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Wolfgang Petritsch describes a conversation he had with Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade on 22 March 1999, a few hours before NATO began its bombing campaign:
"Mr. Milošević seemed to me very aloof and not engaged in this issue. My impression in the course of these talks was that he had already made up his mind basically and was not really listening."
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"[Russian moderator to the Rambouillet and Paris peace negotiations Boris] Maiorsky made an attempt [to restart the negotiations] … by proposing to President Milošević ...: “Mr. Milošević, what would you say if we would reopen the whole agreement and start negotiating from the outset?”
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"And even in this situation, Mr. Milošević did not really react in a positive way. He was rather kind of saying, “Well, if you want, you can”, something like this. He did not feel that he had a role in this."
Wolfgang Petritsch describes a conversation that he had with Serbian Parliament Vice-President Vladimir Štambuk, a close associate of Slobodan Milošević, during the peace negotiations in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999.
Mr. [Vladimir] Štambuk basically said well -- that if there is bombing of [Yugoslavia] -- then it will -- this will mean a massacre in Kosovo. And of course it was -- I was quite impressed, to say the least, by this. It was very clear to me that he was referring to a massacre on the part of the Yugoslav army or MUP [the Interior Ministry] on the Kosovo Albanians.
… [S]ince I was taken aback very much and shocked in a way, I did not further elaborate, but it left in me the distinct impression that there was a clear view, at least with Mr. Štambuk, [of] what would happen if there would be a war or bombing happening in Kosovo.
During his Yugoslav diplomatic engagements, Wolfgang Petritsch worked closely with a number of leading Serb politicians, including Slobodan Milošević. Petritsch possessed an excellent understanding of the workings of the Serb leadership and Milošević’s political dealings. In his testimony, he gave evidence that showed that Milošević controlled and influenced a number of the highest-level Serbian politicians.
As the European Union’s chief negotiator, Petritsch played a leading role in the peace negotiations between the Yugoslav government and Kosovo Albanian leaders in Rambouillet in February 1999 and Paris in March 1999. Those talks were the international community’s last-ditch effort to conclude a settlement to defuse the crisis in Kosovo. The conference failed as the Serbian side refused to sign the agreement drafted by the international community, opposing a NATO presence on Kosovo territory. Although the Albanians signed the agreement, Petritsch testified that they also remained dissatisfied with the foreseen degree of Serb control over the province.
Petritsch underlined that although Slobodan Milošević was not present during the conference, the Yugoslav negotiating team regularly consulted with him. Petritsch claimed that all developments during the talks - both the first positive signs of cooperation, and then the Yugoslav side’s ultimate backtracking - were determined by Milošević. In Petritsch’s words: “It was expressed to me by the negotiators on several occasions that this we cannot decide there. We have to ask - it was made reference to asking President Milošević whether this is possible or not possible. So it evolved a very distinct and clear pattern that the mandate was with the negotiators, the expertise was with the negotiators, but in the end, the political decision to accept any agreement rests with President Milošević.”
Petritsch described that the first part of the conference was held in Rambouillet and was ended by a broad political agreement, including the agreement for the existence of an “international presence” in Kosovo. Petritsch claimed that the understanding was that the international presence meant the military presence of NATO, which as Petritsch told one of the Yugoslav negotiators was necessary in order to demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army. Since this was the most sensitive part of the negotiating process, the parties adjourned for three weeks for consultations at home, to return to the table on 15 March 1999 in Paris.
Before that, on 8 March 1999, Petritsch and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer went to Belgrade to meet Milošević. Petritsch claimed that his impression was that, “somehow dawning on the horizon was a total change of attitude,” and that Milošević was not interested in further negotiations or any kind of agreement. Petritsch’s conclusion was that for some reason Milošević must have changed his mind in the meantime.
This was confirmed during the Paris talks, which “were not negotiations any longer. It was just done in a very accusatory verbal way. They [referring to the Yugoslav delegation] backtracked.” According to Petritsch, it was Milošević who advised them not to achieve a positive outcome.
Petritsch and two of his international colleagues went to speak directly to Milošević in Belgrade on 22 March 1999. They warned him that if the talks failed, NATO would start its military campaign. Petritsch testified that Milošević did not seem interested in reviving the talks, even when the Russian representative proposed to put everything aside and make a clean start of new negotiations. NATO began its bombing campaign on 24 March 1999.
Wolfgang Petritsch, a career diplomat, held various posts in the Austrian Foreign Ministry before becoming Austria's Ambassador to Belgrade and EU envoy to the Rambouillet and Paris peace negotiations. He later became the international community's High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, at the time of his testimony, was Austria's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva.
Wolfgang Petritsch testified on 2 July 2002. Read his full testimony.