral Jokic, do you see before you a document which at the end

25 of it bears your name and has a date of 7 December 1991, 1530 hours at

1 Cavtat.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And is this document also the agreement that is signed by

4 Ministers Davorin Rudolf, Ivan Cifric, and Petar Kriste of the Croatian

5 side?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Is this a cease-fire agreement, Admiral, that was negotiated on

8 the 5th of December and was to have been brought into full implementation

9 on the 6th of December following a morning meeting with the parties who

10 have signed?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And Admiral, just by way of asking you which particular provision

13 may have been the one that required a little looking after. If you could

14 take a look at Article 3, please if it's on your copy, Article 3 which is

15 in English on the second page. Do you see it, Admiral? Is it there?

16 A. No, I haven't got it here on the monitor. No.

17 Q. It isn't on the monitor, okay. Perhaps a hard copy might be

18 helpful, if that's...

19 Okay. Do you see it now, Admiral Jokic?

20 A. Yes, yes.

21 Q. Is Article 3 the control of traffic? Is this the particular --

22 A. This is in English.

23 Q. Do you have the Serbo-Croatian version? Okay, thank you very

24 much.

25 A. Yes, now I do, yes.

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1 Q. If you can just comment, is Article 3 the provision that needed

2 some additional consideration as of the 5th, but otherwise it was the only

3 article that -- I'm sorry. It was otherwise a cease-fire that you

4 understood to be implemented right away?

5 A. Precisely because of this Article 3, on the 5th of December, the

6 agreement was not initialled because we could not agree where the ships

7 would be checked, at sea or in Gruz harbour. And then it all became

8 clear.

9 Q. And other than this provision everything else was understood to be

10 effectively a done deal as of the 5th?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 MS. SOMERS: I would ask to move this document in evidence,

14 please.

15 JUDGE PARKER: Two things --

16 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

17 JUDGE PARKER: May I first have a correction made in the

18 transcript of my remarks earlier on page 2, line 10. I think I may have

19 said, "The accused." I meant, "The witness." If that could be corrected.

20 Now, Mr. Rodic, you have a submission?

21 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I just wanted to mention

22 something. This agreement, among the other documents contained in the

23 binder, it was included when Witness Hvalkov Pero testified. Will it

24 remain within that single number it was assigned then? Are we going to

25 give it another number? How are we going to deal with it?

1 JUDGE PARKER: Very good question, Mr. Rodic. Ms. Somers, are you

2 wanting to tender it twice?

3 MS. SOMERS: No, Your Honours. We had checked yesterday, and it

4 didn't come back as having been tendered. So if we're in error, if it is

5 tendered -- okay. In which case, my apologies. It just didn't show up in

6 our search. So I simply would ask, no need to have it retendered. It's

7 not necessary.

8 JUDGE PARKER: Can we be reminded of the exhibit number.

9 MS. SOMERS: It appears P61. Thank you very much to counsel for

10 bringing that to our attention. We weren't able to confirm it. Thank

11 you.

12 Q. Admiral Jokic, I wanted to move along at a rapid rate. I want to

13 just remind you where we left off on Friday. My last question to you

14 before we broke was -- my last two, so you have a context. "Speaking

15 about the morning of the 6th, are we speaking about the same date. Did

16 you on the morning of the 6th when this attack on the Old Town took place,

17 did you issue after you learned about the attack an order not to attack

18 the Old Town?" Your answer was: "Absolutely, yes." My next question

19 was: "Did General Strugar issue that morning an order not to attack the

20 Old Town?" Your answer was: "I don't know. I mean in his order, in his

21 written order and the decision to order operations, that's the name of the

22 document, that was written on the evening of the 5th or the 6th, and it

23 was valid for the 6th. His organs wrote that what is prohibited is the

24 opening of fire starting from 1200 hours on the 6th of December. That is

25 what it says quite literally in that order. As for the other orders of

1 his, I mean, I don't know."

2 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down.

3 MS. SOMERS:

4 Q. Did General Strugar ask as to -- when it became known that there

5 was, in fact, an attack on the Old Town, did he ask what was going on, or

6 did he not indicate or did he indicate that whatever was going on as to

7 Old Town needed to be stopped? Do you know?

8 A. No. This is what I know: General Strugar called me and told me

9 that General Kadijevic had called him, and he said that he was very angry,

10 furious because Dubrovnik was being attacked. This came as a major

11 surprise to me. I was practically in shock. How was this possible? How

12 did he know? Who informed him, et cetera? What did he mean, Dubrovnik.

13 I just know that at 6.00 my --

14 Q. Admiral, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but my question to you, if

15 you can just give it a brief answer since we are really under time

16 constraints, is did General Strugar ask what was going on, or did he in

17 some way say to you or to any subordinate that you know of that whatever

18 was happening to the Old Town that morning needed to be stopped? That is

19 my question to you.

20 A. No.

21 Q. You stated that Captain Kozaric informed you that Captain

22 Kovacevic requested artillery fire, or support. What artillery in terms

23 of calibre did he request from Captain Kozaric? And what formation did

24 that artillery belong to?

25 A. He asked for support from my artillery for support, 130-millimetre

1 guns and 105-millimetre howitzers. I beg your pardon, I stand corrected.

2 130 millimetres and 85 millimetres. Those that belonged to my command.

3 Q. Did you allow them to be given to Captain Kovacevic?

4 A. No. I gave strict orders that not a single shell should be fired.

5 Q. And when you say, "My artillery," are you referring to sector

6 artillery?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And where was it located?

9 A. It was located in the area of the Cilipi airport runway.

10 Q. You have stated that you instructed Captain Kozaric to find the

11 captain of the battleship, Zec, and Colonel Kovacevic. At any stage

12 during this time did you succeed in contacting Captain Zec? If so, how?

13 A. No, I did not contact any one of them. I ordered him to find them

14 and to send them both to Zarkovica. Actually, the Zec should call me

15 first, and Kovacevic, he should send him immediately to Zarkovica in order

16 to stop the attack.

17 Q. And where was Zec at the time when you made the request to find

18 him? Do you know?

19 A. He was in his apartment. That is what I was told. His apartment

20 in Herceg Novi.

21 Q. Did Captain Zec call you?

22 A. Yes. I think he called me from Kupari, from Kozaric, because we

23 could not get any contact with Zarkovica.

24 Q. What did you tell him to do?

25 A. I ordered him to go to the observation post immediately, to the

1 commander of the 3rd Battalion, to stop the attack immediately and to

2 return the unit to its initial position.

3 Q. And where was that observation post?

4 A. Well, that was at the Zarkovica feature. That was the observation

5 post of the commander of the 3rd Battalion, Captain Kovacevic.

6 Q. Did you succeed in contacting Colonel Kovacevic? If so, how,

7 where?

8 A. I met Colonel Kovacevic when I went to Cavtat in the meantime, in

9 order to talk to the Crisis Staff of Dubrovnik. I met him in his vehicle

10 on the way. I stopped him, and I ordered him, too, to go to Zarkovica to

11 see Captain Kovacevic and to stop the attack. If he could not do so, he

12 should replace Captain Kovacevic. He should remove him from his duty. He

13 should remove him from his command position, that is.

14 Q. When you say, "Him," to whom are you referring? You say, "Remove

15 him." Whom do you mean?

16 A. I meant Colonel Kovacevic because he was my assistant commander

17 for land forces. And he was in this area [as interpreted] all the time,

18 and his task was to control the work of Captain Kovacevic.

19 Q. Right. When you say he should remove him, remove who?

20 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we just have to

21 clarify the transcript. I'm sorry for interrupting. The witness said

22 that Colonel Kovacevic was all the time in that battalion. And in the

23 transcript, it says, "In that area." So the difference is significant.

24 What I'm referring to is on page 10, line 8.

25 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

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1 MS. SOMERS: May I just reask the question. I think it might be

2 helpful.

3 Q. Sorry, Admiral, for any confusion, but let's start again.

4 My question to you after you said -- I said did you succeed in

5 contacting Colonel Kovacevic? If so how, where? Answer, I met Colonel

6 Kovacevic when I went to Cavtat. I met him in his vehicle on the way, I

7 stopped him, and I ordered him if he could not -- I'm sorry, ordered him,

8 too, to go to Zarkovica to see Captain Kovacevic and to stop the attack.

9 If he could not do so, he should replace Captain Kovacevic. He should

10 remove him from his duty. He shall remove him from his command position,

11 that is. Then my question do you is when you say, "Him," "Remove him," to

12 whom are you referring? And I'll go to the next point that Mr. Petrovic

13 asks about. "Remove him," who is the him?

14 A. I thought that Colonel Kovacevic should replace the commander of

15 the 3rd Battalion, Captain Kovacevic.

16 Q. Thank you for clarifying that. Now, the next point is -- let's

17 see, sorry. Okay. You -- you originally answered: "I meant Colonel

18 Kovacevic because he was my assistant commander for land forces, and he

19 was in this area all the time and his task was to control the work of

20 Captain Kovacevic." Would you please indicate what Colonel Kovacevic's

21 assignment was? Did you mean "area"? I think you heard Mr. Petrovic's

22 question. Perhaps you could clarify what you meant by where Colonel

23 Kovacevic was all the time.

24 A. No, I did not mention "area" at all. I just said that Colonel

25 Kovacevic, as my assistant for the land forces, was in charge of that

1 unit, the 3rd Battalion, of the Trebinje Brigade. And also for Captain

2 Kovacevic, he was supposed to monitor his work and to assist him in his

3 command. And that is what he did all the time.

4 Q. Thank you for clarifying, Admiral.

5 What other steps did you take to stop the attack? Did you send

6 any other officers up to the area? Besides Captain Zec and Colonel

7 Kovacevic?

8 A. In the meantime, I made contact on the telephone, before I left

9 Kumbor. I spoke to Gojko Djurasic, Major Gojko Djurasic, who was

10 commander of Mokosica. He asked me to deal with something. And in that

11 telephone conversation, I told him to go to Zarkovica urgently and help to

12 stop this attack. He was a very good officer. Also, I spoke to Captain

13 Kozaric on the phone, and I told him, since he didn't have any connection

14 with Zarkovica, I told him to call the command post in Brgat and to order

15 the deputy commander of the battalion, Captain Soldo to go to the

16 observation point in Zarkovica and to convey a message to the battalion

17 commander to stop the attack.

18 Q. If you are able to give approximate times, when did you dispatch

19 Captain Zec to Zarkovica?

20 A. I don't know exactly. It could have been between 8.00 and 9.00,

21 around half past 8.00. As soon as I got in touch with him.

22 Q. When did you dispatch, if you recall, approximate time is okay,

23 Colonel Kovacevic?

24 A. Sometime later. First Zec reported to me while I was still in

25 Kumbor. And for the lieutenant colonel, I met him on the road to Cavtat.

1 That was a bit later.

2 Q. And what about Colonel Djurasic?

3 A. I can't be sure of that. Most probably later, maybe even after

4 10.00.

5 Q. Did you confirm that all the officers you just spoke of actually

6 got to Zarkovica?

7 A. Yes. I received reports from Kozaric, because I did not have

8 communication with Zarkovica. He was the one who confirmed to me that

9 both of them had gone there.

10 Q. Admiral, the three officers whom you sent up there were part of

11 the 9th VPS. Is that correct?

12 A. Yes, that is correct.

13 Q. Can you tell us or do you know if the second operational group

14 command sent any officer to stop the attack?

15 A. I don't have such information. I only know that General Grubac

16 who did not belong to the 2nd Operations Group or the 9th sector at the

17 time was in Kupari. And immediately after that, he went to Zarkovica.

18 Q. Who is Grubac?

19 A. General Grubac was sent from the General Staff to monitor combat

20 operations and to report on that with a view of writing an expert report

21 or something like that.

22 Q. Did the officers on Zarkovica have any success in stopping Captain

23 Kovacevic immediately?

24 A. No, they didn't manage to stop him. It took quite a while.

25 Q. Were you given any explanation as to why not, why they were not

1 effecting your order?

2 A. Around 10.00 or half past 10.00, when I had already spoken with

3 Dubrovnik twice, I heard a very short report from my deputy Zec. He told

4 me that it was very difficult for him to withdraw his units because of the

5 losses that Kovacevic had suffered and that -- for that reason it was very

6 difficult for him to withdraw because Kovacevic's units had come under

7 fire from the city of Dubrovnik.

8 Q. And what happened in the interim period between the time you

9 dispatched these officers and the time that fire ultimately ceased? Do

10 you know what was going on up in Zarkovica? Were you getting any types of

11 reports?

12 A. Yes. Zec reported to me once and told me that withdrawal was very

13 difficult, that Kovacevic was suffering losses, that there was a lot of

14 casualties, a lot of wounded and dead, and that he was endeavouring to

15 stop the attack as soon as possible. The order that I issued was that at

16 11.00, all the artillery fire should stop because I had made such an

17 arrangement with the citizens of Dubrovnik. And the fire did indeed stop

18 around half past 11.00. I was on my way to the Cilipi airport, and I was

19 to fly from there by helicopter to Podgorica. However, once I left

20 Dubrovnik, fire continued.

21 Q. So despite your attempts to have a cease-fire, there was fire

22 beyond the point of 11.00, 11.30?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Can you give to the best of your understanding or at least what

25 you were able to learn when fire ceased?

1 A. I believe that according to information that I have, this was

2 after 2.00. And according to the information that we received from

3 Dubrovnik, this happened around 1400 hours or 1430. I believe that the

4 truth is somewhere in the middle.

5 Q. So continued at least from 5.45 in the morning until mid or

6 perhaps -- if you're not sure -- but at least mid-afternoon?

7 A. I believe that it lasted between 6.00 in the morning and the early

8 hours of the afternoon, yes.

9 Q. When you returned -- when you returned from your journey to

10 Belgrade, was there still fire going on?

11 A. No.

12 Q. What time did you return?

13 A. Around 1730 I was in Trebinje.

14 Q. What did you do in response to General Strugar's telephone message

15 regarding General Kadijevic's instructions?

16 A. I did everything possible in order to stop the attack. I called

17 the Crisis Staff in Dubrovnik to explain that I wasn't the one who had

18 ordered the attack, that it was a decision made by my inferior commander.

19 And I also tried to establish the situation and see who it was who issued

20 an -- the order for the attack and how the attack had started in the first

21 place.

22 Q. I was thinking more -- I was -- perhaps I wasn't clear. But

23 logistically, what did you do to get yourself to see General Kadijevic?

24 Can you tell us, did you meet General Strugar? Did you go individually?

25 How did you get to Belgrade?

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1 A. General Strugar gave me the message. He told me what General

2 Kadijevic had ordered him. Whenever I did all it took to stop the attack,

3 I was to be prepared to go to Podgorica and then to join him on his way to

4 Belgrade, to the General Staff where the two of us were to report about

5 this incident.

6 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

7 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Petrovic.

8 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Line 15 -- page 15, line 16, in the

9 transcript, it says, "He told me what Kadijevic had ordered to him." And

10 the Admiral said, "He told me what Kadijevic had ordered me to do."

11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

12 MS. SOMERS: May I reask the question so we can get clarification.

13 Q. Admiral, you heard Mr. Petrovic's comment. Perhaps you can

14 revisit the question and clarify for us. The question was did you go

15 individually? How did you go to Belgrade? Your answer as read

16 is: "General Strugar gave me the message. He told me what General

17 Kadijevic had ordered him." What should your answer be?

18 A. I believe that this is the correct interpretation. He ordered him

19 to tell me. After 13 years, it is very difficult to remember every word.

20 But this is the essence. General Kadijevic ordered General Strugar for

21 the two of us to come to Belgrade to report to him. And that is the

22 essence of my answer.

23 Q. That was my next question. And the order, as you understood it,

24 was for both you and General Strugar to report to General Kadijevic?

25 A. Absolutely.

1 Q. At this stage -- well, excuse me. Let me just...

2 How did you travel to Podgorica?

3 A. By helicopter from Cilipi airport. This is near Cavtat. I was

4 there. I conducted negotiations with the people from Dubrovnik. I

5 arrived at the airport near Podgorica. General Strugar was already there.

6 I was about half an hour late.

7 Q. Which would have put you at what time approximately?

8 A. It was around 1.00 when we took off for Belgrade. It was around

9 1300 hours.

10 Q. At this stage, how did you feel, how did you as a person and as a

11 commander feel about the shelling of the Old Town and the imminent meeting

12 with General Kadijevic, particularly in the context of the pending

13 cease-fire and the instructions which General Kadijevic gave on

14 December 3rd to keep the troops under control?

15 A. I was very concerned. I was still in a state of shock. And all

16 this time, while travelling to Belgrade, I was so concerned that I did not

17 even speak to General Strugar. We did not engage in any meaningful

18 conversation at all. All this time, I was telling him how this was

19 possible? Where did he muster the courage from to attack Srdj? At that

20 time, I still didn't know the extent of damage in the town of Dubrovnik,

21 and I was all the time asking myself questions as to how this had been

22 possible.

23 Q. To clarify something you just said, please --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

25 MS. SOMERS: I beg your pardon.

1 Q. To clarify something you just said. You said: All this time I

2 was telling him how was this possible? Where did he muster the courage to

3 attack? When you say, "He," who do you mean? "He muster the courage."

4 A. I'm referring to Captain Kovacevic all this time.

5 Q. And when you say, "I was telling him," who are you referring to

6 when you were telling him?

7 A. General Strugar.

8 Q. Did -- from the conversation, if you're able to, or from just the

9 general atmosphere during your travel, did it appear to you that General

10 Strugar knew about the shelling of the Old Town? And if so, did he seem

11 worried?

12 A. He was not as worried as I was, of course, because my

13 responsibility was more direct. He comforted me, and he told me that

14 General Kadijevic wouldn't do anything to me, that he couldn't do anything

15 to me, that all this would pass, that he probably responded to the

16 provocation of the Croats from Srdj. And the damage was not that great.

17 And all such things along these lines.

18 Q. When you say, "Because my responsibility was more direct," what

19 did you mean by that? Can you explain that.

20 A. Because that battalion was under my direct command. I was its

21 immediate superior.

22 Q. And was General Strugar the commander over all the battalions,

23 over all the formations, including the one that is the offending

24 formation?

25 A. Yes. Yes, of course.

1 Q. Admiral Jokic, could you have ordered such an attack outside of

2 General Strugar's order? Could you have done that?

3 A. No, no, of course not.

4 Q. When you say -- let me just get the -- excuse me one second. I'll

5 get the phrase. When you indicated that he told you, he, I guess --

6 by "he," whom do you mean? You said: "He comforted me, and he told me

7 General Kadijevic wouldn't do anything to me, that he wouldn't do anything

8 to me, that it would all pass." What did you mean "he"? Who is he?

9 A. I'm referring to General Strugar because there were just the two

10 of us engaged in that conversation, in that dialogue.

11 Q. The two of you are going to Belgrade to meet the -- with General

12 Kadijevic. Now, General Strugar is going there as your commander?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Were you surprised by this attitude of General Strugar's,

15 considering the orders prohibiting the attacks on the Old Town, as well as

16 the orders relating to the imminent cease-fire?

17 A. I don't know what to say. At that time, I was so preoccupied with

18 my own worries that I didn't pay too much attention to that. It somehow

19 did not come home. The comforting words that he said to me when he said

20 that Kadijevic wouldn't do anything to me just didn't reach me.

21 Q. My question to you was did it surprise you that he was saying that

22 in light of all the circumstances and what you were feeling?

23 A. Yes, one may say so.

24 Q. What in particular were you concerned about? Why -- excuse me,

25 I'll wait for a second.

1 Why were you -- what were you actually concerned about when

2 meeting General Kadijevic?

3 A. The fact that a battalion commander under my command who had been

4 ordered not to open fire still carried out such a wilful attack, even

5 after the agreement had been reached. I was worried as how this would all

6 end up because there was a possibility that I would be removed. I was

7 going to resign myself anyway, but I was concerned that this would come

8 across as - how shall I put it - those circumstances were of such a kind

9 that were unpleasant for any soldier. So what I'm talking about is me

10 being removed from my duties.

11 Q. Did you think that as your commander General Strugar should have

12 had the same concerns?

13 A. I didn't think about that. He was not so concerned. He knew more

14 than me because he was directly subordinated to the General Staff and

15 Kadijevic. So he was better informed about the relationships and how

16 things were done.

17 Q. And now what do you think? Do you think that he should have been

18 concerned?

19 A. Absolutely.

20 Q. Were you concerned that General Kadijevic would get a picture of

21 the real condition of the command in the 2nd Operational Group at all

22 levels and its failings?

23 A. Yes. I presented my situation very sincerely as far as that case

24 was concerned, the attack of the battalion on Srdj and what arose and what

25 transpired after that, the attacks on town afterwards and so on and so

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1 forth. And I also spoke about the command, but I didn't speak about the

2 2nd Operational Group. I didn't have the right to speak about that.

3 Q. Where was the meeting with General Kadijevic held and who was

4 present?

5 A. The meeting was at the General Staff, and in addition to General

6 Kadijevic there was also the Chief of Staff, General Blagoje Adzic, and

7 the chief of the operational administration, General Simonovic.

8 Q. What happened at that meeting in Belgrade? What was General

9 Kadijevic's response to the shelling of the Old Town and the attack in

10 general?

11 A. General Kadijevic was very angry. All this time, he was pacing

12 around his office. He couldn't sit down. He was very sick at the time.

13 I saw him for the first time after the beginning of October. He kept on

14 attacking us, both of us, General Strugar and myself. When he spoke to

15 us, he addressed us in plurals, so I believe that he referred to both of

16 us. And he said, "I ordered you not to approach Dubrovnik and get within

17 the range of their cannons. They provoked you. You didn't react wisely.

18 You allowed yourself to be provoked into this and to open fire. You did

19 not react wisely," and so on and so forth. "You know that they tend to

20 exaggerate every reaction, every provocation of ours. You know that the

21 representatives of the European Union are on their side. There has been a

22 lot of -- there was an outcry about this attack in the international

23 community. And we have to make sure that this is resolved in the best

24 possible way." This is the essence of the words that he said to us at the

25 time.

1 Q. And did you consider as you were hearing these words the fact that

2 you yourself after the shellings in November, which were directed against

3 the Old Town, did you not agree that the weaponry should have been -- did

4 you not agree that they should have removed the weaponry, you should have

5 removed it from the proximity of Dubrovnik, that it in and of itself

6 placed an additional danger in the hands of a particular battalion?

7 A. Yes. I agreed with General Kadijevic's word in myself. However,

8 I was very sorry that I didn't know what he had ordered. I didn't receive

9 his orders. So this did not refer to me. All of his orders, the orders

10 of the General Staff, went to the command of the 2nd Operational Group.

11 And I received these orders from other people. So I was not aware of the

12 exact ideas of the General Staff about the blockade. Does it have to be a

13 strict blockade? I was not aware of the real operational goals. And I

14 was very sorry that my commander, General Strugar, didn't ask the floor.

15 He did not talk. Everything was addressed to me. Kadijevic actually

16 spoke to both of us using the second person plural. But I was the only

17 one who spoke at that meeting. Nobody else but me asked the floor at that

18 meeting.

19 Q. So whom was he addressing concerning the orders, then? Was he

20 addressing General Strugar?

21 A. Well, that's what I have been saying all along, he kept saying, "I

22 ordered you," you in the second person plural. And I kept wondering to

23 myself how could I be included when I never received orders from the

24 General Staff and General Kadijevic. But that is what he kept saying, "I

25 ordered you."

1 He must have meant General Strugar, but he wasn't direct. I don't

2 know why he didn't actually say it, who it was that he gave these orders

3 to.

4 Q. You earlier - or just a few moments ago - said you didn't have the

5 right to speak about the 2nd Operational Group. Why not? Or speak for

6 the 2nd Operational Group.

7 A. Well, because in the Yugoslav People's Army, a command is far more

8 centralised than perhaps in other armies. Before the chief of General

9 Staff, or rather the minister of defence I cannot criticise the work of my

10 Superior Command at such a meeting. That's at least what my view about

11 this was. If this were an investigation, though, if direct questions were

12 put in this regard, then perhaps. But for me to speak up, to be the first

13 to speak about this, I thought I didn't have the right to do so.

14 Q. And your superior commander was at that time?

15 A. My superior commander was General Strugar. I thought that he was

16 the one who should proffer an explanation.

17 Q. Did General Strugar proffer any explanation at that particular

18 meeting with General Kadijevic, General Adzic, and General Simonovic?

19 A. No. He did not ask for the floor at all.

20 Q. And what was General Kadijevic's response with regard to Captain

21 Kovacevic? What did he say about Captain Kovacevic?

22 A. He asked me who this man was, how it was possible that he should

23 undertake such an attack. I gave him an answer by way of the remarks I

24 made, that I did not know him, that I first met him on the 10th of

25 November when that battalion was resubordinated to me, and that is when

1 this attack was launched, that this was a capable, young brave officer,

2 but it seems that his braveness was of the crazy type. But at that time,

3 I did not know him.

4 He had assumed duty from his seriously wounded commander, and that

5 he certainly was not up to the level required for leading such a unit.

6 Q. When you say, "Of the crazy type," are you suggesting

7 recklessness, or what are you suggesting by that term?

8 A. Well, I mean all of it put together, especially later on when I

9 investigated all of it.

10 Q. What casualties did Captain Kovacevic's battalion take as a result

11 of his attacking on the 6th?

12 A. On the 6th of December, he had 5 dead and 14 wounded. But

13 otherwise, that battalion had sustained their greatest casualties, more

14 than the entire brigade together in the totality of these operations. So

15 this shows this crazy braveness of his and recklessness.

16 Q. Did General Strugar know about the recklessness of Captain

17 Kovacevic?

18 A. I don't know what he thought about him. But I do know that he

19 looked up to him as an officer. In his opinion, he was an ideal officer

20 in terms of all of his characteristics and also in the opinion of others

21 at the time.

22 Q. When you say, "He looked up to him," are you saying General

23 Strugar looked up to Captain Kovacevic?

24 A. Yes. Yes, absolutely, yes.

25 Q. Did you tell General Kadijevic that you had proposed the

1 withdrawal of the 472nd Brigade earlier in time following concerns about

2 discipline?

3 A. I think so. For the most part, I said things by way of an answer

4 to what he had asked. But for a while, I gave a free interpretation of

5 what was going on around the town.

6 Q. How did you feel about General Strugar's silence in the face of

7 the criticism being expressed by General Kadijevic and leaving you to do

8 the explaining?

9 A. I was very hurt on account of that because I realised that I was

10 left out in the open on my own, and that General Strugar did not want to

11 explain more extensively how this happened on the 6th of December, or at

12 least to protect me in some way or anything.

13 Q. Did you convey this to General Kadijevic at the time, how you were

14 feeling?

15 A. No, no, no, I did not.

16 Q. From what you've just said, did you view yourself as what we refer

17 to as a scapegoat?

18 A. Well, that's not how I viewed myself. But all the circumstances

19 led to me turning out to be the main perpetrator, and I had taken every

20 measure in order to stop this from happening, as if someone was pulling

21 all the threads so that all of this would happen to me. And I never

22 dreamt of any such thing.

23 Q. Did you explain to General Kadijevic that whatever measures you

24 had tried to take as to this incident or previous incidents involving

25 shelling of the Old Town had not met with support of General Strugar?

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1 A. No, I did not.

2 Q. When did you return to Podgorica or when did you leave Belgrade?

3 A. I think sometime around 1630 hours, around 1700 hours, I believe.

4 I don't know exactly. I had proposed some measures to General Kadijevic.

5 Q. Can I ask you, please, you have just a moment ago mentioned

6 that, "I had taken every measure in order to stop this from happening, as

7 if someone was pulling all the threads so that all of this would happen to

8 me." Who did you mean by "someone"? Did you have anybody in mind when

9 you said, "Someone was pulling the threads"?

10 A. No, no. At that time, of course, I didn't know anything about it.

11 It was only later that I investigated this. And during all these 13

12 years, I tried to establish the truth, how this attack came about. And I

13 think that the truth is out now, except for some minor details.

14 Q. And after -- at this point in time, looking at it now, do you have

15 any view of who that someone who was pulling the threads may have been?

16 A. I cannot point a finger, and I cannot say that it was General

17 Strugar who ordered that. That would not be right. That would not

18 correspond to the facts, or rather I cannot prove that. But I do believe

19 that many or some people who were close to him were giving support, or

20 rather encouraging the attack on the 6th of December. General Strugar --

21 General Strugar supported the story of Kovacevic, and he was saying that

22 he was not responsible or guilty on account of that.

23 Q. That who was not responsible or guilty?

24 A. I'm saying that General Strugar supported the story of Captain

25 Kovacevic, that he did not intentionally attack Srdj, that he did not

1 intentionally shell Dubrovnik and so on. He supported that story, and he

2 protected him.

3 Q. And what I'm asking you, though, is you said that: "He was not

4 responsible or guilty on account of that." Who are you referring to when

5 you say, "He is not responsible."

6 A. Well, I meant Captain Kovacevic because I investigated --

7 Q. And are you of a different opinion?

8 A. Absolutely.

9 Q. Are you suggesting, from the vantage point today, that persons

10 under the command and control of General Strugar are the persons you're

11 referring to as having supported the activities on the 6th of December,

12 the attack and all that followed on the 6th of December?

13 A. Yes, of course.

14 Q. On the return from Podgorica, did you discuss with General Strugar

15 the measures to be taken in relation to the shelling?

16 A. Yes, I did. From Podgorica, we went to Trebinje, to his command

17 post. And then from Trebinje to Kupari, to my command post. As we

18 travelled, we talked, especially at his command post in Trebinje, about

19 the further steps that were to be taken. It was accepted that the

20 official version of the events of the 6th of December, which was composed

21 at the command of the 2nd Operational Group on the basis of information

22 provided by Captain Kovacevic, which was given by his officers, that this

23 official version of the event should be sent to Belgrade to the General

24 Staff, and that I should stand by that story, that version, at the press

25 conference on the following day. And that press conference was held in

1 Kupari.

2 Likewise, I suggested, and General Strugar agreed, that on the

3 following day, I sign the peace agreement, initial the peace agreement, or

4 rather the cease-fire, and that I send my team of officers to Dubrovnik to

5 assess the damage in the Old Town.

6 Q. Who accepted? It was accepted. What did you mean by "accepted"?

7 Who accepted it? Who gave the instructions to adopt a certain version of

8 the facts?

9 A. General Strugar instructed me as to what we should accept, what we

10 should do. It was this official version of the events that took place on

11 the 6th of December. That is to say, that I should stand by that at the

12 press conference.

13 Q. Did you suggest the removal of Captain Kovacevic to General

14 Strugar on the way back?

15 A. Well, I tried to say that a while ago. During the meeting with

16 General Kadijevic, towards the end of my remarks, I offered my

17 resignation, and I proposed that Captain Kovacevic be removed from the

18 position of the commander of the 3rd Battalion and that an investigation

19 be carried out and that he be sent to Court. Those were my proposals and

20 requests.

21 Q. Did General Strugar agree with the removal of General Kovacevic?

22 A. No. General Strugar did not say anything at the meeting. But

23 after that, he did not agree with it. I'm sorry. I forgot. I proposed

24 that the 3rd Battalion be taken out of the combat deployment because of

25 their lack of reliability. However, he did not agree with that. Also, he

1 did not agree with the removal of Captain Kovacevic.

2 Q. Did the version of the facts that you indicated you were

3 instructed by General Strugar to adopt prove to be false? Or was it

4 apparent at the time that it was false?

5 A. At that time, everything was not clear. It wasn't clear to me for

6 sure, but I believe that everything was not clear to him either.

7 Q. Did you propose to issue an apology or an expression of regret to

8 the Croatian side and to the intermediary European monitors for the

9 events, for the shelling of the 6th?

10 A. Yes. That's what I suggested to him, but he did not accept that.

11 Not only then, but also before that when they informed me around 9.00 from

12 the Crisis Staff in Dubrovnik, that's when I expressed my regrets, when I

13 established that it was actually true that shells were falling on the

14 town. I expressed my regrets then, and I said that I had not ordered

15 that, that this was an arbitrary attack by a lower-ranking commander and

16 that he would be taken to task and held responsible. I ordered fire to

17 stop. And then I sent a telex to Minister Rudolf. In this telex, I

18 repeated this yet again stating that General Kadijevic had also ordered an

19 investigation. Although I was not quite sure of that, but I did write it

20 nevertheless.

21 However, General Strugar said to me that we would not apologise to

22 anyone, and that extremists from Srdj were to be blamed, volunteers.

23 Something was said along that lines -- along those lines, because of the

24 losses that Captain Kovacevic had sustained on account of that and that

25 that is why he set out to take revenge for those killed soldiers. I

1 absolutely accepted this first part, and that is what I said to the

2 journalists, that --

3 Q. Which first part is that?

4 A. Well, the first part, that the commander of the battalion was

5 provoked by the attack from the Croatian side, that he had one casualty,

6 that is to say, one man dead and two men wounded, and that is why he

7 launched an attack, in order to avenge his soldiers. I said that to

8 journalists, that that sometimes happens during war, that a commander

9 loses it and then he wants to take revenge. However, I said further on

10 that this was an arbitrary attack and that this battalion commander would

11 be held accountable, that an investigation would be ordered and that it

12 would be carried out. I said that because I believed that that is what

13 would really happen.

14 Q. You knew at the time, did you not, that this was not the case,

15 that this was false and that you could not justify any type of shelling

16 with retaliation or reprisal? That is not acceptable --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. When I asked you about apologies, you said "I told him." To whom

19 where you -- when you said "him" and that he did not agree, to whom were

20 you referring?

21 A. General Strugar.

22 Q. What was your assessment as to which units shelled the Old Town

23 on the 6th of December?

24 A. Until I came from Belgrade, I thought that it was only the 3rd

25 Battalion of the 472nd Brigade took part in the shelling. However, when

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1 I came to my command post in Kupari, they notified me that in addition to

2 the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade, this attack upon the request

3 of Captain Kovacevic was supported twice by the 3rd Battalion of the 5th

4 Brigade which was across Rijeka Dubrovacka. And --

5 Q. Before you proceed, my question to you was about the Old Town.

6 Which formations, which units shelled the Old Town? You have answered me

7 that other units were involved in the attack generally, but which units

8 shelled the Old Town as far as you determined?

9 A. As for the shelling of the Old Town, only the 3rd Battalion of the

10 472nd Brigade could have done it, and they were the only ones who did

11 operate against the Old Town.

12 Q. Who was the commander of that formation, that unit?

13 A. It was Captain Vladimir Kovacevic.

14 Q. Is this the same battalion that was introduced in November, and

15 after its introduction to the combat theatre, the Old Town was shelled?

16 A. Yes. Let me just add one thing: However, at that time, it was

17 not on its own in front of Dubrovnik. At that time, we were not sure

18 because there were other battalions of the brigade there, and at that

19 time, in November, it was the entire brigade artillery that could have

20 targeted the Old Town. So we were not sure that it was only that

21 battalion that did it, although there was suspicion even then.

22 Q. Does the fact that it was one of the battalions that could have or

23 that was -- yes, that could have been involved in the November shellings,

24 is there a relationship to your conclusion also about its involvement in

25 the December shelling? Did you factor that into it?

1 A. Yes, yes, yes, of course. Absolutely.

2 Q. You were telling us about the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade.

3 Can you please continue. Just indicate what you learned about the

4 involvement of that battalion during the attack and how it came to be

5 involved. Did you yourself know at the time it was involved?

6 A. No. At that time, I did not know it. When I returned from

7 Belgrade, I heard about how this had happened. When Captain Kovacevic

8 took Srdj, and when he started suffering lethal artillery fire from the

9 town of Dubrovnik, and since he did not have the artillery support

10 from my units because Captain Kozaric sent him a message that he would

11 never be supported by sector artillery, he then asked his colleague, the

12 commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade who was behind Rijeka

13 Dubrovacka to target with his artillery those points that he could not

14 reach outside the Old Town. That was Lapad, Babin Kuk, where there were

15 cannons belonging to the Croatian Defence, cannons that were of larger

16 calibre. From there, he was targeting his soldiers at Srdj, and he did

17 sustain losses.

18 This colleague of his, Lieutenant Colonel Jovanovic, engaged in

19 fire twice with his mortars of 120 and 82 millimetres.

20 Q. I will ask you in a minute about the --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

22 MS. SOMERS:

23 Q. I will ask you in a minute about the weaponry of the 3rd Battalion

24 of the 5th Brigade. But I have a question based on something you said.

25 Considering that the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade was one of the

1 battalions that you viewed as having potential culpability in the November

2 shellings against the Old Town, and considering that you had wanted the

3 entire brigade removed, is it your view that if the 3rd Battalion had been

4 removed, the shelling that occur on the 6th of December may not have

5 occurred? Do you see a relationship between the two events?

6 A. Absolutely. Absolutely, I do see a relationship, because had

7 there been a mixed unit of the Territorial Defence that was still there or

8 a battalion of the Territorial Defence of Trebinje or any other unit,

9 these events of the 6th of December would not have happened. That's for

10 sure.

11 Q. In your view, leaving in place heavy weaponry with units who had

12 shown willingness to use such weaponry against areas prohibited from being

13 shelled, do you see a link between that and the - I'm referring to

14 November - do you see a link between that and the events of the 6th of

15 December, the shelling of the 6th of December?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did you continue to hold the view that troops should be thinned

18 out and that weaponry should be withdrawn? And if you did, do you see a

19 link to the failure to implement that to the events of the 6th of

20 December?

21 A. Well, now that this event already happened, now the mosaic has

22 fallen into place, and now everything is quite clear. It was hard for me

23 to make an additional request to pull out the 3rd Battalion or, rather,

24 for it not to remain in those positions at all, because I did not have

25 clear grounds. There had not been an investigation in November that had

1 established that Captain Kovacevic and his battalion were the sole

2 perpetrators. So all of this had to do with suspicions only, reasonable

3 doubt certainly, but we didn't have more than that in terms of him being

4 the sole perpetrator. However, if that unit had not been there, the Old

5 Town would not have been shelled on the 6th of December.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Somers, is that a convenient time?

7 MS. SOMERS: Thank you, Your Honour. It is.

8 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

9 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Ms. Somers.

11 MS. SOMERS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

12 Q. Admiral Jokic, your conclusion as to the unit which shelled the

13 Old Town, you've identified as the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Brigade, can

14 you please give us some of the bases for your conclusion.

15 A. One did not have to investigate in order to establish that it was

16 only that unit with regard to the position of their arms that could shell

17 the city on that day, on the 6th of December.

18 Q. Your notification about the shelling of the Old Town, as you

19 indicated earlier, came through Mr. Rudolf, Minister Rudolf?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you conduct an investigation into the shelling?

22 A. Yes, I tried to carry out investigation upon my return from

23 Belgrade.

24 Q. What did you do? Explain how you carried out the investigation.

25 A. When I came to the command post in Kupari, I asked all the

1 participants, the battalion commander, the Chief of Staff, my deputy Zec

2 and Colonel Kovacevic and Kozaric, the captain, I asked them to give me

3 their written reports, and I investigated as much as possible what had

4 happened on that same evening. I was told then they issued their reports.

5 I listened to them. And then I was told that Captain Kovacevic was in

6 such a state of shock that he was beyond control because of the losses

7 that he had suffered in his units, and that he was not able to issue any

8 statements or reports and that he was not able to come and see me in

9 Kupari.

10 Q. So you were not able to have any interview with Captain Kovacevic,

11 neither you nor any of your officers who may have been designated to speak

12 with the parties involved?

13 A. That's correct. I sent my officers to his battalion. My four

14 officers went there to talk to others, to establish what had happened, and

15 to help this unit to reinforce their state of morale after all the losses

16 that they had suffered. I asked them to spend the entire night with that

17 unit.

18 Q. Excuse me for interrupting you, Admiral. What type of losses?

19 Numbers?

20 A. There were 5 dead and 14 wounded.

21 Q. Over the course of the Dubrovnik combat, did you have any

22 observation about the numbers of losses that Captain Kovacevic's battalion

23 suffered relative to the overall losses for the brigade?

24 A. Yes, I believe that this battalion had more losses than the entire

25 brigade up to that moment.

1 Q. And were these losses incurred -- who was commanding the battalion

2 when these losses were incurred?

3 A. Up to the 25th of October, the commander was Ekrem Devlic, Major

4 Devlic, and he was seriously injured on the 24th of October. And then

5 Captain Kovacevic took over. Up to then, he was deputy commander.

6 Q. And at all times Captain Kovacevic was in one way or the other

7 either commander or deputy commander of this battalion. Is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, the losses that were incurred, do you know how they were

10 incurred? Where they were incurred? Was it perhaps in response or from

11 responsive fire from Croat positions? Did you have any information?

12 A. I didn't know exactly about all the circumstances before the

13 brigade came under my command. However, very often I would receive

14 information that losses were incurred by wrong command, lack of

15 discipline, fire, a lack of reconnaissance, failure to take shelter,

16 provocation on both sides.

17 Q. On the 6th, the losses on the 6th of December, did you come to

18 learn how they were incurred?

19 A. They were incurred in battles for the mount -- for Mount Srdj.

20 When Mount Srdj was taken, then the entire artillery from the city of

21 Dubrovnik opened fire on that unit. The terrain was not covered, and

22 that's how losses were incurred.

23 Q. Can you ask you to clarify something. You have in the past

24 referred to the town of Dubrovnik and the city. When you use the

25 term "town" or "city" without the term "Old Town," are you referring to

1 the overall municipal Dubrovnik area? Just so we can distinguish.

2 Excluding the Old Town.

3 A. Yes. I'm talking about the artillery outside the old city walls.

4 I'm talking about the fire positions of the artillery that belonged to the

5 defence of the town of Dubrovnik, which was outside of the Old Town.

6 Q. Okay. The reason I ask you is earlier on, much earlier in your

7 testimony, you talked about warning sent to the Dubrovnik Crisis Staff

8 that civilians and citizens of Dubrovnik should be removed from the

9 weapons of, and you said, "The town," that were being used to fire in

10 order to reduce civilian casualties. Was that reference to the city, the

11 main part of the city outside the Old Town?

12 A. Yes, precisely so. It was on the 10th of November that the call

13 came from the Crisis Staff.

14 Q. Thank you, Admiral.

15 What did you find out from the statements of the individuals that

16 were taken by the officers you assigned to interview them? What had the

17 company commanders of the 3rd Battalion and those at Zarkovica informed

18 your officers? I'm going to ask you to try to move at a relatively rapid

19 pace given the time considerations.

20 A. At that time, there were not that many details with regard to the

21 conversations with company commanders. They were not willing to talk

22 because of the losses, because of the casualties. They were very sad. So

23 they didn't offer too much information to my officers. The only thing

24 that was clear was that fire had been opened from Srdj on Captain

25 Kovacevic's unit, and according to that information he had one dead and

1 two injured soldiers up to 6.00 in the morning of the 6th of December.

2 Based on that, he decided that one part of the battalion, the 3rd Company,

3 would start moving towards Srdj and that the 1st Company from Bosanka

4 forward, that he would also start moving towards Mount Srdj in order to

5 prevent provocations and take the facility on Mount Srdj.

6 When he took it, around 10.00 in the morning, fierce fire was

7 opened from town. More losses were incurred. And that's when the drama

8 started with regard to the withdrawal of his units and shelling of the Old

9 Town and some parts of the area outside the Old Town walls. However,

10 their statements, according to which the artillery of the 3rd Battalion

11 opened fire on the weapons that had inflicted losses upon them in the

12 vicinity of the Old Town, in the vicinity of the towers of the Old Town

13 where they had discovered mortars. And according to them, they did not

14 shell the Old Town directly. The only thing that they wanted to do was

15 neutralise those mortars that were incurring their losses. And that's the

16 essence of what they had learned from them.

17 The same story repeated that was offered in November.

18 Q. How did they tell you the losses that were incurred? What was

19 their version?

20 A. Their version was as follows: Cannons and mortars from the town

21 outside the Old Town or in the vicinity of the towers of the Old Town

22 opened fire on them in an encovered [as interpreted] area and incurred

23 their losses. And there was also suspicion that there were arms in the

24 Old Town itself. This, however, was never confirmed.

25 Q. So if I understand it, this is their version, the version given by

1 the officers involved in the attack on that day, on the 6th. Did you

2 necessarily accept this version as having truth, or as the true version of

3 the facts?

4 A. Yes, I had my doubts about that from the very beginning, and I

5 expressed my suspicion. And I said to the Chief of Staff that I couldn't

6 believe that he could not stop the attack together with Colonel Kovacevic

7 and prevent the shelling while it lasted.

8 Q. Did you come to learn -- or did you ever come to find that fire

9 was, in fact, not initiated from Srdj, but rather initiated by the 3rd

10 Battalion of the 472nd Brigade?

11 A. Subsequently I established that. And especially during the period

12 when I managed to get hold of company commanders and battalion commanders.

13 And then I spoke with Captain Kovacevic when he was free, and I managed to

14 talk to him openly about certain things.

15 Q. When was this?

16 A. That was before my departure to The Hague. He told me that

17 Captain Zec had told him when he arrived at Mount Zarkovica that the

18 Admiral was very angry, that he would not get artillery support, that he

19 should finish off what he had started and withdraw. These were his words.

20 And I quote him.

21 Q. When you say, "This is before my departure to The Hague. He told

22 me that Captain Zec told him," who is "he"?

23 A. Captain Kovacevic.

24 Q. Where did this take place, this conversation?

25 A. In Belgrade, just before my departure for The Hague. I had a

1 meeting with him. I wanted to learn the truth, regardless of how serious

2 it may have been for any of the parties involved. And it was then that I

3 finally concluded that both of them, Colonel Kovacevic and Captain Zec,

4 sabotaged my decision and my request to cease fire immediately. I had my

5 doubts about that, even before, but it was then that I reached my final

6 conclusion to that effect.

7 Q. Did you factor into your conclusion about believing or not

8 believing Captain Kovacevic's version the type of weapons that were at the

9 disposal of the Croatian forces at Srdj? I say that as the indication or

10 the allegation that there was lethal fire coming from Srdj and that an

11 artillery attack by the 3rd Battalion had to be undertaken. What was your

12 view of that?

13 JUDGE PARKER: I'm sorry, Ms. Somers. I haven't understood there

14 was lethal fire from defenders from Srdj. I understood it was from parts

15 of Dubrovnik, but not the Old Town --

16 MS. SOMERS: The city, that's correct.

17 JUDGE PARKER: -- directed at Srdj.

18 MS. SOMERS: That's correct, Your Honour. I withdraw that.

19 Q. The type of fire that was coming from Srdj, what could that have

20 been?

21 MS. SOMERS: Thank you for the correction.

22 A. Are you referring to Srdj or to the Old Town?

23 MS. SOMERS:

24 Q. Srdj.

25 A. It was infantry fire from automatic rifles, and they also had two

1 machine-guns on Mount Srdj. But they didn't have artillery. And it could

2 not have been lethal for the unit.

3 Q. What type of response, if there were any truth to the allegation

4 that the Croatian forces attacked that morning, what type of response

5 would a reasonable commander or would a commander of a battalion have

6 taken to that type of fire?

7 A. If that fire had been lethal, as they claimed, from the front part

8 of the defence, from Srdj and Nuncijata and the Belvedere Hotel, a

9 reasonable commander should have responded with adequate fire which he had

10 at his disposal and neutralise that fire. So he had to prevent that

11 infantry fire, and he had at his disposal everything in order to do that.

12 He should not have used artillery and mortars. Because the attack was

13 still not fully fledged up to the point when the town had to be shelled.

14 Only the front lines of the Croatian Defence from which provocation fire

15 started.

16 Q. You indicated that you believe that Captain Zec and Colonel

17 Kovacevic had sabotaged the operation or the mission you had sent them to

18 do. What -- can you explain that, please. Did you sense these officers

19 individually, or was there some collusive action you're referring to?

20 A. I'm not saying that this was a concert activity, that this was

21 organised. However, from 8.00 in the morning when Captain Zec arrived in

22 Zarkovica and immediately upon that Colonel Kovacevic followed, up to

23 12.00, so for the period of four hours, they could talk Captain Kovacevic

24 into abandoning the position. And they could prevent further artillery

25 attack on the town, if they had been determined to do so, and if they

1 acted -- had acted professionally, and if they had executed my express

2 order for the unit to be stopped and returned to their initial positions.

3 Q. Admiral Jokic, did you undertake any discipline toward Captain

4 Kovacevic for submitting what you believed to be a false report?

5 A. I didn't manage to go -- to get hold of Captain Kovacevic at all.

6 At my request for him to finally come and see me, I was told that he had

7 previous commitments, that he had to attend funerals of his dead soldiers,

8 and those funerals were taking place all over Montenegro. Once this was

9 done, then General Panic visited, and this is the first time I saw him

10 after the incidents that took place on the 6th of December. But it seems

11 to me that he was given advice to leave the unit for a while. However, I

12 can't prove that.

13 Everybody knew that I wanted to remove him from this position.

14 Q. Admiral, in his report, did Captain Kovacevic allege or assert

15 that his positions had come under fire from the Old Town and was this

16 probable?

17 A. In his official report which he actually didn't write himself as

18 far as I understand, I don't know who participated in the writing of this

19 report, he claimed that fire had been opened on his unit from the front

20 part, from Srdj and Nuncijata and Belvedere Hotel, as well as from the

21 town itself.

22 Q. When you say the town, are you referring to the parts outside of

23 the Old Town?

24 A. He is not referring to the Old Town; he's referring to the town of

25 Dubrovnik.

1 Q. Did you forward to General Strugar the report of Captain

2 Kovacevic? And if you did, what was General Strugar's reaction or

3 attitude towards it?

4 A. His attitude was that this report reflected the truth, that it was

5 credible, and he believed in that all this time.

6 Q. In the course of your investigations, you mentioned that you

7 learned that the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade had become involved.

8 Who was the commander of that battalion and was it under your command?

9 A. The commander was Major Srboljub Zdravkovic. He was absent from

10 his unit at the time. His deputy was Lieutenant Miroslav Jovanovic. He

11 had been sent by his unit in Podgorica to replace the commander of the

12 battalion during his absence.

13 Q. And how can you explain getting support from another -- from one

14 battalion to another? Did it go through you? Did it go through your

15 operations officer? How could this happen? Are you necessary in that

16 particular activity?

17 A. Absolutely. That was a battalion under my command. And without

18 my express order, they were not supposed to open fire or participate in

19 operations. Until my return from Belgrade, I didn't know that they had

20 opened fire because they only opened fire on two occasions for ten

21 minutes. Its positions were far from Kupari, and we did not hear fire

22 being opened from their artillery. The distance between their positions

23 and the command post was about 25 kilometres.

24 Q. Then explain if you had to be -- if you had to give your

25 authorisation, how did they communicate? How did they get the support?

1 How did Captain Kovacevic get support from Jovanovic? Support fire.

2 A. Yeah, I did not explain that. It all starts with the units.

3 Their initial positions are able to communicate between themselves. The

4 3rd Battalion of the 472nd can communicate with the 5th Brigade

5 independently of me. They can communicate through the communications

6 centre without my knowledge. And when they started suffering losses,

7 Captain Kovacevic did not receive my artillery support. He phoned his

8 colleague and asked him to neutralise the artillery fire in the Babin Kuk,

9 Lapad, Petka sector, and some hotels were -- mortar positions were outside

10 of the Old Town. This battalion could not reach as far as the Old Town

11 from their position. The 3rd Battalion of the 5th Brigade couldn't do

12 that.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

14 MS. SOMERS:

15 Q. Were you aware of the use of naval units in the course of the day

16 in connection with the attack on the 6th of December?

17 A. The naval units, that is, ships, did not open fire on the 6th of

18 December. This was not planned. We didn't know that it would occur. The

19 ships did not have any orders. And this can be confirmed by the commander

20 of the defence of the town of Dubrovnik. He can confirm that the ships

21 did not open fire on that day or around that time.

22 Q. Based on all of the information that you have assessed, how would

23 you characterise the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik on the 6th of

24 December 1991?

25 A. Well, in no other way but this being a wilful attack, illegal, in

1 contravention of all explicit orders of Superior Commands. And it was

2 only the commander of the 3rd Battalion who could have been responsible

3 for it because he was the one who had issued the order to shell.

4 Q. Do you have any views on other factors that -- or what factors may

5 have supported your conclusion that it was a deliberate attack?

6 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, objection. This

7 word "deliberate" cannot be found in the previous answer. I cannot see

8 it. And I did not hear that word being used in B/C/S. I did not hear the

9 Admiral use it.

10 MS. SOMERS: I'll be happy to substitute that word for "wilful."

11 I see them as synonymous, but I will be happy to use the word wilful.

12 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

13 MS. SOMERS:

14 Q. Admiral, let me rephrase my question. Do you have any views on

15 other factors that have supported your conclusion that it was a wilful

16 attack?

17 A. I think -- well, first of all, when we are talking about a wilful

18 attack, I mean the way the attack started against Srdj. That's how the

19 attack started. This attack later on developed further due to the losses

20 sustained when the attack was launched further on the town.

21 Q. Admiral, I want to make sure we're understanding each other. When

22 you say "wilful," what do you mean by wilful? And I'm talking only about

23 the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik on the 6th of December 1991.

24 A. What I wish to say is the following: That the attack was wilful.

25 But at first, it was not aimed against the Old Town. That's not what I

1 meant. I think that it was aimed at Srdj only. And in order to take Srdj

2 and destroy all of those who were at Srdj. That was the idea of those who

3 were planning this, protecting it, supporting it. But the idea was not to

4 attack the Old Town. That is what I mean.

5 Q. When the Old Town was attacked, how do you come to the conclusion

6 that it was wilful once it was attacked? And it may help, Admiral, if I

7 say attack --

8 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour. Your Honour, I think

9 we have a problem which has been appearing for a few days now due to the

10 interpretation. In the B/C/S language, the witness has been

11 saying "samovoljan," in the sense of not having been ordered, that is to

12 say, an arbitrary decision of someone who launched an attack. I have the

13 impression, though, that this description is being interpreted

14 as "wilful." I'm not sure that the word "wilful" in the English language

15 corresponds to what the witness means when he says "samovoljan," what he

16 means when testifying before this Trial Chamber. I believe that there was

17 confusion on that account, a very meaningful one, because these are two

18 completely different things, or rather in the Serbian version of the B/C/S

19 language. So I think that this should be clarified in detail because the

20 witness keeps talking about "samovoljan."

21 THE INTERPRETER: Arbitrariness, wilfulness says the interpreter.

22 MR. PETROVIC: But it turns out to be different. So what the

23 interpretation of "samovoljan" should be self-initiative, or at his own

24 initiative. That is what it should say, not "wilful."

25 Thank you, Your Honour.

1 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Somers, if you could explore that.

2 MS. SOMERS:

3 Q. Admiral Jokic, you have heard the discussion about linguistic

4 differences, and so that we are clear, I want to ask you what factors --

5 first of all, if by the term "wilful" in your language you are referring

6 to the -- let me ask you, what aspect are you referring to when you use

7 the term "wilful"? Can you explain that, and then perhaps we can explore

8 that a little further.

9 A. What I wish to say by that is that the decision concerning the

10 attack was made by Captain Kovacevic, without receiving orders from his

11 Superior Command.

12 Q. Considering the duration of the shelling of the Old Town, the

13 intensity of the shelling of the Old Town, the weapons used during the

14 shelling of the Old Town, what is your view -- how would you characterise

15 the shelling of the Old Town?

16 A. I don't know. It's hard for me to say that from the very first

17 moment the idea of the battalion commander was to attack the Old Town

18 straight away. It is hard for me to say that. And I cannot claim that.

19 However, as soon as he started suffering losses, it is hard for me to say

20 at what time, what the hour was. But I think that already as of 8.00 in

21 the morning, shells started falling on the Old Town because I heard about

22 that during the telephone conversation I had with Minister Rudolf. Now,

23 whether he intended to attack the Old Town immediately in the morning is

24 something that I cannot believe at all, but the shelling of the Old Town

25 did start at 8.00 in the morning.

1 Q. Given the weaponry that was used or that was available to the

2 battalion, is it your view that Captain Kovacevic knew he was shelling the

3 Old Town, he or units under his command and control were shelling Old

4 Town?

5 A. I think that absolutely, from the position where he commanded from

6 and from the observation post, that he had to know that and see that.

7 Q. From Zarkovica, would you -- is there an obstructed or

8 unobstructed view of the Old Town of Dubrovnik from Zarkovica?

9 A. Unobstructed. Everything can be seen clearly.

10 Q. Did you question the three senior officers you sent to Zarkovica

11 regarding the incident? The senior officers Zec, Colonel Kovacevic, and I

12 think it's Djurasic?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And what were the results of your inquiry of these three persons?

15 A. Well, I said that the result was that he was responding to the

16 gunfire coming from Srdj and from the front end where he had incurred

17 losses from, and that therefore he was out to destroy the defenders

18 at Srdj.

19 Q. Sorry. You said: As I said that the result was that he was

20 responding to, could you please clarify? Did you mean to say, "I said"

21 or, "He said"?

22 My question was: And what were the results of your inquiry to

23 these three persons? And the transcript shows is, "Well, I said that the

24 result was that..." Who was speaking? Who said?

25 A. No. These officers of mine said that they had found out that

1 Captain Kovacevic had started the attack because he was provoked by

2 gunfire coming from the front end of the Croatian Defence and because of

3 the losses that he had suffered. And that that is why he started this

4 wilful attack.

5 Q. Did you view that your senior officers then as well were giving

6 false reports?

7 A. At that time, of course, I had suspicions regarding that.

8 Q. Was there a commission of investigation that you ordered to be put

9 into action to conduct an assessment of damage to the Old Town?

10 A. Yes. As for the damage, yes, I did propose this, and General

11 Strugar accepted it, and Minister Rudolf did, too, that a team of officers

12 should be sent from my command who would tour the Old Town and assess the

13 extent of the damage.

14 Q. And did this happen? And who were the officers, please?

15 A. Yes. This was done on the 8th after the agreement had been

16 initialled. On the 8th of December.

17 Q. On the 8th of what?

18 A. On the 8th of December, a three-member commission from my command

19 toured the Old Town and compiled a report about it.

20 Q. And that was the 8th of December 1991, some two days after the

21 incident?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Who were the officers whom you sent? The names, please, if you

24 recall.

25 A. Well, I can't recall this very instant. But the names are on the

1 report.

2 Q. And was there a means of recording the damage that these officers

3 saw?

4 A. Yes. They mentioned point by point the damage that they had

5 established for themselves and seen for themselves.

6 Q. How did they memorialise it? Was there some form of

7 memorialisation?

8 A. Well, they made a report. I'm sorry. I forgot to mention

9 something. They also recorded two diskettes about this damage.

10 Q. Audio or video?

11 A. Videocassettes.

12 Q. Did you see the videocassettes? Did you see whatever they --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. How would you have rated or how would you have characterised the

15 damage resulting from the 6th of December that you observed in the

16 videofootage? Would you have characterised it -- well, how would you have

17 characterised it?

18 A. Well, what I saw, and which was presented on these diskettes, were

19 not terrible damages. It wasn't total destruction. I characterised it as

20 damage. I don't know whether I gave any particular qualification as to

21 the level or degree of that damage. But I don't think that it was major

22 damage. I don't think that it was destructive. I think that's the word I

23 used, and perhaps that's the word I could use now, too.

24 Q. Is that the word that you used at the time?

25 A. I think so, yes.

1 Q. And were you presented with a finding of the commission, a report

2 which you had to author -- to sign off on?

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. Was -- at the time, was there a complete, transparent, thorough

5 investigation conducted as to the damage in the Old Town?

6 A. No. Perhaps I should explain this better. In that report of

7 mine, I did not qualify the damage as far as I can remember. I just

8 signed the report. And I said the following: That these were the

9 findings of the commission --

10 MS. SOMERS: I was just going to ask if everyone would turn to

11 tab 32 of their binders, please.

12 Q. Do you recognise this document, Admiral?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And is it --

15 A. That's the document, yes.

16 Q. [Previous interpretation continues] ... that came out of your

17 command?

18 A. Yes. That's the document dated the 9th of December and sent to

19 Admiral Stane Brovet, deputy Federal Secretariat for National Defence,

20 with my signature.

21 Q. Was this investigation carried out in connection with orders by

22 General Kadijevic to investigate?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And who is Admiral Brovet?

25 A. He was General Kadijevic's deputy.

1 Q. And was General Strugar aware of the fact that there was an

2 investigation ordered by General Kadijevic?

3 A. General Kadijevic did not order an investigation of the entire

4 incident of the shelling of the Old Town on the 6th of December. I just

5 said to you that I had proposed to have an investigation and to have

6 Captain Kovacevic removed and so on. However, towards the end of what I

7 was saying, and when I also offered my resignation, General Kadijevic said

8 something to the effect of, "Go down there, repair the damage, let there

9 be no greater consequences, finish this successfully," and so on and so

10 forth, along those lines. He did not explicitly order to carry out an

11 investigation.

12 Q. Was General Strugar present at this conversation you just talked

13 about?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Looking at this document, Admiral, it is, "Conclusions of a

16 commission." Is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And identifies a commission of 9th Naval District Boka

19 compromising of Major Boskovic, Colonel Pesic, and a Savo Jovanovic, a

20 cameraman, visiting old parts of Dubrovnik on the 8th of December, 1991,

21 between 1000 and 1400 hours. This is the group that you were referring to

22 before whose names you were not necessarily able to recall?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And are these are the people you had in mind?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Sorry, your answer?

2 A. Yes, yes.

3 Q. Thank you. A quick question. How did these individuals from the

4 JNA, from your formation which is part of the 2nd Operational Group of the

5 JNA, how did they manage to get into Dubrovnik? What was their means of

6 being allowed into the city? What were the logistics of this, if you can

7 very briefly describe it?

8 A. Well, on the 7th of December, when I initialled the agreement, I

9 agreed with Minister Rudolf that he should let the team members in because

10 they were to investigate the damage. So they entered Dubrovnik as there

11 was a cease-fire in place, so they had free passage. And they were met

12 there. And together with the members of the Crisis Staff, they toured all

13 the places where the destruction had actually occurred.

14 Q. And above the -- sorry. A very quick run through, literally just

15 a moment on each point: "First point, visible traces of damage on some

16 houses caused by small-calibre shells. Damage is minor and can be

17 repaired in a short time. Signs of damage were noticed on the following

18 facilities and were recorded. One, Church of St. Blaise, slightly damaged

19 in two places on the facade from shell ricochet and one metre of the

20 fence. Two, the Stradun pedestrian promenade, street damaged in 15 places

21 in the form of superficial holes with a radius of 35 to 50 centimetres.

22 Three, a house of Rudjer Boskovic, the parapet demolished and one lintel

23 slightly damaged. Four, opposite house on Siroka Street, one corner at

24 the top of the building slightly damaged. Five, five buildings burned

25 down, the cause of the fire could not be determined on the spot. Six, the

1 Onofrio fountain, one hit to the dome."

2 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Somers, there are 20 items listed. Do you need

3 to read all of them?

4 MS. SOMERS: No, Your Honour, I wanted to give a sampling of the

5 description. I have no intention of going through --

6 JUDGE PARKER: All right.

7 MS. SOMERS:

8 Q. Admiral, when you saw that these items as described were in a

9 protected area, did you ask for any further clarification, any further

10 investigation of the damage that's reported? Or did you just accept what

11 the commission gave you at the time?

12 A. I accepted the findings of the commission because that is what

13 Admiral Brovet had asked for first and foremost. So I just signed this

14 and sent it. I did not give any qualifications. I did not present any

15 opinions of my own.

16 Q. And at the very end: "It is the opinion of the commission that

17 there is no substantial damage to the cultural and historical monuments.

18 The origin of all the damage cannot be stated with certainty or the

19 perpetrators named because it is obvious that a lot of the damage was not

20 caused by attacks from outside of the Old Town centre."

21 Now, Admiral, was this part of the climate of denial that appears

22 to have been permeating through all the discussions about culpability as

23 to the attack on the 6th of December?

24 A. Yes, I think you're right, yes. If you wish, I can explain on

25 this specific example.

1 Q. I have another question, though. The damage that is listed here

2 and the damage that was seen, would you really -- do you concur that it is

3 minor? Did you come to learn later about a different state of description

4 of damage?

5 A. Yes. At that time, it was considered that this was not major

6 damage, that it was damage of smaller proportions. It was even being said

7 that some of the damage was done intentionally, meaning the torching of

8 wooden houses or houses that had wooden roofs, not to go into all of that

9 now. However, later on, of course, it was established that the damages

10 were of greater proportions.

11 Q. You began to explain my question about the climate of denial.

12 Would you please continue with what you were going to say.

13 A. This is what I meant to say: This denial or shifting the guilt to

14 the other side, it did exist then. And I think that this was another

15 example of hushing things up or hushing the guilt of JNA units up. My

16 opinion was then, and today I think, that evident facts cannot be hushed

17 up and that professionalism of the units of the Yugoslav People's Army

18 cannot be proven by shifting the blame to the other side. Had an

19 investigation been ordered and carried out then, a true investigation

20 regarding the shelling of Dubrovnik, I think that the JNA would have

21 gained far more in terms of its reputation and dignity, rather than that

22 mountain of orders stating that we should not target the Old Town, that we

23 should be disciplined, that all sorts of measures should be taken. And in

24 practice, these orders were not observed.

25 I think that that is the truth of the matter.

1 Q. "Not observed" by whom, Admiral? These orders were not observed

2 by whom?

3 A. Specifically in this case, the commander of the 3rd Battalion.

4 But also certain officers who gave support or protection to such an

5 arbitrary and grave offence.

6 Q. And was this non-observance tolerated by all levels of command

7 above?

8 A. Yes, I think so.

9 MS. SOMERS: I would like to ask at this point, please, to move

10 into evidence the 9th -- I'm sorry, I'm informed that it has a number. It

11 does. P61 for reference for the Registrar. Apparently, it's a

12 previous... And it's tab 39 of P61. It must have been a composite

13 exhibit. Thank you.

14 Q. What was the reason in your view that a thorough, complete

15 investigation was not conducted by you? Why did you not complete a

16 thorough investigation?

17 A. First of all, this unit, the 3rd Battalion, was temporarily

18 resubordinated to me. It was not within my establishment. It was within

19 the establishment of the 472nd Brigade, which was subordinated to the

20 2nd Operational Group. So for an investigation that I would carry out

21 with my authorities, I would have to receive orders from the commander of

22 the 2nd Operational Group.

23 Q. Did such orders come through? Did you receive such orders for an

24 investigation?

25 A. No. No. A thorough and real investigation regarding this case

1 was not wanted.

2 Q. By whom?

3 A. I think everybody from the General Staff -- let me start from

4 there, and the commander of the operational group, and at my level, my

5 level, including me. But I personally wanted even then, and I did do what

6 I was in a position to do. However, when General Panic came and when

7 orders were issued that there should be decorations and commendations for

8 persons participating in this event, that was something that came as total

9 discouragement to me. And officially, I could not do anything any more.

10 Q. Please indicate, who is General Panic? When did he come and where

11 did he come to?

12 A. At that time, he was deputy chief of General Staff. And he came

13 to the command of the 2nd Operational Group. And near Dubrovnik --

14 Q. When?

15 A. I think it was on the 12th of December. The 12th or the 14th of

16 December. So he came to establish, as far as I know, what had happened on

17 the 6th of December and to see this for himself. And then he observed

18 from Zarkovica both the Old Town and listened to the explanations of the

19 commander of the 3rd Battalion and some of his company commanders in the

20 presence of General Strugar and in my presence, too.

21 Q. Did General Strugar make any particular request of Captain

22 Kovacevic in the presence of General Panic?

23 A. At the end, when he finished, he asked Captain Kovacevic to

24 propose two commanders for decoration, the ones that were the most

25 prominent during the events.

1 Q. During the events of what? During what events?

2 A. That was on the 12th or the 14th of December, and the events were

3 combat operations in which those commanders played a prominent role. So

4 we're talking about the month of November and the events on the 6th of

5 December in which this certain battalion participated.

6 Q. I want to make sure I understand because it is not entirely clear

7 to me. Who recommended that the names be presented for commendation for

8 these combat operations? Who recommended to General Panic?

9 A. Not to General Panic. I didn't say General Panic. I said General

10 Strugar had ordered Captain Kovacevic to propose the names of two of his

11 company commanders who played the most prominent role in the combat

12 operations that took place on the 6th of December and between the 10th to

13 12th of November.

14 Q. And was done in the presence of General Panic?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did Captain Kovacevic do that? Did he obey the order of General

17 Strugar?

18 A. Yes, he did.

19 Q. Were you there? Did you witness this yourself?

20 A. Yes, I was there.

21 Q. After that, did you attempt to have any further investigation,

22 inquiry, or discipline inquiry concerning the events of the 6th of

23 December?

24 A. No.

25 Q. After that, were you aware of any steps that were taken within the

1 command of the 2nd Operational Group to investigate the incident or to

2 take any measures against those responsible for the shelling on the 6th of

3 December, the shelling of the Old Town on the 6th of December?

4 A. No. I'm not.

5 Q. Were you aware of any promotion that Captain Kovacevic may have

6 gotten during that period? Actually, if we can turn to tab 41, I believe.

7 MS. SOMERS: It is an exhibit with a number of pages. And perhaps

8 if the hard copy could be given to Admiral Jokic, it would be helpful.

9 Q. Admiral, you have before you a document which is a personnel file,

10 part of a personnel file of Captain First Class Vladimir Kovacevic. Are

11 you familiar with this type of document, Admiral?

12 A. No, I have not seen this before.

13 Q. Are you familiar with personnel files, Admiral, this type of

14 dossier? Is this something that you have -- generally?

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. Does this appear to be a personnel file with Captain Kovacevic?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Could you turn to the page that has at the top of it the numbers

19 03390469. That is in B/C/S. And let me see if I can find the...

20 MS. SOMERS: And in English, Your Honours, it would be, on the

21 translation, page -- looks like it's page 1 of the translation, where it

22 says, "For permission, promotion."

23 Q. Can you find there any promotions that occurred in the year 1991?

24 If you find such a promotion, can you read across and indicate what is

25 said about the promotion.

1 A. Yes. Here, what is described is an extraordinary promotion in to

2 captain first class. This was ordered by the Federal Secretariat for

3 National Defence on the 14th December 1991. And the number of this order

4 is 7-173. The extraordinary promotion was carried out on the 11th of

5 November 1991.

6 Q. Does that mean it was retroactive? It went back to the time of

7 11 November 1991?

8 A. Yes. This was an extraordinary promotion, and it was retroactive,

9 referring back to the 11th November 1991. All the regular promotions in

10 the JNA took place on the 22nd of December. This, however, was an

11 extraordinary promotion, and the order was issued on the 14 December. And

12 it was retroactive as of the 11 November 1991.

13 Q. Do you see any other promotions for Captain Kovacevic listed on

14 that page? And if so, the date, please.

15 A. Yes. On the 11th November 1995 -- I apologise. On the 21st of

16 February, 1996, Captain Kovacevic was promoted to the rank of major.

17 Again, retroactively as of 11 November 1995.

18 Q. If you move along a bit, do you see any document that indicates

19 when Captain Kovacevic separated from his military service? If you look

20 at the top of 03390501 in Serbo-Croatian, the document that bears the

21 signature of Commander Colonel Miroslav Filipovic. Do you see that

22 document, Admiral?

23 A. Yes, I can see that. Again, this is a decision issued by Colonel

24 Miroslav Filipovic on the termination of service for Captain Kovacevic.

25 Q. What is the date for termination of service?

1 A. The 5th of April 1999.

2 Q. And just briefly, who was Miroslav Filipovic?

3 A. Miroslav Filipovic was the -- Major Kovacevic's commander in

4 VP2322, Pozarevac.

5 Q. Was he a part of the 2nd Operational Group during October,

6 November, and December of 1991?

7 A. Yes, he was the chief of the operational department in the command

8 of the 2nd Operational Group.

9 Q. Going back to what you've described as an extraordinary promotion

10 in 1991, from December 14th, 1991 retroactive to November, on whose

11 recommendation would a subordinate officer be given a promotion?

12 A. It was on the recommendation of his command, of his unit, I

13 assume, the unit that was superior to the 3rd Battalion, which means that

14 his brigade was his Superior Command, the 472nd Brigade. And it was only

15 this brigade that could issue such proposal, such recommendation.

16 Q. Did you recommend this promotion, or did you have any support for

17 his promotion?

18 A. No. I believe that everybody was astonished about this

19 extraordinary promotion, the person who had to be taken to task and who

20 had to stand trial for what he did.

21 Q. Can a promotion like this go through if the command of the 2nd

22 Operational Group does not agree with it or does not recommend it or does

23 not veto it? Either approve, recommend, or veto?

24 A. The procedure is as follows: All the subordinated commands,

25 subordinated to the 2nd Operational Group deliver their proposals for

1 extraordinary promotions. This is then gathered in the operational group.

2 It is approved or not, and the approvals are then referred to the General

3 Staff. That is the procedure. And if the 2nd Operational Group rejects

4 the proposal, it would not be forwarded to the General Staff.

5 MS. SOMERS: I would ask to move this document into evidence,

6 please.

7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

8 THE REGISTRAR: This is Document P133.

9 MS. SOMERS:

10 Q. Just in summary, then, Admiral, based on what you just explained,

11 what is your understanding of General Strugar's approval or disapproval of

12 the promotion of Captain Kovacevic? Talking about the one in 1991.

13 A. He approved it.

14 Q. If I can ask, please, to take a quick look at tab 33.

15 Admiral, before I ask you to look at the document in front of you,

16 I want to ask you something -- one more point about the promotion, and

17 we're talking about Captain Kovacevic still. If he receives a promotion

18 with effect to -- retroactive effect to 11th of November, what is that

19 for? What type of activity is that type of promotion for, given what is

20 happening -- given what the units are doing?

21 A. We were talking in great detail about the period between the 10th

22 and 12th of November when this battalion took Strincjera and Gradac for us

23 and the entire area of Dubrovnik in front of Srdj. So this promotion

24 would refer to the successful activities of that battalion and the taking

25 of Vitares in front of Mount Srdj during the Dubrovnik campaign which took

1 place in November.

2 Q. Are those the same combat operations during the course of which

3 the Old Town of Dubrovnik was shelled?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Taking a look at what is admittedly only two pages of a larger

6 bulletin, I wanted to ask you simply about language. This is a bulletin

7 that is for -- it is a bulletin. Do you recognise this type of

8 publication? Are you familiar with it?

9 A. Yes. This is the information service of the Federal Secretariat

10 for National Defence which carries information about various events. In

11 this particular case, we're talking about promotions.

12 Q. And in this particular case, we're looking at communication of the

13 service. It's called FSND Information Service, Belgrade, November 29th,

14 by decree of the Yugoslav Presidency of November 28, 1991, the following

15 officers have been promoted to higher ranks for successful directing and

16 commanding exceptional conduct in action and carrying out combat

17 assignments of a particular importance for the armed forces in the defence

18 of country.

19 And then it lists some names. To the rank of Colonel General,

20 Lieutenant Generals Panic, Pavle A. Strugar, and Nikola M. Uzelac. Are

21 you familiar with the promotions that are referred to in this particular

22 bulletin?

23 A. Yes, I am.

24 MS. SOMERS: I ask to move this document into evidence, please.

25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

1 THE REGISTRAR: This document is P134.

2 MS. SOMERS:

3 Q. And the reference to 28 November, that is eight days before the

4 shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And language indicates: "Successful directing and commanding."

7 They are talking about General Strugar's promotion for successful

8 directing and commanding?

9 A. Yes, yes.

10 Q. I would ask you to look at tab 42, please.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Just before we leave that tab, I wonder whether the

12 Admiral can clarify the rank to which this promotion was. Can you tell

13 us, Admiral, whether this is a rank of three-star or how many stars?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this rank is of a

15 general, three-star.

16 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

17 MS. SOMERS: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. Admiral, in front of you is a document which is personnel file.

19 Again, you have indicated that you're familiar with personnel files. And

20 you've shown that some of the entries there include promotion. This is a

21 file for General Pavle Strugar. I would ask you to take a look in the

22 Serbo-Croatian version on page that has at the top 03390543. Do you see a

23 section that deals with promotions on that page?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. And at the bottom of the page, is there an indication of a

1 promotion for General Strugar? If so, to what rank, what type of

2 promotion, and what date?

3 A. Yes. Lieutenant Colonel by degree of the Presidency of the SFRY.

4 The number is 1/64. The date is 28 November. Extraordinary promotion

5 effective as of 26 November 1991.

6 Q. And just moving very quickly to the page that has 03390668 in your

7 language, a document signed by General -- Lieutenant Colonel General

8 Momcilo Perisic, does that document indicate the date of General Strugar's

9 separation from military service?

10 A. Yes. This decision was issued on the 31st of December, 1993. And

11 by this decision, General Strugar was separated from his active military

12 service.

13 Q. And what was his rank at the time of separation?

14 A. Colonel General.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 MS. SOMERS: I would ask to move this into evidence, please.

17 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

18 THE REGISTRAR: This document is P135.

19 MS. SOMERS:

20 Q. Admiral Jokic, in your view, what are the underlying reasons for

21 the 6th of December shelling of the Old Town?

22 A. I cannot be absolutely sure about the motives because those

23 motives were neither rational or reasonable.

24 Q. I'm not asking motives. What do you view, based on what you have

25 told us today, what do you view, not just today but over the course of

1 your testimony, as the underlying reasons for the shelling of the 6th of

2 December of the Old Town?

3 A. I would like to give you all the reasons, the reasons that were

4 put forth and were not correct and those that were actually correct. One

5 of the reasons that was given to me in this half-investigation was that

6 cannons around the Old Town were shelled in order to neutralise them. And

7 that's why shells started falling on the Old Town. I'm now going to give

8 you the true reasons.

9 Q. I'm not asking you for justifications. I'm asking you for

10 underlying reasons that have to do with what was going on in your command

11 area. I'm not asking for justifications for the various excuses. The

12 reasons that the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik on the 6th of

13 December could occur given the history of everything that you have told

14 us.

15 A. As I've already said, one of the reasons was to shell the weapons

16 around the Old Town. The second one was to inflict damage on the

17 Old Town. Another one was to retaliate for the dead and wounded in the

18 3rd Battalion. Also, to punish the command -- the former commander of the

19 472nd Brigade who had fled to Dubrovnik. And they considered this to be

20 one part of the retaliation as well. So there were multiple reasons. But

21 the main reason was to inflict damage on the town, on the Old Town.

22 Q. Do you find a connection, a link, between the enforcement of

23 orders toward the Old Town prior to the 6th of December, the enforcement

24 or non-enforcement, and the events of the shelling of the Old Town on the

25 6th of December?

1 A. Yes, I do. There is a link. In November, there was an

2 investigation -- if there had been an investigation and if the culprit had

3 been identified, there wouldn't have been the shelling on the 6th of

4 December. And I can agree with that.

5 MS. SOMERS: I'm going to try to skip through things really

6 quickly. I just need a second to review.

7 JUDGE PARKER: Well, I think we might skip through them after the

8 break, Ms. Somers. We'll have a break now.

9 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

10 --- On resuming at 12.55 p.m.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Ms. Somers.

12 MS. SOMERS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

13 Q. Admiral Jokic, having indicated just before the break that there

14 was a link between the lack of investigation in November and the failure

15 to take measures for the shellings against the Old Town in November and

16 the events of the 6th of December, can you explain why you did not take

17 stronger measures to bring Captain Kovacevic under your control in that

18 interim period.

19 A. Why I did not take any measures?

20 Q. Why you did not take stronger measures to keep Captain Kovacevic

21 under your control during that time period.

22 A. In the month of November, I asked for the removal of the commander

23 of the brigade and the Chief of Staff. At that time, it was not

24 established what the explicit guilt involved was in terms of the shelling

25 of the Old Town in November. I did not have evidence to prove that this

1 was done by Captain Kovacevic. But there were no orders for an

2 investigation. There was no removal of the brigade command. And I did

3 not have a free hand or orders to carry out an investigation and to

4 request a removal of the commander of the battalion. What I established

5 was not sufficient for me to act on my own in order to take measures

6 against Captain Kovacevic.

7 Q. What do you mean when you say you did not have a free hand? Was

8 there some element that interfered with your taking control or taking

9 measures?

10 A. Well, there was not an order of the command or there was not a

11 general feeling in favour of such an energetic measure or an independent

12 investigation on my own. That's what I thought then.

13 Q. In favour where? Where was there not a general feeling?

14 A. I mean the Superior Command. There has to be a general feeling.

15 I mean, let me just add this -- to this, one more fact: In November --

16 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Petrovic.

18 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] The transcript does not reflect

19 when he speaks about the higher command. He said, "At the highest level,"

20 or something to that effect, at that level of the JNA. But it is not

21 contained in the transcript.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can explain.

23 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the month of November, if you

25 remember, there was a letter written by General Kadijevic to the

1 representative of the European Community, van Houten. In this letter it

2 says that the JNA did not shell the town or the Old Town. I could not

3 refute that by my own statements, or my own investigation, or the removal

4 of Captain Kovacevic. Secondly, after that the 6th of December happened.

5 The chief of the administration for information of the Federal Secretariat

6 for National Defence, General Milan Gvero, in the official statement

7 claimed that Dubrovnik was not shelled and that no dust fell on the town.

8 How can I now deny what the top brass of the General Staff is saying? And

9 how can after that I remove the commander of the battalion and take

10 independent measures on my own if no one ordered me to carry out a

11 thorough investigation aimed at establishing the actual truth regarding

12 the shelling of the Old Town?

13 So at the level of the JNA, there was not a general feeling or

14 determination, an intent to establish the truth, and my Superior Command

15 did not order me to do anything in that direction either.

16 MS. SOMERS:

17 Q. When you refer to your Superior Command, do you also include the

18 2nd Operational Group, or is that what you are referring to?

19 A. Yes, absolutely. General Strugar, as my superior officer.

20 Q. How would you characterise the tone or the climate of the command

21 of the 2nd Operational Group toward carrying out the investigations and

22 putting into place measures which might be required following

23 investigations into the shelling of the Old Town?

24 A. Well, I think the command of the 2nd Operational Group certainly

25 did not take any energetic action or issue orders in that direction aimed

1 at even a superficial investigation, let alone a thorough and real one.

2 Q. After the shelling of the 6th of December against the Old Town of

3 Dubrovnik, why did you not attempt to have Captain Kovacevic removed or

4 replaced?

5 A. I could not replace him because the commander of the 2nd

6 Operational Group did not allow it. He protected him and said that he was

7 a good lad. Those were his words. And that everything remained as it

8 was. The battalion remained in place, and he remained in place.

9 Q. Did you, Admiral Jokic, issue an order to shell the Old Town or to

10 attack Srdj on the 6th of December 1991?

11 A. No, absolutely not.

12 Q. Is there anything that indicates to you that there may have been

13 such an order in effect?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Do you believe that there is any room in the doctrine of the JNA

16 and the regulations which -- for a battalion commander to initiate an

17 attack without prior approval from his command?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Can you explain the extent of planning and coordination that would

20 be required for such an attack, such as took place on the 6th of December?

21 And depending on your answer, would you be able to comment on whether or

22 not the 6th of December attack went beyond the scale of a spontaneous

23 counterattack?

24 A. Yes. I think that -- I mean, I did not quite understand your

25 question. The proportion -- the scale of planning and attack?

1 Q. Let me rephrase it for you, Admiral, so it's perfectly clear. Was

2 there any evidence to you that might indicate that there may have been

3 some prior planning behind the attack? And I would ask you to look at the

4 extent of coordination of materiel, of weaponry that went into that

5 attack, as well as the time period during which the attack continued, the

6 duration of the attack. Do you understand my question now, Admiral?

7 Is it consistent with a spontaneous reaction?

8 A. Yes. It was not a spontaneous reaction. I knew it, then, too.

9 But I did not know about all the preparations. As for the scale of

10 preparations for such an attack, I think that at that level of battalion,

11 it could have been carried out during the day, on the 5th, before the 6th

12 of December. During the 5th of December, the battalion commander had to

13 carry out preparations with his company commanders. Also, carry out

14 agreement on acting in concert between certain parts of the battalion and

15 preparing artillery fire for limited targeting of Srdj. So he did need

16 several hours to carry out these preparations. And that shows that it was

17 not a spontaneous attack.

18 Q. Do you know anything about Captain Kovacevic's movements on the

19 eve before the attack?

20 A. At that time I --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Ms. Somers, please.

22 MS. SOMERS:

23 Q. The evening before the attack, so you're clear, meaning the 5th of

24 December.

25 A. At that time, I did not have any knowledge whatsoever. I know

1 that he did not come to my command post on the 5th of December.

2 Q. Did you learn anything subsequently about his movements?

3 A. Yes, I did, absolutely. As I investigated this, long after that,

4 and that included all his company commanders, and when I talked to him,

5 too, I established that he was carrying out preparations for an attack on

6 the 5th of December and that he went to the command post of the

7 2nd Operational Group on the eve of the 6th of December.

8 Q. And was anything said about the events that were to take place on

9 the 6th of December? Did anyone ask any questions as to why he was at the

10 command post of the 2nd Operational Group as opposed to the command post

11 of the unit to which he was subordinated, your command post?

12 A. Well, I wondered myself. I found that very surprising, that he

13 went to the command post of the Superior Command, of my Superior Command,

14 and without my knowledge, and I did not know of the intentions and

15 objectives involved. Also, without reporting to me, or rather my command

16 about going there.

17 Q. Did you indicate earlier that in notification of the units about

18 the cease-fire that Captain Kovacevic himself did not appear? Or did he

19 appear? Tell us, how was Captain Kovacevic's battalion made aware of the

20 cease-fire arrangements on the 5th.

21 A. He was informed by telephone from the forward command post of

22 Kupari. He was informed in the afternoon on the 5th of December. He was

23 informed by Captain Zec and Kozaric. One of the two of them.

24 Q. Who informed you that Captain Kovacevic visited the command post

25 of the 2nd Operational Group on the eve of the 5th of December?

1 A. I was told by two officers from the command of the 2nd Operational

2 Group, and Rambo told me, or rather Captain Kovacevic.

3 Q. About being present on the evening of the 5th of December.

4 A. Yes, precisely.

5 Q. When did Captain Kovacevic, Rambo, confirm this to you?

6 A. He said that to me before I went to The Hague. During a long

7 conversation of several hours, I was questioning him. And I wanted to

8 establish exactly what had happened on the 5th and 6th of December.

9 Q. Did you yourself visit the command post of the 2nd Operational

10 Group on the 5th of December? And if so, what time?

11 A. Yes. As soon as the talks at Cavtat ended, I went to Trebinje and

12 informed General Strugar about the conclusion of the negotiations, about

13 the fact that an agreement had been reached, that there was only one point

14 that remained undefined, and that that was a pure formality. As for the

15 rest, everything had been agreed upon. And a cease-fire order was

16 supposed to be issued to all units.

17 Q. Do you have any idea what time Captain Kovacevic would have gone

18 to the 2nd Operational Group on the 5th of December?

19 A. He went after that time, sometime between 1700 hours and 1900

20 hours. Sometime between the two.

21 Q. Are you able to give us an idea of what time of day you had gone

22 to the command post of the 2nd Operational Group?

23 A. Well, sometime between 1600 and 1700 hours, or rather between 1500

24 and 1600 hours. Sometime around then.

25 Q. Was General Strugar present at the command post when you went?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did you personally speak to General Strugar?

3 A. Yes, I did.

4 Q. Did you understand whether or not or did you know whether or not

5 General Strugar moves about regularly when he's in Trebinje, or is he

6 constantly -- I'm sorry. Does he move about regularly or is he constantly

7 at his command post? What do you know about General Strugar's movements?

8 A. You mean on the 5th of December?

9 Q. In general.

10 A. I cannot know at all where he was and what his movements were. He

11 covered a broad range because his units were from Mostar to Dubrovnik, and

12 he had Podgorica where he had to go, too. But I think that on the 6th of

13 December, he was not at his command post. I think, but I'm not sure.

14 Q. Were you aware of any high-level negotiations in which

15 General Strugar may have played a part as commander of a 2nd Operational

16 Group in 1992 in connection with issues settling Croatian territories?

17 A. Yes. I know after I was relieved, he took part in negotiations

18 with General Bobetko on a destroyer sometime in 1992. I don't know

19 exactly which month. Zec told me about that, but I wasn't there then.

20 Q. What was the subject matter, if you know, if you were told, of the

21 discussions? Did it concern Dubrovnik area?

22 A. Yes, these were talks, final talks, regarding the final withdrawal

23 of units from the area of Dubrovnik on the basis of the Vance Plan that

24 had been adopted in order to have the JNA withdraw from Croatia.

25 Q. I would like to ask you if you know of any protests that may have

1 been lodged against the attack on the 6th of December and what your

2 response was to those protests?

3 A. Yes. As for me, not to repeat everything that I've already said,

4 I said to Minister Davorin and in the fax that I sent to Dubrovnik, I

5 expressed my regrets over what had happened and so on. The protest, the

6 official protest, went to the command of the 2nd Operational Group. I

7 don't know exactly what General Strugar's response was. I know what he

8 said to me, but I don't know officially what his response was.

9 Q. I would ask you, please, to turn to tab 39 in your binders.

10 MS. SOMERS: I'm terribly sorry. I'm corrected. I have 39. It

11 should be 34.

12 Q. Admiral Jokic, looking at this document, do you recognise it?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And it's dated 6 December 1991, and it reflects a fax time of

15 15.36, but it says at the bottom, "Received at approximately 1400." And

16 who is it to?

17 A. It was addressed to the Crisis Staff of Dubrovnik, or rather,

18 Minister Davorin Rudolf.

19 Q. Would you please just very quickly read the first lines of the

20 message.

21 A. Yes. This is what it says, "These talks would be issued, continue

22 tomorrow, 12.00 after my return from Belgrade" --

23 Q. Perhaps you're not -- under message, where it says, "Your

24 Excellency," at the very beginning of your message.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Could you read that, please.

2 A. "I express my sincere regret for the difficult and unfortunate

3 situation that has been created. This was not our order, neither was it

4 ever in my mind to act this way. General Kadijevic sent a message to you

5 and to the ECMM in Dubrovnik on undertaking an energetic investigation at

6 our responsibility and the guilty ones for this event. At the same time,

7 we expect responsibility to be established on your side, too, for the sake

8 of a thorough clarification of all circumstances with regard to the events

9 from last night and this morning."

10 Q. I appreciate that.

11 MS. SOMERS: I would ask to move this document into evidence,

12 please.

13 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

14 THE REGISTRAR: This document is P136.

15 MS. SOMERS:

16 Q. Moving quickly to tab 39, please.

17 Admiral Jokic, in front of you is a document. Do you recognise

18 it?

19 A. Yes. This is a directive.

20 Q. And the date of the directive, Admiral?

21 A. The date is the 10th of December 1991.

22 Q. And who is it from, this directive?

23 A. It's a directive of the Federal Secretary for National Defence on

24 the use of armed forces in the coming period.

25 Q. Can I ask you to turn your attention to paragraph 6, please,

1 under -- where it says, "Zadatke." If you could just let us know, what

2 does paragraph 6 say?

3 A. The paragraph says, "In all areas of combat activity, place in

4 command the most senior officer of the JNA all units of the JNA and TO, as

5 well as volunteer units which agreed to be subordinate to that command and

6 wear JNA and TO insignia. All other armed formations should consider to

7 be paramilitaries and should be disarmed and removed from the zone of

8 combat activities. Take all steps to prevent looting and genocidal,

9 vengeful behaviour. To this end, establish necessary control by engaging

10 military police organs and units designated for that purpose as well as

11 criminal prosecution organs."

12 Q. Thank you, Admiral. Now, this was issued after the attack on the

13 6th of December. Do you know why?

14 A. Well, probably because previous orders were not obeyed in respect

15 of command and using different units, diverse units, including volunteers

16 and paramilitary units that probably did exist in certain areas. Also, in

17 terms of this vengeful behaviour and looting.

18 MS. SOMERS: I'd ask to move this document into evidence, please.

19 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

20 THE REGISTRAR: This document is numbered P137.

21 MS. SOMERS:

22 Q. Admiral Jokic, you have discussed your having come to The Hague.

23 And I want to ask you if you were charged by the Office of the Prosecutor

24 with violations of the laws or customs of war relating the shelling of the

25 Old Town of Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991. Were you charged with

1 violations? Were you indicted?

2 Was there an indictment against you for the attacks, your role in

3 the attacks against the Old Town of Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And did the counts indicate -- I'm sorry. Did the counts include

6 murder, cruel treatment, unlawful attack on civilians, devastation not

7 justified by military necessity, unlawful attack on civilian objects,

8 destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion,

9 charity, and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and

10 works of art and science?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Are these the same counts that General Strugar is charged with?

13 Same charges?

14 A. I believe so.

15 Q. Did you enter a plea of guilty to all counts before another Trial

16 Chamber of this institution on the 27th of August 2003?

17 A. Yes, I did.

18 Q. Were you sentenced to a period of seven years' incarceration on

19 the 18th of March 2004?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And are you currently in the Detention Unit of the United Nations

22 prior to any further action on that imposition of sentence?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MS. SOMERS: Your Honours, as a final point, there is a video that

1 has some reference to the individuals that Admiral Jokic has mentioned

2 tour the Old Town on behalf of the JNA. I fear because of time the most I

3 could try to do would be to show the video enough to identify it - I'm

4 proffering what I would do - and then seek admission. And whatever

5 weight the Chamber wishes to affix to it, simply leave in your hands. But

6 I think time would prohibit anything more than that. If that is --

7 JUDGE PARKER: What is the playing time?

8 MS. SOMERS: I believe it's over 20 minutes. And I think that

9 would be not appropriate to have the Chamber wait beyond this time.

10 JUDGE PARKER: The timing at the moment, we would be delaying the

11 cross-examination of Admiral Jokic until after the evidence of -- or the

12 completion of the evidence of the Ambassador. I wonder whether you would

13 want to finalise dealing with that tape at the commencement of the next

14 session of the Admiral's evidence. In other words, not close your case

15 now; deal with it when the Admiral resumes as the one last thing.

16 MS. SOMERS: We could do that. The Defence was given this video.

17 It had not been on the original exhibit list. It was given prior to the

18 commencement of testimony. And I hope that has offered enough time to

19 review it without any objection.

20 JUDGE PARKER: What I propose will give them even further time. I

21 know that Mr. Petrovic was anxious to say something. He might say it at

22 the resumption of evidence of the Admiral.

23 MS. SOMERS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE PARKER: What we might do is interrupt at this point the

25 evidence of Admiral Jokic for him to return certainly not tomorrow, but

1 probably the day following. And we will hear any submissions there may be

2 tomorrow about the resumption date of Admiral Jokic's evidence. We

3 will -- on the resumption of his evidence, whenever that is, you will deal

4 with that tape and any submissions of the Defence.

5 Now, is it still proposed that the Ambassador will give evidence

6 tomorrow?

7 MS. SOMERS: Yes. The Ambassador is actually here today, but I

8 believe the time is not favourable to starting.

9 JUDGE PARKER: It would be impractical, yes.

10 MS. SOMERS: Yes, sir.

11 JUDGE PARKER: What we will do is adjourn for today, resume

12 tomorrow morning. At the resumption tomorrow morning, we would hear brief

13 submissions on the way the Tribunal should deal with the medical condition

14 of the accused; that is, whether it should be dealt with on the written

15 record or whether we should hear oral evidence. We will hear those

16 submissions tomorrow morning. They need only be brief. And we will then

17 hear the Ambassador, and we will then hear any submissions that are to be

18 made about the resumption date and time of the evidence of the Admiral.

19 At the moment, we would anticipate that could be Wednesday.

20 MS. SOMERS: Thank you, Your Honour. May I just bring to the

21 Chamber's attention that from the binder, there were several tabs from

22 which we did not draw, so you know. I think tab 40 is already in

23 evidence, if I'm not wrong. But I didn't refer to it here. Tabs 35, 36

24 were not tendered. 40 and 36 -- I'm sorry, I have that backward. 40 and

25 36 were not tendered. 35 is in evidence.

1 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. On the basis that I've indicated, we

2 will now adjourn for the day to resume tomorrow morning.

3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.31 p.m.,

4 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 30th day of March,

5 2004, at 9.00 a.m.

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