110512IT

Page 14008

1 WITNESS: DRAGOMIR KESEROVIC [Resumed]

2 [Witness answered through interpreter]

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir is continuing his cross-examination.

4 Mr. Tolimir.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I will

6 like to greet everybody. May God's peace reign in this house, and may

7 God's will be done in these proceedings and not necessarily mine. I

8 greet General Keserovic and I wish him a pleasant stay in our midst.

9 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

10 Q. [Interpretation] General, sir, yesterday we showed document D176

11 and that's where we left it off.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the same document in

13 e-court, D176. Thank you. Thank you. Can the document please be blown

14 up for the benefit of the witness.

15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16 Q. This document was issued by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia

17 and Herzegovina --

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think there is a technical problem at the

19 moment. The B/C/S version is very small and only on the top of the

20 screen. I hope that problem can be resolved. We have still this

21 problem. Now we can read it. Thank you very much.

22 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, sir, this document was issued by the Army of the

Page 14009

1 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by its 2nd Corps, or rather, the command

2 of the 2nd corps. They called it the chronology of events surrounding

3 the break through by the 28th Division, and the document says:

4 "Enclosed please find the complete chronology of events from the

5 start of the Chetnik attack on Srebrenica until the break-through carried

6 out by the units of this division and their later consolidation," and so

7 on and so forth.

8 My question to you is this: Did the command of the 2nd Corps of

9 the BiH Army rightly call this document a break-through? Thank you.

10 A. Well, as I said it yesterday, it was a forced advance or a forced

11 movement. What I had in mind was the fact that when the VRS entered

12 Zepa, the forces had already left the encirclement, but in strategic

13 terms, in view of the fact that there was another front line towards

14 Tuzla, it would be right to call this the break-through of the division

15 from the encirclement.

16 Q. Thank you. My question is this: Did the Main Staff of our Army

17 of the VRS have intelligence and other information to the effect that

18 preparations were under way for the break-through of Muslims from Zepa

19 towards Tuzla, and vice-versa, from Tuzla and Zivinice towards Kakanj,

20 Vlasenica, Srebrenica and Zepa?

21 A. There was some intelligence available to us indicating that there

22 could be two-sided offensive activities undertaken by the 2nd Corps on

23 the axis from Tuzla towards Srebrenica, and, at the same time, the

24 division from Srebrenica would try to link up with them and leave the

25 blockade from the enclave. However, I'm not aware of any information

Page 14010

1 about any concrete plans, although there may have been such plans in

2 place.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see in Court D239, page 2,

4 paragraph 2. Thank you.

5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

6 Q. General, sir, we see this is an intelligence report by the VRS

7 dated the 19th of May. On page 2 that I called up, in paragraph 2 it

8 says:

9 "We have confirmed that the 28th Division is undergoing intense

10 preparations for offensive activities in order to link up with parts of

11 the 23rd Division in the Han Pogled sector. As part of the offensive

12 preparations from the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, they have taken

13 possession of important facilities to secure the corridor linking the

14 enclaves and they have partially grouped forces in the western part of

15 the enclaves. They have taken Podravanje, Ljeskovik, Susica, Stublic,

16 Brloznik, Sadilo Cair, Godenje, Ljubomislje, and Gusinac. All of which

17 are outside the so-called demilitarised zone, in order to create better

18 conditions for offensive activities."

19 My question is this: Does this show that they had left the

20 demilitarised zone and that they had taken up facilities outside of the

21 demilitarised zone on the line that I have just described? Does this

22 also confirm the intelligence that we had about their intentions and

23 future activities?

24 A. Thank you. This paragraph in this paragraph confirms that, or

25 rather, describes the situation as it was.

Page 14011

1 Q. Thank you, General, sir. Yesterday and the day before yesterday,

2 you said that you had arrived at the facility in Crna Rijeka and that you

3 didn't find anybody there, that all the officers had left and stayed in

4 the cellar because of the attacks from Zepa and Srebrenica. Do you know

5 when that attack on the command post of the VRS from Srebrenica and Zepa

6 took place?

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I think we see the word "cellar" used in a

9 translation here. I'm sure we are talking about the bunker, and since it

10 may get talked about again, I think the -- just want to alert the

11 translation to that. Cellar being, of course, something and that is just

12 something in the bottom of a house.

13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, did you understand the comment of

14 Mr. McCloskey? Were you referring to a bunker or a cellar in your

15 question?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mr. President, maybe

17 the witness is best suited to answer that. Let me ask him where the

18 Main Staff went and could they all stay in the bunker, the bunker is a

19 very small area.

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Maybe the witness could answer.

22 A. It was an underground area below Zep hill and that was an area

23 with a footprint of several thousand square metres with a lot of rooms

24 and corridors. It was the war command post for the former JNA. So it

25 was not a bunker but an underground space which was dug into the hill.

Page 14012

1 Q. Thank you, General, sir.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see D145.

3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

4 Q. And I will ask you to answer questions about the attacks that was

5 carried out by the forces that had left the demilitarised zone that they

6 had arrived at the command post of the VRS and launched an attack against

7 it. Thank you.

8 A. I was not present when that attack took place, but I know that

9 some time in the summer of that same year before Operation Krivaja was

10 launched, there was indeed an attack on the command post. The positions

11 and the facilities of the signals regiment and the protection regiment

12 were attacked on one axis and that was the axis leading to Han Pogled and

13 the waterworks. And the troops suffered major losses. I'm not familiar

14 with any of the details so I wouldn't like to speculate on that.

15 Q. Thank you, General, sir. Did you see that Han Pogled is

16 mentioned in that intelligence report as the place where the forces from

17 the two directions would link up?

18 A. Yes. I saw that. I saw that in paragraph 2.

19 Q. Thank you. And now, let's look at this report where it says:

20 "On 23rd June of this year," which was 1995, "at 0200 hours, a

21 unit of approximately 300 soldiers headed out from Srebrenica led by

22 Ibrahim Mandzic, the commander of the 280th Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade

23 and Vejz Sabic, the commander of the 284th Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade,"

24 and so and so forth. And then in seconds paragraph, it reads:

25 "In the above sector, this group is to use combat" --

Page 14013

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you are reading very fast again, the

2 interpreters and the court recorder hardly can follow. Please slow down

3 while reading. Now the second paragraph you just started with it.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise for reading

5 fast.

6 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

7 Q. In the second paragraph it says, and I quote:

8 "In the above sector, this group is to use combat to attract the

9 VRS forces in order to secure safe passage for Naser Oric, who is also

10 moving with a large group from the direction of Kladanj, and will

11 supposedly travel through Pjenovac, Podzeplje and Radava to Srebrenica."

12 Does this indicate that Naser Oric and his forces will head out

13 from Kladanj in order to link up with the forces from Srebrenica? Thank

14 you.

15 A. Yes. This is indicated by the report.

16 Q. Now let's look at the third paragraph:

17 "According to our information, the return of Naser Oric is

18 connected with plans to commence combat operations from the Srebrenica

19 enclave, which, supposedly, is conditioned by the possible taking of the

20 Vis elevation in the Serbian municipality of Kalesija by the Muslim

21 forces in the direction of Kalesija, whereby they would create conditions

22 for further penetration towards the municipality of Sekovici."

23 My question is this: In view of the fact that those groups

24 really arrived, as we will see from further documents and as you learned

25 at the command post and as you, yourself, observed from the activities of

Page 14014

1 the police units and since you did not find any officers there, can you

2 tell us anything about that situation? Thank you.

3 A. The report shows that there were activities on both sides. Both

4 from the protected area of Srebrenica and from the direction of the

5 2nd Corps and that those were parallel co-ordinated activities aimed at

6 the achievement of the information that we saw before. And that was that

7 active combat would be used in order to provide for the linking up of the

8 two groups of the BiH Army.

9 Q. Thank you. As a soldier, can you tell us whether it is

10 appropriate for demilitarised zone to carry out combat activities against

11 the forces that granted it, the status of demilitarised zone, and that

12 didn't threaten it in military terms? Would you say that that was

13 militarised zone or a demilitarised zone in that case? Thank you.

14 A. It was our estimate at the time, based on activities originating

15 from Srebrenica, that it was not demilitarised. Later on that became

16 even more obvious, and ultimately even the international forces and their

17 commanders confirmed that in their reports. It's not only Srebrenica,

18 none of the areas that were supposed to be demilitarised were devoid of

19 forces and weapons.

20 Q. Thank you, General.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask in e-court D193.

22 It's the statement of General Smith and will take a look at what he says

23 about your answer, namely that UNPROFOR itself confirmed that the zones

24 were not demilitarised. It's now on the screen, the statement given on

25 the 14th of August 1996. We need page 9 in B/C/S, paragraph 5.

Page 14015

1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Let's see what General Smith says about the protected area. But,

3 first of all, let's look at paragraph 2. It says:

4 "On my way back from Srebrenica to Sarajevo, the 7th of March, I

5 met with Mladic at his request."

6 We see from this that before the 7th of March, General Smith had

7 been in Srebrenica to inspect the situation. And that's page 8 in

8 English, paragraph 5. The force commander of UNPROFOR says:

9 "After a series of meetings, I came to the conclusion that

10 Bosnian Serbs had concluded that fighting will be inevitable in the

11 future and some solutions had to be found. The enclaves were too strong

12 and the BH Army within them constituted a clear threat, especially

13 because the Bosnian Serb army felt it was likely they will be confronted

14 with attacks at several fronts."

15 Now, since this is a statement of a general who is also a witness

16 in this case, can you answer this question: Did the UN also have reports

17 that Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves were not demilitarised, and they were,

18 instead, very strong, very well armed?

19 A. I believe that is unequivocal from his statement.

20 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether the United Nations had had taken

21 any steps whatsoever to disarm the enclaves and demilitarise them in

22 keeping with the agreement?

23 A. I personally have no information that anything was done. I only

24 know that requests have been made to them to demilitarise these areas but

25 I don't think -- I don't know that anybody actually did anything.

Page 14016

1 Q. Thank you.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 10, last

3 paragraph in Serbian. And that will be page 11 or 9 in English. Thank

4 you.

5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

6 Q. We can see that the general says:

7 "The situation continued to deteriorate. The following week when

8 the BH Army mounted offensives against -- along two axes. They were

9 designed to relieve pressure on Bihac. One attack was at Mount Vlasic

10 which was successful, and the attack against Majevica was not. I

11 concluded that the Bosnian government has no intention of prolonging or

12 extending the COHA," the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, "after end

13 April."

14 You said you went to the Main Staff to inspect the part of the

15 front line that was attacked by the BH Army and you said you continued on

16 to Bihac. Can you tell us whether the BH Army had violated the Cessation

17 of Hostilities Agreement and started to launch offensives at the time

18 when that agreement was still in place? Thank you.

19 A. Following the decision of the commander of the Main Staff, I went

20 to that area, to the area of that 22nd Vlasic Brigade because in the

21 night between the 18th and the 19th, the 3rd and the 7th Corps attacked

22 that area on a stretch of the front line from the border area of the

23 first Jajic [phoen] Brigade all the way to the Kotor Varos Brigade area

24 along the axis of Paljenik, and that stretch of the front line was

25 occupied at the time and the RS forces were pushed back to the western

Page 14017

1 and north-western slopes of Mount Vlasic. That's where the Bosnian

2 advance was stopped.

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we get a month and a year for that. It's

5 really not evident in the record.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Sir, you said in the night between the 18th and

7 the 19th. Can you give us month and year?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Between the 18th and 19th March,

9 1995.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.

11 Mr. Tolimir.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14 Q. It's my fault. I'll continue to quote from this paragraph 10.

15 General Smith says:

16 "I concluded that the Bosnian government had no intention of

17 extending the cessation of hostilities agreement after end April. I met

18 with Dr. Ganic, Mr. Muratovic and General Hajrulahovic on the 22nd of

19 March," the year is 1995, "I was accompanied by Mr. Aguilar. The purpose

20 of this meeting was to assess the political stance of the Bosnian

21 government in relation to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement

22 following the Bosnian offensive in the Tuzla area. I met with

23 General Delic on the 23rd March in order to gain a clearer understanding

24 of the Tuzla and Travnik areas and assess the potential for maintaining

25 the cease-fire in Bosnia."

Page 14018

1 On the next page he continues:

2 "Throughout April, the situation in Bosnia deteriorated further.

3 The enclaves continued to be squeezed logistically ...," et cetera,

4 et cetera.

5 My question is: Was it the general trend for the Bosnian Army to

6 repair all their tactical positions during cease-fires, to take control

7 of all the strategic features and gain the best possible position in

8 order to occupy, as they said, all of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

9 A. From these activities that we just described, and later the

10 spring offensive in Sarajevo and the offensive on the Ozren-Ozric [phoen]

11 theatre and the activities of the Bosnian corps in other area, led us to

12 the same conclusion. I had not had occasion earlier to see the statement

13 or hear the testimony of General Smith, but this is consistent with what

14 we knew.

15 Q. Now, bearing in mind the totality of the military situation --

16 let me repeat for the benefit of the interpreters. Bearing in mind this

17 whole military situation described by General Smith, the force commander

18 of UNPROFOR, where he says that the cease-fires were being violated, was

19 there also a plan by the Bosnian Army that fit into this context, namely

20 to link up the protected areas of Srebrenica and Zepa and bind them with

21 the Zivinice, Kladanj and Tuzla territory?

22 A. All the reports we had and all the activities on their part that

23 we observed led to that conclusion. I don't know any details but I know

24 that we had reports and information about the intention of the Bosnian

25 Army to link up Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, and to further link them up

Page 14019

1 with Tuzla and perhaps even with another enclave, Gorazde.

2 Q. Thank you, General.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask e-court to display

4 D176 again, page 2. We've already seen page 1. And then I can ask the

5 General about attempts to establish a truce with the enclaves. We'll now

6 see page 2 which describes the chronology. It says:

7 "Brief overview of events in Srebrenica: The 28th Land Force

8 Division and the steps taken."

9 And then it describes everything that was done beginning with

10 3rd June, 1995, until the 8th of July.

11 Can we scroll down a little so we see the bottom of the page.

12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Do you see the last paragraph:

14 "Ramiz from Srebrenica notified that the UN had suggested to try

15 to talk to the Chetniks which he refused."

16 Was it the position of the BH Army at the time not to accept any

17 negotiations in or about the demilitarised areas, not even with the

18 UNPROFOR?

19 A. It is now difficult for me to evaluate the balance of powers,

20 especially in the protected areas relative to the VRS, but generally

21 speaking, the Bosnian Army was far stronger in numbers. It had -- it was

22 already on the move and armed and it outnumbered, simply, the VRS forces.

23 Q. We have seen in this last paragraph that Ramiz Becirovic, then

24 Chief of the General Staff, refused negotiations with the Serbs and

25 refused to authorised UN to negotiate with the Serbs because they had

Page 14020

1 already taken control of some favourable positions for their project of

2 linking up the enclaves with Tuzla and other protected areas. Can you

3 tell us if later when the situation became unfavourable for Ramiz,

4 instead of fighting in Srebrenica, he moved with all his forces to break

5 out via Baljkovica with all the military-aged men?

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. If we could get some idea of what this

8 document is would be helpful. Also, there's no foundation to this

9 question on why the lieutenant-colonel working out of Banja Luka as a

10 military police would know the details of Srebrenica that he learned

11 about in the media. So if he could have a foundational what he knows

12 about these things, I think it would be important before just launching

13 into them from a document that we don't even know what it is.

14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mr. President, the

16 foundation was -- for introducing this document was indicated yesterday

17 when Mr. McCloskey said that the 28th Division ran over the

18 Zvornik Brigade, and that's why I showed this document produced by the BH

19 Army that speaks about the break-out and provides an evaluation of this

20 situation in which they did not even want to negotiate. I thought we

21 needed to see this because this witness was present there for awhile when

22 he visited the command post and when he found out the command post that

23 the forces described here had attacked.

24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Please, General, upon your arrival to the Main Staff, did you

Page 14021

1 find out that the forces from Srebrenica had attacked the command of the

2 Main Staff of the VRS using active operations from so-called

3 demilitarised zones or zones under the protection of the United Nations?

4 Thank you.

5 A. I found about it one of those days, I'm not sure whether it was

6 immediately upon my arrival, but I did find out that an attack had

7 occurred against the Main Staff itself.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, can we have in e-court

10 page 4 of the current document where the 12th of July is discussed, when

11 Mr. Ramiz Becirovic decided to start with the break-through. Thank you.

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Which page is it in English?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is page 5. Thank you. It's the

14 end of the fourth page in English and then the text continues into the

15 fifth page, but we are interested in second item and I quote:

16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17 Q. "12 July 1995, in a conversation at 0220 hours, Ramiz reported

18 that he was leaving the enclave along the Urdc-Baljkovica route with his

19 units because Srebrenica had been captured at 1500 hours."

20 And this is my question: From this can we see that Srebrenica

21 surrendered without fighting and that soldiers from Srebrenica went to

22 make their break-through and that they left civilians and population to

23 find shelter in bases including in Potocari?

24 A. I cannot see the entire document, but based on this item, it is

25 hard to make any conclusions as to what is going on, but it is clear that

Page 14022

1 chief of the staff of the division is clearly saying that they are

2 setting off to break through outside of the enclave. I don't see any of

3 the rest that you mentioned in this item.

4 Q. Thank you. In your statement -- apologies. In his statement,

5 General Smith said that he was told by General Mladic about how Mladic

6 had been surprised to see empty Srebrenica on his arrival. Did you hear

7 from our soldiers and officers also stories about their surprise with a

8 quick getting into Srebrenica and lack of any resistance?

9 A. I did not have much opportunity to discuss issues with members of

10 troops that entered Srebrenica. What I do remember was that there were

11 several days of preparations and that once UNPROFOR was removed from

12 their check-points, the entry into town itself was relatively easily

13 achieved.

14 Q. Thank you. Please, on this same page in the third paragraph, we

15 see that the 24th Division of the Land Army to put their units in combat

16 readiness for move towards Srebrenica. And then later on we can see, it

17 is in the following paragraph under the locations it says there, the

18 commander of the 28th Division - do you see that - is in Tuzla with a

19 group of officers and he left, and so on and so forth. There is no point

20 for me to read the document now, but one can see that all the units of

21 the 2nd Corps headed that way including Naser Oric with a group of

22 officers that were conducting commander reconnaissance -- command

23 reconnaissance. So can you please tell me whether all this has had the

24 following effect: That they as an armed force managed to overrun the

25 defences of the Zvornik Brigade and link up, starting from Srebrenica

Page 14023

1 with the BH forces in Kladanj and Tuzla? Thank you.

2 A. Considering their numerical strength, and I'm talking about the

3 forces arriving into the area of the Zvornik Brigade, one can say that

4 militarily speaking it was quite logical that the Zvornik Brigade could

5 not stop them.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have D155 on our

8 screens to see what the commander of the army had to say about this when

9 addressing his president. Thank you.

10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11 Q. We see a document issued by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

12 dated 16th July. It is a report on Srebrenica. It was sent via the

13 security organs and among the addressees is also Alija Izetbegovic.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see the third page of

15 this document in B/C/S. Thank you. Here on the third page -- it's on

16 the 4th page in English, thank you, Aleksandar. So here we can see the

17 last paragraph marked with number 3. It appeared only now. In the

18 English version, yes, there it is. And there it is stated:

19 "Units of the 28th Division of the Land Army are pulling out of

20 Srebrenica while still fighting. They have remained compact. They have

21 scored success after success in the temporarily-occupied territory. They

22 have inflicted great losses on the aggressor in the course of the

23 fighting. So far, they have eight Chetniks (alive) in captivity. Units

24 of the 28th Division of the Land Army have linked up with the infiltrated

25 units of the 2nd Corps. Their joined forces have continued fighting in

Page 14024

1 the temporarily-occupied territory. It is expected that they will fully

2 link up with these units. Activities are underway to exploit the success

3 of units carrying out the break-through."

4 Thank you, that was the end of the quotation.

5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

6 Q. And this is my question: The commander of the BH Army -- and can

7 we please see the last page so we could see the signature block. So the

8 commander of the BH Army, Mr. Rasim Delic, did he assess the

9 break-through operation from Srebrenica and linking up of the forces of

10 Srebrenica and Tuzla as a successful operation?

11 A. Yes, this report describes the break-through operation as a

12 success.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Tolimir.

15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Yesterday, you told us that they didn't have a lot of weapons but

17 can we now see from all these documents that they had enough weaponry to

18 carry out such an operation and to break through the zone of the, at the

19 time, strongest brigade in the area, the Zvornik Brigade? Thank you.

20 A. On the basis of this report, they obviously had enough weaponry.

21 Yesterday, when I was talking about the issue, I was basing my statements

22 on information according to which in this column of 15.000 people roughly

23 over one-half were only armed, and that's the information I had. And it

24 was on the basis of that that I said that they had just infantry arms.

25 It would be difficult even to imagine that while carrying out a

Page 14025

1 break-through operation they would push or carry artillery weaponry.

2 Whereas the people who were on the front line obviously had all available

3 weapons at their disposal.

4 Q. Thank you. Did you know whether the 28th Division was receiving

5 weapons via air-lifts?

6 A. We did have intelligence information about helicopters flying

7 over and heading towards the protected area. The reports also indicated

8 that weapons and ammunition were being brought in.

9 Q. Thank you, General.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, can we have D67 now on our

11 screens. This will confirm what you knew on the basis of reports of the

12 BH Army which will confirm it as fact.

13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Here we see an interim report sent by the intelligence

15 administration from Sarajevo, BH Army intelligence administration. The

16 date is 13th July, 1995, and it went through the commander of the

17 1st Corps to the president of the Presidency of the Republic of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, on the 13th of July. So one day

19 after their attempted break-through, they report to him about what they

20 did. In the introduction we can see, I quote:

21 "In view of the situation of our enclaves during the preceding

22 period, the army General Staff has undertaken a series of military

23 activities and procedures to organise the members of the army in the

24 enclaves and prepare them for possible operations, primarily the defence

25 of the existing free territory and planned engagements and preparations

Page 14026

1 for future joint operations and planned operations."

2 Please, on the basis of this, is it obvious that the BH Army was

3 planning joint operations with the forces of Srebrenica throughout the

4 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

5 A. Yes, we can see that and this document confirms the following

6 position, at the time when the enclave was allegedly demilitarised,

7 namely before the developments we are talking about here, that weapons

8 had been brought into the enclave via air-lift on many occasions.

9 Q. Thank you, General. Can we please look at the second line of the

10 report where Alija Izetbegovic is saying 17 helicopter flights were

11 carried out in each of which a helicopter was hit fourth item -- no, I

12 apologise. The third item, in such a manner, we managed to bring back

13 some seriously-injured people, and then the following item:

14 "In preparations for future operation to link up the enclaves we

15 brought in and took back four brigade commanders, two brigade chiefs of

16 staff, and the 26th Division Chief of Staff," that's how it is written

17 here, "the division commander, who was meant to go on the next helicopter

18 flight, did not return after the final flight ended tragically. Naser

19 remained."

20 And this is my question: In this item is it clearly

21 unambiguously stated that he managed to take the commanders from the

22 enclave to Tuzla and back for the purpose of discussing future tasks

23 concerning linking up of enclaves? Have you observed this and how would

24 you comment a report of this sort that the Chief of Staff is sending to

25 his president?

Page 14027

1 A. Yes, we can see here that for some reason the commanders went to

2 Tuzla. In the previous item, it is stated that it was in relation to

3 future operations and this also confirms some of our intelligence,

4 according to which air corridors were constantly functioning between

5 Srebrenica and Tuzla.

6 Q. Thank you, General.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please turn to the following

8 page. I would like to show General what weapons and ammunition were

9 being supplied from Tuzla to Zepa by plane and then further on from Zepa

10 to Srebrenica via land. The first column represents Zepa; second,

11 Srebrenica; and the third is total. Can we please have the following

12 page in English where -- yes, we see this overview here as well. The

13 following page, please, where one can see the signature to see who was it

14 who issued this document.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, we have it on the screen, please

16 continue.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19 Q. General, helicopter flights, could they have come unobserved to

20 the demilitarised zone without being observed by the UN forces whose task

21 it was to make sure that the enclave is demilitarised? Thank you.

22 A. No, they certainly could not because the check-points, and the

23 check-points UNPROFOR troops were deployed and VRS forces were around the

24 enclave. If the Serbian soldiers could observe this, then the UN

25 observers should have been able to do the same.

Page 14028

1 Q. Thank you.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up D16 in

3 e-court.

4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

5 Q. And while we are waiting for it to be shown, I have to say for

6 the record that this document was issued by the Republic

7 of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the General Staff of the BiH Army. It was sent

8 from Kakanj to the command of the 2nd Corps to OG 8 Srebrenica and to the

9 command of the 1st Zepa Brigade. Please, let's look at the 6th line from

10 the top of the page and you will see that the report was sent to their

11 commanders. It says:

12 "On the 16th of February, 1995, the aggressor filed a request

13 with UNPROFOR to declare Zepa a non-demilitarised zone, with the

14 following rationale."

15 I don't want to go on reading, but I would like to say that they

16 repeat everything that General Mladic sent the UNPROFOR command as his

17 objections. What follows is an order and under 1 it says:

18 "Bring units of OG 8 to full combat readiness."

19 Under bullet point 2, they say that a co-ordinated action should

20 be organised. Under bullet point 4, it says the helicopter has to be

21 camouflaged. UNPROFOR was not allowed to inspect and therefore the

22 instructions for dealings with UNPROFOR.

23 My question is this: Bearing in mind the information that we

24 sent to UNPROFOR, bearing in mind that we requested for the zone to be

25 demilitarised, can you tell us, do you know whether any steps were taken

Page 14029

1 by UNPROFOR to demilitarise those zones to be disarmed and for the

2 weapons to be returned which would have stopped us from doing it by

3 force? Thank you.

4 A. I'm not aware of any steps that may have been done to that

5 effect.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at P1011 [Realtime

8 transcript read in error "P10111"] in e-court. Thank you.

9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10 Q. What we see here is the agreement on complete cessation of

11 hostilities. In the first paragraph the agreement reads:

12 "Following the cease-fire agreement signed on the 23rd December

13 1994, the parties agree to a complete cessation of hostilities with

14 effect from 1200 hours on the 1st of January, 1995, along all lines of

15 confrontation. This agreement will be in effect for an initial period of

16 four months, subject to renewal under the these same conditions by

17 agreement of the parties."

18 My question: Do you know if this agreement was honoured by the

19 Muslims, or rather, is it during that time that most of their hostilities

20 took place against our forces that were in the area?

21 A. I don't --

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please continue your answer.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We have already spoken about this

24 period, and we said that during that period, during that winter and early

25 spring, this cease-fire agreement was not complied with in many parts of

Page 14030

1 the combat area, for example, on Mount Vlasic. And according to what I

2 know, it was not honoured in the zone of the 30th Division from Kupres to

3 Donji Vakuf, and the same situation prevailed in Bihac front line in

4 Mount Ozren and the territories around Doboj. There were a lot of places

5 where the agreement was not honoured.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, could you please repeat the number

7 of the document because it's wrongly recorded.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. The

9 document number is P1011.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13 Q. In the second paragraph, it says:

14 "The cessation of hostilities will be supervised and monitors by

15 UNPROFOR through the establishment of Joint Commissions."

16 Can you tell us anything you know about the fact whether they

17 prevented activities against the units of the VRS in which you

18 participated at the time?

19 A. According to my experience which does not have to be the

20 experience of others, the international forces, at least from the point

21 of view of the VRS, left the area in case of any incidents and they

22 justified that by security reasons.

23 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether UNPROFOR also left UNPA zones in

24 Croatia before Croatia or its army launched its attack on those zones?

25 A. I cannot testify to that. I was not a firsthand witness, but it

Page 14031

1 is a historical fact before Operation Storm and Flash began and before

2 that in 1993 before operations started to liberate Maslenica and the

3 hinterland of Zadar, the forces that had been in Croatia would leave the

4 area before those operations were launched.

5 Q. Thank you, sir.

6 In the transcript on page 23, I believe, I don't know if I

7 recorded the page number well, actually, it was on page 18, line 2 of the

8 transcript the day before yesterday, you were asked whether that would

9 include UNPROFOR and NATO. You were talking about counter-intelligence

10 activities and protection measures, and you were asked whether those

11 included UNPROFOR and NATO. On page 18, line 2, and on line 4, you

12 answered that it was probably so. My question is this: Did we have any

13 specific information about abuses among UNPROFOR or individuals there and

14 that information was conveyed through them from one side to another?

15 A. There was intelligence to that effect, to the effect that

16 information was conveyed about the two sides, and the bad experience

17 probably resulted in our concern about the intentions of the

18 international forces. We were very cautious about them.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, you raised one second earlier than

20 Mr. Gajic. Mr. McCloskey.

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: We got in English, "Did we have information," and

22 of course we need to know what he means by that. "We" could mean: We,

23 the VRS; we, the Main Staff; you and I. So it's not a very helpful way

24 to ask a question. The answer was very clear, there was intelligence

25 that, but it doesn't really answer the question because it's impossible

Page 14032

1 to answer "we" because we don't know who "we" is. So if you could be

2 more particular with that, I think it would be helpful.

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.

4 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to say

5 for the transcript that that was recorded on the 10th of May, 2011, page

6 13876.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is the updated numbering of the transcript

8 of the day before yesterday. Thank you.

9 Judge Nyambe has a question.

10 JUDGE NYAMBE: Yes, I just wonder if you could clarify for me, at

11 page 23, in lines 14 to 19, at the end of those lines you've stated there

12 were a lot of places where the agreement was not honoured, meaning the

13 cease-fire agreement. Who or which parties did not honour the cease-fire

14 agreement? Thank you.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Tolimir's question was about

16 the BiH Army which means that I was referring to the BiH Army in my

17 answer.

18 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you very much.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, if I recall correctly, you have used

20 the term "we" several times yesterday and today when you put questions to

21 the witness. Taking me account the remark of Mr. McCloskey, indeed it

22 would be helpful to identify exactly what you are meaning. Carry on,

23 please.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Thank you,

25 Mr. McCloskey. When I say "we," I mean the VRS. I apologise for the

Page 14033

1 feeling that it was both myself and the General, the two of us were

2 members of the same service. In my future questions and answers, I will

3 try to be very clear for the record.

4 I would like to call up D188 in e-court. Thank you.

5 We can see the document on the screen. We see a document before

6 us which says that UNPROFOR conveyed information about the VRS to the BiH

7 Army. Let's just read the beginning of the document. The document was

8 issued by the Gorazde state security sector. It was signed by the

9 chief --

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before you continue, is there an English

11 translation? In your list of documents to be used with this witness, you

12 indicated that there is a translation.

13 Mr. Tolimir, could you clarify that, or Mr. Gajic.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We

15 thought that the document was translated because it was used during the

16 examination of General Smith. It seems we were wrong, it hasn't been

17 translated apparently.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it's marked for identification.

19 Mr. Gajic.

20 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, this is an

21 exhibit which was marked for identification not only because there is

22 no -- there was no translation during Mr. Smith's testimony. As far as I

23 know, we have not received a translation yet. As soon as we have it, it

24 will be uploaded in e-court.

25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. Please continue.

Page 14034

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. We can see that the document was drafted by the state security

4 sector in Gorazde. That was a territory under the BiH Army control. The

5 date is 22nd July, 1995. That document was submitted to their superiors.

6 In the first paragraph, it says:

7 "We inform you that on the 1st of July, 1995, in the evening

8 hours, we were invited by the commander of UNPROFOR in Gorazde,

9 Colonel John Riley, for a short meeting. He explained that he was

10 prepared to offer to us some of the intelligence that he had obtained in

11 a telephone conversation with General Smith."

12 This document therefore confirms that the UNPROFOR commander in

13 Gorazde collated intelligence to the Muslim side. My question is this:

14 If the security organs of one army receive intelligence and information

15 that there may be spy activities against them on the part of UNPROFOR and

16 NATO, are they duty-bound to draft a plan of counter-intelligence

17 activity against such an organisation?

18 A. Yes, according to our rules we had that obligation. And it was

19 the counter-intelligence group that focused on those activities, if at

20 all possible.

21 Q. Thank you. My question is this: Was that in keeping with the

22 rules and laws which were in force and that we were duty-bound to comply

23 with, and when I say "we," I mean the Main Staff and the intelligence

24 administration or members of the VRS in general?

25 A. Yes, that was in keeping with the rules and laws.

Page 14035

1 Q. Thank you.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see D189, please.

3 Thank you.

4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Now we can see D189. It's also a document from the state

6 security service in Gorazde dated 18 June which says, I quote:

7 "Regarding your request from your dispatch, please be informed

8 that with a view to verifying reports received earlier we had a

9 discussion with Colonel Roger from the BritBat. In that conversation,

10 Roger confirmed what we had heard earlier from Officer Allen and said

11 that the aggressor had been seen regrouping with forces two or three

12 brigades strong in the broad area of Trnovo. He also said that this

13 should not be of any concern to us because in his estimate it was -- it

14 involved 1.500 to 1.600 aggressor troops."

15 Now, did you have any knowledge about UNPROFOR members sharing

16 information with one or another side?

17 A. This document seems to confirm that.

18 Q. Pursuant to laws and regulations, would it be the duty of the

19 counter-intelligence service to act against such persons?

20 A. Yes.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see D237. Could we rotate

22 the document so the witness can read it.

23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24 Q. This is an intelligence report from the Main Staff of the VRS

25 dated 30th March, 1995. We are looking at paragraph 2 which says -- it's

Page 14036

1 the next page in English:

2 "According to reports from reliable sources, the Americans are

3 providing Muslims with intelligence about VRS units. UNPROFOR and NATO

4 continue to threaten with bombardment of VRS positions and installations

5 in the event that the VRS mounting a counter-attack to crush the Muslim

6 offensive carries out an attack against Muslim enclaves, although there

7 is no agreement about that at the UN Security Council."

8 My question is: Were the Americans able to gather the most

9 information about the Army of Republika Srpska and other parties to the

10 conflict because they had drones of all kinds flying over all theatres of

11 war on the pretext that they were doing it for their requirements and

12 UNPROFOR and NATO.

13 A. It's quite likely that some of the satellites covering this

14 territory were active non-stop and they were able to have such

15 information.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, we must have our first break now.

17 Before we break, I would like to clarify two dates. You said in relation

18 to this document, this is an intelligence report from the Main Staff of

19 the VRS dated 30th of March, 1995. In your list, you were indicating

20 it's the 31st of March. It is not very legible, but we see handwriting

21 on the top of this document from the 31st of March. The document itself,

22 it's hardly legible, just for the record.

23 The other date which is -- seems to be unclear is the previous

24 document from the 21st of July. You said on page 27, line 20, the date

25 is 22nd of July. Now, it should be the 2nd of July instead of 22nd.

Page 14037

1 We have to adjourn and resume quarter past 4.00.

2 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 4.16 p.m.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Thank

6 you for -- [Microphone not activated]

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you for noticing the dates on

9 these documents. The date is 31 March, not the 30th. You can see that

10 on the last page where the encrypting officer signed it. And on the

11 second document, it's the 2nd, not the 22nd.

12 Could we have this document D188 and D189 dated 18 June admitted

13 or marked for identification pending translation.

14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: They are both marked for identification on two

15 reasons: One is the lack of translation, and the other was that the

16 witness, Sir Smith, was not able to identify these documents and couldn't

17 testify about its content. I think the situation, this is my personal

18 impression, has not changed yet because the witness says, yes, if I read

19 this it seems to indicate something. He was not able to identify the

20 documents as well.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

22 Please, could we now display 1D196. This document, 196 is D196.

23 We received something else.

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The reason is that you indicated the wrong

25 number, 1D196. But now you are asking for D196, that is fine.

Page 14038

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I will

2 try not to make these mistakes in future.

3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

4 Q. This is a document from the Main Staff of the Army of Republika

5 Srpska dated 24 February 1995. It's a protest addressed by

6 General Mladic to the command of the UNPROFOR in Zagreb to the attention

7 of General de Lapresle and to the command of the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo to

8 the attention of General Smith. This protest, General Mladic says, I'm

9 quoting from paragraph 1:

10 "On 23rd February, 1995, around 2010 hours another freight

11 aircraft landed on the auxiliary runway of Tuzla airport carrying weapons

12 and military equipment and escorted by two fighter planes of NATO which

13 secured and protected it in flight and during unloading. Regrettably,

14 this has happened more than once lately before the eyes and ears of NATO

15 and UNPROFOR forces in the air and at the Tuzla airport who do not do

16 anything to prevent these violations of the relevant UN Security Council

17 resolutions banning import of weapons and military equipment."

18 My question is: Is it the case that our forces frequently

19 addressed protests to the UNPROFOR over the arming of Muslims, especially

20 1994 and 1995, with the assistance of the UNPROFOR and NATO forces

21 deployed in Bosnia?

22 A. I knew that protests were sent and that in direct contact and

23 talks this issue was raised repeatedly.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now display -- or rather,

Page 14039

1 could we have this document admitted first and then let us display P1430.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document we just had on the screen was

3 already marked for identification pending translation. We are still

4 waiting for the translation.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

7 Q. This document speaks of an incident like the one you mentioned.

8 This was written by the UNPROFOR staff for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the author

9 is Colonel Baxter, and it was submitted on the 6th of March, 1995, in the

10 form of minutes of the meeting between General Smith and General Mladic.

11 In paragraph 1, we read:

12 "Today at Jahorina ski resort south of Pale, a meeting took place

13 between General Smith and General Mladic. The meeting was organised at

14 the invitation of General Mladic. This is the first occasion, in the

15 memory of HQ BHC, that Mladic has been the instigator of a meeting. The

16 invitation was issued during a telephone conversation the previous day

17 when General Smith obtained General Mladic's clearance for a resupply of

18 DutchBat in Srebrenica. The meeting lasted two and a half hours.

19 Major-General Tolimir attended throughout," and so on and so forth.

20 Now, below on the same page, paragraph 2 (b):

21 "Mladic alleged the use of Tuzla airfield for the supply of arms

22 to the BiH Army covered by NATO. General Smith stated that he was

23 satisfied that NATO was not resorting -- sorry, not escorting or was in

24 any way associated with the alleged landings of aircraft at Tuzla.

25 General Smith reported that UNPROFOR will continue to observe the area

Page 14040

1 and report sightings to NATO as part of Operation Deny Flight. Mladic

2 acknowledged that aircraft had been observed and sighted."

3 My question is: Does this confirm what you said, namely that in

4 direct contact the problems related to the supply of weapons to Muslims

5 covered by NATO and UNPROFOR was frequently raised?

6 A. Yes, this report confirms that this was one of the topics.

7 Q. Did we in the final stages of the war -- I mean me in the

8 Main Staff. I apologise for again saying we. Did we, the intelligence

9 and security administration, receive reports that in the final stages of

10 the war NATO forces together with BH Army forces and the Croatian Army

11 would attack the territory and the Army of Republika Srpska? Do you know

12 that we had such information?

13 A. Yes, we had such reports. They reached also the forward command

14 post in Bosanska Krajina.

15 Q. Thank you. Seeing that you had visited the forward command post

16 of General Milovanovic, were there any NATO and Croatian Army operations

17 against the VRS in that part of our territory?

18 A. Well, I cannot speak to any direct operations by NATO forces, but

19 I can confirm that I personally observed operations mounted by the

20 Croatian Army, both their land forces and their aviation.

21 Q. Do you know whether NATO attacked installations of

22 Republika Srpska in those final stages in July and August?

23 A. Yes, I had forgotten about that. In Republika Srpska, all radio

24 relay hubs were destroyed, such as on Mount Kozara, at Svinjar,

25 Mount Majevica, Ozren, Kmur, Leotar. I don't know all the places. In

Page 14041

1 any case, all communication centres and radio relay hubs were destroyed.

2 Q. Thank you. As a war time commander in various units ranking from

3 battalion to Chief of Staff of a corps, what can you tell us about what

4 the communication system represent for maintaining the full combat

5 readiness of units?

6 A. I can give you an illustration. We would call it the throbbing

7 vein of any army or any defence system.

8 Q. Would then NATO operations against this throbbing vein, would

9 that be something that would have influence on the positions of VRS in

10 relation to Croatian Army and BH Army, in those parts of the battle-field

11 where you were present?

12 A. Yes, it would and it did.

13 Q. Could you just briefly tell us in what way, which positions were

14 lost at the time in Republika Srpska, what VRS lost of the positions that

15 they had held before that?

16 A. An area covering about 11 municipalities in western Krajina:

17 Grahovo, Glamoc, Drvar, Petrovac, Krupa, Kljuc, Mrkonjic Grad,

18 Sanski Most, Jajce and Donja Vakuf. We lost all these municipalities

19 within a period of two months of joint operations by NATO forces against

20 radio relay, hubs and Croatian Army land operations.

21 Q. Thank you. If the commander of the Main Staff of

22 Republika Srpska would receive intelligence such as this, namely that

23 NATO is assisting in arming Muslims, that UNPROFOR is protecting this

24 process of ABiH arming, would the commander then be justified in sending

25 intelligence officers to examine the situation which would later help him

Page 14042

1 in negotiations?

2 A. Well, that's one of the focuses of the intelligence work, namely

3 protection of units and facilities, infrastructure facilities in the army

4 and in the Republika Srpska as such.

5 Q. Thank you. Since throughout 1995, as we have seen in this

6 document recently, should have introduced truce and in -- cease of

7 hostilities for a long period of time. Can you tell me whether the

8 commander of the army according to regulations could have insisted that

9 intelligence and counter-intelligence activities should be focused on

10 those issues? Thank you.

11 A. The commander of the Main Staff is in any case authorised to take

12 all measures using intelligence forces at his disposal to protect

13 intelligence and counter-intelligence in both the troops and the

14 territory.

15 Q. Thank you. On page 10 of the transcript from two days ago, line

16 18, I don't know which page but my legal assistant will surely tell me,

17 the Prosecutor showed document P01112 which was instruction on command

18 and control. On page 11 in the first line you told us that you haven't

19 seen that document while you were in the VRS.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to ask for this

21 document, P01112, to be put on the screens so that we can see what is in

22 it. Thank you.

23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24 Q. We see this instruction of the Main Staff of the VRS dated 24th

25 of October that was used during the direct examination. We will not go

Page 14043

1 into any further details except saying that at the time, and this is on

2 page 11, lines 23 to page 12, there you said that there is a problem with

3 the percentages, that it shouldn't be 80/20. Instead, it should be

4 two-thirds, one-third, and one-third should be for the staff-related

5 tasks, not 20, but 16 [as interpreted].

6 And this is my question: The commander of the Main Staff of the

7 VRS who is commanding by using measures and methods and gives orders to

8 the organs of the military police, can he issue an order that during

9 periods of truce and when there is an increased presence of international

10 elements in the zone, can he order that the number of intelligence

11 officers be increased at expense of those who are engaged in command and

12 staff activities? Is that his right?

13 A. If you remember when I was talking about the percentage, I also

14 stated that I'm not sure that I don't know what were the reasons for the

15 decisions of the commander of the Main Staff. I didn't know about what

16 you've just told me now, but that it was customary and it was also stated

17 in the rules that the distribution be two-thirds, one-third, but if there

18 were reasons, of course, the commander could have changed the ratio any

19 which way he wanted.

20 Q. Thank you, General. During the examination-in-chief, you were

21 also asked whether the JNA rules were applied in the VRS. And this is my

22 question: The JNA rules concerning the activities of the military

23 police, the security service, and command and control, were they

24 something that could also be used in the VRS in the same way as they had

25 been applied before? What was missing there and was there any reason for

Page 14044

1 change?

2 A. They could have been used because the continuity of application

3 of the rules was there, and with the change of conditions, some of the

4 rules were changed but they were mainly taken over and used as they were.

5 And, as far as I know, all the parties in the area continued using all

6 rules, and even in other spheres, the Criminal Code and so forth. The

7 problem was that the new laws were not drafted yet after the changes in

8 the political and governmental system, but the old rules applied until

9 new rules would be in effect.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, can we please have D203 on

12 our screens.

13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14 Q. This is rule of service in the security organs of the

15 Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. We'll see it on the screen

16 soon. Can we turn it around. And this is my question: Were these rules

17 of service used in the VRS while you were a member of the VRS?

18 A. Yes.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you please turn to page 30 in

20 English. Yes, 30 in the English and in Serbian page 30.

21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Let's see what the rules say about how it should be applied in

23 practice and during war time.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please show page 30 in

25 Serbian. Item 84. I apologise, it's page 24 in e-court. I made a

Page 14045

1 mistake.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Here we can see item 85, "Work of Security Organs During War

4 Time," and it says:

5 "In war, security organs act in accordance with the provisions of

6 these rules and other rules and regulations that regulate the work of

7 security organs adapting their own activity, methods, and means of work

8 to the war time conditions."

9 And this is my question: General, even in peacetime did we

10 have -- did we in peacetime get an open opportunity, an option to act in

11 accordance with these rules?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. In item number 2, we can read the following:

14 "In combat activities, security organs organise and implement

15 methods of counter-intelligence security and participate, within the

16 framework of their competence, in the organisation of security measures

17 and self-protection of commands, units, institutions ...," and so on and

18 so forth. End of quotation.

19 This is my question: Security organs in war time, were they

20 authorised to carry out measures of counter-intelligence support for

21 units, institutions?

22 A. Yes, according to the regulations.

23 Q. Thank you. These rules, did they apply also in various republics

24 that were part of former Yugoslavia, both in peacetime and in war time?

25 Thank you.

Page 14046

1 A. Yes, they applied throughout the former state and therefore all

2 of its republics. For the defence and in terms of application of the

3 rules before us, there was no difference between republics. The only

4 thing that mattered was Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

5 Q. Thank you, General.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please move now to item 87.

7 It is the last item in the Serbian version. Can we please turn to the

8 following page in the English. Yes, thank you.

9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10 Q. There it is stated:

11 "Security organs familiarise the competent military officer with

12 the counter-intelligence situation and, on the basis of the conclusions

13 of the evaluation under item 86, paragraph 1 of these rules, recommend

14 counter-intelligence support measures. In the process of the work of

15 commands, units, institutions, and staffs of the armed forces in

16 preparing and carrying out combat activities, at the request of a

17 competent military officer, security organs recommend necessary security

18 measures and the use of the military police."

19 And my question to you is the following: Can you tell us who is

20 the competent officer in relation to security organs in VRS to whom

21 assessments and estimates were to be recommended and submitted?

22 A. Exclusively the commanders.

23 Q. Thank you. At all levels of command, can you tell us whether

24 security organs were briefing commanders about counter-intelligence

25 assessments and proposed and recommended measures and use of military

Page 14047

1 police for the purpose of protection of units, institutions, and staff,

2 and did commanders authorise them and approve their recommendations?

3 A. Security organs participated at all levels in relation to

4 recommending measures concerning the use of military police, if there was

5 military police within the unit, and my experience was that commanders

6 would mostly accept the recommendation, sometimes change it a bit, and

7 very seldom turn it down.

8 Q. Thank you, General.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us turn to page 5 in Serbian,

10 page 6 in the English, on e-court to see what was the scope of activities

11 of the security organs.

12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13 Q. I will then put the question to you. Thank you. Please read to

14 yourself item number 1. There's no point in me reading it out to you,

15 and then I will ask you a question. And this is my question but I will

16 wait for you to read the text first. I apologise. So this is my

17 question: Security organs within the VRS, were these organs in charge of

18 security of the Republika Srpska, its army, its institutions, and its

19 territory?

20 A. Yes, they were in charge of state security, and within the system

21 of defence one of the basic laws was the one about security organs which

22 implied armed forces security organs as well.

23 Q. Thank you. I apologise for not having prepared a constitution to

24 show you, but it was shown to you during the examination-in-chief. My

25 question is this: When it comes to the constitution of the

Page 14048

1 Republika Srpska, was it in any way limiting upon the work of the

2 security organs and the state security organs, or rather, did they have

3 the same tasks that they would have had no matter what the constitutional

4 order was? What I'm saying is that they were duty-bound to protect the

5 constitutional order? Thank you.

6 A. If general terms, every constitution irrespective of the type of

7 the security system elements bounds them to protect the constitutional

8 order of that state and the principle values of that state or its

9 elements, the territory, the population and the political system or the

10 political order that exists in the state.

11 Q. Thank you. Bearing in mind what you have just told us, did the

12 constitution of the Republika Srpska limit the application of the rules

13 from the former JNA governing the work of the security services within

14 the army and the institutions?

15 A. As far as I know, there were no restrictions.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move to page 6 in the

18 English version and page 6 in the Serbian version. We would like to look

19 at paragraph 6, or rather, bullet point 6, paragraph 2, "The tasks of the

20 security organs."

21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Now we can see that. I am not going to read from the text. In

23 the examination-in-chief, you were asked about this paragraph, you were

24 asked about your tasks and activities. I'm just going to read the first

25 sentences in each of the paragraphs:

Page 14049

1 "6(a), The detection, tracking and prevention of intelligence

2 activities and other activities of foreign military intelligence. 6(b),

3 The detection and prevention of hostile activities by individuals groups

4 or organisations against armed forces and members of the arms forces.

5 6(c), The implementation of measures and operations of

6 counter-intelligence protection."

7 Let's move on to the following page, page 7 in English. We want

8 to see 6(2)(b), which is:

9 "Prescribing measures of protection and self-protection. (c),

10 planning the training of permanent reserve force."

11 And now let's look at (d) where it says:

12 "In professional terms, the control of the military police units

13 and then actions that precede the commission of a crime and criminal

14 proceedings" --

15 A. I believe that there has been a mistake. I'm looking at page 12

16 instead of page 7 or 8. I'm looking at a different text on the screen.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 13 in Serbian. I'm

19 not going to repeat again. Thank you, Mr. President.

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Thank you, General Keserovic. My question based on what we have

22 just read out is this: When it comes to the control of the military

23 police, was it only in professional terms that the security organs were

24 in charge of the military police as it is stated in bullet point 7(d)?

25 A. Yes, only in professional terms and I believe that in the

Page 14050

1 previous examination I said exactly that.

2 Q. Thank you. Could you please explain for the benefit of the

3 Trial Chamber what is the difference between the professional

4 relationship and the command relationship within a unit or within a

5 command of a military organisation? Thank you.

6 A. A command relationship is a relationship which implies

7 subordination and an exclusive right by the commander to use a military

8 police unit or rather to give it orders and tasks as he would to any

9 other unit on the strength of that unit. That is the relationship

10 between the commander of the unit and the commander of the military

11 police unit. There is a direct link between the two.

12 In terms of a professional control over military police units,

13 this implies activities with regard to the staffing of the unit,

14 training, it's preparedness for the execution of policing duties, the

15 duty service, planned control of the military police services and other

16 tasks and duties which fall out of the scope of command or issuing orders

17 for the direct use of that unit.

18 Q. Thank you, General, sir.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 10 in

20 English and page 9 in Serbian.

21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22 Q. We want to see the part about which you were asked yesterday, and

23 that was why did we share responsibility within a single organisation.

24 Let's look at a bullet point 16, "Management of security organs." I'm

25 going to read bullet point 6 [as interpreted] where it says:

Page 14051

1 "The security organ is directly subordinated to the commanding

2 officer of the command unit, institution, or staff of the armed forces in

3 whose strength it is placed in the establishment, and it is responsible

4 to that officer for its work ..."

5 My question: Were security organs in the security administration

6 of the Main Staff of the VRS subordinated to the commanding officer of

7 the unit or institution or staff or to the chief of their service? Who

8 were they subordinated to in military terms?

9 A. In military terms, they were subordinated to the commander. In

10 this particular case the officers in the sector for intelligence and

11 security were subordinated to the commander of the Main Staff. That was

12 in military terms. In professional terms and for some professional

13 tasks, that fell within the scope of the work of the security organs,

14 primarily counter-intelligence. They were subordinated to the officer of

15 the professional unit, in this case it would be the sector for security

16 and intelligence.

17 Q. Mr. Keserovic, could you tell us, please, whether that

18 relationship of subordination in professional terms also implied the

19 subordination to the superior officer, military commander who approved

20 any measures ordered?

21 A. Yes, certainly. This means that the activities of the

22 organisational unit for security or the security sector or the security

23 administration or the security section were planned, and those plans were

24 approved by the officer or the commander of the unit on whose strength

25 any of those institutions or units existed.

Page 14052

1 Q. Thank you. Since we are talking about very specific use of

2 measures, methods, and means of work, I would like us to look at bullet

3 point 17, and then I'm going to ask you to answer a question because

4 during the examination-in-chief you were asked about methods and means.

5 A. When it comes to the application of different methods and means

6 of work or combined application of methods of work, in war time the

7 commander of the Main Staff, or, if it has been otherwise stipulated, it

8 can also be the minister of defence would be the one who approved

9 individual use of some particular methods. Under peacetime conditions,

10 and that applies today, the approval of the use of special methods is

11 within the purview of the courts. This means that none of the methods or

12 means of work of the security organs can be approved by the commander of

13 that unit or applied by the commander of that unit.

14 Q. Thank you. Did the same regulations apply during the war? In

15 other words, that the commander could not do anything in that sense

16 without the approval of the superior officer?

17 A. Yes, the same rules applied.

18 Q. Thank you. Who was the superior officer of all security organs

19 in the VRS in keeping with the rules and regulations? Thank you.

20 A. The commander of the Main Staff of the VRS.

21 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us, you were asked about covert

22 methods, was anybody in a position to approve the application of a covert

23 method without a prior approval by a court or in war time by prior

24 approval of the superior commander?

25 A. No, that cannot be done legally.

Page 14053

1 Q. Can we look at bullet point 22, which says:

2 "The senior officer of a command unit, institution, or staff of

3 the armed forces supervises the work of subordinate security organs

4 according to the general regulations ..."

5 Who was the superior officer in the commands of the brigades and

6 the Main Staff? Who was in charge of managing security organs at those

7 levels? Thank you.

8 A. The unit commander.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 10 in

10 Serbian and page 11 in English.

11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Let's look at the other parts of bullet point 22 dealing with

13 management and control. The second paragraph reads, and I quote:

14 "The control application of methods and techniques used by the

15 security organs is carried out by the commanding officer pursuant to the

16 previous rule."

17 Who was it in the VRS that was the superior officer pursuant to

18 Article 17 of these regulations?

19 A. It was the commander of the Main Staff.

20 Q. Thank you. Can we look at bullet point 23. This bullet point

21 speaks about professional control and management of the military police

22 units. Let's read the first paragraph, we are talking about professional

23 relationship. And in the second paragraph of the same bullet point it

24 reads, and I'm quoting:

25 "When it comes to the control of the military police units, the

Page 14054

1 commanding -- the security organ officer under paragraph 1 of this item

2 has the same rights and duties as officers of arms and services of

3 commands, units, institutions, and staffs of the armed forces in managing

4 units of the arms and services of those commands, units, institutions,

5 and staffs."

6 My question is this: Was the security organ in possession of

7 bigger rights than the chief of artillery in respect of all the officers

8 who were members of the artillery units? Thank you.

9 A. No. All organs of arms and services in the army had the same

10 rights and that relationship, professional relationship vis-a-vis units

11 that belonged to those arms or services. This same applied to the

12 security organs. He had the same rights as, for example, the chief of

13 the artillery, engineers, communications and others.

14 Q. Thank you. Since you were a commander of military police units

15 and since you trained military police men and officers in those units and

16 later on in the service, you were the most responsible person for all

17 that, could you tell us whether the same rules were prescribed for the

18 officers in the military police and for the professional organs in the

19 military police, and is that highlighted in the rules governing the work

20 of the military police, that is that they had the same rights as the

21 other officers of arms and services?

22 A. Yes, they had the same rights.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at page 12 in

25 Serbian and page 15 in English. We are interested in paragraph 32, or

Page 14055

1 rather, bullet point 32, paragraph 4.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. We can see it now. This is the last paragraph on page 23. It's

4 the last paragraph under bullet point 32. Thirty-two, last paragraph,

5 and I'm reading now, and I quote:

6 "When the approval of the officer under item 17 of these rules

7 cannot be obtained in time, and when the" -- I misspoke. I didn't say

8 17. "And when the situation urgently demands it, the application of

9 methods and means of security organs work may be decided upon by the

10 senior officer of an army's security organ or an equal officer of a JNA

11 security organ or the senior officer of the security organ or a

12 Territorial Defence staff of a republic or autonomous province. But he

13 is obliged to notify, without any delay, the officer under item 17 of

14 these rules of the measures taken ..."

15 My question is this: In case of an emergency, if a method had to

16 be applied and if the commander was not there as the responsible officer,

17 who would have had the right to approve the use of such methods and to

18 inform him immediately thereafter about the application and the results

19 of the method that was applied?

20 A. In this case, an equivalent to the command of the army was the

21 VRS, and the chief of the sector for security and intelligence had the

22 right to apply measures temporarily but he was also duty-bound to inform

23 thereafter the commander.

24 Q. Thank you, General. Can we look at number 48 in this rule. It's

25 page 20 in English; page 19 is the beginning in Serbian, point or

Page 14056

1 paragraph 49. We are reading it because it was raised in

2 cross-examination. In keeping with the responsibilities and duties as

3 established by the law and regulations, the authorised commanding officer

4 of security organs is responsible for performing the tasks within the

5 field of competence of security organs as designated by his commanding

6 officer regardless of whether these tasks form part of the tasks normally

7 executed at the establishment post they occupy. My question is: When

8 your superior officer ordered you to go and carry out strictly military

9 tasks, did you go to do that and did you later report back to him

10 regardless of the fact that these tasks did not fall strictly within

11 the -- your field of work in the establishment post you occupied?

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is a vague on an important point. If we

14 could get who the superior officer is or what position he holds, then the

15 answer would have some meaning.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It's a very compound question, if you see that in

17 the transcript.

18 Would you be in a position to rephrase your question and make it

19 a bit more specific, Mr. Tolimir?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Keserovic, who was your superior officer at the Main Staff?

23 A. My immediate superior in the security administration was

24 Colonel Beara, but if we look at the Main Staff as a whole, then the

25 commander of the Main Staff, militarily speaking, was the commander.

Page 14057

1 Q. Were you in the security administration the authorised commanding

2 officer of security organs?

3 A. Yes.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.

5 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr President, I would like to ask

6 Mr. Tolimir to repeat the question because on page 50, we see "the

7 authorised commanding officer."

8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 Q. Were you the authorised officer, senior officer over security

10 organs at the security administration?

11 A. Yes, I was as envisaged by the rules of service of security

12 organs.

13 Q. Did your establishment position involve command over combat

14 units?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Did your senior officer send you to an assignment where you would

17 have to be involved in commanding?

18 A. There have been situations when it was suggested that I take

19 command over a group of units.

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sorry ... [Microphone not activated]

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Microphone doesn't work. What happened to you?

23 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's after 5.15, maybe they are cutting me off

24 which sometimes is a good idea.

25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Now it's working.

Page 14058

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think I'm okay. It's just come on. Again,

2 same objection for vagueness, because it's, "Did your senior officer...,"

3 and it may be translation, but as a lieutenant-colonel he has got more

4 senior officers than, you know, he has got hundreds of them. So we need

5 to know what -- who he is talking about, or, at least, the position that

6 he is talking about because there are a lot of generals that can order

7 him. So this doesn't help us when the question is phrased like this.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, could you please be, again, a bit

9 more specific.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12 Q. My question was, and it was clear to everyone: Were you given

13 that task from -- were you given that task by your senior officer from

14 the intelligence administration or your senior officer who was the

15 superior of all the organs?

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: Same objection: vague. What task now? We don't

17 even know what task he is talking about.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We will hear the answer and perhaps then

19 Mr. Tolimir should clarify it.

20 Sir, did you understand the question? Please clarify.

21 THE WITNESS: [Microphone not activated]

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Stop, please. We don't receive interpretation at

23 the moment. Could you please repeat your answer.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think I can answer. The thing is

25 that a task to take command over units was not received by me from

Page 14059

1 security organs but from the competent commander. In this case that we

2 are discussing, it's General Tolimir -- sorry, the Main Staff commander,

3 General Mladic. General Mladic.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It's really confusing.

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think I know what he is talking about, but the

6 question didn't give him -- doesn't identify the task and he doesn't

7 identify the task. So if somebody could identify the task, we'll all be

8 fine, I think.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12 Q. General, since these things are difficult for some people to

13 understand, I will put it in several questions and you give me the best

14 possible answers you can. At the command post, did you receive orders

15 and a task to go to Bratunac to integrate command over several brigades,

16 and who gave you -- who issued you with that task?

17 A. Originally, I was given that task by the commander of the

18 Main Staff, General Mladic.

19 Q. Thank you. Did he order his operations officer to also write an

20 order to that effect after notifying you verbally?

21 A. He did. He ordered General Miletic to write an order to that

22 effect.

23 Q. Did Mr. McCloskey show you that order in both of the variants

24 during examination-in-chief?

25 A. Yes, I have had occasion to see it.

Page 14060

1 Q. Did General Mladic later change his orders and tell you to just

2 go and see what the situation is and report back to him?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did you follow that order given you by the military commander?

5 A. Yes, I did.

6 Q. Therefore, does the military commander have the right to also

7 engage officers from the security administration to carry out whatever

8 tasks he designates?

9 A. The commander of the Main Staff has the right to engage every

10 member of any unit under his command.

11 Q. As a soldier, did you carry out the task given you by your

12 Commander-in-Chief?

13 A. Yes, on that day I executed the task I had been given to the

14 extent possible.

15 Q. Did you report back along the chain of command as to what you had

16 observed that day on the ground and the situation and the condition of

17 our units?

18 A. I don't think I made a report in writing, but I believe I

19 informed General Miletic, I think, at the operation centre, about what I

20 had seen and what was going on.

21 Q. Did that end your engagement on military tasks and did you then

22 return to your normal work envisaged by your establishment post in your

23 security organ?

24 A. Yes.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I believe we have

Page 14061

1 now cleared up the matter. If anything remains outstanding,

2 Mr. McCloskey can take it up in redirect.

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It was a very good idea to split up the compound

4 question and now we have received clear answers. Thank you very much for

5 that. Please carry on.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Look at paragraph 50. In case of lack of diligence in carrying

9 out tasks in their field of work or failure to comply or violation of the

10 provisions of this rule, the officers serving in security organs shall be

11 held responsible in keeping with the general rules. Now, my question is:

12 If you had refused or failed to carry out the tasks given you by your

13 military commander, would you have been held responsible for that?

14 A. Yes, I believe we discussed that before. I would have been held

15 responsible under general regulations depending on the gravity of the

16 violations of general rules and laws. Sometimes it would be disciplinary

17 proceedings and in some cases it could even be criminal proceedings.

18 Q. Thank you, General.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move to page 22 in

20 Serbian and 23 in English to look at the powers of the security

21 administration of the Federal Ministry of Defence [as interpreted], and,

22 in this case, of the Main Staff. We are looking for paragraph 57 in

23 Serbian, too, because now we are looking at 74. We need to go a few

24 pages back. It's page 16 in Serbian in e-court.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: It's not the

Page 14062

1 Federal Ministry of Defence, it's the security administration.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Paragraph 57:

4 "The security administration of SSNO, (hereinafter security

5 administration) shall perform its duties as prescribed by these rules and

6 other regulations. The security administration provides professional

7 management for security organs in JNA commands, units and institutions

8 according to the provisions of these rules and organises and directs

9 their work of importance for security."

10 First of all, tell me, does the security administration of the

11 level of the Main Staff have the same powers and authority as the

12 security administration of the Federal Ministry of Defence in the former

13 Yugoslavia?

14 A. Since the whole rules were taken over, the rights and

15 responsibilities have also been translated or taken over, adopted into

16 our rules.

17 Q. Did you have the same rights and responsibilities, only in

18 professional terms, to command security organs in lower level units?

19 A. Yes, only in our professional terms.

20 Q. Thank you. Now look at 58. The first sentence reads:

21 "The security administration provides specialised direction and

22 co-ordination for the work of security organs of the Territorial Defence

23 relating to counter-intelligence matters and the counter-intelligence

24 protection of members of the armed forces."

25 Now, this professional direction in counter-intelligence tasks

Page 14063

1 and affairs, does it apply to all the work carried out by security

2 organs.

3 A. Yes, the security administration directs all the organs down the

4 chain, and on lower levels it goes through the commander of the security

5 organ. In the corps, it goes through the chief of the security section

6 of the corps.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now see item 67

9 which is on page 18 in the Serbian version and on page 25 in the English

10 version. Item 67 of these rules.

11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12 Q. And my question is the following: Was the security

13 administration in charge of professional training and improvement of

14 skills of members of the armed forces, and by that I mean the military

15 police and security service members within the armed forces?

16 A. Yes, I believe this question was already put when they organise

17 education, participates in programming and monitors the conduct of

18 training. This is what the security administration is in charge of.

19 Q. Thank you. Mr. Keserovic, let us now look at item 85 of the

20 rules. No, I apologise, it's not 85, it's 96. That's the last page.

21 And here in item 96 it is stated:

22 "The chief of the security administration is hereby authorised to

23 give necessary explanations for the preparation and implementation of

24 these rules."

25 And my question is: All unclear provisions concerning

Page 14064

1 professional view of the military police organs, was that something that

2 could be issued by the chief of the security administration?

3 A. Yes, he could provide explanations and to interpret the rules.

4 Q. Thank you. Since you went through various levels of command

5 within the army, the brigade, the corps, always in military police, could

6 you tell us: Did the police forces have chemical agents for suppressing

7 rebellion or unrest, and did the military police at all levels have such

8 chemical abilities?

9 A. At certain levels in battalions of military police there were

10 units, organisational units of company strength that were called

11 anti-terrorist companies. These companies had at their disposal

12 so-called action chemical agents in packages that were ready-made for

13 manual use, mostly it was tear gas, and occasionally there would be a

14 special rifle available for a bullet that was -- that included tear gas.

15 So in some units, and this is the legacy of the JNA, the military police

16 had means for chemical activity.

17 Q. Thank you. At the level of republics or armies, who was the one

18 who could reach a decision that such chemical agents can be used for

19 temporary disabling those who are causing problems?

20 A. Only officers at the level of the army command and higher.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P1297, please. Can we please have

23 that on the screen. Thank you.

24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25 Q. As we can see, these are the rules of military police.

Page 14065

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 3, please. There we'll be

2 able to see what this is. 3 in e-court. Thank you. We can see here

3 this is the rules of service for the military police of the armed forces

4 of the SFRY. In the English version it will be on the following page.

5 Can we now please see page 16, item 36. Or maybe let's just find item 36

6 in both versions. In English, it's on page 18, there we will find item

7 36. Thank you.

8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Thank you. We see it on the screen now, and I'll read from

10 item 36 of the rules of the SFRY armed forces military police:

11 "The military police may use other means of coercion, (chemical

12 means for temporary incapacitation, special vehicles, devices for

13 forcibly halting vehicles) only in extraordinary cases, upon an

14 authorisation by a commander of the army and other high-ranking military

15 officer."

16 That was your answer, wasn't it? Could you please now tell us

17 whether these means for temporary incapacitation, can they leave

18 permanent traces or permanently leave a mark on a person against whom

19 they were used?

20 A. If someone was only once exposed to it, no, that's why it's

21 described as temporary incapacitation. In most cases, it would not leave

22 any serious consequences.

23 Q. Thank you. Up until 1995 in former JNA, could they also be used

24 in the VRS in accordance to international laws and conventions?

25 A. Yes, all these means were on the lists of means that were

Page 14066

1 allowed, and, as far as I know, any police in the world or army in the

2 world is still using them.

3 Q. Thank you, General. Can we now please see page 6 on our screens,

4 since we have the rules in front of us because that will give us an

5 opportunity to clear up something about the difference between a military

6 commander and the commander of the military police. First of all, on

7 that page we can see the introduction, and in the third paragraph of the

8 introduction, we can read the following:

9 "The regulations are intended for the following: Members of the

10 armed police for their unified approach when executing their tasks from

11 their jurisdiction, officers in commands, staffs, units of institutions

12 of the armed forces within which the military police are organised for

13 their unified command and control."

14 And my question is: This unified command at all levels in all

15 units of the military police on the territory of the state where the

16 rules are applied, can you explain that for us?

17 A. That means that it is set up in such a way that within all units

18 officers of certain level have equal rights of commanding units that are

19 part of their complement in the same way, and to use them.

20 Q. Thank you, General. Does that mean that commanding over a

21 soldier in Banja Luka and a soldier in Belgrade must be the same and that

22 the officer in Banja Luka and officer in Belgrade also has to act in

23 accordance with the rules of service for military police?

24 A. Yes, of course, regardless of where he is located.

25 Q. Thank you. My next question, because of this unified behaviour

Page 14067

1 or action to achieve that, are officers and soldiers sent for training

2 where they learn how they can arrest someone, and so on, how they will be

3 carrying out all their tasks, to be more precise?

4 A. The training programme for military police was different to

5 training programmes of other infantry units and it involved, inter alia,

6 the training that was additional to what was provided for by the general

7 rules of service in JNA and later VRS. It was complemented by the rules

8 for the military police, and if I'm not mistaken, there were 14 such

9 elements in the rules specific for the military police.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move to page 9 in

12 e-court where we see the discussion about command and control or

13 directing over military police.

14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, before you start with the next line

15 of questions, I think it's a convenient time to have our second break for

16 today. Do you agree? Thank you. We must have our second break and

17 resume quarter past 6.00.

18 --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.

19 --- On resuming at 6.19 p.m.

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, as usual, you have provided us with

21 an update of the list of documents to be used with the witness. I just

22 note for the record that you have not included four documents you have

23 used so far. This is D329, D193, P1011 and P1430. We would appreciate

24 if you could include all documents you want to use for the benefit of the

25 Chamber and the other party.

Page 14068

1 Now you may continue your examination. Mr. Tolimir.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

3 apologise if those documents are not in e-court. I will make sure that

4 they be uploaded and had I known that they weren't there, I wouldn't have

5 used them. Before us is --

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It's a misunderstanding. I'm not talking about

7 e-court. They are all in e-court. This is not the problem. But they

8 are not in the list you have provided us with, the list of documents to

9 be used. This is for the benefit, especially for the Prosecution that

10 they know in advance which document you want to use. Please carry on.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I will

12 make sure that something like that does not happen again. It is not

13 customary either for myself or Mr. Gajic to do things like that.

14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Keserovic, before us we see the command and control of the

16 military police rule. I will just put questions to you because I believe

17 you are the most meritorious person to give answers in relation to this

18 topic. I will not lead you in any way because you are the expert on

19 this. In item 12, we see how military police is it to be commanded and

20 controlled. Could you please tell us who is the only person who is

21 authorised to command and control military police units at all levels of

22 command?

23 A. The commander of the unit within which this military police unit

24 is located.

25 Q. Thank you. Is there any other officer who can command and

Page 14069

1 control the military police, except the commander who is their superior

2 officer?

3 A. Not within the command hierarchy. There is only the matter of

4 professional control.

5 Q. Within the sphere of professional control, is it true that only

6 the security organs that have been properly trained can do that, people

7 who are familiar with how military police has to be used?

8 A. The commander of the organ of security is the one who controls in

9 that respect, in professional respect, the military police. But there is

10 another element which involves organs of traffic service, where in the

11 sphere of security of military traffic, they are entitled to provide

12 professional control to the unit that is in charge of traffic.

13 Q. Is the traffic military police department also subordinated to

14 the commander of the unit?

15 A. Yes. All specialties, all units of military police, whatever

16 their purpose is, are subordinated to the commander of the unit where

17 they are.

18 Q. Thank you. Would you please read second paragraph of item 13

19 before you and then tell us whether the same rights and duties are in

20 possession of the officer who is in charge of the military police in

21 relation to an officer who is in charge of arms and services?

22 A. Yes. It is the same situation.

23 Q. Thank you. Is it so because of the fact that the law provides

24 only for a relationship between military police/security organs and the

25 relevant commanding officer?

Page 14070

1 A. Yes, these rules are based on the laws. You first have the laws

2 that regulate the matter and then based on that one drafts the rules.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would you please be so kind and

5 show us page 8 in the e-court, item number 7. Thank you. Here we see

6 item number 7 in the Serbian version. Can we please get it in the

7 English version which is on the following page. Yes, here we see it.

8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Can you please explain to everyone present why it is prohibited

10 to use military police for other activities that are outside of their

11 scope of their normal activities? Thank you.

12 A. The units of military police are not to be used outside of their

13 needs and tasks for different activities, regardless of the type of

14 activities, duty services, various works carried out by units, and so and

15 on so forth, because these units are specialised units with special

16 authorities that are regulated by the laws and the rules of service and

17 because of the role they have within the system of defence within the

18 armed forces, they should not be used for non-standard tasks. That would

19 be the definition, in brief.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move to page 9 in

22 e-court, item 12 in both versions, please. Page 9 in e-court, item 12.

23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24 Q. My question is the following: Military police unit of a brigade,

25 can it be under the command of a senior officer of the military police

Page 14071

1 from another brigade?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Can you explain why?

4 A. You can't have units of military police of one brigade under

5 command of any officer who wasn't put to a position of a commander by

6 some order. It is possible that sometimes more units of military police

7 work together and that after re-subordination -- but the only officer

8 that can command the military police unit is the commanding officer of

9 that police unit.

10 Q. Thank you, General. Can we please -- or can you please read the

11 second paragraph in item 13 where senior officers of the security organs

12 are discussed and then tell us why is it that the senior officer of the

13 security organ in relation to military police is placed in the same

14 position as the chief of branches in relation to different branch --

15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Of arms, combat arms

16 within the military.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the military, in the armed

18 forces that we are familiar with and that existed in the area in the

19 armed forces and in the units, the basic principles of unity of command

20 and subordination are applied so that means that only one commander can

21 exist in a unit and he is responsible for everything. Functional or

22 professional relationship exists in all combat arms and services, but it

23 is restricted only to the rights and duties of professional management

24 and control of those combat arms and services, or rather, the units of

25 those combat arms and services. The law does not separate them. The

Page 14072

1 rules also do not separate them. We have already spoken about that. In

2 other words, they are equal. The security organ's relationship to the

3 military police is the same as the head of musical department to the

4 military orchestra.

5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Thank you. Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was going to correct the

8 interpretation but it seems to be okay, my legal advisor tells me. Can

9 we now look at page 13 in e-court, item 25(b). Thank you.

10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Thank you. We can see it now. I'm going to quote bullet point

12 (b) where it says 25(b):

13 "Take part in preventing the activities by any armed enemy groups

14 or individuals who have been infiltrated or left behind on the axes of

15 movement in the areas to which commands, institutions, and staffs of the

16 armed forces have been deployed, and in temporarily occupied territory."

17 My question is this: Is it in keeping with this bullet point

18 25(b) that the commander had the right to send the then

19 Lieutenant-Colonel Savcic to prevent activities by infiltrated groups at

20 the command post? Thank you.

21 A. If that refers to the battalion of the military police from the

22 protection regiment, protection motorised regiment, and the entire

23 protection motorised regiment had the same task, that task was rightly

24 assigned.

25 Q. Thank you. Bearing that in mind, bearing in mind what you've

Page 14073

1 just told us, was the commander in a position to assign any individual in

2 the command to participate in the prevention of attacks and diversions

3 that were undertaken by the sabotage groups against the Main Staff?

4 Thank you.

5 A. Fight against sabotage and terrorist infiltrated groups or groups

6 left behind is an obligation and a right equally applied to all units,

7 commands, staffs, and institutions irrespective of the time and place

8 when such fight is necessary. This specially applies to terrorist and

9 sabotage group and fight against them is the universal right of all army

10 members.

11 Q. Thank you. Let's wait for the interpretation to stop. When it

12 comes to the use of the military police in combat against infiltrated

13 terrorist groups, such as were the terrorist groups from Srebrenica and

14 Zepa that infiltrated to launch an attack against the Main Staff, would

15 the same rule apply to a fight against sabotage groups? Would that be

16 one of the regular tasks of the military police?

17 A. I am afraid that I did not understand your question. However, I

18 believe that that was a regular task of every military police unit.

19 Every police military unit has a detachment for anti-sabotage and

20 anti-terrorist fight. People who are specially educated for that fight.

21 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us when you contacted Malinic, did you

22 learn if an anti-terrorist company had been sent to assist the

23 Main Staff? Was it used in that way by the commander of the protection

24 regiment and the commander of the Main Staff? Thank you.

25 A. I believe that I have already testified about that, and I said

Page 14074

1 that an anti-terrorist company and some other forces were in the sector

2 of the Main Staff at the time and that they were fighting the groups that

3 had been infiltrated and engaged in combat. Some were engaged in the

4 Trnovo front line in the Sarajevo theatre of war, and in the Kasaba

5 sector only a company of young soldiers in training remained.

6 Q. Thank you. We were shown a document in this courtroom, or

7 rather, could you please be shown D64, first of all. And then we will

8 talk about very specific actions by the security organs of the military

9 police once we have looked at the document. Thank you.

10 We can see it now on the screen. This document was issued on the

11 12th of July to the intelligence and security departments and to the

12 command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the Eastern Bosnian corps. If

13 you look at the document, we will see that it says, amongst other things,

14 in its fourth paragraph, "Those who communicated over the radio network,"

15 actually, this is the third paragraph. You can also say that it is the

16 fourth paragraph, in any case:

17 "Those who communicated over the radio network were probably in

18 the Zvornik-Sehovic road and in the sector of Cerska. According to the

19 number of communicators, it seemed to be divided into several groups

20 headed by Ibrahim Mandzic, aka Mandza, one of Naser Oric's deputies."

21 A new radio network was discovered on the 12th of July and its

22 participants are mentioned in the document further on. It says in the

23 sixth paragraph --

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, if -- he is going so fast you can

Page 14075

1 tell the interpreter didn't get half of that paragraph because he was

2 going so fast, and she would normally try to read it from the original

3 translation, if they can get some help from there. But when everyone

4 goes so fast they can't do that and this is an important document, so I

5 would hope that we would slow down a bit. Obviously no hurry, we are

6 going into next week.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed. And there's another danger that

8 sometimes the court reporter can't get which is part of your quotation

9 and which is are your own words. Therefore, please slow down a bit.

10 Carry on.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, I'll bear that in mind.

12 I will repeat everything from the beginning.

13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14 Q. We see a strictly confidential document issued on the 12th

15 of July and sent from the Main Staff, or, on behalf of the Main Staff, to

16 the intelligence departments to the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija

17 Corps and the Eastern Bosnia Corps. In the document it says, in the

18 second paragraph, and I quote:

19 "On 12 July of this year," and it was in 1995, "at 1945 hours, a

20 radio network of elements of the 28th Muslim Division was activated;

21 during the morning, at around 0500 hours, these elements came across our

22 minefield in the sector of Ravni Buljim at the juncture between the Milic

23 and Bratunac Brigades."

24 "The individuals communicating over the radio network are

25 probably in the sector of the Cerska and the Zvornik-Sekovici road.

Page 14076

1 According to the number of communicators, they seem to be divided into

2 several groups headed by Ibrahim Mandzic, aka, Mandza, one of

3 Naser Oric's deputies."

4 My question is this: Was this information received about

5 elements of the 28th Division that had set out from Srebrenica and

6 attempted a break-through on the access specified in this document?

7 Thank you.

8 A. This document indicates that those were indeed units of the

9 28th Division.

10 Q. Thank you. If we look at the fifth paragraph from the bottom in

11 the document, we will see that it says:

12 "All electronic surveillance units of the

13 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, the Eastern Bosnia Corps and the Drina Corps,

14 shall focus on surveillance and monitoring radio communications between

15 these Muslim groups which operate on frequency 164 800."

16 My question: Did the superior officer from the sector or from

17 the security administration have the right to issue an order or to

18 propose the engagement of the electronic surveillance unit to monitor

19 that radio communication and that radio network? Thank you.

20 A. I'm not sure that I had a good look at the heading. I don't

21 think that this is a document issued by the Main Staff. It was rather

22 issued by the security department of the Drina Corps. But it doesn't

23 really matter, the monitoring of certain frequencies is a purpose task by

24 units for electronic surveillance and monitoring. So this --

25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Now you can see the headline of the document in

Page 14077

1 B/C/S.

2 Mr. McCloskey.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: It would be fair to let the witness see who the

4 document is from. I mean, who is it authored by so he can -- as he is

5 speaking as an expert on this document, given where he was on the 12th of

6 July, but if he is going to be asked about it, he should be able to see

7 who authored it which he hasn't seen yet.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Okay.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can the electronic

10 courtroom move the document to display the stamp for the benefit of the

11 witness so that the witness may see who signed the document and which

12 command issued a document. And then at the top you also see the

13 recipients, the command who received the document.

14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Now that you see that, now that you see the signature of

16 Zdravko Tolimir, are you able to determine?

17 A. Now that I see both the top part as well as the bottom part or

18 the beginning thereof, this is obviously a forwarded document that was

19 first issued by the Main Staff and sent to the corps, and then the corps

20 forwarded it to the electronic surveillance and monitoring unit. If the

21 signature of General Tolimir was lost in the process, that would mean

22 that it was done without an authority, or rather, that one commander of

23 the corps issues an order to another commander of the corps. But since

24 it was sent by the chief of the sector from the Main Staff, this would be

25 in compliance with the valid rules.

Page 14078

1 Q. Thank you. Please look at the following paragraph.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would like to see the heading of the document

3 in both versions. It says here in the English version, "Command of the

4 Drina Corps Intelligence Department." Do you see that, sir? I'm asking

5 the witness.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I can see that.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, and General Tolimir, and again it may be a

9 translation issue, but said as you can see the signature at the bottom

10 from General Tolimir. Of course, we can't see that and there is no

11 signature on this document. It's a teletype document. So I just wanted

12 to clarify that for the record because that was just incorrect.

13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: That happens quite frequently. We should go to

14 the next page again in both languages. Indeed, we see here the name

15 Nacelnik General-Major Zdravko Tolimir without a specific handwritten

16 signature.

17 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, you can see that the telegram went under the name of

21 Major-General Zdravko Tolimir?

22 A. Yes, I can see that.

23 Q. Does that indicate that the document was issued at the level of

24 the Main Staff?

25 A. Yes.

Page 14079

1 Q. Please, let's look at page 1 again, third paragraph from the

2 bottom, beginning with the word "organs":

3 "Intelligence and security organs of the brigade commands shall

4 propose to the commanders of units positioned along the line of

5 withdrawal of elements of the routed 28th Muslim Division from Srebrenica

6 to undertake all measures to prevent the withdrawal of enemy soldiers and

7 to capture them."

8 Is this a proposal or an order?

9 A. This is a proposal, or rather, this is a task given to security

10 organs to propose to their own commanders a mode of engagement in

11 fighting the 28th Division, that they should propose it.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down to see the last

13 two lines. Next page in English.

14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I quote:

16 "The Muslims want to portray Srebrenica as having been

17 demilitarised and populated only by civilians. And that is why they

18 ordered all armed men fit for military service to pull out from the area

19 illegally, across the territory of Republika Srpska, to Muslim controlled

20 territory, so that they could accuse the VRS of an unprovoked attack on

21 civilians in a protected area.

22 "Although it is very important to arrest as many members of the

23 crushed Muslim units as possible, or liquidate them if they resist, it is

24 equally important to note down the names of all men fit for military

25 service who are being evacuated from the UNPROFOR base in Potocari."

Page 14080

1 Now, Mr. Keserovic, in the paragraph that I quoted, is it

2 emphasised why it is necessary to list everyone and to capture as many of

3 these groups and to list all those leaving Potocari? Can we see why this

4 was proposed -- to be proposed to the commanders?

5 A. From the context of this document to the extent I was able to

6 read it, this registration of those who are being evacuated and capturing

7 others was necessary in order to counter the Muslim attempt to portray

8 the zone as demilitarised while the Republika Srpska authorities knew

9 very well it was not. By listing all those who were armed and fit for

10 military service, it would have been possible to do that. I believe that

11 was the purpose, just based on the context.

12 Q. Based on the context of this document, can we infer that the

13 person who is suggesting to security organs to propose to their own

14 commanders to take this action, can we infer what the author wanted to

15 achieve with this registration?

16 A. I think we can infer that.

17 Q. Thank you. Is this proposal to register some and capture others

18 legitimate both from the point of view of military activities and

19 security related activities in terms of what was being sought, in terms

20 of the intention?

21 A. At any rate, it was in keeping with the current rules of combat,

22 rules of engagement.

23 Q. Mr. Keserovic, tell us, did security organs act in accordance

24 with this rule, and did you know about that from your contacts with the

25 military police and security and intelligence organs?

Page 14081

1 A. Well, my hands-on experience from the war shows that security

2 organs mainly complied with the rules.

3 Q. In the course of examination-in-chief, you said that

4 Major Malinic, commander of the military police battalion, told you that

5 he listed and registered the prisoners of war he had up until a point

6 when Mladic showed up to address them. Do you remember that or shall I

7 show you a transcript?

8 A. I remember that. I said it more than one.

9 Q. In that particular case, did Major Malinic act in accordance with

10 the instructions of the superior security organs, in this case the staff

11 of the battalion?

12 A. He was perfectly within the rules when he was listing those

13 people. If I'm remembering this well, he had received instructions given

14 originally by Colonel Beara, and he proceeded to list the prisoners.

15 That was in keeping with the rules.

16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Keserovic. Since we have only one minute left, I

17 want to wish you a pleasant weekend and to apologise that I didn't ask

18 before if it causes you great inconvenience to stay until Monday. But I

19 wanted to take advantage of this time and ask all the questions I needed

20 to.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is all I had

22 for today. If there's nothing else -- if the witness has to go, we can

23 live with that and we can perhaps arrange to recall him at a later stage.

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before I come to that question, I have only one

25 question for the witness at the moment: Who was the commander of the