(Exclusively for the use of the media. Not an official document)

MO/1137e annex

Mr. President,
Excellencies,

It is an honour to be given the opportunity to report once more to the Council. Appearing in front of the Council is an important duty and a good opportunity to report on the completion strategy, This time, however, I believe it is essential to also seek fresh guidance on fundamental issues of the completion strategy. Namely, a strong message is needed from the Council in relation to the fugitives, especially Karadžić and Mladić. And that message should be that their trial can begin in The Hague at any time until 2010, and a mechanism will be established for them to be tried in The Hague after that date.

Since my last assessment, in June, my Office has been working productively with the Chambers to speed up trials while trying to maintain the highest standards of fair trial and due process. The transfer of cases to the domestic jurisdiction has also continued to progress well. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1503, my Office proposed to the Chambers the referral of all cases involving mid- and lower-level accused. In one case, Dragomir Milošević, the referral bench denied the prosecution’s motion on the ground that the accused was too senior to fit in that category. Therefore, I believe we have reached the limits in this matter and, unless the Security Council modifies the seniority conditions under which an accused can be transferred to local courts, there is no legal possibility to transfer more cases. The remaining cases all involve the most senior leaders responsible for the most serious crimes.

Following my initiative to join cases involving similar crimes, two further multiple-accused cases have opened in The Hague in July. One case concerns the Srebrenica genocide with seven accused, all former senior aides to Ratko Mladić. It is very unfortunate that Mladić himself could not be tried with his close associates. The other case involves six top political and military leaders from Serbia for their role in the crimes committed in Kosovo. A seventh accused, Vlastimir Đjorđjević, should also be present at this trial. His last known whereabouts were in Russia. In total, we have 24 individuals on trial at present, the largest number of accused on trial at any one time in the Tribunal’s history.

More written evidence has been admitted in trials. As a consequence, we have been able to limit the time allocated to the examination-in-chief of prosecution witnesses to a minimum. In a large scale trial of six accused, for instance, the prosecution has used an average of roughly two court hours per witness, but less than half an hour for crime-base witnesses, which is extremely efficient by any standard. In several trials, the Chambers have also accepted via judicial notice a higher number of facts established in previous trials. These facts, therefore, do not need to be proven again.

When directed by the Trial Chambers, I have acted in a cooperative spirit to select the counts on which to proceed, for instance in the Perišić and Dragomir Milošević cases. My office has also reacted in a helpful way to the directions by the Chambers on time limits set for the presentation of the prosecution case. As long as the measures taken to increase the efficiency of trials do not undermine the prosecution case or the rights of the victims, I will be willing to go along with them.

I wish nevertheless to draw the attention of the Council to some negative reactions from victims’ groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I forwarded to the Presidency of the Council a letter from the Association “women-victims of war” from Sarajevo. I have received more such letters in the mean time. On 30 November, I met victims’ groups in Sarajevo. Many of them are bitter about the completion strategy, because they believe all high-level cases, including of course Karadžić and Mladić, must be tried in The Hague. Furthermore, they do not understand why some crimes should be removed from indictments. They see the Tribunal as a promise of justice and as a concrete sign that the international community cares about their sufferings. They find it profoundly unjust to envisage closing the Tribunal before it has successfully completed its task. Of course, Karadžić and Mladić are in their minds as the two individuals most responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no other place than The Hague to try them.

While the judicial authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and in Serbia have stepped up their efforts to try war crimes, the political bodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia have not shown the political will necessary to arrest the remaining fugitives. I have explained to the Council in previous presentations the reasons why, in my assessment, six accused are still at large. I will come back to this issue more extensively in the course of my next assessment, which will also be my last one.

Over the past six months, Serbia has been busy working out a so-called action plan to capture the remaining fugitives. This initiative has thus far proven to be just another smokescreen. Since I took office in 1999, I have been confronted with the same reality: none of the successive Serbian governments was truly willing to arrest Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. It has now come to light that most of the detailed information I was passing to the highest Serbian officials back in 2001 and 2002 was accurate, but these officials, some of whom still hold key positions today, were simply pretending my information was wrong. However, history now shows that my information was indeed correct. In 2002, the then President himself signed the decision on the retirement of General Mladić. Therefore, despite his denials at the time, he knew perfectly well that Mladić was sheltered by the army as I was telling him. My assessment remains that the Serbian Government could easily arrest Ratko Mladić should the authorities want to do it. It is simply a question of political will.

There are many reasons why democratically-elected leaders pretending to show the utmost respect for the rule of law have been protecting persons indicted for genocide for so long. I will not elaborate on this further at this stage. But the wilful failure of Serbia to cooperate with my Office, and in particular to arrest and transfer Karadžić and Mladić, is a demonstration of utmost disrespect towards thousands and thousands of mainly Muslim, but also Croat and other non-Serb victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina that is likely to impact on the relations between the various communities within the region for decades. The only way to remove that stain would be for Serbia to arrest and transfer Karadžić and Mladić immediately.

The situation is not much more favourable in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There, the central institutions are not working efficiently and the authorities of the Serb entity, despite some recent improvements, have not shown so far a robust willingness to arrest Radovan Karadžić and Stojan Župljanin. They are the fugitives who are the most likely to be in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both at the central and at the entity level, key institutions remain staffed with individuals who used to be and maybe are still closely connected to Karadžić and his network. As long as Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina do not cooperate fully with my Office, and with each other, the two most important indictees will continue to escape justice, thus affecting the completion strategy.

Mr. President,

Within the limits set by the interests of justice, my Office is doing its utmost to meet the objectives of the completion strategy. However, unless the Security Council allows the transfer of more accused, we will not be able to achieve the target date of 2008. Furthermore, we have already missed the opportunity to try Karadžić and Mladić with other accused. Strong incentives must remain in place for Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to fully cooperate with my Office. The European Union has been a key partner over the past years. Nineteen out of the 24 accused currently on trial were transferred to The Hague as a direct result of the European Union’s policy of conditionality. I trust the EU will remain a reliable supporter of the ICTY. Despite its clear failure to capture Karadžić and Mladić, NATO over the years has provided a useful political support to the Tribunal. The recent decision by NATO to allow Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia into the Partnership for Peace, however, is a powerful signal that the international support for the Tribunal is decreasing.

Therefore, I wish to request the Security Council to say whether, as some permanent members stated in the past, it considers that the ICTY should stay open until Karadžić and Mladić are tried in The Hague. This is very important for the tens of thousands of victims who have placed their hope in the justice provided by the United Nations. They have the right to know whether they can still count on the promises made by the Security Council when it created the Tribunal thirteen years ago. As we are all aware, many victims have the perception that the United Nations abandoned the so-called safe areas to the troops of Karadžić and Mladić. Let us not, by our actions, give them further reason to feel that the United Nations – and the Security Council - did not do everything in their power to ensure that the most responsible accused are brought to justice.

These are not easy words. And there are not easy times in front of us. But there are steps that can be taken. First, as indicated, the Council must consider changing the conditions under which an accused can be transferred so that, if necessary, the Tribunal can meet its objectives in time. Second, the political will to arrest remaining fugitives must be strengthened. And third, the Council must confirm that there remains the possibility for the Tribunal to continue its mandate until such time as fugitives such as Karadžić and Mladić are brought to trial.

The full and forceful support of the Security Council for the Tribunal needs to be expressed now. Strong messages must be passed to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina so that they finally deliver the fugitives from justice, especially Karadžić and Mladić. Clear guidance must be provided to us, so that we can complete our mandate in a dignified and successful manner.

Thank you.