120823IT

Page 19540

1 Thursday, 23 August 2012

2 [Defence Closing Statement]

3 [Open session]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.

7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case

9 number IT-05-88/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Zdravko Tolimir. Thank you.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is the last day of our proceedings before we

11 come to the final session at the end of the year hopefully.

12 Mr. Tolimir, again, if there's any need to have a break then you

13 should indicate that to the Chamber. Today we start with the remainder

14 of the closing arguments of the Defence for 15 minutes, followed by

15 rebuttal arguments, and then possibly rejoinder arguments by the Defence

16 and then some administrative matters.

17 Mr. Tolimir, you have the floor and I hope you are able to stick

18 to the 15 minutes, but before you start did the interpreters and the

19 court reporter receive hard copies of the statement you are now

20 delivering? I see Mr. Gajic nodding. I take it that this is the case.

21 Mr. Tolimir, you have the floor.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. The remainder will be

23 quite brief and we'll be able to deliver within the given time. Thank

24 you.

25 Let me resume that the commander could issue orders directly to

Page 19541

1 all the members of the Main Staff is clearly confirmed by the situation

2 described by Keserovic at transcript pages 13925 to 13928, where he

3 received the order related to Srebrenica directly from commander -- from

4 the commander. At page 13956 Keserovic clearly said that he was supposed

5 to submit the report or to report, in fact, directly to the commander.

6 D143 clearly indicates how they were deployed to the combat area,

7 and I mean the senior officers from the intelligence and security,

8 Keserovic from the security administration, and Stankovic from the

9 intelligence administration. So you can clearly see that Tolimir could

10 not directly deploy anyone to the combat area or issue orders to them,

11 and that's quite clear if you look at the situation with regard to all

12 the other officers who were deployed to the front line. It's therefore

13 an erroneous conclusion, one, that Tolimir could issue orders where

14 there's an operation in course. Only the commander of that operation can

15 issue orders to those involved; otherwise, the system of command and

16 singleness of command would fall apart.

17 In their final brief, the Prosecution said that Tolimir had the

18 duty to ensure that the prisoners of war from Srebrenica were treated in

19 a humane manner. First of all, when it comes to prisoners of war, in

20 Srebrenica Tolimir had no duties whatsoever, either in terms of detaining

21 them, accommodating them, or their treatment. The obligation to adhere

22 to the rules of the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of war

23 prisoners was incumbent upon the unit that detained those war prisoners

24 or under whose authority they were kept. Tolimir did not have the duty

25 nor was it his duty to tour the prisoners of war from Srebrenica or to

Page 19542

1 take care of each and every one of them president. From the 12th of July

2 through to the end of July, Tolimir had duties that had to do with the

3 civilian population and the authorities in Zepa.

4 The responsibility over prisoners of war was vested with the unit

5 that detained them or the unit that they had surrendered to, and this is

6 clearly indicated in Exhibit D148, item 295, which states that the

7 logistics support of war prisoners is one that is provided by logistics

8 organs and other organs of the unit or units that have detained them.

9 The security and intelligence administration had no jurisdiction at all

10 or authority to in any way take care of the prisoners of war. The

11 closing arguments of the Prosecution clearly stated, and I quote, that:

12 "Tolimir was in command of and oversaw people who detained and

13 killed Palic."

14 Tolimir was on the western front at the time and Witness Pecanac,

15 the witness of the Prosecution, clearly listed the names of the

16 individuals before this Trial Chamber who were the ones that he was in

17 contact with before Palic's surrender and detention.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please read a little bit more

19 slowly. This is a very high speed. Continue, please.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.

21 Let me repeat, Mr. Pecanac clearly listed the names of these

22 individuals. Since this was in closed session, I cannot refer to them

23 now. Nevertheless, Tolimir was not mentioned in his report at all nor

24 was Tolimir in that part of the front. He was in the western-most part

25 of the front where an aggression against Republika Srpska was ongoing by

Page 19543

1 NATO, the Croatian Army, and the army of the BH Federation.

2 Since the Prosecution do not have and cannot possibly have any

3 evidence to the effect that Tolimir participated in the murder operation

4 of the war prisoners of Srebrenica, the Prosecution advance a case

5 whereby Tolimir committed a crime by not having or by having failed to

6 take certain measures. And they do so by advancing an unsubstantiated

7 assertion whereby Tolimir decided not to do anything because he was a

8 member of the joint criminal enterprise. And the Prosecution base this

9 case of theirs on the fact that Tolimir was assistant commander for

10 intelligence and security in the Main Staff of the VRS. This sort of

11 case is completely speculative, arbitrary, and without foundation in

12 evidence.

13 First of all, the Prosecution can have no evidence possibly of

14 the fact that Tolimir knew that a murder operation was ongoing in the

15 relevant time-period or that he decided by his own will or in the absence

16 of his own will to participate in it. He cannot participate in something

17 he knows nothing of. Yesterday we spoke of the role of Tolimir during

18 the evacuation of the population of Zepa. Tolimir was part of the escort

19 of the convoy. And Witness Carkic testified to his conduct in Zepa in

20 his statement given to the Prosecution, namely, Exhibit D219

21 [as interpreted], page 19 in Serbian and 13 in English; as well as page

22 21 in Serbian and 14 in English.

23 Let me cite only one sentence here out of his statement, which

24 reads that "on the part of Tolimir," and I quote:

25 "There had been no orders save for him insisting that nothing

Page 19544

1 should happen."

2 As for Tolimir's treatment of the prisoners of war and the

3 instructions issued in relation to the treatment of the prisoners of war

4 and as well as the way in which he responded to the evacuation in terms

5 of what needed to have been done or not can be gleaned from

6 Exhibit P1434, pages 3 and 4 in Serbian and pages 5 and 6 in English.

7 The Prosecution moved that the Trial Chamber should find the

8 accused guilty and to render a life -- a sentence of life imprisonment.

9 The Prosecution based their case on the assumption that Tolimir was -- on

10 an assumption that relies upon the fact that Tolimir was assistant

11 commander for intelligence and security. Now, this request on the part

12 of the Prosecution is based on the fact that Tolimir was Mladic's

13 subordinate and received an order to kill the population in Srebrenica.

14 Let me repeat that Tolimir had never received any sort of order from

15 General Mladic or Karadzic or anyone else with relation to the killing of

16 the prisoners of war. Something that has never happened cannot possibly

17 be proven to have happened, either in this world or in heaven, either

18 before worldly courts or heavenly courts.

19 The Defence suggests that the Trial Chamber should render an

20 acquittal on all the counts of the indictment because the Prosecution

21 failed to prove that Tolimir had committed any of the crimes against him,

22 as alleged in the third amended indictment, in the relevant period. And

23 of course the Trial Chamber seized of this case will render its

24 judgement. All the other submissions by the Prosecution that Tolimir

25 should have launched an investigation or make sure that there was

Page 19545

1 punishment following was also without foundation because where is this

2 evidence that you were allegedly presented with where Tolimir would have

3 been present. As of the end of the month of July he was engaged in

4 Western Bosnia.

5 Furthermore, Tolimir was not charged under 7(3) of the Statute of

6 the Tribunal under command responsibility -- or he was charged under

7 Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic, you should switch off the microphone

9 when you have a private conversation.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mr. Gajic has just

11 alerted me to the fact that Carkic's statement was misrecorded in the

12 transcript. It's D217. That was his intervention and I apologise for

13 not having switched off the microphone.

14 Thank you, Mr. President. That is all I had to say in the time

15 that I had on my disposal. I thank the interpreters and everyone else,

16 and I do apologise for the impediments that I objectively have when I

17 speak. Thank you.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much, Mr. Tolimir. This indeed

19 concludes your closing arguments.

20 I give the floor now to Mr. McCloskey for his rebuttal.

21 You have the floor for 30 minutes.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

23 Yesterday General Tolimir stated that the

24 10th Sabotage Detachment 23 June attack on the tunnel did not fall within

25 the indictment, and this is not true. An attack against a civilian

Page 19546

1 population -- against the civilian population began with directive 7 in

2 March. And as the Court is aware, an attack does not have to involve

3 armed conflict or combat against the population; it can involve starving

4 and making life unbearable, shelling, and sniping. You'll see this in

5 the Kunarac appeals judgement at paragraph 86.

6 Our indictment does set out shelling and sniping in paragraphs 38

7 and 60 and Tolimir's responsibility in that regard. Shoulder-fired

8 rockets that were clearly used in the sabotage attack on Srebrenica can

9 be sniping or shelling, the size of those is subjective. This incident

10 has been part of the history and the record of this case for a long time

11 and it can be no surprise.

12 He also stated that the 10th Sabotage Unit fell under the command

13 of General Mladic and was not controlled by the intel or security sector.

14 We of course established early on that this was a Main Staff unit under

15 the command of Mladic, but we also established early on that of course

16 General Mladic, as commander of the Main Staff, did not have the time nor

17 was it his job to control specifics of an individual unit like this. And

18 we know very clearly from Salapura, Colonel Salapura, the chief of the

19 intel of the Main Staff, that it was the intel's department, Tolimir's

20 unit, that controlled and dealt with the 10th Sabotage Unit. Why the

21 General ignored his basic truth and his former subordinate, I don't know.

22 He doesn't explain it in any way. But that's clear as a bell.

23 He also finally brings up Colonel Beara after mentioning in his

24 brief that Beara was irrelevant to this case, finally says that Beara was

25 not resubordinated or that he was resubordinated to the Drina Corps along

Page 19547

1 with Colonel Jankovic. Now, we have heard the argument that

2 Colonel Jankovic was resubordinated to the Drina Corps and it's dealt

3 with in the brief and I've gone over quite a bit of the information and

4 evidence relating to that, his reports to the Main Staff, the

5 Main Staff's directions down to him, the intercepts, the documents. It's

6 very clear that Jankovic is not resubordinated, that he is reporting up

7 to in dealing with the Main Staff. Look to Momir Nikolic's testimony on

8 that as well.

9 Colonel Beara being resubordinated, the second-highest-ranking

10 and senior officer in the Main Staff intel and security section - in fact

11 the top security officer - it's inconceivable that they would put him as

12 a colonel under the Drina Corps, especially with the few officers they

13 had. The fact that General Tolimir was very busy with lots of things

14 and, again, if we go through the documents, the reports, they are

15 constantly being referred to, to call up 155, panorama on the key days,

16 14 and 15 July. It is clear he is not resubordinated to the Drina Corps.

17 But I'm not going to go into the detail on that. I think it's in

18 the brief and you know that, and it's also not essential to the criminal

19 responsibility in this case because, as you're aware, we have spent a lot

20 of time showing the responsibilities of General Tolimir as the chief of

21 the sector for intel and security. He is the top person that's

22 responsible for the professional supervision of the security branches in

23 the areas of which he and they are experts, whether they are under his

24 command or not, as long as they are involved in matters related to the

25 expertise of the security branch. And as you've learned, he has that

Page 19548

1 responsibility from the brigades all the way through the corps to the

2 Main Staff. This is his responsibility.

3 Now, I'll touch briefly just on what the responsibility is

4 related to the crime of this case because we have a nice statement from

5 General Milovanovic, who in an answer to describing the situation, this

6 is what he said at 14243 to 14244.

7 "The other administration under Tolimir's, administration or

8 command, was the security administration headed by Colonel Beara and

9 their task was to make sure that the military information at the disposal

10 of the Republika Srpska and about the Republika Srpska army would not

11 leak to the enemy."

12 That's one thing. We've referred to that as the chief secret

13 keeper:

14 "This was something done in a passive manner, so to speak, that's

15 at least how I understood it. But part of the active part of these

16 duties was interrogating prisoners of war, securing them by using

17 military police and the such."

18 So there, out of General Milovanovic, is the crux of his

19 responsibility that is relevant to this case and it's important to

20 understand that.

21 Now, I also want to give you the guts of what it was to

22 professionally supervise his -- not only his own people, but his

23 subordinate branches. And I'll cite two exhibits that were put in by

24 General Tolimir. They are from the former Yugoslavia. The first is

25 D00202, and I'll just read the brief section. This is from Article 29,

Page 19549

1 item 9:

2 "The security organ is responsible for ..."

3 And number 9:

4 "Expertly directing security organs and the military police in

5 the corps command and the units and other JNA units in the zone of

6 responsibility."

7 And here are the key words:

8 "Organising, directing, and co-ordinating their activities,

9 providing assistance and controlling their work."

10 So that's just one rule. Let me go to the next rule he cites.

11 D00203 from chapter 2, item 18, this is from 1984 rule, the other was

12 from a 1990 rule:

13 "The security organs provide specialist administrative services

14 for security organs in subordinate commands, units, institutions, and

15 staffs of the armed forces, provide assistance to these organs," and

16 again, "organise, direct, co-ordinate, and supervise their work."

17 He wants to say he's in Zepa and has no contact or any dealings

18 with his people or his subordinate security branch; not true. He retains

19 professional supervision over them, so even if Beara or his other people

20 are, for some reason, resubordinated to the corps, he retains

21 professional responsibility over them. It's either that or command

22 responsibility over them. And this is his job. There's one word that's

23 left out of the professional supervision and related to his job, and that

24 is the word you have heard that assistant commanders are also responsible

25 for the implementation of orders of their commander along the expert

Page 19550

1 lines that have to do with that order. In fact, one witness referred to

2 it as experts in implementation, and as assistant commander for intel and

3 security sector he was an expert in implementation through his staff and

4 through the security branches of the VRS. He doesn't need to receive the

5 order himself, he doesn't -- it doesn't even need to go through him.

6 Once there is an order out there that has the responsibility of the

7 security branches, especially Colonel Beara, Salapura, and others, he in

8 his position is responsible to implement it along with all the other

9 words: Organise, supervise, monitor. These are the black-letter law of

10 his responsibility that he is well aware of and he can't just shirk them

11 off by saying he's gone to Zepa.

12 Let me go to General Tolimir's questioning of General Skrbic on

13 this very point on the 30th of January, 2012, on page 18555 and

14 Mr. Tolimir asked this question. And you remember Skrbic was an

15 assistant commander, I believe, for personnel affairs:

16 "Q. Did assistant commanders control the business in their

17 sectors in accordance with the commander's decisions or are they entitled

18 to change it? Thank you.

19 "A. They cannot change it but they -- actually what they cannot

20 change is the commander's order, whereas a decision is part of an order.

21 "Q. Thank you. Let me repeat my question. Can they change the

22 commander's decision or order? Thank you.

23 "A. They cannot change either.

24 "Q. Thank you. Can they control the business or task in order

25 to achieve what the commander ordered? Thank you.

Page 19551

1 "A. They are experts for the implementation of the commander's

2 order and decision in the best possible way."

3 So here is General Skrbic telling us precisely what the

4 regulations say. So put that into his professional responsibility, put

5 that into his responsibility as an assistant commander, they apply to

6 wherever he is on duty, and they are his responsibilities, none of which

7 he has been able to explain away to you. These are the rules he lived

8 by, his career, has grown up with, and he cannot shirk them at this

9 point.

10 One of the best examples of General Tolimir professionally

11 supervising the security branches and the personnel, I've gone over at

12 length the documents of the 12th and the 13th and those proposals and

13 even orders to various people for lists and to make proposals to

14 commanders and others. But I want to take you to the 16th of July,

15 because here - as the General just mentioned - we have an order from

16 General Mladic to Keserovic to take over command of a sweep operation

17 which is a combat task. And where does General Tolimir fit into this?

18 Well, he's present at the time and he advises Keserovic about it. He

19 even, according to Keserovic, speaks to Mladic about it and then gets

20 back and speaks to Keserovic. But the key point to remember is he

21 provides, Tolimir provides, directions to Keserovic to pass on to

22 Jankovic regarding what Jankovic is doing in Bratunac. Keserovic will

23 admit he's being directed to deal with the wounded Muslims, but these are

24 prisoners. Of course they're prisoners issues. They're the prisoners in

25 Bratunac. His subordinate and professional line is dealing with them.

Page 19552

1 He passes on directions to Keserovic to deal with it. So on the evening

2 of the 16th of July, General Tolimir is at Crna Rijeka doing his job;

3 he's professionally supervising the work of Jankovic. He also provides

4 Keserovic information about the whereabouts of Colonel Beara. I'm sure

5 he provided him more than the whereabouts, but that's what Keserovic was

6 able to tell us before he shut his mouth. So this is one of the

7 excellent examples of professional supervision and implementation. And

8 the implementation of the order that Mladic gave to Keserovic, this -- as

9 you know, a sweep operation, it involved taking prisoners and it did in

10 this case.

11 A Witness PW-52 who was a commander of the RS MUP that was

12 working under the command of the army is -- his testimony is in this case

13 and he talked about that sweep operation and that they took approximately

14 up to 200 prisoners, 17 July, 200 prisoners. There's no record of those

15 folks beside that we do know they did a sweep operation and took 200

16 prisoners. So this would be an issue for the security branches. And

17 indeed, you remember the intercept that related to Keserovic. It was

18 Keserovic -- has he seen Momir Nikolic on the morning of the 17th? So

19 Keserovic is dealing with Momir Nikolic. We don't know about what, but a

20 sweep operation in the middle of a murder operation that ends up with

21 capturing prisoners, it's not hard to guess. And we also know from the

22 17th, 18th, 19th of July that Jankovic was looking to Toso, to Tolimir,

23 to help decide what to do with the MSF workers. So he's clearly on duty,

24 in charge, doing his job the 16th. He's advised -- he's the person

25 they're looking to to advise on what to do with prisoners on the 17th and

Page 19553

1 18th. Look to the Keserovic letter -- excuse me, the Keserovic testimony

2 and order to see Tolimir at work. It's amazing Keserovic gave us as much

3 as he did, but he did and he exposes the fallacy in what the General's

4 been saying.

5 Now, getting to what I felt was two watershed moments yesterday,

6 and the first is the General got to his proposal in the late evening of

7 13 July to bring 800 Muslims secretly to Sjemec, to this farm. And that

8 he was only, he told you, concerned about their adequate care and knew

9 nothing about the murder operation. Reminder, the Luke school victims

10 who had been systematically taken off the buses right before crossing to

11 Kladanj were murdered the night of the 13th. The Jadar victims had been

12 killed, the 15 people, that morning. The Kravica warehouse had a

13 thousand people dead. The controversy over where to send the prisoners

14 was in full swing; eventually Zvornik was the decision. I won't go over

15 that again.

16 And where were the top people in his life? Mladic that day, on

17 the 13th, was in Srebrenica, going up and down Kravica, Konjevic Polje a

18 good part of the day; Beara was in Bratunac walking to the schools in

19 Bratunac with the Celanovic, the lawyer, sent Nikolic to Zvornik to deal

20 with prisoners; Salapura was in Nova Kasaba, we know that, at 10.15 a.m.

21 from an intercept where he was dealing with prisoners, then he was, on

22 his own admission, in Srebrenica with Mladic. We see him on the video to

23 that effect; Jankovic on the 13th is in Potocari. He's directing

24 Bratunac MP to count the separated prisoners, clearly engaged in the

25 organisation and implementation of the murder operation; Popovic is in

Page 19554

1 Bratunac going along the road Kravica-Konjevic Polje, and I won't remind

2 you what the various brigade security officers are doing. That's very

3 clear. We know that Tolimir is in communication because he receives

4 information about the thousands of prisoners, the subject of his

5 proposal. Is it really imaginable that the person that is the most

6 well-informed of the VRS was working within the Drina Corps zone of

7 responsibility is actively receiving top-secret information about

8 prisoners, that many dead people and that that many of his people that

9 are on the ground at work that he, in the evening of the 13th of July,

10 doesn't know about the operation? Impossible.

11 His explanation for the meaning of the document really was

12 exposed yesterday because he says he's trying to just look at these

13 folks, but he never explained the agricultural work, the lack of

14 agricultural work, that was clearly set out by an officer who again was

15 no friend of ours. And also, if he was really concerned about their

16 care, their -- adequately housing them in the Rogatica area, why didn't

17 he recommend the Rogatica prison, Rasadnik. You remember seeing that

18 area? It was a large area, a lot of buildings. It was an ongoing

19 prison. They put 40, 50 people there right after Zepa. That was a place

20 that could have handled people, was ready to go. It wasn't out in the

21 middle of nowhere, as a massive pig farm that looked more like Kravica

22 than Kravica. It was already a prison.

23 We also know that not far away in Foca the Srbinje prison.

24 Tolimir Exhibit 2256 14 August document, Beara communicates to Tolimir

25 that this prison can handle up to a thousand folks. The problem with

Page 19555

1 these prisons, as you know, in Rogatica is the ICRC visited that prison

2 and the thousand prisoners from Serbia had already been registered by the

3 ICRC which is in the record. So General Tolimir picked this

4 out-of-the-way place that he clearly learned about from Carkic in order

5 to bring people down and kill them. Had he wanted to care for them, he

6 had the places right in his back yard. Prisoners of war shall be treated

7 humanely. In particular, they must be protected against violence,

8 insults, and intimidation. This is P02482, Article 210, SFRY regs.

9 He knows. He knows his job. Finally, the untruth from yesterday

10 that shook me to my very insides was when he finally responded to

11 Todorovic's testimony, the chief of the security branch of the

12 East Bosnia Corps. When Todorovic testified he was contacted by Tolimir,

13 perhaps in person, and told to arrange for a thousand to 1200 prisoners

14 at Batkovic and most essentially within 24 hours, soon thereafter, 48,

15 maybe three days according to his statement, please look at the statement

16 that's part of this case. It's the complete statement. It's an

17 interview transcribed from 2007, I believe. What does he say about that

18 critical evidence? Almost nothing. He says he's not reliable, he's just

19 not reliable. And that's all he says.

20 We looked at the record to see if General Tolimir challenged the

21 reliability of this witness when he testified, a witness who was clearly

22 not our friend. And as you remember when he testified, he stretched

23 those days beyond three into four and even five perhaps. And we found at

24 20 April 2011 this question by General Tolimir about Todorovic's

25 interview with the Prosecution when he provided these key details and

Page 19556

1 Tolimir asks this:

2 "Q. When providing this interview, did you always repeatedly say

3 that you were uncertain about the time precisely? Because a lot of

4 time's elapsed and that you cannot be specific as to the date?

5 "A. Yes.

6 "Q. Is there a possibility that later on when questions were put

7 to you and insistence placed on confirming something you cannot recall

8 you made certain changes to the original interview you provided in

9 Belgrade?

10 "A. Partially yes, but the gist of my original statement remains

11 unchanged."

12 Look at Todorovic's testimony. Look at his statement, solid as a

13 rock. He is no friend of the Prosecution's, he is the friend of

14 Tolimir's, but he was honest enough several years ago to provide the

15 details that Tolimir cannot live with. Now, is there support? He does

16 say that he's not sure about the date. It's after the fall of

17 Srebrenica. There's only one fall of Srebrenica where the VRS enters

18 Srebrenica and takes prisoners. It's nothing that anyone could confuse

19 with any other date. But what about dates? Can we get closer to it?

20 Well, the answer is: Yes, we can. Do you remember General Tolimir's

21 driver Mile Micic? And he testified on this point. He testified he

22 drove to -- drove up to the East Bosnia Corps and took General Tolimir to

23 the offices of the East Bosnia Corps security. You may remember he said

24 he was absolutely sure it happened on 12 July. He wasn't sure of a lot,

25 this witness, he was Tolimir's driver and friend, but one thing he was

Page 19557

1 absolutely sure was 12 of July.

2 Do you remember why he was so sure it was 12 July? It's because

3 12 July, as it is every year, was his name saint's day, St. Peter,

4 St. Peter. There is poetic justice.

5 Thank you. Nothing further.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much, Mr. McCloskey.

7 Mr. Tolimir, do you intend to respond to that? You have the

8 opportunity to do that in 30 minutes, up to 30 minutes, if you wish so.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Certainly I wish to respond. I wish to say a few words.

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, do so.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since I don't have time for

13 preparation, I'll start with last things first, with the last

14 Prosecutor's allegation. The Prosecutor alleges that Todorovic remembers

15 everything. I, on the other hand, remember and you remember that

16 Todorovic didn't even remember that he was with me on the 12th. How come

17 he could not remember that I was with him on the 12th and he still

18 remembers other dates when I told him something. He, himself, told us

19 that he changed his statement after the conversation with the Prosecutor.

20 He, himself, stated that he had thought that he had seen the 23 -- the

21 document that was signed by Milovanovic in 1993 concerning prisoners of

22 war, but he could not remember when the document was drafted. And all of

23 a sudden he remembered in 2007 what had happened. After ten years he

24 remembered. That's why I maintain that his statement is ambiguous, that

25 it leaves a lot to be desired. You can interpret it any way you want.

Page 19558

1 This is the first thing that I wanted to mention.

2 Secondly, Todorovic stated to the Prosecutor that he made a

3 contact with Tolimir. How did he do that? Is there any proof to the

4 fact how he made the contact with Tolimir? Nobody could contact Tolimir

5 because there was no telephones in Zepa. There was no telephone

6 connection between the Main Staff and the check-point which was between

7 the two firing lines of UNPROFOR on the hilltop called Boksanica. I

8 wanted to say in my closing argument that there was a telephone there,

9 but there was only a telephone line which reached not further than the

10 check-point of UNPROFOR from the forward command post. And nobody could

11 use it to call anybody else but the brigade because there was no

12 switchboard there.

13 No information was sent to the forward line, to Tolimir, about

14 what was being done in his area of responsibility because he had

15 substitutes, officers who replaced him when he was not there. This is

16 common practice, when the officer in charge is absent there are other

17 people who stand-in for him.

18 Second of all, the Prosecutor just claimed that I was looking for

19 accommodation for prisoners of war; no, that's not true. I only offered

20 them a possibility. I told them, there is a possibility of

21 accommodation. I was not the one actively looking for accommodation. I

22 was not in charge of that. It was erroneously interpreted that I was in

23 charge of the accommodation. That's not true. I only told them where

24 there was accommodation available, and that accommodation was not in a

25 prison. It was accommodation in agricultural facility. Carkic testified

Page 19559

1 about that. A unit of the brigade was billeted there before that. So

2 these premises were not prison premises.

3 The Prosecutor alleged that Jankovic was in charge of POWs.

4 Jankovic was in charge of contacts with UNPROFOR and international

5 organisations. Medecins sans Frontier and UNPROFOR were in charge of

6 transferring prisoners of war to the locations where they wanted to

7 transfer them to and they were in constant communication with Jankovic

8 about that. Tolimir could only advise him what to do when he received

9 that document. That's why Djurdjic told me on the 16th that Tolimir

10 would arrive. Salapura himself testified that he could not get in touch

11 with Tolimir all the time while he was in the Main Staff. Todorovic also

12 from the Eastern Bosnia Corps could not do that and neither could

13 Salapura from the Main Staff.

14 In professional terms, professional guidance, and professional

15 management does not concern the crimes charged that Mr. McCloskey spoke

16 about when he cited the rules in D0020 [as interpreted] and D00203.

17 When it comes to professionalism and professional guidance, the

18 security organ guides professionally his own officers as to how to apply

19 methods of work concerning the work of security organs. This is not

20 about command. That person is the only one trained for applying covert

21 methods of work like intercepting conversations and other methods that

22 are used in civilian life as well as in military, searching premises and

23 other things. These are not command duties and tasks. What I'm trying

24 to say is that Tolimir could not supervise anybody who command sent on a

25 mission like he did Keserovic and Stanko who were organs in my

Page 19560

1 department.

2 Furthermore, the Prosecutor has just stated that my organs were

3 in charge of supervising the military police. We've heard several

4 witnesses who have repeatedly testified that the military police were

5 always subordinated to the commander, not to the security organ. The

6 security organ can only propose their use, and that's where his duty

7 stops. The commanders are those who supervise the implementation of

8 their tasks and orders, not the security organs.

9 Furthermore, when it comes to the attack in the tunnel,

10 Mr. Salapura testified about that and he said that nobody, no civilians

11 were targeted or attacked. The tunnel did not involve the civilian

12 population. It was just a demonstration of force about the possibility

13 of entering Srebrenica through a tunnel that had been -- had not been in

14 use for years. It was a diversionary action. It was not an attack

15 against the civilian population. Mr. Salapura was shown a document

16 drafted by Ramiz Becirovic from the 28th Division. He reported to

17 Naser Oric that nobody had been killed, and Naser Oric was his commander,

18 he was his deputy, and that's why he reported to his superior, to his

19 commander.

20 These are more or less my replies to what the Prosecutor has

21 stated in rebuttal. I thank you. I apologise to everybody. I apologise

22 to the Prosecutor, but I had to highlight those things which are not

23 objectively true. I will never say a lie because I'm not only

24 responsible before this Trial Chamber. We will all be judged by our

25 savior one day. I prefer to be found guilty here, but to be found guilty

Page 19561

1 before my savior. That's why I apologise to you and I apologise to the

2 Prosecutor for having alerted him to the fact that the allegations were

3 incorrect and they erroneously represented the place where I was during

4 the incriminated events. Where I come from, there is a saying that you

5 shouldn't tell lies and falsely accuse anybody without any arguments. I

6 cannot speak about the things that I don't know, but I can tell you what

7 I do know and I'm telling the truth. I apologise to everybody. To the

8 interpreters, I apologise for having spoken very fast and for my poor

9 articulation and other impediments. I wish you all God's blessings. May

10 Godspeed be with all of you when you perform your duties in keeping with

11 God's will. Thank you very much.

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much, Mr. Tolimir. I have to say

13 there's no need for apologies. You are permitted to present your

14 arguments, as is the Prosecution, and in fact it was your duty as part of

15 the Defence to present all your thoughts and arguments.

16 We are at the end of the closing arguments, but there are two

17 remaining issues I have to raise. One is a translation issue. The last

18 couple of days there was informal communication between the parties and

19 the Chamber about one document where there is some doubt about the

20 accuracy of the translation, which seems to be quite important. We

21 listened very carefully to your oral submissions two days ago,

22 Mr. McCloskey. I just would like to remind you, it's your duty to

23 clarify that with CLSS and please inform the opposing party and the

24 Chamber about any achievements you were able to make.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Ms. Stewart was able to do that today and we

Page 19564

1 instruction to the Registry how to deal with this. The document should

2 be noted as marked but not admitted pursuant to the decision of the

3 Chamber of 14th of May.

4 I turn now to P1001. The situation is the same. The admission

5 was denied by the 14th of May decision. It will be now marked but not

6 admitted.

7 P1369, the translation was uploaded but the Chamber was not

8 informed about that.

9 Mr. McCloskey, can you confirm that the translation has been

10 uploaded?

11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I can. According to our research, it has

12 been.

13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. The document is now

14 admitted into evidence as P1369.

15 The last document is P1617. The OTP indicated that it would

16 offer this document through bar table motion, but the Prosecution did

17 not. And therefore, we change the status to marked but not admitted.

18 This concludes this matter. Therefore, I would like to come to

19 my last point. On behalf of the Chamber I should like to say a few words

20 of thanks. We are approaching the end of a trial that begun two and a

21 half years ago. We have heard the testimony of 130 witnesses, some of

22 whom have been here for several days. Over 3.000 exhibits have been

23 admitted. Nearly 20.000 pages of transcript were produced. There has

24 been the usual flow of written motions, responses, and decisions. It has

25 been a long and arduous process. Occasionally there have been

Page 19565

1 difficulties, but every person now in this courtroom has contributed in

2 his or her own way to ensuring that this trial has reached the present

3 stage having proceeded relatively smoothly.

4 Let me first thank my fellow Judges, Judge Mindua and

5 Judge Nyambe, for the co-operation of the Chamber.

6 Next I should thank both the Prosecution team and the Defence

7 team for the manner in which they have conducted the proceedings and for

8 their communication. Despite the length of the trial there has been a

9 pleasant but business-like atmosphere in court and very little acrimony.

10 I thank both teams for this and for co-operating well on the whole during

11 the trial, both with each other and with the Chamber.

12 There have been those who assisted the Chamber directly in its

13 work, these are the Judges' assistants and the Tolimir team. This team

14 has fully performed the functions conscientiously and to the best of the

15 abilities and made the task of the Chamber easier. Thank you for that.

16 I should also like to thank the staff of the Registry. First and

17 foremost, the Court Officer, several court ushers, the stenographers, the

18 court reporters, interpreters, and the translators, never in the

19 courtroom but we had to rely on their hard work. The IT staff, we had

20 them quite often at the courtroom when we faced difficulties. And

21 especially the security staff, and I hope very much that the security

22 officer will convey this thanks to all his colleagues.

23 And I think, especially in this case, I would include the staff

24 of the UNDU, including the medical staff of the Detention Unit which

25 assisted in some stages of the trial, especially for Mr. Tolimir.

Page 19566

1 Everyone else in the Registry who has given us assistance at one time or

2 another. The contribution of the Registry staff is sometimes forgotten,

3 but we as a Chamber have been aware of it and have appreciated it very

4 much. Each of the staff has played an essential role in the process that

5 is immensely complicated from a logistical point of view. The Chamber

6 will now be deliberating and the next step will be the issuance of the

7 judgement. We will now adjourn and the day of the delivery of the

8 judgement will be announced at a later stage.

9 We adjourn.

10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.24 p.m.