110505ED

Page 13726

1 Mr. Tolimir is continuing his cross-examination.

2 Mr. Tolimir, you have the floor.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

4 May God's peace reign in this house, and may God's will be done

5 in these proceedings, and not necessarily mine.

6 And I greet all the people present in this courtroom today. I

7 greet Mr. Salapura and wish him a pleasant stay in our midst, and I wish

8 him a safe return to his home.

9 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Salapura, yesterday we left it off with some issues that I

12 don't want to pursue today. I would like to continue talking about the

13 document that we saw yesterday at the end of our session, and that

14 document was provided by the Documentation Centre based in Banja Luka.

15 And we spoke about that, but I didn't ask you anything about the victims

16 in Zepa and Srebrenica.

17 Were there any victims in Zepa? Thank you.

18 A. [No verbal response]

19 Q. Were there casualties among our army as a result of the fire of

20 the enemy army during the armed conflict and after the conflict, when the

21 zone was finally demilitarised? What can you tell us about that?

22 A. Yes. There were many. I don't know how many, though. In 1992,

23 there was a large number of casualties. Several dozen men were in our

24 column. I can't tell you what date was that. And that column was

25 bringing food for a communications facility. They were ambushed, and

Page 13727

1 they suffered great losses. After that, there were a lot of onslaughts

2 and attacks against facilities, even one against command facilities, or

3 actually several attacks against the command facility. We suffered

4 losses among foot soldiers and officers at the command post. Those were

5 continuous activities carried out by the forces from Zepa. I can't tell

6 you, after such a long time, when that was. In any way, that was a

7 continuous activity.

8 Q. Thank you. We're --

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, Mr. Salapura, like yesterday, I

10 would like to remind you to bear in mind you are using the same language

11 and we need a pause between question and answer and the next question.

12 You're starting to overlap again. Please bear that in mind and be very

13 careful with that.

14 Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Salapura, I apologise to you for not being able to get

18 documents with the exact data as to how many were killed in Zepa and how

19 many in Srebrenica, since the Trial Chamber decided not to continue

20 talking about the document provided by the Documentation Centre. Did you

21 analyse information, and did you --

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I have to interrupt you. This is a

23 misstatement.

24 The Chamber didn't stop you at all. The Chamber gave you some

25 advice to focus, in the time you may use during cross-examination, on the

Page 13728

1 events in 1995. The Chamber didn't stop you at all. You may read the

2 transcript of yesterday carefully.

3 Please carry on.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

5 You advised us to focus on 1995. Let me ask Mr. Salapura.

6 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Did you -- do you remember that a motorised convoy was ambushed

8 when they were carrying food to Zlovrh? That there were over 40 people

9 killed and over 40 captured; do you remember that?

10 A. I remember. And this is exactly what I was talking about. I

11 told you that I didn't know how many there were. There were several

12 dozen men in the convoy. And you'll remember that I personally went to

13 negotiate about the exchange of bodies, and I personally, with my own

14 hand, loaded those decomposing bodies onto a lorry. Those were the

15 bodies of our soldiers that had been killed. And you know that I was

16 beaten at the time. I carried a white flag in my hand because that was

17 the only way I could establish communication.

18 Q. Thank you. Tell me, please, when it comes to the Main Staff, did

19 the Main Staff ever retaliate against Zepa? Did you and I infiltrate

20 sabotage groups into Zepa? Our job was to work in the enemy territory;

21 however, were we able to work in the enemy territory there, in the

22 territory of the enclave of Zepa, as we were supposed to, because that

23 was our job?

24 A. I believe that there was one more attack, or perhaps two, coming

25 out of Zepa. A communications facility in the command sector was

Page 13729

1 attacked on the eve of the negotiations that I was supposed to carry out

2 with them. That's when two officers were killed. Two non-commissioned

3 officers were killed about 15 minutes before I turned up for the

4 negotiations. They were minor skirmishes, but we never infiltrated any

5 groups into the territory of Zepa. At the moment that UNPROFOR forces

6 arrived, I believe that the Ukrainian Battalion was there, and we did not

7 carry out any offensive activities at that time.

8 Q. Thank you. Do you remember whether the Main Staff ever sent

9 protests or demands to UNPROFOR, asking them to curb the attacks coming

10 out from the demilitarised zone?

11 A. Yes, that happened very often. You were very heavily involved in

12 that. I personally did not participate in the drafting of those protest

13 notes. You were the one who dealt with that, and there were a lot of

14 those. A few over Zepa and over Srebrenica, it happened all the time,

15 because from Srebrenica, provocations and armed attacks were continuous,

16 and we suffered very many losses as a result of that.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can D16 be displayed in e-court. I

18 apologise. Thank you, Aleksandar. Line 17 -- line 7.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Apologies by the interpreter.

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 Q. You can see the document, Mr. Salapura. And on line 6, the first

22 words are:

23 "The aggressor, on the 16th of February ..."

24 This is a document issued by Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was issued

25 by the Command of the 2nd Corps, and it was sent to the 28th Division,

Page 13730

1 and it is a warning about what we had done. That's when the

2 28th Division was called the 8th Operative Group. And we request

3 measures to be taken to raise combat activities. And it says here:

4 "The aggressor, on the 16th of February, 1995, filed a request

5 with UNPROFOR to declare Zepa a non-demilitarised zone, with the

6 following rationale:"

7 And helicopter flights are mentioned and attacks from the

8 demilitarised zone. Let me not go on reading any more.

9 Please, do you know that we tried to do that through UNPROFOR,

10 and in a written form, and through meetings at the airport? Do you know

11 about all that? Thank you.

12 A. You were in charge that activity. You co-ordinated that activity

13 with Colonel Magazin [phoen]. I'm not sure about his name, though. At

14 that level, the level of exchanging information, I know that there were

15 daily protests filed with UNPROFOR and that those protests were dealing

16 both with Srebrenica and Zepa.

17 Q. Thank you. Do you know anything about an attack that was

18 launched from Zepa at the Main Staff of the VRS? Did you happen to be

19 there in the Main Staff when they launched a direct attack against the

20 Main Staff? Thank you. And can you remember approximately when that

21 was, in what month and what year?

22 A. Yes, I remember; of course I do. We were all in trenches at that

23 time. I was the guards commander at the time. I can't tell you when

24 that was. I can't remember the date. However, as far as I know, there

25 was a direct attack, and there was a somewhat smaller-scale attack in the

Page 13731

1 same sector a bit later.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. Salapura.

3 I would like to call up D145.

4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

5 Q. You will tell us whether you remember that document which was

6 sent to the commander of the 65th Protective Regiment about an attack

7 from Srebrenica and Zepa. I will kindly ask you to read it. That

8 document was drafted on the 24th of June, and will you see the date when

9 that attack took place. Thank you.

10 I'm going to read the first sentence in this document.

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I would kindly ask you to slow down.

12 We hear the interpreters, and it is too fast for them, especially when

13 you are reading. Please slow down.

14 Carry on, please.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17 Q. And I quote:

18 "On 23rd June of this year," which is 1995, "at 0200 hours, a

19 unit of approximately 300 soldiers headed out from Srebrenica, led by

20 Ibrahim Mandzic, the commander of the 280th Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade,

21 and Vejiz Sabic, the commander of the 284th Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade,

22 and his deputy, Semso Salihovic, and a guide, a man called Zoran

23 Cardakovic, a Muslim."

24 And it says here that the unit's task was to insert itself that

25 same day and to attack [indiscernible], Han Pijesak."

Page 13732

1 Let's not waste any more time reading.

2 Do you remember that date? And was that in the month of June?

3 And what do you remember about this attack and about the units that

4 headed out from Srebrenica and Zepa and attacked the Main Staff in the

5 month of June 1995? Thank you.

6 Could you please wait.

7 A. Yes, I do remember that. I remember the warnings and the

8 preparations. But as far as I remember, this attack followed -- it

9 wasn't on the 23rd or the 24th; it was slightly later, in June. I think

10 that at the time I had already left the command post area. But I do know

11 that the attack took place, but I really cannot remember the exact date.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Can you please tell us, then, what you

13 do remember in relation to the attack, when you were acting as a guards

14 commander? What happened, and do you remember whether it was in the same

15 year, in the same month?

16 A. No, that attack was -- it happened earlier than this one, but

17 that was a larger-scale attack. I think their forces were larger, and

18 the command post was almost encircled.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Please, can you tell us whether you

20 remember whether the BH Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina were encouraging

21 their commanders to carry out attacks against Main Staff at that time for

22 the purpose of diverting our forces from Sarajevo?

23 A. Yes, those activities were very frequent. It's a pity. There

24 must be that somewhere one can find all the protests we filed to

25 UNPROFOR, mainly to UNPROFOR. They were our immediate communication with

Page 13733

1 the enemy. Of course, we couldn't have sent protests to the enemy. We

2 were sending requests to UNPROFOR to stop the attacks, to carry out

3 demilitarisation, to disarm them. And I remember that this was a topic

4 of many negotiations with the Ukrainian Battalion and their

5 representatives as well as with the representatives of the forces in

6 Srebrenica, UNPROFOR forces in Srebrenica.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have D62 on the

8 screen. It is a document issued by the Army of the Republic of

9 Bosnia and Herzegovina. You can see it in the heading. That was sent

10 from Zepa by the 285th Light Eastern Bosnia Brigade. It was sent to the

11 Command of the 2nd Corps and the 28th Division, and it's a report by

12 Avdo Palic to his superior commands.

13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Could you please just go through this document. I'm sure you

15 know it by heart, just as well as I do. And he's there informing them

16 about nine groups being established and that their purpose was to get to

17 the Main Staff. And look under number 9 or paragraph immediately after

18 that:

19 "All sabotage groups were tasked with acting simultaneously

20 within intervals of two hours for the purpose of spreading Chetnik

21 forces ..."

22 And so on and so forth.

23 So just as you told us, it was a large group, it was an organised

24 attack with nine groups. And in the last passage, we can see that they

25 claim 40 Chetniks were killed, that tens or dozens of them were wounded,

Page 13734

1 that a lot of weaponry was seized, and one soldier was captured; Mrdjan,

2 Velimir.

3 And this is my question to you: Is it a usual thing to carry out

4 attacks from the demilitarised zone, with nine groups attacking our

5 Main Staff and capturing a staff soldier and take him to the

6 demilitarised zone? Thank you.

7 A. In military terminology, this kind of action, a co-ordinated

8 attack with strong reconnaissance and sabotage forces or groups, with

9 even smaller number of troops, would be called a sabotage operation

10 because it's of a wider scope. And we can see from this text by

11 Avdo Palic what the casualties and intentions were, really. Bearing in

12 mind that Zepa was a protected, demilitarised area, this was something

13 that shouldn't have happened, and it shouldn't have been possible if it

14 was really a demilitarised zone. It was a protected area, but it

15 definitely wasn't demilitarised, just as Srebrenica.

16 And these attacks, as I was saying, were constant. We were

17 experiencing their attacks throughout that period. Why did UNPROFOR fail

18 to demilitarise them, we are still not clear about that, regardless of

19 all our protests and so on.

20 And they do mention the casualties here. There were also many

21 civilian casualties. More of the casualties were civilians. They are

22 talking about Chetniks. For them, all Serbs were Chetniks. That was

23 their terminology. And one must bear in mind that when they say "40,"

24 they don't mean exclusively soldiers.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura.

Page 13735

1 We will now look document D52, which speaks about exactly the

2 same thing. It's a document issued by the Army of the Republic of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and drafted by the Command of the 2nd Corps, and it is

4 addressed to the Command of the 28th Division of the 2nd Corps. Through

5 this, we can see the involvement of the entire 28th Division, and not

6 only Zepa forces.

7 And I apologise to Mr. Vanderpuye.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

9 Mr. Vanderpuye.

10 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

11 The reason I'm on my feet is in respect of the witness's last

12 comment with respect -- concerning what is meant by the term "Chetniks"

13 as used in this particular document.

14 It's not clear to me whether or not his opinion, that "Chetniks"

15 referred to all Serbs, is related to this particular document or just

16 related to his experience in general in the military, because as it's

17 written in this particular document, it refers specifically to military

18 operations. It talks about Chetnik forces, it talks about the commander

19 of a Chetnik group. And so if he's speaking in the context of this

20 document, then I would just ask if he could explain what his basis for

21 that comment was. But if it's just in terms of his experience, then

22 I think we're all right.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Salapura, can you help us? You said, at

24 page 10, lines 16 through 18:

25 "For them, all Serbs were Chetniks. That was their terminology.

Page 13736

1 And one must bear in mind when they say '40,' they don't mean exclusively

2 soldiers."

3 Could you explain that any further? What do you mean by that,

4 "not all of them were exclusively soldiers," in the context of this

5 document, of course?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I also added "civilians." But let

7 me explain. Yes, I can explain.

8 First of all, there were no Chetniks there. All these were

9 members of the VRS, because that was the name of our army. They were

10 there in our area of responsibility around Sarajevo. There were groups

11 that declared themselves as Chetniks. These were mostly volunteers. But

12 in this area, there were no paramilitary groups or anyone like that.

13 There were only units that belonged to the 67th Protective Motorised

14 Regiment and Vlasenica Brigade. There were no Chetniks there. There

15 were exclusively soldiers of the VRS.

16 The Muslim side, at the time, used the term "Chetnik" not only

17 for such groups, but for all Serbs along all front-lines. I can also

18 tell you we saw that as a derogatory term, but our side also used

19 derogatory names for Muslims.

20 But out of these 40 mentioned here, not all of them were

21 soldiers. I cannot tell you exact numbers or give you data that I

22 haven't verified. I'm here under oath. I don't know how many of the

23 casualties were actual soldiers, but some of them are also civilians.

24 Now, from this period in time, I cannot really tell you the exact

25 numbers. I've told you already that I have problems with numbers, and my

Page 13737

1 memory is failing me.

2 This report of theirs, I cannot give any more detailed comment.

3 But they used the term "Chetnik" for both soldiers and civilians. And if

4 there are any reports sent by the 28th Division and 5th Corps, 1st Corps,

5 and official documents, they all use the same term.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Salapura, I only wanted to know what is your

7 source about the -- your explanation that not all of the mentioned

8 40 people, killed people, were soldiers. What is your source for that

9 statement?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The source is my memory.

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

12 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. If Mr. Vanderpuye would like to hear a

15 more detailed explanation about the term "Chetnik," as used by Muslims,

16 that is something that he can do in his re-direct.

17 Now, this document was sent by their Tuzla Command, and it was

18 sent to the 28th Division. And as you can see under first item, 60

19 Chetniks were liquidated. So there was an action from Zepa. And then

20 under that, in the following paragraph, it is stated:

21 "In the village of Visnjica, large quantities of ammunition were

22 seized, but the soldiers were exhausted and could not remove it, so the

23 ammunition was destroyed, as were all the facilities that the aggressor

24 could have used for military purposes."

25 And this is my question to you: Did you hear about the village

Page 13738

1 of Visnjica being burnt down and that most of the casualties were

2 civilians, because a village is a village? Did you hear that through the

3 media and through the reports coming from our subordinated units? Thank

4 you.

5 A. Yes, I do remember that the village of Visnjica was burned down.

6 But, again, I cannot give you any figures concerning the casualties. But

7 I believe that such information can still be obtained in Vlasenica, in

8 Han Pijesak, in the municipalities, how many of the victims were

9 civilians and how many soldiers.

10 Q. Thank you. In the survey made by the Documentation Centre that

11 we saw yesterday, we can even see the names of the people who were killed

12 in the village, but we'll discuss it later. Now, we don't have time for

13 that.

14 And now I would like to ask you to tell us whether we were

15 receiving information about the fact why the Muslims from these areas

16 were being directed to act against the Main Staff, as we can see in that

17 document before; that the purpose was to spread our forces thin. So did

18 you know about that, did we have information about that, and did we send

19 warnings to our command that they are using it for the purpose of

20 diverting our forces away from Sarajevo? Thank you.

21 A. Yes, that's correct. We had another, but unconfirmed

22 information, so I wouldn't want to really present it here as an answer,

23 another information about what the purpose was of the attacks, in

24 addition to spreading our forces thin. I can tell you about it if you

25 want me to. We could not confirm it.

Page 13739

1 The BH Army, in this report of theirs, did not mention that goal,

2 but their objective was to provoke the international community to start

3 with the air-strikes, continue them, and to possibly bring in NATO land

4 forces to assist.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D53 now, please, a document which

6 will confirm it. And then we'll move to the document which talks about

7 creating conditions about the introduction of NATO land forces into the

8 area.

9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10 Q. D53 we have before us. It's an order by the General Staff of the

11 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the purpose of it is:

12 "Preparations for Offensive Combat Operations, Order," sent to the

13 Command of the 28th Division. And what you just told us can be also

14 found in the text:

15 "Pursuant to a verbal order issued by the commander of the

16 General Staff of the BH Army, Army General Rasim Delic, and on the

17 occasion of the great success achieved by the units of the BH Army in the

18 wide area around Sarajevo and Gorazde, as well as on the basis of

19 intelligence ..."

20 And so on and so forth.

21 "... I hereby issue the following order:

22 "1. Execute all preparations in the Command of the

23 28th Land/Army Division to execute offensive combat operations with a

24 view to liberating the territory of BiH, overextending the aggressor

25 forces and inflicting losses on them, co-ordinating action with the

Page 13740

1 BH Army forces carrying out operations in the broader area of Sarajevo.

2 "2. Plan realistic tasks ..."

3 And:

4 "3. The General Staff will regulate and order the commencement

5 of offensive combat activities."

6 So this is my question: Order coming from the Republic of Bosnia

7 and Herzegovina's General Staff, did it order the troops in the

8 demilitarised zone to act against forces that allowed for them to be seen

9 as a demilitarised zone, namely the VRS?

10 A. This order is very clear. I see it for the first time, but it is

11 very clear that this was a violation of the status of protected area, and

12 not only by carrying out provocative actions, but also wide-ranging

13 actions with more radical objectives. This document is self-explanatory.

14 Q. Thank you. Mr. Salapura, if you had came by an order from the

15 aggressor side during the war, how would you have qualified it? How much

16 reliability would you have given to it? Thank you.

17 A. We would like to have another source for that to corroborate this

18 information. This does appear to be reliable information. However,

19 during every war, there is the so-called operative disguise or decoy,

20 which means that false information is launched to the effect that an

21 attack would be launched along the Sokolac axis, but the contrary was

22 true and, for example, the attack went in the direction of Vlasenica, and

23 that was done in order to divert the attention of our forces. We had

24 different sources. We did not have this particular order. We did not

25 come by this particular order. We had our own sources. This is

Page 13741

1 completely correct, absolutely correct, and subsequently it was proven

2 correct.

3 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. You have just told us how

4 you checked the reliability of information.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 03996. Can we see

6 it in e-court, for the benefit of the witness. Can we look at its second

7 paragraph. Then I would have a question of the witness. I don't have

8 the time to read the contents of the entire document, unfortunately.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I take it you are referring to 65 ter 3996.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.

11 We can see it on the screen now. Can we see the second

12 paragraph, where it says:

13 "According to reliable sources," which means that the reliability

14 of the sources is evaluated, "the Americans are providing the Muslims

15 intelligence on VRS units. UNPROFOR and NATO are continuing to threaten

16 that they will bomb VRS positions and facilities if the VRS launches an

17 attack on the Muslim enclaves in counter-attack, in order to crush the

18 Muslim offensive, even though there is no agreement about this in the

19 UN Security Council."

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21 Q. This document was issued by the Intelligence Sector. I signed

22 it. I suppose that all of us participated in its creation, and you also

23 were heavily involved. Did we have such information, did we have such

24 intelligence? Did NATO and international monitors insist on this, and

25 were we threatened by being bombed?

Page 13742

1 A. Yes. And according to our information, and you know it even

2 better, because you directly participated in the negotiations, I did not

3 often participate directly in any negotiations. It did happen, but not

4 that often. This is our intelligence which originates from different

5 sources, and you are privy to information directly from negotiations.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this please be admitted, and

7 then can we see 04035 in e-court. Thank you.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received as an exhibit.

9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D237, Your Honours.

10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Q. We can see a document here which was also drafted by our

12 Intelligence Administration, or the Intelligence Sector, and sent to all

13 the end users. And here it says that the Western diplomatic circles know

14 that at the summit of seven countries it was agreed that France should be

15 the organiser of a new peace conference about the former Yugoslavia. We

16 received that information, and we forwarded it further.

17 And can we now see the second page of the same document, the last

18 paragraph thereof. Thank you.

19 There was information according to which the Muslim forces of the

20 28th Division, on the 25th and 26th of June, which means a month before

21 the events in Srebrenica, launched an offensive from the enclaves of

22 Srebrenica and Zepa by way of organising incursions of several sabotage

23 groups into our territory. In Srebrenica, they blockaded UNPROFOR on the

24 charges that they had not protected the so-called demilitarised zone. It

25 is also possible that they disarmed some of UNPROFOR elements.

Page 13743

1 Can we have the following page, please:

2 "The goal of those activities is probably to provoke our

3 activities and to create favourable conditions for the activities of the

4 24th, 23rd, and 26th Divisions from the axis of Kalesija, Visnjica, and

5 Kladanj."

6 My question is this: Is it true that there was an intention to

7 link up the forces mentioned in the document, the forces from the

8 2nd Corps and Central Bosnia, with the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa,

9 and were we privy to that intelligence?

10 A. Yes. That was a plan which had been drafted even prior to this.

11 It was a long-term goal of the Muslim forces. However, realistically, no

12 conditions were put in place for that. There were several failed

13 attempts. However, they didn't have enough strength in order to achieve

14 such a goal. They did not really embark on the execution of the entire

15 plan. They did it in batches, as it were, gradually.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura.

17 I would like to tender this document on the screen into evidence.

18 It's number 04035.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Since there is no English translation, it will be

20 marked for identification, pending translation.

21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D238.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. Salapura, did we receive intelligence to the effect that the

25 Muslim command cadre from the 28th Division had gone to Tuzla in order to

Page 13744

1 prepare themselves for the linking up of the enclaves, and carry out the

2 operation to link up the enclaves with Central Bosnia and Herzegovina,

3 and the arrival of the Muslims at the Drina?

4 A. Yes. They often went both by road and by helicopter. The

5 operation was planned as I have described it. They had a radical plan in

6 place. However, conditions were never put in place to carry out such a

7 radical operation. That was their main goal. A serious of provocations

8 and activities that were launched were launched precisely in order to

9 achieve that long-term goal. They tried to approach the goal gradually

10 to see whether the moment would come when they would be able to carry it

11 out completely.

12 Q. Do you remember whether Naser Oric led a group of officers to

13 Tuzla and to the commands bordering on the areas under the control of the

14 VRS? Do you remember that that happened, and then they went by

15 helicopter to those places for those meetings?

16 A. While the operation around Srebrenica was taking place,

17 Naser Oric was in Tuzla. He had left before our operation was launched.

18 I can't tell you exactly when that happened, on what date. He went for

19 negotiations, for meetings, and preparations. There are materials that

20 demonstrate exactly what happened at the meeting with Alija Izetbegovic

21 and how much ammunition and weapons had been brought into the protected

22 and demilitarised zone of Srebrenica. I can't tell you the numbers. I

23 wouldn't like to speculate. There is information. I can see how many

24 documents you have given me, and I believe that there is much more at the

25 Tribunal.

Page 13745

1 Q. Yes, you're right, Mr. Salapura. However, according to our

2 intelligence, and you will see that later, for example, D67 is a document

3 where Alija Izetbegovic is informed about what had been brought into the

4 enclaves, what was air-lifted and what was brought by land. The document

5 was drafted by the Intelligence Administration of the Army of Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina. It was their interim report dated 13 July 1995. It was

7 sent to the president of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, and it shows

8 what was sent to Srebrenica. And it says here:

9 "In view of the situation of our enclaves during the preceding

10 period, the Army General Staff has undertaken a series of military

11 activities and procedures to organise the members of the army in the

12 enclaves and prepare them for possible developments, primarily the

13 defence of the existing free territory and planned engagement and

14 preparations for future joint operations and planned operations."

15 So they're talking about joint operations and planned operations.

16 And he continues to say as follows:

17 "Seventeen helicopter sorties were carried out, and in each of

18 which a helicopter was hit."

19 At first, the materiel and equipment were brought in in smaller

20 quantities. And then bullet point 3 says:

21 "We suffered a lot of casualties as a result of that."

22 And then the overview that you mentioned on the following page,

23 and you can see how much was brought into Zepa and how much was brought

24 into Srebrenica, how many lethal weapons and how much ammunition.

25 And my question is this. You can see the overview in the English

Page 13746

1 version. You can see the total situation. Now it is enlarged so you can

2 see Zepa and Srebrenica total. My question to you is this: Bearing in

3 mind the preamble where the preparations for future joint actions is

4 referred to, what do you deem, as an intelligence officer? Is that what

5 you have just spoken about? And was that the reason why those lethal

6 weapons and ammunition were brought into the enclaves, why they were

7 air-lifted and brought by land? Thank you.

8 A. This document is a clear confirmation of all that. However, I'd

9 adhere by our assessment and our statement that that was their ultimate

10 goal that they wanted to achieve. However, they did not have enough

11 equipment and strength in order to achieve it. According to some

12 intelligence that we had, the goal was to provoke a larger-scale activity

13 by the international community and NATO. That was what they wanted to

14 achieve. You cannot see it here, but that was the intelligence that we

15 had. We could not check. We did not have two more sources at our

16 disposal in order to be able to check them and to give that intelligence

17 the higher degree of reliability.

18 Q. Could you please look at the document 4020. Can you look at the

19 last sentence in the second paragraph of that document - thank you - and

20 the first sentence as well. Thank you.

21 We are still waiting for it.

22 Let me tell you that this is our intelligence report that we

23 submitted to all of our end users. It was drafted on the

24 19th of May, 1995, in the month of May. And it says in the first

25 sentence:

Page 13747

1 "Muslims continue illegally importing weapons and military

2 equipment. This week, two Turkish freighters left Hanover, carrying

3 weapons and military equipment for Muslims in the former Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina."

5 And now let's look at the last sentence in the second paragraph,

6 where it says:

7 "We still continue to note several indicators to the fact that

8 they plan on taking Doboj and link up with units intended to attack

9 Serbian Posavina."

10 And so on and so forth.

11 My question is this: During this stage, in the month of May 1995

12 and in March of 1995, did Muslims start arming their forces at a faster

13 rate? They received weapons from their allies, from foreign countries,

14 through the channels that they used. Did they prepare to launch an

15 offensive in the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the

16 fact that a cease-fire was in force at the time?

17 A. Yes. The weapons arrived by land, by the sea, through the

18 territory of Croatia, through Croatian harbours, and then it was

19 infiltrated into the territory of the Federation.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 Can we see the second page.

22 THE INTERPRETER: The microphone is not on.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone, please.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 Can we see the following page of this document and the next

Page 13748

1 paragraph, which is on page 3 in the English version.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. We can see here where first we received information and then

4 confirmed it, and it is stated here:

5 "We have confirmed the information that the 28th Division is

6 undergoing intensive preparations for offensive activities in order to

7 link up with parts of the 23rd Division in the Han Pogled sector. As

8 part of offensive preparations from the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves,

9 they have taken possession of important facilities to secure the corridor

10 linking the enclaves, and they have partially grouped forces in the

11 western part of the enclaves. They have taken Podravanje, Ljeskovik,

12 Susica, Stublic, Brloznik, Sadilov Cair, Godenje, Ljubomislje, and

13 Gusinac ..."

14 And this is my question: Did we, as an intelligence

15 administration, forward intelligence to commands confirming that Muslim

16 forces are planning to link up with the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa,

17 and they are fortifying these positions and forces?

18 A. Yes, we were monitoring this type of activity continuously. That

19 was one of our main tasks. And towards the bottom, we can see the other

20 one, only I cannot see the date of this document, what date, what year

21 this is. Is it 1995? Yes.

22 Q. 19th of May, 1995, just for the record.

23 A. Yes, yes, yes. Yes, that's it. And we are at the time already

24 drafting our reports about the preparations by the Croatian Army to

25 attack Bosnia and Herzegovina and continue their attack against the

Page 13749

1 western parts of Bosnia, or, rather, Republika Srpska.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 I'd like to tender this document 4020 and to have 4022 on the

4 screen.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received as an exhibit.

6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D239, Your Honours.

7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 Q. You spoke about introducing NATO forces into the Balkans. This

9 is another information report, 42. In the first passage, it is stated:

10 "NATO continued bringing its forces to Jadran and former BiH

11 through independent state of Croatia. According to unverified

12 intelligence, the British 24th Air Brigade is being deployed in the area

13 of Kiseljak for their involvement."

14 And then in the last passage, you are saying:

15 "There are information about special forces of the NATO being

16 brought in to the territory for the purpose of liquidating political

17 leadership and top military structures."

18 And this is my question to you: Were you receiving such

19 intelligence? Was our administration receiving such intelligence? Thank

20 you.

21 A. This was on the 3rd of June?

22 Q. This document is dated 31st of May, 1995, so one month and ten

23 days before the Srebrenica events.

24 A. I don't remember this report, but I did tell you what we had,

25 what their objectives were, what their attempts were. I cannot remember

Page 13750

1 this exact report. I can see what is written in there.

2 Could we please see the bottom of it so that I can see the

3 signature?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the end of the

5 document. Thank you.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I wanted to see -- yes,

7 "Karanovic," yes. I don't remember having read this report. I must have

8 been absent from the command post at the time when it was drafted.

9 However, I did have such information in general sense. We needed to

10 verify them.

11 And could we please have the beginning of the text again, because

12 I do remember that there was mention of unconfirmed sources, so I don't

13 know what the degree of reliability this was.

14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Yes. You can see it in the second line.

16 A. Yes, unverified sources. This means that this information -- can

17 I please explain this, Your Honours? Would you allow me to provide an

18 explanation about this segment?

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It's up to Mr. Tolimir to decide.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So, Mr. Tolimir, is that okay?

21 Yes, okay, thank you.

22 What I'd like to say here, and it is very important: This

23 intelligence is of great weight. We had to draft this and put it in, but

24 we distance ourselves by saying, "according to unconfirmed information,

25 unverified information." By doing that, we're providing indication to

Page 13751

1 our leadership. We continue processing the information and trying to

2 confirm it. We are doing this because we don't want to be caught by

3 surprise and to be told, Why didn't you inform us earlier so that we can

4 carry out the required actions and measures?

5 I'm just trying to explain some of our terminology that was used

6 only by our service.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura.

8 I would like to tender this document. And in the meantime, let

9 us discuss the verification of responsibility, as Mr. Salapura was

10 telling us about that some time ago.

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: 65 ter 4022 doesn't have an English translation.

12 It will be marked for identification, pending translation.

13 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D240, Your Honours.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

15 Can we please have document 4026 on the screen so that

16 Mr. Salapura would know what I intend to ask him about.

17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18 Q. We will see a document here that discusses the very same

19 situation on the 6th of June, the same situation that was discussed in

20 the 31st of May report, when we said we have unconfirmed information.

21 And in the meantime, we have verified them. On the 6th of June, we are

22 saying:

23 "We have information that the Supreme Command of the Muslim Army

24 had ordered its wartime units in Muslim enclaves to immediately take

25 UNPROFOR check-points, seize their weapons, and organise the defence of

Page 13752

1 the enclave on their own, using UNPROFOR's weaponry."

2 In the second paragraph, it is stated:

3 "It is our assessment that the Muslim leadership reached this

4 decision in agreement or in consultations with the NATO Command, with the

5 purpose of deteriorating relations of warring parties with UNPROFOR, and

6 thereby increasing tensions and creating conditions for intervention by

7 the international forces through RS territory, which would bring about a

8 change in the UNPROFOR mandate."

9 And in the third passage, it is stated:

10 "Unless UNPROFOR members from Muslim enclaves try to withdraw to

11 our territory with their weaponry, they need to be accepted and taken

12 out. One must make sure that we will not be surprised."

13 And could you please tell us whether this fits in with our

14 assessment of the potential situation, and did subsequent events prove us

15 right?

16 A. As far as my memory serves me, yes, I think it was like that.

17 And I actually think that the situation with the check-points of the

18 Ukrainian Battalion was exactly like that. I don't remember what the

19 situation was like in Srebrenica.

20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. I still owe you an explanation.

21 One of our witnesses was Mr. Nikolic, who was our man in

22 Srebrenica, and he told us about some check-points, UNPROFOR

23 check-points, being taken.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

25 document, Your Honours.

Page 13753

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be marked for identification, pending

2 translation.

3 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D241, Your Honours.

4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Salapura, unfortunately we have numerous documents that we

6 cannot use publicly. These documents are under seal, and I'm talking

7 about -- I'm referring to reports that we were sending to our end users,

8 including the Yugoslav Army.

9 Can you tell which end users were receiving our reports?

10 A. Yes, I can tell you. It was a large group of addressees: The

11 Presidency of Republika Srpska, then the State Security Administration.

12 I don't know whether a copy was sent to each individual member of the

13 Presidency or just to the Presidency, as such. All the assistant

14 commanders of the Main Staff received one copy. The minister of defence

15 received one copy; corps commanders, all of them. Serbian State Security

16 received a copy, according to you're order. And Intelligence

17 Administration of the Army of Yugoslavia also received one copy.

18 Q. The reports that we were sending to Serbia, to their

19 State Security and the Yugoslav Army, were they sending this to them just

20 for their information, whereas others were using -- were receiving that

21 to be using such documents?

22 A. Yes, that's normal. And -- yes, I apologise. Yes, of course.

23 Documents sent to Yugoslavia, to these two institutions, we were sending

24 them full reports. But I would like to add that it's a very typical,

25 standard situation even before the war, and during the war, and even

Page 13754

1 after the war, as long as the administration existed. And this is also

2 normal practice between various services all over the world; namely, that

3 there are contacts between services and diplomatic corps, other services'

4 members and so on, and that people discuss situation, exchange some

5 information, those intelligence -- those pieces of intelligence that can

6 be handed over. That's a usual situation.

7 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Chamber whether the information and

8 reports we were providing to them, were they mainly information we

9 gathered ourselves so that they would be just informed about what we were

10 doing?

11 A. Yes, that was just for information.

12 Q. Can you tell us whether anyone from Yugoslavia asked you about

13 which pieces of intelligence could be used publicly, which should be

14 secret, and which could be distributed among other end users? Thank you.

15 A. No, I don't think it was necessary to do that because all of the

16 reports were sent to professional institutions who -- or which know how

17 to treat them. They didn't need any assistance in determining how to use

18 it. Some of the intelligence that was made public would not be credited

19 to anyone.

20 I hope I was clear in my answer.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Do you know that Serbia, and they were

22 receiving our information just as an information, do you know that they

23 asked for these materials to be used exclusively in closed session?

24 A. I heard about it only yesterday, when you told us that various

25 information here, that is protected. But that's their choice.

Page 13780

1 Q. Mr. Salapura, did we receive information about the Muslims from

2 the Zepa and Srebrenica enclave making hasty preparations to launch their

3 so-called operation to link up with the Tuzla Corps and the forces of the

4 B&H Army along the line of the front from Kalesija, Zivinice, and so on

5 and so forth? Thank you.

6 A. Yes. These -- this information was sent in late 1994/early 1995.

7 This is when they first appeared. And I think I said that once already,

8 that that was their strategic goal. And I did state my position on that

9 clearly. Yes, this information did appear. This was planned. This is

10 something that they wanted, but it didn't actually come about. Well,

11 many plans don't actually materialise in the end. Many of our plans did

12 not materialise either.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: There was no interpretation because your

15 microphone was off.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Which is not under seal, thank you.

17 Which is not under seal, thank you.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Which document are you asking for? It's not on

19 the record.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I am asking for

21 65 ter 07349, which is not under seal.

22 Can we look at the first page, please, so that the witness could

23 see that it's a document from the 8th of February, 1995.

24 And can we look at the last page, please, so that we can see who

25 signed the document. And after that, we can look at page 2 so that I can

Page 13781

1 quote paragraph 8, which is relevant for what I would like to ask the

2 witness about.

3 Can we please look at the eighth paragraph. This is the fourth

4 one from the bottom, if that is easier. It states:

5 "Information has been confirmed that in the Srebrenica enclave,

6 as part of the general preparations of the Muslims for the spring

7 offensive, reorganisation and training is being conducted of Muslim

8 units, with the objective of carrying out offensive actions in order to

9 link up with the forces of the 2nd Corps along the line

10 Drinjaca-Konjevic Polje-Cerska, whereby the intention is to establish a

11 territorial link between Srebrenica and the Tuzla region. In relation to

12 this, information has been confirmed that five brigades and one sabotage

13 battalion were formed in Srebrenica of 400 to 800 men, and the most

14 numerous of those brigades is the 281st Brigade, under the command of

15 Zulfo Tursunovic. Information has been confirmed that in the recent

16 contingent that was transported to Zepa by helicopter there was a large

17 number of Glicerinka rifles, a certain number of mortars, 500 to

18 800 uniforms, and a considerable quantity of infantry ammunition."

19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Could you please explain to us what the part of the sentence

21 means where it says "information has been confirmed"? What does that

22 phrase mean in intelligence work?

23 A. That means that the confirmed piece of information was received

24 from several sources and so that it has already a certain degree of

25 accuracy.

Page 13782

1 Q. Thank you. Are the clear intentions here being talked about,

2 about the Muslim Army's intention to link up the Srebrenica and Zepa

3 territories with the part of the territory that is under the control of

4 the 2nd Corps?

5 A. Yes.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 This information about ammunitions, the Glicerinka rifle was

8 confirmed in the previous document, where it says exactly the quantity of

9 these types of rifles that were received.

10 Could we please tender this document, and then can we show the

11 next document, please.

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This document will be marked for identification,

13 pending translation.

14 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One moment.

16 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit D245, MFI'd.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

18 I take the opportunity to put the two documents under seal which

19 we have received some minutes ago, D242 and D243, just for the record,

20 both under seal.

21 Now continue, please.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

23 Can we now look at 65 ter 07351, please, which is also under

24 seal, and the document is signed by the witness. Thank you.

25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Are you sure that this is under seal? I don't

Page 13783

1 see such an indication on the document, itself. Please check that.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will be grateful.

3 And if the Prosecution agrees, I would gladly use it in open session, but

4 I believe that the document is under seal. Thank you.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You should know it, Mr. Tolimir, with the

6 assistance of Mr. Gajic.

7 Mr. Vanderpuye.

8 MR. VANDERPUYE: I understand that it's not, Mr. President, so we

9 can use it in public session.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you,

12 Mr. Vanderpuye.

13 This is information of the 10th of June, 1995. It's a regular

14 report that we sent to all of our users.

15 Can we now please read line 7 of the first paragraph. I will

16 quote. It states:

17 "NATO is attempting to legalise the presence of its own forces in

18 the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, stating that these forces

19 would be acting as part of UNPROFOR."

20 This was on the 10th of June, 1995, before the signing of the

21 Dayton Accords.

22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Was it later correct that NATO acted as part of the

24 implementation forces that were there to implement the Dayton Agreement?

25 A. Yes, it's true that NATO forces served in the territory of Bosnia

Page 13784

1 and Herzegovina. A contingent is still there to this day.

2 Q. Thank you. It states, I continue:

3 "Along with implementing the preparations for the application of

4 the military option and the media preparations, in order to prepare the

5 public opinion for the use of force, the West continues its intensive

6 diplomatic campaign in order to overcome the situation created following

7 the bombing of our positions and facilities, and to legalise the broader

8 application of force and direct military engagement of NATO in support of

9 the Croat Muslim forces in the attack on the VRS and the SVK in order to

10 break them up and establish an independent state of Croatia and a unitary

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina within the AVNOJ borders. They will apply the

12 principle of gradualness in the implementation of the set objective in

13 order to make sure that the FRY does not interfere in the military

14 conflict and that Russia does not use its veto right in order to block

15 the vote of certain resolutions of the United Nations Security Council."

16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask Mr. Tolimir to

17 repeat the question.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, the interpreters translated --

19 interpreted the reading from the document, but not your question. Please

20 repeat your question.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Mr. Salapura, can you please tell us if after the

24 10th of June, 1995, bombing of Republika Srpska was carried out by NATO,

25 and did this coincide with the offensive that the Croatian army and the

Page 13785

1 Muslim army from the Cazin Krajina was conducting against the Army of

2 Republika Srpska? Thank you.

3 A. Well, I don't remember that now, but I would need to see it. If

4 it says that this did take place, if it says so in this information, then

5 it probably did take place, but I cannot really make that connection now.

6 Can you please tell me again which paragraph that is here?

7 Q. Well, it's the first paragraph, line 6 from the top.

8 A. Well, if it's here, then it says the option of using national

9 contingents on the basis of decision by individual governments, if we're

10 talking about the first chapter.

11 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether after June, let's say July or

12 August, NATO did carry out actions in Republika Srpska and targets in

13 Republika Srpska? Did this occur in August, for example? Do you know

14 when the Storm Operation occurred?

15 A. Yes, I do. I think it began on the 4th of August. It was

16 supposed to start on the 2nd, but it was moved.

17 Q. Thank you. Did NATO fire on targets in Republika Srpska in that

18 period?

19 A. Yes. That was the intense part of the campaign. They fired at

20 targets in the Krajina. There was intensive drone reconnaissance

21 throughout Republika Srpska. And from what I can recall now, I don't

22 know if the air-strikes campaign had already ended by that time or not.

23 I cannot really remember that definitely.

24 Q. And did NATO fire at military targets in Republika Srpska in

25 August, targets such as relay stations, relay nodes, bridges? They even

Page 13786

1 destroyed three bridges in Foca over rivers that could be crossed by

2 foot, for example.

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, are you giving evidence or are you

4 asking the witness? If you say, They even destroyed the three bridges,

5 is that a question? This is a statement. But you should be aware that

6 the facts -- that Mr. Salapura --

7 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Wait.

9 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please. Please wait. I'm speaking. Please

11 wait.

12 You may put questions to the witness, but not put such a

13 statement on the record.

14 And please try not to overlap. It is very difficult for the

15 interpreters, again.

16 Please carry on.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I repeat

18 my question.

19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Did NATO fire at targets in the Republika Srpska when it

21 destroyed relays and three bridges; for example, in Srbinje and in other

22 places in the Republika Srpska? Thank you.

23 A. A lot of facilities were exposed to NATO air-strikes, and a lot

24 were destroyed; radio relay nodes, for example, radar systems. Bridges

25 were destroyed in Srbinje. Certain facilities such as depots and

Page 13787

1 warehouses were targeted; for example, Kosara, above Banja Luka, near

2 Teslic, above Han Pijesak. A lot of facilities were fired at by NATO. I

3 can't remember all of them, and I can't tell you exactly when, on what

4 day. I really don't know. I've forgotten. I'm not sure about the

5 dates.

6 Q. Thank you. The air-strikes that you're referring to, did that

7 happen in the month of August or even before that? Thank you.

8 A. I wouldn't be able to give you the exact time-period.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can you give us the year?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that it was in 1995.

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

13 Mr. Tolimir.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

15 Since I don't have the right to jog the witness's memory, I can't

16 help it, Mr. Salapura.

17 Can this document, dated the 10th of June, be admitted. Bear in

18 mind that you drafted a document on the 10th of June dealing with the

19 activities that were taking place at the time or thereafter.

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We see the document was signed by the witness.

21 One comment, Mr. Tolimir: You have the right to jog the memory

22 of the witness, but this is different from putting a statement on the

23 record.

24 It will be marked for identification, pending translation.

25 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit D246, MFI'd, Your Honours.

Page 13788

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 Q. Mr. Salapura, did NATO use every single opportunity to open fire

4 against the VRS and targets in the Republika Srpska and later on in the

5 Republic of Serbia as well? Thank you.

6 A. Yes, there were a lot of such instances. Again, I would not be

7 able to list all of those occasions. I remember a lot of them, but I

8 can't give you the exact time when they happened. I know that there were

9 air-strikes against Serbia. Later on, I could watch that on television.

10 And a lot of things I experienced with my own two eyes. But I don't

11 think that those facilities are the issue here.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Let us see what the NATO commander, who

13 was a witness here, said about all that. His name is Mr. Rupert Smith,

14 and the exhibit number is D193, page 11. Let's see what he said:

15 "In the course of April," and I mean the events that took place

16 in 1995, this is what General Rupert Smith said in his statement:

17 "In the course of April --"

18 You can see the statement now. Page 11, please.

19 Now you can see it. And in the first paragraph, it says:

20 "In the course of April, the situation in Bosnia got even worse."

21 The previous page in English, please. Thank you, Aleksandar.

22 "In the course of April, the situation in Bosnia got even worse.

23 The enclaves continued to be squeezed logistically to the extent that I

24 made a further plan to resupply the enclaves by helicopter, daring the

25 VRS to attack a helicopter with the prospect of subsequent attack."

Page 13789

1 My question is this: I'm inviting your comment upon

2 Mr. Rupert Smith's statement provided to the

3 International Criminal Tribunal, and that statement was later on used in

4 the proceedings against me. Thank you.

5 A. Yes, there were a lot of provocations against our forces, against

6 our leaderships. There were a lot of challenges. That was co-ordinated

7 throughout the war. There were a lot of provocations whereby the Muslim

8 forces co-ordinated with NATO, and the aim was to provoke the VRS and

9 provoke a response and possibly larger-scale actions. And one of those

10 provocations are -- is mentioned here in Mr. Rupert Smith's statement. I

11 can't remember all of them, but the fact that I can't remember them

12 doesn't mean that they didn't exist. I'm just saying that I have

13 forgotten a lot, and I've not made any notes. I have nothing on me that

14 could jog my memory. I can't give you any dates or specific instances.

15 Q. No. It suffices for you, as a witness, to tell us what you know,

16 what you remember. Thank you.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye.

18 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

19 Just a brief correction. In his question to Mr. Salapura at

20 page 63, line 12, he referred to General Rupert Smith as a NATO

21 commander. And I think the record is quite clear in the proceedings, but

22 just so that the record is clear: He was an UNPROFOR commander during

23 the period of time at issue. So that's all I wanted to say.

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Well, I suppose this is not in dispute between

25 the parties.

Page 13790

1 Please answer the question, Mr. Salapura. Sorry, you did

2 already.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Vanderpuye, for

4 correcting the record. I misspoke. He was an UNPROFOR commander in

5 Bosnia, and then he was a member of the Joint Command of NATO in

6 Brussels. Thank you.

7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Mr. Salapura, you said that when you had left the army to go on

9 sick leave before the events in Srebrenica you didn't see me until the

10 moment I arrived in Banja Luka or, rather, in the Republic of

11 Srpska Krajina. Do you remember that? Is that correct?

12 A. Yes, in Banja Luka. I don't remember that I had seen you before

13 that.

14 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us: When you returned and went

15 to see General Milovanovic, what happened next, according to the best of

16 your recollection? You gave him a piece of information, and was that

17 piece of information corroborated, and was that information about the

18 forces on which we collected evidence proven to be true?

19 A. Yes, everything was corroborated later on by the subsequent

20 events. Immediately thereafter, American pilotless aeroplanes were sent

21 out from the base on the island of [indiscernible]. They started

22 over-flying the Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

23 The information was submitted directly to the Croatian armed forces. An

24 attack was launched against the Republika Srpska, and then the Croatian

25 forces attacked the western part of the Republika Srpska. They crossed

Page 13791

1 over to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They continued to move

2 towards Banja Luka. There were two attempts, one from Dubica, but the

3 attack was dispelled. And the second attack followed the Bjelovar and

4 Bosanski Petrovac axis and the Military District of Split, and their

5 forces launched that attack against Jajce via Mrkonjic Grad and Jajce,

6 towards Banja Luka. That means that the information was

7 confirmed/corroborated by the events. And the operation was, indeed,

8 carried out.

9 Q. Thank you. Mr. Salapura, was information about NATO and the

10 activities of NATO during that operation also confirmed? And what about

11 the strikes later on in the month of August and September? Was that also

12 something that was contained in the information and subsequently

13 corroborated by the events?

14 A. Yes. However, I'm not in a position to confirm that the

15 air-strikes, indeed, happened in the months of August or September. I

16 don't remember the time-period. I can't tell you the exact date. In

17 that respect, I cannot confirm that the information was corroborated in

18 that respect. I know that there was air-strikes, but I can't remember

19 when.

20 Q. Do you know when Zlovrh, in Zepa, was bombed? Thank you. In

21 what month? Just a month, please. Thank you.

22 A. Again, I wouldn't know. I know that soldiers from the

23 Gusic Brigade were killed there. I know that we had been aware of --

24 that would happen. We couldn't inform them on time because our radio

25 communications were down. I don't remember when that happened. I know

Page 13792

1 that the events did occur, but I've already told you that I have problems

2 with numbers and dates.

3 Q. Do you know when the radio-relay in Kraljica was bombed, and did

4 that create a problem so that for a while couriers had to maintain

5 communications from Banja Luka to Bijeljina, and from Bijeljina the

6 drivers from the Main Staff would take documents over and take them to

7 the Main Staff, and that had to do with the fact that all the radio-relay

8 nodes had been destroyed? Do you remember when that was taking place,

9 when that occurred?

10 A. Yes, Kraljica was one of those radio-relay nodes, as well as

11 Kosara. The television repeater was also destroyed, and Majevica as

12 well, as far as I can remember. And all those relay nodes were destroyed

13 during the same campaign, but I can't give you any time-period when that

14 happened.

15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Salapura. In view of the fact that you were not

16 in the eastern part, I cannot keep on asking you about Zepa and

17 Srebrenica. You did not participate in the events. You were on a sick

18 leave. I would like to thank you for what you have told us so far,

19 although you were on furlough and on sick leave in Banja Luka during the

20 offensive, when all the population of the Serbian Krajina was expelled.

21 Can you tell us whether the territory of the Republic of

22 Srpska Krajina was under the protection of the United Nations at the

23 time? Thank you.

24 A. Yes, that was the so-called UNPA area, a protected area.

25 Q. Thank you. Would different yard-sticks apply there? Territories

Page 13793

1 in the enclaves in Bosnia that were under United Nations protections were

2 never protected, whereas the UN protected areas in Croatia were bombed;

3 for example, in Udbina?

4 A. Yes, NATO air-strikes did occur at Udbina, the airport there, and

5 that was in preparation for the offensive in Croatia. And it is so

6 obvious that the NATO forces and the Croatian forces acted in concert.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Salapura. Thank you

8 for coming here. Thank you for all your answers that you provided. I

9 would like to apologise to you for having asked you questions that I had

10 to ask you, in view of the problems that you have with your memory.

11 Thank you very much for everything. I wish you a safe and a pleasant

12 return to Banja Luka. I wish you good health, and I wish you all the

13 happiness in your life.

14 Your Honours, I've tried to finish within the six hours you gave

15 me yesterday, and I have no further questions for this witness. Thank

16 you.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you, Mr. Tolimir.

18 Mr. Vanderpuye, your re-examination.

19 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, Mr. President.

20 I have to admit I'm a little --

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before you commence your re-examination,

22 Judge Nyambe has a question for the witness.

23 JUDGE NYAMBE: Just a small one for my education and for the

24 witness.

25 Can you tell me exactly when the Republika Srpska came into

Page 13794

1 being? Thank you.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1992.

3 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was an Assembly session where

5 it was proclaimed. And its first name was the Serbian Republic of

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then the name was changed, either in late 1992 or

7 early 1993, into the Republika Srpska.

8 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you very much.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye, now it's your turn.

10 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thanks, Mr. President.

11 I was about to say I'm caught a little off guard. I do have

12 material that I'd like to examine the witness on, but the material is

13 still upstairs. So it might be a good idea, since it's 10 minutes before

14 the break, if you could give me -- if we could take the break now, I'll

15 get the material and then I'll -- and then I can commence the

16 re-examination.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think this is a very good proposal.

18 We should have our second break now, and we will resume

19 10 minutes before 1.00.

20 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye, your re-examination.

23 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

24 Good afternoon to you, Your Honours. And good afternoon to you,

25 Colonel Salapura.

Page 13795

1 Re-examination by Mr. Vanderpuye:

2 Q. We haven't met, and as you know, I'm here in place of

3 Mr. McCloskey. But I do have a few questions with respect to your

4 cross-examination that I'd like to put to you.

5 During the cross-examination, at least today, and I think part of

6 yesterday too, many questions were put to you where General Tolimir asked

7 you about information that "we" had, "we" in the plural sense, which I

8 took to mean you and General Tolimir. First, can you tell me, is that a

9 fair understanding of what you meant when you responded to his questions

10 concerning information that "we" had?

11 A. Yes, I -- when we co-operated together. Do you refer to our

12 co-operation in preparing some of the reports? Yes, where he was abreast

13 of the contents, and he was my superior officer.

14 Q. And I think you mentioned during your examination -- on

15 cross-examination that General Tolimir was the sector chief for

16 intelligence and security and therefore determined what information went

17 to the Security Administration and the Intelligence Administration within

18 the Main Staff. Is that right?

19 A. The Intelligence Administration was drafting the reports.

20 Q. All right. But as the sector chief, General Tolimir received

21 certain information that you didn't necessarily receive; is that right?

22 A. Yes. He was receiving information from the other service as

23 well, the Security Service, and he could then tell them, Yes, forward the

24 information, the intelligence, to the Intelligence Administration, or the

25 other way around. If we had information that would be of interest to the

Page 13796

1 Security Service, we would forward that to them. Yes, he was the one

2 co-ordinating that, and also to the other end users. He would determine

3 who is to get which piece of intelligence, depending on the content.

4 Q. All right. Thank you for clarifying that. Now, you mentioned

5 during your cross-examination -- or you were asked, rather, with respect

6 to certain code-names; do you recall that? In particular about the

7 code-name Uran.

8 A. Yes, I do remember that.

9 Q. And I think you indicated that you did not know what that

10 code-name stood for or represented.

11 A. Yes, I did.

12 MR. VANDERPUYE: Just for the record, that's at page 13612 of the

13 transcript.

14 I'd like to show you 65 ter 5271, please.

15 Q. And what you should have here is a document from the

16 Drina Corps Command, dated the 11 July 1995, and it's sent to the

17 Special Police Brigade Command, concerning code signs for Krivaja-95.

18 And I think you're familiar with what Krivaja-95 was about, aren't you?

19 A. Yes, that was the name of the operation, Krivaja-95.

20 Q. What I'd like to do is show you page 2 of this in English and in

21 B/C/S. There, you can see, where it says "Plan" or "Rada," the work plan

22 for this operation, Krivaja-95, and you can see that the first line, the

23 first entry, says: "Drina Corps IKM." Do you see that? It's on the

24 left-hand side in the top corner.

25 A. Yes, I can see that.

Page 13797

1 Q. And then you can see the code-name that applies to that as

2 "Uran."

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And then you can see a number of code-names for other units.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And this kind of assigning of code-names was typical and normal

7 for the conduct of any given operation, in your experience, in the

8 military; right?

9 A. Yes. For operations, one would develop a communications plan,

10 which would be done, normally, by the chief of the Communications Sector

11 and the operative officer. But in times of war, code-names are used all

12 the time; even in peacetime, sometimes. Military phone and radio

13 communications normally avoid naming the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, or

14 this or that. Instead, they use, for instance, "Uran," or a commander

15 would have his call sign, for instance, 100. So one wouldn't ask for the

16 commander, but, Give me number 100.

17 Q. All right. Thank you for that explanation, Colonel.

18 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this document.

19 It's 5271.

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.

21 THE REGISTRAR: This would be Exhibit P2208, Your Honours.

22 MR. VANDERPUYE: I'd like to show the witness another document.

23 This is another document with a code-name on it. Mr. President, this

24 one, I don't think -- this is a document that I think I need to apply to

25 the Trial Chamber to use. It was not on the Prosecution's original

Page 13798

1 65 ter list. Its number is 7352.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And this is not on the 65 ter exhibit list?

3 MR. VANDERPUYE: It's not on the 65 ter -- original 65 ter

4 exhibit list; that's correct.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Leave is granted to add it to the list.

6 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

7 I'd like to show it to the witness.

8 Q. First of all, Colonel, are you familiar with this document? Have

9 you seen it before?

10 A. I haven't.

11 Q. And are you familiar with the code-name that is indicated at the

12 top, where it reads "Klej"?

13 A. No.

14 Q. What about the two following code-names, one named Rada and then

15 a source named Pilot? --

16 A. No, I'm not familiar with the code-names in question.

17 Q. Just to give you a little bit of background, this was a document

18 that was recovered amongst other documents in a folder, related to an

19 individual code-named Atlantida. First, are you familiar with that

20 code-name? And to put it in context, in relation to the events in Zepa.

21 A. No, I'm not familiar with "Atlantida."

22 I apologise. I just wanted to say that at the period I did not

23 take part in any planning or any activities related to the operation. I

24 was in my office at the time, yes, but I stayed there, and I was not

25 involved in any activities. I was not privy to code-names or code

Page 13799

1 signals, nor did I have any communication with anyone about it.

2 Q. All right. Let me just ask you about one thing that's in this

3 document.

4 If we go to the second page in the English, and I think it's just

5 at the bottom of the page in the B/C/S, it reads that:

6 "Krsto and Peric met in Bijeljina with Generals Ratko Mladic and

7 Zdravko Tolimir and familiarised them with the collected material on the

8 fall of Western Slavonia and the persons guilty of everything that

9 happened there."

10 Are you familiar, first of all, with the fall -- the

11 circumstances surrounding the fall of Western Slavonia, which I'm sure

12 you must be? And if you are, are you familiar with the circumstances

13 concerning this meeting in Bijeljina?

14 A. Western Slavonia, yes. That was the first Croatian offensive

15 against forces of the Republika Srpska in one of the UNPA areas. The

16 code-name of that operation was -- just give me a second. The other one

17 was Storm. I can't remember the name of this one. And it was completed

18 in a very short period, extremely quickly. The Croats took the area,

19 took control of the area. People and the troops from the area crossed

20 over to the territory of Republika Srpska at the Gradiska Bridge, and

21 then they were received. Most of them went on to Serbia later on.

22 I think this was late autumn, but I'm not sure --

23 Q. Well, you can see this document, in particular, is dated --

24 A. -- 1994. And let me just add -- but, no, yes.

25 Q. This document is dated 16 July 1995. Can you tell us anything

Page 13800

1 about this meeting between General Mladic and General Tolimir in

2 Bijeljina? Do you know anything about it?

3 A. I see it for the first time now. This is the first time I am

4 made aware of any such meeting, my first contact with such information.

5 Q. All right. Just so that I'm clear, it is the first time you've

6 seen the document, but it's also the first time you've ever heard that

7 there was a meeting that occurred around that date?

8 A. Yes, yes. Yes, absolutely. This is the first information I have

9 about such a meeting.

10 Q. All right, thank you.

11 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I would like to tender this

12 document.

13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye, I don't see that this witness

14 testified about the content of this document.

15 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, Mr. President, I see that he's not familiar

16 with it. I don't know whether or not the Defence can test the

17 authenticity of the document, but it does relate, I think, to a salient

18 issue in the case. It relates to the whereabouts of General Tolimir on

19 the 16th of July, which I think is quite important. And to the extent --

20 to the extent that the Defence doesn't object to its authenticity, I

21 would propose to admit it.

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24 The document does not state that Tolimir was on the location on

25 the 16th. This is the date when Klej interrogated Pilot and compiled and

Page 13801

1 sent the document to Rada, but we do not know anything about when the

2 activities described therein took place. And maybe Mr. Salapura can help

3 there. General Rupert Smith, in his testimony, said that General Mladic

4 was in Belgrade on the 16th.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye.

6 MR. VANDERPUYE: I don't know whether or not that's an objection

7 to the admission of the document. If the witness has a recollection as

8 to the specific events, which is what I thought I asked him, yeah, then I

9 would like to know if he has a recollection of this meeting, and, if he

10 does, when he recalls that it took place. That would be very helpful.

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Salapura, can you answer that?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely, yes.

13 I didn't know about this meeting at all. I don't know anything

14 about the content. I don't know that such a meeting was held in

15 Bijeljina. A meeting attended by General Mladic and Tolimir; this is

16 what I am reading from the document. I don't know who Krsto is. I don't

17 know of this Peric. I know of one Peric, Slobodan Peric. I think he was

18 a colonel who was in the area of Western Slavonia. I think he was a

19 commander, even, but that's all I know. It's the first time I see this

20 document and that I've heard of such a meeting.

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

22 One moment, please.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This document will only be marked for

25 identification. It may be used with another witness, but it will not be

Page 13802

1 admitted into evidence because this witness couldn't say anything about

2 the content and the source and the authenticity.

3 Please carry on, Mr. Vanderpuye.

4 THE REGISTRAR: This will be P2209, MFI, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

6 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you.

7 I'd like to show the witness P112 -- 1112, sorry.

8 Q. What you have in front of you, Colonel, is an instruction. It's

9 issued, as you can see, on the 24th of October, 1994, from the Main Staff

10 of the VRS, and it is signed for the commander, General Mladic. You'll

11 see, in the course of these instructions, under item 1, for example, he

12 talks about the field of work of the security and intelligence organs,

13 and he talks about intelligence and security tasks and the way they

14 should be divided up as per this instruction.

15 What I wanted to show you -- first of all, are you familiar with

16 this instruction?

17 A. I don't remember. I would have to read it, and then maybe based

18 on the contents.

19 Q. All right. Well, let me just ask you a little about it, then.

20 In the first item, it reads that:

21 "The field of work of the VRS security and intelligence organ

22 primarily includes intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks ..."

23 That's consistent with your testimony so far; right?

24 A. Yes, yes. I mean, I'm not contending any of this. I'm just

25 saying that I don't remember having read that. Thousands of documents

Page 13803

1 went through my hands, and this is almost 20 years ago. And I just don't

2 have the capacity to keep it all in my head all the time.

3 Q. Sure, sure. That's understandable. Let me take you to item

4 number 6, which is at page 3 in the English, and it should be page 3 in

5 the B/C/S.

6 Item 6 reads that:

7 "All security and intelligence organs," and it says "and unit and

8 institution command organs are obliged to provide every assistance in

9 their operative work and tasks to the detached and deployed organs of the

10 410th Intelligence Centre and Counter-Intelligence Group of the VRS."

11 Now, you've mentioned the 410th Intelligence Centre. Let me just

12 ask: Is this paragraph accurate; that is, were security and intelligence

13 organs and institutional command organs obliged to provide assistance to

14 the 410th Intelligence Centre?

15 A. If I may elaborate, please.

16 The 410th Intelligence Centre had its points throughout the

17 territory of Republika Srpska, from Trebinje to Novi Grad, and this

18 instruction that was signed by General Tolimir, because I think this is

19 his signature, because this is a group of people, two or three of them,

20 who were in charge of the operative intelligence. They had a specific

21 room dedicated to them, but they had various problems related to fuel

22 supply, logistics supplies of all sorts. They were independent in the

23 area. They were directly under their chief of centre who was in

24 Banja Luka, but they were within the areas of responsibility of various

25 units.

Page 13804

1 The same situation was with a counter-intelligence group, and

2 that's why General Tolimir had to draft this. And we see that this was

3 something he signed upon commander's authority, and then he sent this

4 document to the corps, asking for such assistance to be provided to these

5 men in order to make their -- to facilitate their work and to enable them

6 to use the corps' communications systems.

7 Q. Would their work be facilitated, for example, by providing them

8 with continuous and accurate intelligence information or security

9 information?

10 A. Now, as far as the intelligence segment is concerned, yes, yes,

11 they were receiving reports or information, because they co-operated with

12 the officer -- intelligence officer in the corps command. For instance,

13 if you had their point in Trebinje, they would be in touch with the

14 intelligence organ of the relevant corps command. They had authority to

15 provide any information or intelligence relevant to that corps

16 immediately to the intelligence officer of the corps, in other words, to

17 avoid sending it first from there to Banja Luka, then to Han Pijesak, and

18 then back to them. These organs were not integral parts of the corps.

19 They were not under the command of the corps commander. And the purpose

20 of this document is to increase efficiency. Likewise, the intelligence

21 organs of the corps who are immediately subordinated to the chief of

22 staff of the corps, this document authorises them or tasks them or

23 approves their exchange of information with the other group.

24 I don't know whether you've understood me fully. I hope I've

25 been clear about this.

Page 13805

1 Q. Yes, I think I have. And I'd like to direct your attention to

2 the next paragraph, which reads that:

3 "The monitoring of the professionalism, legality, and correctness

4 of the work of the security and intelligence organs shall be carried out

5 exclusively by the first superior organs for security and intelligence

6 affairs, except in that part of their engagement relating to command and

7 staff affairs."

8 I just want to ask you, very simply, whether or not that is an

9 accurate -- whether or not that accurately applies to your recollection

10 of how things functioned during 1995 and other relevant periods of time.

11 A. That's how things should be all the time, from the beginning of

12 the war until the very end. During that period, the chief of sector who

13 worked with both services noticed certain problems, and that's why he

14 intervened with the commander, asking him to issue this document in order

15 to remove all those problems. Nothing special was done here. This is

16 the principle of functioning and subordination within different services.

17 Maybe this applies more to the Security Service and the organs of the

18 410th Intelligence Centre.

19 When it comes to the 410th Security Centre, they did not deal

20 with staff duties in the staff, whereas the Intelligence Services are,

21 but they don't engage in operative intelligence work, whereas all

22 intelligence services deal with intelligence and counter-intelligence

23 duties.

24 When it comes to the professional level of work, it is the

25 superior officer along the security line that is in charge of them. And

Page 13806

1 the staff duties, it would be the chief of staff or the commander.

2 When it comes to intelligence organs, the intelligence organ in

3 the corps is subordinated to the chief of staff of the corps. I was not

4 the one who was in charge of them, nor was it the

5 Intelligence Administration. He is subordinated to the corps, and he

6 reports to them.

7 And the organs of the 410th Intelligence Centre, as I've already

8 told you, even those ones who are detached and in the areas of different

9 responsibility, they were subordinated to the chief of centre in

10 Banja Luka, whereas the latter is subordinated to me. However, they do

11 not participate in the work either of the corps command or in their staff

12 duties. They just exchanged information.

13 I don't know if I have made myself clear to -- if not, I am

14 willing to continue in order to make things even clearer.

15 Q. You made it clear. I want to ask, very simply: In principle, is

16 it or was it the case that the first superior organs for security and

17 intelligence were responsible for monitoring the professionalism,

18 legality, and correctness of the work of security/intelligence organs, as

19 you can see is written in this document signed for General Mladic by

20 General Tolimir? Was that the case? That's all I want to know.

21 A. Yes, that was the case. You're correct.

22 MR. VANDERPUYE: I see this document was MFI'd. I'd like to have

23 it admitted at this time, Mr. President.

24 THE REGISTRAR: It will be received.

25 Mr. Gajic.

Page 13807

1 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would not deal with

2 the issue. Just for the record, there will be some problems with the

3 translation of the document and the use of terminology. However, we will

4 deal with that when the time comes, hopefully very soon.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.

6 Mr. Vanderpuye.

7 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

8 I have another document that was not on the original 65 ter list.

9 It's another document that concerns the 410th Intelligence Centre that

10 the witness testified to, which I would like to show him, because it also

11 relates to the intelligence and security organs of the Main Staff, which

12 was the subject of his cross-examination.

13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you please give us the number?

14 MR. VANDERPUYE: Sorry. It's 65 ter 7363.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Leave is granted to add it to the 65 ter exhibit

16 list.

17 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you.

18 If I could please have that shown to the witness.

19 This is a document dated 10 April 1994. It's issued from the

20 Main Staff. And if we go to the last -- I think it's the last page.

21 Yes, it's the last page in the B/C/S, and I think the third page in the

22 English. We can see that this was signed by General Tolimir.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: At that time, Colonel Zdravko Tolimir.

24 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

25 It's page 2 in the B/C/S.

Page 13808

1 All right, I think we have it.

2 Q. All right. You can see that, Colonel; is that right?

3 A. Yes, yes, yes.

4 Q. All right. This is an order?

5 A. Yes, it is, yes.

6 MR. VANDERPUYE: We'll have to go to the first page in both

7 documents, I think.

8 First, let me just note who this is directed to. And it says

9 that it's directed to the intelligence section of the corps. It's also

10 sent to the Main Staff Counter-Intelligence Group; that's the "KOG" that

11 we referred to previously. And also to the 410th Intelligence Centre,

12 which we saw on the other document.

13 If we go to the second page in the English, we can also see that

14 it's sent to the 27th Logistical Base, the 30th, 35th Logistical Bases.

15 And it says that:

16 "With a view to improve a more efficient organisation of the

17 security and intelligence organs of the Army of Republika Srpska," which

18 you were just talking about, "and faster and more efficient exchange of

19 information and co-ordination in the execution of jobs and tasks which

20 fall within the remit of intelligence and security organs, I issue the

21 following order:"

22 Now, what I'd like to do is refer you to some specific provisions

23 in this order. If we go to paragraph 4, which starts on the first page

24 of the B/C/S, we can see that it says:

25 "Intelligence and security organs of the Main Staff,"

Page 13809

1 "Glavni Staba Vojska," "will be directed subordinated to the OB Sector of

2 the Main Staff. They will send security and intelligence reports to the

3 Security and/or Intelligence Section of the OB Sector by telegram or

4 regular mail."

5 Q. Now, having been there at the time, first, are you familiar with

6 this order? And, secondly, if you are familiar with the order, was it

7 implemented, as is indicated here, or in the terms that it's indicated

8 here?

9 A. No, I do not remember the contents of this order. It was

10 implemented, and maybe you would like to hear my comment in order to

11 understand things better. I already spoke about that during the

12 examination-in-chief, when I was answering Mr. McCloskey's questions,

13 when we spoke about that.

14 The intelligence element was short-staffed. There were very few

15 professionals working in the Intelligence Service. Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina was in the depth of the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

17 There were no intelligence institutions that would be dealing with

18 operative work. The units were very small, and they did not have

19 intelligence organs; very few in peacetime. When the war started, only

20 very few of us, perhaps four or five, in the entire VRS were active

21 servicemen dealing with that. That's one of the reasons, and that's one

22 of the things that you need to understand.

23 Secondly, why was this drafted in the first place? At the corps

24 level, for a time we -- let me explain. I believe that it was an

25 organisational issue, you know.

Page 13810

1 Q. That's fair. The reason I'm trying to move on is because I'm a

2 bit pressed for time, so I just need your answers, if possible, to be

3 responsive to the question. And that is: Was this implemented during

4 the time that you were the chief of the Intelligence Administration in

5 the Main Staff? That's all.

6 A. Yes, that was implemented. However, there is a clause here which

7 was not implemented. The intelligence organs were tied to another

8 administration along the professional lines. They were not subordinated

9 to the Intelligence Administration. They were subordinated to the chief

10 of the corps, not to the chief of the Intelligence Administration. And

11 the same applied to the security organs who were subordinated to the

12 commander.

13 For a while, at the corps level we had a Department for

14 Intelligence and Security, up to 1994, and then that was split. The two

15 were divided into the security and intelligence. And the more people

16 joined the Intelligence Service, the more gradually the separation was

17 taking place.

18 Q. Under paragraph 4, it says that:

19 "The intelligence and security organs of the Main Staff will be

20 directly subordinated to the Sector of Intelligence and Security for the

21 Main Staff."

22 That's accurate, isn't it?

23 A. No. In practice, that never happened, nor was it possible. The

24 intelligence organs in the corps were an element of the --

25 Q. I'm not talking about the corps. Just try and follow my

Page 13811

1 question.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. It says --

4 A. Main Staff, oh, oh, okay. The Main Staff, yes, okay.

5 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you.

6 Mr. President, I'd like to have this document admitted as well.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.

8 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit P2210, Your Honours.

9 MR. VANDERPUYE:

10 Q. It also says, in paragraph 5, that:

11 "All intelligence and security organs of the

12 Army of Republika Srpska will send their security and intelligence

13 reports to the Security or Intelligence Section of the Security and

14 intelligence Sector indicating whether it deals with intelligence or

15 counter-intelligence issues."

16 That's right too, isn't it? I see you nodding, but you have to

17 answer.

18 A. Yes, yes, yes.

19 Q. Thank you. I'd like to show you another document.

20 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, this relates to the witness's

21 prior testimony concerning Dragomir Pecanac. I don't have the specific

22 cite, but it related to the witness's testimony concerning

23 Mr. Pecanac's -- or his familiarity with Mr. Pecanac's position in the

24 Main Staff. The 65 ter number of the document, I'm sorry, is 7365.

25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Leave is granted, if you're asking for that, to

Page 13812

1 add it to the 65 ter exhibit list.

2 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. I'm sorry.

3 If I could have that shown to the witness as well.

4 All right. If we could just focus on the very top right corner

5 of the document. That's good. Thank you.

6 Q. We can see here that this is a document that's issued from the

7 Intelligence Centre. It's a bit distorted at the top, but you can see it

8 says "1-3/410."

9 MR. VANDERPUYE: And I apologise, Mr. President. I don't think

10 we have a translation for this document.

11 Q. But it says "Obavestenje Centar." That's the

12 Intelligence Centre, isn't it?

13 A. Yes, yes, you're right. That's how I'm reading it.

14 Q. And it's dated 29 June 1995. I'd just like to --

15 A. Yes, the 29th, yes.

16 Q. And I'd just like to take you to the last page of this document.

17 I see that it's taking a little while, but what you'll see on the

18 last page of the document is that it's signed by Dragomir Pecanac, and it

19 says "Captain First Class, Nacelnik," "Chief."

20 Can you tell us what your recollection is of Mr. Pecanac's

21 position with respect to the 410th Intelligence Centre?

22 A. Dragomir Pecanac, I believe that at the time he was a member of

23 the 410th Intelligence Centre, for a while, at least, but I don't know

24 for how long. I can't help you with that.

25 And then in the month of June he was the head of General Mladic's

Page 13813

1 office. General Mladic requested him to join his office as the head of

2 office. And in the month of June -- I don't know exactly when that

3 happened, I don't know on what date, but -- or perhaps in May, or March,

4 or June. Sometime. In any case, at that time I don't believe that he

5 was in the 410th Intelligence Centre, on the 23rd of June.

6 Q. All right. And the --

7 A. I mean, I can check that for you. I can give you the exact date

8 when he left the Intelligence Centre and joined General Mladic's office

9 as head of that office.

10 Q. All right. That would be helpful. I don't think we can do it

11 today, though.

12 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this document,

13 as it is relevant to the position that was held by Captain Pecanac during

14 the relevant period.

15 And I have another document I'd like to show the witness.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Salapura -- oh, it is gone. I would like to

17 have the last page back.

18 My question would be if you recognise this signature, which seems

19 to be the signature of Mr. Pecanac.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot recognise it. I did not

21 see his signature that often. It says here that it's his signature, but

22 I cannot be of assistance to you. I can't recognise it.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

24 This document will be received as an exhibit. It will be marked

25 for identification, pending translation.

Page 13814

1 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you.

2 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit P2211, MFI, Your Honours.

3 MR. VANDERPUYE: We just lost what we had on the screen, and I

4 don't want to put it back.

5 Q. But did you see on the screen that that document was copied to

6 the Intelligence Administration of the Main Staff? Did you see that?

7 A. Yes, I did see it, yes.

8 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you.

9 I have another document I'd like to show the witness. It's 7364.

10 And again, Mr. President, this was a document that was not on the

11 Prosecution's original 65 ter list, but it relates specifically to the

12 intelligence about the enclaves Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica, which were

13 clearly the subject matter of the witness's cross-examination. It's also

14 a document that was written by Dragomir Pecanac, emanating from the

15 410th Intelligence Centre.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Leave is granted.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 410th, yes.

18 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

19 Here we see a document dated 28th May, 1995. It is an

20 intelligence report, and it concerns a number of intelligence

21 information -- not a number, a large amount of intelligence information

22 concerning the Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica enclaves. And as I

23 indicated, it is signed by -- submitted by Captain Pecanac.

24 If we go to the last page, we can see that.

25 All right. What I wanted to do was focus your attention very

Page 13815

1 briefly on page 7 in the B/C/S, page 13 in the English, and it concerns

2 intelligence on the Zepa enclave. And if you can see that there, it

3 provides the area of the enclave, the population here indicated, 7.000 to

4 8.000, indication that it's densely populated. It tells us about the

5 refugee camps, topical characteristics.

6 We have to go to the next page in the B/C/S.

7 It talks about areas in which people can take shelter, such as a

8 large number of caves and depressions.

9 We have to go to the next page in the English, too.

10 And then if we go to page 21 in the English and page 12 in the

11 B/C/S, we will see similar information concerning the Srebrenica enclave.

12 Q. My question to you is: This is information that was -- that came

13 from the 410th Intelligence Centre which I assume that you received.

14 First, can you tell us, did you receive this type of information from the

15 410th Intelligence Centre regarding the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa?

16 A. I don't remember. I believe that he used information that the

17 Intelligence Department of the Drina Corps had. They had such detailed

18 and elaborated intelligence study for Srebrenica and Zepa. I believe

19 that this was taken from there, that Pecanac took that study from there

20 and used it. They were not in charge of either receiving or

21 disseminating such information.

22 Q. Where would a report like this go? To whom would Pecanac have

23 sent this report?

24 A. To the chief of the 410th Centre in Banja Luka.

25 Q. And wouldn't you --

Page 13816

1 A. And the letter should have been forwarded to us in the

2 Main Staff. However, what I'm saying is that I'm familiar with the

3 content of this report, and what I'm saying also is that he took it from

4 the Intelligence Department of the Drina Corps. I don't know whether he

5 forwarded the study to somebody else. It is not his study. It doesn't

6 emanate from him. He took it from the Drina Corps.

7 Q. All right. So let me just ask this as briefly as I can. From

8 what I understand of what you're saying is that the source of the

9 information may have come from the Drina Corps, but that the information,

10 as acquired by Mr. Pecanac, would have been sent to the Main Staff of the

11 VRS. Is that fair?

12 A. The Main Staff already had those information, those reports. We

13 received them from the Drina Corps. I don't know whether Pecanac took

14 their information and then copied it and sent it again. Maybe he just

15 took the report for his own files, because the Drina Corps was keeping

16 meticulously all the informations about Srebrenica and Zepa. They had

17 more information and more detailed information than the Main Staff.

18 Q. What about Gorazde?

19 A. As well as for Gorazde, yes, for that enclave.

20 Q. All right. And --

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Vanderpuye, we are running out of time.

22 MR. VANDERPUYE: I know, Mr. President. To be honest, I can't

23 finish him in the time I've got left. I've got --

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: If you can't, we can't [Realtime transcript read

25 in error "can"] continue.

Page 13817

1 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, I agree, I think you're right.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What about this document?

3 MR. VANDERPUYE: I'd like to tender it.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.

5 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit P2212, Your Honours.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think I'm recorded incorrectly. We can't

7 continue, and we shouldn't continue. What is your estimation about the

8 remainder of the examination-in-chief -- re-examination?

9 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I have about five more documents

10 to go through, and I'm moving at a relatively slow pace. I think almost

11 the same amount of time as I've taken now, but I can try and whittle it

12 down some before we get started next week, because I don't want to gum up

13 the schedule.

14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I was hoping that we could finish with this

15 witness today, which means this week, but this seems not to be possible.

16 So we have to adjourn for the week and to resume on Monday, 2.15

17 in the afternoon, in this courtroom, Courtroom III.

18 We adjourn.

19 [The witness stands down]

20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.53 p.m.,

21 to be reconvened on Monday, the 9th day

22 of May, 2011, at 2.15 p.m.