100312IT

Page 7530

1 WITNESS: WITNESS ST-179 [Resumed]

2 [The witness answered through interpreter]

3 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Witness, good morning to you, sir.

4 THE WITNESS: Good morning.

5 JUDGE HALL: Before I invite Mr. Cvijetic to begin his

6 cross-examination, I would remind you you're still on your oath.

7 Yes, Mr. Cvijetic.

8 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. Thank

9 you.

10 Cross-examination by Mr. Cvijetic:

11 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Witness. That's how I'll have

12 to call you. My name is Slobodan Cvijetic, and I appear here as

13 co-counsel for Mr. Stanisic. I have a few questions for you.

14 But before I do, let me ask the usher -- let me ask the usher,

15 please, to hand to you a file with exhibits that I intended to show to

16 you. However, I don't know what's going on, on the Prosecution side.

17 Lately, they are leaving us short of work and we have fewer and fewer

18 documents and exhibits.

19 They have already shown you most of the exhibits and asked most

20 of the questions that I had on my list, so I believe, ultimately, we will

21 finish this sooner than we had planned.

22 JUDGE HARHOFF: The Chamber appreciates the co-operation between

23 the parties.

24 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Witness, you don't have to open documents now. We'll look at a

Page 7531

1 few of them towards the end. First, I have a few general questions.

2 In view of the fact that you are not a lawyer and you are not

3 even a trained policeman, you have not been to the School for Internal

4 Affairs, I will skip questions related to interpretation of legislation,

5 although they are my favourite. Instead, I will try to elicit from you a

6 summary of your evidence so far.

7 To begin with, the arming of civilians in the area of Vlasenica.

8 You said that there was an escalation of tensions, resulting in an

9 atmosphere where you could feel already that war was in the offing and

10 civilians of both Bosniak and Serbian ethnicity started arming

11 themselves; is that correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. When you explained the operation of arms distribution, in

14 answering the Prosecutor's question you distinguished between the

15 legality and illegality of this operation, saying that this operation was

16 geared mainly at the Muslim population?

17 A. No, I don't think I said exactly that. This operation was geared

18 at the entire population at first. However, later it turned out that it

19 was mainly Muslims who handed over weapons, even those who had licenses

20 for their weapons, and those who did not have licenses did not hand over

21 weapons in great numbers.

22 Q. That's precisely what I would like to define. What does "illegal

23 possession" mean? Serbs received weapons by responding to the

24 mobilisation call-up and being issued with weapons; right?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7532

1 Q. The Muslims obtained weapons by buying them or procuring them

2 through other channels that had nothing to do with the mobilisation or

3 response to the official military authorities?

4 A. Yes, and I would add that military-aged Muslims also had the

5 possibility to obtain, legally, military equipment, including weapons,

6 but in 1991 their own authorities forbade them to respond to

7 mobilisation, and they abided by that decision. So they procured weapons

8 by other means.

9 Q. Now, concerning the legality or illegality of this arming, I

10 believe an opinion -- a legal interpretation was even required from the

11 Court before this operation proceeded in order to get a definitive view

12 on what legal and illegal arming is.

13 A. Yes, that happened a bit later, when, in keeping with our duties

14 under the Law on Internal Affairs, we wanted to file criminal complaints

15 against people for illegal possession of weapons. We consulted the

16 president of the Court, what exactly we should do, and he gave us the

17 explanation that we've just heard; namely, that members of the army who

18 responded to the mobilisation call-up legally and legitimately obtained

19 army-issue weapons, and these were mainly Serbs, whereas Muslims who did

20 not want to respond to the mobilisation call-up but were found to own

21 automatic weapons or other illegal equipment, were qualified as owners of

22 illegal weapons and, thus, subject to prosecution.

23 Q. Thank you for this explanation. Let me just invoke the orders

24 that the Prosecution had exhibited. These are materials that you

25 provided to the Prosecution upon your arrival in The Hague. This

Page 7533

1 concerns the operation from the early April days, which you said was

2 carried out without any casualties, without application of force. You

3 said that it was done on the orders of the Territorial Defence Staff and

4 that, basically, that, too, was a military action; am I right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Pursuant to that order, the task was given also to the civilian

7 police. But if I read the order well, it was within the purview of the

8 civilian police only to make a record of illegally-owned weapons and

9 owners, and that was your job, that was the way you proceeded?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. There was a subsequent action that you discussed, the attack on

12 Drum village on 16 June. You said it was a very different and purely

13 military operation; correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Let me ask you now about the escalation of tensions in the

16 Vlasenica municipality. Let me ask you specifically: Along the

17 information and news you received from other parts of Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina, news about attacks on military columns, the cut-off of

19 communications with Tuzla, and with the arrival of now Serb refugees from

20 Muslim-held territories, contributed to this escalation of tensions;

21 correct?

22 A. Yes, tensions grew, and this balance of departures and arrivals

23 soon reached 50:50. Muslims were leaving and Serbs were coming in, but

24 as time passed ever larger numbers of Serbs arrived in Vlasenica. And

25 the Crisis Staff thereupon formed an agency that provided accommodation

Page 7534

1 for them in now vacant houses.

2 Q. During this escalation of tensions, you continued to work with

3 your Muslim colleagues. Did they ask you how they should act in a

4 situation like that? Did you discuss it with them?

5 A. I cannot put a precise date on it, but the last night we had a

6 joint patrol was around the 20th of April. I was in that patrol with two

7 Bosniak colleagues, and we were carrying out these checks that I

8 discussed already. And we discussed the general situation, because

9 something was in the offing, something was in the air. Everyone could

10 feel it. Already on the 9th of April, there was an incursion by Arkan's

11 men not far from us, and it was logical to expect it might happen to us

12 as well. We were still hoping that we would come out of it unscathed,

13 but we were still thinking what to do.

14 Q. Did they ask you for advise, as a friend and a colleague?

15 A. Well, my family was still there, unlike many other Serbs who had

16 already moved their families to safety. They asked me, Are you going to

17 move your family? I said, Well, I don't intend to so far. And, indeed,

18 I moved my family only one month into the war.

19 Q. Well, did you advise them to sort of move away, just in case,

20 until you see what exactly is going to happen?

21 A. Yes, yes. I said that's what they should do.

22 Q. After all these years, would you give them the same advice? Just

23 a, Yes, or, No, please.

24 A. Yes, yes, because one needs to place one's family in a safe place

25 before anything else.

Page 7535

1 Q. We'll move to the next subject. That's the take-over of power on

2 22 April 1992. You've already discussed it, but I have a few additional

3 questions.

4 Who, specifically, disarmed the police station, including you and

5 Muslim officers?

6 A. That group or paramilitary group, whatever I should call them. I

7 only later learnt that they were members of the Serbian Guard from

8 Sekovici. Whether they were legally recruited and mobilised and attached

9 to a proper military unit, I don't know, but it was them who carried out

10 that action.

11 Q. The night before that, you were on patrol with your Muslim

12 colleague, and you had no inkling of it?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So you were also taken by surprise when this happened?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. You should observe a pause between question and answer so the

17 interpreters can follow. We should not overlap.

18 It follows from your statement that you claim that up to the 15th

19 of May, 1992, you had absolutely no control whatsoever, including

20 physical control, over the developments in the Public Security Station in

21 Vlasenica; correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. In mid-May, when you turned up at the station, you found two

24 closed packages. A platoon of military police that the government had

25 renamed from the TO Detachment into the Special Police Platoon, that's

Page 7536

1 one package, and you find a mobilised unit of the police reserve;

2 correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You had no influence over either of these units; correct?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. You said that you noticed those reserve policemen were completely

7 unusable for regular police work?

8 A. Yes, but I meant, rather, the special unit.

9 Q. You started coming regularly to work from mid-July 1992; correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And you got a formal decision from the minister on the 8th of

12 August, 1992, appointing you chief of the station?

13 A. Yes. It was a provisional decision, pending the adoption of the

14 enactment on internal organisation.

15 Q. The person who was chief until then, Mr. Bjelanovic, on the

16 orders of the government of the Serbian Autonomous Region Birac-Romanija,

17 is tasked with establishing a public security station in Milici or,

18 rather, co-ordinating this establishment?

19 A. Yes. He was appointed, although I didn't see the appointment,

20 co-ordinator for the Birac region.

21 Q. So, formally, the Public Security Station of Vlasenica was

22 chief-less until the 8th of August, formally speaking?

23 A. Well, in July, I did some work --

24 Q. I'm asking you about the formal side of things.

25 A. Formally, there was no chief.

Page 7537

1 Q. You also touched upon another subject; namely, the strength of

2 the local authorities in SAO Romanija, from the point of view of a

3 regular citizen. You will agree with me that it was a period when the

4 central authorities of Republika Srpska, and that includes the hierarchy

5 and the subordination within the MUP, had a hard time reaching the grass

6 root level in all areas of Republika Srpska, due to the resistance by

7 local authorities and their wish to hold on to positions they had

8 acquired?

9 A. Yes, and that's what I explained previously.

10 Q. You will agree with me that quite some time was needed for the

11 central authorities to take on and to reach every last public security

12 station on the ground?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. In order to achieve that, the ministry first had to deal with the

15 large number of problems, starting with the decision on the seat of the

16 ministry, providing adequate equipment and staff, establishing an

17 efficient system of communications, financing, et cetera; am I right?

18 A. Yes, this was a very tall order, but intensive work was done at

19 that time and the results were finally achieved.

20 Q. All right. Can we agree that only when the MUP seat was moved to

21 Bijeljina, optimal prerequisites were provided for the ministry to work

22 efficiently throughout the territory?

23 A. Yes, conditions were much better once they moved to Bijeljina and

24 the ministry was able to operate throughout the territory.

25 Q. I shall now move to another subject that you also talked a lot

Page 7538

1 about yesterday, answering the Prosecutor's questions. It is about these

2 collection centres, the holding centres. You were quite precise in that

3 regard, but we need to clarify some things.

4 You already said that they were not within the jurisdiction of

5 the Ministry of the Interior, nor in your jurisdiction. There is no

6 dispute about that; right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You said that the local Secretariat of National Defence, which

9 was later renamed the Ministry of Defence, had mobilised the reserve

10 police force and directed it to you; is that right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. I noticed on the payrolls that these reserve policemen were given

13 their salaries according to the days spent at work; that it was not a

14 regular pay like the regular policemen received, but it depended on the

15 number of days spent at work. Is that right?

16 A. Yes.

17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Cvijetic, can I just ask a clarifying

18 question here.

19 Your last question was that the Ministry of Defence had mobilised

20 the reserve police force and directed the local police force to the

21 witness, and the witness answered, Yes. Is that a correct interpretation

22 of your question and the answer? I mean, the question that I have is:

23 Why would the Ministry of Defence suddenly have the power to

24 re-subordinate the reserve police force to the MUP? I thought that the

25 reserve police force, in any case, would be under the authority of the

Page 7539

1 MUP. So maybe I have missed the testimony yesterday and misunderstood,

2 but I need a clarification of: Why would it be the Ministry of Defence

3 who would suddenly have the authority to re-subordinate the reserve

4 police force to the MUP? That sounds to me to be backwards somehow.

5 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will not testify.

6 I shall let the witness explain. I believe that the witness did clarify

7 this yesterday, and I shall ask him to do it once again. I understood

8 what he said yesterday. I shall now ask him to kindly repeat.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Perhaps there was a misinterpretation or a mistranslation, but

11 basically in order for a reserve policeman or reserve policemen to be

12 mobilised into the station, the Ministry of Defence, at the request of

13 the Public Security Station, to the effect that the station needs five or

14 ten or so policemen, the ministry -- the police sends to the ministry

15 this number of policemen who become reserve policemen. And when they are

16 taken over by the Ministry of the Interior, i.e., by the police, they

17 become members of that Public Security Station. The essence is that the

18 Ministry of Defence sends to us, at our request, as many policemen as

19 they can, some reserve policemen that already possess certain knowledge

20 about work in the police, because they had served time in the military --

21 served in the military as reserve policemen or something similar, and

22 people who, of course, are not criminals or anything similar.

23 So the ministry would thus respond to a request of the Public

24 Security Station. Once they were assigned to the Public Security

25 Station, they would become a member of that security station's reserve

Page 7540

1 police force, and they would from then on be under the jurisdiction of

2 the Ministry of the Interior.

3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you for this clarification, and, obviously,

4 I have misunderstood. But let me just ask one question more.

5 Was this related to the fact that a state of imminent threat of

6 war had been declared?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I understood your question

8 correctly, this procedure of mobilising reserve policemen also existed

9 prior to the declaration of imminent threat of war. The same procedure

10 was applied, and we continued to apply that procedure in order to obtain

11 a certain number of members of the reserve police force.

12 JUDGE HARHOFF: So, in essence, just to be clear now, any

13 mobilisation of reserve police forces would, in any case, be determined

14 by the Ministry of Defence, upon the request from an SJB or a CSB?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Exactly.

16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much.

17 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now it is completely

18 clear to us as well.

19 Q. So we were talking about the DSAs and the payrolls. Please

20 assist me. It was the Secretariat of National Defence that mobilised

21 these reserve policemen. Who actually provided the funds for them? You

22 talked about the salaries of regular policemen yesterday, how you would

23 send a request to the financial section of the ministry, et cetera. But

24 for these --

25 A. It was also the Ministry of the Interior that provided the wages

Page 7541

1 for these policemen. Once they became members of the reserve force of

2 the Public Security Station, their wages would be paid by the Ministry of

3 the Interior.

4 Q. Was there a possibility -- was there a provision made for funds

5 to be remunerated from the Ministry of the Interior to the other

6 ministry?

7 A. I don't know about that.

8 Q. In connection with the security provided for these collection

9 centres, the need arose for guards to be provided to secure the prison,

10 and you say that you were not -- that you were not in charge of that.

11 And later a similar need arose in connection with the Susica camp. You

12 never stated that you had assigned the reserve policemen to provide

13 security at these facilities by an order, so was it the ministry, on the

14 basis of a request of the people in charge of the camp, that assigned

15 some guards to provide security there?

16 A. As regards the security for Susica, the police never provided

17 security, nor assigned any members to guard -- any of its members to

18 guard this facility. The Susica camp was set up by the municipal organs

19 initially, and later it was taken over by the army, meaning that the

20 Territorial Defence Staff assigned the people to provide security for

21 that facility.

22 Q. All right. You also referred to the fact that patrols of the

23 police station escorted the buses with the people who expressed a wish to

24 leave the territory. Namely, up to Kladanj there existed groups which

25 recognised no authorities, including the military authorities, and the

Page 7542

1 danger was that they could attack the convoys?

2 A. Yes, but let me just explain. The police escorted the buses not

3 up to Kladanj, but up to a point where there was a tunnel leading to

4 Kladanj, because on the other end of the tunnel the territory was already

5 under the control of B and H forces, whether it was BH Police, or the

6 Green Berets, or somebody else. So the buses would come to the tunnel.

7 The people would disembark and pass on foot through the tunnel and be

8 received on the other end. This happened every day until the 15th of May

9 until the day when the Tuzla column incident happened. After that, the

10 tunnel was mined, it was blown up on the Kladanj side, so that people

11 could no longer pass in that direction.

12 Q. All right. I will now show you a document. It is already a

13 court exhibit. It's number is P160, and I believe that it is on page 26

14 in both the English and Serbo-Croat-Bosnian versions.

15 Until we have what we need on the screen: You often refer to the

16 Tuzla column. What are you referring to? You're referring to the attack

17 on the military convoy?

18 A. Yes, that is what I'm referring to, because that is when the

19 character of the war in B and H changed.

20 Q. Who attacked whom?

21 A. The members of the then TO Tuzla attacked a JNA military column.

22 Q. So the Muslim forces attacked them?

23 A. Yes.

24 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] In the Serbian version, we have to

25 turn to the next page. And in the English, we are on the right page.

Page 7543

1 The next page. We need the conclusion under number 13 to mirror the

2 English page. So it is the next page in the Serbian. That is it.

3 Q. Mr. Witness, please have a look at this section. I will tell you

4 what document is in question. You were not present at the first

5 collegium meeting of MUP officers held in Belgrade, where far-reaching

6 and diverse tasks were actually drawn -- made conclusions about.

7 Inter alia, you see, in item 13, the first bullet, they had noted the

8 problem of the actions of paramilitary formations, and the centres were

9 assigned the task to follow that phenomenon, to submit reports and

10 information to the MUP on it. Do you see that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Are you aware of a meeting of this kind having been held on the

13 11th of July, 1992, in Belgrade?

14 A. I heard that it was held. I was not present, and I did not have

15 occasion to study this document.

16 Q. All right. Please tell me now, in that period did you, either

17 through orders, or the ministry's documents, or through your chief, or

18 the chief of the Centre of Security Services, were you informed about the

19 need to combat paramilitary units and that work had to be done along

20 those lines?

21 A. Yes, because there was intensive work going on against such

22 paramilitary units and against all negative phenomena of this kind. It

23 was us from the field, actually, that exerted pressure on the chief of

24 the centre in order for them to find a way for these paramilitary units

25 to be disbanded and sent away, removed, in a legitimate and legal way.

Page 7544

1 Q. If we -- even if we took this date as the beginning of this

2 activity, although we do have evidence that it had started earlier, you

3 will agree that this activity started in the beginning of July?

4 A. Yes, from the beginning of July. As I mentioned yesterday, even

5 before this we had occasion to clash with paramilitary units, to disarm

6 them, and similar.

7 Q. Now I will show you another document. It is also a court

8 document. It is Exhibit P591. It is page 3 in the Serbian version. In

9 the meantime, we shall also see what page in the English version it is.

10 We are unable to find the proper English page, but it is page 3,

11 paragraph 2, in the Serbian version, which says:

12 "Currently in the territory of the Serbian Republic of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are about 50 paramilitary formations."

14 It is also on page 3 of the English, paragraph 1.

15 So: "60 paramilitary units of a total strength of about 4.000 to

16 5.000 men, of which we shall list but the most important."

17 So -- and then it goes on to enumerate them. Among the

18 strongest, in the very next paragraph, they refer to the Yellow Wasps,

19 with 170 people, et cetera. Can you read that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. This is the Intelligence Administration of the Main Staff of the

22 Army of the SR of B and H, and this is their report dated the 28th of

23 July, 1992. Mr. Witness, I showed you this for the sole purpose that we

24 agree that the problem of paramilitary units was not a minor problem and

25 that these were, indeed, well-organised and numerous units. Do you agree

Page 7545

1 with my position?

2 A. Yes, it was a problem.

3 Q. You will also agree with me when I say that in order to deal with

4 such a problem, the ministry had to organise its own ranks well and to

5 undertake thorough preparations, to actually train a special unit for

6 that particular purpose, as well as to co-ordinate this action and link

7 up its efforts with the military police as well as with you in the field.

8 I believe that you told us that you, yourself, gave 30 of your men to

9 participate in one of these actions. Do you agree with me that

10 comprehensive, extensive preparations had to be undertaken?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. This operation, in its preparation, implied a degree of secrecy;

13 it was not to be known that it was being prepared?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can we now have 1D176. In your file, tab 13. Let's just see the

16 English.

17 Have you found it?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. This is an order from the minister of the interior, dated 27 July

20 1992. Please pay attention to page 1. Mr. Stanisic is now carrying out

21 in practice all the conclusions of the meeting in Belgrade. Among other

22 things, in item 2, he recalls his order to remove all those who were

23 responsible for crimes before taking up duty and in the course of their

24 duty. Do you see that in item 2?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7546

1 Q. In item 3, he says that any surplus of such individuals should be

2 referred to the army, and you said surpluses were turned over to the

3 army, didn't you?

4 A. I did.

5 Q. Read also item 4. All the units set up during the war -- all

6 special units formed during the war should be immediately disbanded and

7 placed under the command of the army. You said that was the case with

8 that special unit, didn't you?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Then the same item further below, as well as item 5, speaks of

11 the replenishment of the Special Detachment of the Police and the way it

12 will be manned.

13 Now we need item 7 on the next page. In English, too, we need

14 the next page. We still don't see the English.

15 Please read item 7, sir. You will agree with me that within the

16 framework of activities from the beginning of July until 27 July, the

17 action to disband and eliminate paramilitary units continues, and a

18 direct order is now issued that they be removed from the territory of

19 Republika Srpska; am I right?

20 A. Yes, and I was directly involved in this work.

21 Q. Thank you. We don't need the document anymore.

22 Now, tell me, even before the action in Zvornik, you personally

23 disarmed a paramilitary unit called Charlie's Men?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. You did that before the action in Zvornik; right?

Page 7547

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. The action in Zvornik followed after this order; right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. That is to say, after the 27th of July, the action in Zvornik

5 occurred; right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You said yesterday that after the action in Zvornik, that special

8 unit went to Bratunac and then to Foca with the same assignment -- on the

9 same assignment; correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Are you aware that before the action in Zvornik, this unit had

12 been in Brcko and Bijeljina on the same assignment?

13 A. I'm aware, but I didn't have particular information. I know that

14 it worked in other areas as well.

15 Q. You will now agree with me that this was, in fact, a systematic,

16 comprehensive operation to eliminate a negative phenomenon, namely, the

17 paramilitary units, and it cannot be associated with individual

18 incidents; it is, on the contrary, a result of a general intention to

19 remove this negative phenomenon?

20 JUDGE HALL: I hope the witness can answer that question,

21 Mr. Cvijetic, because that was a combination of a question and

22 submissions and a number of things. But I suppose he'd have a go at it.

23 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Well, I can divide the question

24 into a number of questions. I'm sorry, but the witness answered already.

25 Q. Witness, I'll have to rephrase. You will agree with me that this

Page 7548

1 action in Zvornik was just one in a series of planned actions aimed at

2 eliminating paramilitary formations in a broader area; correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now part 2. You will agree with me that we cannot associate it

5 with any individual incident caused by a paramilitary unit; correct?

6 A. Yes. All the incidents that occurred can just be cited as an

7 example of their negative impact.

8 Q. But the point is, it was the general position of the ministry

9 that they should be eliminated and removed from Republika Srpska, either

10 by placing them under the command of military authorities or by expelling

11 them?

12 A. Precisely, because without a definitive decision and position of

13 the ministry, the ultimate goal, to expel them, would not have been

14 possible to achieve.

15 Q. You will agree with me that the ministry displayed persistence,

16 courage, and consistency, and the action continued throughout 1992?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. I believe I will be able to finish before the break. Let me just

19 try to clarify something that left me in confusion yesterday.

20 Could you just confirm that there was never any incident between

21 Mr. Stanisic, personally, and any paramilitary units, specifically the

22 Yellow Wasps? And the incident you described yesterday is known to us as

23 an incident involving the minister of information, Velibor Ostojic. I

24 would therefore ask you: Do you allow the possibility that you were

25 slightly confused about this? The young man who came to you and said

Page 7549

1 that the minister was experiencing problems, did he perhaps mean his

2 minister, whereas you understood it as meaning your minister?

3 A. Well, now I'm confused too. I know that I had reports. There

4 was a series of incidents, beginning with citizens who were intercepted,

5 beaten up, their cars and their money were robbed, up to members of the

6 leadership who were the victims of such incidents. I remember something

7 like that with Velibor Ostojic. This was at a stage of preparation of

8 these activities. That young man who came by told this story, that this

9 intensive activity will follow, and he said even the minister had

10 problems of the kind. And that's how I understood it -- or misunderstood

11 it. If Mr. Stanisic had been mistreated, himself, then that would have

12 been the straw that broke the camel's back, but I wasn't necessarily

13 right in that understanding.

14 Q. So I understand that you allow the possibility the young man

15 meant another minister, and you understood him as referring to

16 Minister Stanisic?

17 A. Possibly.

18 Q. And just for your information, I will tell you that the young men

19 who were Mr. Stanisic's bodyguards in 1992 - he had one driver and one

20 security man - were called Zoran Jasarevic and Goran Abazovic. Do you

21 know that?

22 A. I know Goran -- I knew that he had a security detail at the time,

23 but I didn't know these young men personally, although, of course, I

24 appreciated them and they appreciated me.

25 Q. For procedural reasons, I have to put to you another fact before

Page 7550

1 I conclude.

2 It was only in 1994 that a young man by the name of Dusko Malovic

3 was employed in Mr. Stanisic's security detail; do you allow for that

4 possibility?

5 A. I allow for that possibility.

6 Q. I have to mention this because you were there when the minister

7 came back in 1994, and you were able to see that young man by his side?

8 A. Possibly.

9 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Just before the break, I have

10 concluded. Thank you, Witness. Thank you, Your Honours.

11 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Cvijetic.

12 Mr. Pantelic, do you have any questions of this witness?

13 MR. PANTELIC: No, Your Honour, we don't have a question for this

14 witness, thank you.

15 JUDGE HALL: What we'll do is take the break now and then --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

17 JUDGE HALL: We will take the break now, and, Mr. Olmsted, you

18 would begin your re-examination when we resume.

19 [The witness stands down]

20 --- Recess taken at 10.24 a.m.

21 --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.

22 JUDGE HALL: We apologise for any inconvenience to counsel caused

23 by our delay in resuming the Bench, but it was occasioned by one of those

24 ancillary matters that invariably engage Judges. Thank you.

25 Yes, Mr. Olmsted.

Page 7551

1 MR. OLMSTED: Shall we wait for the witness?

2 [The witness takes the stand]

3 Re-examination by Mr. Olmsted:

4 Q. Good morning, sir.

5 A. Good morning.

6 Q. Sir, I believe it was the day before yesterday you testified that

7 the SDS was arming the Serb population back in 1992?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can you tell us, is it legal for a political party to be arming

10 the civilian population?

11 A. Certainly not.

12 Q. And just to clarify your position, is it your position that after

13 the take-over in April 1992, that every Serb who possessed a weapon

14 possessed it legally?

15 A. No, not all of them possessed weapons legally.

16 Q. And just to further clarify your position, is it your position

17 that only persons mobilised into the Serb military were committing crimes

18 against the Muslim population in Vlasenica after the take-over?

19 A. If I understood your question correctly, the persons who were

20 mobilised into the RS Army included the smallest group responsible for

21 such crimes. It is other groups that were mainly responsible.

22 Q. So only military soldiers were responsible for committing crimes

23 against the Muslims; is that what you're saying?

24 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, if I can be of assistance. I wasn't

25 listening to the translation, but apparently the transcript doesn't show

Page 7552

1 what the witness has answered. Maybe you can clarify, because I believe

2 there is a misunderstanding between -- between what the witness said and

3 what is entered into the transcript. Thank you.

4 JUDGE HARHOFF: Put your question to the witness again,

5 Mr. Olmsted.

6 MR. OLMSTED: Sure.

7 Q. Let me ask you the question again, just to make sure we got the

8 record correct. I want to clarify your position on the issue of crimes

9 against the Muslim population after the take-over.

10 Is it your position that only persons in the military -- persons

11 who were mobilised into the military were committing crimes against the

12 Muslim population in Vlasenica after the take-over?

13 A. No, my position is that most crimes were committed by

14 paramilitaries and informal groups.

15 Q. Now, with regard to the special police unit at SJB Vlasenica,

16 were members of this special police unit mobilised through the

17 Secretariat of National Defence?

18 A. They were mobilised through the Secretariat for National Defence

19 into Territorial Defence. After that, the Crisis Staff made a decision

20 that this unit should be seconded to the Public Security Station after

21 the VRS was established. Why? Because they did not want to join the VRS

22 as an organised unit, and they could not exist as a separate unit outside

23 the army or the police, so they got the Crisis Staff to decide that this

24 unit be seconded to the Public Security Station.

25 Q. After this special police unit was seconded to the SJB Vlasenica,

Page 7553

1 any additional members to join that unit would have been mobilised from

2 the -- by the Secretariat of National Defence into the police, itself; is

3 that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, today the question was asked whether you had no influence

6 over the special unit, and that's at page 8, lines 3 through 4. By this,

7 did you mean that the Crisis Staff imposed upon you the special unit; is

8 that what you meant by "no influence"?

9 A. In the course of mobilisation, and when the decision was made to

10 second this unit to the Public Security Station, I was unable to have a

11 say or influence that decision. It was adopted anyway.

12 Q. And just to clarify, that decision was made by the Crisis Staff

13 in Vlasenica?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And once they were within the SJB Vlasenica, you had the power to

16 discipline them; would you agree with that?

17 A. Yes, but at that time the only measure that could be taken

18 against them was to remove them and send them to VRS units. However, it

19 would often happen that those men whom we wanted to remove and send to

20 the army left Republika Srpska because they didn't want to join either

21 the army or the police.

22 Q. Well, certainly, you could have filed a criminal report against

23 them?

24 A. Well, you see, we've been discussing this for three days. We

25 were working within the Criminal Code, and we did all we could to

Page 7554

1 prosecute such cases. We documented and filed reports in every case

2 where we were able to. We forwarded a number of such cases to the

3 Prosecutor's Office, and the Prosecutor's Office did not exist until July

4 or August. And it is common practice that the prosecutor could ask a

5 criminal report to be supplemented or rejected, but they had no

6 obligation to inform us of what they decided. We had no feedback from

7 the Prosecutor's Office. We didn't know what happened with our criminal

8 report, whether it was rejected or not. From our viewpoint, from our

9 position in the police, we did all we could to document these cases and

10 file them to the prosecutor.

11 Another line of work -- another aspect of documenting such cases

12 is sending reports. When the Military Prosecutor's Office and the

13 Military Court were established, we did that, too. Anything that could

14 be found in official notes and reports that went to the ministry, these

15 criminal complaints were either sent to the civilian prosecutor or the

16 military prosecutor. If you wanted to see where the thing hit a snag or

17 what failed to work, you should look in the records of these

18 institutions.

19 Q. That was a very long answer to a pretty straightforward question.

20 But am I correct that, yes, in fact, you could file criminal reports

21 against members of the special unit if you had information they committed

22 a crime?

23 A. Yes, we would file such reports, and we did.

24 Q. I need to show you a document. It's 65 ter 1552.

25 And I ask that this not be broadcast, the reason being it's a

Page 7555

1 log-book from the Prosecution's Office in Vlasenica and it contains names

2 of victims.

3 JUDGE HALL: This arises out of cross-examination how?

4 MR. OLMSTED: The witness just said that the Prosecutor's Office

5 was not functioning until July or August, and I just want him to take a

6 look at the prosecutor's log-book and see if that's the case. So it

7 arises out of his last answer.

8 JUDGE HALL: But it's the prosecutor's log-book, not his?

9 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, but if he can identify it.

10 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Cvijetic.

11 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, you have anticipated

12 my objections. I never dealt with this question at all, and it does not

13 arise from the examination of this witness. The Prosecutor is broaching

14 a new subject which, in fact, was already clarified yesterday, and your

15 intervention is quite appropriate and I subscribe to it myself.

16 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honour, in his last response, when we were

17 talking about his authority over the special unit, which was raised

18 during cross-examination, he says that he wasn't filing criminal reports

19 because -- against the special police because the Prosecutor's Office

20 wasn't functioning. And I need to show him a document to show that it

21 was.

22 JUDGE HALL: Yes, but the difficulty I see, Mr. Olmsted, is that

23 you are seeking to contradict this witness on a document that he has

24 nothing to do with. It may very -- that document, standing on its own,

25 may very well, when put alongside the witness's testimony, indicate that

Page 7556

1 the witness's testimony in this regard is inaccurate, but I don't know

2 that it is -- that you can lay that plank down in the manner that you

3 propose now.

4 MR. OLMSTED: So if I understand Your Honour correctly, the issue

5 is whether he can -- he has the necessary foundation to talk about this

6 particular log-book?

7 JUDGE HALL: No. What you were seeking to do, as I understand

8 it, is to challenge or confront the witness as to the accuracy of his

9 last answer to you. When I say "last answer," before this issue has

10 arisen. But you are seeking to do that not on the basis of work product

11 of the witness, but of somebody else. So apart from the fact that you're

12 entering into new territory which wasn't raised in cross-examination, at

13 the end of this exercise all you would have achieved is getting the

14 witness's comment on something that somebody else did. So it isn't going

15 to be of assistance.

16 MR. OLMSTED: Well, Your Honour, respectfully, the reason I'm

17 showing him this document is to see whether he would revise his answer,

18 based upon what he sees in front of the computer screen. If he wants to

19 stick to his position, then that's fine. And, I think, well, at least in

20 the judicial system I come from, that is an appropriate way to approach a

21 topic such as this.

22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Olmsted, I thought the witness had answered

23 to your question, about whether or not they did file complaints, in the

24 positive. He said, Yes, we did, in fact, file complaints. So that would

25 seem to exhaust the purpose of this extra exercise.

Page 7557

1 MR. OLMSTED: Well, then I'll just move on.

2 Q. Sir, if you did file criminal reports against members of the

3 special police, those would be in your Vlasenica crime register; is that

4 correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. When you reviewed your crime register the other day, did you see

7 any of those criminal reports?

8 A. As we focused solely on the segment under Article 213, I did not

9 pay attention. But the crime register shows that it was not only illegal

10 possession of weapons that were the crimes, but there were also different

11 offences by members of all ethnicities. As far as I remember now -- in

12 fact, I cannot remember now, of the 182 offences in the crime register,

13 which one was under what article and by whom. It is a fact, however,

14 that in those impossible conditions, the wartime conditions, we did

15 everything in our power to make the institution function properly.

16 Q. Now, we see, from the payroll records for May 1992 that we showed

17 you the other day, that you signed them as chief of the station, and you

18 also paid yourself a higher salary than the other police officers. And

19 you also testified yesterday that these payroll went from you to the CSB

20 and then on to the Ministry of the Interior. Were you misrepresenting

21 your position as chief on those occasions?

22 A. I have clarified over the past two days in what position I had

23 been and at what time, when it was that I was formally appointed chief

24 and from which time I could consider myself a co-ordinator. That was

25 sometime in mid-July, after serious talks and consultations with

Page 7558

1 Mr. Cvijetic. Until that time, I had been seconded by the former

2 Ministry of the Interior and worked there as such.

3 The previous chief, my colleague Bjelanovic, would delegate to me

4 certain powers to enable me to carry out certain tasks which were of no

5 bearing on the strategy, so to speak, of the ministry, i.e., of the

6 police station that he had been in charge of. Why did he do this? Why

7 did he delegate such powers to me? At that time, I was the only

8 worker -- worker taking over from the former Ministry of the Interior of

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, with work experience in the Ministry of the Interior,

10 with a proper professional exam, and the only worker with -- with

11 adequate university qualifications. It was in order for me to contribute

12 as much as possible to the establishment of the structure of the police

13 station in order for the police station to start functioning in keeping

14 with the Law on Internal Affairs and in keeping with the rules emanating

15 from that particular law, which I later did.

16 Q. Let's move on.

17 You stated today that there were no police guards at Susica camp.

18 What about Dragan Nikolic? He was a member of the special police unit?

19 A. Dragan Nikolic left when the collection centre started

20 functioning. The TO took him over, as part of their organisation, to

21 provide security for the collection centre. I cannot recall at this

22 point on what grounds he featured on that list, was he retained on it in

23 order for him to be able to receive his salary at that time or was it for

24 another reason, but I claim with full responsibility from the month of

25 May he was not a member of either the reserve force, or of the special

Page 7559

1 unit, or of anything else.

2 Q. Okay. I think your position on that issue is quite clear now.

3 Would -- while the Susica camp was open, would the police still

4 patrol the Susica area?

5 A. That stems from the organisation and the Rules of Service of the

6 police. Namely, the police worked upon the principle of sector patrols.

7 Every chief of a patrol sector had the task to follow the security

8 situation in his respective sector, meaning that the chief of the patrol

9 sector and the policeman in the patrol in charge of that particular area

10 would occasionally drop in on the guards and inquire about the matters

11 which are within police competence; namely, whether there were any

12 problems, whether they had any information that some attacks had

13 happened, that people were not assembling around the camp, or information

14 to that effect. That was all -- that was in the remit of the police.

15 Q. And if there was a person held at Susica camp that the police

16 needed to interview, they're able to bring those persons to the police

17 station to interview them?

18 A. Only according to a request and a permit issued by the competent

19 authority in charge of the collection centre which later was a camp.

20 Q. Yesterday, you testified that Bosniaks left the municipality in

21 large numbers after the take-over of the municipality. By August, let's

22 say, how many Muslims remained in Vlasenica?

23 This will lead to a question that will directly relate to

24 cross-examination, if I may ask this foundational question.

25 By August?

Page 7560

1 A. By August, I cannot tell you the exact number, but let's say

2 about 30 per cent.

3 Q. Just to clarify, 30 per cent of the Muslim population remained or

4 had left?

5 A. Remained. It is a relevant figure, but approximately so.

6 Q. And this is the question that comes out of cross-examination:

7 There was a lot of talk about the paramilitaries and all these operations

8 to contain them, to expel them from the municipality, or incorporate them

9 into the VRS. Can you tell us, were the paramilitaries -- what were they

10 doing to the Serbian population that was in Vlasenica? Were they causing

11 any problems with the Serbian population?

12 A. Yes, they were. It would happen, for example, that they would

13 disturb the public law and order by shooting, by throwing grenades, by

14 barging into people's flats. When they were no longer interested in

15 Bosniak flats and houses, they would break into Serb houses and flats,

16 and different forms of looting is also what they did, plunder. They

17 created problems of all sorts. Namely, they created problems for

18 everyone.

19 Q. Final topic with regard to the Yellow Wasps.

20 During your interview last year, would you agree that without the

21 Prosecution Office asking you a particular question regarding this event,

22 that you told us about Minister Stanisic coming through Vlasenica and you

23 speaking to his driver about what happened to Minister Stanisic at the

24 hands of the Yellow Wasps?

25 A. Yes, but now, in hindsight, taking into account the time distance

Page 7561

1 of some 18 years, and taking into account that I already said yesterday

2 that we did not have -- that we had less communication with Sarajevo than

3 in peacetime, I did not know those guys. It is true that this lad came,

4 and you saw that I actually had mistaken their identity -- I mean, their

5 names, but, anyway, this lad came and he said that an action was in the

6 offing, that was under preparation, and that they had problems in Zvornik

7 with the Yellow Wasps. Within that framework and a series of incidents

8 that I already was aware of, and I have already said that anyone had to

9 pass through Vlasenica, anyone going from Pale to Sarajevo, and people

10 had already complained that they had been looted, their cars and

11 valuables seized and robs, and other problems as well. I knew that a few

12 days particular that, Minister Ostojic had also had a problem. So this

13 man, when he came, he said -- this lad, Even Minister Stanisic has had a

14 problem. An action is being prepared to break up these groups. I didn't

15 want to tell him that I was already aware, that already "au courant" with

16 all these activities, but I told him that I would be only too happy to

17 help disband -- these paramilitary units and for somebody to put an end

18 to their activities, and for them to see that they cannot go on doing

19 what they were doing, and that they would have to either join the army or

20 disband. That is the gist of that matter.

21 Q. And with regard to your interview last year, do you agree that

22 you told us, again without being prompted, that the person -- the driver

23 that you spoke to was by the name of Malovic, and this young man got

24 killed later on in Belgrade?

25 A. They actually mixed up the names of these lads. But as

Page 7562

1 Minister Stanisic had also his second term, this other lad was part of

2 his security guard during his second term in 1993 or 1994. That's why I

3 mixed them up. In 1992, a certain Goran Abazovic, whom I personally

4 know, was part of his security detail, and this other guy whom I don't

5 personally know, and that's how I got things mixed up. So Malovic was

6 part of Minister Stanisic's bodyguards in 1993 or 1994, and later, as far

7 as I know, he got killed somewhere in Belgrade or in Serbia.

8 MR. OLMSTED: No further questions, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Witness, we thank you for your assistance to the

10 Tribunal. You are now released, and we wish you a safe journey back to

11 your home. Thank you.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 [The witness withdrew]

14 JUDGE HALL: And with that, we take the adjournment. We resume

15 in this courtroom at 2.15 on Monday afternoon.

16 I wish everyone a safe weekend. Thank you.

17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.41 a.m.,

18 to be reconvened on Monday, the 15th day of March,

19 2010, at 2.15 p.m.